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CONTENTS.

No. XLIII.—JANUARY 1863.

Article	Page
I. READJUSTMENT OF CHRISTIANITY, . . .	1
II. HIPPOLYTUS'S HOMILY AGAINST NOETUS, . . .	65
III. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED EXAMINED, . . .	77
IV. THEORIES OF THE LORD'S DAY—DOMINICAL AND SABBATARIAN,	93
V. THE GREEK TESTAMENT OF WEBSTER AND WILKINSON, . . .	117
VI. THE REVISION OF THE PRAYER BOOK, . . .	141
VII. LITERATURE OF PASCAL'S THOUGHTS, . . .	152
VIII. THE MATTER OF PROPHECY,	168
IX. MR RUSSELL'S LETTER TO THE BISHOP OF OXFORD, . . .	184
X. DR CUNNINGHAM'S HISTORICAL THEOLOGY, . . .	198
XI. FOREIGN THEOLOGICAL REVIEWS, . . .	209
1. Theologische Studien und Kritiken, Heft 4, . . .	209
2. Zeitschrift für die Historische Theologie, Heft 4, . . .	209
3. Zeitschrift für die gesammte Lutherische Theologie, 8 and 4 Quartal Heft,	209
4. Jahrbucher für Deutsche Theologie, Heft 3, . . .	209
5. Theologische Zeitschrift, by Dieckhoff and Kliefoth, . . .	209
6. Theologische Studien und Kritiken, Heft 1, . . .	210
7. Zeitschrift für die Historische Theologie, by Dr Niedner, Heft 1, . . .	210
FRENCH THEOLOGICAL REVIEWS.	
1. Revue Chrétienne,	210
2. Le Chrétien Evangélique,	210
AMERICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEWS for 1862.	
1. The Princeton Review for July and October, . . .	210

Article	Page
2. American Theological Review for July and October, .	210
3. The Presbyterian Quarterly Review for October, .	211
XII. CRITICAL NOTICES,	211
The Revised Translation of the New Testament, with a Notice of the Principal Various Readings. By the Rev. H. Highton, M.A., late Principal of Cheltenham College, and Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford,	211
Notes on the Gospels, Critical and Explanatory. By M. C. Jacobus, Professor of Biblical Literature,	212
A Paraphrase of the Book of the Prophet Isaiah. By J. C. Whish, M.A., with Notes from various sources,	212
Institutes of the Christian Religion, by John Calvin. A New Translation. By Henry Beveridge, Esq,	212
The Christian Verity Stated, a Summary of Trinitarian Doctrine. By Walter Chamberlain, M.A, Incumbent of St John's, Bolton-le-Moors,	212
A Review of the Baptismal Controversy. By J. B. Mozley, B.D., Vicar of Old Shoreham, late Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford,	213
Christian Faith : its Nature, Object, Causes, and Effects. By John H. Godwin.	214
History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ. By Dr Dorner,	214
Great Missionaries. By Rev. Dr A. Thomson,	214
What hinders? A Sermon preached in Surrey Chapel before the Directors and Friends of the London Missionary Society, May 14. 1862. By Rev. Dr Andrew Thomson, Edinburgh,	214
The Missionary Life and Labours of Francis Xavier, taken from his own Correspondence, with a Sketch of Romish Missions among the Heathen. By Henry Venn, B.D.,	216
The Three Marys. By the Rev. A. Moody Stuart, author of the "Exposition of the Song of Solomon,"	216
From the Cradle to the Crown : or Days with Jesus. By the Rev. John Hunter, late of Halifax, N. S.,	216
The Risen Redeemer ; the Gospel History from the Resurrection to the Pentecost. By F. W. Krummacher, D.D. Translated from the German by John T. Betts, with the sanction of the author,	217
The Sympathy of Christ with Man ; its Teaching and its Consolation. By Octavius Winslow, D.D.,	217
Freedom and Happiness in the Truth and Ways of Christ. By the Rev. James Stratten, more than forty years Minister of Paddington Chapel,	217
Nichol's Standard Divines.—Goodwin's Works, Vol. IV. Commentary on the Second Epistle of Peter, by Thomas Adams,	217
My Country. The History of the British Isles. By E. S. A. Edited by Rev. J. H. Broome, Vicar of Houghton, Norfolk,	217
Calvin, his Life, his Labours, and his Writings. Translated from the French of Felix Bungener,	218
Mick Tracy, the Irish Scripture Reader ; or the Martyred Convert and the Priest. A Tale of Facts, by W. A. C.,	218
Convent Life in Italy. By Algernon Taylor,	218
English Nonconformity. By Robert Vaughan, D.D.,	218

No. XLIV.—APRIL 1863.

Article	Page
I. DR HICKOK'S PHILOSOPHY,	221
II. REMARKS ON THE FOREGOING AND OTHER RECENT VINDICATIONS OF DR HICKOK'S PHILOSOPHY,	237
III. THE RELATION OF ADAM TO HIS POSTERITY,	252
IV. LAWS OF MORAL INFLUENCE,	260
V. DR PRIESTLEY,	275
VI. MISSIONARY WORK AT MADRAS—ANDERSON AND JOHNSTON,	302
VII. DORNER ON THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD,	348
VIII. RECENT ATTACKS ON THE PENTATEUCH—DAVIDSON AND COLENSO,	377
IX. RUDELBACH ON INSPIRATION,	409
X. CRITICAL NOTICES,—	440
Letters of Samuel Rutherford, with Biographical Sketches of his Correspondents. Edited by Rev. Andrew A. Bonar, Glasgow, Lectures on the Epistles of Paul to the Thessalonians. By John Lillie, D.D, First Presbyterian Minister, Kingston, N. Y.,	440
Brief Historical Explanation of the Revelation of St John, accord- ing to the Horæ Apolyptics of Mr Elliott. By H. C. Tucker, Bengal Civil Service,	441
The Redeemer: a Series of Sermons on certain aspects of the Person and Work of our Lord Jesus Christ. By William Robinson Clerk, M.A., Vicar of Taunton,	441
The Argument of St Paul's Epistle to the Christians in Rome traced and illustrated. By the Rev. C. P. Shepherd, M.A., Incumbent of South Lambeth Chapel,	441
Life in Heaven. By the Author of "Heaven our Home" and "Meet for Heaven,"	442
Old Friends, and what became of them. By the Rev. J. B. Owen, M.A., Incumbent of St Jude's, Chelsea,	442
The More Excellent Way; or, Links in Love's Chain,	442
Ulrich von Hutten, Imperial Poet and Orator. Translated from Chaufour-Kestner's "Études sur les Réformateurs Du 16me Siecle," By Archibald Young, Esq., advocate,	443
A History of the Christian Church from the Nativity of our Lord to the Reign of Constantine. By the late Ebenezer Soper,	443
A Reply to the Strictures of the Rev. J. H. Hinton, M.A., on some Passages in Lectures on Christian Faith. By John H. Godwin,	443
The Exodus of Israel: its Difficulties Examined, and its Truths Confirmed, with a Reply to Recent Objections. By the Rev. T. R. Birks, M.A., Rector of Kelshall,	444

No. XLV.—JULY 1863.

Article	Page
I. CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA AND HIS APOLOGETIC,	445
II. DR NICHOLAS MURRAY,	466
III. THE TRUE PLACE OF MAN IN ZOOLOGY,	478
IV. POLITICS AND THE PULPIT,	504
V. THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF GENEVA,	516
VI. REVISION OF THE AUTHORISED VERSION OF SCRIPTURE —ST JOHN'S GOSPEL,	581
VII. BADEN POWELL ON MIRACLES,	557
VIII. POLAND: HER RELIGIOUS HISTORY AND PROSPECTS,	571
IX. LIFE OF PROFESSOR ROBERTSON,	588
X. THE SCEPTICISM OF SCIENCE,	614
XI. BIBLICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE,	641
XII. FOREIGN THEOLOGICAL JOURNALS FOR 1863,	651
Zeitschrift für die Historische Theologie. Jahrgang 1863,	651
Zeitschrift für die gesammte Lutherische Theologie und Kirche. 1863.—Zweites Quartalheft,	652
Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie, herausgegeben, von Dr Liebner in Dresden, Dr Dörner in Berlin, &c.,	652
XIII. CRITICAL NOTICES,	658
Small sins. By the Rev. Alexander Balloch Grosart, First United Presbyterian Church, Kinross,	658
The Divine Human in the Scriptures. By Tayler Lewis,	656
What is Sabbath-Breaking? A Discussion occasioned by the proposal to open the Botanical Gardens of Edinburgh on Sunday Afternoons,	657
Academic Addresses on Various Occasions. By W. D. Killen, D.D.,	659
The Standard of the Cross among the Flags of the Nations; a Narrative of Christian Effort in the Great Exhibition. By V. M. S.,	659
The Book of Bible Prayer; containing all the Prayers recorded to have been offered in the Bible, with a Short Introduction to each. By John B. Marsh, Manchester,	659
Extra Work of a London Pastor,	660
Christ on Earth, from the Supper at Bethany to his Ascension into Glory. By the Rev. Joseph Baylee, D.D., Principal of St Aidan College, Birkenhead,	660
The Kingdom and the People; or the Parables of our Lord Jesus Christ explained. With a Preface by the Rev. Edward Garbett, M.A., Incumbent of St Bartholomew's, Gray's Inn Road,	660

Article	Page
The Messianic Prophecies of Isaiah; the Donnellan Lecture for 1862, with Appendices and Notes, &c. By William De Burgh, D.D.,	661

No. XLVI.—OCTOBER 1863.

I. THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY,	663
II. THE PERFECTION OF CHRIST'S HUMANITY,	681
III. FATHER LACORDAIRE,	722
IV. DÖLLINGER ON "THE CHURCH AND THE CHURCHES,"	740
V. WHEATELY'S PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION,	765
VI. DATE OF THE BOOKS OF CHRONICLES,	783
VII. SLAVERY AND THE BIBLE,	801
VIII. MEXICO, ANCIENT AND MODERN,	824
IX. PLATO AND CHRIST,	845
X. LIFE OF DR LEIFCHILD,	874
XI. BIBLICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE,	886
XII. CRITICAL NOTICES,	891
The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua Critically Examined. By the Right Rev. John William Colenso, D.D., Bishop of Natal. Part III.,	891
The Gospel of the Pentateuch. A set of Parish Sermons. By the Rev. O. Kingsley, F.L.S., F.G.S., &c. With a Preface. Published by request,	893
Ulrich Von Hutten, Imperial Poet and Orator; the Great Knightly Reformer of the 16th Century. Translated from Chauffour-Kestner's Etudes sur les Réformateurs du 16me Siecle. By Archibald Young, Esq., advocate,	894
Songs of the Covenant Times. By an Ayrshire Minister,	896
Footprints of the Holy Dead. Translations from the German. By A. M.,	896
The Principles of Christian Union laid down in the Word of God. By the Rev. William White, Haddington,	896

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

JANUARY 1863.

ART. I.—*Readjustment of Christianity.**

1. *Recent Inquiries in Theology, by eminent English Clergymen; being "Essays and Reviews."* Third American, from the second London edition. With an Appendix. Edited, with an Introduction, by Rev. FREDERICK H. HEDGE, D.D. Boston: Walker, Wise, & Co. 1861.
2. *Tracts for Priests and People.* By various Writers. Boston: Walker, Wise, & Co. 1862.
3. *Aids to Faith; a Series of Theological Essays.* By several Writers. Being a Reply to "Essays and Reviews." Edited by WILLIAM THOMPSON, D.D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1862.
4. *Replies to "Essays and Reviews."* By the Rev. C. E. M. GOULBURN, D.D.; Rev. H. J. BOSE, B.D.; Rev. C. A. HEURTLEY, D.D.; Rev. W. J. IRONS, D.D.; Rev. G. ROBINSON, M.A.; Rev. A. W. HADDAN, B.D.; Rev. CHR. WORDSWORTH, D.D. With a Preface by the LORD BISHOP OF OXFORD, &c. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1862.
5. *Bunsen's Biblical Researches.*
6. *The Westminster Review.*

THERE has never been a period in the world when the men who, by talent, learning, or position, have it in their power to form public opinion on great questions of morals and religion, had a more important work to perform than now. The old opinions which have so long influenced mankind are to be adjusted to this age. Opinions and doctrines are of importance, not merely as they are in themselves, but as they are adjusted to an existing order of things; as they displace old customs, opinions, and laws, and introduce new ones; as they convulse

* This article, from the pen of the Rev. Albert Barnes, appeared in the July number (1862) of the *Presbyterian Quarterly Review* (American).—Ed. B. & F. E. R.

an age by violence, or influence it in a gentle manner ; as they retard the movements of society, or help it on in its developments. Opinions and doctrines are not lifeless things. Creeds in religion and philosophy, however abstract they may be, are not like well-arranged specimens, duly labelled, in a cabinet of minerals ; or like stuffed birds and animals ; or like fossil geological specimens in an academy of natural sciences. They are like the sunlight and the dew ; the wind and the storm the vital forces moving through nature, and forming the living specimens of mosses and ferns, of animalculæ and worms, of trees and fishes, of birds and men of any single generation.

In every new age there is some modification to be made of old opinions and doctrines on all subjects. New facts are discovered ; new thoughts are stricken out by some mind of uncommon power ; old opinions and doctrines are seen to be erroneous, in whole or in part, and are to be modified so as to be brought into conformity to truth, or to be suffered to pass away altogether. The world drops them in its progress, or reconstructs and readjusts them. There are few doctrines in the world now which are precisely like the opinions held by the sages of Greece ; there are few which are precisely like those of the Hebrew prophets ; there are few which could be expressed accurately in the formulas which would have been used by the schoolmen in the middle ages, or which were used by the leaders in the Protestant Reformation. The old books of geography, of philosophy, of medicine, of anatomy, of astronomy, of chemistry, have passed away, and are referred to only as marking historic periods, not as accurate statements of science ; the present age, in its progress, an everflowing stream, is leaving multitudes of treatises in mental philosophy, and even in theology, where the works of Galen and Hippocrates are in respect to medicine ; of Strabo and Mela in respect to geography ; of Ptolemy in respect to astronomy.

The readjustment of opinions and doctrines may be accomplished silently, or it may be by violence. Most of the changes in nature are so silent as to be unobserved at the time, caused by the sunlight, by gentle seasons, by the dew, and by the mild falling rain ; but deluges, earthquakes, and storms, are employed, also, in the adjustments of nature, and in the revolutions of things. Most of the changes in the old geological periods of the earth were made by violent convulsions ; not a few such occur even amidst the movements of a more advanced and settled order of things.

In most changes, whether violent or mild, there is a *shock*, greater or less, to the existing order of things. A machine may be made to move with almost no jar or perceptible friction, but a change, introducing a new principle, can be introduced

only by a readjustment, and not always without peril to the existing arrangements. In religion, great changes may be introduced by the quiet development of thought ; in morals, by carefully adjusting new principles to the old system ; in politics, by a change quite in accordance with constitutional principles, as changes in the world of nature are made by sunlight and dew ; but changes on each of these subjects *may* be made by violent agitation of the public mind, as in the "Reformation" in religion, or by revolutions in politics, as changes are made in nature by earthquakes and storms. But even when most quietly made—when most entirely in accordance with settled laws and constitutional principles, they do not often occur without a shock, more or less severe, to the very constitution of things themselves. A few amendments to the Constitution of the United States have been made in a way entirely constitutional, and with no perceptible shock ; not many more could be made now, even for the purpose of adjusting it to the existing state of things in our country, without peril to the Constitution itself, and to all the great interests which it was framed to protect. As if the framers of the Constitution foresaw that changes in future times must be made ; as if they foresaw that they would be made by the violence of revolution, if provision was not made for a peaceful adjustment of our institutions to what might be the state of things in future years ; as if they hoped that, by quiet and constitutional changes made from time to time, all such peril of revolution might be avoided, they incorporated into the instrument itself an arrangement for such a peaceful change, and up to a recent period our land has been a land of peace, while it has been eminently a land of development and progress, under these constitutional arrangements. Whether such changes could now be made, however, as are demanded in the progress of things, after the lapse of the greater part of a century in the most remarkable period of the world for progress, without convulsion, revolution, and ruin to the existing order of things, is **THE** great question which is to be settled at the present time.*

No provisions for amendments and readjustment, applicable to all cases it would seem, could be made in the operations of nature ; none, it would seem, could be introduced into the church—into Christianity. Nature could not be made to work so quietly and calmly, that storms and tempests, earthquakes and wars, could be dispensed with ; and the Church could not be so framed that the great changes which might be demanded, to adjust it to an existing state of things in future times, could be accomplished without such convulsions as occurred in the transition from Judaism to Christianity—from paganism, in the Roman empire, to the establishment of the gospel—from

the dominion of the papacy, in later times, to the prevalence of the doctrines of the Protestant Reformation.

The men who are the authors of the first work whose title we have placed at the head of this article—a work published in England, under the very general title of “*Essays and Reviews*,” and in our country, under the title of “*Recent Inquiries in Theology*,”—have addressed themselves, each one in his own sphere, without a previous understanding of the designs of the others, to the work of readjusting of Christianity, and of adapting it to the wants of this age. Their work is of the more importance, as it is the production of seven independent minds, without having associated together avowedly for the purpose; and since it happens that, when the results of their separate and independent thinking are brought together, they seem to form parts of one plan. The seven writers aim at one end; they pursue one mode of investigation; they see the same things to be accomplished; they have the same views of what is to be done, and they would reach the same result. The system which they would substitute in the place of that which has been received in the Church, and to which, as members of the Established Church of England, they have all expressed their assent, would be a system in itself, quite distinct from the existing system, and as homogeneous as if it had been the production of one mind. The volume, therefore, has this incidental importance, that it indicates an undercurrent of thought and feeling extensively pervading the public mind in the Established Church in England, if not in the religious mind of England generally, of which this book, or this collection of independent essays, is the exponent. There might be, from anything in the book itself, but slight cause of alarm, and it might have but a slight claim to public attention, if it were the production of one mind; its principal claim to attention is the fact that it is an indication of a wide-spread state of feeling and mode of reasoning which has found a simultaneous expression in this form.

The authors of the *Essays* are seven in number, all English “*Churchmen*,” and most of them occupying conspicuous stations. Two of them are professors in the University of Oxford; one is a professor in St David’s College in Wales; one is a successor of the late Dr Arnold, in the headship of Rugby School. The names of two others, Messrs Jowett and Rowland Williams, are known to not a few American readers in connection with a volume of “*Theological Essays*,” edited, four years since, by Professor Noyes of Cambridge University. One, the author of the first *Essay* in the book, the Rev. Frederick Temple, D.D., occupies the important position of Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen, as well as being Head Master

of Rugby School. And another, Baden Powell, Professor of Geometry in the University of Oxford, who has died since the "Essays" were first published, had secured a wide reputation, both as a man of science and of sacred learning. It is claimed of these men, in the edition of the work republished in this country, that these Essays "represent a new era in Anglican Theology. The topics here discussed are handled with a frankness, a breadth, and a spiritual heroism long unknown to ecclesiastical England. The sincerity which speaks in them recalls the better days of a church which, in catholic ages, and as a branch of catholic Christendom, could boast such names as John Scotus, Anselm, Duns, Alexander of Hales, and Roger Bacon, and which numbers a More and a Cudworth among her Protestant divines."*

The spirit and tendency of the *Essays*, and the importance to be attached to the labours of the "Essayists," in the estimation of the American editor, are expressed in the following language, in commending the work to the patronage and attention of the Christian public in this country:—

"The life of Anglican theology is now represented by such men as Powell, and Williams, and Maurice, and Jowett, and Stanley. Its strain and promise are apparent in these *Essays*."

"The term 'Broad Church' has been used to designate the new phase of ecclesiastical life, whose characteristics are breadth and freedom of view, an earnest spirit of inquiry and resolute criticism, joined to a reverent regard for ecclesiastical tradition and the common faith of mankind. The spirit of this theology is at once progressive and conservative; careful of all essential sanctities, careful also of the rights of the mind, of the interests of science and the 'liberty of prophesying'; carefully adjusting old views with new discoveries, transient forms with everlasting verities; regarding symbols and 'Articles' as servants of thought, not as laws of thought; as imperfect attempts to articulate truth, not as the measure and gauge of truth."

"Rationalistic it is, inasmuch as it is protestant; for of Rationalism, the only alternative is Rationalism. Yet assuming in Christianity itself the perfection of reason, and believing that the truest insight in spiritual things is where the human intellect, freely inquiring, encounters the Holy Ghost, and that such encounter is afforded by the gospel, it goes about to analyse and interpret, not to gainsay or destroy; reverently listening, if here and there it may catch some accents of the Eternal Voice amid the confused dialects of Scripture, yet not confounding the latter with the former; expecting to find in criticism, guided by a true philosophy, the key to revelation; in revelation, the sanction and condign expression of philosophic truth."—Pp. xiii. xiv.

* Introduction to the American Edition, p. x.

The titles of the articles in the volume are as follows : The Education of the World ; Bunsen's Biblical Researches ; The Study of the Evidences of Christianity ; The National Church ; The Mosaic Cosmogony ; Tendencies of Religious Thought in England ; and The Interpretation of Scripture.

It is not our purpose now to state the doctrines which are laid down in the volume on these subjects, or to examine the arguments by which they are supported. This would require much more space than could be devoted to the subject in the pages of a Review, and it is not necessary to our design. To some of those doctrines and arguments we shall have occasion to refer, as illustrating the point which we have indicated as the general subject of our Article, "The Readjustment of Christianity."

It will be seen, at once, from the bare enumeration of the titles of the articles, that they suggest the principal topics which have been brought into notice by the contact of Christianity with this age, or as it touches the principal points which constitute the characteristics of this age on physical science, mental philosophy, and religious thought. It is on these points mainly that Christianity *has* come into contact with this age ; it is here that the principal warfare in regard to the Bible is to be waged ; it is here eminently that those who are preparing to be the future defenders of Christianity are to be armed, if they are properly armed, for the work which they have to do in their generation. How much of Christianity is to be retained, as Christianity has been commonly understood ; how many of the older views, if any, on the past duration of the world, on inspiration, on the origin of the race, on the interpretation of the Bible, on the subject of miracles especially, are to be defended still, and to constitute *the* Christianity of future times ; how many, if any, of the views heretofore held in the church, and embodied in creeds and confessions, are to be *sloughed off* in the development of a purer and more healthful Christianity ; and, in the mean time, how much of obligation remains in regard to doctrines in the church, by those who have solemnly expressed their assent to articles framed in other times and now regarded as inconsistent with the real truth, are questions of great interest and of great importance in this age, and are likely to call forth more inquiry than any other subjects which occupy the attention of the religious world. The authors of these "Essays and Reviews" believe that great changes are to occur in these respects, and that the Christianity of future times will vary materially, on all the points above indicated, from the past ; and quite independently of each other, and yet by some pervading feeling in the religious community suggesting simultaneously the discussion of these topics, they have given them-

selves to the task of thus readjusting Christianity, or adapting it to the present age.

They are not alone. In almost every department of science and literature, contributions are furnished to the work. Our own country, in such works as those of Messrs Oliddon and Nott, we fear in some of the speculations of Agassiz, and in the works of the late Theodore Parker, is doing not a little in lending its aid to this undertaking; and if the warm commendation of the editor of the American edition, to which we have already adverted, be, as it may without unfairness be presumed to be, an expression of the prevailing feelings in the literary and scientific circles, especially connected with the Unitarian denomination in Boston and Cambridge, we may regard the positions taken in this volume as expressing views which Unitarians in our country wish to sustain and propagate, and as representing opinions which they themselves hold, and which they wish to commend to those connected with the church as the form of Christianity which they are to be exhorted to embrace under the readjustment of the system.

In the Established Church of England, also, it is known that these seven men are by no means alone in the effort to readjust the system of Christianity to the prevalent views of science and of mental philosophy. It is even alleged that the entire "Broad" Church party in the Established Church find in these views what substantially represents their own opinions, and that, although not formally and avowedly, yet they are really and practically fellow-labourers in the work of thus readjusting the Christian system, and adapting it to these times. A most malignant testimony in this respect, though, in the present instance, probably not wholly unjust, may be found in a work which we shall soon notice more particularly, the Westminster Review. It relates to the existing state of feeling in the Established Church, and the effect of the teaching of those who are represented in that church by such men as Mr Maurice, Mr Kingsley, and Mr Llewellynn Davies.*

* We copy a portion of this statement on this subject in the number for January 1862:—

"But the heresy which most frighten the representatives of the old theology exist within the church pale, and have a certain odour of sanctity, seeing that they are taught by men on whom the hands of the successors of the apostles have been laid. Mr Maurice is dangerous and heterodox, clearly unsound on the Trinity, though he defends the Athanasian creed, has Alexandrian notions about the Son of God rather than Anglican, has more faith in the heart and conscience than the Articles relating to natural depravity will warrant, and is altogether too charitable to believe in the perdition of the heathen or the everlasting ruin of anybody; but still he is an episcopally ordained clergyman, chaplain of Lincoln's Inn, and rector of St Peter's." Mr Kingsley's illogical humanity, and Mr Llewellynn Davies's mild doses of here-

Germany has, of course, furnished more labourers in the work of adjusting the Bible to the wants of the present age than any other nation. We are not insensible, we trust, to the obligations of sacred literature in this age to Germany. We are not about to indulge in any language of sweeping condemnation of the influence of German criticism on theological opinions. We should forget our own training, and the results of the studies of a life not now brief, if we refused, at any time, the tribute of a grateful expression of what we owe to German labour and patience, in the knowledge of the language of the Bible; in correct views of the principles of interpretation; in the means of illustrating the sacred volume; in the knowledge of words,

tical doctrine, in the sweet disguise of orthodox-sounding language, administer shocks of about equal force to different types of men. Muscular Christians would not complain if the new Professor of History at Cambridge were more careful to keep within the limits of the Prayer-book than he was about to do at Eversley. Hypatia was bad company for him, and the chartist and sceptical Alton Locke would corrupt the strictest rector in the Diocese of Exeter itself. The congregation of Christ church, Marylebone, may discover an unexpected coincidence between their minister's teachings and those of men who thirteen times a year are stated to perish everlastingly. He asserts that no doctrine of vicarious satisfaction is to be found in the Prayer-book, though he condescends not to prove it. Evangelical believers are led away by his evident earnestness and piety; and as much of the well-worn phraseology of the pulpit falls gratefully on their ears, they scarcely know it is prohibited music to which they listen, until they have become partners in guilt by applauding, and heard the warning howl of the watchful Cerberus outside. The 'Essays and Reviews' are both worse and better than all that have gone before. They are free from Mr Maurice's strange freaks of Biblical criticism, and are plain and comprehensible when he is confused and lost in a mud which he fondly imagines is a deep water. They are more scientific, thorough, and consistent, than Mr Kingsley, and set Mr Davies the brave example of dispensing with many forms of speech when they have long since parted with the meaning of them. But the Church of England, practically more catholic than its founders ever dreamt when they insisted on calling it the Holy Catholic Church, includes them all, and others also, whose name is legion. High, Low, Hard, and Broad sections find a home in it, manage to pronounce its Shibboleth with a correct accent, and to see their own theories in its Articles. The two former tilted at one another *à l'outrance* a few years back; and the third, indifferent to disputes about candlesticks and surplices, sneered at transcendentalism, and thought German decidedly the farthest removed of all the dialects of Babel from the primitive language of paradise. Now, the three make common cause against the fourth, and will permit nothing to be Anglican which is latitudinarian. And while the clergy are fighting, what are the laity doing? Is the beginning of the end coming for them, or are they content to listen to the clang of battle without taking part in it? So far as the thoughtful members of the working-classes are concerned, we propose to mention some facts and draw some inferences.

"The reputedly saving ideas of theology were long ago banished from literary and scientific minds. It may be that the ancient words are still occasionally uttered on the Sunday, but they mean no more than a modern song to Bacchus, or oath by Jove. When Humboldt significantly said that he was of the religion of all men of science, he was perhaps mistaken in imagining that all *Savans* were like himself. But, in the main, Biblical orthodoxy is as dead to them as it was to him."

and phrases, and customs, and laws, that tend to throw light on the sacred volume. Meagre and sad would have been all the attainments which a man could have made in sacred literature, in the age in which we have lived, if he had trusted to English or Scotch learning on these subjects. Except in the compilations of Thomas Hartwell Horne, of little original value—in the labours of Herbert Marsh, of real value—and in the more recent work of Conybeare and Howson, on the life of St Paul, the only very respectable contribution to sacred literature which England, with all its rich endowments in sacred learning, has produced in the present age, the British Isles have made no marked progress in sacred learning, and have produced little which the world “will not willingly let die.” It is to Germany that the world is indebted for the real progress which has been made in sacred learning in the nineteenth century.

But while such tributes are due to Germany by all who love sacred learning, it is not to be denied that no small part of the speculations of the German mind on subjects connected with revealed theology, and on subjects connected with mental philosophy, have tended to unsettle the faith of mankind in truths that were long regarded as established, and on points essential to the maintenance of faith in God, in his word, and in his providential and direct agency in human affairs. Not a little of that which threatens to shake the foundation of faith in England had come from ‘Christian’ Germany, not from ‘infidel’ France; no small part of that which has found an utterance in our own country in the writings of Theodore Parker and his fellow-labourers, is but a reproduction of what is found in German writers; and all, or nearly all, in the work before us, the “Recent Inquiries in Theology,” that has tended to shake the Anglican faith in the truths of revelation, is but an echo of sentiments uttered in Germany, and an illustration of a mode of thinking on sacred subjects, and dealing with established truths, derived from the land of Wolf, Hegel, and Kant.

Among the Germans who have done most to commend this mode of treating sacred subjects, and who have contributed most to unsettle the foundations of faith in England as it was held in the Reformation, as it is found in the Thirty-nine Articles, and as it has been maintained by the great body of the English people in the Establishment and among Dissenters, we are disposed to place the late Chevalier Bunsen. His rank, his talents, his statesmanship, his great learning, his remarkable social qualities, and his residence in England for a succession of years, gave him an influence there perhaps never before conceded to any literary foreigner. The effect of that influence is seen in some degree in the second article in the work

before us, entitled "Bunsen's Biblical Researches." The results of these "Researches," as stated in the article, and which are esteemed of so much value by the author of the article, the "Vice-Principal and Professor of Hebrew, St David's College, Lampeter," are said to be "that he has vindicated for the civilised kingdom of Egypt, from Menes downward, an antiquity of nearly four thousand years before Christ," (p. 61); that he "could not have vindicated the unity of mankind, if he had not asked for a *(vast) extension of time*, whether his petition of twenty thousand years," (which he actually did demand), "be granted or not," (p. 61, 62); that the traditions of Babylon, Sidon, Assyria, and Troy, are brought to illustrate and confirm, though to *modify our interpretation of Genesis*; "that is, that "our deluge takes its place among geological phenomena—no longer a disturbance of law *from which nature shrinks*, but a *prolonged play* of the forces of fire and water, rendering the primeval regions of North Asia uninhabitable, and urging the nations to new abodes," (p. 65, 66); that "in the *half-ideal, half-traditional* notices of the beginnings of our race, compiled in Genesis, we notice the combination of documents, and the recurrence of *barely consistent* genealogies," (p. 64); "that the *firmness* of Bunsen is shewn by his *relegating* the long lives of the first patriarchs to the domain of legend, or of symbolical cycle, conceiving that the historical portion begins with Abraham, when the lives became *natural*, and *information was nearer*," (p. 54); that "in the passage of the Red Sea the description may be interpreted *with the latitude of poetry*," (p. 65); that "our author believes St Paul *because* he understands him *reasonably*," (p. 93); that "he" (Bunsen) "could not state original sin *in so exaggerated a form* as to make the design of God altered by the first agents in his creation, or to destroy the notion of moral choice and the foundation of ethics;" and that "the fall of Adam represents with him, *ideally*, the circumscription of our spirits in limits of flesh and time, and practically the selfish nature with which we fell from the likeness of God, which should be fulfilled in man," (p. 98). The entire spirit of Bunsen's writings on theology is expressed by a question asked by himself, "*How long shall we bear this FICTION of an external revelation?*" (p. 103); to which, in the volume before us, the Rev. "Rowland Williams, D.D., Vice-Principal and Professor of Hebrew in St David's College, Lampeter," replies with the severe and withering rebuke, "*There are some who think his language too vehement FOR GOOD TASTE*," (p. 103)—a reply worthy of the best days of the martyrs.

Chevalier Bunsen was engaged, at the time of his death, in a work which he regarded as the principal work of his life, a

"Revised Bible for the People." This work, two parts of which only had appeared at the time of his death, and of which Alexander Humboldt said, "I have formed the highest opinion of his *Bibelwerk*," ("The Supernatural in Relation to the Natural," by Dr M'Cosh, p. 366), was designed to be a book to be read by "*the people*;"* that is, in a popular Commentary to convey down from the clouds of German rationalism to the common mind such views as those to which we have referred in the article of Dr Williams, and which are scattered abundantly in the "*Hippolytus*," and other writings of Bunsen. It was, *perhaps*, with reference to such an effect that Humboldt expressed his admiration of the "*Bibelwerk*," and it is this which gives so much point to a question by Dr M'Cosh, ("The Supernatural," &c., p. 366), "Was he (Humboldt) rejoicing because he saw that it would further very different ends from those contemplated by Bunsen?" Who can tell what the effect of a popular Commentary—a *Bibelwerk für die Gemeinde*—constructed on these principles, with the talent, the learning, and the fame of Bunsen; with the impression derived from the universal belief that he was a truly pious man—a belief which we are not disposed to call in question—would have had on the popular mind of Germany, and ultimately on the popular mind of England, where he was so well known, and so much beloved!

We cannot, therefore, regard the death of the Chevalier Bunsen, pure, and elevated, and learned as he was, as a calamity to the world. It is one of those cases where, in the language of Dr Goodell, missionary at Constantinople, though employed by him with a different significance from that which we give to the phrase, it is proper to say, "Let us arise, and give thanks to God that good men may die." For, the ground of rejoicing when a good man is taken from the earth, is not merely that he is redeemed and has gone to glory; not merely that another of our race has been rescued from sin, and death, and hell; not merely that another gem has been added to the Redeemer's crown, to sparkle there with increasing brilliancy for ever and ever; it is, not unfrequently, that a good man is removed from the world when, from some peculiarity of opinion and character, even in honest and well-meant efforts, he has been doing, and is doing, more harm than good; when a mingled power of good and evil is withdrawn from the world, in a case in which the good gives sanction to the evil, and in which the good that would be done would be more than overbalanced by the evil; or when a good man is embarked in an undertaking the end of which he cannot foresee, and when the

* *Bibelwerk für Gemeinde.*

ultimate results, if accomplished, would more than neutralise all the good which he has done in a long life. Indeed, it is a rare case in which the world does not gain *something* when a godly man dies. Few are the men whose character is such that their influence is wholly salutary and happy. Often, very often, it happens that a man who, on the whole, gives such evidence of piety that we cannot doubt that he has gone to heaven, holds such a form of belief, or is engaged in such plans, or by his position, wealth, rank, or learning, exerts such an influence that the church has little to hope from him except by his removal to heaven.

Such a man, eminently, was the Chevalier Bunsen. We cannot, we would not doubt that he was a good man; that he was sincere and honest in his convictions and in his aims. No one can doubt the reality of his great intellectual ability and his great learning. His rank, and his learning, and his high social qualities, as we have before remarked, fitted him to exert a wide influence over mankind. It is much, too, that he was free from the grosser forms of error which abound in the world, and especially in the circles in which he moved; much, that he placed himself on the side of religion in the view of the elevated ranks of life; much, that his name can never be appealed to in favour of open scepticism. But we should regard the completion of his "Biblework for the People," on the principles in which he commenced it, and which would have been continued if he had lived to carry it out to its completion, as one of the direst calamities which could have occurred to the world; for we can conceive of nothing more fitted to overthrow the foundations of faith among mankind than a commentary "for the people" on the Bible, with lax views of its inspiration, and with a practical and popular embodiment of the sentiments which are expressed in the volume before us. In fact, one of the most dangerous "Essays" in the volume is that of which his writings have been made the basis. Comparatively harmless will be that volume as a volume of "Essays and Reviews," alike in the Old World and the New, in the limited circulation which it will be likely to have, and in the existence to which it is destined; but no one can calculate what *would be* the influence of these sentiments if they were wrought into a popular commentary on the Bible, and if the Bible were to be explained on these principles.

Our judgment of the Chevalier Bunsen may seem to be harsh, and in some quarters will be set down undoubtedly as bigotry and uncharitableness. It will be charged on "orthodoxy" or Calvinism, as a proof of its dark and bitter spirit; of its want of sympathy with liberal views, with the progress of mankind, and with the age in which we live. Be it so. We

cannot help it if it is. But we are happy to confirm our view by the testimony of one who enjoyed an opportunity of forming an estimate of the character and influence of Chevalier Bunsen by a personal acquaintance with him; who had no prejudices to subserve; who was qualified and prepared to appreciate all that was noble, elevated, and pure in his character, and who, in recording the result of his impressions in regard to him, has uttered no word that tends to depreciate his character, or to do injustice to his great and generous qualities. We refer to Dr James Mc'Cosh, author of "The Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation;" "The Divine Moral Government, Physical and Moral;" and "The Supernatural in relation to the Natural."*

* In the Appendix to the last volume referred to, he has stated the impression which he derived from the "delightful intercourse" which he had with him "several hours every day for five successive days," in August 1858. From this, we make the following extracts:—

"He was now, in his retirement, to give to the world the views on all subjects, historical, philosophical, and theological, which had burst upon him in their freshness when he spent so many of his youthful years in Rome. I confess, however, that, deeply interested as I was in his speculations—as these came forth with such a warmth and radiance from his own lips—I had all the while an impression that he would require to live to an antediluvian age in order to commit all his theories to writing,—and also a very strong conviction that his views belonged to the past age rather than the present, and that some of them would not, in fact, promote the cause of religion which he had so much at heart. It ever came out that he drew no distinction between the natural and preternatural. He was a firm believer in meamerism and clairvoyance (in favour of them he mentioned some circumstances which seemed to me to have no evidential value), and was apt to connect them with the inspiration of the writers of the Bible."—Pp. 364, 365.

"On my reporting to Bunsen how kindly Humboldt had spoken of him, he said, 'I am bringing out a certain portion of my Bibelwerk before other parts which should come earlier, in order that it may fall under the eye of Humboldt ere he is removed from us.' The way he said this shewed the great love he had for Humboldt; and he intimated pretty plainly that he hoped the part of the Bibelwerk to which he referred might help to draw Humboldt towards deeper religious convictions."—P. 366.

"Whether any such end was accomplished, I have no means of knowing. I have doubts as to whether the means were fitted to attain the object fondly desired. For Bunsen was already in a very ambiguous position in his own country. Respected and beloved by all—except the enemies of civil and religious liberty—his speculations, philosophical or theological, carried, I found, very little weight in Germany. The great divines of the orthodox school, while they loved him for his piety, just regretted the more that in his opinions as to the authenticity and inspiration of the Old Testament he was adhering to views which had been very prevalent in the earlier part of the century, but had been for years abandoned by all who had given their attention to the subject. The Rationalists, who, in the days of their strength, had hated Bunsen for his warm evangelical piety, were rejoicing, now that the tide was against them, that they had in him an unconscious auxiliary in their work of undermining the inspiration of the Bible,—but they set no value whatever on his own speculations and opinions. His venerated name is being extensively used by the Rationalists of this country; it is right that they should know that he ever spoke of Rationalism in terms of strongest disapprobation and aver-

In noticing the efforts which are made to adjust Christianity to the present age, we cannot, of course, omit the influence of the *Westminster Review*. That periodical, not professedly religious, and not *openly* infidel; not connected with any ecclesiastical establishment, nor pledged to the particular support of any, and not avowedly arrayed against any; nor undertaken with a view to defend the Bible, and yet not pledged expressly or impliedly not to attack the Bible; projected apparently, and conducted with a purpose to represent the opinions of the age, and to record and help forward the progress of mankind, has, from the beginning, regarded with special interest the relation of Christianity to the world at the present time. Its aim is mainly scientific, rather than political; its purpose rather to record the bearings of the discoveries of science, and the progress of literature, than to contend on the arena of metaphysics or theology. It is not a work professedly of sacred criticism, and it looks at theological opinions only as they bear on the existing state of things:—on the modification of old opinions; on the changes which progress in sacred criticism and science seem to be compelling mankind to make in their religious views. It hails with delight *any* change which either criticism or science *compels* men to make, or which may be so employed by the conductors of that journal as to compel them to make in the religious opinions which have been cherished and held sacred for ages. There are, in that periodical, *two* departments which seem to command all the talent and learning which are employed in conducting the Review. The one is the body of the Review itself, where every thing that *science* can suggest is employed to undermine the foundations of faith, especially in those things in religion where the “supernatural” is implied, or where the deductions of science seem to be inconsis-

sion, and he wished it to be known everywhere that he identified himself with the living evangelical piety of Britain. While Bunsen was able to retain his piety, in spite of the vagueness and wanderings of his speculative opinions, it is difficult to see how any young man trained in the creed left to Bunsen, could ever rise to a belief in the Saviour.”—Pp. 366, 367.

“I am able to say—what I believe I can say of no other with whom I had so much intercourse—that we never conversed during these five days, for ten minutes at a time, without his returning, however far he might be off, to his Bible and his Saviour, as the objects that were evidently the dearest to him.”—P. 368.

“The last day I passed with him was a Sabbath—a Sabbath indeed—for I never in all my life spent a more profitable day. In the forenoon I sat with him in his seat in the University Church at Heidelberg, where we had the privilege of listening to a powerful gospel sermon from Dr Schenkel. I spent the afternoon in his house, where he read to us in German, or in English translations, out of the fine old devotional works of his country, interspersing remarks of his own, evidently springing from the depths of his heart, and breathing towards heaven—to which I firmly believe, he has now been carried.”—P. 369.

tent with miracles, and with the faith of former generations ; the latter is what they call "Contemporary Literature," in which all that is furnished by sacred criticism that can be made to bear on the subject, is employed for the same end. It is in this latter department of the "Review" that the hope of success mainly depends. It is, in general, the most elaborate part of the work. It has the advantage of containing more information on the literature of the age than any other publication in the English language. It evinces great acquaintance with German theological literature, and with what religious literature there is in France, and it is prompt to mark and record the result of any labours in either country, or in England or America, that will tend to unsettle the faith of mankind in miracles, in the inspiration of the Bible, or in ancient creeds.

What would be the ultimate creed of the *Westminster Review*, if it should ever be settled and defined, or what would be the precise theological opinions of the world if science and criticism, under its guidance, had done all that they could do to adjust religion to this age, and this age to religion, it would be impossible to say. The points which *have* been settled in the estimation of that work, and which are no longer spoken of as doubtful ; which are always referred to with the complacency of those who feel that they *have* fixed points of belief, are such as the following :—That the laws of nature are so fixed that miracles are impossible ; that the prophecies were written after the events to which they refer ; that the world is much older than the Mosaic records make it ; that man has been on the earth for thousands of years longer than those records would allow ; that there have been different centres of the origin of vegetable and animal life ; that man in his origin has followed the common laws in the development of "Species," as indicated in the work of Dr Darwin ; that there are numerous mistakes, contradictions, and absurdities in the so-called sacred books of the Hebrews, and in the New Testament ; that no scientific man can speak of the "miracle" of Joshua in commanding the sun and moon to stand still as an actual fact ; that the last books of "Isaiah" were written after the return from the exile, and the entire book of Daniel after the events which it seems to predict ; and that all proper idea of *inspiration* in regard to the Bible is to be abandoned. On these, and kindred points, the *Westminster Review* no longer reasons. They are as much beyond the necessity of argument, as the doctrine of gravitation, or the laws of Kepler.

The work which the *Westminster Review* has undertaken is, in a great measure, peculiar to this age. Porphyry, in his day, had his field ; Celsus his ; Julian his. In neither case was it science or sacred criticism. It was ancient philosophy as then

held, coming in contact with a new religion—Christianity. They did their work well. They did all that acute philosophers of that age could do to prevent the progress of the new system. Volney had his field, sitting among the “Ruins” of ages, to find out evidence that Christianity would decline also—so to extend the work of *Ruin*, that Christianity, after his time, might be numbered with the “Ruins” of the world. Paine had his field: by low ribaldry and abuse to attempt to drive religion from the world. Voltaire had his field: satire, learning, wit, philosophy. Paine and Voltaire did their work well, and have left nothing in their departments to be attempted in future times. Hume had his: by most subtle sophistry; by great calmness; by a spirit of apparent candour; by perplexing and involving a subject so as, even to this day, to exercise the ingenuity of the world to shew *where* he was wrong, when all felt that he *was* wrong. And Hume has done his work well, and left nothing in the line of scepticism to be attempted in future times, for he has given employment, in detecting his sophistry, to the great intellects of Reid, of Dugald Stewart, of Campbell, of Chalmers, and of Dr Thomas Brown—each one feeling that his predecessor has *not* satisfactorily shewn where the sophism was; each one proposing a theory of his own; and all leaving us not *quite* sure that the real secret of the sophistry has been yet detected. Gibbon had his field, and well has he worked it. His province was history, and his investigations led him, *a sceptic*, over the entire period when Christianity, from the feeblest beginning, made its way over the Roman world, and “sat down on the throne of the Cæsars;” when during the long and eventful period of the decline of the empire, Christianity was seen moulding society, directing wars, founding empires, modifying opinions, changing the arts of life, introducing revolutions into laws, manners, dress, dwellings, schools; when it controlled the government and influenced the people; when it founded monasteries and colleges; when it poured its embattled legions in the Holy Land in fierce wars of conquest. It was not the work of Gibbon to falsify history. It was not his to state as a fact what had never occurred, or to suppress a fact which had occurred. We believe that as a historian he was, in respect to this, among the most faithful of men. We do not believe that his scepticism—deep and bitter as it was—ever led him, in a single instance, to pervert or falsify a *fact*, however much it might be opposed to his own views on the subject of religion, or however much ingenuity it might require to escape from the legitimate *consequences* of the fact. Never, from the time of Thucydides down, has there been a man more upright, stern, honest, unbending, in recording *the facts* of history. As a sceptic in religion, it

was his to shew what could be done by a *sneer*, and well has he done *that* work. If *that* could have destroyed the credit of Christianity, the work would have been done by Gibbon. In *that* mode of endeavouring to undermine and destroy Christianity, nothing more remains to be accomplished.

The province of the *Westminster Review* is different from that of Porphyry, Celsus, and Julian; different from that of Volney and Paine; different from that of Voltaire, Hume, and Gibbon. None of those men, if, perhaps, we except Voltaire, had any considerable claims to eminence in science; none of them understood the bearings of science on revelation, as it is now presented to the world. None of those men, if, perhaps, we except Celsus and Porphyry, had any considerable knowledge of sacred criticism; none of them would have been able to urge the arguments against the established faith of the Christian world, which Bunsen could urge—which the writers of the “*Essays and Reviews*” can urge—which the industry of the writers of the *Westminster Review* can collect from the abundant storehouse of German scholarship. The peculiar province of the *Westminster Review*, therefore, so far as its bearing on religion is concerned, is to shew how far scepticism may be sustained by the discoveries in modern times in science, or how much may be done by those discoveries, ingeniously applied, in undermining the faith of the world in truths hitherto regarded as established.

We are not to be surprised, therefore, at the favour with which the *Westminster Review* greeted the volume of “*Essays and Reviews*” as a most important contribution in the cause which it is labouring to promote; and in regard to the book itself, and to the real position of the authors of the book before the world, it is a most ominous circumstance that the volume was hailed with so much satisfaction by the *Westminster Review* in England, and published with such a commendatory notice as we have referred to above, by the Unitarian press in this country. In the *Westminster Review* for October 1860, the volume is reviewed in an article bearing the title of “*Neo-Christianity*,” a title itself indicating the view which is taken of the book, and justifying the title which we have placed at the head of *our* article, as indicating the tendency of that and kindred works.*

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It cannot be denied that the question, whether a readjustment of Christianity, as adapted to this age of the world, is

* We omit, as already well known, the extracts which the writer makes from that article, and also the long extracts from the “*Essays and Reviews*.”—*Ed. B. & F. E. E.*

desirable, and whether it can be effected so as to save Christianity itself—that is, so that the Bible, and the doctrines of the Bible, may retain the hold on the public mind which they have held in less scientific periods of the world, and which a book professing to be inspired should secure in the faith of mankind, is THE great question of this age. If such a readjustment is to be made, it is still a question *how* it is to be done; what is to be given up, and what retained; what is demanded, and what is to be conceded; whether these men have so succeeded in their work that the true friends of religion will be compelled to receive the adjustment; whether the Christianity to be left to the world is the system which the authors of the “Essays and Reviews” would bequeath to mankind, and which is to go down to future ages with the endorsement of the *Westminster Review* and the Unitarians of Massachusetts.

It is not to be denied that any system of religion must be shaped very much by the characteristics of an age or country. While there is and must be in Christianity, as a revelation from God, that which is “permanent,” and which must be as unchanging as God himself, it is also true that there is much in the system that may receive, in its application and development, different forms—forms that may give its religious character to a particular age or nation. Religion may put on an oriental or an occidental garb. It may appear in monastic seclusion, or it may be developed in the active and public life of the church. It may be calm, contemplative, reclusive; it may attach itself to the prevailing philosophy of the age; it may be developed in connection with the habits of thinking and the temperament of a people; it may receive its form under a certain system of philosophy, and become embodied in creeds framed on the supposition that that is the true system; it may receive its interpretations on the supposition that certain prevailing views in science are correct, and may *seem* to countenance and sustain those views; it may attach to itself numberless superstitions that may be made to *appear* to belong to the essence of the system; and it may be so identified, in that form, with literary and eleemosynary establishments that the ancient system of religious doctrines embodied in a creed shall come down with all that there is that is venerable, sacred, and philanthropic in those establishments, and all that there is in their charters to render them permanent. When the monasteries in England, in the time of Henry VIII, were broken up, and the accumulated property of ages was confiscated, it seemed to many that a fatal blow was struck at vital religion; and, in like manner, when that which is properly *philosophy* is rent away from the forms of religion, as they have been held in the church, there is the same apprehension that religion itself is assailed,

and that its very existence is identified with maintaining the religion and the philosophy together. Much of the opposition to the changes suggested by the theology of President Edwards has arisen from the fact that he laboured to *divorce* theology from the philosophy with which it had been connected in the older Calvinistic system, and to unite that system with a better philosophy; and, in our own church, in the struggle between the two great parties in that church, the *real* contest has been not so much about the system of Christianity as it is found in the Bible, as about that system as blended with certain philosophical opinions, and as having received their shape from union with such opinions. For, it is to be remembered that Christianity has not come to *us* directly from its Author. It is not to *us* a new revelation. It has come down to us through a descent of eighteen centuries, collecting in its progress whatever of good or bad there might be that could be made in any way to adhere to it; adopting the opinions in mental philosophy, the doctrines of science, the peculiarities of thinking and acting that have prevailed in the world, and uniting all, it may be, in its symbols of faith. It is a ship—not just starting out of port fresh and new, but one that has sailed afar, and that has collected whatever of barnacles and sea-weed that could be made to adhere to it. It is still a ship; whether its timbers are rotten or not is a fair question; whether it can be made to encounter heavy seas now, and keep afloat, is the question which these churchmen and the *Westminster Review* would help us to solve. Whether anything would be left, after taking off all that the authors of the “*Essays and Reviews*” propose to take off, is a question on which the writers in the *Westminster Review*, we think, are looking with all the interest of hatred and of hope.

It is not to be denied that there has been, from time to time, a new readjustment of Christianity to the progress of the world, accomplished either silently or by violence. As a general fact, it has been a silent readjustment. Old interpretations of the Bible, inconsistent with the position which the world takes in philosophy and science, have been quietly dropped, and, without either shock or commotion, the system of religious doctrines has quietly adjusted itself to the advances in science. It has been found that the ancient interpretation of the Bible, though it may have been regarded as sacred for ages, and though it may have been held under some of the best forms of piety in the church, was in no way *demanded* by the fair interpretation of language; and as the new facts in science were accepted by the world, the old interpretation was quietly dropped, and the new discovery in science was found to be, in fact, the best exponent of the real meaning of the language of

the Bible :—for it was seen to impart to it new beauty and sublimity, and to be in no manner inconsistent with the meaning of the record on the most rigid principles of exegesis. In fact, it has been seen that the truth in science as discovered, and the language used in the sacred writings bearing on the general subject, were so adapted to each other that the one seemed to have been designed to describe the other ; or, in other words, that the *language* employed by the sacred writer was such as he would have used if the fact had been distinctly before his mind. The new discovery, therefore, so far from impinging on the claim to inspiration, seemed only to confirm it. As an illustration of this, we may refer to the change made in the views of astronomy in passing from the conjectures of the Ptolemaic to the demonstrations of the Copernican system. The old interpretations of the Bible, in the systems of theology, were undoubtedly all based on the idea of the correctness of the Ptolemaic system. The doctrines of the creeds were all adjusted to that. That system of astronomy became the doctrine of the church, and to maintain that the earth revolved on its axis and around the sun was heresy—the heresy for which Galileo was persecuted and imprisoned, and which he was required by the church to “abjure, curse, and detest,” and which “he was never again to teach, because erroneous, heretical, and *contrary to Scripture*.” Even Turretine endeavoured to sustain that system from the Bible, and to demonstrate that, according to the Scriptures, the earth was the centre of the system, and that the sun, and moon, and stars revolved around it.*

The adjustment respecting astronomy was quietly made. Except the storm that was raised respecting Galileo, there was no agitation or convulsion. The reasoning of Turretine in favour of the old system, as drawn from the Bible, made no impression on mankind, and did nothing to impede the progress of the new sentiments. The church accepted the change, and abandoned the old interpretation of the Bible, and hencefor-

* His argument makes us smile. It is as follows : “*First*,” he remarks, “the sun is said in Scripture to move in the heavens, and to rise and set. ‘The sun is as a bridegroom coming out of his chambers, and rejoiceth as a strong man to run a race.’ ‘The sun knoweth his going down.’ ‘The sun ariseth, and the sun goeth down.’ *Secondly*, The sun, by a miracle, stood still in the time of Joshua, and by a miracle it went back in the time of Hezekiah. *Thirdly*, The earth is said to be fixed immoveably. ‘The earth also is established that it cannot be moved.’ ‘Thou hast established the earth, and it abideth.’ ‘They continue this day according to thine ordinances.’ *Fourthly*, Neither could birds, which often fly off through an hour’s circuit, be able to return to their nests. *Fifthly*, Whatever flies or is suspended in the air, ought, by this theory, to move from West to East ; but this is proved not to be true, from birds, arrows shot forth, atoms made manifest in the sun, and down floating in the atmosphere.”

ward explained the Bible on the supposition that the Copernican and not the Ptolemaic system of astronomy is the one that is accordant with truth. Even infidels saw nothing in the new mode of interpreting the Bible that was not admissible and fair, and were willing to concede that the Bible had made no statements on the subject of astronomy which *required* its friends to maintain that it taught the Ptolemaic system.

There have been, however, readjustments of Christianity attended with violence, and which have convulsed the world. The ancient system had become so established ; it had connected itself so intimately with the opinions, the interests, and the corruptions of mankind ; it was so defended by charters, investments, and laws ; it was so under the patronage of corrupt civil governments, and a more corrupt hierarchy ; it had so subdued all philosophy to itself, and had so asserted its rule over the hearts of men ; it was so blended with pomp, and show, and splendour of ritual ; it was so identified with time-honoured customs, and with time-honoured institutions ; it so placed at the disposal of the church the wealth of the world, and so made the conscience of the world subject to its control ; it had so permeated through the entire system of Christianity ; the church was so completely in all its parts the representative of false philosophy, false opinion, false views of God and of man, false views of the way by which sinful men must be saved, that it was impossible to adjust it to the new condition of things in the world by a calm and quiet process, and convulsion, revolution, and storm became inevitable. Such was the readjustment of Christianity at the Reformation. Literature had been revived. The race had made progress. The world, as it had *become*, could no longer bear the system which had been well enough adapted to it as it *had been*, and a readjustment of Christianity was indispensable. One of two things was to be done ; either the Bible must be abandoned altogether, and the world be given over to infidelity, *or* the system of Christianity must be so presented to mankind as not to be seen to be inconsistent with the progress which the world had made, and was making. It was, therefore, just a question whether infidelity should become universal, or whether the real system of Christianity was of such a nature as to be adapted to the world as it was becoming, and as it was to be. But, for the reasons above stated, the readjustment could not be calmly, quietly made. Hence the Protestant Reformation advanced amidst storms, revolutions, and persecutions. But the adjustment was made. Those things which had been attached to Christianity by a corrupt philosophy and a corrupt superstition were shewn to be no essential part of the system ; the interpretations which had been given to the Bible were shewn to

be false interpretations; the doctrines of the Papacy, which had been claimed to be the doctrines of the Scriptures, were demonstrated to be perversions, abuses, and corruptions, of the pure word of God; the enormous system which had been reared to tyrannize over mankind was shewn to have no authority in the Bible; and, as the result of the storms and conflicts of the Reformation, Christianity reappeared in much of its native purity, and the world has now, for three centuries, accepted it as not inconsistent with any disclosures which science or philosophy has made.

The authors of the "Essays and Reviews," Drs Temple, Williams, and Messrs Baden Powell, Wilson, Goodwin, Pattison, and Jowett, in their high places in the Episcopal Church; the Westminster Review; Chevalier Bunsen; the German Rationalists and their fellow-labourers in the old world generally; Messrs Gliddon and Nott; and Messrs Theodore Parker and Dr Hedge as representing the Unitarian body in the new world, demand a new adjustment of Christianity. They insist that as it is held now it is inconsistent with the science of the age. They affirm that, as commonly interpreted, the Bible is contradicted by the facts which science has established. They demand that the Bible shall be adjusted to those facts; that either a new interpretation shall be adopted, or that certain parts of the Bible shall be reduced from their claim to inspiration to the rank of the common records of the past—true or false, as the case may be, that every man is to be left to his own solution as to what is to be regarded as true; that the ancient ideas of inspiration are to be abandoned, and that it is to be admitted that there are errors and contradictions in the sacred volume, however there may be *in it somewhere* a pure system of doctrines that has *had* a divine origin; that, in one word, the world shall accept the revelations of science as settled, and that, if the Bible does not conform to those revelations as understood, it shall be abandoned for ever. Part of these collaborators—like the Chevalier Bunsen, and, we would hope, the authors of the "Essays and Reviews"—are true and honest men. They are alarmed, and they desire that the Bible and the church may be saved. Part desire the overthrow of church establishments as such, having no particular regard for religion one way or the other. Part have the same pious feelings on the subject of religion which Hume had when he said "*Our most holy religion is founded on faith, not on reason,*" or which Gibbon had when he sorrowed over the superstitions which entered the church from the heathen world, or when he expressed a tone of holy exultation at the success of the experiment made by Cyprian to shew the firmness of the chastity of the sexes among the faithful; or when he dropped a tear on the pages of

this history over the inconsistencies and sins of the ancient worthies in the church. Part welcome the labours of such men as the Chevalier Bunsen and the authors of the "Essays and Reviews," as Alexander Humboldt did the "Bibelwerk" of Bunsen, because, in the language of Dr M'Cosh, "in the Bibelwerk he saw that it would further very different ends from those contemplated by Bunsen,"* and as the *Westminster Review* welcomes the labours of Messrs Temple, Williams, Powell, Wilson, Goodwin, Pattison, and Jowett, because they see in their labours that which tends to the overthrow of Christianity,—for Humboldt and the writers in the *Westminster Review* see correctly the results to which these labours are tending.

The *points* on which it is now demanded that there shall be a readjustment of Christianity, or on which it is supposed that the positions in sacred criticism and science are so well taken that they may be assumed as a basis to which Christianity is to be made to conform, are such as the following:—

(1.) The first, and perhaps the most material, relates to the subject of inspiration. The old and established doctrine of the church has been, that the Bible is a book given by a supernatural inspiration of God; that is, that truths are recorded there which in fact have their origin *directly* in the mind of God, and have been imparted by him to the minds of the writers by a direct communication; that those truths are above any natural power of the writers to originate them, to discover them, or to express them; and that in recording them, however much they may have been left to their own peculiarities of modes of expression or language, they have been so guided by the Holy Spirit as to be preserved from error; that this principle applies to every part of the sacred volume; that the Bible is in fact, and to all intents and purposes, *one book*, whose real author is the Spirit of God. The view which they who propose to readjust Christianity insist shall be taken of this subject is, substantially, that the word "inspiration," if used at all as applicable to a book claiming to be from God, denotes, in fact, nothing more than *the inspiration of genius*, or that the inspiration of Isaiah, David, and Paul does not differ in principle from the inspiration of Homer, Dante, Milton, Shakespeare, Plato, or Bacon; that though the inspiration may pertain to a different subject, yet it is the same in principle; that, moreover, whatever there is of "inspiration" in the Bible does not pertain to the entire book, but that the true idea is that the Bible rather *contains* a revelation than that it *is* a revelation; that, on ordinary subjects, as science and history, the authors of the Bible were liable to err like other men; that the system of revealed

* "The Supernatural in relation to the Natural," p. 366.

truth is to be obtained rather by the general spirit of the volume than by any specific statements of the sacred writers ; that consequently it may be admitted that there are mistakes in regard to the formation and duration of the earth, the origin of the human race, the chronology of the world, the deluge, and the early history of mankind ; and that, as the result of all this, there may be inconsistencies in the statements of the several writers, and contradictions which cannot be reconciled.

(2.) Christianity is to be adjusted to the idea, not only that our world itself may have existed for thousands, or even millions of years ; that it has undergone different and slow modifications, and it has been occupied by numerous races of animals which have long since passed away, but that *man himself* has existed for a much longer period than that assigned to him by the common chronology, or than the Mosaic records, by a fair interpretation, would allow us to believe. The adjustment in regard to the existence of our globe itself, to the geological changes which have occurred, and to the existence of the races of animals which had passed away before man appeared, has been quietly made, and made without any convulsion in the religious world, or any admitted gain to the cause of infidelity. The friends of the Bible have accepted the revelations of geology on these subjects ; and, with a few exceptions, these disclosures of geology are regarded by the great mass of believers in the Bible as among the settled facts in science. Often as the subject has been pressed upon their attention, they have failed to see that there is any essential conflict between these statements of geology and the statements of Moses, and they have been employed in explaining the remarkable *analogy*, in fact, in the *order* at least of the processes on our globe in its preparatory stages as disclosed in geology and as stated in the first chapter of Genesis. Not a few of those who reject the Bible have ceased to urge the revelations of geology on this subject as in conflict with the statements of Moses, since it cannot be demonstrated from the Bible *how long* the earth, in some form, may have existed ; since there is no precise date *when* "the foundations of the earth was laid ;" and since, if the main proposition in Genesis i. 1, that "In the beginning GOD CREATED the heavens and the earth," be admitted, the utmost latitude as to *time* may be given to those who may have the ability or find the means to tell *when* it was that "the morning stars sang together," and "the sons of God shouted for joy" over the creation of the world, Job xxxviii. 7. We do not doubt that the whole Christian world would feel itself laid under unspeakable obligations to infidel geologists if they *would* settle the question of chronology as

to the exact period when our globe was made, however far back in a distant eternity they may fix the epoch.

The other point on this subject is more material; it may be vital. Those who propose to readjust Christianity demand also that it shall be admitted that *the race of man* has existed for an indefinite period back of that assigned to the origin of the race in the records of Moses. The Chevalier Bunsen has demonstrated, "if we will receive it," that Egypt was a civilized kingdom nearly four thousand years before the birth of Christ, and he asks that it may be admitted that the race has existed for a period of at least "twenty thousand years;" and Dr Williams, the author of the second of the "Essays," if we understand him, asks that it should be believed that "there is a historical area of nations and languages extending itself over nearly ten thousand years," and that another "ten thousand" was required "during which the possibilities of these things took body and form." The views which the Christian world is asked to adopt, and to which Christianity is now to be adjusted, may be understood from the article by Dr Williams, in the "Essays and Reviews," in stating the results of the Chevalier Bunsen's investigations.

The *value* to be attached to the Mosaic records in such investigations, in the estimation of those who propose thus to readjust Christianity, may be understood from the same article, as stating the views of the Chevalier Bunsen, and as apparently endorsed by the "Vice-Principal, and Professor of Hebrew, St David's College, Lampeter."

(3.) Christianity is to be adjusted to new disclosures about the various orders of beings in the earth. These disclosures, it would perhaps be admitted by the new Christian philosophers, are not quite complete or fully defined, but they are so far advanced, and promise so much in the future, that it is at least proper that the friends of the Bible should begin to *think* of the way in which the statements there are to be adjusted to them. It has been the commonly-received belief of mankind that the Bible teaches that God *made* man in the proper sense of the term "*made*," as a distinct act of creation, constituting him a quite distinct being from all the other animals upon the earth, or creating him so distinct and peculiar that he could not, in body or in soul, be "*developed*" from any of the inferior orders of being; that, in like manner, God *made* the various orders of beings in the air, on the earth, and in the waters, so distinct in their species, in their original formation, and so confined within certain limits, that the one cannot be "*developed*" into another, or that there are boundaries in their constitution which they do not pass; that originally distinct pairs were created, from which all the others have sprung, and

that they were created at about the time when man appeared upon the earth; that the different races of animals had each one, in respect to its creation, a single "centre," or, in other words, that there have not been different acts of "creation" in regard to each of the kinds of animals in different, and perhaps many, centres upon the earth:—that, for example, all elephants are descended from an original pair, created at the beginning, and that they have not sprung up since from different "centres" in Bengal, in Ceylon, in Caffraria, as occasion required; that all salmon had their origin from a single pair, and not that they have sprung up at successive periods as they were needed—now in the waters on the Atlantic slope, and now in those on the Pacific slope; now in the waters of Scotland, and now in the waters that flow into the Indian Ocean; that in like manner all human beings have sprung from one pair, Adam and Eve, and not that they have had different "centres" of creation, or that men and women have been formed, as occasion required, in different places, and constituting different races—the Mongolian race, with its proper head, its "Adam and Eve,"—and the Caucasian, the Ethiopian, the American, each springing from an original and independent act of creation, or with its own proper ancestry representing that type of humanity. In other words, it has been understood that the doctrine of the Bible is that the race is properly *one*; one in its origin, one in its fall, one in its redemption. To a different form of belief all this is now to be adjusted. Either the whole matter of "creation" is to be surrendered, and we are to admit that all that we see is the result of "development," or, we are to believe, as the result of Messrs Crosse and Weeke's experiments, of Dr Darwin's patient investigation, sustained by Mr Owen's admissions, either that the different orders of animals, including man, have been formed at different "centres," and are, therefore, of different "races," or that the different races of beings on the earth, embracing *all* the species, are developed from a single pair, or from a simple "monad," the weaker dying in the struggle of development, and the stronger surviving, until after an infinite number of struggles, and an infinite waste of being, continued through almost infinite cycles of ages, the earth, the waters, and the air, are at last peopled with the different species and orders of beings which now exist. The old faith on this subject, it is supposed, cannot "hold out above a year or two; just long enough to give the philosophers time enough to finish their experiments."—(Tracts for Priests and People, p. 19.)

(4.) The idea of prophecy is to be given up, and Christianity is to be adjusted to the belief that what have been generally understood to be *prophecies*, in the sense that certain men were

endowed beyond any limits of their natural capacities, or any power of mere sagacity, to foretell future events, are to be explained by the idea that they are "noble old Eastern poems, full of symbolism, like other Eastern poems;" that many of these "old poems" referred to events passing before the eyes of the writers themselves, and are designedly presented in this mode of gorgeous imagery, as if referring to future events; that for the most part these representations are vague and unmeaning, and that where there is any definiteness of time, as in the Book of Daniel (ch. xi.), or any mention of a name, as in Isaiah (ch. xlv. 1), such a fact demonstrates that the so-called prophecy was written *after* the event. So Porphyry long since held in regard to the prophecies in Daniel, admitting that they described with entire exactness the events which had actually occurred, but maintaining that they were written *after* the events themselves. If *neither* of the modes above suggested will explain what have been called "*prophecies*;" if they cannot be resolved into old "poems," gorgeous in their imagery, and sometimes happy in their coincidences, like Virgil's *Pollio*, or like dreams; or if it is not to be conceded that they were written *after* the events referred to, then Christianity is to be adjusted to the idea that they may be explained on the principle of *clairvoyance*, or on the same principles as the ravings of the Priestess of Delphi. Thus, with great apparent candour, and yet with some *slight* show of misgiving, as if not wholly certain whether the same result in the explanation of prophecy *might* not have been reached in some other way, Vice-Principal Williams (Recent Inquiries in Theology, p. 79) says:—

"Why he should add to his moral and metaphysical basis of prophecy a notion of foresight by vision of particulars or a kind of *clairvoyance*, though he admits it to be a natural gift, consistent with fallibility, is not so easy to explain. One would wish he might have intended only the power of seeing the ideal in the actual, or of tracing the divine government in the movements of men. He seems to mean more than presentiment or sagacity, and this element in his system requires proof."—P. 79.

Thus Dr McCosh says of the Chevalier Bunsen, in a passage already quoted, "He was a firm believer in mesmerism and clairvoyance, and *was apt to connect them with the inspiration of the writers of the Bible*," (The Supernatural in relation to the Natural, p. 365); and thus Bunsen himself says:

"'Die Kraft des Schauens, die im Menschen verborgen liegt, und, von der Naturnothwendigkeit befreit, in hebräischen Prophetenthum sich zur wahren Weltanschauung erhoben hat, . . . ist der Schlüssel,'" &c.—*Gott in der Geschichte*, p. 149.

“ ‘Jene Herrlichkeit besteht nicht in dem Vorhersagen. . . . Dieses haben sie gemein mit manchen Aussprüchen der Pythia, . . . und mit vielen Weissagungen der Hellscherinnen dieses Jahrhunderts.’ ”—*Id.* p. 151.

So, also, in another passage (*Gott in Geschichte*, p. 141), translated: “The word which we, after the lxx., translate *Prophets*, means in the Hebrew, *Inspired*. Their original designation was *Seers*—men who *saw*. Clairvoyance (the so-called magnetic sight) and prophesying in the ecstatic state, were of remote antiquity amongst the Jews and their neighbours; and Joseph, a man of a waking spirit, who, as a growing youth, possessed a natural gift of second sight, was able, as man, to see visions in his cup, just as the Arab boy in Cairo still sees them in his bowl.”—(*Aids to Faith*, p. 98.)

As shewing the estimate entertained of prophecy by the authors of the “*Essays and Reviews*,” and by those who propose to reconstruct Christianity according to the principles laid down in that volume, or what Christianity must become if the principles advocated by that class of writers are true principles, we make a single extract from the “*Recent Inquiries in Theology* :—

“With the revival of learning began a reluctant and wavering, yet inevitable retreat from the details of patristic exposition, accompanied with some attempts to preserve its spirit. Even Erasmus looked that way; Luther's and Calvin's strong sense impelled them some strides in the same direction; but Grotius, who outweighs, as a critic, any ten opposites, went boldly on the road. In our own country, each successive defence of the prophecies, in proportion as its author was able, detracted something from the extent of literal prognostication, and either laid stress on the moral element, or urged a second as the spiritual sense. Even Butler foresaw the possibility that every prophecy in the Old Testament might have its elucidation in contemporaneous history; but literature was not his strong point, and he turned aside, endeavouring to limit it, from an unwelcome idea. Bishop Chandler is said to have thought twelve passages in the Old Testament directly Messianic; others restricted this character to five. Paley ventures to quote only one. Bishop Kidder conceded freely an historical sense in Old Testament texts, remote from adaptations in the New. The apostolic Middleton pronounced firmly for the same principle. Archbishop Newcome and others proved in detail its necessity. Coleridge, in a suggestive letter, preserved in the memoirs of Cary, the translator of Dante, threw secular prognostication altogether out of the idea of prophecy. Dr Arnold and his truest followers bear, not always consistently, on the same side. On the other hand, the declamatory assertions, so easy in pulpits or on platforms, and aided sometimes by powers which produce silence rather than conviction, have not only kept alive, but magnified with uncritical exaggeration, what-

ever the Fathers had dreamt, or modern rhetoric could add, tending to make prophecy miraculous. Keith's edition of Newton need not be here discussed. Davidson of Oriel, with admirable skill, threw his argument into a series, as it were, of hypothetical syllogisms, with only the defect (which some readers overlook) that his minor premise can hardly, in a single instance, be proved. Yet the stress which he lays on the moral element of prophecy atones for his sophistry as regards the predictive. On the whole, even in England, there is a wide gulf between the arguments of our genuine critics, with the convictions of our most learned clergy on the one side, and the assumptions of popular declamation on the other."—Pp. 73–75.

(5.) There is to be an entire new adjustment of Christianity on the subject of miracles. The tendency in the study of the physical sciences by the class of men represented by the *Westminster Review*, is to the opinion that the universe is under the control of *laws* which are absolute, unvarying, and universal; that those laws, so far as understood, are never deviated from, and that phenomena which have not yet been reduced to any of those laws are nevertheless subject to the control of laws which are not yet fully understood, but which, when understood, will furnish an explanation of *these* facts as consistent as any case where the causes are now known; and that, in respect to *all* the events which have occurred, or which will occur in our world, it is simply a question of *time*, or a question limited by man's ability, whether those laws shall be understood. In other words, the idea is, that there is, and there has been, no direct divine interference to produce effects which lie beyond the range of those fixed laws; or that, in the administration of the affairs of the universe, God never departs from the laws which have been ordained. It is assumed that there are no such interferences now; and with this, as a point which is regarded as indisputable, the mind looks on all in the past that has the appearance of the marvellous and the miraculous, and supposes that there is either defect in the *testimony* by which such facts are affirmed to have occurred, or that, if they occurred, it will be found that they can be explained by some *law* not as yet fully understood.

It is true that this ground is not openly taken by the writers of the "Essays and Reviews;" but it is true that it *is* taken by the writers in the *Westminster Review*, and that there is, among the authors of the "Essays and Reviews," and the writers of that school, a manifest *disposition*, if possible, to explain all that has occurred, or that is occurring, in accordance with this view. It is certain that there is a *demand* of that kind made by a very large class of the cultivators of science; that they proceed on the supposition of the absolute

universality and uniformity of the laws of nature ; that they insist that this shall be conceded by the friends of Christianity, whatever may be the result ; and that there is a strong *disposition* on the part of the professed advocates of Christianity in the "Essays and Reviews," if possible, to accede to the demand ; in other words, to explain the facts of the New Testament on this supposition, or to *adjust* Christianity somehow to these demands of science.

The *tendency*, on this subject, in the class of minds represented by the writers of the "Essays and Reviews," though we admit that they have not conceded *all* that would be satisfactory to the *Westminster Review*, and *all* that would be demanded by scientific men avowedly infidel, may be seen by a few extracts which we shall now introduce. In the American edition of the "Essays and Reviews," there is an "Appendix" on "The Present Relations of Science and Religion," by the Rev. Frederick Temple, D. D., Head Master of Rugby School, author of the first of the "Essays" on "The Education of the World." This "Appendix" consists of a sermon preached before the University of Oxford during the meeting of the British Association, July 1. 1860, and has an importance, therefore, derived not merely from the name and position of the author, but from the *place* where the sermon was preached. As preached and published, it shews what *may* be preached at Oxford, and what may be regarded, to some extent, certainly, as the views cherished by the "British Association" for Science. In that discourse the author says :

"Science has been called the handmaid of theology, and theology has often had recourse to science for arguments to prove or confirm her fundamental propositions. But it is remarkable that theology has almost always for this purpose dwelt chiefly, not on the scientific, but on the unscientific statements of science. Arguments have been commonly extracted, not from the revelations of science, but from her confessions ; and theology has begun where science has ended. It has been common to trace the power of God, not in that which is universal, but in that which is individual ; not in the laws of nature, but in any apparent interference with those laws ; not in the maintenance, but in the creation of the universe. And sometimes such stress has been laid upon these arguments, that to deny them was held to be a denial of their conclusions ; and men were thought impious who attempted to represent the present order of the solar system, or the existence of animal life, as the work of natural causes, and not the direct handiwork of God himself. *And yet spontaneous generation was long believed in by the most religious men, and there seems no more reason why the solar system should not have been brought into its present form by the slow working of natural causes, than the surface of the earth, about whose gradual formation*

most students are now agreed. The fact is, one idea is now emerging into supremacy in science, a supremacy which it never possessed before, and for which it still has to fight a battle; and that is the idea of law. Different orders of natural phenomena have in time past been held to be exempt from that idea, either tacitly or avowedly. The weather, the thunder and lightning, the crops of the earth, the progress of disease, whether over a country or in an individual, these have been considered as regulated by some special interference, even when it was already known that the recurrence of the seasons, the motions of the planets, the periodic winds, and other phenomena of the same kind, were subject to invariable laws. But the steady march of science has now reached the point when men are tempted, or rather compelled, to jump at once to a universal conclusion: *all analogy points one way, and none another.* And the student of science is learning to look upon *fixed laws as universal*, and many of the old arguments which science once supplied to religion, are in consequence rapidly disappearing. How strikingly altered is our view from that of a few centuries ago, is shewn by the fact that *the miracles recorded in the Bible, which were once looked on as the bulwarks of the faith, are now felt by very many to be difficulties in their way*; and commentators endeavour to represent them, not as mere interferences with the laws of nature, but as the natural action of still higher laws, belonging to a world whose phenomena are only half revealed to us.

"It is evident that this change in science necessitates a change in its relation to faith. If law be either almost or altogether universal, we must look for the finger of God in that law: we must expect to find him manifesting his love, his wisdom, his infinity, *not in individual acts of will*, but in a perfection of legislation rendering all individual action needless; we must find his providence in that perfect adaptation of all the parts of the machine to one another, which shall have the effect of tender care, though it proceed by an invariable action. The vast consequences which flow from a few simple properties of matter, the profusion of combinations, the beauty, the order, the happiness which abound in the creation in consequence of these, such must be now the teachers of the man of science to make him feel that God is with him in all his studies."—Pp. 488, 489.

In like manner we have in the "Essay" of the late Professor Baden Powell, "On the Study of the Evidences of Christianity" (Recent Inquiries in Theology, pp. 106-163), statements of a similar tendency and character, shewing, as far as the similarity goes, that the head master at Rugby School said nothing on that occasion which was contrary to what was deemed allowable at Oxford.

Then we have, in that "Essay,"

(a) The manifestation of a disposition to *undervalue* the testimony from miracles as a proof of revealed religion, as

compared with the views which have been taken on the subject by the church heretofore.

(b) The expression of a belief that the laws of nature are so universal and unchanging that *all* the phenomena which have actually occurred in our world may yet be resolved into those laws, and that those which *seem* to be miraculous may, when the subject is fully understood, be placed in the same category as natural events, and take their place as occurring under established laws of nature; while those which can be explained by no such operations of law will take their place with the alleged miraculous "tongues" of the Rev. Edward Irving, or the marvels in the heathen world.

"No testimony," we are told on the same authority, "can reach to the supernatural; testimony can only apply to apparent sensible facts; testimony can only prove an extraordinary, and perhaps inexplicable, occurrence of phenomena; *that it is due to supernatural causes is entirely dependent on the previous belief and assumption of the parties.*" (Quoted in "Aids to Faith," p. 14.)

(c) It is maintained that the evidence of religion does not depend on miracles, but on faith; on the moral sense; on the conformity of the doctrines which are revealed to our innate conviction of what is true, or that "the human mind is competent to sit as a moral and spiritual tribunal on a professed revelation."

Our space admits no further extracts, and these, we apprehend, are sufficient to put our readers in possession of the demands which are made on this age, in the readjustment of Christianity. To these points it is supposed that the human mind, in its progress has come; from these points it is held that it is not to recede: and as, in former times, Christianity, as held in any particular age, has been modified and adjusted secretly or by violence to that age; as the Papal form has been adjusted, under Protestantism and by Protestantism, to better views of mental philosophy, and better notions of liberty than prevailed in the dark ages; as Protestants have rejected the ancient interpretation of the Bible which proceeded on the supposition that the Ptolemaic system of astronomy was true; and as, in more modern times, the former views of the creation of the world within a period not more remote than six thousand years have given place to the doctrine that the earth has existed for perhaps millions of ages, so it is *now* demanded that the older forms of faith shall be adjusted to the views which we have presented above on the subject of inspiration; on the long continued existence and the origin of our race; on prophecy; and on miracles. These are the demands. In this work the Chevalier Bunsen was engaged when he died. In this

work Baden Powell was engaged, as among the last acts of his life. In this work the living authors of the articles in the "Essays and Reviews" were and are engaged. In this work Dr Hedge is engaged, by commending those "Essays and Reviews" to the favourable notice of the Christian people of the United States. To this result the *Westminster Review* insists that the church shall be driven; and that, if such an adjustment fails, the Bible shall be classed with the Koran and the Vedas.

The great inquiry of the age, so far as religion is concerned, we apprehend, is, How is this question to be solved? How much of these demands, if any, are to be conceded? How many of these demands *may* be yielded, if any, and the Bible still be received as a revelation from God?

To the task of solving these inquiries three of the works at the head of our article are devoted: the first, "Tracts for Priests and People," like the "Essays and Reviews," a collection of voluntary and independent essays on the various points referred to; the two others, the "Aids to Faith," and the "Replies to Essays and Reviews," the result of an avowed effort to vindicate the ancient forms of ancient belief, made under the best auspices, and summoning to the aid of "faith," it may be presumed, the best talent in the English Church.

The first of these works is entitled "Tracts for Priests and People, by various authors," issued by the same press as the "Essays and Reviews" in our own country, and therefore, it may be presumed, coming before the American public with the sanction of the Unitarian denomination, and representing the views of that denomination. The volume embraces the following subjects:—"Religio Laici;" "The Mote and the Beam, a Clergyman's Lessons from the Present Panic;" "The Atonement as a Fact and as a Theory;" "The Signs of the Kingdom of Heaven;" "An appeal to Scripture on the question of Miracles;" "On Terms of Communion;" "A Dialogue of Doubt; Morality and Divinity; and on Laws of Nature and Faith therein, and on Positive Philosophy;" respectively by Thomas Hughes, author of "Tom Brown's School Days;" Rev. F. D. Maurice, Incumbent of St Peter's, St Marylebone; Rev. Francis Garden, Sub-Dean of Her Majesty's Chapels Royal; Rev. John Llewelyn Davies, Rector of Christ's Church, St Marylebone; J. N. Langley, and J. M. Ludlow, "all of whom have hitherto been members of the English Church," p. vii. The object and origin of the Tracts are thus stated:—

"These Tracts were commenced about six months ago. The controversy respecting the 'Essays and Reviews,' which has not subsided yet, was then at its height. Clergymen and laymen were told that they must either declare their sympathy with the book openly, or must unite in condemning it.

"The writers of these Tracts felt that they could take neither of these courses. They could not declare their sympathy with the book; for it seemed to them almost entirely negative; hinting at faults in the prevalent religious opinions of the day, but not investigating them; hesitating dislike to certain obligations which are imposed upon churchmen, but not stating or considering what those obligations are; leaving an impression upon devout Christians that something in their faith is untenable, when they want to find what in it is tenable; suggesting that earnest infidels in this day have much to urge on behalf of their doubts and difficulties; never fairly asking *what* they have to urge, *what are* their doubts and difficulties.

"The very same reason which hindered the writers of these Tracts from accepting the teaching of the 'Essays and Reviews,' hindered them from joining in the popular denunciation of them, or in appeals to ecclesiastical authorities against them. Those denunciations and appeals took an almost entirely negative form. They contradicted and slandered objectors; they were not assertions of a belief; they led Christians away from the Bible to apologies for the Bible, from the creeds which they confess to certain notions about the creeds, from practice to disputation. They met no real doubts in the minds of unbelievers; they only called for the suppression of all doubts. They confounded the opinions of the day with the faith once delivered to the saints. They tended to make anonymous journalists the lawgivers of the church. They tended to discourage clergymen from expressing manfully what is in their hearts, lest they should incur the charge of being unfaithful to their vows. They tended to hinder all serious and honest co-operation between men who are not bound together in a sectarian agreement, lest they should make themselves responsible for opinions different from their own."—Pp. 3-5.

The work is designed, as we have remarked, to take a middle ground, and to shew that the opinions presented in the "Essays and Reviews," though in many respects erroneous and of dangerous tendency, are not inconsistent with an honest subscription to the Articles of the English Church, and are to be tolerated with that liberty which is demanded by Christianity as it advances from age to age. The work is written with freshness, and under the impulse of a warm personal interest in the undertaking. The hearts of the writers are manifestly in their work. Their sympathies are in the main with the writers of the "Essays and Reviews." They demand for the English Church liberty to occupy that wide and not very accurately marked territory which lies between Rationalism in Germany, Unitarianism in England, and Arminianism everywhere, on the one hand, and the strictest form of Trinitarianism and Calvinism on the other. It is a work which, as we have seen, has been commended by Unitarians in this country, and it may with propriety be commended by the editor to them, as its principles would so far accord with the views of that denomination as to

allow them to occupy that wide territory of belief and unbelief which lies between the faith of Theodore Parker and Dr Channing. A few very brief extracts will sufficiently indicate the *doctrinal* position of the book.

"He came to lead us men, his brethren, back into perfect understanding of and submission to that will,—to make us at one with it; and this he did triumphantly by his own perfect obedience to that will, by sacrificing himself even to death for us, because it was the will of his and our Father that he should give himself up wholly and unreservedly; thus, by his one sacrifice, redeeming us, and leaving us an example that we too should sacrifice ourselves to him for our brethren. Thus I believe in the atonement."—P. 26.

"I believe that God has given us these Scriptures, this Bible, to instruct us in these the highest of all truths. Therefore I reverence this Bible as I reverence no other book; but I reverence it because it speaks of him, and his dealings with us. *The Bible has no charm or power of its own.* It may become a chain around men's necks, an idol in the throne of God, to men who will worship the book, and not him of whom the book speaks. There are many signs that this is, or is fast becoming, the case with us; but it is our fault, and not the Bible's fault."—P. 27.

"According to Coleridge, Christ's work on our behalf is never named from anything in itself, but from its known effects upon us. The analogies to sacrifice, redemption, satisfaction of a debt, are all to be sought in those effects, never in their cause. That cause is an act which belongs to the sphere of transcendents, a mystery into which we may not look, and which we must not dare to attempt explaining. But it has effects which are very analogous to the effect of the appointed sacrifice in the reinstatement of the Israelite in his national position and privileges; to the effect of adequate ransom as promising the freedom of a captive; to the effect of complete payment by another as my discharge from a debt which I could not liquidate myself.—Pp. 133, 134.

"To sum up what I have wished to enforce. The atonement, the reconciliation of earth and heaven, of God and man, the redemption of man through Christ, is what is denied, I am sure, by no man who worships Christ as his God, and reposes on him as his elder brother. Every such man, in so far as he is awake and earnest, traces every good thing he has to the work and the intercession of his great High Priest. But many such men may fail of reconciling themselves to the theory of vicarious punishment, may find that to them it in no way manifests the righteousness of God, may be unable to see anything in Scripture which warrants the theory."—Pp. 143, 144.

"It would be a great advantage if we could get rid of the term miracle altogether. It carries with it some arbitrary definition—some 'conception of a miracle'—which is foreign to the ideas of the New Testament. And the word is not wanted. In a great majority of the places in which we have 'miracles' in our version, we ought to replace it by 'signs.' The word itself is exactly equivalent to 'wom-

ders.' Signs, wonders, and powers are what we have to do with in the New Testament."—Pp. 167, 168.

"The Scriptures then do not contain the modern logical notion of a revelation attested by miracles. They represent the Son of God as naturally doing mightier works than other men did, but they do not place his acts, or any part of them, in a class called 'supernatural' by themselves. They give no hint of their having been sifted by incredulous philosophers, and ascertained to be supernatural. They present no careful array of the evidence of those who witnessed them. Their language concerning the signs and wonders of the gospel is such, that if any one should think it worth while to maintain the hypothesis, that in some future age, through the advancing knowledge and power bestowed by the Creator upon the human race, men will be enabled without supernatural agency to do the very works which Christ did, no sentence could be quoted from Scripture to condemn it. We may have other good reasons for rejecting such a hypothesis; I only mention it for the sake of illustrating the language of the Scriptures. The tendency of the scriptural writers is not to draw the line sharply between the natural and supernatural, but to obliterate it."—Pp. 173, 174.

The work entitled "Aids to Faith," embraces essays on the following subjects:—"On Miracles as Evidences of Christianity," by H. L. Mansel, B.D.; "On the Study of the Evidences of Christianity," by William Fitzgerald, D.D., Lord Bishop of Cork, Cloyne, and Ross; "On Prophecy," by A. M'Caul, D.D., Professor of Hebrew in King's College, London; "On Ideology and Subscription," by F. C. Cook, M.A., Chaplain in ordinary to the Queen, &c.; "On the Mosaic Record in Creation," by Professor M'Caul; "On the Genuineness and Authenticity of the Pentateuch," by George Rawlinson, M.A., Camden Professor of Ancient History in Oxford; "On Inspiration," by Edward Harold Brown, B.D., Professor of Divinity in Cambridge; "On the Death of Christ," by William Thompson, D.D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol, Editor of the work; and "On Scripture and Interpretation," by Charles John Ellicott, B.D., Dean of Exeter, and Professor of Divinity, King's College, London. The book is such a book as might be expected to be made in the circumstances of the case. It is a book "made to order." It has all the characteristics of a book made by benefited good men; men whose living is at stake, and who at the same time have a real interest in religion; men who have leisure to write, who are not unaccustomed to speak *ex cathedra*, and whose business it is to *instruct* others; men who have probably never felt the difficulties of scepticism which they are set to combat, and who are therefore little qualified to grapple with suggestions often felt by earnest souls in the search for truth; men of learning, men of position, men of influence; men accustomed to feel that for the purpose in

hand a *dictum* may accomplish the purpose of an argument. The work, therefore, with the exception of the article by Professor Mansel, is, in general, dull, cold, dogmatic, perfunctory ; it is adapted to convince those who are already convinced, to confirm those in the faith who desire to be confirmed, to strengthen those who are willing to be strengthened, but it is a work which will meet few of the difficulties of a book which is the utterance of troubled hearts. We fear that a remark made by the writer of the last essay in the volume, will be found, in the result, to describe the general effect of the book in regard to the object contemplated by its preparation. "*Those*," says he, "*against whom our observations have been directed, will probably not be affected by anything that we have said*," (*Aids to Faith*, p. 537). We fear also that the judgment of the *Westminster Review* on the work will not be found to be far out of the way in the estimation of those who have ever been called to contend with sceptical difficulties, when it says, "A few concessions are made which could no longer be withholden, but neutralized and covered up as far as possible; *there is no grappling with the principles brought into issue by the publication of the 'Essays and Reviews,'* either before the public at large, or before the Established Church of the country," (*Vol. LXXVIII*, p. 292. April 1862).

The work entitled "*Replics to Essays and Reviews*," professes, like the "*Essays and Reviews*," to have been written by those who were "in entire independence of each other, without concert or comparison." "Each author was individually requested by the publishers to write an essay on a subject named, with the especial object of replying to a given essay in the volume of '*Essays and Reviews*.'" The volume is issued under the auspices of the Bishop of Oxford, commending it to the world as an answer to the "*Essays and Reviews*." The subjects, following substantially the same course of discussion as the "*Essays and Reviews*," are, "The Education of the World ;" "Bunsen and the Critical School ;" "Miracles ;" "The Idea of the National Church ;" "The Creation Week ;" "Rationalism ;" "The Interpretation of Scripture."

This work is also "written to order," and has much of the essential characteristics of a work so written. It may be regarded as indicating the High Church method of disposing of the question agitated by the "*Essays and Reviews*."

Its appearance after the others is one of the evidences of the deep state of alarm produced in England by the "*Essays and Reviews*." It shews, as the "*Tracts for Priests and People*" do, as the "*Aids to Faith*" do, as the articles in the *Westminster Review* do, as the general tone of the English religious press does, that, either from the position of the writers,

from the force of their arguments, or from some prevalent state of feeling in the English mind on the subject of religion, there is real alarm, and real cause for alarm.

This work is designed mainly to bring in the force of authority as a primary element in settling the case, and calming the church. It proceeds on the principle that no change is to be contemplated in the doctrinal articles, or in the form of religion in the Established Church, and that uniformity and perpetuity are to be secured by an appeal to authority, and to the power of traditionary doctrines—the authority of the Fathers. Thus, the Lord Bishop of Oxford, in a preface to the work, says: "Two distinct courses seem to me to be required by such a state of things: FIRST, The distinct, solemn, and, if need be, severe decision of authority, that assertions such as these cannot be put forward as possibly true, or even advanced as admitting of question, by honest men. *Secondly*, we need the calm, composed, sincere, scholarlike declaration of positive truth upon the matter in dispute."—(P. 12.) This is the order which the Roman Catholic Church pursued in the case of Galileo and the Reformers; this is the order which the "Old School" attempted in our own country; this is the order which persecutors generally pursue in attempting to suppress heresy. We do not believe that much will be accomplished in religion until the order is reversed.

We judge, also, that some of the writers, like some in our own country, have very little confidence in the power of *argument* in suppressing error, and that the only hope, in regard to the evils referred to by the "Essays and Reviews," or caused by them, is in the final conflict in the second advent of the Saviour. Thus, in the Essay on "The Education of the World," in reply to that of Dr Temple on the same subject, Dr Goulburn says, "What we have to expect as time goes on is, that both evil and good will draw to a head together; that if on one side of us the light will be brighter, on the other the shadows will be darker, *until the righteous one and the evil one, in personal manifestations, confront one another on the stage of the earth,*" (p. 32.)

The work is most thoroughly Episcopal, and the writers do not seem to suppose it possible that religion could survive on the earth if the ecclesiastical establishment of the Church of England was successfully assailed. Thus the very able canon of Westminster, Dr Wordsworth, allows himself to say: "From the time of the apostles, for fifteen hundred years, there was no church in Christendom without a Bishop," (p. 364.)

Of course we do not mean to say that the work is without ability. The very names of the writers assure us that a volume proceeding from their pens must have high claims to public

attention. Inferior men would not have been selected for this task under the auspices of the Bishop of Oxford, and the writers are in fact "among the most able and scholarly members of the Episcopal Church." Whatever may occur, Dr Temple will have occasion to review the manner in which he has made facts bend to theory in his article on the Education World; Dr Rowland Williams will stand humbled before the world for the mistakes which he has made, or the gross misrepresentations of which he is shewn to be guilty in the article on Bunsen and the Critical School; and to the end of life, the author of the article on the Interpretation of Scripture, in the Essays and Reviews, will not forget the caustic severity, the cutting sarcasm, the keen wit of the Canon of Westminster. There is great ability in the work; but it is most sad to reflect that when such vital issues are at stake; when Christianity itself is assailed, as we believe it to be in the "Essays and Reviews," men prominent in the schools, exalted in the church, eminent for learning, for piety, and for moral worth, cannot, for once, forget that they are *churchmen*; cannot defend Christianity on great and broad and catholic principles; cannot attack the great foe, and bring these mighty weapons of warfare to the defence of the system assailed, without evincing an exclusive sympathy for an established religion, for Diocesan Episcopacy, and for an Anti-Puritan Theology.

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To examine all the points which are noticed in the volumes before us cannot, of course, be expected in an article like ours; yet, without attempting to go into the *argument* as such, a few remarks may be made rather relating to the *progress* which is made in the work of readjustment as thus undertaken by the writers whom we have referred to, than on the argument itself; designed rather to shew what is *assumed* by writers of that class than to *disprove* the truth of the positions which they have taken. The remarks which we shall make will relate to certain *facts* which must be admitted on all hands, and which may tend to shew that the modes of reasoning adopted only remove the main difficulty a step further back, and that no real difficulty in the case is removed, even if what is assumed to be true should be conceded.

1. One of the main points in the general subject, and one which lies at the foundation of the whole, pertains to *inspiration*; that is, to the question whether the Bible is inspired, or whether there is such a thing as *book revelation*. The main point here, we apprehend, appertains to the *principle* in the case—whether what is implied in the *idea* of a revelation is absurd or not; for when the *principle* is settled, if it can be, the main difficulty would be overcome, and there would be little dif-

ference of opinion on the question *where* that revelation has been preserved, or what particular book has a just claim to being such a revelation ; whether the Bible, the Zendvesta, or the Vedas.

The ground *assumed* in all the reasoning on the subject in the "Essays and Reviews," and in the public sentiment extensively represented by those Essays, is that the revelation in the Bible is substantially the same *in kind* as that which is made to men of eminent genius—men who have been able to strike out great thoughts that have given a new impulse to human affairs ; or that it differs in *degree*, not in *kind*, from that which is found in Homer or Shakespeare. The objection of avowed infidels is, of course, essentially the same. It is, that there can be nothing communicated to man which cannot be fairly *measured* by the human powers. The objection to inspiration is substantially the same as the objection to miracles in general, since the imparting of knowledge to a human mind in regard to the future beyond the limits of human sagacity, or of the knowledge of what occurred at a period anterior to the records of history, or of the knowledge of God *above* what the human powers could originate, is essentially of the nature of a miracle ; that is, it is bringing in the aid of the Divine Being to accomplish a work whose sole cause *is* God, and which could neither be originated by nor measured by the powers of man. Beyond the natural powers of man ; beyond what there is *in* man, and what may be properly conveyed through him as having capacities to be the proper organs through which intelligence may be conveyed to the world, and in the same sense in regard to sacred truths as all other truths, there is, according to the views of inspiration to which we are adverting, *no* inspiration. "It is," says Coleridge, "that one and the same intelligence is speaking in the unity of a person, which unity is no more broken by the diversity of pipes through which it makes itself audible, than is a tune by the different instruments on which it is played by a consummate musician, equally perfect in all. One instrument may be more capacious than another ; but as far as its compass extends, and in what it sounds forth, it will be true to the conception of the master." (Quoted in the "Aids of Faith," p. 343.) The idea is, that while it may be admitted that God *has* spoken through Isaiah or Samuel, it is him only in the same sense in which it is true that he speaks to any man's soul, according to the measure of his capacity, or in the spiritual and providential direction of enlightened men in every age and nation.

Now we would like to ask of the men who object to the doctrine of inspiration on the ground that it is essentially a "miracle," or that it is "supernatural," a solution of the question about the origin of what is called *genius*, and of what marks

the superiority of one mind over another. Is not the fact that such thoughts came into the mind of Plato or Shakespeare, of Bacon, Watt, or Fulton, encompassed with the same difficulties which are implied in the idea of supernatural inspiration ; that is, of communicating directly to the world thoughts that God designs to communicate to mankind ? If it be said that the thoughts in such cases of genius come *through* human powers, and can be *measured* by those human powers, we ask whence were those powers themselves ? They are not the result of any transmitted or inherited genius ; they are not the effect of development from the seminal genius of ancestors whose powers are unfolded into this form ; they cannot be measured by any thing in the line from which they are descended that has grown to this growth ; they are apparently the result of a divine arrangement above any mere "laws of nature," for the very purpose of throwing these great thoughts upon the world. Assuredly it will not be maintained that the germ of Hamlet, and Lear, and the Tempest, was laid in the heart of some remote ancestors of Shakespeare, and were in the course of ages developed *into* these wonderful creations of genius." It will not be pretended that in the intellect of John Shakespeare, the father of Shakespeare, "originally a glover, and then a skinner and wool-stapler,"* in Henley Street, in Stratford-on-Avon, there was anything that could be *developed* into those marvellous works that have placed his son in creative genius at the head of the race. And even if all this could be traced back to some germ in some very remote ancestor which had been slowly developed for ages and generations until it last appeared in the form of Hamlet and Lear, still we would ask what is the true account of the origin of the germ *there* ? Had it a beginning there ? If so, what *caused* it ? Or had *it* also come down as a germ as yet undeveloped, from the beginning of things : and if so, what formed or produced it in the beginning ? Now, what we are saying is, that in the case supposed in our example, as a specimen of millions of such examples in principle on the earth, there is *something*—that something which we call "*genius*"—that lies *above* and *beyond* any of the operations of natural laws ; above and beyond anything of the nature of development, above and beyond anything that can be measured by what is anterior in time or in order, as *really* as in the visions of Isaiah there is that which is above and beyond all that there was of a similiar kind in his origin and training, or as really as there was in the act when Peter healed the lame man in the temple, or when he raised up Tabitha from the dead. Any valid objection in the one case, in the sense of its being of the

* Ulrici, Dramatic art of Shakespeare, p. 70.

nature of a "miracle," or as being "supernatural," would be a valid objection in the other; any theory which would explain the one case, so far as the point before us is concerned, would explain the other; any argument that the one could not be received, on the ground that it is a departure from "the course of nature," would be an argument of equal force in the other. Let a man explain the phenomena of *genius*, and he would probably find that he would have little additional embarrassment on the score of inspiration. In either case, we apprehend, the fact for which a solution is to be found is, that there may be such a control over a created mind, either in its origin, or by some mode of communicating with it after its creation, as to lodge a thought in that mind whose existence there cannot be explained by any mere natural laws. We see not that the infidel gains any thing by denying the fact that God can and does suggest thoughts to a mind that is already made, while he cannot but admit that there must have been, in the creation of "genius," some departure from settled "laws," or some direct agency in bringing upon the stage a *mind* of remarkable powers. We see not that the Essayists and Reviewers gain any thing by adopting the same principle as the infidel, and by attempting to *explain* what the infidel *rejects*. In either case the difficulty is merely removed a step backward; but it is no removal of a difficulty, and no explanation of a subject, to place it a little farther back.

We shall not, we trust, be considered as intending to concede, by these remarks, that there *is* no difference between the play of genius and the teachings of inspiration; or that in the doctrines of the prophets and the apostles there *is* nothing more than can be explained under some proper view of the phenomena of *genius*. We believe that there *is* a marked difference. But what we are saying is that, so far as we can see, the objections and difficulties in the one case may be urged also in the other; that if the difficulties could be removed in the one case, they might in the other; and that what may be an explanation in the one case *may* contain, in principle, all that might be necessary in the explanation of the other. For ourselves, we shall not regard it as absurd to suppose that God could have *inspired* the mind of Isaiah, when we have in our recollection the fact that he *created* the mind of Pascal; nor shall we think it absurd to believe that he may have made use of the mind of Paul to suggest truths to mankind quite in advance of what the world knew, or could otherwise have known, on subjects of the highest importance, when he created the mind of Bacon, to place the world on a higher elevation in regard to science than it had before attained, or than it *could* have attained by any contemporary minds, *if* his had not been created.

2. The second point on which Christianity is to be readjusted is, the long duration of the earth itself, and the long duration of man upon it. For the former of these, geology asks that it shall be conceded that the earth itself *has* existed for an indefinite period, perhaps millions of ages; that that long period was necessary to prepare it for its present inhabitants; and that, during its preparation for the abode of man, countless numbers of races of beings, inferior to its present inhabitants, and adapted to the state of the earth as it then was, have appeared, and played their part, and have vanished for ever. For the latter of these points, those who would readjust Christianity and the Bible demand that the Mosaic record, which describes the appearing of *man* upon the earth at about six thousand years ago, shall be so far set aside as to allow the Egyptian records to be regarded as authoritative, and to admit, if necessary, no small part of the hitherto rejected records of the Hindoos in regard to the ancient history of their race.

The former of these, as we have seen, has been readily conceded by the Christian world. The friends of the Bible see no reason why all that the geologist asks in this respect should not be granted, and are willing that the general statement in Gen. i. 1, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth," should be laid as far back as the geologist may demand. They are willing to give to geologists ample time for the slowest possible evolution of things upon the earth, and for the most gradual of the processes by which they suppose that the earth was wrought into its present form.

It is now demanded that the other point shall also be conceded, and the authors of the "Essays and Reviews" have undertaken the task of shewing that it *must* be conceded; the *Westminster Review* assumes it as an undoubted fact that the race has existed upon the earth for that long period, and that the Mosaic record is false. In the apprehension of the writers of that *Review* this is no longer a matter of doubt, but may be spoken of as among the settled points pertaining to the past—a point as clear as the existence of the earth itself during the long periods claimed by scientific geologists. The Chevalier Bunsen demands a period of "twenty thousand years" as requisite to explain the "changes of commerce" which have occurred upon the earth; the rise and fall of the governments which have existed; the changes of language, and the development of the physical features of the race. He thinks that he finds evidence of this in the Egyptian records. Vice-Principal Williams, as we have seen in the quotation which we have made from the "Recent Inquiries in Theology" (pp. 61-63), is disposed to concede all that is thus demanded.

Now, whatever credit *may* be due to the Egyptian Records,

as interpreted by Lepsius and Bunsen, there are some things, on this general subject, which will make it not altogether easy for the world to embrace this view, and which may shew that all the *credulity* in the world is not on the side of those who are willing to believe the records of the Bible.

There are, then, *besides* those Egyptian records as thus interpreted, no such memorials of those ancient times as we have a right to expect to find, *if* the race of man has been upon the earth for a period of twenty thousand years. All the records of *history* terminate at a period long subsequent to that. No authentic records go back to a period *beyond* that assigned for the appearance of man upon the earth in the Mosaic records. The Bible states the manner in which man appeared upon the earth, and describes the origin of nations, and the first settlement of the different parts of the world. That account is a statement on that point, clear, and plain, and natural enough, for we see how, *according to that account*, the different nations of the earth *may* have sprung up, and how the fact of the different locations of the nations, and the diversities of language, customs, and laws *may* be explained. The statement has, moreover, this element of probability, that in many of those nations the *names* which were originally given to individuals, as stated in the Bible, have been perpetuated in the nations which have descended from them. The account in the tenth chapter of Genesis, apparently quite a dry and uninteresting account—almost as much so as the enumeration of the Grecian hosts at the siege of Troy, in the first book of the Iliad—is one of the most remarkable records in the world; for, taking that as a basis, it is easy to account for the origin of nearly all the ancient nations, and to explain how it was that the earth was peopled. But, setting the Bible aside, and relying simply on the records of the earliest profane histories, nothing is more confused, tangled, and inexplicable than the early history of this world. Take away the history of the past which we have in the Bible, and there are at least some two thousand years of the history of the race—even supposing that man appeared upon the earth at so late a period as that assigned by Moses—of which we know nothing, and that, too, the *forming* period, and in many respects the most interesting period of the history of the world. Begin, in the investigation of past events, when ancient profane history begins, and we are plunged into the midst of a state of affairs of whose origin we know nothing, and where the mind wanders in perfect night, and can find no rest. Kingdoms are seen, but no one can tell by whom they were founded; cities appear, whose origin no one knows; heroes are playing their part in the great and mysterious drama, but no one tells us whence they came, and what are their de-

signs ; a race of beings appears upon the earth, whose origin is unknown, and the past periods of whose existence no one can determine—a race formed no one can tell when, or for what purpose, or by what hand. Vast multitudes of creatures are suffering and dying for causes which no one can explain, and generations, in their own journey to the grave, tread over the monuments of extinct generations, and with the memorials of fearful changes and convulsions in the past all around them, of which no one can give an account. Begin the knowledge of the past at the remotest period to which profane history would conduct us, and we are in the midst of chaos, and we cannot advance a step without plunging into deeper night—a night strikingly resembling that of which the oldest poet in the world speaks when he describes the abode of the dead : “A land of darkness and the shadow of death ; a land of darkness as darkness itself ; and of the shadow of death, without any order, and where the light is as darkness” (Job x. 21, 22). The history of the world—of the whole world—in this respect, is much like the history of the tribes that wandered in the wilds of America when the western world was disclosed to the eyes of Europeans. Who could tell what was their origin ? Who could recover their history ? Who could explain whence, or how, or why they came ? Who can do it now ? The Bible *states*, at least, the way in which the race began, and professes to shew how those nations, which, at the oldest period of profane history, we find already organised, and in some degree civilised, were originated ; by whom those cities were built ; who the heroes *are* that are playing their part in the mysterious drama.

All ancient records, unless it *be* those on which Baron Bunsen relies, and the records of India, agree in regard to the recent origin of nations. They do not even pretend to carry up their own history to a remote period. The Greeks, for example, acknowledge most freely the recent origin of their own, and their indebtedness to others. Herodotus (Book ii. 50, 51) admits that his countrymen derived a great part of what they possessed from Egypt. Lord Bacon well remarks in regard to the ancient “fables,”—as he justly calls them—of Egypt itself, as thus coming to our times modified by Grecian genius, “The writings that relate these fables being not delivered as inventions of these writers, but as things before believed and received, appear like a soft whisper from the traditions of more ancient nations, conveyed through the flutes of the Grecians.”

Meantime there are no monumental records of those far-distant times—those remote ages beyond the period of the Mosaic record when, according to the theory to which the Bible is to be adjusted, nations played their parts—of those portions

of the "twenty thousand years" in the past which lie back of the Mosaic record of the creation of man. There are no records on papyrus, parchment, lead, or rock, to preserve the transactions of those marvellous ages. There are no poems or histories composed then; no orations delivered then. There are no remains of cities or towns. There are no tombstones, no sarcophagi, no *mummies* that were then swathed up, and kept to excite our wonder, or to give us information in these latter days. There are no implements of war or peace; no battle-axes; no helmets or shields; no arrow-heads of flint; no chisels or hammers of stone; no remains of aqueducts or bridges; no towers or pyramids; *no human bones*. All, if they ever existed, have been swept away. The ancient monstrosities of the earth, in the forms of the Plesiosaurian and Ichthyosaurian races, have been preserved; serpents, crocodiles, alligators, have been kept; the footprints of enormous birds now unknown to man have been found as they were made in the soft sand, and then solidified into stone; shells in abundance have been preserved, and the cabinets of the learned world are full of the fossil remains of extinct generations, by which, in far distant ages and times,

" Air, water, earth,
By fowl, fish, beast, was flown, was swam, was walked ;"

but not one genuine bone of *man*—prince or peasant; African, Indian, Mongolian, Caucasian; not one pure, undisputed specimen of a human being that lived—that laughed or cried—that built a city or a tent—that married a wife—that caught a fish, or that killed a deer—in all those "twenty thousand years."

Now, what we are required to believe, in this readjustment of Christianity, is, that all these generations of human beings, so varied and so numerous, and with this long period for development and improvement, lived through so many thousand years, and passed away, leaving to future ages no record whatever of their having lived, unless it be in the records of India or the hieroglyphics of Egypt; that they built no cities, the foundations or remains of which can be discovered; that they found out no arts by which their memory could be perpetuated; that they invented no methods of keeping up the knowledge of their existence, on lead, or rocks, or parchment; that they made no such use of iron or the precious metals as to preserve the remembrance of their having lived; that they reared no monuments that have survived to tell who they were; that, after an existence of "twenty thousand years," they passed away, leaving the world in the rude state in which, according to the testimony of all the historical records on which

the world has hitherto relied, it was found at the beginning of authentic history ; and that all the arts of which we have any knowledge—of war or peace—of poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture—have had their origin, *somehow*, since the period assigned in the Mosaic records to the origin of mankind. *Credat Judæus Apella !*

In the mean time we are also required to believe that the lowest races—the monsters of the ancient geological world—the Dinotherium, the Megatherium, and the Pterodactyls—the monster, “qualified for all services and all elements,” that, like Milton’s “Fiend,”

“O’er bog or steep, through strait, rough, dense, or rare,
With head, hands, wings or feet, pursues his way,
And swims, or sinks, or wades, or creeps, or flies”—

that enormous and shapeless birds—tadpoles—oysters—centipedes—have somehow contrived to preserve the memory of their having *lived*, and appear again in the museums of science, so preserved that their forms can be determined ; that their habits can be described ; that the age when they appeared can be ascertained ; and that the causes why they disappeared can be stated with accuracy ; but man—proud, intelligent, warlike, Godlike man ; man, that subdues the world ; that builds cities ; that employs metals to accomplish his purposes ; that has control over iron, and gold, and brass—in all those twenty thousand years found out nothing to perpetuate the memory of his being, and suffered all the means of informing future ages that he lived upon the earth to “slip through his fingers,” save what a few old priests in Egypt sketched, in strange and mysterious forms, to be interpreted by two very respectable Germans, Lepsius and Bunsen, in the nineteenth century of the Christian era. Verily it may be presumed that *all* credulity will not have passed away from the earth when the last believer in revelation shall have died—when the last man that supposed that Moses made a true record shall, by death, have escaped from the ridicule of the “scientific” world.

3. The third point which it is demanded shall be surrendered, in order to the readjustment of Christianity, pertains to the origin of species. What that demand is, we have stated above.

There are no opinions more absurd than many which have been held by “scientific” men. With all that there is that is bounded, and fixed, and accurate in true science, yet a collection of the theories advanced and the opinions held by men of “science” in different periods of the world, would have much more the aspect of wild romance than the Arabian Nights, and would surpass in absurdity the wildest legends of the

Talmud. Each age has its own theories ; and it is remarkable that the general progress of the world does nothing to check and restrain men in the suggestions of absurdities, and in the fact that they find believers in the age in which they are proposed.*

The theory which we are required now to believe, and to which the Bible is to be adjusted, is, that the different beings on the earth had no original prototype that could properly be regarded as the head of existing species ; that the orders of animated beings are separated by no fixed and impassable limits ; that any one, under certain circumstances, may melt away in its peculiarity, and be moulded into another ; that vegetables may become mollusca, and mollusca quadrupeds, fishes, or fowls, men ; that there was no original centre of creation for each of the orders of beings now on the earth, but that they have sprung up by spontaneous generation, or by successive acts of creation, or by development, at various convenient centres on the earth or in the waters ; that all the varieties of species on the earth, including man, are the results of "struggles" carried on for indefinite ages, in which countless millions of the "weaker" have become extinct, while the "stronger" have survived, to engage in new "struggles" for the development of new orders of species ; and that, in fact, *all* the varieties of beings on the earth *may*, by a more profound analysis, be found to have sprung from a single "monad," in its struggles to develop itself, and to originate new forms of being. This is the latest form of belief, as presented, with great learning, by Dr Darwin "On the Origin of Species."

This view appeals to man's *faith* ; we will not now say to his credulity. It presents, however, some propositions to be believed of such a nature, that when a man *has* received them, he has come to the *Ultima Thule* of faith. Beyond the exercise of the faith which will be required to receive this theory, there will be little or nothing to stagger him in any doctrine of revealed religion ; in the doctrine of transubstantiation ; or in the revelations of Swedenborg. For, according to this theory, elephants, and tadpoles, and men ; Bacon, Newton, Plato, the orang-ou-tang and the ape ; the lizard, the scorpion, the oyster : the oak, the cedar, the apple, the laurel, and the bramble ; the hero of a hundred battles, and the mastiff snarling over his bone ; the hunter, the dog with which he hunts, and the animal which he captures and kills ; the angler, the worm with which he baits his hook, and the fish which

* Nihil tam absurde dici potest, quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum.—
Cicero, *De Divinatione*, ii. 58.

he catches and devours ; the malt that lay in the "House that Jack built," and the rat that ate the malt, and the cat that caught the rat, and the dog that worried the cat, and the cow that tossed the dog, and the maiden "all forlorn" that milked the cow, and the man all "tattered and torn" that wooed the maiden, and the priest "all shaven and shorn" that married the man—all are derived from the same origin ; all are the results of the "strugglings" of the "strongest" in the formation of "species ;" all have, in fact, come from one little "monad," in its "struggles" to develop itself.

It has often happened, it may therefore happen again, that in the warfare which science, "so called," has waged against Christianity, the defenders of infidel principles have become engaged in a warfare with each other, and, so far as the Bible is concerned, the issue of the conflict may be safely left with them. It was, not long since, maintained, and it is still maintained in many quarters, that the diversities in the human race are so great that it is impossible that all can have been descended from one pair, and that, consequently, the account of the unity of the race in the Bible must be false. Accordingly, it has been held that there have been different "centres" of creation, or "development," in regard to the races of men ; that the Caucasian, the Mongolian, the Ethiopian, and the American races have had each a distinct ancestry and origin ; and that although they have, in many respects, the characteristics which distinguish man from the beast, yet that they are in fact separate, and can be called a *race* only as having certain properties in common. This was the argument of Messrs Nott and Gliddon ; this has long since been assumed as one of the settled matters of science by the *Westminster Review* ; and this has been received with special avidity by the advocates of slavery, as justifying the subordination of the African to the Caucasian race.

It is now maintained, however, by Dr Darwin, and *this* theory, also, is endorsed and commended by the *Westminster Review*, that, so far from its being true that the diversities in the *human* race are so great that they could not have had the same origin, or that the different races or "species" could not have been derived from one pair, it is a fact that *all* the "species" on earth, all the diversities of existence, have been produced by the "strugglings" of the strongest, and can all be traced to a single "pair," or even to a "monad," in its efforts to develop itself. According to *this* theory, therefore, the believer in the unity of the human race, as stated by Moses, must be *quite safe* in supposing it possible that the Caucasian and African races *may* have sprung from a single pair.

In the mean time, until these "Doctors shall agree," and
VOL. XII.—NO. XLIII.

D

shall inform us which of these theories is to be believed, it may be prudent for the world to act as if the Bible gave the true account of the matter ; and it may be regarded as wise to act on the opinion generally entertained by mankind, that in the origin of things there *was* a diversity ; that the different departments of the material, the vegetable, and the animal kingdom had separate and fixed boundaries, now ascertainable by science ; and that Lavoisier, and Linnæus, and Buffon, have been endeavouring to develop laws actually existing and operative *in* the different departments of the works of nature. It is true that it is not easy to mark the *exact* boundaries between the mineral, the vegetable, and the animal kingdoms, but there *are* such boundaries ; it is true that it is not easy to arrange and define the different genera, orders, and classes *in* any one of those kingdoms, and that the work is not yet done, but it has been commenced, as every well-arranged museum will shew.

But, though it is not easy to shew exactly where one department ends and another begins ; where the laws of chemistry cease, and the laws of vegetable life begin ; where the laws of vegetable life cease, and the laws of animal life begin ; where the kingdom of instinct ends, and the functions of rational life begin, yet there *is* such a limit ; and God, not nature, has so determined the boundary that it cannot be passed. In the world of matter, there are sixty or more original elements made known to us by chemistry, where the boundaries between those elements are so *fixed* that they cannot be passed ; where the one cannot be transmuted into another ; where, however it may unite in combination with others, it remains the same. The oxygen does not become hydrogen, nor the hydrogen nitrogen, nor the nitrogen carbon ; lead does not become iron, nor iron tin, silver, or gold ; gold does not become platinum, nor platinum potassium, nor potassium sodium, nor sodium barium or strontium. However these, any or all of them, may be combined, in the ocean or the atmosphere—in the violet, the oak, the oyster, the panther, or in man—they *are* oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon, lead, iron, tin, silver, gold, platinum, potassium, sodium, barium, strontium still ; and when any of them are combined with *life*, and the life which has detached them from their original chemical combinations, and united them in a new form, ceases, they return unchanged into their original forms. A bramble may be cultivated, but it will never become a rose ; and the sensitive plant, though it shrinks, as if with virgin modesty and purity, from the most delicate touch, is not a nerve, nor can it be converted into a nerve. The “philosopher’s stone” has not been discovered, nor will it be ; but gold will remain gold, and the baser metals will remain baser metals for ever, after all the labours of the alchemists and

the chemists. We think, therefore, that "the way is not yet prepared" for the adjustment of the Bible to the idea that there have been different "centres" for the creation of man; or that the varieties of the human race have had a different origin; or that all the diversities of "species" on the earth are but the results of the "struggles" of the "strongest"—of the crossings and recrossings of a few original pairs made millions of ages ago, or of the throes of parturition of a solitary "monad" in the inconceivably remote part.

4. The fourth point on which, as we have seen, Christianity is to be readjusted, is prophecy. What concession is demanded on this point, or what view is to be taken of prophecy, in order to meet the demands of this period of the world, we have stated above. The so-called prophecies are to be regarded as old oriental poems, full of "symbolism," and happy, in some instances, like Virgil's *Pollio*, or like dreams, by coincidences; or, as having been written after the events, and ingeniously composed in the gorgeous style of eastern imagery, to describe those events as if they were yet to occur; or, when these solutions fail, the aid of mesmerism and clairvoyance is to be called in, and this unknown and mysterious power is to furnish the solution of the difficulty.

It is not to vindicate prophecy that we now write, nor to refer to specific prophecies with reference to their fulfilment. That is a task far beyond what could be accomplished in an article like this, and the consideration of this subject must be looked for in the volumes that have been professedly devoted to the vindication and elucidation of the prophecies. Our remarks must be confined to the solution thus proposed of a great and momentous subject.

(a) That God *can* so enlighten, influence, or control a human mind that the future may be perceived and recorded, no one can doubt. As all this knowledge must be with Him, and there is no absurdity in supposing that he *could* in some way, by visions, or signs, or dreams, or words, communicate it to mankind. To deny this, men must deny everything that properly pertains to the idea of *God*.

(b) That God could not have endowed man—all men—with the power of foreseeing the future, as well as of remembering the past, no one can demonstrate. In the nature of mind there does not seem to be any reason why its power should be limited to the range of the *past*, and not embrace also the *future*. It is undoubtedly a characteristic of the divine mind, that, so far as the idea of *past* and *to come* can be applied to God, the one is as equally before him as the other. In the nature of *mind*, therefore, there is nothing that necessarily confines its powers to the past; and as God made man in his own "image"

in one respect, so he could, if he had so willed, have made him in his own "image" in the other respect also. If it were necessary, it could be shewn that the fact that he has *not* done so is an arrangement of pure benevolence. On the one hand, most valuable objects, it is hardly needful to say, are accomplished in respect to the comfort of man, and to the progress of the world, by the power of treasuring up the results of the experience of individuals, the inventions of past times, and the lessons of history; while, on the other hand, the stimulus to discovery and invention would be paralysed, and individuals would be filled with sadness and sorrow, if the future could be seen as the past can be remembered. For the good of the world, therefore, and for the happiness of individuals, the occasions must be few in which it would be proper to make known to men what so perfectly lies in the divine mind, the knowledge of what is to come.

(c) There is a limit, therefore, affixed to the capacity of the human mind in this direction, and that limit is soon reached. Burke, indeed, in his work on a "Regicide Peace," indicated, with remarkable sagacity, what would be the result of the French Revolution; and, in our own times, Mons. Gasparin has anticipated, with almost prophetic sagacity, in his "Uprising of a Great People," what would occur in our country; but there is, and must be, in each and every such case, a limit in regard to dates and names and details. In like manner, the politician, from his knowledge of men and parties, may often predict, with great moral certainty, what will be the result of an election; but, in order to understand the limits of the human powers in this respect, we must take into account the *failures* in such anticipations, as well as the fulfilments; the new combinations which may be formed, or the results which must depend on the human *will*, whose acting no man can anticipate. On a similar principle it is that a merchant may evince so much natural sagacity; may have such knowledge of the course of trade; may calculate on what may occur so much in advance of what others may be able to anticipate—that he may shape his own course as if he *saw* what would happen. But none of these things furnish an explanation of the prophecies in the Scriptures. They are not mere matters of coincidence, like dreams; they are not bare general statements, for they enter into detail in regard to times, and persons, and places; they are not cases where one prediction is fulfilled, and where many fail—as, for example, in the struggle in regard to "the origin of species," as described by Dr Darwin, there may be a hundred failures before there is one new form of a vegetable or animal thrown off that is strong enough *not* to perish; they are not the statements of one man or one age, in reference to a pos-

sible event ; they are the statements of many men of different ages, one stating one circumstance and another another, yet all relating to the one future event, and all to be combined and arranged, in order to obtain the whole prophetic view—for *the prophetic view of a future event is what it is stated to be by ALL the prophets, as the narrative of a Scripture event is what it is stated to be by ALL the sacred writers*. Thus, in the predictions respecting the Messiah, it is not a single statement made by Moses, or Jacob, or David, or Balaam, or Isaiah, or Daniel, or Malachi ; it is the result of *all* the statements made by these, and by the other prophets—statements scattered at intervals through many ages. These, *when combined*, constitute the *prophetic view* in regard to the Messiah. In asking whether these prophecies have been fulfilled ; whether these varied circumstances of time and place and character—of the Messiah's mode of teaching, his manner of life, and the circumstances of his death, have been found actually in one person, we look at the improbability, the absolute impossibility, that all these should be the result of mere *coincidence*, or that there could have been any *conspiracy* to impose in this manner upon the world. We ask whether it *could* have happened that, in an age lying far back in the past, one man should have thrown out a most obscure *hint* in regard to a future deliverer, and then in another age another pretended prophet should have improved upon the hint by suggesting a new circumstance and then another and another should have added a suggestion in itself equally obscure, until, in a far distant future, the *idea* of the Messiah should have become so complete that a cunning impostor could embody them all, and carry them out in his own life, in an attempt to impose upon mankind. Cuvier, indeed, was able to “reconstruct” an animal of an extinct race ; that is, from a single bone, or from a few fossil remains found in certain localities, he could throw the mind back, perhaps for tens of thousands of years, and tell when the animal lived, what was its form, and what were its habits : but is that the way in which the Apollo Belvidere, and the Laocoon, and the Dying Gladiator have been formed ? Was it true that, in far distant times, remote from each other, and with no knowledge of any general purpose to *form* an Apollo, or such a group of statuary as the Laocoon, or such a figure as the Dying Gladiator, one artist gave a hint about an arm, and another about a foot, and another about an eye, and another about the position, until the whole figure *could* be combined by the future sculptor ? Is it true that, in regard to the cartoons of Raphael, and the Last Judgment of Michael Angelo, they are the results of the imaginings of numerous artists, scattered through many ages, with no general conception of the design, and with no

knowledge of the intention of each other ; that one ancient artist has given a hint in regard to such future paintings, and another another, in almost endless variety, until, long after all were dead, some cunning artist, Raphael or Michael Angelo, gathered all these hints together, and combined them in the splendid works of art that now adorn the Vatican ? Not thus were those immortal works made ; not thus could they have been made : and yet we are asked, by those who deny the truth of the prophecies in regard to the Messiah, to believe what would be much more improbable than this ; not a prediction respecting a piece of statuary, or a painting, but respecting a living man—a messenger sent from God ; one who had an individuality, a will, a character, an origin, a rank, such as no other one has ever had who has appeared among mortal men.

In reference to the Scripture prophecies, and the proposed mode of adjusting the faith of the world in regard to them, we have two things to add to what we have already said.

One is, that the principles advocated by the "Essayists," by the Chevalier Bunsen, and by the German Rationalists generally, would destroy all faith in ancient records, and reduce nearly all the ancient literature in the world to fable and myth. The world has not forgotten the literary scepticism first applied by Wolf to the works of Homer, and the fact that among those of that school it is still a question whether any such man as Homer ever lived. The same principles of literary scepticism which have been applied to the ancient classics, it is proposed to apply to the Hebrew sacred literature, and with no more reason in the one case than in the other. The genuineness of the writings of the Hebrew prophets is as firmly established as the genuineness of any other ancient writings, and the principles of criticism which would destroy confidence in the genuineness of the works ascribed to Moses, to Isaiah, to Daniel, would annihilate all confidence in the genuineness and authenticity of Thucydides and Herodotus, of Homer and Virgil, of Sallust, Livy, or Tacitus. No literary facts are better established than that Moses, Isaiah—alike in his earlier prophecies and in his later prophecies (chaps. 40–66)—Daniel, Jeremiah, and Malachi, wrote long before the events occurred to which their predictions are applicable, and the principle which would call these in question would introduce universal literary scepticism.

The other remark which we have to offer on the subject of the prophecies is, that either their inspiration must be admitted, or the facts of the case must be explained by mesmerism and clairvoyance. We have seen that the Chevalier Bunsen admitted the reality of this pretended power, and applied it to the explanation of the prophecies of the Old Testament, and

to this he was driven by the necessity of the case. He was not prepared altogether to abandon faith in the writings of the prophets, or to maintain that they were forgeries of a later date, and hence he was compelled to adopt some theory by which the apparent fulfilment of the prophecies could be accounted for. It was clear that revealed predictions were beyond the limits of natural sagacity; it did not occur to him to adopt the solution suggested by Vice-Principal Williams ("Essays and Reviews," p. 79, Am. Ed.), when he says of his belief in clairvoyance, "One would wish he might have intended only the power of seeing the ideal in the actual, or of tracing the divine government in the movements of men." Whatever that may mean, he was not willing to be a universal sceptic, and hence he adopted the theory of mesmerism and clairvoyance as a solution of the mystery. Now, we maintain that one or the other of these theories *must* be adopted by those who would readjust Christianity on the principles of the authors of the "Essays and Reviews." Either *all* faith in ancient records must be destroyed, or some such solution as that of clairvoyance or mesmerism must be resorted to, for the predictions in the prophets are clearly beyond the limits of any natural sagacity possessed by man.

5. The fifth point on which it is proposed to readjust Christianity relates to miracles. What the demand on this point is, we have stated above. The fundamental idea in the position taken by the authors of the "Essays and Reviews," by Bunsen, by the Westminster Review, and by the rejecters of miracles in general, is derived from the supposed fixedness, stability, and unchangeableness of the physical laws by which the universe is controlled, as established by science. It does not differ essentially from the position assumed by Mr Hume, and to whose reasoning on the subject no substantial addition has been made by the labours of subsequent writers: "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof of a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.* Of this it is well remarked by Prof. Mansel (Aids to Faith, p. 21), that "the argument, as thus stated, was just as strong or just as weak at the day when it was written as at the present time; it has received no additional strength from the progress of science during the interval; indeed, it is hard to see how the evidence of 'a firm and unalterable experience,' if such existed at any time, is capable of being made stronger." All that could be said in addition would be, that, since the days of Hume, science

* Philosophical Works, vol. iv. p. 133.

has lent its aid in *establishing* the unalterable nature of those laws ; in extending them into regions and worlds at his time unknown ; in reducing under fixed laws phenomena which in his time seemed to be beyond the range of strict observation ; in diminishing, as science has advanced, the number of marvels. Thus the mysteries of the Middle Ages were dispelled by the science of the fifteenth century (see Brewster's "Natural Magic") ; and thus from the experience of the past it may be presumed that much still that has the appearance of the marvellous may, by a more profound analysis, and by more accurate and extended observation, be reduced to the operation of strict and accurate law.

It is not our purpose to enter on any general examination of this subject, or to repeat what has been so well said by Campbell, by Dr Thomas Brown, by Prof. Mansel, and others, in reply to this argument. We shall merely offer a few remarks on the question whether *it is an ascertained fact* that the world progresses under the operation of fixed and uniform laws.

The essential idea of a miracle is, that God interposes, on fit occasions, to accomplish anything *by his own direct power*, without reference to the "laws of nature," or to his ordinary mode of securing results. The real question at issue is, whether God, in ordaining the "laws of nature," has reserved to himself the right of interposing by direct acts of his power in accomplishing his purposes, or whether the world advances *solely* by the operation of those laws ; that is, whether there are any events in the progress of things which can be traced *only* to direct divine interposition.

(a) The first point here would be, of course, the question whether any such certain and fixed stability of "the laws of nature" has been ascertained. When it is said that this has been ascertained by "experience," if the word has any meaning, it must refer to experience that *embraces the whole subject* ; that is, in relation to *all* the events to which the question of such uniformity would be applicable. But it is clear that among men there has been no such experience. There have been, and are, many events that lie quite beyond any such range of observation hitherto made ; there are, undeniably, many things which have not as yet been reduced to any known laws, and it is yet an open question whether they can be ; that is, whether the powers of men are adequate to the inquiry, and whether, if they are thus adequate, the events are of such a nature that they can be reduced to regular and fixed laws. In the earlier periods of the world there were many things that passed under the name of "miracles" and wonders—phenomena which there were then no ways of accounting for—whose causes

are now familiar to us, for in the ruder ages of the world they seemed to lie wholly in the regions of the marvellous and the miraculous. As science advances, the circle of those marvellous works is contracted, and a large part of those wonders are reduced to the dominion of known laws. It is but recently that the whole subject of electricity was in this condition as viewed by the human mind; it is but recently that the phenomena connected with it have been reduced to the control of law. The laboratory of a chemist now exhibits many a phenomenon, which in the Middle Ages would have been classed among the marvellous, now reduced to the regular operation of law; and it cannot be doubted that there may be yet in nature many a secret power that has not yet been made the subject of scientific observation, or been brought under the general word "*experience*." It cannot be regarded as improbable that many of these things *will* thus be carefully observed, arranged, and classified, and that they will be found to be under the control of fixed and unchanging *laws*; but the world is not yet far enough advanced to justify the assertion that the "*experience*" of mankind extends to *all* these things. Still less was it proper to assert this in the time of Mr Hume.

(b) The next remark to be made is, that there is an utter improbability, amounting now to absolute certainty on the subject, that science ever *will* make such advances as to bring within the range of natural and fixed laws the things *alleged* to have been performed by the Saviour and the apostles. There have been no forces developed in nature; there have been no discoveries in the laboratory of the chemist; there have been no occult powers laid open by well ascertained principles of science, by mesmerism, or by any kindred power, that will produce what is said to have been produced by Jesus of Nazareth—the healing of the sick, the giving of sight to the blind, the restoration of hearing to the deaf, or the raising of the dead, by a word. This thought, which seems to us a very important one in its bearing on the subject, we cannot better express than in the words of Prof. Mansel:—

"In one respect, indeed, the advance of physical science tends to strengthen rather than to weaken our conviction of the supernatural character of the Christian miracles. In whatever proportion our knowledge of physical causation is limited, and the number of unknown agents comparatively large, in the same proportion is the probability that some of the unknown causes, acting in some unknown manner, may have given rise to the alleged marvels. But this probability diminishes when each newly-discovered agent, as its properties become known, is shewn to be inadequate to the production of the supposed effects, and as the residue of unknown causes which might produce them, becomes smaller and smaller.

We are told, indeed, that 'the inevitable progress of research must, within a longer or shorter period, unravel all that seems most marvellous;' but we may be permitted to doubt the relevancy of this remark to the present case, until it has been shewn that the advance of science has in some degree enabled men to perform the miracles performed by Christ. When the inevitable progress of research shall have enabled men of modern times to give sight to the blind with a touch, to still tempests with a word, to raise the dead to life, to die themselves, and to rise again, we may allow that the same causes might possibly have been called into operation two thousand years earlier, by some great man in advance of his age. But until this is done, the unravelling of the marvellous in other phenomena only serves to leave these mighty works in their solitary grandeur, as wrought by the finger of God, unapproached and unapproachable by all the knowledge and all the power of man.

"In proportion as the science of to-day surpasses that of former generations, so is the improbability, that any man could have done in past times, by natural means, works which no skill of the present age is able to imitate. The two classes of phenomena rest in fact on exactly opposite foundations. In order that natural occurrences, taking place without human agency, may wear the appearance of prodigies, it is necessary that the cause and manner of their production should be *unknown*; and every advance of science from the unknown to the known tends to lessen the number of such prodigies by referring them to natural causes, and *increases* the probability of a similar explanation of the remainder. But on the other hand, in order that a man may perform marvellous acts by natural means, it is necessary that the cause and manner of their production should be *known* by the performer; and in this case every fresh advance of science from the unknown to the known *diminishes* the probability that what is unknown now could have been known in a former age."

—Aids to Faith, pp. 21, 22, 23.

This thought is also admirably illustrated in the "Replies to Essays and Reviews," in the article on miracles, in answer to the article of Baden Powell, "On the Study of the Evidences of Christianity," by the Rev. C. A. Heurtley. We have not space to give an abridgment of this article, or even to make an extract from it, but we commend the whole of it as worthy of profound attention. (Replies, &c., pp. 125-176).

(c) The next remark which we make is, as a sequence from what has been just said, that the effect of true progress in science in regard to the miracles of Scripture, is to demonstrate that the hypothesis which refers them to "unknown" natural causes is utterly baseless, and to establish the fact that if the events occurred they were *real* miracles. The only possible opinions in regard to the miracles of the New Testament are, that they were not performed at all; or that they were performed, as those who wrought them declare, in virtue of a

supernatural power, and in attestation of their own divine mission; or that they "are distorted statements of events reducible to known natural causes." This latter was the solution suggested by Paulus, who proposed to explain them on "naturalistic" principles. This theory has been abandoned even in Germany, the land of its birth, and is not likely to be revived there again. There remains, therefore, for mankind, only the "choice between a deeper faith and a bolder unbelief" (Mansel), and to one or other of these the world is advancing. It can never rest on the intermediate theory proposed by the authors of the "Essays and Reviews," and whatever may be the result in regard to the general faith of mankind on the subject, it is plain that the principles of true science will not allow the human mind to rest there. The miracles as referred to in the New Testament are put for ever beyond the possibility of being explained by natural causes, or the operation of the laws of nature. If they occurred, they were direct interventions of divine power. There is not the slightest approximation in the progress of science towards any "laws" by which the eyes of the blind can be opened and the ears of the deaf unstopped, and by which the dead can be raised, by a word.

(d) Our next remark, therefore, is, that, as bearing in an important manner on this subject, there is a sense in which it is very common that the "laws of nature," so fixed and determined, are set aside, or are "*violated*" by the action of other "laws of nature," or are held absolutely in check as long as those other laws prevail. When the lightning strikes a tree "it puts an end to all the orderly development of vegetation," and seems to be a bare conflict of "force with law." Yet it is also true that the lightning follows a law of its own, and that law seems to conflict with law, and that there are meteorologic laws to which both the lightning and the vegetation are subject.—(Tracts for Priests and People, p. 342.) The same thing is true when the wind raises up the waters of the ocean and piles them in mountains, or when the vapour is upborne and carried by the clouds over valleys and hills, or when the dust of the earth is raised up by the whirlwind—in each case suspending or "*violating*" for the time the law of gravitation—the most universal law in nature. The result is perhaps still more manifested in the principle of *life*—that mysterious and unknown principle which seems to have the power of suspending or "*violating*" during its continuance all the physical laws of nature. By that principle, the chemical elements which enter into the composition of the lofty oak are detached from their natural connections; the chemical laws which united them before are suspended; they enter into new

combinations, constituting now the component parts of a tree—the organic structure, the fibre, the bark, the branch, the leaf, the fruit, and they are held there by all the power needful to lift up the enormous mass from the earth, and to keep it steadfast against the influence of tempests and storms for generations, until the principle of life is extinct, and then, and not before, the chemical laws resume their power, and the old oak returns to gases and earths under the operation of those chemical laws. The same thing is still more strikingly manifest in the *animal* structure, under the principle of life. The elements that make up the human body—carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, lime, iron, sulphur, sodium, potassium, magnesium—are all detached from their natural chemical connections in the air, the earth, the waters, the animal, the vegetable, the mineral world, and are formed into an entirely *new* combination of bone, sinew, nerves, muscle, with a definite size and shape, until *life* decays, and *then* the natural chemical laws resume their functions, and the human frame is resolved into its natural elements. The chemical laws begin *at once* to react as soon as *life* departs, and those laws *act* until every particle that composed the human frame enters under chemical laws into natural inorganic combinations, or under some *new* principle of life, vegetable or animal, the process is arrested midway, and new forms of life appear. All over the earth, therefore, on the land, in the water, in the air, nothing is more common than that what are called the “fixed and uniform laws of nature,” those laws which Mr Hume informs us “*a firm and unalterable experience has established*,” are in fact suspended, “violated,” held in check, by this principle of life. That a higher power than *life* may not suspend them; that even the principles which regulate *life itself* may not be suspended, has not been established by a “firm and unalterable experience.”

(e) Our next remark is, that in order to a proper understanding of this subject, it is necessary to take into consideration the element of the *will*, and the power consequent on that, in reference to the “laws of nature.” However fixed and settled those laws may be, the power of the will in man is constantly operating to suspend or interrupt them; that is, is constantly producing effects which are not to be traced to regular and fixed laws, and which never would be produced by those laws. In other words, the effects in the case are not produced by laws of nature, but the laws of matter are, for the time, as really *disturbed* as in the case of a miracle, and only fail of striking us as being as remarkable and perplexing, because they are matters of constant occurrence. It may be said, indeed, that the *will* is itself subject to fixed laws,

and that, after all, the effects are produced by regular and fixed laws; but, whatever may be true of that in reference to the *human* will, it is no more true than in reference to the *divine* will, and the difficulty in the one case is, as to this point, the same as in the other. In either case it is the introduction of a new *power*, apart from the power of force in the physical laws of nature, which are regarded as so settled and fixed—"the work of an agent wholly independent of those laws, and who, therefore, neither obeys nor disobeys them." For the time being, and so far as the result is concerned, the new agent or the new power sets aside or suspends the operation of those laws, and the result in the case is to be traced to this new and independent power. Whether God has reserved to himself this power and right to *interfere* with the regular laws of matter, as he has actually conferred it on man, is simply a question as to a *fact*, and not at all as to the *possibility* of the thing.

When a man by the exertion of his *will* raises his arm, or walks, or lifts a weight from the earth, he so far, in each case, *suspends* or *overcomes*, for the time, the law of gravitation as to produce an effect which is not to be traced to that law, but which is to be accounted for *wholly* by a power above and regardless of it—the power of the *will*; and in estimating the "*experience*" of the world on the subject in reference to Mr Hume's argument, we are to take *that* fact into the account as a *part* of the "*experience*" of mankind—a matter of "*experience*" quite as common as that pertaining to the "*firm and unalterable experience* which has established those laws." When a man of his own free will throws a stone into the air, "the motion of the stone, as soon as it has left his hand, is determined by a combination of purely natural laws—partly by the attraction of the earth, partly by the resistance of the air, partly by the magnitude and direction of the force by which it was thrown." But by what *law* came it to be thrown at all? By what law of nature fixed, "by an unalterable experience," did it happen that it left its quiet bed on the earth; that the principle of *inertia* was overcome; that the law of gravitation which held it there was for the time interrupted, and that it *commenced* its course through the air? Neither the law of gravitation, by itself, nor all the laws of nature put together, would ever have caused it to leave the ground and commence this flight through the air, but all the "*laws of nature*" in fact combined to *resist* this, as really as the "*laws of nature*" combined to resist the raising up of Lazarus to life, or the "*laws of nature*" in the Sea of Tiberias combined to keep up the storm, and to resist the power of Jesus who commanded the winds and the waves to be still. It re-

remains to be proved that when God's free will interposes to produce effects which are to be traced to that will alone, there is more *real* violation of the laws of nature than there is when the human will interposes and produces changes which are to be traced to that will alone. It may be further added, that if the will of man *does* produce such disturbances and interruptions of the laws of nature, then so far from its being true, as Mr Hume says, that "a firm and unalterable experience has established those laws," it is true that there is almost nothing that is more *liable* to be unsettled and changed, or that nothing is more common than that there are effects which are not to be traced to those laws.

(f) Our final remark is, that the progress of our world and, as far as we know, of the universe, has not been uniformly under the operation of regular and fixed laws. We mean that there are evidences of divine interposition apart from the operation of regular laws, and that the results are such as cannot be traced to those laws, but are to be traced to a direct divine interposition, and *therefore* miracles are not absurd or improbable.

There are two methods by which, subsequent to the act of creation, the existing state of things on the earth and in the universe at large, has been produced—the one by development, the other by the institution of a new order of things which, in no proper sense, can be the result of any antecedents in nature, but which must be traced to a new interposition of power.

That the former—that of *development*—exists, no one can doubt, and it cannot be denied that this is the regular and usual course of events: that is, there is something which in the order of nature *precedes* the effect; which is the *cause* of it, or which *measures* it; which contains, in embryo, all that is produced. Thus the germ in the acorn is developed into the oak, and the ovum is developed into the crocodile, the ostrich, or the barnyard-fowl; and thus the slumbering powers of the infant are developed into the physical strength, the poetic genius, or the eloquence of the man. In *all* such cases there is nothing *produced* which is not a fair *unfolding* of what preceded; nothing which is the result of mere power *ab extra*. The precise *limit* of this class of operations in nature has not yet been fixed. It is well known that attempts have been made to explain all the phenomena of the universe on this principle. The author of the "Vestiges of Creation" regards this as a sufficient explanation of the origin of the worlds and systems which compose the universe; Dr Darwin supposes that the varieties of "species" on the earth can be explained on this principle; and in this manner it is supposed—as may be true—that new worlds are constantly forming, and that the nebu-

lous masses are now resolving themselves into suns and stars. Perhaps it is not within the range of the human powers to determine the exact limits of this process, and it is not material for any purpose connected with revealed religion.

But, while we would concede all that true science can ask on this point, it is still a fact that this is not the sole or main agency by which our world exists as it is now. In very many respects it has made advances—has reached higher elevations, from age to age, by some *new power* that has come in, over and beyond anything that can be regarded as the result of mere *development*, and that can be best explained on the supposition that it is by direct divine interposition. It is rather *per saltum*—by impulse—than by development. It has been by a new act of creation, bringing a new order of beings upon the earth; it has been by some great invention in the arts, putting the affairs of the world on a higher level; it has been by some *new disease* that has materially affected the progress of things; it has been by some new discovery that has enlarged, not by the slow progress of development, but by a sudden impulse, the limits of human knowledge; it has been by bringing upon the earth some man endowed with transcendent gifts, who has materially changed the current of human affairs; it has been by storm, tempest, plague, famine, the best explanation of whose existence *at that time* is that God saw such things to be needful, and arranged their coming by his own wisdom, or sent them by his own direct power.

Thus geologists tell us of successive acts of *creation* before the earth was fitted for the residence of man; of orders of beings that had their day, and that passed off the stage to give place to higher orders in the progress of things. The essential *fact*, which no man properly informed on the subject will deny, is, that races have been entirely swept away, and have been succeeded by others which were, in no proper sense, the *development* of the former; for the Plesiosaurian and Ichthyosaurian races have no *successors* on the earth. The fossil remains of the old geological periods reveal successive *creations*; not successive *developments*. Thus man appeared, at last, not as a *development* of the ourang-outang or the monkey, but as a *new creation*. Thus now also God *creates*, as he pleases, some great mind, and brings it upon the earth, to lift the race to a higher level, and then suffers the race to move on that level, or to *develop* the result of the changes wrought by that great mind, until the occasion shall demand a new manifestation of his power, in lifting the world in this manner from that condition to a higher. So he made the mind of Plato, of Socrates, of Newton, of Bacon, of Pascal, of Edwards, of Shakespeare, of Watt, Fulton, Morse, Columbus, Cuvier, Alfred, Charlemagne,

Washington. As we have before remarked, the mind of Shakespeare was, in no proper sense, a *development* of what existed in the mind of the glover and wool-stapler in Stratford-upon-Avon; nor was there, in any of the progenitors of Newton, anything that could properly be regarded as developed into his great powers. The bringing of such minds upon the earth can be regarded as in no proper sense the "result of a firm and unalterable *experience* in establishing the laws of nature," but is as much the result of a divine agency as the creation of a world, or as the healing of the blind man at the pool of Bethesda.

Thus the world advances by some new invention in the arts that can in no proper sense be regarded as a development of a previous order of things, or as the result of "fixed and certain laws." Such inventions are often the result of a *suggestion* that comes into the mind from some unknown quarter—one of the thousand *suggestions* that may come into a man's mind, that can be traced, by no law of association, to anything existing previously in the mind, and the origin of which no system of mental philosophy will explain. The suggestion which gives birth to the invention is retained in the mind; reflected on; developed; matured; experimented on, *until* the invention appears before the world, modifying human affairs, raising the race to a higher level, lifting it up on a new *steppe* or *plateau*, along which it travels, or by the help of which it rises higher, until some newer invention, still more brilliant and important than that which preceded, shall lift the race to a higher level still, and be the cause of a still higher advancement. Thus the discovery of the art of writing, of printing, of gunpowder; the discovery of the properties of the magnet, of the telescope, of the microscope, of the application of steam, of the telegraph, have successively modified human affairs, and put the condition of the world on an *elevation* from which it is never to descend—not by development, but by a new power.

So some new form of disease occurs in the progress of things, which appears to have all the marks of a direct divine intervention for the accomplishment of important ends in the government of the world. The small-pox, the cholera—in what sense were they a *development* "under the laws of a firm and unalterable experience," as Mr Hume would say? Of what previous disease were they the "development"? Nothing is more certain than that the "experience" of the world was *against* the small-pox and the cholera; and, according to the argument of Mr Hume, all our faith in those diseases has been a delusion.

The cases to which we have thus referred shew that God has not bound himself to govern the world always, and in all cir-

cumstances by the fixed laws of nature; that he has reserved to himself the right to interfere, when he has important ends to accomplish, by his own free will, in some manner corresponding to the fact, though far above it, that *we* thus, by *our* wills, interfere with those laws; that, as there were occasions in which it was proper that he should interfere by new acts of *creative* power in the old geological periods of the world, and when the present order of things was to be inaugurated by the creation of a new order, so he may now interpose by acts of creation in the distant parts of the universe by bringing new worlds into being and new orders of creatures upon them; and that, as there *have been* occasions when the affairs of the world were to be raised to a higher elevation by the creation and endowment of some mind of extraordinary powers, or by some brilliant discovery in science or invention in the arts, so there *may have been* an occasion in which it was proper to interfere by the introduction of a new religion upon the earth, and by attesting its divine origin in so far suspending the established laws of nature as to open the eyes of the blind, to unstop the ears of the deaf, to cause the lame man to leap like a hart, and to raise the dead from their graves.

In conclusion, we would say that we by no means intend to deny that there may be, in our times, occasion for the readjustment of Christianity. We are fully disposed to admit that there may be; but we trust that we have shewn that what is demanded is not that which is suggested by the seven authors of the "Essays and Reviews;" by what would be in the line of the labours of the Chevalier Bunsen; by what would meet the approbation of Unitarians in our country; or by what would be sanctioned by the *Westminster Review*.

ART. II.—*Hippolytus's Homily against Noetus.*

OUR readers may have seen the celebrated painting in which Orpheus is depicted at that bitterest moment of his history, when he turned towards his all but recovered Eurydice, only to see her swept from his embrace to the implacable realms below. The sympathetic pang which they may have felt in looking at this ideal work, will be changed into a pang more sensible and immediately personal, if they engage in the attempt to reconstruct a complete likeness of Hippolytus. After countless and mazy wanderings toward the supposed place of his entombment, and after weary expenditure of the delicate

manipulation of historical criticism, we turn to embrace a perfectly restored Hippolytus, when the very motion of turning seems to shake out of equilibrium the subtle elements, and down from the clear day of ascertained fact, a resistless hand drags him to the mists of the region of the shades. The silence of ancient chroniclers concerning one who was among the most stirring rulers and instructive writers of the early church, is at once remarkable and tantalising. While every one is ready to say something in his praise, no one gives us such details of his history as enable us clearly to see the man, and thoroughly to understand the grounds of his celebrity. With one he is "viridissertissimus;" with another he is "γλυκύτατος; και ιουδίστατος;" but all the magniloquent laudation on record, we would gladly exchange for the simple intimation of the year of his death and the place of his abode. The accuracy of the information that is occasionally dropped from early writers regarding this celebrated but little known individual, is rendered suspicious by the silence of others whom we expect to be better informed; and when we find that even in the age of Eusebius* it was not so much as known in what part of the world he had lived, we are thrown upon the writings of Hippolytus himself for all the information we possess regarding him. And it is satisfactory to find that these writings, and especially his recently discovered work "against all the heresies," are unusually instructive in personal detail. From these writings, and availing ourselves of the learned though not always sufficiently circumspect and deliberate labours of Bunsen, we propose to give, in as few words as possible, a sketch of Hippolytus.

Born during the reign of the last of the good emperors, Hippolytus from the first enjoyed every advantage for the education and exercise of his natural ability. The Roman world was open to him as his school, and out to that school he went, like Justin Martyr and Clement of Alexandria, determined to find some truth in the wide sea of opinion. Viewing with a wise eclecticism all wisdom as existing for his use, he went from place to place, sitting now at the feet of a teacher of Greek philosophy, and now lingering fondly in the school of the aged and attractive Irenæus. The saying of Tertullian, "Peregrinandum nobis in literas orbis," was amply fulfilled by Hippolytus. With enough of the Roman in his nature to mingle frankly with all, and appropriate freely "quod usquam

* Eusebius has been charged with wilful suppression of facts in the case of Hippolytus. We think that this charge is sufficiently refuted by the words of Eusebius (*ἱρίστατος*), in speaking of the church in which he ruled, shewing, as they do, that there was uncertainty in the writer's own mind. The charge, however, shews how natural it is to believe that more *must* have been known than is found recorded.

egregium fuerit,"* he was so much of a Greek as to see all for his own personal development and culture. To him nothing came foreign, because all was Roman; and as he journeyed from land to land and from one centre of influence to another, and found everywhere the same faith and worship, one Christ held to and confessed by all tongues and peoples, his cosmopolitan spirit was gradually ripened to the Christian consciousness of universal brotherhood, and what Hippolytus the Roman might have tolerated through policy or adopted through pride, Hippolytus the Christian sympathised with as human and valued with respect as belonging to Christ. And never was a man's power to sift, select, and adopt, more severely tried than in that very age, when the worn-out philosophies seemed to kindle anew and shoot up an expiring flame, when every absurd system could find willing advocates, when every fanatical leader could number his followers by thousands, and when orthodoxy was but slowly and precariously advancing towards an instructive and defensive form of sound words. Sects innumerable, maintaining every shade of error, from the most obvious misapprehensions of the truth to the wildest, most fantastic, and deplorable perversions of it, sprang up wherever a church was formed. It was a time capable in the highest degree of wrecking a weak spirit or of maturing a strong one. What strange and dreamy theories Hippolytus heard propounded by the sages of Greece, what impossible cosmogonies were given to him by the Neo-Platonists of Alexandria when he asked for science, and what mystic theosophy when he begged religious truth, it is impossible to relate; and were it possible to relate, it would be impossible to believe. That any one ever passed through such a pleasant but dangerous education with perfect safety, we are not prepared to assert. That when all wisdom and truth, along with all folly and error, backed by names synonymous with genius and eloquence, and by associations the most attractive and brilliant, were presented at once to an eager mind, this mind should have chosen only what was true and useful, and rejected, as if by an innate and instinctive power of repulsion, whatever was unreal and deceptive, is a conclusion certainly not warranted by anything we have yet learned of the youthful mind, or observed in the search after truth. And it will scarcely be wondered at, that the young Hippolytus should not have shewn a sagacity of judgment far beyond his years, and a power of rejecting error far ahead of the age on which he was thrown. But whatever confusion and mistake may have been introduced into his

* The Roman state maxim, "Transferendo huc quod usquam egregium fuerit."—*Tacit., Annal. xi. 24.*

mind during his years of pursuit and acquisition, he returned from his travels with his critical and dialectic ability certainly whetted ; with a vast store of information already laid up, and with formed habits of industry, which gave promise of still greater wealth ; with a culture of mind which was rare even in an age which strove, by extra refinement and cultivation, to hide a rapidly diminishing originality and strength ; with his native humour broadened, and his knowledge of man enlightened and matured by his knowledge of men ; with his religious sentiments undisturbed in their practical operation, and his strict integrity and purity of character confirmed rather than relaxed by his frequent change of circumstance, and various opportunity and temptation ; a man of a cheerful, active, and manly spirit, void of all bitterness and hate, but all the rather capable of vehement indignation—the man of all others fit for the place and the work in which he was to spend what he had acquired and become.

A few years before the close of the second century, Hippolytus is acknowledged by the church as a man of worth and influence, and is elected bishop of Portus. His residence in this town, which had superseded Ostia as the harbour of Rome, proved an effectual restraint upon the usurping, heretical, and immoral tendencies of the Roman bishops. In this town he was near enough to the great centre of action to be intimately acquainted with every turn of event, and yet was fortified, as in a citadel of his own, from all interference, and maintained here his presbytery unswayed by Roman influence, and his flock uncontaminated. From the death of Victor, in the year 198, to the termination of the government of Callistus in 222 A.D., Hippolytus was almost solely occupied in maintaining the forms of ecclesiastical government against the innovations, and the orthodox doctrine, against the heresies of Rome. And had there been no such man as Hippolytus provided, a man of thorough intellectual culture and wide information, of calm and commanding spirit and sincere love of the truth, the diseased condition of the metropolitan church would undoubtedly have infected the provinces, and the submission to her proud claim of supremacy would have been anticipated by several ages.

The eloquence with which Hippolytus expounded the great doctrine of the incarnation, and inculcated the benefits resulting from it in an age when Docetism was wide spread, will appear from the following passage of his homily :—

“ In this person, God was manifest in the body, going forth perfect man ; for not in mere appearance (*φarrasia*), nor by change, but truly, did He become man.

“ And so, though he were God, yet did he not refuse any conditions of the humanity he bore. He hungers, and toils, and wearies,

and thirsts in his weariness; he flees through fear, and prays out of tribulation, and he who as God has a sleepless nature, slumbers on a pillow; he shudders at the cup of his passion, though for this end he was present in the world, and in his agony he sweats blood, and is strengthened by an angel, himself strengthening all that believe in him, and by his example he teaches us to overcome the fear of death. He who knew Judas, and what was in him, is betrayed by Judas. By Caiaphas He is dishonoured, who as God had been honoured with sacrifice and offering at the hand of Caiaphas. By Herod He is set at nought who cometh to judge all the earth; and by Pilate He who took on him our diseases is cruelly scourged. By the soldiers He is mocked at whose word thousands of thousands, and ten thousand times ten thousand of angels and archangels stand obedient. By the Jews He who stretched out the heaven as a curtain is stretched on the accursed tree. And the Inseparable from the Father cries to the Father, and commends to him his spirit, and, bowing his head, he gives up the ghost—He who had said, and said truly, ‘I have power to lay down my life, and I have power to take it again.’ And because he was not subdued by death, he said, as being himself the Life, ‘I lay it down of myself.’ The bountiful Giver of all life has his side pierced with a spear, and the Raiser of the dead is wrapped in linen cloth, and laid in a sepulchre, and the third day is raised by the Father, though himself ‘the resurrection and the life.’ All these things has *he* accomplished for us, who for our sakes became as we are. For himself hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows, and for us he was afflicted, as saith the prophet *Esaias*. This is he who was lauded in the hymns of the angels, seen of the shepherds, waited for by Simeon, and witnessed to by Anna. This is he who was sought after by the Magi, and discovered by the star. This is he who lingered in his Father’s house, and was pointed out by John, and was witnessed to by the Father from above in these words, ‘This is my beloved Son, hear ye him.’ This is he who is crowned as the conqueror of the devil. This is Jesus of Nazareth, who was invited to the marriage in Cana, and changed the water into wine, and rebuked the sea when it raged under the violence of the winds, and walked upon the sea as on the dry land, and gave sight to him that was born blind, and raised up Lazarus, four days dead, and performed manifold mighty works, and forgave sins, and gave power to his disciples. Blood and water flowed from his holy side when pierced with the spear. For his sake the sun is darkened, and the day has no light, the rocks are cleft, and the veil is rent. The foundations of the earth are shaken, the graves are opened, and the dead arise, and the rulers are ashamed when they see upon the cross the controller of all nature drooping his head and yielding up the ghost. Creation sees and is troubled, and unable to approach and view his exceeding glory, shrinks into darkness. This is he who breathed the Spirit upon the disciples, and enters among them, the doors being shut; who is taken up into the heavens, a cloud receiving him out of their sight; who is set down at the right hand of the Father, and comes as judge of quick and dead. This is

God, who for our sakes became man, and to whom the Father hath made all things subject. To him be glory and might, with the Father and the Holy Ghost, in the holy church, both now and always, even for evermore. Amen."

Hippolytus was the great champion of the truth at a very critical epoch. In Rome, every heresiarch was sure of finding followers; and wherever heresy arose, it was pretty certain ere very long to find its way to this common centre of influence, and here to make its stronghold. Valentinus and Marcion, Praxeas, Theodotus, and Noetus, were all known by sight on the streets of the city, as well as in their distant native towns. Consequently, the revolution of opinion was rapid and extreme, the variety of teachers confusing in the highest degree, and many seem to have been driven, or at least strongly tempted to attach far less value to Christian truth than to diplomatic maxims, which would secure their own aggrandizement. "Omnia fui, et nihil expedit" was the sad conclusion of the contemporary emperor Severus, a conclusion which has something of the pathos of Solomon's reiterated "Vanity of vanities; all is vanity;" and many a presbyter of the church, who could mark the periods of his life by the several systems he had believed in, must have only reached at the last the same melancholy conclusion, and sighed from dying lips, "Omnia fui, et nihil expedit." In Portus, at least, so long as Hippolytus lived, there was a safe harbour, where, if the long swell of controversy still rolled in and was heard murmuring, there was, at least, a safe mooring and shelter from the violent personal assault either of tyranny or heresy. It is quite true that the catechumens at the mouth of the Tiber may not have been instructed in just those points we think most important, but had our choice been to be made of either of two infallibilities, we would not long have hesitated between the stupid, worldly, and immoral Callistus, and the thoroughly Christian, if somewhat too philosophical, bishop of Portus.

To enter into the details of the protracted and somewhat scandalous contest which the Roman bishop gave rise to, is beside our present purpose. Happily, there were, towards the end of Hippolytus's life, some quiet years left, which he devoted to the more congenial labour of writing most of those "very many" books which Eusebius ascribes to him. By means of these writings, he extended his wholesome influence far and near. His writings were in the hands of many, and his clear statements, in good scholarly Greek, made them everywhere valuable and attractive. He has the merit also of introducing to the western church the mode of teaching by **HOMILY**, which had been practised with great effect at Alexandria. Ready in everything to follow the teachers he had there be-

come acquainted with, he instructed the assembled church at Portus upon the points of doctrine regarding which there was most doubt and discussion at the time. How useful such addresses must have been to those who had not ability to solve difficult questions or examine the truth for themselves, nor opportunity to read the written works of other men, will be learned from the specimen given above of the homiletic style of Hippolytus. Its distinctness of statement, its confident appeal to Scripture, and its eloquence, shew us very plainly how so short a fragment has come to be so long preserved. If his homilies were often like this one, we do not wonder that Origen should sometimes have been seen among the congregation, nor that the Greek teachers in Egypt should have commended Christians trading to the Tiber to seek the acquaintance and instructions of this widely read and judicious presbyter. It was first published in the edition of Hippolytus by Fabricius, who received from Montfaucon a copy of the Vatican MS. The Latin version of Turrianus had been previously published under the title, "*Homilia de Deo trino et uno, et de mysterio Incarnationis contra hæres in Noeti.*" In the Vatican MS. the title runs, "*A Homily of Hippolytus against the heresy of one Noetus.*" Noetus had affirmed that the Father himself was Christ, and that the Father himself was born, suffered, and died; and Hippolytus, after stating the historical circumstances under which Noetus propounded his heresy, and the faithful exercise of discipline which ended in the casting out of the heretic from the church, proceeds with his refutation as follows:—

"And this is what Christ himself said when in the gospel he confessed both his Father and his God, saying, 'I go away to my Father and your Father, and my God and your God.' If, therefore, Noetus dares to say that Christ himself is the Father, let him tell us to what Father Christ was going away according to this saying in the gospel. But if he thinks that we should abandon the gospel and listen to his folly, he labours in vain, 'for we ought to obey God rather than men.'

"And if he should say, 'Christ himself said, I and the Father are one,' let him attend to the expression, and consider that he did not say, 'I and the Father *am* one,' but '*are*' one. For '*are*' is not used of one, but he uses it to point out two persons and one power. He explained this himself when he said to the Father concerning his disciples, 'The glory which thou gavest me I have given them, that they may be one, even as we are one: I in them, and thou in me; that they may be made perfect in one, that the world may know that thou hast sent me.' What have the Noetians to say to these things? Are all one body according to substance? Or do we become one by the power and disposition of like-mindedness? In the very same manner the Son (*παῖς*) who was sent pro-

claimed to them that were in the world, and knew him not, that he was in the Father by power and disposition. For the Son is the mind of the Father. Those who have the mind of the Father accordingly receive Christ; but they who have not the mind of the Father reject him. And if they cite the case of Philip, who said, 'Shew us the Father, and it sufficeth us,' and to whom our Lord answered saying, 'Have I been so long time with you, Philip, and yet hast thou not known me? he that hath seen me hath seen the Father. Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me?—if they cite this as proof that Christ calls himself the Father, let them know that they herein adduce the most direct contradiction to their own dogma, and convict themselves by the very scripture they bring forward; for when Christ, by very deed and word, had declared himself the Son, they yet did not know him, and were unable to comprehend or perceive his power, and Philip, not understanding how far it was possible to see, asked that he might look upon the Father, and so our Lord answered him, 'He that hath seen me hath seen the Father;' that is, if thou hast seen me, through me you may know the Father; for the Father is brought within easy reach of our knowledge through the image which bears his likeness; but if thou hast not known the image, that is, the Son, how think you to see the Father? And that these things are as we have stated them, the context evinces, shewing that the Son, being set forth, was sent from the Father and went to the Father.

"And many other passages, or rather, all others, bear witness to this truth. So evidently, too, is their testimony borne, that a man is forced, even though unwilling, to confess God the Father Almighty and Christ Jesus the Son of God, God become man, to whom the Father hath made subject all things save himself and the Holy Spirit, and that these are truly three. And if he desires further to know how the unity of God is proved, let him know that his power is one, and that so far as concerns his power God is one; but so far as concerns the incarnation, there is a threefold exhibition, (*ἰσθιζεις*), as shall shortly be proved when we come to the positive side of our argument, and deliver the true doctrine. The things which we have said are the articles of our common faith, for there is one God in whom we must believe, but unbegotten, impassible, immortal, doing all that he willeth, as he willeth, when he willeth. What, then, will this nothing-knowing Noetus dare to reply to these things! [*Νέητος μὴ ῥεῖν*]. Since, therefore, Noetus is thus speedily confuted, let us pass to the demonstration of the truth; that, as he has endeavoured to disseminate his error, we may establish the truth against which all these so great heresies have arisen, and yet say nothing to the purpose.

"One God there is, my brethren, and the knowledge of him we receive from the holy Scriptures, and from no other source. For, just as any person wishing to be skilled in the wisdom of this world will find no other means of attaining his desire than by studying the writings of philosophers, so as many of us as resolve to practise godliness must draw our information from no other source than from

the oracles of God. Whatever, therefore, the holy Scriptures declare, let us observe ; and whatever they teach, let us understand ; and as the Father wills that we believe in him, let us believe ; and as he wills that the Son be honoured, let us honour him ; and as he wills that the Holy Spirit be given, let us receive him,—not after our own understanding, nor after our private prejudices and preconceptions, nor using violence towards the things given us of God, but as he himself intended to teach by the holy Scriptures, so let us mark and understand."

These instructions were suddenly interrupted in the first year of Maximin the Thracian (A.D. 235). Worthily, as his contemporaries might have said, of a more glorious death than mere decay or disease could inflict, Hippolytus won the twofold honour of a long and useful life, and a martyr's death. When he had already spent his life in the service of his master, he was called upon to give up for his sake the remnant he yet held. Prudentius, in the verses he has written in celebration of this martyr, assures us that the heathen magistrate found in the name of Hippolytus a sufficient warrant for the manner of his death, and ordered him to be torn asunder by horses, that he might in his death resemble the chaste but slandered son of Theseus, whose name he had borne through life. This we may happily be spared believing. The numerous calls upon feeling which fact makes, oblige us to adopt a strict economy of emotion, and forbid that we should waste, upon what may be only fiction, the sentiments of pity or regret which are so abundantly demanded by actual events. In the case of Hippolytus, there is little need to resort to fiction, for we read that he was banished "in insulam nocivam Sardiniam;" and it is not likely that an old man, spent with anxiety, study, and manifold labours, would long resist the influence of the unwholesome climate, unusual habits of life, and harsh treatment, or would long disappoint the intention of his persecutors. "Feminis lugere honestum est, viris meminisse."

Rather than attempt to detail the theological opinions of Hippolytus, we would recall one or two of the characteristics of the theology of his time. We appreciate the service rendered by the early theologians, and are put in a position from which we see the whole bulk and symmetry of their intellects only when we stand so as to see at the same time the work they had to perform. The men whom, for the prospects of Christianity, it was chiefly important to win over, were those of active and disciplined mind, who were dissatisfied with the philosophical systems in vogue, but who could not, and would not, divest themselves of the mental habits, nor discard all the modes of thought to which, throughout their thinking lives, these systems had accustomed them. The philosophical

inquiries of these men were to be met by philosophical explanations. An exposition of the faith was called for, which should appeal to the learned through all that was good in their previous learning. A method and range of instruction was required which should at once defend Christianity from the attacks of philosophy, and should invite the attention of all who were thirsting for the truth. To present Christianity in such a form was a very difficult task. It required that the Christian theologian should have thorough sympathy with the intellectual culture of Greece, and yet should at the same time be wholly obedient to the teacher of Nazareth. When a modern reader finds so much philosophical terminology mingling with the words of Scripture in ancient expositions of the faith, he is to remember that, in their day, these forms of expression were intelligible and pregnant, and that throughout the educated world they were familiarly used. There were certain ideas current which, however incomprehensible or absurd to us, were not then the guilt of individuals, but the common inheritance of all thinking persons. These ideas were part of the property of every mind, and with them, whatever the mind received, had to be harmonized. Now, this was so different a juncture from that which Christian sentiments and ideas have to effect when they enter the modern mind, that we are very apt to underrate the efforts of the early theologians, not understanding the union which they had to bring about. An educated and speculative heathenism is a very different thing to deal with from that state of mind to which modern theology has to introduce itself; and few, if any, periods of the church's history have required from her leaders a more generous breadth of sympathy, or a more genuine culture, or a more judicious treatment of opinions.

Moreover, in judging of the value of early documents, we are to bear in mind that the truth delivered in Scripture was not discovered all at once, and that what is to us obvious and trite, was only slowly developed by the labour and repeated mistakes of the fathers of Christian theology. Instead, therefore, of summarily condemning as heretical every writer who does not distinctly and fully declare the truth according to our light, we are to inquire whether he spoke in denial of, or only in ignorance of, the whole truth. We are not to blame him for having come so short a distance on the road, but to consider whether his face be turned in the right direction, and what willingness and ability he manifests for prosecuting the journey. And we will also learn to distinguish between "the first principles of the oracles of God," and "the things hard to be understood." Of the latter, there is one which falls under the notice of Hippolytus in this homily; it is the doctrine of

the eternal generation of the Son. The difficulties connected with this doctrine are known best by those who have longest examined it, and no one who does not expect a miraculous unanimity of consent among the fathers is astonished to discover that the church lived till the time of Origen without possessing any exact statement of this doctrine, while it abounded in statements quite inconsistent with it. The truth is, that it was the difficulties and obvious errors of Hippolytus himself, that drew Origen to consider the matter, and to deliver that statement of the truth which has ever since been generally received as the orthodox doctrine. Justin Martyr, and perhaps Theophilus of Antioch (though even such authorities as Lumper and Dorner disagree as to his opinion), did not grasp the truth on this point, though they avoided the common error. They did not say with Tatian and Athenagoras, that the Word in the beginning of the world becomes the first-born work of the Father, but much further were they from saying with Bishop Pearson, "The essence which God always had without beginning, without beginning he did communicate, being always Father as always God." They did not with Tertullian maintain that there was a time when there was no Son ("Fuit autem tempus, cum ei filius non fuit."—Adv. Hermog. 3); but neither do they with Dionysius of Alexandria distinctly aver that "there never was (a time) when God was not a Father." Hippolytus views the generation of the Son as dependent on the will of the Father, and thinks of his production as merely for purposes of creation. On this point Hippolytus thus expresses himself:—

"But as the author, and fellow-counsellor, and maker of all that is made, he begot the Word; which Word, retained within himself and unseen by the created world, he makes visible; uttering the first creating word (*φωνή*),* and begetting light of light, he sent forth the Lord to the creation; the Lord, his own reason (*νοῦς*), formerly visible to himself alone, and unseen by that which was made, he now makes visible, that through his appearing the world might see him and be saved.

"And in this way beside himself there existed another.† Anc-

* In this chapter, and specially in this expression, Hippolytus evinces his belief that the prolation of the Son was contingent upon the Father's purpose of creation. The similarity of this doctrine to that of Tertullian may be seen from many passages in the tract Adv. Praxean, e.g., in c. 6, he says:—"Ut primum deus voluit ea, quæ cum Sophiæ ratione et sermone disposuerat intra se, in substantias et species suas edere, ipsum primum protulit sermonem habentem in se individuas suas rationem et Sophiam, ut per ipsum fierent universa, per quem erant cogitata atque disposita, imo et facta jam, quantum in dei sensu."

† *ὁὐτως καὶ παρὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἵσταντο*. This expression certainly forces us to conclude that Hippolytus did not consider the Son to exist as a person until

ther, I say, not meaning that there are two Gods, but as light of light, or as water flowing out of its fountain, or as a ray from the sun. For there is but one power which proceedeth from the whole (*ἐκ τοῦ παντός*), and the whole is the Father, from whom proceedeth this Power, the Word. This is the reason which came forth in the world, and was manifested the Son of God (*παῖς*). All things exist by him, and he alone is of the Father. Who then introduces a multitude of God's increasing through the ages? For all, however unwilling, are shut up to this creed, that the whole runs up to one. (*τὸ πᾶν ἐς ἓν ἀνατρέχει*). If, therefore, all things run up into one, even according to Valentinus, and Marcion, and Cerinthus, and all their silly talk, they are forced unwillingly to confess that the one is the cause of all, and thus bear their extorted testimony to the truth that one God made all things according to his own will. And the same gave the law and the prophets; and gifting them with the Holy Spirit, he caused them so to speak that, receiving the inspiration of the Father's power, they should declare the counsel and will of the Father."

What these fathers held was not Sabellianism, for they maintained the distinction of the persons; neither was it Arianism, for they maintained the sameness of the essence; but neither was it the orthodox doctrine, for they held that the generation or the prolation of the Son was contingent on the purpose of God to create, and that while he was, as the word or reason of the Father, co-eternal with him, he was only subsequently to the purpose and will of the Father sent forth as a personal agent. In fact, they felt the difficulty involved in their position. They must have seen that it was something very like a contradiction to maintain the existence of a person possessed of the eternal divine substance, uncreated, and yet who does not come forth till a period that at least bears relation to time. They saw that to the Son two things were to be attributed, eternal divine nature and personal genesis; but how these two were to be reconciled, Origen was the first to see. His philosophical mind gave the solution which does not lose the eternity in the genesis, nor the personality in the one divine essence, but seeing God, the eternal Father, sees the Son as therefore

thus sent forth by the Father to create. Bull feels that some defence of this passage is needed, and says (*Defensio Fid. Nic.*, 2d Ed., p. 368):—"Agnosco quidem hic ab Hippolyto generationem quandam Verbo, sive Filio Dei tribui, quæ mundi creationem proxime antecesserit. Sed omnino nego de generatione loqui Hippolytum proprie dicta, quæ scilicet Verbi fuerit productio, quæ Verbum ipsum, cum prius non existeret, existere cœperit." This defence is invalid. The generation here spoken of is the only generation Hippolytus knows anything about, and is that generation whereby the Son "becomes the first-begotten of the Father," (v. c. 15). At all events, if he and the others who use similar language intend to intimate that before this manifestation or prolation the Word existed as a person eternally in the Father, they are, as Goode has convincingly shewn, equally heterodox.

eternal, though begotten, and as therefore divine, though distinct. These remarks may help to an understanding of some of the statements which occur in the homily.

ART. III.—*The Philosophy of the Unconditioned Examined.*

IT has been affirmed by Sir William Hamilton, that the Unconditioned, the Infinite, the Absolute, the First Cause, is inconceivable and incognisable. And as the Being thus designated has been at the same time identified with God, we seem to be hurried by this formidable dictum to the disastrous conclusion, that the Creator of all things is equally, that is, absolutely inconceivable and incognisable. This conclusion is indeed avowed by Hamilton, and carried out with the most painful elaboration by Mansel in his recent work on the limits of religious thought. To relieve the aching sense of separation from God, which is awakened in the mind by this sweeping asseveration, we are constrained to examine the grounds on which it rests.

2. If it were merely meant that a being barely defined by a negative, by the absence of a definite quality, that is, in fact, not yet defined at all, is *so far* inconceivable and incognisable, there could be no difficulty in yielding our assent to the proposition. The unwhite, insipid, insipient, is *so far* inconceivable, because it has *not yet* presented us with any quality to conceive. It only tantalises our conceptive faculty by announcing the absence of certain conceivables, as whiteness, sapidity, sapience. It feeds even our imagination with emptiness. Such is the philosophy of the pure negative. It gives us a broad hint of the inexhaustible store of positive and conceivable qualities in reserve ; but then it puts its inexorable negative on them all, and so leaves us totally in the dark as to the entities it intends. It introduces the mind to an insufferably dull masquerade, in which the masks are all so thorough, that not a characteristic of the various parties, whether true or false, is allowed to meet the eye. Such a philosophy is truly inconceivable and impossible. It is mere trifling.

3. Now if any one were to say, the unwhite, insipid, insipient is inconceivable ; but the sky is unwhite, insipid, insipient, and, therefore, it is inconceivable and incognisable ; the absurdity and erroneousness of the conclusion would be manifest. Yet the syllogism is in diction unassailable. Hence, as the conclusion is manifestly false, there must be falsehood in the premises. We detect the fallacy in the assertion, that the un-

white, insipid, insipient, is inconceivable and incognisable. The truth is this. That which is unwhite, &c., is only *so far* inconceivable *as yet*, simply because we have got as yet no quality to conceive. But we cannot tell whether it is absolutely inconceivable, until its positive qualities and real nature are laid before us. As soon, however, as we are informed that it is the sky that is thus defined, we find that it is conceivable and cognisable, not only in other respects, but even in those by which it was negatively defined. The ethereal blue, we are perfectly aware, is not white, and possesses no quality corresponding to sapidity or sapience. Hence we get the general principle, that a thing only negatively defined is unconceived and unknown as yet, though it may be, if its positive qualities were revealed, both conceivable and cognisable. In this sense, then, the Unconditioned is, so far as it is thus negatively described, as yet inconceivable. But when we are informed that by the Unconditioned is meant God, a new light springs up in our mind, by which we are enabled to understand even the application of this negative epithet to the Supreme. "God is a spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." Here is a goodly array of intelligible and observable qualities, by which we can form a comparatively clear and definite notion of the great Being, and even discern the very propriety and necessity of those negative epithets, Unconditioned, Infinite, Eternal, Absolute, Unchangeable, by which he is justly characterised.

4. But our philosophers mean something more than this when they place the Unconditioned, the Infinite, the Absolute, beyond conception or cognisance. They hold, we must suppose, that these special qualities, condition, limitation, relation, are of such a nature, that the very fact of their absence from any being renders it inconceivable and incognisable, though the absence of other qualities is not attended with the like result. The line of argument, therefore, by which this is sought to be established is first to be noticed. We must then examine the negatives which these terms afford, and we shall do so with clearness and effect by considering them not promiscuously in a group, but severally in succession.

5. The whole substance of the argument supposed to demonstrate the inconceivableness of the Unconditioned is comprised in the axiom that we conceive by condition. "To think is to condition." To conceive is to regard as conditioned. Hence the Unconditioned is inconceivable, and therefore incognisable. There is no more to be said, and accordingly no more is said. Sir William Hamilton was not the man to multiply words without occasion. A similar line of argument applies to the other negatives. To conceive is to limit. Hence the

unlimited or Infinite is inconceivable. To conceive is to stand in actual relation to the conceived. The unrelated or Absolute is therefore inconceivable. In short, we conceive by condition, limitation, relation, and so we cannot conceive the Unconditioned, the Infinite, the Absolute.

6. Before entering upon the examination of this argument, it is necessary to call to mind some points of essential importance relating to negative terms. (1.) Every negative is the contradictory of the corresponding positive, and the two between them include the whole of being. Thus good and not good comprise the whole of things. There is no being, actual or ideal, that does not come under the one or the other. Hence two contradictories are the complements of each other, and together make up the grand total of existing and even possible things. (2.) The negative is called the indefinite, because, while it determines the absence of a certain quality, it leaves the character of the mass of things which it embraces undetermined. This heterogeneous collection contains, in general, at least three distinguishable classes of things. 1st, Those beings that want the quality in question, simply because it does not apply to their nature. Thus a stone is unwise, because the quality of wisdom has no relation to its nature. These are the properly indefinite. 2d, Those beings that are devoid of the quality, though it is applicable to their nature. Thus some men are said to be unwise, while others are reckoned wise. These are marked, not so much by the mere absence of the quality in question, as by the presence of its contrary. They are therefore in reality definite. Thus the unwise in this sense are the foolish. (3.) The negative is used to denote the absence of a quality in a certain respect, or in every respect. It is taken for granted in the present discussion, that we are thinking of *actual things*, otherwise we cannot talk of their *knowableness*. Now actual things have all more than one property. Hence the negative may refer to the thing so designated, either in respect of a certain quality, or in respect of all its qualities, or its whole nature. Thus a man may be said to be unwise or foolish, either in respect of the use of money, or in respect of his whole conduct. Hence there are three distinguishable classes coming under every negative. 1st, Those beings in which the quality is simply absent as inapplicable. 2d, Those in which the contrary quality is present in the whole of the thing. 3d, Those in which the contrary quality is present in some part of the thing.

7. THE UNCONDITIONED. These distinctions being before us, let us examine whether the Unconditioned be inconceivable, any farther than other negatives, from the mere circumstance of *condition* being the quality absent. The Unconditioned

includes, 1, the unconditioned from the incompatibility of condition with the nature of the thing ; 2, the unconditioned in every respect ; and 3, the unconditioned in some respect. The first class, it is clear, has no existence in the present instance, as there is absolutely no being to the nature of which condition does not apply. Even to be is a condition. To have a property is to be conditioned. The second class, the totally unconditioned, is impossible, if contradictory conditions be involved, and pure nothing, even if positive conditions only be regarded. A *being* without any condition is a contradiction in terms, since *being* itself is a condition, and every quality is a condition. The third of these classes, the unconditioned in some respect, is so comprehensive as to include all beings whatsoever, as there is no being that is not free from innumerable conditions. Gold is not white, black, blue, &c. ; light, transparent, &c. The absence of some condition does not of itself render any being, otherwise, of course, conditioned, inconceivable or incognisable. This universal class, then, is not excluded from the observation or imagination by the mere fact of its wanting some conditions. If it were so, all nature would be beyond the ken of reason. Thus it appears there is nothing unintelligible in the Unconditioned, except where it denotes the impossible or the non-existent.

If it be said that we have confounded the division of all things into the conditioned and the unconditioned, by the introduction of the partly unconditioned, which is of course partly conditioned and inclusive of all being, we cannot help it, if reason and nature will have it so. Our philosophers use condition in the most unbounded sense. With them to think is to condition, and to be is to be conditioned. Hence the class we speak of forces itself upon us. The very Being of beings is *thus* conditioned, not only by *being*, but by every positive attribute he is confessed to possess. A stone does not possess wisdom, and a spirit does not possess hardness, and hence, in these respects, they are unconditioned. If condition is to be taken in this all-comprehensive sense, there is nothing totally unconditioned, nothing totally conditioned. And we may add, no being is unintelligible or inapprehensible from the mere circumstance of the presence or absence of a certain condition.

8. There is another meaning of this particular negative, the Unconditioned, to which, though it is rather airy and abstruse, we will venture to refer. Unconditioned may mean undefined as to condition, not having the conditions of being determined. This is perhaps the only tenable contradictory of the conditioned, the latter being understood to mean the definite as to condition. In this sense, it is quite true that the Unconditioned

is inconceivable and incognisable. It is, in short, impossible. For every existent is perfectly defined in all its conditions by the fact of its being. And we can conceive only the definite. Hence the undefined in point of condition is impossible and inconceivable.

Now, our philosophers meant by the Unconditioned, either the determined as to the absence of condition, or the undetermined as to condition. If the latter, their conclusion is true, but nugatory, as it refers to the impossible. If the former, their conclusion has been found to be invalid. If they infer, in the one sense, and then employ their conclusion in the other, they are in the position of having proved one thing and imagining that they have proved another; in other words, they have slipped into the fallacy of *ignoratio elenchi*. In any case, their principle is either unsound, or affords a meagre and unsatisfactory philosophy of the Unconditioned.

9. If our philosophers complain that we have misapprehended them, and declare that they mean by the conditioned that of which the existence and nature are conditioned by some other being, and by the unconditioned that of which the existence and nature are not conditioned by any other being, we thank them for the correction. It relieves us, and we hope it will release them from the use of the word condition in so extensive a sense, that even to think is to condition. A condition, then, is that without which a certain being could not have come into existence. In this true and important sense, the Creator is absolutely unconditioned, and every created thing is absolutely conditioned. But in this sense, to think is no longer to condition; the phrase, indeed, has no meaning, or one in which it is untrue. Even with God himself, to think is not to condition,—that is, to give being. A condition is now a fiat of creation, a deed of omnipotence.

It remains for us to consider how this new sense of the word condition affects the general principle on which the *dictum* that the unconditioned is inconceivable and incognisable is founded. The condition by which the unconditioned is negatively defined is now the *sine qua non* of existence, the cause, the creative act by which a thing is called into being. But the condition, in the fundamental principle that we conceive by condition, is merely a quality, property, or characteristic by which a thing is so far determined to be what it is. In the first place, therefore, the logical nexus is broken, as the middle term has two different meanings, and therefore the conclusion does not follow.

In the next place, the principle comes simply to this, that we perceive and conceive only the determinate or the definite. To conceive is to define. The definite is conceivable. The

existent is by the very fact definite, and therefore conceivable and cognisable. The negative is merely the *not yet* conceivable. Let it be existent; then it has certain definite qualities, though it wants others, and so it is perceivable and conceivable by a competent intellect.

Let it be granted, then, for the present, that the necessity or the impossibility of a *conditio sine qua non*—a condition without which a thing cannot be—is not a noticeable property of things, which is all that our philosophers can demand. Then it is manifest that this circumstance does not interfere in the slightest degree with the noticeableness of the thing so characterised. We notice definite qualities in the conditioned, without mooted the question whether it be conditioned—in the sense of caused—or unconditioned. We discern and conceive definite qualities likewise in the unconditioned undoubtedly without being impeded by the impossibility of its being caused. We observe and conceive the qualities of a tree, without entertaining the question whether it be conditioned as to its origin or nature by another. We discern and conceive the wisdom of God without any conscious reference to his absolute independence.

10. It is only fair to notice that our philosophers may raise another question of considerable importance in relation to this topic. They may affirm that there is a difference between absolute and restricted, or uncreated and created intelligence, and that the unconditioned only can conceive and cognise the unconditioned. We accept the distinction, and acknowledge its value. The unconditioned alone can thoroughly perceive the unconditioned, or, we will add, the conditioned. The conditioned, that is, created, reason perceives and conceives only according to the measure of its given capacity and access to things. It has not, on the one hand, perceived all that is in anything, not even in itself. But it has, on the other hand, discerned in some degree certain attributes even of the unconditioned. It has not reached the utmost length of its possible attainments in either direction, nor has it any ground for setting a precise limit, beyond which it cannot go in the avenues on which it has entered. We know, and we follow on to know.

We regard it also as a self-evident truth, that the unconditioned or uncaused, as well as the conditioned or caused, perceives and conceives things *definitely*, that is, as they actually are. To be is to be defined in essence and property. It is impossible to conceive the undeterminate; and this is a perfection of the uncreated as well as of the created intellect. So far, then, is the created reason from being degraded by thinking only of the definite, or, in other words, conceiving only by condition, that it is in this respect on a par with the

uncreated. And our philosophers have indeed told us a very important fact when they informed us that mind conceives by condition, or as things exist, but they have not thereby pointed out that which limits human reason or distinguishes it from superhuman, inasmuch as uncreated reason itself must perceive and conceive things in the self-same way. Hence the necessity of thinking by condition, being common to created and uncreated intellect, does not afford the shadow of a basis for the destructive philosophy of the unconditioned. We venture to say there is no opposition between the conditioned and the unconditioned in point of intelligence. There may be a reason that transcends human reason, but we are bold to affirm that there is no reason that contradicts it. What is logically necessary or impossible to the conditioned reason is equally so to the supreme intelligence.

11. Thus it appears that if condition mean property, characteristic, the totally unconditioned is either impossible or non-existent, as there is no being without some condition. The partly unconditioned is also the partly conditioned, and includes all being, and, because conditioned, is so far conceivable and cognisable. The undetermined as to condition is alone inconceivable, incognisable, and impossible. For no *thing* can be undetermined as to its qualities. If condition mean that without which a thing cannot come into being, then the unconditioned and the conditioned are perceivable and conceivable in their definite properties, without reference to this anterior condition of their existence. And lastly, if it be asserted that uncreated intelligence transcends created, it is to be remembered that they agree at least in thinking of and perceiving things as they are,—that is, according to the definite characteristics of their nature. If these strictures be accepted as correct, it is evident that this seemingly impregnable dictum of recent philosophy falls to the ground.

12. Out of the ruins, however, of this dictum may be constructed the solid basis of a hopeful philosophy of things. The purely indeterminate is impossible, inconceivable, and incognisable. The determinate is conceivable, may be possible, and, if realised, cognisable. Under the definite are the conditioned and the unconditioned. The totally unconditioned is impossible or non-existent. The partly unconditioned includes all being, as there is no creature that is not free from some condition. It comprehends, therefore, the Creator and the creature. The impossible, the non-existent, the creature and the Creator, are all definite, and so far conceivable. Creature and Creator, as actual beings, are moreover perceivable, in whole by the Creator, in part by the intelligent creature. Each we know *in part*, and are coming to know more and more.

If we take the higher and narrower sense of the word condition, namely, the efficient without which there is no effect, the unconditioned is simply the Creator, and the conditioned the creature. In the last resort the former is the conditioning, as the latter is the conditioned. If we can understand the conditioned, we can equally comprehend the conditioning. Each is conceived by condition, that is, by noticeable qualities. It is common to the created and the uncreated to conceive that only which is definite in its characteristics. Hence this at least imposes no limitation on human apprehension. The existent is determinate in its properties. The unconditioned, by hypothesis, exists, and is therefore definite. Hence it is capable of being conceived. This is a more cheerful philosophy than that of the above dictum. It amounts simply to this, that the definite is conceivable, and that the existent is of necessity definite, and therefore perceptible and intelligible, by the created intellect in part, by the uncreated in full.

13. **THE INFINITE.** The author of the above dictum divides the unconditioned into the infinite and the absolute, so that, so far as his theory is concerned, the discussion of the unconditioned involves that of the other two. As Mansel, however, omits the unconditioned, and takes up successively the infinite and the absolute on separate grounds, it is necessary to examine them in the same order and detail. He lays down the principle that conception implies limitation, and draws from it the grave conclusion, that "a consciousness of the infinite as such thus necessarily involves a self-contradiction; for it implies the recognition by limitation and difference of that which can only be given as unlimited and indifferent." He pursues a similar line of argument to shew that the Absolute and the First Cause cannot be construed in thought, and seems to demonstrate, by inexorable logic, that reason is not only incompetent to form any conception of the being possessing these attributes, but plunges into a fathomless sea of self-contradictory conclusions whenever it makes the attempt. He thus concedes the wildest asseverations of speculation run mad, in order to exhibit the impossibility of anything approaching to a philosophy of the infinite.

14. If our author had strictly adhered to the conclusion above quoted, with the cautious limitation, "as such," which it contains, it would have been a very harmless announcement. For it would have been merely an assertion in loose terms, that *consciousness* is unable to grasp, not properly the infinite, but infinity. And his conclusion does not touch *conception*, though his premise does. The infinite, always granting it to be a reality, has, besides infinity, some other qualities which are definite, and therefore conceivable and discernible, even by

a limited intellect. A being known by one or more qualities, though another of its attributes be unknown, must be admitted to be partly known, and may, in the course of time, become better known; and this is as much as can be said of human knowledge, even in regard to finite things. But it is impossible to read the author's melancholy pages without coming to the obvious conclusion that, after enunciating his metaphysical dogma, with the restriction of it to consciousness as the faculty, and infinity as the quality, he tacitly assumes it in his subsequent reasonings in its unrestricted form. Without the unqualified position, however, that the infinite is inconceivable and incognisable, his most formidable inferences concerning our mental incapacity are both irrelevant and unfounded. We must therefore examine this unacknowledged basis of all his reasonings.

15. The finite, then, in its proper signification, is a term of quantity, and strictly applies to that which is capable of the relations of greater and less. It has reference only to that which is continuous or numerable. The term infinite is to be understood as the contradictory of the finite, in this its strict sense. It is to be used, not with the freedom or latitude of popular discourse, but in a clear and determinate sense. Negatives are intricate enough, without exaggerating their difficulty by attaching to them a vague or vacillating meaning. Thus, when it is said that God is infinite in holiness, the meaning is good and intelligible. It denotes the absolute perfection of the divine holiness. And when it is asserted that his perfections are infinite, it is merely intended that no perfection is wanting to him, without determining whether the number of them be limited or not. But the highest in degree, the whole and such like popular variations of the term infinite, are to be excluded from view at present. Holiness and other spiritual qualities, hardness, whiteness, and numberless other material properties, are incapable of being strictly and properly infinite. The infinite is the contradictory of the finite in that which is capable of increase and decrease.

16. The infinite and the finite, it is to be remembered, as contradictories, include the whole of being. Hence the infinite contains (*a*) the large class of things to the nature of which finitude has no relation, and these are of course utterly undefined by the term infinite, though they are exceedingly numerous. Most of the properties of mind and matter are of such a nature as to exclude the relation of greater and less, and, therefore, come under the head of infinite, only as not being capable of number or measure. These all, however, are in themselves perfectly definite and intelligible when otherwise made known. This class of the infinite, then, is only *not yet*

conceivable until otherwise defined. Such indeed are not properly infinite in the usual sense of the term.

When we confine ourselves to the measurable, or those things that are capable of increase or decrease, the infinite takes its definite form, in which it denotes the presence of the quality contrary to finitude. In this sense it includes (*b*) the infinite in every respect; and (*c*) the infinite in some respect. Now the infinite in every respect is simply impossible, as it would include opposite respects, as small and great. And that which is nothing but infinite, even if compatible, is unreal; as in the real, besides the immeasurableness, there is at the least the property that is immeasurable, and this property is definite and knowable. Space is infinite in solid dimension; and dimension is a quality that may be known. To be in measure or beyond measure does not constitute any substantive quality. Lead is nothing but lead, whether it be an inch or an infinite sphere. All *beings* whatsoever must have other qualities than infinity, which make them what they are. Hence the purely, that is solely, or if you will, wholly infinite, is not a substantive reality at all. It does not even give us space or time, neither of which is a substantive being.

The infinite in some respect, then, can alone have place among real things. If its qualities be consistent, it is possible. When real, all its *real* qualities, even those to which infinity belongs, are in themselves definite and so conceivable and cognisable. The qualities of all substantive things are numerous, and infinity is only one among many. Hence the knowledge we may have of *things* that are infinite is vastly greater than what we want, even on the supposition that this quality can in no way be cognised or conceived.

17. We are now prepared to examine, with less anxiety about the result, the statement that "the recognition," whether in consciousness or conception, "by limitation of that which can only be given as unlimited," involves a self-contradiction. Let us first take *the conception*. To conceive by limit what is, by hypothesis, actually unlimited, is certainly contradictory, if limit be used in the same sense and applied to the same things in both parts of the proposition. Otherwise not. Now if conceiving by limit be a law of the mental constitution, and not specially got up for the infinite, it will apply equally to other negatives. If the unwise then be merely that which is *not limited or defined* in point of wisdom, we cannot indeed as yet conceive it, simply because the mind has no handle by which to take hold of it. But if it mean the foolish, we have a *definite* characteristic in the quality contrary to wisdom, and can form so far a sufficient conception of the thing so designated. While the absence of a particular quality, then,

yields no object to the conceptive faculty, the presence of the opposite quality affords a definite and tangible reality to the imagination. The negative, therefore, if it mean the undefined, is as yet unconceived; but if it denote that which is defined by the presence of the contrary quality, it is conceivable. Hence it appears that to conceive *by limit* is to conceive the definite. But the infinite, in the sense in which we now view it, is definite in respect to the presence of the quality contrary to finitude. There is no self-contradiction, then, in conceiving *definitely* that which is *definite*, even though it be so in respect of the presence of infinity.

Having seen that the conception of the infinite does not really involve a contradiction, it is easy to shew that we actually do conceive the infinite. An attribute that is utterly inconceivable cannot be known to belong to any real thing. But infinity is known to belong to space, time, the duration of the Eternal Being. Infinity, therefore, is not wholly inconceivable. But infinity is a simple idea, and therefore cannot be partly conceivable and partly inconceivable. Hence it must be conceivable. Moreover, the Supreme Intelligent conceives objects definitely, or as they are. *He conceives the infinite.* There can therefore be no contradiction between conceiving the defined and conceiving the infinite. The infinite we speak of is real, and therefore of necessity definite and so conceivable.

Next, with regard to *consciousness* we have to say, that the infinite, if existent, is of course definite and cognisable as a whole by the Intelligent Infinite. The conceivable, however, may not be always cognisable *by us* as a whole. This is not peculiar to the infinite. The earth is not cognisable by us as a whole. We seldom know the whole of anything by actual observation, whether finite or infinite. Yet we may fairly enough say we know a thing that may be infinite when we know a part of it. If we examine an inch cube of gold, we have as perfect a knowledge of it as if we beheld an infinite solid of the precious metal. The quality of infinity neither adds to nor detracts from our capacity of observing the positive qualities of any kind of being. It is said we do not know the Infinite to be infinite. But we may not know the finite to be finite, and yet we may know it sufficiently for our purpose. Men once did not know the earth to be finite, and we do not know *by actual observation* the heavens to be finite. Yet we never doubt our power of knowing these objects of our senses. Besides, though we do not know the infinite by actual observation, yet we certainly know infinities by the force of reason, intuitive or deductive, as algebraic infinities. It is remarkable that almost all the infinities, of which we have any information, are known to us by intuition or demonstration, a fact sufficient

of itself to prove that we have the conception and cognition of the infinite, though we may not be able to bring it as a whole under actual observation. We thus arrive at the conclusion, that the infinite as such is, if consistent and definite, conceivable; if existent, cognisable as a whole by the Intelligent Infinite, noticeable in part by our senses, and knowable as a whole by our reason.

As the above argument may appear subtle, and fail to carry conviction to some minds, it is to be remembered that it refers solely to the infinite *as such*, or to the bare quality of infinity as existing in a concrete thing; while it does not affect any of the other qualities co-existing in the same subject by which it may become sufficiently known to us, even though that of infinity be held to be unknown.

18. It deserves to be noted, however, that the infinite of itself is an intangible basis on which to erect a theory of things. Infinity is the most meagre and barren quality of things that could be selected for primary consideration. It is indeed by itself utterly empty. For it belongs to the measurable or the class of qualities to which measure applies, and indicates only immeasurability, without determining any substantive property whatever. Hence it is even predicable of that which has no substantive essence, as space and time, which are the measurable without content. It is obvious that this characteristic alone furnishes not the shadow of a hint concerning the nature of the being of whom it is affirmed. Our philosophers assure us they mean by the infinite, the Supreme Being, the Creator. We can very well believe they do. But here is the mischief. The Creative Being is a term conveying to our minds a host of attributes, conceivable and noticeable by us, and deriving no doubt an inexpressible grandeur from the property of infinitude or absolute perfection attached to them all. But our philosophers reason and talk about the infinite as inconceivable and incognisable, and leave the unwary to conclude that the Deity, with all the transcendent attributes pertaining to his essence, not one of which is intimated in their favourite term, is equally inconceivable and incognisable. Whereas the fact is, that this Infinite, in every one of his essential properties, even in those to which infinity actually belongs, may be conceived by a competent intellect, and is conceived by us in the measure of our given capacity. And if finitude be conceivable, the absence of it is at least conceivable; and though the actual infinite be not observable by our senses as a whole, yet it is in certain cases discernible by our reason.

19. THE ABSOLUTE.—The absolute, Sir William Hamilton defines to be "what is out of relation, &c., as finished, perfect,

complete, total, and thus corresponds to τὸ ὅλον and τὸ εἴληον of Aristotle. In this acceptation—and it is that in which for myself I exclusively use it—the absolute is diametrically opposed to, is contradictory of, the infinite.” If the absolute and the infinite be contradictory, they cannot both belong to the same being. Mansel avoids, therefore, this meaning of the absolute. He defines it to be “that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being;” and he contends that there can be no consciousness of it, because consciousness implies relation. For the sake of the logical connection, then, we shall call the absolute the unrelated; and we at once acknowledge that the unrelated to us cannot be cognised by us, though there is nothing to hinder our conceiving it. The unrelated is either externally unrelated or internally. The sum of being to which we belong, including the Creator and the creation, is of the former kind; and we being part of it, can conceive and cognise it in measure, as we actually do. The internally unrelated is sheer nothing; for there is no being, matter, or spirit that has not some internal relation. The absolute, our author says, *exists* in and by itself. It must therefore be only externally absolute.

Sir William Hamilton defines the absolute “the finished,” &c., and thence infers that it is contradictory of the infinite. In that case it would be identical with the finite, which the author did not intend. His real meaning was, that the absolute is the total, the complete, to which nothing can be added. In this sense, it is not the contradictory of the infinite. On the other hand, the infinite itself is really absolute, as it is complete and incapable of addition. Thus every infinite is absolute, but every absolute is not infinite. The holiness of God is absolute, but not infinite in any definite sense.

20. Having now separately canvassed the Unconditioned, the Infinite, and the Absolute, we observe in general; that a negative cannot, because it is a negative, afford a theory of being, which is positive. So long as we are only informed what a thing is not, we cannot directly know what it is, whether it is or not, or even if it be possible. Any negative, as descriptive of a thing, is inconceivable, simply because it offers no positive quality to conceive. We have also seen that these negatives, as contradictories and complements of the corresponding positives, conceal a diversity of meaning which is a source of frequent, obscure, and fatal fallacy, and that not the least of these fallacies is the seeming presumption, that the negative is one indivisible and homogeneous whole, so that the same predicates may be made of all its parts. Meanwhile, we have arrived at some general conclusions of importance even from these negatives. In the first place, the negative, when it denotes the

definite absence of a quality, is definite, and if consistent, that is, including no contradiction, conceivable and possible. If existent, it is of course consistent as well as definite, and therefore conceivable. The conceivable, as a whole, however, may not be always perceivable by us as a whole. This applies, however, to the finite as well as the infinite. We have also seen that the infinite and the absolute are not contradictory, but on the other hand, the infinite is by its very nature absolute. The unconditioned, if existent, and therefore consistent, may be both. We have learned, farther, that the totally unconditioned is either impossible or nothing, the totally infinite impossible or unreal, and the internally unrelated nothing. Hence the *Being* that is unconditioned, or infinite, or unrelated, or all of these, must be so in a certain respect, and not in all respects. The great Being, then, to whom these negatives in a certain respect necessarily belong, is in other respects at the same time conditioned, definite, related, and is thereby not in the least lowered, but equally exalted as in those respects in which he is free from condition, finitude, or relation. Thus we see that a being may have all these negative characteristics in their due relation, and therefore the theory of the unconditioned is possible.

22. Hitherto we have looked at things, at the statics of nature. Let us now cast a hasty glance at events, at the dynamics of nature. These bear the same relation to time which things do to space. The faculty by which we take notice of things is perception. That by which we observe events is memory. By memory we can notice a change actually taking place, marking the former state of things, the instant of transition, and the present state of things. By reason we can discern in this change what is not patent on the surface of observation, namely, cause and effect. We involuntarily lay it down as a self-evident maxim, that the effect or resulting state of things must have had an adequate cause. We trace the cause back to the first cause. Creation itself is not fundamentally different from change in general. Were we present at an act of creative power, we should see nothing in the first instance, and then at the moment of change something coming into view. The cause would be hidden; but this is not unusual even in the phenomena of nature. There is no difficulty of conceivableness in primary causation that is not in secondary. We cannot mark off time by any essential difference from eternity, which is merely time without beginning or end. It is said that a cause cannot as such be absolute, or the absolute be a cause, as cause is relative to effect. But the first cause, if we will speak logically and not found an argument on a mere looseness of speech, is not the first causator, but merely the act of his

power, prompted by his will. A first causer is of necessity a being of power, otherwise he cannot cause : a being of free will ; otherwise he cannot begin to cause : a being of intelligence ; otherwise he cannot form a plan of causing. Thus we see how prolific a positive property is in enucleating the nature of the Infinite. Grant him to be a causer, he is and must be a spirit. Now, we have already seen that the absolute, if existent, and therefore possible, is necessarily related within itself. Let one of its qualities be will, and there may be internal change, as far, at least, as the expatiations of intellect, which is presupposed in will, are concerned. Let there be power, or more particularly causativity, which, in the absolute, must accompany the will, otherwise it would be impotent, and there may be creation, and so a universe full of change and life. In a grand and true sense all this is within the power, and therefore ultimately within the essence of the Absolute, and so it is still externally unrelated. But in another and not less real sense, it may be said to be external to it : and so a volitive Absolute has the remarkable peculiarity, that it may become in a certain respect externally related to a world of its own creating. It does not, cannot cease to be absolute by the sovereign acts of its own will, simply because these acts, however beyond its essence, are yet within its potency.

Thus we see how the first cause emerges from the Absolute, as soon as it is recognised as having a free will. This first cause is the voluntary act of power, and has in it all that is in that act, and might have all that is in the power from which it springs. It is at the same time the pure correlative of the whole effect that follows. Granted, then, that the Absolute has a will, or is a spirit, it naturally admits of cause and effect.

23. To be a mind, to have thought, will, power, however, is to be a person ; and all this implies condition, limitation, relation ; and this, it has been and is said, cannot be in the unconditioned, the infinite, and the absolute. But we have seen that the *totally* unconditioned is either impossible or nothing ; the *totally* infinite, impossible or unreal ; and the *totally* absolute, nothing. Hence it appears, that if we are to talk of such a BEING, we must conceive of him in a *possible* form, and *exclude the contradictory*. The possible form is the partly unconditioned, the partly infinite, the externally absolute. The bare exclusion of the contradictory is a manifold, some might recklessly say an infinite, condition, limitation, and relation. At all events, how many positive conditions soever there may be, the exclusion of each one necessarily implies the inclusion of its contradictory, in that which is possible or actual. Hence it follows that the real must have condition, limitation, and at least internal relation. Personality is not therefore

excluded from the unconditioned, infinite, and absolute BEING, because it is a condition, limitation, or relation, as some of these must be found in the possible and the real. May we not add, that all *worthy* attributes, that is, conditions, limitations, and internal relations, must have their place in the great unconditioned, infinite, and absolute Being?

24. This is a criticism, not a treatise, on philosophy. If it had been otherwise, it would have been necessary to have begun at an earlier stage, to have traced from experience the laws of the contemplative faculties, and cleared away certain preliminary errors that have crept into our recent philosophy of the mind, and then we should have been better prepared for exhibiting the unsoundness of the daring theory it propounds of the unconditioned and the infinite. As it is, we have been under the necessity of merely appealing to the commonly acknowledged laws of human thought. In a formal treatise, also, we should not have been content with endeavouring to remove a weak stone from the foundations of human knowledge, without attempting to supply more than a hint of the solid truth. But our limits and our object will not permit us to pursue the inquiry farther. We are persuaded that Mr Mansel's doctrine of the infinite, which is traceable to Sir William Hamilton's theory of the unconditioned, embodies a grave and pernicious error. His "Bampton Lectures" are replete with learning and with valuable and instructive thought. But their main scope, which is the building up of religious faith, totally fails; first, because, even if the infinite God were proved to be inconceivable and incognisable, faith would thereby be deprived of any ground to stand upon, as we cannot believe in what is neither conceivable nor knowable; secondly, because, if the Infinite God be in a just sense, and in a reasonable measure, conceivable and perceivable by the human intellect, the chief ground of the whole reasoning which pervades the volume is taken away, and so its argument falls to the ground; and thirdly, because faith, if made to stand not only in its own place, but also in the stead of reason in the process of cognising and acknowledging the infinite God, has a task imposed upon it which it will be found utterly unable to discharge.

But our aim has extended farther than the mere criticism of the argument of the Lectures on the limits of religious thought. Even if these had never been published, the position of Sir William Hamilton, of which they are the legitimate fruit, would still remain, in its portentous boldness, to embarrass the minds of earnest inquirers after divine things. If it be solid, it will easily withstand the assaults of its opponents. If unsound, in whole or in part, the sooner it is removed out of the way the better for the interests of eternal truth.

ART. IV.—*Theories of the Lord's Day—Dominical and Sabbatarian.*

1. *Sunday, its Origin, History, and present Obligation, considered in Eight Lectures* (the Bampton Lecture for 1860). By JAMES AUGUSTUS HESSEY, D.C.L., &c.
2. *The Christian Sabbath, viewed in the light of Reason, Revelation, and History, with Sketches of its Literature.* By the Rev. JAMES GILFILLAN, Stirling. 2d Edition. Edinburgh: Andrew Elliott. 1862.

THESE two works have already taken a high place in the recent theological literature of our country. On the subject of the Lord's day, they are the most important English works that have appeared in this generation.

Dr Hessey's work is a very admirable sample of what the church may expect from such an institution as the Bampton Lecture, planted in the rich and generous soil of English Christian scholarship. It exhibits a great *amount* of learning, and considerable ability and eloquence. Its leading positive doctrine, that the Lord's day is apostolic, scriptural, divine, is one which we would be glad to see heartily embraced by the powerful Church of England; and which we are thankful to find so ably advocated, in a position so well fitted to gain a favourable hearing to the truth. But regard for truth constrains us to add, that the merits of the work, unquestionably high, are counterbalanced by serious defects. It is the production of a first-rate general scholar, who has set himself to "get up" a work for an occasion, rather than of one who has been long familiar with the subject, and who speaks from the fulness of mature meditation. Its learning is much more imposing in appearance than sound in reality, and bears evidence of having been accepted from one-sided authorities at second-hand. Its views on Lord's day observance, though, we believe, sound in the main, indicate considerable confusion of mind, unripeness or crudeness of thought: the lecture on this subject strikes us as singularly weak, inconclusive, and even self-contradictory. And above all, while its positive doctrine is well defended against the ecclesiastical theory, yet Dr Hessey is no less earnest, if not somewhat bitter and supercilious, in advocating a *negative* doctrine against what he calls the Sabbatarian or Puritan theory—a negative which withdraws from his own positive doctrine its living foundation in the system of revealed truth, and so far seriously injures that cause, of Lord's day observance, which the author has at heart.

Mr Gilfillan's work is a sample still more admirable of what may be achieved, unaided, by a laborious minister who earnestly sets himself to the study of a subject. To the rhetorical qualities of its English contemporary it makes no pretension: per-

haps it will make the deeper and more lasting impression on this very account, that it is written in the style of a quiet and earnest thinker, and lacks the pungency of platform address, or polemical pamphleteering. Its temper is much in its favour: with all the earnestness of a Christian apologist, Mr Gilfillan has none of the rancour of a controversialist. His learning, less imposing in its form than Dr Hessey's, is really more conscientious, thorough, and exhaustive. His view of the subject is much more comprehensive, especially in its practical applications to man, in all his interests, material, mental and spiritual, individual, domestic, social, and political—the work, throughout, is redolent of the pastorate. Mr Gilfillan teaches with authority, as one who is no novice, but has long and deeply thought on the subject of which he speaks. Ripeness, meditation, is written on every page. His work is no mere “big pamphlet;” it is one which could not be “got up” for an occasion, but which must have *grown* out of the labours of a studious life. It is a thorough “book,” reminding us, by its fulness of learning, thought, and earnest Christian wisdom, of the great works of our great “old divines.” Above all, Mr Gilfillan teaches, we believe, for substance, “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,” on the subject. And in all our recent literature we know not one other work that approaches his work in value, as a veritable treasury of argument and information, of all that a Christian minister or man most needs to know on the subject of “the Christian Sabbath.” In the following pages, it will be understood we occupy substantially the same ground with Mr Gilfillan; and, therefore, our critical remarks will be mainly directed to Dr Hessey.

For eighteen centuries, the Christian world as a whole has observed the first day of the week as a religious rest, in memory of the resurrection of Christ. But Christians are not agreed on the question, What is the reason of this observance, the ground of our obligation to observe the Lord's day? Some hold that the institution, in its origin and authority, is merely *ecclesiastical*; that the church has made the day (and therefore, we presume, can unmake it if she will); that the ground of our obligation to observe it, is her sense of its desirableness. In opposition to this ecclesiastical theory, Dr Hessey contends for what he calls the *dominical*, maintaining that the Lord's day is apostolic, scriptural, divine; that it originated in the church while she was under the authoritative guidance of the apostles of the Lord; that in instituting it they acted as they were moved by the Holy Ghost; and that therefore the institution is sealed with the seal of their divine inspiration. Mr Gilfillan goes still further. He holds that the Lord's day is “the Christian Sabbath;” that this religious rest of the New

Testament church is one in substance with the Sabbath of the Old ; that the Sabbath law is part of the law of nature, whose obligation is permanent and universal ; that is, was first revealed in Eden, and then declared anew on Sinai ; and that the ultimate ground of our obligation to observe the Lord's day is not a mere positive precept of the apostles, but the moral law, as declared in the fourth commandment of the Decalogue. This may be called the *Sabbatarian* theory of the Lord's day. It is held in substance by the mass of "Evangelical" Christians in the British Isles, North America, and our Colonial Empire, especially by that great presbyterian church which holds by the Westminster Standards ; and therefore may be described as the *Puritan* theory.

Against this Sabbatarian or Puritan theory, Dr Hessey contends that the Lord's day is not the same in substance with the Sabbath ; that it has no foundation in the fourth commandment ; that the Sabbath law is no part of the law of nature ; that the fourth Commandment is not moral in any relevant sense, but merely a part of that Mosaic ceremonial which was swept away by the death of Christ ; and that the Lord's day is merely a positive institution, which had no existence before the apostolic age. Thus the Dominical and Sabbatarian theories are at one in affirming that the Lord's day is of divine institution and authority : they differ in this, that while the dominical affirms that it is a merely positive institution emanating from inspired apostles, the Sabbatarian affirms that it is founded on the moral law, as declared in the fourth commandment. Now it might be imagined, that if Christians be agreed on the observance of the day, it matters little though they should differ as to the reason of observing it. But the Puritan will tell us that recognition of, and acquiescence in, the revealed reason, constitute one element in the due observance, as an exercise of faith in God speaking in his word. Dr Hessey will tell us that his theory is the only safeguard against the (alleged) evils of a Puritan Sabbath on the one hand, and a Continental Sunday on the other. And history tells us that, on a large scale, the theory and the observance, the doctrine and the practice, distinguishable in thought, are inseparable in fact ; that men's practice varies with their doctrine,—either the high doctrine gradually elevates and assimilates their practice to itself, or the low practice leads to the adoption of a doctrine such as may serve for its theoretical justification. We are not, therefore, merely engaging in an interesting speculative discussion, but doing our part towards the due observance of the Lord's day among the peoples, when we endeavour to discover and to vindicate the true theory, the God-given Scripture doctrine of the subject.

As both Dr Hesse and Mr Gilfillan are very copious in their accounts of the history of opinions on the subject, we will make a few remarks under this head. And first, we observe, that of that history the *prolegomena* are to us more important than the facts. To the mere church historian the great question is, What, in point of fact, have this and that class of men actually thought and said? To us, who are seeking *the truth* on the subject of the Lord's day, it is a question of much greater importance, What is the real *value* of their opinions in this case?

So, for example, of *the Reformers*. On this, or on any other subject, their opinions have, of course, no *absolute* authority; they do not constitute a rule of faith; for, however great and wise and holy, the reformers were not infallible, they were not inspired. And on the question now before us, their opinions have not even that *comparative* authority which attaches to their opinions on the "doctrine of grace." For, first, while they had no information on this subject which we do not possess, they did not bring those gifts and graces with which they were pre-eminently endowed to the calm and dispassionate contemplation of it; they did not carefully study the subject as a whole; they only glanced at it, in passing, under some of its aspects. And, second, their controversy with Rome, while instrumentally training them for their clear and full apprehension of "the doctrine of grace," led them into a position in which it was, humanly speaking, inevitable that they should take a distorted and one-sided view of the subject of the Sabbath or Lord's day. The popish church had taught her votaries to regard her festivals as "holy," in this sense, that the mere outward observance of them would, like the *opus operatum* of her sacraments, secure a saving benefit. With the system of church festivals had come to be mixed up the Christian festival of the Lord's day. It had come to be regarded as a bulwark of the doctrine of "holiness" in days; men had learned to observe it in a formal manner, looking for a saving benefit from mere bodily rest; and even the first reformers themselves did not escape the error of imagining that mere bodily rest had constituted the essence of the Sabbath of the Jews. In opposition to the popish doctrine of salvation by outward works, and in defence of their own doctrine of salvation only by grace through faith, the Reformers were naturally led to assail the popish festival system as a whole. And, considering the circumstances of their position, as thus defined, we need not wonder nor stumble if we find that some of the blows levelled against that antichristian system lighted upon a Christian institution, which antichrist had corrupted with his pharisaic leaven. They would have been more than men, if, in the ardour of their polemic against the

Papacy, they had not given utterance to expressions, some of which are liable to misconstruction, others of which are really inconsistent with the truth regarding the Lord's day, even though they themselves had firmly believed the truth in their heart.

An enemy of the Lord's day can easily misconstrue and pervert such expressions as the following :—That no day is "holy" in itself ; that to a Christian all days are alike ; and that it is in itself indifferent which day of the seven shall be observed as a religious rest. Now-a-days we are familiar with such expressions as employed by enemies of the Sabbath ; we are *not* familiar with them as they were employed by assailants of the Popish festival system ; and, therefore, when we meet them in the writings of the reformers, we are ready to understand them as meaning what they mean in the mouth of an anti-Sabbatarian. But to a candid theologian, a competent critic, who is able and willing to put himself in the view-point of the reformers, their expressions will appear to mean only what we, thanks to them, have learned to regard as innocent truisms—that no day is "holy," as no bread nor wine is "holy," in the sense of being able to convey saving benefit, *ex opere operato*, by the mere bodily use of it, without faith or love ; that the rest which a Christian realises most fully on the Lord's day, the spiritual rest in the finished work of Christ, ought to pervade the whole of a Christian life ; and that (if a competent authority had ordained it) any day of the week might be observed instead of the seventh or the first, without violation of that constitution of things on which the law of the weekly rest is founded.

But the first reformers made statements to the effect that the selection of the *first* day of the week has been determined, not by the sovereign ordination of Christ, but by the Christian wisdom of the church. Such expressions it is impossible to rescue from the advocates of the merely ecclesiastical theory. Sabbatarian and dominical alike must give them up, as simply indefensible, "the errors of the wise." And as they are in express contradiction to the only affirmation of fact on which the dominical theory is founded, they of course place the authority of the reformers, whatever its weight may be, dead against the Bampton lecturer : *hinc illæ lachrymæ* ?—hence, perhaps, the low opinion he has of the reformers.

On the other hand, the Sabbatarian can appeal to such facts as the following. Spite of their polemic against the Popish festival system, and carnal Lord's day observance, the reformers all practised and inculcated a holy observance of the day, the first of the week. All the first reformers believe, that the Sabbath was instituted in paradise. They all believed that the fourth commandment is moral thus far, that it requires

for holy resting a *stated portion* of our time. That the stated portion thus required is "one day in seven," was believed by the mass of their followers in the second generation, including such men as Beza, who had lived through the first, and Francis Turretine, the greatest of systematic divines. And before that second generation had passed away, the Sabbatarian theory was fully unfolded and applied by the Puritans, the most adequate representatives of completely developed reformation theology. In this connection it is a fact of some, though not much, importance, that, as Dr Hessey admits, the first reformers of England were Sabbatarian, and that the English liturgy solemnly acknowledges the continued obligation of the fourth commandment—a fact on which the Bampton lecturer comments in the manner of those Arminian doctors of his church who expound her Calvinistic articles.

On the ground of these facts, we are not warranted in citing the reformers as authorities explicitly in favour of the Sabbatarian theory. But, as the leading propositions on which the theory is founded are affirmed by them with growing clearness and fulness from the first, it may fairly be reasoned, that in logical consistency they *ought* to have been Sabbatarians, and that in fact they *would* have been Sabbatarians if they had given the subject a calm and unbiassed consideration. Such of their statements as militate against the theory can be easily accounted for, as the froth on the surface, occasioned by the temporary excitement of their controversy with Rome. Those which favour it can be accounted for only by supposing that they represent the deeper current of their thoughts, and indicate what *would* have been their deliberate judgment, if they had formed a deliberate judgment on the subject. The matter really stands as Dr Fairbairn has represented it. (Appendix to his "Typology of Scripture.") The reformers, on this subject, were fundamentally "sound," but they were not consistent and thorough. Some of their statements, representing the inadvantages of their passion against the Papacy, have been developed, by men of a very different spirit from theirs, into the Continental Sunday: others, representing their better mind, have been developed, by their true successors, into the Puritan Sabbath: with what results to the *religion* for which the reformers lived and died, let history declare. And while in point of fact their opinions were fundamentally consistent with the Sabbatarian theory, in point of reason their opinions on this subject, even when superficially opposed to that theory, are not of such value as to constitute any presumption against its truth.

Passing back over the middle ages, and "the age of the councils," in which Sabbatarians reigned almost undisturbed, we now ascend to the *Primitive Fathers* of the ante-Nicene church.

And here we must distinguish between matter of *doctrine*, and matter of *fact*. In the opinion both of Sabbatarians and of dominicals, in point of *fact*, the Jewish Sabbath—held on the seventh day—is abolished, and the first day of the week has been observed in its place, as the Lord's day, ever since the New Testament church began to be. This opinion is founded upon a series of statements in the New Testament church history, viewed in the light of the general relations of the New Testament to the Old. And, as it concerns a matter of historical fact, it admits of corroboration from the post-apostolic church, especially from the earlier fathers. Paedobaptists affirm that, as a matter of fact, the practice of baptizing infants has prevailed in the church ever since the day of pentecost. And this opinion, founded (they allege) on scripture testimony, receives a powerful corroboration from the testimony, *e.g.*, of Tertullian, a hundred years after the death of the last apostle, and of Augustine, two hundred years after Tertullian, both giving us to know, quite incidentally, that the practice did notoriously prevail from the church's first beginning. Such corroboration, only much more abundant, is furnished by the early fathers to the opinion, that the Jewish Sabbath is abolished, and the first day of the week, the Lord's day, has, since the time of the apostles, been observed in its place. Beginning with Barnabas and Clemens Romanus, contemporaries of the apostles, the testimony extends down through time to the era of Constantine the great and the first Council of Nice. In *breadth* it is coextensive with the then existing Christendom and civilisation: Clement of *Rome*, Irenaeus of *Lyons*, Dionysius of *Corinth*, Pliny in *Bythinia* (Saul among the prophets!), Justin Martyr of *Syria*, Tertullian and Cyprian of *Carthage*, Clement, Origen, and Peter of *Alexandria*, carry us round the whole Roman world; there is not a region, hardly an important church, which does not, in the scanty remains of the literature of that age, furnish a witness, direct or circumstantial evidence, to the fact that the Jewish Sabbath is abolished, and that the Lord's day has been observed in its place since the apostolic age. The testimony conclusively establishes this fact, and not less conclusively, though less obviously, the fact that the change was effected by the authority of the Lord's inspired apostles. This fact being the common property of Sabbatarians and dominicals, the testimony by which it is established is received with equal favour by both.

But to the testimony of the early fathers Dr Hesse further appeals on what is really a question, *not of fact* in church history, patent to their observation, but of *Bible doctrine*, addressed to their judgment—the question, *viz.*, of the *internal relation* of the Lord's day to the Sabbath, and of the fourth commandment to both; the question, as Mr Gilfillan puts it, Whether

the two institutions, with a specific difference, may not have a generic unity? Whether, differing in form, they may not be one in substance, embodying the same unchanging law of nature? This is the real question between Dr Hessey and Mr Gilfillan. And on *this* question the opinion of the early fathers is of exceedingly small importance. It has, of course, no *absolute* authority, to rule our faith; for they, like the reformers, were not inspired. And on the scale of that *comparative* authority which attaches so full and clear speculative apprehension of the Christian system of doctrine, they stand not only immeasurably lower than the reformers, but lower than any other class of really orthodox Christian teachers represented in Christian literature. Even in the case of great theological genius, like that of Tertullian and Origen, their genius was so wildly undisciplined, that their speculations, richly suggestive though they may be, have no authority whatever. Their controversies with the Jews, the Pagans, and the Gnostics, led them to the close study only of the evidences and outline of the Christian system as compared with other systems. The study of Christian doctrine, as we now understand it, the apprehension of Christian facts in their internal relations as a system, did not, properly speaking, commence till it had been thrust upon the church by the rise of the Arian and Pelagian heresies within her borders, in "the age of the councils," of scientific theologians like Athanasius and Augustine,—an age which witnessed the definitive statement and acceptance of that theory against which Dr Hessey is contending. The early fathers are valuable as witnesses to positive facts within their knowledge; and also as witnessing by their *silence* the absence, at least in their developed form, of the corruptions of the antichristian system. But to make them, in the infancy of Christian thought, authorities on a question of doctrine, as against the catholic church, is virtually to bind the church in the swaddling-clothes of perpetual babyhood.

But, further, the *early fathers do not pronounce in favour of the dominical theory*. To one who has read their statements only as arrayed by Dr Hessey, this may appear a bold averment. But to one who contemplates them in the *setting* of early church history, it will appear that the statement is true. The early fathers had frequent occasion to refer to the fact, that "the Sabbath" is abolished. By this "Sabbath," however, as Dr Hessey admits, they meant the *Jewish* Sabbath, held on the seventh day of the week,—the superstitious observance of which is censured by the apostle Paul. It continued to be observed, in addition to the Lord's day, by many converted Jews and some Judaizing Christians, for several generations after the apostolic age. So long as the observance was not

imposed upon Christians as part of the law of Christ, the church tolerated it as a harmless weakness, and even learned to favour it as a useful preparation for the Lord's day. But she had frequent occasion sternly to censure those who insisted on the observance in a really Judaical spirit, as if this part of the law of Moses had still been binding upon Christians. Further, "the Sabbath," *as opposed to* "the Lord's day," was one standing topic of the then great controversy of the Christians with the Jews. It is easy, therefore, even though that early church had held the Sabbatarian theory, to account for her occasional expressions of hostility to "the Sabbath," i.e., the Jewish Saturday as opposed to the Christian Sunday; and also to account for her cautious abstinence from applying the *name* of the Sabbath to the Lord's day, lest her simple-minded members should be led to embrace *the thing* (the Jewish Sabbath) *then understood by that name*. But the early church did not hold the Sabbatarian theory. Mr Gilfillan has produced some statements, from Origen and others, which at first sight appear to favour that theory. These statements Dr Hessey has left totally unnoticed. With such statements on record, we think it at the best exceedingly strange that he has ventured to make such sweeping assertions as he has ventured to make regarding the opinion of the early church on the subject. Still, the statements do not necessarily imply that even the parties who made them are explicitly and consciously Sabbatarian: they may be fairly construed to mean no more than this, that the Lord's day has *in some way* come in place of the Sabbath, and has *some* foundation in the nature of things. And certainly the early church as a whole was far from being explicitly Sabbatarian. She did not explicitly rest her Lord's day observance on the fourth commandment. She did not explicitly hold the substantial oneness of the Lord's day and the Sabbath. And if any of her teachers had been abruptly asked the (doctrinal) question, Whether the two institutions, apparently diverse and hostile, were not, after all, really and substantially one? he might probably have answered in the negative. For, as we have said, the time for theorizing, for speculative apprehension of doctrines, had not yet come. Any theory of the Lord's day would in that age have been an *anachronism*. And in point of fact, the church had formed *no theory*, Sabbatarian or dominical, of the subject. What she *might* have thought, if she had closely thought on the subject at all, may be judged from a sentence uttered by Tertullian, when he is led to glance for an instant in that direction. Marcion, against whom he is reasoning, maintains that the Creator of the Old Testament is not the same God with the Saviour of the New,—an idea which seems to underlie a great deal of the thinking of our modern apostles of anti-Sabbatarianism, and what they choose to call "Christi-

anity *versus* Judaism " in general, i.e., in reality, Christianity without the gospel of Christ. In support of his notion, Marcion instances, among other things, the relation of Christ to the Sabbath, affirming that he has come to destroy it. Tertullian answers that Christ came not to destroy the Sabbath but to fulfil it; and *that it became him who had hallowed the Sabbath as Creator, to hallow it more abundantly by his benificent healing work as Redeemer.* Here, through his "coal-bright" obscurity, we see, in germ, the Sabbatarian theory. But here Tertullian is before his age, anticipating, for the instant, Athanasius and Augustine; neither he, nor the church of his age, having deliberately considered the question of the substantial oneness of the Lord's day and the Sabbath. The church of that age had no real occasion, and no trained theological skill, to grapple with that question. The question remained to be pondered and settled by a succeeding generation, which had both. The earlier generation simply bore witness to the fact, which Sabbatarians and dominicals affirm in common, that the Jewish Sabbath is abolished, and the Christian's festival is the first day of the week. Although the authority of the early church on a doctrinal question had been as great as it is small, the authority would be unavailing here: for the doctrinal question was never so much as fully and fairly before her mind.

The Sabbatarian, therefore, has no cause to shrink from contemplating the facts of church history, even of those which are most ostentatiously paraded against him. Though the opinions both of the reformers and of the early fathers had been fundamentally opposed to his theory, yet the theory has been held by the Puritans, who fairly and fully studied the whole subject, and whose authority in relation to it is far greater than that both of reformers and of fathers together. And neither the reformers nor the fathers were fundamentally opposed to it. Their practice was perfectly consistent with it. From a full and consistent recognition of the true doctrine, they were hindered by circumstances which clouded and disturbed their judgment for the time—the early fathers, by their controversy with the Jews, and the errors of Judaizing Christians; the reformers, by their controversy with the papists, especially against the system of festivals. By these circumstances, they were even led into occasional statements inconsistent with the truth in its fulness. But when the disturbing circumstances had passed away, and men's minds were left free to a calm and unbiassed consideration of the question on its merits, the successors of the early fathers and reformers rested in a doctrine substantially Sabbatarian. The merely ecclesiastical theory is a modern innovation. The merely dominical theory has never been affirmed by any Christian church. So far as there has

been anything which may be called a catholic church doctrine of the Lord's-day, the Sabbatarian theory is the doctrine of the catholic church. And as to occasional shortcomings and divergencies from this catholic doctrine, what is true in regard to the great facts of redemption is still more obviously true in regard to such subjects as the Sabbath, that even after God has completed the revelation of his truth in the Word, the church has arrived at the full and explicit recognition of it, not by an instantaneous flash of enlightenment, but by a gradual process of doctrinal development, her apprehension, obscured at the first, it may be by some *mis*-apprehension, but slowly brightening and expanding "more and more unto the perfect day."

As regards the Sabbatarian, the historical question is this, Can the facts of history be reconciled with your theory? And to this question he can answer with truth, that they can: the facts can easily be accounted for, supposing the Sabbatarian theory to be true; they cannot be accounted for by the supposed truth of any other. But while thus able and willing to stand his ground on the field of history, the true Puritan loves best to try this question, and every other question in religion, on its own merits, by what he regards as the only rule of religious faith and practice. And while he appeals to Scripture, no professing Christian can consistently gainsay his right of appeal. If "the Bible—the Bible alone—is the religion of Protestants," "the Bible—the Bible at least—is the religion of all Christians" worthy of the name. Outside of the Bible, Dr Hessey cannot find one relevant fact which he does not also find in the Bible itself. And the Puritan, while undertaking to shew that history favours the truth of his theory, undertakes from the Bible to establish its truth, as a doctrine of revelation, declared by the voice of God.

Here, again, the *prolegomena* are of some importance. Against the doctrine of the Sabbatarian, and against its detailed Scripture evidences, it is easy to make this, and that, and that other objection. It is easy to bring some objection against *every* Scripture doctrine, both in itself and in its evidences. Thus the Socinians can object to the doctrine of a trinity, that it is incomprehensible, and involves an apparent contradiction in terms: they can object to its detailed evidences, that some of them are irrelevant, that no one of them is demonstratively conclusive by itself. But all this does not destroy, nor even sensibly diminish, the strength, of the trinitarian position. The strength of that position consists in this, that, in reference to the Godhead, the Bible presents a series or system of statements which can be accounted for by, and only by, the supposition of a trinity in unity. Though the doctrine be difficult, it may be true; though it cannot be comprehended, it can be

believed ; and though some of its alleged evidences should be irrelevant, and no one of them be conclusive in isolation, by itself, yet all of them together, in combination, as so many *converging lines* of evidence, forming, so to speak, a *pencil* of rays of light, may constitute a proof clear and strong as demonstration. So of the Sabbatarian theory of the Lord's day. The question is not, Is the doctrine such that no objection can be urged against it? Are the alleged evidences such that no objection can be urged against any or all of them? But, Does it explain the whole Bible statements on the subject? Does it account for all the Bible facts to be accounted for? Is it *the* hypothesis which explains the Bible *phenomena*? If it be, then no matter how many or how strong the objections may be, the Sabbatarian theory is the Scriptural theory—the Bible doctrine of the Lord's day ; the objections are only so many difficulties encumbering an ascertained truth of God.

The popular objections to the doctrine, apart from its evidences, are mainly drawn from the alleged practical *consequences* of admitting the doctrine. These objections ordinarily assume the form of the *argumentum ad invidiam*—working upon popular passion, with a view to stir up the popular hatred against what is called “the Puritan Sabbath.” They have so strongly impressed Dr Hessey, that he represents it as one grand advantage of his theory, that it provides a way of escape from the practical consequences of the Sabbatarian. In point of fact, this is a mistake. No practical inference regarding Lord's day observance can be logically deduced from the Sabbatarian theory, which will not flow, by parity of reasoning, from the dominical. But it is a fact of much greater importance, that the objections themselves are invalid, and derive their only appearance of force from misapprehension and misrepresentation.

1. For example, it is alleged, that the Puritan Sabbath is Judaical or Popish, in the sense of being *pharisaical*. Now there may be pharisaical Sabbatarians, as there may be pharisaical dominicals ; if the man be a pharisee, whatever may be his theory of the Lord's day, his Lord's day observance will of course be pharisaical. The objection has no point nor power unless it be meant, that the Puritan's *doctrine* of the Lord's day is pharisaical ; so that the pharisaism of his practice is the natural and proper result of his doctrine. Now pharisaism, in Jew or Gentile, consists in these two things, jointly or severally : 1st, religious observance of what God has not prescribed ; 2d, the expectation of saving benefit from mere outward observance. But the Puritans have been distinguished from all other Christians by the zeal with which they have contended, 1st, that religious observance of what God has not prescribed in

his Word is a sin, the sin of "will-worship;" and 2d, that to expect a blessing without faith and love, from mere outward observance even of the ordinances of God, is mere superstition. Their *general* doctrine, therefore, is the exact antipodes of pharisaism, whether Judaical, Popish, or Pusevite. Nor is there anything to reverse the practical effect of this evangelism in their special doctrine of the Lord's day? The only peculiarities of their doctrine of the Lord's day are, first, that they regard the Sabbath-law as moral; and, second, that they hold themselves bound by the fourth commandment. But does a moral law, as such, bind man to a *pharisaical* obedience? Does the fourth commandment prescribe a *pharisaical* observance? Surely not. The Sabbatarian doctrine is in itself no more pharisaical than the dominical. To say that the one or the other is pharisaical is to utter a stupid untruth, if not a malignant lie.

2. It is objected, that the Sabbatarian theory bids us spend "*the whole day*" "in the public and private exercises of God's worship," and forbids us to give any part of it to our "worldly occupations and recreations." By this, of course, the Puritans never meant, that every instant of the day is to be spent in praying, or psalm-singing, or reading or hearing the word. It is a wonder that they should have been understood to mean anything so preposterous by a learned doctor of divinity, who has studied church history, and written a book brimful of Latin and Greek. If I announce a resolution to devote a whole day to study in the class-room and in my own house, no one will imagine that I have covenanted with myself not to be for one single instant without book, or pen, or pencil in hand: even a babe will understand me to mean, that study is to be the recognised business of *the day throughout*, that I am not to give myself a half or quarter holiday, but to take a *bond fide* "whole day's" work. Now the Puritans had in their view not only the no-day of antinomians, but specially the *half-day* of those whose religious observance of the day was limited to the "canonical hours" of public worship. This half-day religion was characteristic of pagan festivals, and of that Judaism, the carcass without the life, which survived the rise of the Christian religion. At an early period, it began to creep into the church: thus Origen inveighs against some professing Christians of his time, who gave the hours spent out of church to mere carnal resting and enjoyment, instead of devoting the whole day in holy resting to the Lord. The practice spread with the baptised paganism of the popish saints' days, and other church festivals. It lingered in the half-reformed church of England. It met the Puritans in a severely practical form as advocated by that semi-popish party which have left us such monuments.

of their piety and zeal as "King James's Book of Sports." And it was in opposition to that pagan-popish "half-day" that the Puritans contended for the "whole day;" by which they merely meant, that the religious rest, and its appropriate devotional exercises, should not be restricted to the "canonical hours" spent at church, but should be continued in the family and closet at home. To this "whole day," no doubt, they were bound by their doctrine of the Sabbath; for a day, and not a half-day, is what is prescribed by the fourth commandment. But to the same "whole day" the dominical is no less truly bound by his doctrine. His doctrine speaks of a whole day, and not a half day—"the Lord's day." It binds him who believes it to a holy resting all through the day; unless the day become a half day, or something less than "a whole day," by being "the Lord's."

3. It is objected that, in point of fact, the Puritan church discipline and state legislation have been characterised by a stringency and particularism savouring of the old dispensation of the letter, rather than of the new dispensation of the spirit. Here we must distinguish between the *ideal* of the Puritan Sabbath, and the Puritan attempts to realise it. Their attempts to realise it we know to have been human. It is their ideal alone which we own as divine: that alone is involved in the Sabbatarian theory. Now that ideal expressly excludes the observance of the seventh day, the characteristic of the *Old Testament* Sabbath; it excludes those sacrifices, and other ceremonials, which characterised the Sabbath *of the Jews*; and it does not include the stringent penal sanctions of the Mosaic code, for these have no place in the fourth commandment. The Puritan ideal simply is, "a whole day" of religious rest. This ideal the Puritans were bound by their theory to realise. So are we. So is Dr Hesse. Every one who, on whatever ground, believes that God has ordained a day of religious rest, is bound in consistency to seek and find a solution of this practical problem:—How the church by her discipline may best enforce upon her members the duty, and the state by its legislation may best secure to its members the privilege of ceasing from their ordinary toils and recreations for one whole day in seven, and devoting it to a holy resting in the Lord. This problem we are bound to solve for our time, according to the light that God may have given us. The Puritan fathers were bound to solve it, according to their light, for their time. They set themselves manfully to the endeavour to realise their ideal. That they perfectly succeeded we will not affirm of fallible men. We remember, indeed, that while they were singularly endowed with the life, and power, and freedom of the Spirit, they had a great work to do, and this a species of "law-work," in purifying that church

which Popery had reduced, and semi-Popery was bringing back, to the condition of an Augean stable ; that a disciplinary code which would be utterly out of place in our better time may have been admirably adapted to their glorious purpose, to rear up a regenerate society from the *debris* of an ungodly nation and a corrupted church ; that what now appears to us an unnecessary and offensive stringency and particularism may have been the very remedy that was needed to heal the disorders of their time. But to defend every Sabbath regulation of every Puritan church and state is what we will by no means undertake, and what we have no call whatever to undertake. Our Sabbatarian theory commits us to the defence, not of the details of Puritan legislation, but simply of the Puritan ideal of "a whole day" of religious rest, as the end to be aimed at in the discipline of churches and the legislation of states.

But here our adversaries are alternately maudlin and fierce in imploring and demanding, that we should take into merciful consideration the circumstances of individuals, the condition of society, what poor human nature can bear. The human nature which is most intolerant of the cruel burden of a "whole day" of religious rest, has very little claim upon our favourable consideration. But all the truth that is contained in these appeals is perfectly consistent with the Puritan theory of the Sabbath. The Puritan theory not only permits, but demands, a due regard to every circumstance which ought to modify our application of its ideal to practice. It is based upon a law which has been authoritatively construed by the Lawgiver himself, not only to permit, but to demand in its spirit, a departure from its letter in every real case of "necessity and mercy." And accordingly the claims of "necessity and mercy" are inscribed on the face of the Puritan standards. So far, therefore, the dominical and Sabbatarian are at one ; save that the ground of exemption, in exceptional cases, which the dominical seeks to establish by general reasonings of his own, the Sabbatarian finds established to his hand by the words of Christ. It is true that the dominical may differ from the Sabbatarian on the question, *What is a real case of "necessity and mercy,"* such as will justify a departure from the letter of the law ? But so may a Sabbatarian differ from a Sabbatarian. So may a dominical from a dominical : *e. g.*, we are greatly mistaken if some devout dominicals do not regard some of Dr Hessey's proposed exemptions as tantamount to a sacrifice of the Lord's day in its integrity. But however they may differ in their practical application of the rule, the rule by which dominicals and Sabbatarians alike are bound by their respective theories is this :—Seek as your ideal a day of religious rest, a day of which throughout religious rest shall be the recognised business ; and let exemption be

made in cases of real "necessity and mercy," and in these alone.

4. With these objections to the *form* of the Puritan Sabbath, is usually mixed up an objection to its *spirit*, as harsh and austere, a spirit of sullen and gloomy asceticism. From the terms in which this objection is sometimes couched, it would appear that many regard the Puritan Sabbath-keeping as some horrible mystery, some fearful "communion of demons," pregnant with demoralisation and woe, like the pagan worship of the devil. We regret to find Dr Hessey represent a spirit of gloom as the natural and proper spirit of a Puritan Sabbath. The question, we again observe, is this, What is the natural and proper result of the Sabbatarian doctrine? In answer to this question it is fair, to a limited extent, to consult the experience of those by whom the doctrine has been wrought out in practice, as, for example, Dr Hessey, to their honour, refers to the Christians of Scotland. But the experience consulted must be the experience, not of hypocrites, who in everything are joyless slaves, but of true Christians, the living children of God, who alone are capable of discerning and relishing the things of the Spirit. And their experience must be taken as reported, not in the malignant gossip of wordlings, who know not what they say nor whereof they affirm, but by those who have at once full means of information, and the moral and spiritual capacity of appreciation. Such, for example, is Dr Chalmers, a truth-speaking man, who well knew what he said, and from whom Dr Hessey has quoted a noble testimony, to which he has appended a foolish comment. Such are the children of God, in many ages and lands, whose testimonies have been collected by Mr Gilfillan from the life-history of the church. Such are millions of Sabbath-keeping families in Britain and America, which bear a silent but most impressive testimony in the prevalent spirit of their homes throughout the week. And of the Christian experience thus attested, we believe it to be the uniform tenor, that to evangelical Christians their Puritan Sabbath is the very crown and joy of their earthly existence, "the pearl of their days," diffusing "righteousness, and peace, and joy" through their whole week, and forming their truest foretaste of heaven on earth.

But the natural and proper spirit of the Puritan Sabbath can best be learned from a direct contemplation of the Puritan Sabbath-law. Now that law does not, on the face of it, prescribe a spirit of gloom. Even when it was veiled behind the Mosaic ceremonial, Dr Hessey admits its observance was not a mere fast, to "afflict men's souls," but a true religious festival and rest. A more authoritative voice has declared, that its spirit was coincident with the spirit of the whole religion of

grace, as contrasted with pharisaism, "I will have mercy and not sacrifice;" that even with all the painful particularism, and severe penal sanctions of the Mosaic institute, it answered the purpose to which it was destined at the first, "the Sabbath was made for man." And now every trace of that particularism and severity has disappeared. The good which the day bestowed upon the Jew still remains to the Puritan. But what the Jew enjoyed in the dim and tremulous light of the stars, the Puritan now enjoys in the gladsome light of the risen "Sun of righteousness." The good enjoyed, under both dispensations, is a holy rest, in communion with God, the Creator and Redeemer, on the bosom of the Father, as revealed by the Son. The Puritan Sabbath, according to the Sabbatarian doctrine, is *a day spent at home with God in Christ*. From such communion, the carnal mind, which is enmity against God, naturally shrinks with loathing terror. The Puritan Sabbath must be regarded as a gloomy bondage of fear to them whose ideal rest is a secular holiday, devoted to mere carnal resting and enjoyment, whether in indolent torpor, or in mere intellectual or æsthetic cultivation, or in feverish pleasure-seeking, swelling the tide of unresting idleness, of vagabond blackguardism, which every Sabbath morning rushes forth from our cities and towns, to disturb the sacred repose and pollute the morals of the land. But we wonder that any Christian should regard as a gloomy day *a day spent at home with God in Christ*. It is the creed of all professing Christians, and the experience of all true believers, that the children of the bride-chamber *cannot* mourn while the bridegroom is with them. The blissful enjoyment of communion with Christ, in the glorious fulness of his resurrection life, is the Christian's true festival, the realised ideal of his rest. And its practical effect upon the character is thus described:—"Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. . . Now we all, with open face, beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the spirit of the Lord."

Such is the spirit of the Puritan Sabbath: such is the ideal which the Puritan strives and longs to realise. This ideal is prescribed by his theory. But the same ideal is prescribed to the dominical by his theory. According to this theory, the first day of the week is "the Lord's day," a day devoted to him, the festival of his resurrection. Consequently, in order duly to observe it, we must be "*in the spirit* on the Lord's day." Now, to be in the spirit of Christ is to be in spiritual communion with him, recognition of his glory, enjoyment of his presence, as the risen and glorified Redeemer; *i. e.*, to be in precisely the same frame of mind which is prescribed by the Puritan theory. And thus we have shewn, as to these objections to the Sabbatarian doctrine, first, what is most important, that they are in them-

selves invalid ; and, second, what is of least importance, that all of them apply, with equal force, to the dominical theory. This we say, not in disparagement of that theory, but so far in its praise. But having proved it, we now repeat it, because it has been urged in behalf of the dominical theory, that it will relieve us of certain alleged evil consequences of the Sabbatarian, while, in point of fact, no practical inference can be deduced from the Sabbatarian doctrine, which does not, by parity of reasoning, flow from the dominical.

But it is one thing to shew that a certain observance is obligatory in strict logic, and another to secure the discharge of the obligation in practice. In point of mere logic, the due observance of the Lord's day *ought*, perhaps, in the opinion of dominicals, to follow from the merely ecclesiastical theory. But Dr Hessey objects to this theory that, whatever may be its logical consequence, it utterly fails to secure a due observance of the Lord's day, because *it gives the institution no adequate hold upon the conscience* of men in the mass. Now we object to his dominical theory that, though not in the same degree, it is characterised by the same practical weakness. A Christian, no doubt, is bound to observe the mere institution of an inspired apostle, as truly as though the law of that institution had been written by the finger of God, in an imperishable code, many ages before it was issued anew from the apostolic mint ; but though as truly bound in logic, the mass of men will never feel so strongly bound in practice. Again, we are as truly bound in logic, but do not feel so strongly bound in practice, to obey a mere positive precept, which has no recognised root in the nature of things, as to obey the same precept when we see its *rationale*, its root, its living foundation, in the whole revealed constitution of the world and of the church. Take, for example, the case already referred to, of the baptism of infants. Pædobaptists justify their practice by apostolic institution. But the New Testament evidence of that institution is by no means overwhelming. The mass of Christian men are not in a position to estimate the value of corroborative evidence furnished by the primitive church. And, while their conduct is ruled by what they believe to have been the practice of the apostles, their judgment and their conscience ultimately rest, their belief itself is established on the Biblical *rationale* of the practice, that which lies at the root of infant baptism and infant circumcision alike—the Scripture *doctrine* of infant church-membership. So with reference to the Lord's day. The dominical theory represents it as a merely positive institution, originating with the apostles, and having no vital connection with anything that went before it ; leaves it to be regarded as a merely *arbitrary* institution, standing in no vital relation to the con-

stitution of man, either as citizen of the nation or as member of the church. This, at least to the mass of men, must greatly detract from the force of the evidence for the institution itself. We believe with Dr Hessey, that the evidence of New Testament church history, corroborated by the post-apostolic church, is logically conclusive; but we also believe that that evidence is by no means so *practically impressive and indisputable* as to rule the lives of the mass of men. Some will doubt whether, after all, the apostles did observe the first day of the week as a religious rest, distinguished from all other days. Others will reason: Even upon the supposition that they did in fact observe it, that, as they have given no express precept on the subject, their practice does not constitute a binding rule to us. And both classes will urge, with much force, that it is antecedently most improbable, *ex facie* incredible, quite *unprecedented in the constitution of the New Testament church*, (which rests upon the Old Testament), that there should be transmitted to us a binding law which has no reason in the nature of things, no root in the Old Testament, no living foundation even in the system of the New, not so much as an express precept of the apostles, but only a not indisputable, and not obviously relevant practice. The force of these considerations is silently, perhaps unconsciously, confessed by Dr Hessey, when he speaks of the apostles, in instituting the Lord's day, as having perhaps been "directed" by the "analogy" of the Old Testament Sabbath-law, and acknowledges that the Church of England is bound by the fourth commandment, so far as it is moral. In so far acknowledging the morality of the command, in speaking of that "analogy," he either says nothing to the purpose, or rests for the moment upon the Sabbatarian theory. And, indeed, to a rational being, there is no other "rest for the sole of the feet." The dominical theory is practically weak and ineffectual, for this, among other reasons, that it is speculatively weak and poor, a lame and beggarly theory. It does not account for the facts to be accounted for. It does not so much as appear to account for the Bible facts regarding the Sabbath. It does not even account for, but leaves wholly unaccountable—it encumbers with a serious difficulty—the one isolated fact on which it professes to stand, of the universal acceptance of the Lord's day by the apostolic and sub-apostolic church. In truth, it accounts for nothing. It gives no *rationale* of anything. It merely affirms one isolated fact, and calls the affirmation a theory! But it is not entitled even to this name. It is, on the face of it, *no theory*; i. e., it does not enable us to see any system of facts, to apprehend them in one view, from centre to circumference, from beginning to end. A bare, bald,

isolated, lifeless assertion like this is not that on which men's souls will ever repose in stable faith ; and an unstable or wavering faith will never sustain the mass of men in a steadfast and thorough-going practice.

We grieve to say, that the *practical weakness* of the theory is illustrated in the person of Dr Hessey himself. We do not, of course, refer to his personal observance of the Lord's day : of that we know nothing, and are willing to believe that it is all that the most strenuous Sabbatarian can desire. Such observance, we have shewn, is the *logical* consequence of his theory. But that it is not its *practical* result or outcome, is shewn by the exceedingly unsatisfactory character of Dr Hessey's treatment of the form and spirit of Lord's-day observance. Without contending for the pagan-popish "half day," or for a three-quarters' day, or for anything less than a "whole day," he dislikes and misrepresents *the only other alternative*, the *bond fide* "whole day" of the Puritans. While earnestly protesting against the continental Sunday, a secular holiday with a sprinkling of religion (like holy water on a robber), he dislikes and misrepresents *the only other alternative*, the Puritan day of holy rest, including due allowance for the claims of "necessity and mercy." Objecting alternately to each of the only two ideals of Lord's day observance, he has no *tertium quid*, no new idea of his own. We often think that what he really has at heart is the Puritan ideal, which he condemns without knowing. But his remarks on Lord's-day observance are pervaded with a sort of Sadducean leaven, which awakens painful suspicion, a vague *arrière pensée*, reserving something for a modern "liberty of the spirit," which does *not* mean a freedom in love and light to do God's will, relief from the guilt and dominion of sin. And this distressing vagueness he appears to regard as justified in some unaccountable way by the "theory," that the first day of the week is *only* the day of "the Lord !" If such practical looseness of conception on Lord's day observance result from the theory in the mind of a logician and divine, what must be its results in the practice of the mass. God grant that it never may be tried, as it never has.

The Puritan theory, on the other hand, is practically impressive and strong, were it only for this reason, that it is speculatively clear and complete. So far from excluding, it demands the Bible facts regarding the Sabbath. It, and it alone, professes to account for them all. The facts to be accounted for are all connected with the institution of *the week*. This institution has appeared as an institution of God, with growing clearness at every stage in the progressive revelation of God in his Word. And in connection with it, there are three leading facts, patent to the observation of every one who believes

believes and reads the Bible, whatever may be his theory of the Lord's day: 1st, as stated in the second chapter of Genesis, God declares *the reason* why he has blessed the seventh day, by which the hebdomadal division of time was first determined; 2d, *for that reason*, on Mount Sinai, he declares the Sabbath law, placing it among those moral laws which bind all men in all ages and lands; and 3d, in the apostolic age we find his people, under the guidance of his inspired apostles, still observing the institution of the week, altered in its form, but unchanged in its substance, still containing seven days—six of holy working, and one of holy resting. These facts are the *principal* or primary evidences of the doctrine, that the Sabbath law is a law of nature, that the fourth commandment is in its nature moral, of permanent and universal obligation. They are its evidences, because it is their *rationale*: they are accounted for by that doctrine, and that alone. Every other doctrine fails to account for these plain Bible facts.

Again, around these three leading facts we find so many clusters of secondary facts, which constitute so many accessory evidences, so many rays of circumstantial evidence in favour of the doctrine. 1st, In connection with the statement in Genesis, there is reason to believe that the Sabbath law was known and observed by our first parents in paradise, and, more or less fully, by the patriarchs before and after the flood; and it is certain that traces of the institution of the week remain among the Gentiles, and that the Sabbath law was known and observed by Israel before the law was given on Sinai. 2d, In connection with the Sinaitic legislation, the Sabbath law (with ceremonial additions) was observed by God's ancient church for 1500 years. During that period, he gave prophetic intimation of his purpose to preserve a Sabbath for his church of the New Testament; and when his Son came, in the fulness of time, he declared that "the Sabbath was made," not merely for Jews, but "for man," and therefore constitutes a part of his mediatorial lordship as "the Son of man." And 3d, In connection with the Lord's day observance of the apostolic and post-apostolic ages, neither the apostles nor the Christians of the primitive church give any indication of regarding the institution of the week, determined by the Lord's day, as anything new or unaccountable, but appear to receive it, like the practice of infant baptism, based on the doctrine of infant church-membership, as a matter of course, requiring no explanation, with which they are familiarly acquainted. All these facts are accounted for by the Sabbatarian theory of the Lord's day. No other theory pretends to account for them.

The account which the Sabbatarian gives of them is this:—

First, The institution of the week is founded in nature; the Sabbath law is moral in its substance, as requiring one day in seven for a religious rest; and thus far it has remained in force through all ages of human history. *Second*, As laid down in the fourth commandment, the law, while moral in its essentials, is positive or ceremonial in its circumstantialia. The nature of things does not determine, the Sabbath law as such does not declare, *which* day of the seven shall be set apart for the religious rest. That falls to be determined by the positive precept of God, and it has been so determined. God has ordained that the resting day should be the seventh of the week in the ages before, and the first in the ages that follow the coming and work of his Son, our Lord. But, *third*, while the change of the day has altered the *form* of the week, it has made no real change in its *substance*. Under both forms alike the substance remains the same,—a week of seven days, embracing six days of holy working for God, and one day of holy resting in him. The theory thus accounts for all the Bible facts, and alone accounts for them all. Therefore, the whole series of Bible facts constitute a system of evidence in behalf of the Puritan Sabbatarian theory.

Against this theory, there can be produced, properly speaking, *no counter evidence* from Scripture. The apostolic statement about regarding of days obviously refers to a Judaical, *superstitious* regard, such as the reformers condemned in the popish festival system. The apostolic censure of "Sabbaths"—in connection with "new moons"—no less obviously refers to the *Jewish* Sabbath, observed on the seventh day; the same "Sabbath" which was placed on the black-books of the primitive post-apostolic church. These expressions require, not to be explained away, but merely to be understood, in order that we may see that no New Testament statement so much as appears to discountenance the Puritan theory of the Lord's day.

But in the absence of Scripture utterance against the theory, it has been attempted to construct an argument against it on apostolic *silence*. Why, it is reasoned, if your theory be true and scriptural, have the apostles not placed on record an express declaration of its truth? To the advocates of the dominical theory, it might be answered, How do *you* account for the circumstance implied in your theory, that an ordinance *entirely new*, vitally affecting all human life, should have been instituted by the apostles, and universally adopted by the church, while the New Testament Scriptures give no hint of its novelty, and do not so much as mention its institution? But the question admits of a much more generous answer than a mere *argumentum ad hominem*. Why, if the Sabbatarian doctrine be true, do not the apostles expressly declare

the doctrine? Because, *if it be true, they had no need to declare it*; in its practical application it was well known already to the church, and had been familiarly known ever since the church began to be. Let us look once more at the parallel case of the baptism of infants. The practice of infant baptism rests upon the doctrine of infant church-membership. This doctrine involves, as a corollary, the substantial oneness of baptism and circumcision. Now, against circumcision, the Jewish *form* of the sacrament, the apostles inveigh much more strongly than they inveigh against "the Sabbath," the Jewish *form* of the weekly day of rest. And yet they take no pains to guard the church against error by explaining that what they condemn is only the Jewish form of the sacrament, and not the sacrament itself, by declaring the doctrine of infant church-membership, and the consequent oneness of circumcision and baptism. That doctrine *they leave the church to infer*,—e. g., from an incidental allusion in Col. ii. 11, 12, not more conclusive than the allusion to the Sabbath in Heb. iv. 9; from the continued substantial *identity* of the church under both dispensations (Rom. xi. 16-24), as Sabbatarians reason from the continued substantial identity of the constitution of man in all ages and lands; and from the revealed *reason* of the Old Testament sacrament (Rom. iv. 11), equally applying to infants under the New, as Sabbatarians appeal to the "reason annexed" to the fourth commandment, applying equally to all men in all ages and lands. The apostles do not formally and expressly declare the doctrine of the church-membership of infants, *because they have no need to declare it*; in its practical application, it has been familiarly known to the church through many generations of infant circumcision. And for the same reason, they make no express mention of the Sabbatarian theory of the Lord's day.

It must be kept in mind that, historically, Jerusalem on earth is "the mother of us all." The Jewish church is the "olive tree" on which we Gentiles have been grafted. Of the membership of the apostolic church a very large proportion, probably a large majority, were Jews by birth and education. They alone brought into the Christian church, what had been impressed upon them by the Old Testament revelation of grace, *a definite religious character and habit*. With new hearts, but religious character or habit quite unformed, the Gentile converts were, so to speak, in a state of solution. The Jewish element in the church thus came to be *the mould* in which the Gentile element was "cast," from which it received its shape. And so it came to pass that the mixed primitive church accepted, without question or doubt, the seemingly irrational practice of infant baptism, because the doctrine

which underlies it, of infant church-membership, had been inwrought into the Jewish mind, so as to form a sort of religious second nature, by 2000 years' familiarity with it in the working constitution of the church. So, too, the apostles had no need to make any express and formal declaration of the Sabbatarian doctrine of the Lord's day. The institution of the week, founded in nature, on the moral law, had, by 4000 years of Sabbath observance, been made familiar to the church as the air she breathed. That institution was received by the New Testament church as a matter of course, as an immemorial part of God's revelation in the word. The silence of the apostles, therefore, while utterly unaccountable on the supposition that the Lord's day dates its origin from them, is easily and naturally accounted for on the supposition that it is "the Christian Sabbath;" not a new institution, dating from Pentecost, but, under a new form, an old institution, as old as Eden, as the nature of man.

And thus the Sabbatarian theory really *is* a theory of the Lord's day. It enables us to *see* the Bible facts, to apprehend them all in one view. It not only accepts whatever is true in the dominical theory, but explains *all* that demands explanation, accounts for all the Bible facts to be accounted for. This, we have said, is the logical evidence of its truth. But this, too, is one reason of its practical power. It sways the conscience by giving satisfaction to the understanding. It moves the man to obedience, by enabling his mind to rest. Recognising the apostolic institution as fully and frankly as the poor dominical "theory," it presents that institution to our view as organically connected with the whole historical revelation of God in his word; laying the foundations deep and wide in the whole system of revealed truth regarding the relations of God to man, as created and redeemed, it secures to the Lord's day a place of corresponding depth and breadth in our affectionate veneration. Its practical impressiveness was no doubt one reason of the joyful reception given to this true theory by such earnest practical men as the Puritans, and has been one cause of its profound and abiding influence in Puritan churches and nations. We have not entered on the speculative question, *how* the Sabbath law *can* be a law of nature, in *what* precise sense the fourth commandment is moral. To that question, we trust we shall be permitted soon to return. In the mean time, we rest in the conclusion that the theory which affirms the morality of the fourth commandment is the only one which even appears to explain the Bible facts regarding "the Sabbath" and Lord's day; and that it is the only theory which, on a large scale, has been tried, and *not* found wanting in practice—no unimportant evidence of its truth.

ART. V.—*The Greek Testament of Webster and Wilkinson.*

The Greek Testament, with Notes, Grammatical and Exegetical. By WILLIAM WEBSTER, M.A., late of King's College, London, and formerly Fellow of Queen's College, Cambridge; and WILLIAM FRANCIS WILKINSON, M.A., Vicar of St Werburgh's, Derby, formerly Theological Tutor of Cheltenham College. Vol. I., containing the Epistles and the Apocalypse. London: Parker, Son, & Bourn, West Strand. 1861. Pp. 884.

IN our notice of the first volume of this work in July 1861 (p. 642) was omitted* a reference to Carpzov's "*Apparatus Criticus*," where, at p. 424, the real point at issue respecting the alleged difference of time between our Lord and the rest of the Jews, as also between the Pharisees and the Karaites, is disposed of in the assertion that the inhabitants of the Holy Land were agreed, whilst the temple was standing, in reckoning the new moon, not by an astronomical calculation taken from the conjunction of the sun and moon, but from the first appearing of the moon after it was clear of the sun's rays. It is true, indeed, that notwithstanding this, Carpzov himself† accedes to those who suppose that our Lord anticipated the Jews in the celebration of the passover, respecting which we again refer to the notes of Dr Robinson at the end of his "*Harmony of the Gospels*."

We proceed to notice a few instances of controverted passages in regard of interpretation. It is our conviction that the modern literature is by far too innovating in this department.

Rom. i. 17, "*For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith*." Professor Scholefield, in his "*Hints for an Improved Translation of the New Testament*," departs from Beza here, to whom he generally inclines. But we think it has not been sufficiently borne in mind, that the transposition adopted by so many of the moderns is altogether unnatural for the epistolary style. That style of itself favours the ancient interpretation,—from the less instructed faith of the Old Testament to the clearer faith of the New, in accordance with the opinion of Tertullian amongst the Latins, and Clemens Alexandrinus and Œcumenius amongst the Greeks. We find from Professor Scholefield that Lightfoot held to this, the ancient view. Matthew Henry evidently leans to this construction, explaining the words of the apostle to import from one degree of faith to another. And it may be well that our readers

* By a misprint also (p. 641), Dr Hastings Robinson was changed to Robertson.

† P. 480.

should be reminded that Matthew Henry had the very great advantage of his learned father Philip Henry's MSS. and great erudition. The late Dr Butler, Bishop of Lichfield, is known to have expressed his astonishment at Philip Henry's *profound* acquaintance with the classics. Our impression is that it was in consequence of some of his MSS. being put into his hands.

Rom. iii. 4, "*And mightest overcome when thou art judged.*" Our editors thus paraphrase, and we think, rightly, "That thou mayest be proved righteous in thy promises, and mayest gain the cause when thou art put on trial." Here our editors rightly forsake Beza, whom Scholefield, in this instance, follows. St Paul follows the LXX. Accordingly, Rosenmuller here follows Wolf, who adheres with our version to the rendering of the Vulgate.

Luther's version is with us in Rom. iv. 24, *if we*, instead of *who believe*, as proposed by Scholefield and Webster and Wilkinson, after Fritzsche. Dr David Brown, in his compendious "Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans," adheres to the authorised version. The *condition* is requisite for the argument, and hence probably the agreement of our own with Luther's version.

Rom. v. 7. The editor, with Scholefield, would have γὰρ to refer to the preceding clause of the sentence, in order to modify it. But the adversative sense of the particle is qualified by the use of the Hebrew ׀, to which it answers, and is maintained by Alt. See his "Grammar of the New Testament," pp. 220, 221.

Rom. v. 20. Rosenmuller appears to have selected the right sense of παριστήλθεν. He regards it as equivalent to προσεβή, as at Gal iii. 19. And so it is given in Luther's version: *the law next came in: das Gesetz aber ist neben eingekommen.*

1 Cor. iii. 15. *By fire.* Both Scholefield and our editors suggest, as more perspicuous, *through fire.*

1 Cor. iv. 6. *Not to think of men above that which is written.* Webster and Wilkinson here, we think rightly, justify our version, which inserts *of men*, applying the warning to the party-spirit, the favouritism that divided the Corinthian Church. This surely suits the context better than Scholefield's rendering, *not to be wise above that which is written.* Scholefield here follows Beza. The Lutheran version supplies *of yourselves; Erasmus, of himself.* The Lutheran version is perhaps the best. *Above that which is written* refers to the preceding portion of this epistle.

1 Cor. v. 9. We would suggest that for *an* should be read *this* epistle. (See p. 22.) We, with the editors, are content with our version at 2 Cor. iii. 7, where Professor Scholefield would have rendered, "The ministration of death by the letter engraven on stones."

And so, at ver. 18, we, with them and Beza, would retain *beholding as in a glass*. Erasmus, who would render by *repre-sentantes*, is corrected by Beza, who here appeals to the Syriac version.

Gal. i. 10. Here, *do I seek to get on my side men or God*, in accordance with the use of *πειθω*, in Acts xii. 20, and xiv. 19, would be clearer than the word *persuade*. Webster and Wilkinson propose "make my appeal to, try to satisfy." Scholefield would render, "Am I now seeking the favour of men or of God?" which approach too closely the words that follow.

At Gal. iii. 22, we would, with Ellicott and the editors, retain the present reading, as more natural than the transposition proposed by Scholefield, *that the promise may be given to believers by faith in Jesus Christ*. Beza is here against Scholefield.

Dean Ellicott, amongst other innovations of the exegetical kind, in his essay on the interpretation of Scripture in the "Aids to Faith," has questioned the reference to vicarious substitution in *ὑπὲρ* in Gal. iii. 13. We are glad to find no such idiosyncrasy in the volume before us.

At Ephes. i. 1, our editors rightly retain *ἐν ἑπίσῳ*. We have elsewhere observed that, besides the very doubtful "Codex Sinaiticus," the only uncial MS. which omits the words is the "Codex Vaticanus."*

Ephes. v. 5. In the kingdom of Christ and of God. Our editors would read, and rightly, with Bishop Middleton, *of him who is the Christ and God*. See p. 363 of Rose's edition of "Middleton on the Greek Article." We regret to find Mr Ellicott, without any valid reason, giving up this rendering at p. 424 of the "Aids to Faith."

At Ephes. vi. 12, our editors indicate the equally correct translation, *the wicked spirits in the air*. Luther's version has "the evil spirits under the heavens." So Chrysostom, whilst Theophylact justifies our version. The student will find ample references in "Wolfii Curæ Philologicæ."

Ephes. vi. 16. *The fiery darts of the wicked*. The editors, with Scholefield, correctly render, *of the evil one*: τοῦ πονηροῦ.

Phil. i. 7. As Erasmus, Schmidt, so Scholefield: *partakers with me of grace*. The editors give the same rendering. Scholefield refers to Rom. viii. 17, Philem. ver. 1, Rev. xix. 10, and Herodotus, l. 2, c. 134, σύνδουλος Αἰσώπου. Soph. Antiq., 451. ζῆμιος τῶν πάσῳ Θεῶν. "And," he observes, "any reader of

* See a letter to the Bishop of Oxford upon the "Defence of the Essays and Reviews," in the April number of the *Edinburgh Review*, 1861, by the Rev. Arthur T. Russell, B.C.L., of St John's College. John Palmer, 58 Sidney Street, Cambridge.

Greek may add to the collection, almost without end, from any author he may take in hand."*

Col. i. 15. Our editors rightly explain *κράτος*; of the heirship of all things.

1 Tim. ii. 15. Our editors adhere to our version. Not so Ellicott, who has recourse to the singular interpretation, by *the childbearing*, as alluding to our Saviour's birth of the Virgin. We refer our readers to Beza on this passage.

We now proceed to a brief notice of the Chronology of the Epistles, and of the Acts of the Apostles, as standing in close connection with them. We believe that we cannot here follow a safer guide than Guericke, with whom we are satisfied upon every point in this department, except with the earlier date which he assigns to the Apocalypse. That date appears to us to rest upon the answer that is given to the question, Was Claudius a persecutor of the Christians? Dr Burton observes, in his 12th Lecture on the Ecclesiastical History of the first century, that "the name of Domitian is handed down as that of the second persecutor of the Christians after Nero." But Nero and Domitian are, by the common consent of church historians, reputed the two first persecuting emperors. Michaelis himself, therefore, was obliged to admit that the evidence of antiquity was in favour of the later date. "No traces," he observes, "are to be discovered of any persecution of the Christians in the reign of Claudius; for, though he commanded the Jews to quit Rome, yet this command did not affect the Jews who lived out of Italy, and still less the Christians. Consequently, the banishment of St John to the island of Patmos can hardly be referred to the reign of Claudius."† And, in truth, the bias of commentators, in regard of the interpretation of the Apocalypse, has had the principal hand in the attempt to affix the earlier date to this book. Guericke is himself a clear evidence of this.

The conversion of St Paul occurred in A.D. 35 or 36. Compare Gal. i. 15-18, and 2 Cor. xi. 32; Joseph. Antiq. l. 18, v. 1, 3; Gal. i. 3. *After three years, i. e.*, three years after his conversion, St Paul left Damascus, which was a Roman city in the hands of Aretas, 2 Cor. xi. 32. This could have been the case only about the time of the war of the Romans with Aretas, which broke out in A.D. 37. Affairs were made up with Arabia in A.D. 38; so Dio Cassius lix. 9, 12. Three years earlier would be A.D. 35 or 36; and fourteen years thence (according to Gal. ii. 1), in the year 50, the great synod of the apostles and elders at Jerusalem.‡

* "Hints," &c., p. 88.

† Intro. to the New Testament, vol. iv. c. 33, sect. ix. p. 520.

‡ Guericke's Einleitung, pp. 47, 48.

A.D. 45 was the first great apostolic journey of St Paul, after the death of Herod Agrippa, which was in A.D. 44. See Acts xiii. and xiv.

His second journey to Jerusalem (Acts xi. 30, and xii. 25), which was occasioned by the famine in Palestine (Acts xi. 27), was in the preceding year, A.D. 44; for the famine was, according to Josephus (Antiq. xx. 5, 2), in the fourth year of Claudius, A.D. 44.

About A.D. 50, Paul and Barnabas were sent to Jerusalem to consult the apostles (Acts xv. 2.) Gal. ii. 1 shews that it was fourteen years after his conversion.

His second great apostolic journey was in A.D. 51 or 52, Acts 15-18.*

His third great apostolic journey was about A.D. 54 (Acts xviii. 23; v. 21), first interrupted by his imprisonment at Jerusalem (Acts xxi. 27) about A.D. 58. He was imprisoned two years at Cæsarea, and two years at Rome.

The most difficult question in this chronology is, whether St Paul was ever released or no from his imprisonment at Rome, mentioned in Acts xxviii. But history assures us that he was set free after his first imprisonment. And so Clemens Romanus affirms that he went to the farthest bounds of the west.† And so Romans xv. 24. And see the testimony of Muratori's Canon (supposed to be as early as the end of the second century), which speaks of the apostles setting out from Rome for Spain. Eusebius ‡ (Ecc. Hist. l. ii. c. 22) also alludes to his release after his first imprisonment. He is followed by Jerome in his Catalogus.

From 1 Cor. v. 9 and Col. iv. 16, the question has been raised, whether St Paul wrote any other epistles that have not come down to us.

1 Cor. v. 9, "*I wrote unto you in an epistle not to company with fornicators.*"

Col. iv. 16, "*But when this epistle is read among you, cause that it be read also in the Church of the Laodiceans; and that ye likewise read the epistle from Laodicea.*"

The editors of the Greek Testament now under review, conceive that 1 Cor. v. 9 is an allusion to another epistle not extant, and ground their opinion on the words in the 11th verse *οτι δε εγγαφα*. Some would translate thus, *in the former epistle*. These are followed by Mr. Barrett in his *Companion to the New Testament*. And our own version countenances the supposition, that St Paul refers to a now lost epistle. Such was the opinion of Grotius, Beza, Le Clerc, Mill, Doddridge, Wetstein, Michaelis, and others. But it has been replied, and with

* Guerike, p. 52. † Ep. ad Cor. i. sect. 5. ‡ Euseb. p. 66. ed. Schwegler.

reason, that the 11th refers us to the 3d and 7th verses in this chapter, which do in effect contain the prohibition alluded to in the 9th verse.* Hammond, in this instance, differs from Le Clerc; and with him are Wolf, Lardner, Macknight, and Bishop Tomline. And these are countenanced by the general consent of Christian antiquity, which, in a point of this nature, ought to be regarded as a most important testimony.

Messrs Wilkinson and Webster, indeed, admit that this passage may be rendered so as to refer to *this* epistle. So our translators render the article at Col. iv. 16, "*And when this epistle is read among you ;*" and at 1 Thess. v. 27, "*I charge you by the Lord, that this epistle be read unto all the holy brethren.*" And we may add Rom. xvi. 22, "*I Tertius, who wrote this epistle, salute you in the Lord.*" Whitby, who also thus renders this passage in the fifth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, adduces the authority of Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Photius, and Theophylact, on his side. "And whoever," he asks, "heard among the ancients of more than fourteen epistles of St Paul, or of one word cited from an epistle of his to the Corinthians, supposed to be lost?"† Estius, indeed, opposes here the Latin to the Greek Fathers; but it is probable that they were misled by the Vulgate, which here reads as does our own version. Professor Stanley's conjecture that, from chap. v. and ix. to chap. vi. and viii. is a postscript, was (according to Wolf, in his *Curæ Philol.*, vol. iii. p. 373) anticipated by Dr John Edwards at p. 467 of the third volume of his "Discourse concerning the Authority of the Books of the Old and New Testaments." Middleton; refers to Hermann de Emend. Ratione Græcæ Gram., p. 194, to prove that the Aorist is often used as the present *tense*; and will also have it answer to the Latin future perfect, *scripsero*.

We come to Colossians iv. 16, "*And when this epistle is read among you, cause that it be read also in the church of the Laodiceans ; and that ye likewise read the epistle from Laodicea.*" Here we must mention that it was probably unknown to Whitby that two spurious epistles to the Corinthians had been found amongst the Armenians by the learned David Wilkins, who published them at Amsterdam in 1715. They were again published by Fabricius, in the second volume of his *Codex Apocryphus Novi Testamenti*, and in Armenian, Greek, and Latin, in 8vo., at Leipzig, in 1776, by J. B. Carpzov. W. F. Rinck translated them into German, and published them with introductions, at Heidelberg, in 1823. The spurious

* See the Rev. James Slade's "Annotations on the Epistles," vol. i. p. 205.

† Whitby on the New Testament, vol. ii. p. 161. London : 1744. 6th ed.

‡ Pp. 324, 325.

epistle to the Laodiceans, made up unconnectedly from the Epistles to the Philippians and Colossians, appears to have been better known to the ancients, as it is noticed by Jerome in his "Catalogus," only, indeed, to be condemned. This was also referred to by Theodoret on Col. iv. 16. The Epistle to the Laodiceans is also in the "Codex Apocryphus" of Fabricius; in C. W. Stein, on "St Luke," 1830; in Alter's "New Testament;" and lastly, in Latin, by R. Anger, Leipzig, 1843. That the epistle alluded to in the above passage in the 4th chapter of the Epistle to the Colossians was the Epistle to the Ephesians, was probably believed by some as early as the second century. This may be inferred from the words of Tertullian, in the 11th chapter of the fifth Book of his work against Marcion, as given by Bishope Kaye,* "Prætereo hic et de aliâ epistolâ, quam nos ad Ephesios perscriptam habemus; Hæretici vero ad Laodicenos." This, according to Guericke,† is the opinion of Anger in his edition of the spurious Epistle to the Laodiceans, Leipzig, 1843.

Or it might have been that St Paul requested the Colossians to send for the letter sent to him from Laodicea, that they might the better understand his own. So Rosenmuller, who refers to the younger Michaelis, and to Koppe's "Prolegomena on the Epistle to the Ephesians." Here, again, Messrs Webster and Wilkinson consider that the allusion was most probably to a now lost epistle of St Paul. Whitby observes that Chrysostom, Theodoret, Œcumenius, and Theophylact, understood by it some epistle writ by them of Laodicea to St Paul. Dr Whitby himself inclines to their opinion, who conceive that the epistle intended in this passage, was the Epistle to the Ephesians, as designed for the places in connection with it as their metropolis, as the churches of Achaia had a like interest in the epistles directed to Corinth as their metropolis.‡

Some of the Greek fathers, following Chrysostom and Origen, imagined that St Paul cautioned the Thessalonians against a spurious epistle, in 2 Thess. ii. 2, *nor by letter as from us*, but this is an uncertain conjecture.

We come now to the dates to be assigned to the epistles. It has been constantly agreed from Baronius, by modern chronologers, that the first Epistle to the Thessalonians was the first of the fourteen Epistles of St Paul.

In St Paul's second great journey, Paul and Silas came to Thessalonica (Acts xvii. 1), and after a short stay there, were compelled, by persecution, to leave that city for Berea. The same molestation on the part of the unbelieving Jews, drove

* Bishop Kaye's "Tertullian, 3d ed., p. 299.

† P. 291.

‡ Whitby, pp. 409, 410.

him thence also. He went, therefore, by sea to Athens (c. xvii. 15), and from that city came to Corinth (c. xviii. 1), where *he continued a year and six months teaching the word of God among them* (c. xviii. 11). The paragraphs at the end of the two Epistles to the Thessalonians, asserting that they were written from Athens, are grounded upon the Synopsis of Athanasius and Theodoret's Preface to St Paul's Epistles.* But as it is clear, from the 3d chapter of the First Epistle, that it was written after the return of Timothy from Thessalonica, to the apostle, and Timothy returned, together with Silas, to St Paul at Corinth (Acts xviii. 5, and 1 Thess. iii. 6), it is certain that St Paul wrote not from Athens, but from Corinth.

The Second Epistle, according to the Synopsis of Athanasius, and the commentaries of Œcumenius, was written from Rome; according to others, from Athens; but, since the apostle did not return to Athens, and the same persons are mentioned at the commencement of both epistles, Baronius and Estius agree with our own divines, that the epistles were written from Corinth, the second at no long interval from the first. We may place the first in A.D. 52, with Messrs Webster and Wilkinson; the second in A.D. 53.

Respecting the Epistle to the Galatians, a greater diversity of opinion has all along existed. Some have contended that it was written, not from Ephesus, but from Rome, and after the Epistle to the Romans. St Paul, in Romans xv. 25, writes, *But now I go unto Jerusalem, to minister to the saints*; but in this epistle, at c. ii. 10, *Only they would that we should remember the poor; the same which I also was forward to do*. Hence, it is agreed, that he had completed his collection for the poor saints that were at Jerusalem when he wrote to the Galatians, but not when he was writing to the Romans. Some, however, regard this as a general precept, and not as an injunction relating to any particular instance. That this epistle was written from Ephesus, is countenanced from the circumstance, that it was written soon after the apostle's second stay in Galatia (Gal. iv. 13), and probably soon after that visit; *I marvel that ye are so soon removed from him that called you into the grace of Christ unto another gospel*.

Other indications in this direction are given in the Introduction to this Epistle, in the work under review. St Paul was at Ephesus from about A.D. 54 or 55, to A.D. 57 or 58. During this period, then, he wrote the Epistle to the Galatians, and also his First Epistle to the Corinthians.

That the First Epistle to the Corinthians was written also from Ephesus, appears from St Paul's own words: *But I will*

* Estius. p. 713.

tarry at Ephesus until Pentecost, 1 Cor. xvi. 8. With Guericke agrees Michaelis, who places this epistle under A.D. 57. Baronius, Pearson, Dr John Mill, and Fabricius are also agreed upon this date. But Pearson and many others place the Epistle to the Romans before that to the Galatians, ascribing, however, both these latter epistles to the same year, A.D. 58.

The Second Epistle to the Corinthians was written in A.D. 57 or 58, soon after St Paul had left Ephesus.

It was written in Macedonia, as Chrysostom and Theodoret pointed out. This, indeed, is grounded upon a comparison of 2 Cor. viii. 1-5, with c. ix. 4. St Paul had sent Titus to Corinth after his first Epistle, to reform the evils that had induced the apostle to write to them. The mission of Titus took the desired effect, 2 Cor. vii. 6, 7. And now, after Titus had returned to him in Macedonia, he again sent him to Corinth with his Epistle, 2 Cor. viii. 18. This period is in the Acts, the beginning of the 20th chapter.

Of the Epistle to the Romans, Professor Hodge, in the Introduction to his valuable commentary upon it, remarks—"It is plain from its contents, that it was written just as Paul was about to set out on his last journey to Jerusalem. In the fifteenth chapter, he says, that the Christians of Macedonia and Achaia had made a collection for the poor saints in Jerusalem, and that he was on the eve of his departure for that city (v. 25). This same journey is mentioned in Acts xx., and occurred most probably in the spring (see Acts xx. 16) of the year 58 or 59. This date best suits the account of his long imprisonment, first at Cæsarea, then at Rome, of four years, and his probable liberation in 62 or 63. His subsequent labours and second imprisonment would fill up the intervening period of two or three years to the date of his martyrdom, towards the close of the reign of Nero. That this Epistle was written from Corinth, appears from the special recommendation of Phœbe, a deaconess of the neighbouring church "(Cenchrea)," "who was probably the bearer of the letter (c. xvi. 1), from the salutations of Erastus and Gaius, both residents of Corinth, to the Romans (c. xvi. 23); compare 2 Tim. iv. 20, and 1 Cor. i. 14; and from the account given in Acts xx. 2, 3, of Paul's journey through Macedonia into Greece, before his departure for Jerusalem, for the purpose of carrying the contributions for the poor in that city."*

Bishop Pearson fixes this epistle at A.D. 58. The second class of the Pauline Epistles consists of those which were written from Rome, during his imprisonment, from A.D. 62 to A.D. 64; the

Epistles to the Ephesians, the Colossians, Philemon, and lastly, the Philippians.

Not a few of those who are regarded by the rising generation of English theologians, as the lights of the age, the foremost of modern German critics have alighted upon a truly Germanic theory respecting the period to which all the above epistles, excepting that to the Philippians, are to be assigned. They maintain that they were not written from Rome, but in the previous imprisonment of the apostle at Cæsarea. So, first, (observes Guericke), David Schulze, in the "Theologischen Studien und Kritiken," 1829, Pt. iii. p. 612; then, Schott, in his "Isagoge," p. 272; De Wette, in his "Einleitung;" J. Wigger's "Beitrage zur Einleitung in die Briefe an die Ephesier, Colosser und an Philemon," (in the Theologischen Studien, 1841, ii. 413-456); Meyer, in his "Commentary on the Ephesians, Göttingen, 1843;" and Reuss, in his "Geschichte des Neuen Testaments." C. Graul wrote a Latin Dissertation in 8vo., against Schulze and Schott, published in Leipzig in 1836, and on the same side appeared Neander, in his History of the "Planting of the Christian Church by the Apostles," p. 372.

Only Bottger, in his *Beitrage*, Göttingen, 1837, and after him Thiersch, in his *Die Kirche im Apostolischen Zeitalter*, 1852, also assign the same period to the Epistle to the Philippians.

In the absence of external evidence, the opinion has prevailed, that the Epistle to the Ephesians was the first of those that were written in St Paul's first imprisonment, on the ground of its being more copious than that to the Colossians, which appears to have followed that to the Ephesians, as in some measure a summary of the larger epistle. Both were sent by the hand of Tychicus. See Eph. vi. 21, 22, and Col. iv. 7, 8.

The church of Colossæ, more properly Colassæ, was probably founded by Epaphras, who afterwards came to Rome and acquainted the apostle with their state, and who was himself afterwards a sufferer for the faith of Christ. St Paul, writing to Philemon, calls him (v. 23) his fellow-prisoner.

The Epistle to Philemon was probably sent to Colossæ at the same time with the epistle to the church of that city. Compare Col. iv. 9 with Philem. 10-17. Onesimus was himself of Colossæ, Col. iv. 9. Luther, like all truly great men, was a man of a tender and overflowing affectionate spirit. Guericke, who writes not simply as a critic, but as one devoted to the gospel itself, does not fail to give Luther's characteristic remarks upon this beautiful epistle; in which we see that the same spirit filled the hearts of the beloved evangelist and of the favoured apostle. "As Christ," says Luther, "satisfied the Father for us,

so did St Paul make answer for Onesimus to Philemon; and we are all Christ's Onesimi, if we believe."*

Philippi was the first European city to which St Paul preached the gospel. That it was written from Rome is evident from Phil. i. 13 and iv. 22. It has been inferred from Phil. i. 25, 26 and ii. 24, that it was written toward the end of his imprisonment. The Epistles to the Ephesians, Colossians, and Philemon, are accordingly ascribed to A.D. 62, the Epistle to the Philippians to A.D. 63 or 64.†

The third class comprises the pastoral epistles to Titus and to Timothy, written after his first imprisonment at Rome.

The Epistle to Titus and the first to Timothy appear to have been written in the interval between the two imprisonments. These and the second to Timothy are all of a kindred character, all of a similar polemical nature, all dissimilar from the earlier epistles.

Nothing can be more bewildering than the speculations of not a few of the German commentators on the dates of these epistles, and, indeed, on the chronology of the Acts of the Apostles,—particularly Gieseler, Thiersch, and Reuss.

Guericke conjectures that first St Paul wrote his Epistle to Titus, then the two to Timothy.

After his release from his imprisonment at Rome, he entered anew upon his journeys, as he had previously intended. Of his design of journeying westward he speaks in Rom. xv. 24; of journeying eastward in Philemon 22, and Phil. ii. 24. On one of these he came to Crete. After he had preached the gospel there in many places (Titus i. 5), he departed, leaving behind him Titus, with an apostolical commission, and went, probably by Miletus, where he left Trophimus sick (2 Tim. iv. 20), to Ephesus (1 Tim. i. 3), whence, perhaps, he wrote his Epistle to Titus. He left Ephesus for Macedonia (1 Tim. i. 3). His faithful helper, Timothy, continued at Ephesus and in its neighbourhood, with an apostolical commission. Compare 1 Tim. i. 3 with 2 Tim. i. 18. On this journey St Paul wrote his First Epistle to Timothy. The apostle went to Troas (2 Tim. iv. 13), and thence to Corinth (2 Tim. iv. 20). The following winter he spent at Nicopolis in Epirus, opposite Actium (Titus iii. 12). Thence he went over to Italy and Spain. This was followed by his last imprisonment at Rome, in which he wrote his second Epistle to Timothy, with his approaching martyrdom before his eyes (2 Tim. iv. 7, 8).

This is, indeed, met with this difficulty, that St Paul declared to the Ephesians his full conviction that he should see them no more, Acts xx. 25, in about A.D. 54. "But," as the editors of

* Guericke, p. 354.

† Guericke, p. 338.

this edition of the Greek Testament observe, "the language of the apostle in 1 Tim. i. 3 does not absolutely imply that St Paul ever revisited Ephesus, but simply states that the writer when he was on his journey to Macedonia desired Timothy to remain at Ephesus."*

They, indeed, conceive that the Epistle to Titus was written at the same time and place with the First Epistle to Timothy. The place they suppose to have been Corinth, and point to various passages in the First Epistle to Timothy as presenting some striking coincidences with the Epistles to the Corinthians. Compare 1 Tim. ii. 11-14 with 1 Cor. xiv. 34, &c. Surely nothing of a local nature can be inferred from such affinities as these. The church would everywhere need, in such matters, the same apostolic regulations.

According to the view of the editors, St Paul upon his release from imprisonment proceeded to visit Crete, where he left Titus, and Colossæ, where he availed himself of the hospitality of his friend Philemon; then, departing into Macedonia, he appointed Timothy to stay in Ephesus, and thence proceeded to Philippi and to Corinth, where he wrote to Timothy and Titus. During the winter of 64 he stayed at Nicopolis in Epirus, and in the spring of A.D. 65 went through Dalmatia, and visited Troas (2 Tim. iv. 9-13). Soon afterwards, perhaps in Asia, he was apprehended, and sent to Rome in the summer; wrote thence his Second Epistle to Timothy, and suffered martyrdom in A.D. 66.

Dr Wordsworth agrees with the editors in supposing that St Paul did not revisit Ephesus, but adds that, if he did, all those whom he addressed in the words recorded in the Acts, xx. 25, may have died before this third visit. This latter, however, is surely an improbable supposition.

Dr Burton supposes St Paul to have visited Asia Minor and Jerusalem, and afterward Spain, in the interval between his two imprisonments at Rome.† Clemens Romanus informs us that the apostle visited the farthest bounds of the west. This has been regarded as favouring the Patristic tradition of his journey to Spain, which is affirmed by Epiphanius, Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Jerome, as may be seen in Tillemont and Natalis Alexander.‡ Dupin, indeed, takes the contrary side, with the editors of the Greek Testament now under review. The candid Lutheran historian Weismann (Hist. Ecc. 1745) gives no decision, but refers to Basnage on the one side, and Pearson,

* Page 562.

† Lectures upon the Ecclesiastical History of the First Three Centuries vol. i. Oxford, 1833. Lect. ix. pp. 278-282.

‡ Burton, p. 281; Tillemont, Memoires, tom. i. p. 867; Nat. Alexander, sec. i. dissert. 14.

in the first of his Latin dissertations on the succession of the first bishops of Rome, on the other; as also to Vitringa, Hypotyp. ii. s., p. 257, and Witsii Meletemata Leyd., p. 215. Neander himself favours the apostle's journey into Spain. For *Epi-phanius* there is *Eusebius*, in Mr Rose's translation of Neander. The writer of this review has not the German original at hand. Neander, after remarking on the uncertainty of the early traditions generally, adds, "But since the Roman Bishop Clemens (Ep. i. c. 5) says that St Paul went to the very boundaries of the west, we cannot imagine this expression to allude to Rome, and our thoughts naturally turn to Spain. Clemens was probably himself the disciple of St Paul, and this is a matter on which we can hardly suppose him to have been deceived."*

Assigning, then, the three pastoral epistles to between A.D. 64 and 67, we come to the epistle to the Hebrews, which occupies a distinct place by itself. Guericke supposes it to have been written some time before A.D. 66; Thiersch, not later than A.D. 63. The more probable date appears to be between A.D. 64 and A.D. 66. Ebrard, in his commentary, would have it to have been written about A.D. 62. It was written in the interval between his two imprisonments, and whilst he was meditating a journey to Palestine. Heb. xii. 23. The editors give a succinct and valuable summary of the internal evidence in favour of the general and ancient tradition which ascribes this epistle to St Paul.†

Messrs Webster and Wilkinson erroneously, as we think, follow some of the more modern German theorists with regard to the time at which St James wrote his epistle. They place this epistle first in their second volume, and maintain that "this composition is correctly described by the Syriac MS. as the earliest of the writings contained in the New Testament, unless priority be given to a part of the gospel according to St Matthew."‡ This same MS. is confessedly in error in ascribing this epistle to the beloved disciple's brother, St James, the son of Zebedee. The editors follow Pfeiffer in the "Theologischen Studien und Kritik," 1852, and Thiersch in his work upon "The Church in the Apostolic Age."§ These, however, were anticipated by the younger Michaelis in his "Introduction to the New Testament."|| He indeed refers to Venerable Bede as of opinion that it was written soon after the death of the martyr Stephen. The learned John Henry Michaelis sided with the more general opinion, that it was written not long before the death of the apostle. Mill, in his

* Neander's Church History of the First Three Centuries, ed. Rose, vol. I. London 1831, p. 79.

† P. 618.

‡ P. 2.

§ See Guericke, p. 440.

|| Vol. v. c. 26, § 7.

"Prolegomena to the New Testament," follows Pearson, who places it about A.D. 60. Guericke, placing the martyrdom of St James in A.D. 64, would ascribe a somewhat later date to his epistle. Dr Burton would place it "between the year 53, when St Paul wrote to the Romans, and the year 62, when James himself was put to death."* The epistle of St Jude appears to have been written not long before the destruction of Jerusalem. Michaelis places this epistle after the second epistle of St Peter, and so many others, and amongst them Pearson, Mill, and Fabricius, who place it twenty years after the destruction of Jerusalem. Messrs Webster and Wilkinson, in their "Introduction to the Catholic Epistles," observe that "the date is probably A.D. 70,"† that is, five years, according to them, after the second epistle of St Peter. Dr Burton concluded, from the close resemblance of the two epistles,—that of St Jude and the second of St Peter,—that they were both written about the same time, between the martyrdom of James and the destruction of Jerusalem.‡ For the originality of St Jude's epistle, as independent of the second of St Peter, Arnaud pleads in his "*Recherches crit. sur. l'ep. de Jude*," Strasburg, 1851, 8vo. The reader will find much information respecting the controversies connected with this epistle in the Latin commentary upon it by H. E. A. Hänlein, a third edition of which was published at Erlangen in 1804. Arnaud had previously published a dissertation on the authenticity of this epistle at Strasburg in 1835. This was followed by a critical introduction to the epistle, also published at Strasburg by F. Bran in 1842. To these Guericke adds "Herman Witsius," in the "*Meletemata Leidensia*," Basil, 1739; C. F. Schmid, "*Observatt. super ep. Cath. S. Judæ Historica crit. theol.*," Leipzig, 1768; Herder on the "Epistles of St James and Jude, (in German), Lemgo (in the principality of Lippe), 1775, 8vo; J. G. Hasse on the "Epistle of Jude" (in German), illustrated from eastern sources, Jena, 1786, 8vo; M. T. Laurmann, "*Collectt. s. notæ crit. ep. commentar. in ep. Jude*," Groningen, 1818, 8vo; R. Stier, "*Der Brief Judä*," Berlin, 1850, 8vo; J. E. Huther, "*Auslegung der Briefe, Petri und Judä*," Gottingen, 1852; and A. Jessien, "*De authentia ep. Jud.*," Leipzig, 1821. We have placed all these before the student as the points connected with the priority of the two epistles, that of St Jude and that of the second epistle of St Peter are of sufficient interest and importance to invite farther investigation.

The first epistle of Peter was written from Babylon in the East after the name of Christian was in use (c. iv. v. 16),—that is, after A.D. 44. Guericke agrees with Thiersch in placing

* Lectures, vol. i. p. 290.

† P. 9.

‡ Lectures, p. 384.

this epistle soon after that to the Hebrews,—that is, in A.D. 63 or 64.* It was evidently written not for Jewish Christians alone. This is manifest from c. iv. v. 3, 4; as also, from c. i. v. 18, and ii. 10—*Which in time past were not a people, but are now the people of God; which had not obtained mercy, but now have obtained mercy.*† The fervour and earnestness of its style well accord with the peculiar character of the apostle. The points of agreement between this and St Paul's epistles are pointed out by Guericke in a note to p. 461. Dr Hammond, who, as a commentator, was marked with many singularities, agreed with Baronius in placing this before all the other epistles. He dated it A.D. 44, and the second epistle A.D. 47. Baronius gave A.D. 45 for the first, A.D. 68 for the second epistle. According to Bellarmine, his martyrdom occurred in A.D. 69 or 70. Pearson, Mill, and Fabricius assigned this epistle to A.D. 61.

The second epistle was not written until A.D. 67, not long before the death of the apostle. Guericke refers to "Hug's Einleitung," Pt. II., sec. 176, and to "Dietlein on the Two Epistles," Berlin, 1851; J. F. Schirmer, 1778; G. B. Eisen-schmid, 1824; J. D. Schlichthorst, 1836; and on the first alone, to C. G. Hensler, Sulzbach, 1813; W. Steiger, Berlin, 1832. The first epistle of St John was probably composed soon after his gospel,—that is, between A.D. 80 and 90.‡

And here we will briefly advert to the chronology of the gospels and of the Acts. Eusebius in his "Chronicon," Euthymius, and Theophylact (Euthymius in the 12th century, following Theophylact) have placed the gospel of St Matthew in the eighth year after our Lord's ascension. That truly ingenious and valuable author, Archdeacon Townson, has very elaborately defended this early date. Townson gives the date A.D. 37. Dr Owen, in his "Observations on the Four Gospels," published in London, 1764, fixes it only one year later, namely, in 38. So the late Bishop Marsh, in his "Notes to Michaelis, § Tille-mont, in the first volume of his "Eccles. Memoires," upon very mistaken grounds, contended that St Matthew wrote his gospel in the third year after our Lord's ascension. He is sufficiently refuted by Michaelis. That it was written before the other gospels, rests upon the uncertain authority of Irenæus. Guericke is not the first who has disputed his authority regarding St Luke as the first of the evangelists, and St Matthew as the second. He maintains that St Luke wrote his gospel and the Acts in A.D. 63 or 64, St Matthew before A.D. 66, St Mark in A.D. 67 or 68, and St John between A.D. 80 and 90. Wolfe

* Guericke, p. 458.

† Ibid., p. 459.

‡ Guericke, p. 171.

§ Vol. iii. Part 2, p. 92. London, 1802. 2d ed.

refers to Fabricius and Solomon van Till. The testimony of antiquity connects the authorship of St Mark's gospel with his attendance on St Peter at Rome, but it is now agreed that St Peter was at Rome not long before his death. Therefore, Guericke places St Mark's gospel in A.D. 67 or 68;* and so, from St Luke's connection with St Paul, his gospel is assigned to the latter end of the two years which St Paul spent at Rome, mentioned in Acts xxviii. 30, the gospel being supposed to have been written at least a short time before the Acts.† But, on the other hand, very various have been the conjectures and traditions respecting the places where St Luke wrote his gospel. Michaelis thought that although Palestine was not included in the traditionary reports, it was more eligible than any other spot out of the many assigned. An account of them all may be seen in the sixth section of the chapter on St Luke's gospel, in the first parts of his third volume.‡

Respecting the time when St John wrote his gospel, there have been three principal opinions, that of those who, with Lardner, suppose it to have been composed previously to the destruction of Jerusalem; that of those who, with Messrs Webster and Wilkinson, place it not long after that event, between A.D. 70 and 80; and lastly, that of those who assign it to a much later period, from A.D. 80 down to A.D. 95. This last rests partly upon tradition, but the tradition of that very uncertain historian, Epiphanius, and partly upon internal evidence, its being argued that the Greek of the gospel betokens an intimacy with the language in its purer form that requires us to admit that St John had resided many years at Ephesus before he composed it. Guericke places it between A.D. 80 and 90.§ Michaelis has a very interesting section to shew that St John had read the three first gospels before he wrote his own. This section also, on the time and place where this gospel was written, is worthy of consultation. He proves that at least it must have been written after A.D. 67, the year of St Peter's martyrdom, from the allusion to it in c. 21, and from the mention of his name (which is passed over by the other evangelists) as the apostle who cut off the ear of the high priest's servant.||

The first epistle of St John was written, probably, not long after the gospel, which, as Guericke observes, it requires as a commentary upon it, and to which it accordingly points in the first chapter.

There is nothing to mark the time of the second and third epistles. That they belong to the Evangelist, and not to another John of Ephesus, as Grotius conjectured, the style itself

* P. 147.

† P. 155

‡ Marsh's 2d ed. London, 1802.

§ P. 171.

|| Vol. iii., Pt. I., p. 321.

betokens; and we have, moreover, the testimony of Irenæus, lib. i. 16; Clem. Alex. Stromata, ii. 15, and Tertullian de Præscript. Hæret, c. xxxiii. The reader may farther consult Lampii Prolegomena in Evang. Sti. Joannis, p. 110.

We have already touched upon the date of the Apocalypse, abiding by the more common opinion, that it was written in the reign of the Emperor Domitian, by whom, and not by Claudius, the Evangelist appears to have been banished to the isle of Patmos.

From the chronology, we proceed to the occasion and design of the epistles.

The design of the first epistle to the Thessalonians, may be inferred from the 4th and 5th, to which the preceding chapters form an introduction.

St Paul designed, in the first instance, to correct certain practical, then other and speculative evils which had found their way into the Church of Thessalonica. The first, he handles at the commencement of the fourth, and in the latter part of the 5th chapter. The second from the 13th verse of the 4th to the end of the 11th verse of the 5th chapter. Here we see that some were tempted to let go their faith in the resurrection, that divine ground of comfort, of which the philosophy of their times would have deprived them. For, without this doctrine, there can be no consistent doctrine of an immortality of the soul; a truth admirably shewn in Bishop Sherlock's able Sermon on 2 Tim. i. 10. This simple view of the scope of this part of the epistle is taken by Rosenmuller in preference to that by Michaelis, that the Thessalonians imagined, that they who survived the day of judgment would have a great advantage over them that were deceased, for that they would enter immediately into the millennium, of which some of the primitive Christians entertained very strange notions. And on this account he says, they lamented the death of their friends, as they supposed that it deprived them of privileges to be enjoyed by those who were alive, and remained on earth at the general judgment.*

Others there were who looked for the day to come in their own lifetime, an error into which some have supposed that the apostles themselves fell. Dr Whitby justly condemns such a supposition in his learned observations upon the 15th verse of the 4th chapter.

The second epistle resumes the latter subject, the error of those who were expecting the immediate approach of the day of the Lord, and teaches that it will be preceded by a portentous apostasy in the Christian Church, not an infidel apostasy

* C. xii. § 2, vol. 4.

which denies the existence of the Christian Church, the temple of God, affirming it to be a delusion, but an idolatrous apostasy, that of the Church of Rome, which has set up a succession of men in the place of God over his church, whence the blasphemous title known in the days of Bishop Jewell, *Our Lord God the Pope!* "You may remember," says Jewell, in his defence of the Apology of the Church of England, that the Pope suffereth his canonists thus to publish and to blaze his godhead to the world in printed books. "*Dominus Deus noster Papa*"—"our Lord God the Pope." Extrav. Joan 22, cum. inter. Paris, 1513. Lugdun, 1555.*

The design of the Epistle to the Galatians is unfolded in the 6th verse of the first chapter. It is a protest against the Judaizing teachers who sought to corrupt and subvert Christianity by imposing upon Christians as essential to salvation, the observance of the Jewish law. In the course of his argument, St Paul is led to treat of and to vindicate the doctrine of justification by faith in Christ as opposed to every kind of justification by the works of the law.

Multiform has been the ingenuity expended upon the history of the first Epistle to the Corinthians. Some have divided the parties at Corinth into four, others into three. Thus, those who are represented as saying that they were of Christ, have been conceived to be followers of James, the Lord's brother; those who claimed to be of Cephas have been made the representatives of the Judaizing system refuted in the Epistle to the Galatians, and manifested more or less wherever there existed a body of Jewish converts in the Church. The followers of Apollos have been turned into an Alexandrian party, who transformed Christianity into a system of Alexandrian philosophy and rhetoric. But we refrain from going farther into an investigation utterly fruitless and fallacious. Guericke sums up these German theories and gives a brief account of them at pages 311-314 of the second edition of his *Einleitung*.

The spirit of schism and party, of division upon unessential grounds, was the primary occasion of the Epistles to the Corinthians. To this subject St Paul immediately resorts after his usual salutation and congratulation of the purer part of the Christian Church of Achaia, for the epistle is directed to Corinth, as the Christian metropolis of Greece, as is that to the Ephesians, as the Christian mother church of Asia Minor. From the consideration of that party spirit and factious favouritism which had begun to dissipate the practical influence of the gospel at Corinth, St Paul, in the 5th chapter, passes on to

* Jewell's Apology translated, with Notes by the Rev. Arthur T. Russell. Cambridge: Stephenson, 183. P. 137.

condemn that relaxation of Church discipline, and that immorality which are the sure concomitants of such a spirit. In the 7th chapter, he enters upon various subjects that had been submitted to him by the Corinthians. Amongst the Jews, there were some who insisted upon the necessity of marriage. St Paul replies, that marriage is a concession, not a divine commandment (c. vii. 6, 7), not a divine law in the same sense with the commandments given upon mount Sinai; *but every man hath his proper gift of God, one after this manner, and another after that, verse 7.*

The remainder of the epistle is taken up with the judgment of the apostle on other practical abuses that disfigured the church of Corinth, together with the denial of the doctrine of the resurrection, probably induced from the remains of the philosophizing spirit.

The incestuous person of whom St Paul had written in the 5th chapter of his first epistle had been excommunicated, and had repented, upon which St Paul wrote his second epistle, to instruct the Church to receive him again, taking occasion again to rebuke the party spirit which had infected them, and those who had seduced them into it, and also availing himself of this opportunity of encouraging their liberality towards their suffering brethren, the Christian converts in Palestine. In this as in the other epistles of St Paul, the beautiful illustrations of the great truths of our religion, that are scattered over them, derive a fresh interest from the circumstance, that they arise out of other topics, and everywhere indicate how full the mind of the apostle was of those doctrines which are thus incidentally brought before us.

Nowhere does this appear more strikingly, nowhere is it more variously evidenced than in the Epistle to the Romans. The late Bishop of Lincoln, Dr Kaye, who himself maintained all the great doctrines of the Reformation, justly remarked, in one of his sermons,—

“ Though St Paul treats in that epistle of other most important questions, he treats of them only incidentally, and in subordination to his main design—the vindication of the dealings of God with the Jewish people in casting them off, and adopting the Gentiles in their place. If, for instance, having declared the gospel to be ‘the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth,’ he adds, ‘to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile,’ it is because one of the pleas urged by the Jews for rejecting the gospel was that, though faith in Christ might be necessary to the justification of the Gentile, it was inapplicable to *them*, to whom God had himself given a law by which they might be justified. Hence it is that the apostle takes so much pains to prove to them, by an enumeration of their transgressions, that they, as well as the Gentiles, were under sin, and to convince them of the vanity of trusting for justi-

fiction to a law which they had so grievously violated. Hence it is that he proceeds to shew that faith must, under every dispensation, be the medium of justification, and to remind them that Abraham, in their descent from whom they prided themselves, and to whom they traced the origin of their privileges, had been justified by faith.

"If, again, we find St Paul enlarging upon the universality of the ruin which had been brought upon mankind by the sin of Adam, and shewing that death had passed upon *all* men, not only upon those who had sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, by the violation of a positive command, or by disobedience to a positive law—if we find him representing the effects of the fall as extending to the whole natural world, even to things inanimate, and causing them to groan and travail together in pain—it is with the view of establishing the consolatory truth, that the remedy is more than commensurate with the evil; that if the offence abound, grace did much more abound; and that as all, both Jews and Gentiles, were alike included in the condemnation arising from Adam's guilt, so all would alike be delivered by the atonement made by Christ upon the cross. As God is the God of all, Gentiles as well as Jews, so is he the justifier of all.

"It is, however, from the ninth and two following chapters that we most clearly collect the apostle's design, because in them he sums up the whole question, and exposes the vanity of the arguments on which the Jews mainly rested their cause. They affirmed that the calling of the Gentiles was at variance with the promise made by God to their forefather Abraham, that in him should all families of the earth be blessed. In answer to this argument, St Paul proves, by a reference to various passages of their own history, that the promise was never meant to apply to that seed of Abraham only which is of the law, but to his seed by faith. He next convicts them of misunderstanding the meaning of their own scriptures, from which they ought to have learned that the calling of the Gentiles always formed a part of the divine plan. Why otherwise had God declared, through the prophet Hosea, that he would call them his people who were not his people, and her beloved who was not beloved? Why had the prophet Isaiah been commissioned to proclaim salvation to all, without exception, who should call upon the name of the Lord? Why to him had been vouchsafed the privilege of penetrating into futurity, and beholding, through the long vista of intervening ages, the preachers of the gospel, the proclaimers of glad tidings of good things, entering upon their glorious office? By arguments like these, drawn from their own scriptures, did St Paul labour to remove the prejudices of the Jews, and convince them that the admission of the Gentiles to the privileges of the gospel, far from being at variance with the promise made by God to their forefathers, was in perfect accordance with it, nay more, was its appointed accomplishment. By these arguments also, while he vindicated the faithfulness of God, he vindicated the course which he was himself pursuing, and by which he had excited the

jealousy and the enmity of his countrymen. Far from being engaged in any design to subvert the authority of the law and the prophets, he was an instrument in the hands of God, to carry on the one to perfection, by developing its spiritual character, and to accomplish the predictions of the other. If it was clearly intimated in their own scriptures that a time would arrive when *all*, whether Jew or Gentile, who should call upon the name of the Lord, should be saved, it was necessary they should believe in him on whom they were to call. But how could they believe in him, unless they received previous instruction respecting his character and pretensions? and how, in the ordinary course of God's providence, could they obtain that instruction, unless it was conveyed to them through the medium of appointed preachers? Thus the going forth to preach the gospel to the Gentiles, the very act by which St Paul and his fellow-labourers drew down upon themselves the ill-will and persecution of the Jews, was shewn to be a necessary step to the accomplishment of the purpose of the Most High, as intimated in their own scriptures."*

In the above quotation, it will be perceived that the late learned and exemplary Bishop of Lincoln speaks of St Paul's application of the Old Testament promises to Abraham's seed as belonging to his spiritual seed,—his children by faith. Accordingly, he applied in another sermon, preached not long before his death, the eighth and ninth chapters to those whom God had chosen to eternal life, to the adoption of children; in the same sense in which St Augustine, long before Calvin, taught the doctrine of predestination.†

We come, in the next place, to the epistles written from Rome during St Paul's first imprisonment, those to the Ephesians, Colossians, and Philippians. We need not include in our notice the Epistle to Philemon. We have already touched upon it in our brief history of the chronology of the New Testament writings.

Were we to follow Hammond, Mosheim, Michaelis, we should discover in the Epistle to the Ephesians, a polemical dehortation from Gnosticism. St Paul, says Michaelis, uses Gnostic terms in Ephes. ii. 2 and vi. 12, and adopts Gnostic terms in order to combat the Gnostic doctrines.‡

The term Gnostic was applied to the heretics of the first century, in a looser sense, as being the precursors of the Gnostics, properly so called, who arose in the second century, and comprised the sects of Saturninus, Basilides, Carpocrates, and Valentinus. On the supposed references in the New

* "Bishop Kaye's Sermons and Addresses," Rivingtons, 1856. Pp. 426-430.

† A Sermon at the Consecration of Burwell Church, November 4. 1850.

‡ Vol. iv. p. 149.

Testament to the Gnostic heresies, the reader can have recourse to Tittmann's work "*de Vestigiis Gnosticorum in N. T. frustra quasitis*," 1773. In like manner, there was no sect of the Docetæ, but the name took its rise from the nature of the error designated as Docetism, that our Lord had not a real body, but only an imaginary one—an apparition.*

The Epistle to the Ephesians is simply a letter of affectionate exhortation to the Christians in the Roman province of Asia (1 Cor. xvi. 19). In it St Paul enlarges upon the doctrine, both of the invisible (the catholic church of the creeds), and of the visible church as a school in which the members of Christ are trained and prepared for the church that is around him, the heavenly company of angels, and of the spirits of the just made perfect.

The Epistle to the Colossians is, in many points, akin to that to the Ephesians. Even in the ethical portion of both epistles, there are features of general resemblance, indicating that both were written about the same time. But, after his glowing exordium, the apostle at once proceeds to his specific object, namely, to warn the Colossians against the errors that threatened to poison and extinguish the faith of Christ amongst them. We must not be surprised, that a great amount of misdirected learning should have been put forth upon this foundation. We much question whether the editors of this edition of the Greek Testament would not have adhered more closely to the actual history of the church, had they abstained from all mention of Gnosticism, and of the *Essenes* † in connection with this epistle. We would refer the student to the more accurate statements of Wolf upon the 8th and 18th verses of the second chapter of this epistle, where he will see a full view of this subject.‡ The worship of angels as mediating spirits belonged to the Platonic philosophy. The concluding portion of the second chapter (*touch not, taste not, handle not*), is directed, as v. 16 indicates, against those who sought to join the ceremonial law to the Christian religion.

The Epistle to the Philippians was intended to guard the beloved converts of St Paul in that city, against the same Judaising spirit which had visited the Church at Colossæ. At the same time, it was a letter of affectionate encouragement to assure the Philippians, that every consolation waited upon their spiritual father and guide, in his imprisonment.

The Epistles to Titus and Timothy have been justly called *pastoral* epistles, since the object in each instance was to

* See H. A. Niemeyer, *Commentat. Hist. Theol. de Docetis*, 1823. 4to.

† Pp. 467, 468.

‡ Wolfii *Cursus Philol. in N. T.*, tom. iv. pp. 308, 328, 329. Basil, 1741.

direct them in the discharge of their spiritual functions, as commissioned by the apostle, to regulate the churches for a season committed to their care.

The Epistle to the Hebrews is a direct commendation of the doctrine and worship of Christ to the Jewish nation, though addressed immediately to the Jewish Christians. It begins at once with the author of Christianity, the Son of God; it then enforces the authority of his gospel as a whole, upon this ground, that it was *spoken by the Lord*. Then St Paul returns, after his own manner, to the first subject, his divine Sonship, in the 5th verse of the second chapter; and thence proceeds to the great end of his incarnation, his priesthood as essential to our redemption, c. ii. 14.

The editors truly observe, that it is a weak objection indeed to the Pauline authorship of this epistle, that we read in the 3d verse of the second chapter, *confirmed unto us by them that heard him*. No other apostle could have written this; but the testimony of the other apostles was, though not the ground, yet an ample confirmation of the faith of St Paul himself.

The Epistle of St James is as remarkable in its character as an epistle, as it is unique in the peculiarities of its contents. It does not appear to have been addressed to Christians alone, but in part to the Jewish Christians, in part to those Jews who were their enemies and persecutors. To these, the first six verses of the fifth chapter are addressed. In the 7th verse St James turns from them to his brethren in Christ.

When the scope of the apostle in the second chapter is declared by himself to be the exposure of the worthlessness of an unproductive faith, we cannot but wonder that so much has been written respecting the apparent opposition between his teaching and that of St Paul. Besides which, *δινατω* in a classical sense itself, is taken for to *prove*, as here it is used, of a declarative justification—in other words, of being shewn or proved to be just.

St Peter wrote his first epistle for the consolation of his persecuted fellow-countrymen, but not to them only, as is evident from c. ii. v. 11, and c. iv. v. 3.

The second epistle, with that of St Jude, imports a defection on the part of some from their Christian sincerity,—a defection that can scarcely excite surprise when we see amongst ourselves the instability that still adheres to the Jewish character. There is a majesty and simplicity in the style of this second epistle only to be found in the canonical Scriptures. Who can help feeling this in the *last verse* of this truly *energetic* epistle?

The First Epistle of St John bears the impress of the author upon it. As a polemical epistle, it is summed up in the words,

Who is a liar but he that denieth that Jesus is the Christ? He is antichrist that denieth the Father and the Son, c. ii. 22. Is this written against the Gnostics? Is it not a denunciation of all infidelity, Jewish or Gentile? Accordingly, Lampe, in his "Prolegomena to the Gospel of St John," denied that the especial aim of this epistle was to oppose the errors of Cerinthus. The terms of the apostle are so general as to embrace not merely the errors attributed by Irenæus to Cerinthus, but every kind of antichristian unbelief.

But when St John says, *Even now are there many antichrists; whereby we know that it is the last time*, c. ii., v. 18, we must admit that, as the heresy of Cerinthus existed contemporaneously with the apostle, it was, at least, one of those forms of antichrist against which he warned the church in this epistle. Simon Magus, Dositheus, and Menander, are also, according to some of the ancients, heretics of the first, or apostolic, age. Augusti has, in his Latin Epitome of Ecclesiastical History, said of these that, on account of the defective traditions respecting them, they cannot be accurately defined and distinguished.*

It would indeed appear that some of the earliest heretics—as those who said that there would be no resurrection—applied the principle of ideology to the doctrines and also to the facts of Christianity, and early separated the humanity from the divine nature of our Lord, and the faith of Christ from the Jewish religion as unfolded in the Old Testament. Thus, the whole foundation of Christian doctrine was insidiously removed, and a new philosophy raised up on the ruins of faith, and in the place of revelation.

There is no solid reason for departing from the reading of our version *to the elect lady*, with some who take the adjective, or with others who would take the substantive for a proper name, in the one case *Eclecta*, in the other *Kuria*. And to suppose the second epistle directed anonymously to a church, is equally uncalled for. The 4th verse is rendered utterly unnatural by such a supposition.

Whilst in looking through the edition before us we have found much to commend, and a vast fund of very reliable information, we have regretted to perceive an innovation, as we cannot but consider it, upon the doctrine of justification by faith, opposed alike to Christian antiquity and to the theology of the Reformation. We allude to the at least tacit opposition to the doctrine of the imputation of our blessed Saviour's righteousness for our justification. For this truth we have sought in vain in one and another part of this elaborate volume, in the notes of the editors.

On the contrary, the editors affirm that "faith in Christ is imputed to us for righteousness; faith itself, not a righteousness proposed as a subject of faith."* If so, then how are we justified by his merits, or, as St Paul elsewhere says, by his name? or how is he made to us not only sanctification but righteousness? or what becomes of his name, The LORD our RIGHTEOUSNESS?

Much more to the purpose are the observations of Professor Hodge upon the 4th chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.

From the general excellence of this elaborate volume, we the more regret this unhappy and, to us, essential blemish.

A. T. R.

ART. VI.—*The Revision of the Prayer Book.*

Church and State Two Hundred Years ago. By JOHN STOUGHTON.

The Church and the Nonconformists of 1662. By the Rev. D. MOUNTFIELD, M.A., Incumbent of Oxon, Salop.

On the Amendment of the Act of Uniformity. Lord EBBURY'S Speech. May 1862.

Church Life in Australia. By T. BINNEY.

Liturgia Recusa. By AQUILA DE RUSSÉ. (Richard Bingham, M.A., Incumbent of Queenborough, Kent.)

THE first work in our list is a valuable addition to the history of ecclesiastical affairs in England. By a careful examination of the journals of Parliament, Mr Stoughton has corrected many of the errors committed by Clarendon, Burnet, and Kennet. From the fresh materials which have been brought to light in the State Paper Department of Her Majesty's Public Record Office, from the letters intercepted at the Post-Office, and similar sources, he has made use of information which was unknown to Macaulay and Hallam.

The lecture by Mr Mountfield contains a succinct and popular account of the schismatical Act of Uniformity, which came into operation on Bartholomew's Day 1662; the other works detail some of the attempts which are in progress to repair the breach which was then made. We are greatly indebted to the Bishop of Adelaide for his letter on the Union of Protestant Evangelical Churches; and though the idea which he has sketched of a church of the future, which is to conciliate all affections and unite all diversities, is one which no one can seriously entertain, we are truly thankful that the visit of Mr Binney to Australia was the means of eliciting a proposition which may issue in some real visible union, without any compromise of principle.

On the present occasion we purpose to limit ourselves to one of the many points involved in the fatal disastrous reactionary Act of Uniformity of 1662, viz., the declaration imposed on all who are ecclesiastically regarded as having care of souls,—i.e., on vicars and rectors, but not necessarily on curates, canons, archdeacons, deans, bishops. The reformers in the time of Edward VI. and Elizabeth intended that the English Church should exemplify the noble maxim of Chillingworth,—“The Bible, and the Bible only, is the religion of Protestants.” The Caroline rulers willed that it should be otherwise, and laid down the principle,—“The Prayer Book, and the Prayer Book only, is the religion of Churchmen.” The declaration is as follows :—

“I do declare my unfeigned assent and consent to all and every thing contained and prescribed in and by the Book of Common Prayer.”

Every portion of this declaration is singularly vague and uncertain. It is not easy to say what is contained in, and what is prescribed by, the Book of Common Prayer. In what sense are we to understand the words, “unfeigned assent and consent?” We may assume that the coronation service formed no part of the book. We ought to know whether the declaration referred to the State services recently framed as well as those for ordering of priests and deacons, for the consecration of bishops, and all the offices which are printed in modern editions of the Prayer Book.

Nor is it easy to say what is prescribed therein. One might suppose that daily service is really enjoined on every minister in public or private, except hindered by sickness or other urgent cause! But, to judge by the practice of 90 or 95 per cent. of the clergy, we must presume that this is an erroneous inference. But if there is difficulty in determining what is contained and what is prescribed, still greater is the perplexity in endeavouring to ascertain the precise meaning of “unfeigned assent and consent.” Bishop Morley said to an ejected minister, “You must not philosophise upon the words assent and consent; no more was intended than that the person so declaring intended to use the book.” But this explanation did not satisfy this worthy minister; he felt probably as Philip Henry expressed himself, “Oaths are edged tools, and not to be played with.” The real import of the words is very debateable; for although from the title of the Act of Uniformity it might be fairly argued that the declaration aimed solely at the *use* of the Liturgy, there can be no doubt that the word *use* was designedly left out in the form of words, in order that those who conformed might declare their approbation of all and every thing, *ad animum imponentis ecclesie*. We are shut

up to this opinion by the proceedings in the House of Lords, (July 25-27. 1663), when, on a proposition being made that the terms *assent* and *consent* meant nothing more than *practice* and *obedience*, the Duke of York, at the head of twelve lay Lords, protested against the alteration, declaring it to be destructive of the Church of England as by law established (Stoughton, pp. 282, 296).

There can be no doubt that the Caroline revisionists intended that this declaration should have the effect and validity of a creed ; that the subscribers should express their approbation of the changes made in the Liturgy, and virtually say, "All these I stedfastly believe."

The alterations made in the Book of Common Prayer were no less than 600 in number, and were completed within a month from the time that the king's letter was read authorising the convocation to proceed in the matter. Sheldon and his associates had resolved upon their measures, which were formed, as Dr Cardwell admits, from "a distinct and settled desire to exclude the Puritans from the Church," and all must allow that "the time was too short for the revision."—(Luthbury, History of Convocation, p. 390.)

That this declaration was intended to have the force of a creed will appear by the further consideration, that sufficient security for the use of the Prayer Book had already been taken by the second article of the 36th canon, which is subscribed by all who are admitted to holy orders. This article has the same calm, judicious, but decided tone, in which it is declared that holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation, viz., the Book of Common Prayer containeth nothing contrary to the word of God, and may lawfully be so used.

The strong, extravagant, not to say the intemperate, tone of the Declaration of 1662 betrays a consciousness, on the part of the revisionists, that it was necessary to resort to violent asseveration, and that simple assertion would be of no avail. The stringency of the declaration shews the wisdom of our Lord's precept, "Let your yea be yea, and your nay nay ; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil." Vehement protestation belongs to one who is not fully persuaded in his own mind.

A careful examination of the changes thus introduced will confirm the view of Alexander Knox (Remains, vol. i.), "The revisers seized the opportunity, contrary to what the public was reckoning on, to make our formularies, not more Puritanic, but more Catholic. They effected this, without doubt, *stealthily*, and, to appearance, by the minutest alteration." Without any change of features which could cause alarm, a new spirit was breathed into many parts of the offices. This point is

established in detail by Mr Fisher, in his work, "Liturgical Purity our Rightful Inheritance."

The excessive care which the Caroline revisionists took for the right use of the Liturgy will appear the more remarkable by the silence they maintained concerning King James's version of the Bible, which was made subsequent to the thirty-nine articles agreed upon in 1603. Although the authorised version is universally adopted, yet we conceive that all men would hesitate to put their hand to a declaration expressing their unfeigned assent and consent to all and every thing contained therein. Nor is this hesitation limited to the English translation; we would not express this unfeigned assent and consent to all and every thing contained in the *Textus Receptus*, or any other edition of the New Testament.

The use of the authorised version is common to the Church of England and Nonconformists, because it is felt to be more conducive to the edification of the people than any other. Churchmen and dissenters alike feel "*Salus populi suprema lex.*" We are not aware that the clergy would subject themselves to any penalty if they thought proper to read any other English translation; we cannot make out that they would transgress any ordinance, precept, or canon of the church, if each man read his own translation, unless it be the technical offence of not reading out of the book which the churchwardens had provided for that purpose. The fact is, the Church of England has treated the clergy as honest men in this matter of reading the authorised version. The Caroline revisionists, in introducing the church of the Prayer Book, looked upon the clergy as dishonest and insincere. The confidence reposed in the clergy as regards the reading of the Scriptures has never been abused. A few cases may have occurred in which the defects of the authorised version have been unwisely and ostentatiously paraded in such a manner as to betray the affectation of superior learning; but generally the emendations suggested and hinted at from the pulpit and the press have been made from a simple and sincere desire to feed the church of God with the pure milk of the word, and to edify the body of Christ. The fact is, no legal enactment can secure fidelity. The slight and slender security which has been taken for the reading of holy Scripture has been tested by the experience of 250 years, and has been found satisfactory and sufficient; the strong and stringent security taken by the Caroline revisionists has turned out a mockery, a delusion, and a snare. It is quite competent for a clergyman, without compromise of principle or character, of credit or caste, to suggest amendments in the authorised version, or to advocate a new translation; but to hint at blemishes in the Liturgy, or to suggest the propriety

of a revision, exposes him to the charge of breaking his ordination vows.

The stringency of the declaration has defeated its end. All agree that it must be interpreted in some conditional sense. Each one determines for himself the limits within which he exercises the liberty of private judgment. Some interpret the subscription so as to claim the right of holding all Roman doctrine, while others deem it compatible with the cold negations of Rationalism. The retention of this oath has seriously lowered the standard of professional and personal morality. To this source we ascribe the Jesuitical language of Professor Jowett:—"Cases often occur in which we must do as other men do, and act upon a general understanding, even though unable to reconcile a particular practice to the letter of truthfulness, or even to an individual conscience." The non-natural sense in which this non-natural declaration is necessarily interpreted has done much to introduce the doubt, suspicion, and scepticism which lurks beneath the altars of the church, and steals into the most solemn mysteries of religion. What faith is now reposed in subscription? What a reproach that the standard of honesty, sincerity, and truth should be lower in the church than in the mart? What a scandal that the worldling should have reason to charge the church with breeding a peculiar and artificial morality which has a corrupting influence on the transactions of ordinary life? Yet such is the joint effect of the Caroline Revisionists, and of the Act of Uniformity in 1662, which could only have been devised by men of seared consciences and hard hearts.

Though the revision of the Liturgy was effected by convocation, 600 changes being made in one month,—though these changes were made after ascertaining the mind of the Presbyterians, and Sheldon made good his word, "Now we know their minds, we will make them all knaves if they conform,"—yet the work of convocation was incomplete and ineffectual until Parliament put the finishing stroke to their labours. It was the especial disgrace of the House of Commons to perpetrate this act of national schism, cruel in its intention, disastrous in its results.

In the Commons, says Clarendon, "Every man, according to his passion, thought of adding something to the measure which might make it more grievous to somebody he did not love." Politics were intruded into the sphere of religion, the ephemeral shibboleths of party were stereotyped in the symbols of faith. The political clauses of the act were expunged or modified on the accession of William III. Those who had expelled the last of the Stuarts could no longer maintain the

doctrine of passive obedience, and denounce in absolute and unqualified terms the unlawfulness of taking up arms against the king. That which they were compelled to do from the necessities of their position is binding upon all who would strive together for the faith of the gospel, endeavouring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the band of peace. Many burn with indignation when they think how the church of the Reformation has been marred by the church of the Prayer Book ; how the divines of a dissolute age, of a corrupt court, aided by the *pensionary* Parliament, succeeded in introducing a sacerdotal and sacramental element into the Prayer Book, and drove out those who were faithful to the principles of the Reformation when the truth had well nigh perished among men.

We call attention to the Declaration as the stumbling-block which must be removed out of the way of the church if the Prayer Book is ever to be brought in close alliance with the church of the Reformation. The alterations which were so stealthily and insidiously introduced by the Caroline divines must be carefully reviewed and brought into harmony with scriptural catholicity. The publication of the Tracts for the Times was commenced by forming an association, the members of which were pledged to oppose all change, except in the direction of what each might judge catholic antiquity. We hail with thankfulness the formation of district associations in London, Dublin, Bath, Bristol, and other places, the object of which is retaining the present requirements of subscription to the thirty-nine articles, to bring the whole of the Prayer Book into stricter harmony with the word of God.

As the passing of the Act of Uniformity was a national act, every Christian citizen, whatever be his title in the church universal, has an interest in demanding the repeal of the declaration, which was designed as an engine of oppression to the Puritans, and has proved disastrous to our national character, the source of weakness and disunion, of confusion, of strife, and every evil work.

On no point has the judgment of posterity been so unanimous as in condemning this measure, which, by the confession of churchmen, cast out many of the best fish from the net, while it retained the bad, the careless, the unscrupulous, the unprincipled. The author of the "Excursion" thus records them in the roll of praise :—

" Their altars they forego, their homes they quit,
Fields which they love, and paths they daily trod,
And cast the future upon Providence,
As men the dictate of whose inward sense
Outweighs the world, whom self-deceiving wit
Lures not from what they deem the cause of God."

There is one point, however, which has very generally been overlooked, one which a British public may well press upon the House of Commons, viz., this declaration, which has the same force as a creed, is altogether out of place in an act for prescribing the orderly conduct of public worship. Parliament thus introduced clandestinely what was entirely beyond its province, and what few of its members really contemplated. We have heard, in modern times, of Acts of Parliament for the improvement of a town which made provision for the introduction of a lottery, of an innocent measure for the regulation of the constabulary police, which was in effect a strong Coercion Act, destructive of the liberty of the subject; thus the pensionary Parliament, like the conspirators of old, who concealed their daggers in branches of laurel, aimed a blow, too successfully, at the heart of the Reformation, under the guise of securing order, decency, and propriety in public worship.

It is beyond our present purpose to describe in any detail the particulars in which changes are desirable. The objections which were made at the Savoy Conference have been made in substance over and over again with wonderful unanimity. They are the same as were urged with great force in the agitation for liturgical revision which ensued in the days of the Reform Bill. If any one will compare the hosts of pamphlets which then issued from the press with the seventy or eighty which have appeared within the last three years, he will see that revisionists are actuated by a unity of purpose and design which exhibits substantial agreement amid circumstantial variety. Among these writers, the Rev. R. Bingham, a lineal descendant of the writer on the antiquities, holds a distinguished place. We are glad to see that this veteran in the cause has announced a work, "*The Prayer Book as it Might Be*," which will set forth the principles and plans he has already sketched in the well-known series of letters, "*Liturgia Recusa*."

Some of the objections made at the Savoy Conference are not, indeed, felt now by any great number in the ranks of conformity or nonconformity. But as to the truth of the objections the experience of two hundred years, notwithstanding the progress of education and intelligence, proves either that the objections are well founded, or that millions of Englishmen, for a period of two centuries, are the subjects of invincible ignorance and insuperable prejudice. If this be so, surely the strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and instead of censuring them, to adopt the resolution no longer to cast a stumbling-block or an occasion to fall in a brother's way.

Waiving, then, these matters of detail, we will briefly glance

at the scriptural principles which ought to guide such a revision, and at the preliminary means by which all the members of Christ's holy catholic church may forward this important object.

There are three scriptural rules directly applicable to any revision—(1.) Let all things be done decently and in order. (2.) Let every one please his neighbour for his good to edification. (3.) Let all your things be done in charity. Of the alterations which were made two hundred years ago, we may assume that all will stand the test of the first rule. But to those who have studied the subject, the question of rational conformity is very perplexing. Even whereas in the time of the Reformation, there was great diversity in saying and singing within this realm; some following Salisbury use, some Hereford use, and some the use of Bangor, some of York, some of Lincoln; even so now there is greater diversity than is consistent with the *beau idéal* of decency and order. This, however, may be left to the discretion of the minister, as it now virtually is, as may be found conducive to edifying in the peculiar and local circumstances of the people. But if we try the alterations made in 1661 by the other canons of Scripture, which of them can stand the test? Where shall we find that anything was done "to please his neighbour for his good to edification?" On what change can we put our finger and say, "This was done in charity?"

The objections which are made to the Prayer Book as it is are well founded or ill founded. If they are well founded, the church abandons its high prerogative as a witness and keeper of Holy Writ, and is unfaithful to her divine Lord, if it continues to put a stumbling-block or occasion to fall in a brother's way.

If these objections are ill-founded, then the mistaken views of the weak brother, of the imperfectly taught disciple, are the real impediment to his edifying. Now, what can be done to remove these mistaken views? Is no consideration due to those who are of imperfect education, of feeble understanding, who know no other than their own mother tongue, to those who cannot be brought to understand the technical, the metaphorical, the figurative, the applied senses in which words are used? Granted that there are difficulties and mysteries in the Bible, is this a reason why difficulties and mysteries should be imported into the Prayer Book, which can only be discovered in the Bible when the keen eye of the theologian penetrates beneath the surface. Granted that many do not personally feel the objections to expressions in the church catechism and the baptismal services, which are considered to

put sacramentalism in place of the answer of a good conscience before God—for much may be imputed to the effect of early training and the associations of childhood—the grounds on which some justify the use of these terms never have occurred to other minds. Woe be to the man who can see his weak brother perishing, or stumbling on the dark mountains of suspicion, doubt, obscurity, and perplexity, without holding up, as far as he can, a friendly light to guide his steps into the way of peace.

But, do all objections arise from the mistaken views of dissidents? Was this the case with the 4000 clergymen who, in a document dated Cambridge, June 1850, represented how their consciences were aggrieved by the use of the burial service in all cases? Shall we say that these 4000 were poor, ignorant, and foolish? The grievance of which they complain remains unredressed. As we would please our neighbour for his good to edification,—as we would do all things in charity,—is it not an incumbent duty to help those who, in this matter, have struggled to obtain some relaxation of liturgical bondage.

The character of every action derives its complexion from the motives from which it proceeds, or from the object to which it is directed. Many plans of liturgical revision have been advocated under the idea of comprehending the nonconformists, and of proselytising them. Now, our opinion is, that all plans undertaken with this object and end will certainly fail. We cannot expect the divine blessing to rest upon any plans of revision which are formed and prosecuted with the direct intention and main design of proselytising nonconformists.

If this matter be taken up in the fear of God, for the maintenance of his truth, and for the glory of his holy name,—if the Church of England is desirous of doing what is right simply because it is right, apart from the idea of gaining a triumph over the notions of Nonconformity,—we doubt not the divine blessing will rest on her efforts.

It is important that the revision be undertaken in such a spirit that all “who call on the name of Jesus Christ, both their Lord and our Lord,” may be expected to give their aid for the purpose of promoting peace and purity, righteousness and truth.

The want of this revision has done much to prevent greater union and co-operation between all those churchmen and nonconformists who are heartily attached to the principles of the Reformation. Notwithstanding the activity of different branches of the church universal in city missions, special services, and other agencies, there is not, generally speaking, the same

affectionate and friendly intercourse between churchmen and dissenters as there was forty or sixty years ago. At the commencement of the present century episcopalians and nonconformists met together in private social intercourse with fraternal sympathy and concord. The "Eclectic Notes," a work which ought to be read by all who desire to form an impartial opinion of the sentiments really held by the evangelical fathers, shew the friendly terms on which a Clayton and a Goode associated with Venn, Cecil, Pratt. We fear that there are few clerical associations now into which a nonconforming brother would be admitted as one who is working the work of the Lord. It is quite unnecessary to remark how much the effect of public co-operation would be increased by the amenities of private fellowship. The manner in which many evangelical clergymen frown upon dissenting ministers is very injurious to the cause of religion. They stand aloof from those whom they ought to esteem as auxiliaries and confederates. Fifty years ago there was, to some extent, an interchange of pulpits between churchmen and dissenters. Several clergymen preached in Surrey Chapel, and Rowland Hill, long after his open accession to nonconformity, occasionally preached in parish churches. We do not think that this interchange would be of any service whatever to nonconformity as a system in antagonism with the national church. The chief advantage accruing to the children of the pilgrim fathers would be that they could join with greater fervency and thankfulness in the hymn, "Behold how good and joyful a thing it is, brethren, to dwell together in unity." The benefit resulting to the church would be incalculable, in relieving it from the odium of ecclesiastical exclusiveness, from the charge of intolerance, from the appearance of neglecting, depreciating, or denying the labours of those whose efforts to "console and to civilise" have been attended with distinguished success.

We may notice how much the want of revision stands in the way of all those steps which are to be taken for the education of the people. What has been the great impediment to the harmonious co-operation of church and state? The difficulty of securing the religious instruction of the young without doing violence to tender consciences. This difficulty has arisen entirely from the church of the Prayer Book, as this was constituted in 1662, from the *additions* then made to the Church Catechism, and the interpretation affixed to them by changes stealthily introduced into the baptismal and other offices. If it had pleased God to spare the life of Edward VI. a few years longer, so that Bishop Poynt's Catechism had received the sanction of Parliament, the country might have been

spared all those lamentable conflicts and party strifes which, during the last twenty years, have retarded the education of the people.

From the want of this revision, and the spirit fostered by the perpetration of things as they are, churchmen frown on any attempt to call into requisition Lay agency. The dread of laymen stretching themselves beyond their province, and the jealousy of their being too successful, is so great, that under the present system Anglican laymen are, and are likely to be, dumb dogs that cannot bark, loving to slumber. The secret wish and desire of many clergymen is that it should be so. As truly as Wolsey said, "Ego et rex meus," so the clergy, as a body, say, "Ego et ecclesia." The first consideration with the beneficed clergy is their own position, their own order, the rights of their patrons, or of their successors. If these privileges and immunities are duly preserved, then there is scope for lay activity in secular matters; but the clerical mind generally has willed it that it is far better for nothing to be done by the laity, and nothing attempted, than that one jot or tittle of clerical prerogative should be placed in jeopardy. The consequence is, that thousands of laymen feel themselves doomed to involuntary inactivity. They cannot move without exciting suspicion, alarm, and distrust in the hearts of their spiritual pastors. Every churchman may well blush to think how widely, in contrast with the Free Church of Scotland, and Wesleyan Methodists in England, the church of the Prayer Book deviates from the church of the Bible.

It may be added, that the number of candidates who presented themselves for holy orders in 1860 is computed at one hundred less than it was in 1840. Much of this is due to the unsettling of men's minds by the subtle Romanism of the Caroline revisionists, and by the reactionary influence of rationalism, but the greater part is due to the cruel neglect with which the church of the Prayer Book has treated those who held fast the principles of the Reformation. When the father and the son have been cradled and nurtured, have laboured, lived, and died in clerical poverty, it is high time that the grandson, if the will of God be so, should serve his generation in some way which does not entail irrevocable obligations and unavoidable straitness. There have been those who, for many years past, have discouraged those who were destitute of private resources from taking orders, unless they were disposed to devote themselves to colonial service or missionary toil. The present lack of eligible candidates for the ministry will probably be felt more and more for years to come.

We regret, with Mr Stoughton (p. 434), that social ecclesiastical caste perpetuates to this hour much of the evil that was done by the Act of Uniformity, and by the Conventicle and Five Mile Acts.

W.

ART. VII.—*Literature of Pascal's Thoughts.*

(PRINCIPAL EDITIONS OF THE PRESENT CENTURY.)

- Pensées de Pascal, avec les Notes de Condorcet et de Voltaire.* 2 vols. in 24. de Bure. Paris, 1823.
Pensées de Blaise Pascal, avec Tables Analytiques, et Préface de l'édition de 1669. EMLER, éditeur. Paris, 1828.
Pensées, Fragments, et Lettres de Blaise Pascal, publiés pour la première fois conformément aux MSS. originaux, en grande partie inédits, par P. FAUGÈRE. 2 vols. in 8vo. Andreaux, Paris, 1844.
Pensées de Pascal, publiées dans leur texte authentique, avec un Commentaire, suivi d'une étude littéraire, par E. HAVET. Dezobry, Paris, 1852.
Pensées de Pascal, suivant le plan de l'auteur, d'après les textes originaux avec les additions, et les variantes de Port-Royal, par J. M. FRANKIN. 2d edition. Lagay, Paris, 1853.
Pensées de Pascal, disposées selon un plan nouveau. Edition complète d'après les derniers travaux critiques, avec des Notes, un Index, et une Préface, par J. F. ASTIE. 2 vols. in 24. Lausanne. G. Bridel, 1856.
Pensées de Pascal. Edition variorum d'après le texte du M.S. autographe, par CHARLES LAUANDRE, in 18. Paris. Charpentier, 1861.

..... "C'est méchant signe pour ceux qui ne liront pas ce livre."

MAD. DE LA FAYETTE.

Two hundred years ago the friends of an illustrious man, just deceased, received the following invitation:—"You are invited to attend the convoy, funeral service, and burial of the deceased *Blaise Pascal, Esquire*, when living, son of the late Messire Estienne Pascal, Councillor of State, and President of the Court of *Aydes* of Clermond Ferrand, deceased in the house of M. Perrier, his brother-in-law, and councillor in the said court of *Aydes*, upon the *Fossés* of the Porte St Marcel, near the fathers of the Christian doctrine, which will take place on Monday the 21st day of August 1662, at 10 o'clock in the morning, in the Church of St Estienne du Mont, his parish, and the place of his burial, where ladies may attend if they please."*

We have now to make an inventory of the literary labours which have been heaped on this tomb within the last fifty years. The mere reading over of the list at the end of this

* This precious relic was sent to the *Journal de Paris* on the 4th of April 1703, by a person who avers that "he has seen it in the library of a magistrate, along with Descartes's funeral card, under a glass."—V. Faugère, "*Abrégé de la vie de Jésus, par Pascal*," p. 71.

article may perhaps astonish our readers, when they see the large fortune France is accumulating, as compared with the few small treatises published in England. What is the reason of this enormous difference? Dr Thomas M'Crie, in his elegant translation of the "Provincial Letters," attributes the semi-oblivion in which these letters are buried to something else than "a want of taste among us for the beauties and excellencies of Pascal" (Johnston's edition, 1851, p. 8). And he points to the imperfections of the three preceding translations. As for the "Thoughts," we cannot accuse the translator—(is there one?)—but we must just say that the small space they occupy in Great Britain is due to the English method of dealing much more in *external* evidence than Pascal does. Were the equilibrium established in English apologetics, and moral proofs brought more fully into relief (without falling into the errors of Maurice's school), Pascal would have as many friends in England as he has in France. May these lines obtain a few for him.

We have already said that it is a bibliography, with some notes, that we wish to write, and that we intend restricting our remarks to the principal works which have appeared within the last few years.

Victor Cousin has the glory of opening the list with his remarkable *Report before the French Academy* "Upon the necessity of a new edition of Pascal's Thoughts," 1842. It was known that the *autograph* MS. of the Thoughts had been deposited at the then Royal Library of Paris. It is a large MS. in folio, of 491 pages numbered.

"Upon the greater number of these pages are pasted, or carefully framed round (where they are written on both sides) papers of all sizes, which come, one after another, *pêle-mêle*, confusedly. Pages constituting a part of the same subject are inverted or detached at greater intervals. There are even pages, the two halves of which are separated the one from the other; thoughts which have no relation to one another are traced consecutively on the same page. The manuscript is almost entirely in Pascal's own handwriting."—(Flotte's "Etudes sur Pascal," p. 76.)

"The writing of Pascal," says Cousin, "always difficult to decipher, is sometimes illegible, from its extreme smallness and the multiplication of the most capricious abbreviations. One cannot help a feeling of a painful emotion at the sight of this large MS. in folio, where the faltering hand of Pascal has traced, during the agony of his four last years, the thoughts which presented themselves to his mind."—"Des Pensées," p. 10.)*

* Besides this autograph, the library possesses two copies of the MS. of the "Thoughts," both of the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries. These two copies were confided to Charles Bossut, to serve for the

It is on this autograph that the illustrious philosopher worked.† His "Report" was therefore quite an event in the French literary world.

Evidently Cousin was tolling the funeral bell of all the preceding editions. "After reading the new book," said Vinet, "I look sadly at my two copies of the 'Thoughts,' and say to myself, 'I have not got Pascal there at all.'" Neither the edition *Princeps*, given by Pascal's own family, under the inspiration of his friend Antoine Arnauld (printed by Després, 1669), nor that of Desmolets,‡ nor that of the Bishop of Montpellier, nor that of Condorcet§ and of Voltaire,|| nor even that of Bossut,¶ (upon which so many other editions have been founded), had succeeded in giving us the true Blaise Pascal.

With the idea that sound criticism teaches us upon the sacred duties of an editor, how are we to explain this literary anomaly? We answer, through fear of the Jesuits, the Messieurs de Port-Royal, Arnauld, Nicole, Etienne Perrier, the Duke de Roannez, &c., suppressed and adulterated a great number of the "Thoughts." But let us beware of judging Pascal's friends with the just severity which an editor of our times would deserve. Who knows, besides, whether a clever critic was not right in saying, "It is to be presumed that the later

edition of the "Thoughts" that he was preparing. The first is numbered 3002 *bis*, "Supplement to French MSS.," the second, No. 176 of the same. There exist still two other MSS., one of which, in folio, is from the *Oratoire* Library, No. 160, containing numerous letters of Port-Royal and of Pascal. The other ("Supplément Français," No. 1485) is a collection of memoirs by Marguerite Perrier, Pascal's niece, with new letters of Port-Royal and Pascal.

† Notwithstanding this, the conscientious editor of the "Thoughts and Fragments," Prosper Faugère, reproaches M. Cousin with having in this "committed serious unfaithfulness, in following the partial copy of the autograph MS. instead of studying the MS. itself."—(Letter to the *Courier Français*, 17th Dec. 1844.)

‡ The Père Desmolets ("Supplément aux Pensées"), published in 1728, inedited "Thoughts," after a MS. belonging to the family; he is, on the whole, a faithful editor.

§ The "Eulogium of Blaise Pascal," by Condorcet, London, 1776, furnishes its little contingent of new thoughts, and contains remarkable notes, although they aim at effacing all religion and edification from the "Thoughts," and leaving only the philosophical idea.

|| "Remarks of Voltaire on Pascal's Thoughts," in 8vo. Geneva, 1778.

¶ "Discourse upon the Life and Works of Pascal," by the Abbé Bossut, with the "Eulogium of Pascal," by Nicole (Latin). Edition of 1779. 5 vols. in 8vo. The same discourse, with corrections and additions (1781). Bossut, the friend of d'Alembert, and a distinguished geometrician, has the merit of having gathered into one work all the "Thoughts" that had appeared since 1669, and other new ones, taken from sources which he does not indicate. But his work is done only from the copies, on the whole faithful, of the Abbé Guerrier. Bossut retains all the adulterations of the edition of 1669, preserving even the thoughts which are neither in the MS. nor in the two copies. Bossut establishes also an arbitrary order in his division. 1st, Thoughts relating to philosophy, ethics, and belles-lettres. 2d, Thoughts relating to religion. As if Pascal troubled himself with literature.

changes which Pascal's 'Thoughts' have undergone would have been approved of, and perhaps executed by Pascal himself, if he had lived?" One thing is sure, and that is, that in the seventeenth century the idea of respecting the form of an author's work did not come into any one's mind. Individuality was thought very little of then, particularly at Port-Royal, where authors did not sign their works. The Port-Royalists meant, apparently, to render the same service to Pascal, in *perfecting* his book, that they had done to another, to St Cyran, in mutilating his "Considérations sur les Dimanches et les jours de Fêtes." Were there not lines to be continued in the *Pensées*, and others to be effaced, under the pain of giving scandal? Was that indeed a book, "this shapeless rough draught, these improvisations of a sudden but deeply pre-occupied mind, which is every moment proposing objections, without taking the time to answer them, and without even knowing whether he will answer them?"* So thought the friends of Pascal. This is proved by the following letter of Arnauld to M. Perrier, of the 20th November 1668, a year before the "Thoughts" appeared :—

"Sir, suffer me to tell you that you must not be ill to please, nor so superstitious in leaving a work as it has come from the hands of the author, when it is to be exposed to public censure. We cannot be too particular, knowing that we have to do with enemies so bitter as ours. It is much better to prevent cavils by some little change, which only softens an expression, than to be reduced to the necessity of making apologies. This is the conduct we have held touching the 'considerations upon Sundays and festival days' by the late M. de Saint Cyran."

Arnauld then takes up a passage upon justice in the Thoughts which offends him, and he concludes :—

"I must tell you plainly I think this place is untenable, and beg you to seek among M. Pascal's papers, if something cannot be found to put in place of it."†

What did these friends wish to do? To give to the "Thoughts" the perfection of the Provincial letters, the eighteenth of which they said had been written over *thirteen* times, and all their mutilations were, in their eyes, "only *embellishments* and *explanations*. But let us hear them :—

"As what has been done does not in any way change the sense and the expressions of the author (!), but only *explains* and *embellishes* them (and it is certain that if he were still living he would, without any difficulty, subscribe to these little embellishments and

* Charles Modier, "Bulletin du Bibliophile," 1843, p. 107.

† Cousin; *Pensées*, pp. 76-77.

explanations). . . . I do not see that you can reasonably oppose yourself to the glory of him whom you love."

These lines, written by the Count of Brienne to Pascal's own niece, assure Marguerite Perrier that

"M. Pascal's thoughts are better than they were. 'Madame Perrier, when she reads the preface that is being prepared, will not only give her hand to all that has been done, but will be delighted with it.' For even the most exact Christian sincerity will not be wounded by one saying that the fragments are given just as one found them, and as they have come from the author's hand."—(*Ibid.* pp. 78, 80.)

Such is the first answer to the question, why these incorrectnesses, we dare no longer say, unfaithfulnesses? But here is a second answer, viz, the circumscribed horizon which surrounded Port-Royal. With all their piety and all their learning, were the Port-Royalists able to understand the heights and depths of Pascal, or, if you like better, the intricacies, the fluctuations, the interrogations, the reticences, the bold conclusions of that mind so "passionately geometrical," so vigorous, so caustic, so like Capernaum, now exalted to heaven, now thrust down to hell? What affinity is there between the sober, colourless diction of the Port-Royal *Logique ou l'Art de bien penser* and the naive, incisive, original turn which characterises the style of Pascal? Constituted as they were, the recluses of Port-Royal could not let the author of the Thoughts pass without stripping him of all superfluous beauty:—

"After having softened down the thoughts in many places, says Cousin's *Report*, to render them more edifying, the Port-Royalists have, without scruple, corrected the style to render it more regular and more natural, according to the model of the simple, calm style they had formed for themselves. The Port-Royalists gave proof of strong intelligence and often of greatness of mind; they, therefore, allowed what was intelligent and great in Pascal to pass, but they fell ruthlessly upon everything that betrayed the depths of his thoughts and of his soul, and, as this soul beams forth in every line traced by the dying hand of Pascal, the Port-Royalists were condemned to correct and mutilate all."

Lastly, in 1669, Louis XIV. was still above the horizon, and that monarch had no love for the Jansenists. After the peace (the so-called peace of Clement IX.) which he had just concluded between the parties in the church, Port-Royal was in mortal dread of reawakening the old animosities. In 1677, this dread was yet so great that Mme. Perrier was entreated not to publish her brother's life.

With these facts before us, can we wonder if Pascal was laid on a Procrustean bed?

But to return to Cousin's work. Its importance consists, 1st, in the examination of the pieces inserted into the edition of Pascal which do not belong to it, and which are not to be found in the original MS. The author concludes that a fourth, and perhaps even a third of the Thoughts, considered as fragments of Pascal, are completely foreign to his plan, are not to be found in the autograph MS., and belong to different periods of his life; that several were never even written by him, and are often only distant and feeble echoes of hearsays gathered and edited by very diverse persons.

2d. In the restitution of the Thoughts to their primitive form, both those found in the previous editions and in the autograph, the judicious editor brings once more to light "the constant originality of language which had been almost everywhere effaced, by the prudence and the severe but rather timid taste of Port-Royal."

3d. In the reproduction for the first time of thoughts taken from the autograph, and which M. Cousin has divided thus: *a*, moral and Christian thoughts; *b*, thoughts upon the miracles, the Jansenists, and the Jesuits.

Our aim being merely to indicate the literature written on the subject of Pascal's thoughts, we shall not enter into discussion with Cousin upon the thesis which he maintained in 1828, and still more vigorously in 1842, viz., the scepticism of which he accuses Pascal. But we cannot refrain from making two or three remarks. And first, let us remember that the sixteenth century inaugurates a new epoch in the history of humanity. "It was," as Vinet observes, "the age of paroxysms, the age in which the storm gathered by its predecessors burst out, the fruit which had been long sown ripened, the embankment beaten by so many accumulated waves gave way."*

In short, the philosophy of good sense invaded every domain. It attacked popular superstition, and condemned the long sanctioned divorce between the religious idea and life; but unable to effect a reconciliation between the parties, it got angry, turned its back on religion, and threw itself into scepticism with Montaigne and Charron, or into sensualism with Rabelais. But as, happily, humanity cannot long tolerate the separation of religion from morals, the proscription of the one or other element, the Reformation came and attempted the reconstruction of the edifice; and in this point of view at least, it was not a *schism*. Nevertheless, apart from the evangelical faith, philosophy remained sceptical. Its supreme authority was reason, and it took its *point d'appui* beyond the pale of religion; this was interest, egoism, sometimes benevolence, or

* The *Moralists of the 16th and 17th Centuries*, p. 12.

even duty ; but until they were clear as to the rule of life, "These children (the sceptics), rather embarrassed than aided by their liberty, found themselves upon ground at once sterile and encumbered. As birds hunted out of their nest before their feathers were grown, thrown from the bosom of a servile but secure dogmatism into the hazards of a vague scepticism, they allowed to weigh upon them an inevitable and constant disproportion between the end and the means, between the resources and the exigencies of their situation."*

But the remedy was not far off. I do not speak of Descartes, in spite of his influence at the Oratoire and at Port-Royal, and of the patronage which he received from Malebranche and Arnauld ; the remedy was not to come from a philosopher but from a Christian ; in *Pascal*, says Vinet, "scepticism is dissolved in faith."

This last phrase would seem to imply that the Professor of Lausanne maintains the same thesis as he of Paris, viz., that religion was only a make-shift with Pascal ; but nothing could be more contrary to Vinet's thought.† "What Pascal did," writes he, quoting the ingenious comparison of Pascal's German biographer, M. Reuchlin, "was to get on to the shoulders of Montaigne, in-order to reach the enemies of religion more certainly ; and he has thus given a striking proof of the support which faith may find from its natural enemies, infidelity and scepticism." M. Reuchlin also compares them to "those demons which, in the architecture of the middle ages, support, so to speak, the vault of the temple in its bold soaring towards that other vault which is heaven."‡

The defenders of Pascal against Victor Cousin have not been awanting. As early as 1843-45, the Abbé Flottes appeared with his learned and conscientious *Studies upon the Spirit and the Faith of Pascal*, as manifested in his life and writings. This book could not but be wanting in unity, being a series of articles, which the Abbé threw like so many bombs from Montpellier against the Parisian philosopher. The proofs are sometimes specious and weak, but still he has been able amply to justify Pascal, and to shew that everything, even to the parchment that he carried in his coat-lining, and which Condorcet (who first brought it to light) ridiculed as a *mystic amulet*, throws a bright and serene light upon the secret soul of Pascal. Let us give an extract of this curious document :—

* Vinet, *Moralistes*, p. 19.

† V. in particular, in "Les Etudes sur Pascal," the chapter on the *Pyrrhonism of Pascal*.

‡ Etudes, &c., p. 215.

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"The year of grace 1654."

"Monday, 23d November . . . from about $\frac{1}{2}$ past 10 in the evening till $\frac{1}{2}$ past midnight."

"God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers and savants."

"Certitude, certitude, feelings, sight, joy, peace, God of Jesus Christ."

"Deum meum et Deum vestrum," John xx. 17.

"Thy God shall be my God," (Ruth).

"Forgetfulness of the world and of all, except God."

"It is found only in the ways taught in the gospel, greatness of the human soul."

"Righteous Father ! the world hath not known thee, but I have known thee," John xvii. 25.

"Joy, joy, tears of Joy."

This fragment is the summing up of several critical epochs in the life of Pascal, which makes it a sort of description of his inner man ; and he carried it about with him eight years,—that is, until his death (1662). Is Victor Cousin, then, justified in saying, "Pyrrhonism had taken such a hold of the mind of Pascal, that he could see nothing out of or beyond that."* Let the contemporaries of the celebrated apologist witness against Cousin. Here is one who was a skilful enough physician to have discovered the scepticism of Pascal, if it had existed ; but what says Bayle ?

"A hundred volumes of sermons are not equal to that life, and are far less capable of disarming infidels. The humility and the outward devotion of M. Pascal mortify libertines more than if a dozen missionaries were let loose upon them."†

M. Cousin's objection, that it is only as a philosopher, and not as a religious man, that Pascal is sceptical, goes for nothing, for, without even accepting his judgment upon the "*unhappy faith*" of Pascal, and "which he would not wish for any of his fellow-men," we merely observe that Pascal, in the name of human instinct alone, not only accepted first principles, but formally rejected scepticism, as a *disease of the mind*. Doubtless, at times he so identifies himself with the scepticism of his adversary that one is embarrassed to know whether he is applying to himself what he is saying. Doubtless, he has written :—

"It is a disease natural to man to believe that he possesses the truth directly, and from thence it comes that he is always disposed to deny all that is incomprehensible ; instead of which the truth is,

* *Pensées, Fr face*, p. xix.

† *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres*, Dec. 1694.

that naturally he knows nothing but lies, and he ought to take for true only those things which appear false to him."

And again :—

"Whatever be the goal to which we think we can attach ourselves, it moves away and leaves us ; and if we follow it, it escapes from our grasp, and slips away in an eternal flight. Nothing stops for us. Such is the state that is natural to us."

But Pascal adds :—

"Still it is a state contrary to our inclination ; we burn with the desire to find a firm resting-place, a last and constant basis whereon to build a tower that shall reach the infinite."

If he ends this paragraph by this withering word, "our whole foundation cracks, and the earth opens even to the abyss," the context shews that he wishes thus to prove the necessity of a revelation ; and it is in the same sense that he says :—

"We must learn to doubt when we ought, and to be sure when we ought. He who does not do thus, does not understand the force of reason. There are some who go wrong upon these three heads, either in affirming everything, as if it were demonstrated, and that for want of knowledge ; or in doubting of everything for want of knowledge where they ought to submit ; or in submitting to all for want of knowing where they ought to judge."

In fewer words :—

"We ought to have three qualities ; we ought to be—viz., Pyrrhonists, Geometricians, and submissive Christians."

Or under a not less original form :—

"Draw the curtain ; do as you like ; we must either believe, or deny, or doubt. Have you, then, no rule ? We judge that the animals do *well* what they do. Is there no rule by which to judge men ? To deny, to believe and to doubt *well*, are to man what running is to the horse."

In face of these quotations, we ask once more, Was Pascal guilty of scepticism ? Is he the "sublime madman" of Voltaire ? Was doubt always within him "as a caged lion ?" (St Beuve). No, he is neither a "Werther" nor a "René." His scepticism is but the "smoke of Sinai which surrounded God himself" (Havet).

But we may naturally ask how it is that so distinguished a critic as M. Cousin should have been so mistaken in his judgment on Pascal ? Let us listen to the words of one more competent than we :—

"There is in the *Thoughts*," writes Vinet, "something more than a book, there is a man ; something more than philosophy, there is

Christianity. There is, as has been said, a tragedy going on, at which one must not be present merely as a metaphysician. There are things that the cleverest will not understand unless he feels them. Learned though he (M. Cousin) be, there are facts which he does not know; penetrating though he be, there are situations which he does not understand. To understand them they must have been tried. It is with certain questions as with these fortresses that cannot be reduced by a distant cannonade, for example, from on board a frigate, but only by landing. There are problems to the bottom of which a philosopher ought to descend, not as a philosopher, but as a man, doubtless with all his reason, but also with all his conscience, with all his sensibility, and even with his imagination." *

We have not to occupy ourselves with the superstitions of which Pascal has also been accused. His belief in the miracle of the Holy Thorn,† in Transubstantiation,‡ in Relics, so far as to frequent the churches in which they were exposed, in the *authority of the church*,§—that is, in something superfluous, since he believed in the Holy Spirit—all this only shews that "there is one side in which Pascal did not go further than the age in which he lived. He had his share of credulity; like Tertullian, he dipped in asceticism. He had his limits, his horizon. He was a sectary; we all are at bottom, and the great men along with us."||

* *Etudes sur Pascal*, p. 348.

† Pascal's niece, Marguerite Perrier, is said to have been cured by touching the Holy Thorn on the 22d October 1656, that is, while Pascal was writing his provincial letters! Pascal defended the miracle against the Jesuits, (V. his letter of the same month), to Mademoiselle de Roannez, to let her know that "the verification of it had been made by the church" (Faugère, i. p. 38). There are some very just observations in it upon miracles in general. "Were God to discover himself continually to men, there would be no merit in believing him; and were he never to discover himself, there would be little faith." But his temerity knows no bounds, when he writes elsewhere, "The church is without proofs, if they are right;" that is, if the *Jesuits* can shew that the miracle is apocryphal (Havet, p. 288, note 8).

‡ "Heretical Christians have known God, as it were, through his humanity, and worshipped Jesus Christ, but it is Catholics alone who have recognised him in the element of bread. It is only us that God has enlightened up to this point" (Faugère, i. p. 39).

§ "We know that all virtues, &c., are useless out of the church, and the communion of the head of the church, who is the Pope. I will never separate myself from communion with him, at least I pray God to grant me this grace, without which I shall be lost for ever" (Faugère, i. 36).

|| L. Vuliemin, *Revue Chrétienne*, 1857, p. 658. Let us compare this judgment of the Professor of Lausanne with that of his former colleague—"We must not," says Vinet, "look upon this great man (Pascal) in the light of an experienced, ripe, temperate Christian, equally free from the old errors of his worldly life and the illusions of a novice, but in the light of a neophyte, younger in heart than in years, newer in faith than in life, who makes use of profound but appalling words suggested to him by the crudeness peculiar to that period of the Christian life, combined with the natural vivacity of his impressions and the boldness of his genius, but which we should never have known but for his premature death" (*Etudes*, p. 346).

We shall now pass to the two volumes of Prospère Faugère : *Pensées, Fragments et Lettres de Blaise Pascal*. After Cousin's labours, nothing was wanting but a new edition of the "Thoughts." That of Faugère appeared in 1844, and we may say that, if some people could see nothing in the mutilated editions but a "withered" Pascal, a "black Silhouette," Pascal restored, completed can only be seen as a "convinced, fervent, happy Christian." All that was needed to work this change was to give Pascal, as Providence had left him, with his *errata*, his unfinished sentences,* sometimes barred, often re-copied ; Pascal with his incertitudes, his brusque interrogations, his apparent contradictions, true *dissecta membra*, or, as de Pressensé has poetically said, "precious materials scattered on the ground like the ruins of a fallen temple, or like those marbles at Pompeii, all ready hewn to enter into the structure of unfinished edifices, waiting for a morrow which shall never come." †

Yes, this is indeed the feeling of indescribable sadness which every lover of Pascal must feel in turning over the leaves of these two volumes. It is as if, after long years, we entered, for the first time since the last adieu, the room of a beloved friend. There are his books upon the table, here his letters, some of them not even opened, further off his writings, with the last words he was tracing when death entered. Let us comfort ourselves, however, not only in the thought that this death was "for the glory of God," but also because it is certain that, had the apologetical treatise been finished by the hand of its author, (that is to say, re-written perhaps *thirteen* times, like the eighteenth provincial letter), we should never have had a Pascal so open, so naive, so sparkling, at times so playful, but also so bold, so innovating,—that is to say, so completely *himself*, as he whom the divine hand has put before us. "With more care than any one else, he would have softened down the abrupt movements, rounded the sharp angles ; in a word, Pascal would have kept himself as from fire, from giving us the whole of Pascal." ‡

* "Pascal, such an admirable writer when he completes, is perhaps even still superior where he was interrupted" (St Beuve).

† *Revue Chrétienne*, 1858, p. 556. *Pendent opera interrupta !* In the first edition of the *Thoughts*, there was placed as frontispiece a vignette in which are seen, on the right and left, scattered stones and unfinished buildings ; in the middle, in a detached frame, rises a temple surmounted by a cross in front. This is the design of the monument as the architect had conceived it (Havet, p. 1, note 1).

‡ Vinet's *Etudes*, p. 65. This opinion is justified by these lines in the edition of 1669 :—"Pascal was accustomed to polish all his works so much that he was hardly ever pleased with his first thoughts, however good they appeared to others ; he wrote over again eight or ten times pieces that every one but himself thought admirable from the first" (Edition Emile, 1828, p. 3).

Therefore, we are inclined to think that Pascal would not thank M. Faugère for all the trouble he has given himself to expose him in such a way to the public gaze. "You have come in," he would say to him, "without knocking, when I did not expect you, and you are bringing all the country behind you!" Perhaps so, but doctors do not always knock, and they sometimes do violence for the good of the sick man.

The *Studies upon Blaise Pascal*, by Alexandre Vinet, were collected into one volume after the death of the author. Pascal, it is well known, was the favourite of the apologist of the nineteenth century. Was it because of the affinity between the minds of these two men? Whatever it may have been, the one serves as a model for the other, and Vinet, under date of the 10th April 1847 (some days before his death), dictated his last impressions upon the great genius of the seventeenth century.

The *Studies* had already appeared in the journal of *le Semeur*, and attracted the attention of a well-skilled critic; we mean the author of Port-Royal. "If," wrote St Beuve, in the *Journal des Débats*, "the articles of M. Vinet upon Pascal were collected, we should have, in my opinion, the most exact conclusions which we can arrive at regarding this great nature so controverted" (17th March 1847).*

The numerous citations we have given will justify this opinion, and permit us to pass on.

We can only note the edition of J. M. F. Frantin, the chief merit of which consists in his giving us, at the foot of the original text, the additions and *variantes* of Port-Royal. The plan followed by Frantin, which he believes to have been that of the author, is simple (1st part, Evidences. 2d, Doctrine and Christian Morals). The work ends with divers thoughts and discourses upon philosophy.

Frantin is a disciple of Lamennais (the Lamennais who submitted to Rome) in matters of authority, and this preoccupation is betrayed in his plan. Without doubt it is for that reason that he has eliminated the *Discourse upon the Passions of Love*. Prudery! For since Pascal makes of love a phenomenon of the mind ("the purity of the mind causes the

* E. Havet, in his laborious edition of the Thoughts, corroborates this judgment:—"Most distinguished, original articles, in which, as Pascal says, there is not only an author but a man." Then he adds this singular remark: "It is curious to see Protestantism drawing the Thoughts to itself, and making its spoil of them, with an ingenious but obstinate and chagrined zeal" (*Pensées, Étude*, p. 53, Note 6),—as if the co-religionists of Havet do not also make their spoil of Locke, Paley, Butler, John Milton, and John Bunyan; and as for the *zeal* he alludes to, their *mutilations* of the "Pilgrim's Progress" prove that it is not always of the best kind.

purity of the passion") which takes birth only at the age of reason, there is not much to fear. . . .

We come next to the edition of Ernest Havet (1852). It is the text of Faugère, but according to an order more or less different from that of the *textus receptus* of Bossut, and merely divided by *numbered paragraphs*. In the way of restorations, we find the conversation of Pascal with M. de Sacy, in which Pascal explains the philosophy of Epictetus. This conversation was printed in 1728 by the Père Desmolet, after the Memoirs of Fontaines; I mean the *manuscript* memoir of 1728 where the text is not mutilated.* The 600 pages of Havet contain precious commentaries. The author treats Pascal as a classic, and explains him with the help of the Bible, Plato, the Fathers, Epictetus, Montaigne, Descartes, Balzac, Grotius, Port-Royal, and the Chevalier de Mére. We may add that the work is preceded by a long and learned study upon the spirit and the ideas of Pascal. Havet is a disciple of Cousin, and maintains at once the scepticism and the dogmatism of Pascal, and reconciles the contradiction by means of his Jansenism.

We shall say a few words of two charming little volumes, published by Professor J. J. Astié of Lausanne, 1857. This edition owes its existence to two remarks of St Beuve. The first is, that "Faugère's book, in its decomposed and perforated state, could no longer have any edifying effect upon the public; that Pascal's Thoughts, therefore, as a work of apologetics, had served their time." The second is, that every "epoch goes on making an edition for its own use." M. Astié then wished to make an edifying and popular book, and we think he has succeeded. He does not make use of the autograph manuscript, since he finds it in Faugère, but his aim is to make out Pascal's true plan, and he has a happy idea in taking for his guide the leading thought of Pascal's apologetics. We know that Pascal repeated with Peter Charron what Pope said, after these two moralists, "the true science and the true study of man, is man" (*Livre de la Sagesse*, li. Preface). Pascal's idea of Christianity was, then, that it is an adaptation to the moral wants of man. He did not wish to prove the divine truths by logic or metaphysics; these sciences did not appear to him to make a deep enough impression on the mind.

"When he had to confer with atheists," writes his sister Jacqueline, "he never began by dissecting, nor by establishing the principles of what he had to say; but he tried first to find out if they were seek-

* It is after the printed Memoirs of 1736 that Faugère has published this remarkable conversation. The readings are somewhat different.

ing the truth with their whole heart; and he acted accordingly with them, either in assisting them to find the light which they did not possess, if they were sincerely seeking it, or to dispose them to seek it and to make of it their most precious occupation before instructing them, if he wished their instruction to profit them.*

Voltaire's objection to Pascal's method is well known:—

"My great dispute with Pascal," says he, "is founded precisely on the ground-work of his book. He pretends that, in order to be true a religion must know human nature thoroughly, and be able to account for everything that passes in the heart. My opinion is, that a religion must not be examined in this manner, and that it is treating it like a system of philosophy. I think that all he has to do is to see whether this religion be revealed or not."

Faithful to the method of his master, M. Astié deviates from the order followed by M. Faugère, particularly in what concerns the place assigned by the latter to the people of Israel. In the plan of his book, M. Faugère puts it before the statement of the proofs of Christian doctrine, because "the old Testament goes before the New." But is it likely that Pascal meant to mix historical considerations with proofs of a quite different nature? Is it likely that just after analysing that strange being, called man, and crying, "if he falls down, I extol him; if he boasts, I throw him down," he would stop to give us a dissertation upon this history. We must, therefore, throw the historical proofs back to their own place, and treat first of Jesus Christ, "the Restorer of the Scripture."†

* Quoted by M. N. Recolin in his *Apologétique de Pascal* (Thesis, 1850), where he makes the following judicious remark:—"There are several sorts of apologetics in this apology: a moral, *internal* kind, by which the proof of Christianity is found in its adaptation to the wants of man; a *practical* kind which degenerates into asceticism, the aim of which is to give man a discipline by which he may be prepared to receive the Saviour; a *historical* sort, based upon the external evidences, which gives great value to the arguments drawn from the miracles and the prophecies. But what predominates in every one of these methods is the spiritual point of view. The apologist seeks rather to awaken a moral disposition than to convince" (p. 54).

† PLAN:—

1st Part.—*Misery of man without God.*

1. Need of knowledge.
2. " of righteousness.
3. " of happiness.
4. Greatness and misery of man.

2d Part.—*Felicity of Man with God.*

1. Character of true religion.
2. Means of reaching faith.
3. Jesus Christ.
4. Jewish people.
5. Miracles.
6. Types.
7. Prophecies.

The finest eulogium that could be given M. Astié's edition is what a mind of the same family with Pascal has bestowed on the editor: "We think we see," says he, "M. Vinet, were he among us (he who was the most intelligent and sympathetic interpreter that Pascal ever had), we think we see him, smiling on this edition which he has himself inspired, and which M. Astié has dedicated to his blessed memory: 'They have taken my Pascal from me,' said he, speaking of I forget which of the editions he knew; 'Pascal,' he would say, if he had this one in his hand, 'my Pascal has been given back to me.'"^{*}

We conclude by noticing Ch. Louandre's edition (1861). This editor has endeavoured to give a genuine version; he takes no part in the literary disputes about Pascal, and does not seek to find out his author's original plan. His notes, selected from the best writers on Pascal, are as scarce and short as those of Havet are numerous and long. He has summed up, in a special chapter, some hundred *Pensées* published since 1843, and given an epitome of the history of divers editions since 1669. Our list (which follows) of the works on Pascal was finished when we met with Louandre's on the same subject, and we rejoice in saying that both lists are identical as far as the year 1852. But since then seven important pamphlets or articles have been written which Louandre does not mention. Astié's edition is equally passed by. This shews how very little Protestant works are cared for in France among the savants.

WORKS TO BE CONSULTED ON PASCAL.

Recueil de plusieurs pièces pour servir à l'histoire de Port-Royal. Utrecht, 1740.

Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de Port-Royal et de la Mère Angelique. Utrecht, 1742.

Nicols. Eloge de Pascal.

(Bouiller) Sentiments de M. sur la Critique des Pensées de Pascal. 1741 and 1753.

Vie intéressante des religieuses de Port Royal. 1751.

Condorcet. Eloge de Pascal. 1776.

Voltaire. Remarques sur les Pensées de Pascal. Geneva, 1778.

Bosnut (Abbé). Discours sur la Vie et les Œuvres de Pascal, 5 v. 1779 and 1781.

Baillet. Vie de Descartes. II^e Partie, p. 330.

Chateaubriand. Génie du Christianisme. III^e Partie. Liv. ii. chap 6. Paris, 1802.

A. Dumesnil. Eloge de Pascal. Paris, 1813.

Raymond. Eloge de Pascal avec notes. Lyon, 1816.

Mennier. Essai sur Pascal. Paris, 1822.

Villemain. Pascal comme écrivain et comme Moraliste (Discours et Méditations). Paris, 1823.

Cousin. Journal des Savants, p. 554. Paris, 1839.

Cousin. Bibliothèque de l'Ecole de Chartes. Paris, 1842.

* L. Vulliemin. *Revue Chrétienne*, 1857, p. 678.

Cousin. Sur la nécessité d'une nouvelle Edition des Pensées. Rapport à l'Académie française. (Paris, 1842.) Réimprimé avec Préface nouvelle. Paris, 1843.

Bordas-Demoulin. Eloge de Pascal. Concours de l'Académie. Paris, 1842.

Faugère. Idem id. Paris, 1842.

Villemain. Rapport sur le Concours. Paris, 1842.

Saint Beuve. Port-Royal. Liv. III. tom 2 et 3. Paris, 1842.

Ch. Nodier. Bulletin du Bibliophile. Pp. 107-108. Paris, 1843.

Flottes (Abbé). Etudes sur Pascal. 8^a Montpellier, 1843-45.

Vinet. Etudes sur Blaise Pascal. 8^a Paris, 1844-47.

Nizard. Littérature française. Influence de Descartes sur Pascal. T. ii. ch. 4. Paris, 1844.

Revue des deux Mondes. Du Scepticisme de Pascal. 1844-45.

A. Thomas. De Pascali; ou vero Scepticus fuerit? Thèse, 1844.

H. Martin. Histoire de France. Paris, 1845.

Cousin. Jacqueline Pascal. Paris, 1845.

Léat (Dr.) De l'Amulette de Pascal. Etude sous le Rapport de la Santé de ce grand homme à son génie. Paris, 1845.

Faugère. Lettres, Opuscules, &c., de Mme. Périer, &c. Paris, 1845.

Edinburgh Review. January Number. 1847.

F. Collet. Fait inédit de la Vie de Pascal in 8^o. Paris, 1848.

Lescœur. De la Méthode Philosophique de Pascal. 1850.

N. Recolin. Apologétique de Pascal. Thèse. Montauban, 1850.

Maynard (Abbé). Pascal. Sa Vie et son Caractère, ses écrits et son génie, 2 vols. in 8^o. 1850.

F. Chavannes. Revue de Théologie. T. viii. S. Rôle de l'autorité dans les Pensées). 1850.

Asté. Revue Chrétienne. La Méthode apologétique de Pascal peut seule renverser les arguments de J. J. Rousseau. 1854.

L. Vulliamin. Revue Chrét. Article sur l'Edition des Pensées par Asté. 1857.

Rambert. Pascal. Bibliothèque Universelle de Genève. (L'Apologétique de Pascal a fait son temps.) 1858.

E. Naville. Réponse. Même Revue. 1858.

E. Schérer. Quelques questions d'Apologétique à propos de l'article de Rambert et d'Ernest Naville. Nouvelle Revue Théol. vol. ii. Strasbourg, 1858.

E. de Pressensé. Deux récentes discussions sur l'Apologie de Pascal. (Réponse à Schérer.) Revue Chrétienne. Paris, 1858.

Gérusier. Littérature française.

Reuchlin. Pascal's Leben. Stuttgart, 1840.

Neander's Über die Geschichtliche Bedeutung der Pensées Pascal's für die Religions philosophie insbesondere. Berlin, 1847.

Kitto's Journ. Sac. Literat., translated by Rev. J. Tollock, p. 338. 1849.

ANALYSIS OF PASCAL'S "THOUGHTS" BY NEANDER:—

1. Disunion of human nature.
2. Faith, an immediate assurance of feeling upon which the whole life rests.
3. Distinction betwixt reasoning and intuition.
4. Intuitive certainty derived from the heart.
5. God reveals himself only to those who seek him.
6. God apprehended by the heart.
7. Right place assigned to the intellectual faculties. The point to a harmonious development of the whole man.

C. D. F.

ART. VIII.—*The Matter of Prophecy.**

THE likeness of the prophets to Moses, and their position in the old economy, determine the task with which they were charged. This was to maintain in its integrity the covenant relation of the people to God, and so to conduct and superintend that relation that it might work out the grand end of its institution, a preparation for the coming of Christ. Hence every thing is viewed by them in its bearings upon that fundamental covenant. It is theirs to develop to the understanding of the people their obligations and privileges arising out of their special relation to God, the fatal consequences which would ensue from its abandonment or neglect, and the glorious issue which God designed to effect for them and for the world by means of it. As they were the authorized expounders of the purposes of God touching a plan still in progress, their communications largely concerned events which were yet future. It was given to them to anticipate the further unfoldings of the divine plan of grace, and to announce what the Most High had in store for Israel and for the world.

The predictions of the prophets are of course qualified and shaped by their grand aim as just exhibited. They are consequently not anticipations of future events selected at random, nor revelations of what was to take place hereafter considered as such; any more than the sacred history is a chance record of the past, in which any thing that has ever occurred might with equal readiness have found a place. All clusters about the covenant of mercy, the gracious scheme of salvation which God was conducting amongst men. The true prophecy differs from the disclosures of the future pretended to by heathen seers, as much as the true miracle does from useless and isolated prodigies. As the miracle is more than a mere wonder of superhuman power, prophecy is likewise more than a wonder of superhuman foresight. The end is in neither case the exhibition of the supernatural. This is but a means, and must be determined in its character and the extent of its employment by the end to which it was subordinated. Inasmuch, therefore, as prophecy was not a field for the display of supernatural prescience, but an agency for the furtherance of a divine plan, it must itself be methodical and form a related system. Its seat was the chosen people, its end the salvation of Christ, Rev. xix. 10; and to this end it worked its way by gradual approaches.

The prophetic disclosures of the future may be classed under three heads, viz. 1. The coming fortunes of the covenant people, or its individual members; 2. Those of Gentile nations; and 3. Messianic prophecies. The Mosaic covenant

* From the *Princeton Review*, Oct. 1862.—ED. B. & F. B. R.

is the polestar from which each of these takes its direction ; and each is made to do its part in the instruction and training of the people.

In regard to the first theme, it is shewn how the violated covenant shall in every instance be avenged upon transgressors, while the divine blessing shall attend the faithful and obedient. The prophets point out in numberless cases, as divine prescience alone could enable them to do, the particular form of chastisement which could be inflicted for given acts of transgression, or indicate the exact blessing to be expected if a hearty obedience be yielded. The evident aim of these revelations is to render the people steadfast in their adherence to the fundamental covenant, and to deter them from its violation.

In the predictions respecting Gentile nations these are contemplated as aliens to the covenant, and as enemies of it. For, as a general rule, with few if any exceptions, no prophecy is directed against any foreign power except on the ground of avowed and active hostility to the people of God. As nothing is more fixed in the divine counsels than the triumph of this scheme of grace, all who set themselves in opposition to it must be overthrown. The prosperity of the heathen must, therefore, be temporary, and be succeeded by their utter fall and ruin, except as they shall ultimately yield to this gracious covenant and share its blessings. This is repeatedly exemplified by detailed exhibitions of the fate awaiting various nations. These revelations were not made for the benefit of those nations themselves. It does not appear that they were commonly even sent to them, or their existence made known to them. It was for the instruction of the covenant people that these prophecies were uttered. And hence the prophet Isaiah (i. 1.) entitles his book a vision concerning Judah and Jerusalem, although it contains several chapters of predictions respecting a number of other nations. These prophecies relating to the heathen were particularly designed, 1. To teach the people of God that Jehovah was not like the imaginary gods of the pagans, a local or national deity, but the governor of the whole world, who by his omniscience foresaw, and by his almighty providence controlled, all the affairs of all mankind. 2. That the principles of his administration were everywhere the same, and everywhere those of perfect rectitude. Sin should be punished wherever it was found. 3. To counteract the temptation to despondency and unbelief, arising from the splendour and power of heathen kingdoms as contrasted with the humble and often suffering condition of the worshippers of the true God. It was not the superior power of their idol deities which raised them to their affluence and prosperity while Israel was weak. But Jehovah raised them up, and was accomplishing his own

purposes by them. As soon as these were fulfilled they would be overturned, and the kingdom given to the righteous Ruler, who was to proceed from the midst of Israel. 4. The covenant would accomplish its end, even with respect to them. The original design of its establishment was (Gen. xii. 3), that all families of the earth might be blessed. Broken as the heathen were to be by judgment, a remnant would finally seek the Lord, and share with Israel the blessings of his grace.

Messianic prophecies are those which relate to the person and work of the great Redeemer, who is called Messiah, the Anointed, Dan. ix. 25, 26; Psalm ii. 2. Compare Isa. lxi. 1. He is the end of the Mosaic covenant, to prepare for whose coming it was instituted, and in the glory of whose reign it shall find its consummation. Then all the ideas which it exhibited in outline, or in imperfect forms, shall have a complete and adequate realisation; then all the wants and deficiencies which were developed during the operation of the old economy shall be abundantly made up and supplied. The doctrine of a Messiah is peculiar to the religion of Israel, of which it thus forms a most essential part. Heathen antiquity preserved among its traditions the memory of a golden age; but it neither knew nor dreamed of its return in the future, except as the hint was gathered directly or indirectly from the Hebrew Scriptures. It is also not a doctrine of the false prophets, but only of those who were truly inspired by him who established the old economy. The former, in prophesying smooth things, confine their promises of good entirely to the proximate future.

This class of prophecies was calculated and designed to answer a number of important ends,* in the experience both of those who lived before, and those who lived after the advent. As respects the former, they contributed.

1. To their encouragement and steadfastness in times of outward depression and trial. The people were thus assured that God's plan of grace was not contingent, but fixed and sure, and that it had not been abandoned nor suspended, as their sufferings and their sins might tempt them despondently to imagine. However oppressed and downtrodden Israel may at any time be, they shall not be suffered to perish, nor shall the aim of their selection as the people of God be frustrated, but every word of promise made to them and to their fathers shall certainly be fulfilled. This same end was accomplished, to a certain extent, by predictions of inferior blessings and of deliverances nearer at hand. But even these are often blended with or merged into Messianic hopes. These latter were in-

* See Reinke Beiträge, II., p. 9, &c. Hengstenberg's Christologie, III. 2, p. 1, &c.

deed misunderstood or misinterpreted by the carnal portion of the people, who thought only of an external worldly splendour, and lost sight of the true spiritual glory of the Messiah. But in spite of this, they were not without their use for those who thus perverted or failed to apprehend them; for they still tended to preserve, in at least an outward adherence to their covenant obligations, such as could only be attracted by the sensible and the outward.

2. They removed the temptation to unbelief, arising from the glaring contrast in Israel themselves, between what they were by the promise and appointment of God, and what they were in actual fact. They were the people of God, with whom he had entered into solemn covenant at Sinai, and yet how far actual appearances seemed to disprove the existence of any such relation! Could they be under Almighty protection, who were lorded over by the servants of impotent idols? Could they be his peculiar people, his holy nation, among whom iniquity so abounded? The seeming contradiction is resolved by pointing to the Messianic future. The present state of things was but temporary. The covenant had but imperfectly done its work as yet. It would one day achieve all that it was designed or could be expected to accomplish. And the people of God would then be, both in outward state and in inward character, all that the people of the infinitely glorious Jehovah should be.

3. They were powerful aids and incentives to holiness, by keeping before the minds of the people their true ideal. Under the sway of the Messiah, the requirements of the covenant would be fully recognised and obeyed. To exhibit Israel as they were then to be, was to set forth a model for present imitation, and to reveal the pressure of obligations which already existed; and this might be expected to be the more effective, inasmuch as all participation in the blessings of that period was suspended upon the possession of the requisite character, while others were to be visited by a heavy condemnation.

4. They tended to repress that pride, which the possession of superior privileges is so apt to engender, by shewing the temporary nature of their superiority and the end of its bestowment. They were thus blessed, not because they were better than others, nor in order that they might be exalted above others, but that others might be blessed in them. That with which they were put in trust was for the benefit of the world, and the existing restriction was for the sake of an ultimate and universal diffusion. The necessity of such a check is shewn by the fact, that even in spite of it the majority fell into the error which it was designed to counteract, indulging a vain conceit of the inherent superiority of the Jews to other

nations, and regarding the favour of God as theirs by a perpetual and exclusive right.

5. They held up ever afresh, and under those aspects which were at each time most needed and most impressive, the great object of saving faith and hope, the true Mediator between God and man, the only availing offering for sin. How far Messiah was understood and accepted in this character, particularly in the early stages of the Old Testament revelation, cannot now perhaps be certainly determined. It is, however, clearly taught that he was the true ground of the forgiveness of sins under the old economy, however imperfectly this may have been apprehended by the penitent believer. Rom. iii. 25.

6. Another most important end of these prophecies was to afford sure marks for the recognition of Messiah, when he should appear. They did thus lead to Jesus great numbers of those who were waiting for the consolation of Israel. They were constantly appealed to for this purpose by our Lord and his apostles, who rested his claims upon their authority, and bid the people search the Scriptures, for they were they that testified of him.

7. Now that Messiah has long since come, the exact fulfilment of these as well as other prophecies, is an irrefragable argument of their divine origin, of the divinity of the Old Testament religion, and of the divinity of Christianity; while they afford, likewise, an insight into the method pursued by God in making known to men his scheme of grace, and preparing for its complete introduction. And they shew how every thing centred in Christ from the very beginning, leading us thus to prize and exalt him more, as well as thankfully to adore the ways of God.

There is a sense, having inspired authority for its correctness (Acts iii. 24), in which every prophecy uttered under the Old Testament may be said to have been Messianic. The entire Old Testament is the record of the divine scheme of preparation for Christ's coming, and nothing was admitted into it which did not belong to this scheme, and which consequently was not in some way, direct or indirect, evident or obscure, immediate or remote, related to the common end of the whole. Every prophecy of the overthrow of a hostile heathen power indicated the removal of an obstruction and an antagonist to Messiah's universal sway. Every prophecy of good to Israel was a foretaste and type of the blessings which Messiah was to bring, and these are frequently so blended in the description with the antitype, that it is impossible to separate them, and to distinguish with precision those expressions which are to be referred to inferior mercies, close at hand, from those which relate to the ultimate good things of Messiah's days.

In the more restricted and usual sense, however, those prophecies only are called Messianic in which distinct and explicit mention is made either of Messiah's person, or of the results which he was to accomplish by his coming. There are several criteria by which such prophecies may be distinguished.

1. Their correspondence with the event. Prophecies evidently and exclusively fulfilled in the Messiah, must have been spoken of him. If a person is described as possessing attributes which belong only to Christ, or performing works such as he only has performed; or if any thing is described which is characteristic of the dispensation he was to introduce, this is beyond a doubt Messianic, whatever the immediate connection in which it may stand. Thus when Isaiah (ix. 6) describes a child as born, who was yet the mighty God, or (chap. liii.) speaks of a servant of God who offered himself a vicarious sacrifice for the sins of men; and Zechariah (ix. 9, 10) speaks of the king of Jerusalem entering it upon an ass, who shall exercise a universal dominion; or (xiii. 7) of the man, Jehovah's fellow, smitten with the sword; and Micah (iv. 1-4), of the submission of all nations to the law proceeding from Zion, and the consequent cessation of war and strife—these have been or are to be fulfilled in Christ, and are inapplicable to any other subject.

2. The analogy of other prophecies. A prophecy, which might be in itself of doubtful signification, will be determined to be Messianic, if it be so connected with another known to be such, that both evidently relate to the same subject, or if it ascribe to its subject attributes or works which the analogy of prophecy determines to be peculiar to the Messiah, or to the period following his advent, or if it contain expressions and forms of speech which are characteristically Messianic. Thus, even if it were possible, as rationalists allege, to explain the child Immanuel given as a pledge of deliverance from the Syrians (Isa. vii. 14) of another than Christ, every other reference would be precluded by the subsequent allusions to this same child (Isa. ix. 6, 11), where Christ must beyond question be intended. That it is Messiah who is spoken of (Zech. iii. 8) as the Branch, is proved by vi. 12, where the same name is applied to him "who shall be a priest upon his throne;" and this creates a strong presumption that the Branch of the Lord (Isa. iv. 2) is to be understood in the same way. The prediction (Isa. xix. 18-25) of an altar to the Lord in the land of Egypt, of the cordial alliance between Egypt and Assyria, and their union with Israel in covenant privileges, must relate to the Messianic period, because the conversion of the Gentiles and universal peace are in all the prophets represented to be characteristic of that period. The invasion of Gog and Magog,

(Ezek. xxxviii. 16), and the final return of Israel to God, (Hosea iii. 5), are to take place in "the latter days;" this expression, being a standing designation of the times of the Messiah, fixes this as the period of fulfilment.

3. The testimony of the New Testament. If our Lord or the apostles or evangelists unequivocally declare any prophecy to apply to Christ, this infallibly determines its meaning. Thus, when Jesus in the synagogue at Nazareth cited Isaiah lxi. 1, 2, as fulfilled in himself (Luke iv. 18, 19), or declared to the Pharisees (Matt. xxii. 43) that David spoke of him in the 110th psalm; and Philip, acting under the direction of the Spirit of God, preached Jesus to the eunuch from the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, (Acts viii. 35); and Matthew adduces the prediction (Zech. xi. 12, 13) of the thirty pieces of silver paid as the price of the Good Shepherd, and asserts that it was fulfilled in the reward of Judas's betrayal (Matt. xxvii. 9).

It is important, however, in the application of this criterion, that a meaning be not attributed to these inspired authorities which their words do not properly contain. It is only when they design to give a real exposition of the prophecy, that we are authorised to infer its meaning from the use which they make of it. They sometimes employ the familiar words of the Old Testament in application to a subject of which they are treating, without designing to intimate that this was in the thoughts of the writer, or is the proper sense of the passage in its original connection. Thus, when Paul (Rom. x. 18) adopts the language of Psalm xix. 4, "their sound went into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world," in describing the universality of the gospel offer, he is not to be understood as deciding that this is the subject of the psalm. He merely declares that what David there says of the revelation of God by the material heavens, is true of the proclamation of the gospel; both are addressed to all men without restriction. So when our Lord says (Matt. xiii. 14) that the prophecy of Esaias, "Hearing ye shall hear, and shall not understand" (Isa. vi. 9), was fulfilled in his own generation, his meaning is that the words of the prophet have a fresh application to them, are as appropriate to them as to those of whom they were originally spoken.

Again, the declaration of the sacred writers, that a prophecy finds actual fulfilment in a given person or event, does not necessarily shew that it is, when interpreted in its original connection, to be restricted to that single application. That must of course be included within its proper scope, but the prophecy itself may have a much more extensive signification. Thus, when Matthew says (viii. 17), that Christ's miracles of healing

were wrought in fulfilment of Isaiah liii. 4, "Himself took our infirmities and bare our sicknesses," he does not thereby limit the meaning of the prophet to this particular sense, or deny that his words were intended to describe the entire redeeming work of Christ and his vicarious atonement. His miraculous cures of bodily disorders were performed in his capacity as Redeemer, and were signs and pledges of whatever it was his design to accomplish besides. As such, they properly fall, agreeably to the statement of the evangelist, within the broader compass of the prophet's meaning. So, when it is said (John xix. 36), that "a bone of him shall not be broken" (Exod. xii. 46) was fulfilled in the history of the crucifixion, this does not hinder but that those words in their original connection relate to the paschal lamb; that lamb, however, being typical of Christ, the apostle remarks upon the coincidence between the type and the antitype; what was enjoined in regard to the one was fulfilled in the case of the other. So again Matthew, ii. 15, quotes Hosea xi. 1, "Out of Egypt have I called my son," as fulfilled in the fortunes of the infant Saviour. As spoken by Hosea they have immediate relation to the exodus of Israel from Egypt. But Israel, as the son of God, was a type of Christ, his only begotten Son; and the evangelist directs the attention of his readers to the fact that the history of the type is repeated in the antitype. Israel was, in the infancy of the people, rescued from a tyranny which threatened his destruction, and was brought safely out of Egypt. God's own Son had a similar destiny. He was in his infancy exposed to a tyrant's persecution, and by divine interposition rescued from it. The same principle of the divine procedure marked both cases in allowing the malignity of man to display itself against the object of heavenly love. And the land of Egypt was to both a scene of the same paternal interference.

4. The history of prophetic interpretation. If a passage has prevailingly been referred to Christ from the earliest periods, among both Jews and Christians, this affords a strong presumptive proof that such reference is correct. The presumption thus gained rests not barely upon the concurrent judgment of many able minds, in different ages, but upon the promised guidance of the Spirit, which gives a real insight into the meaning of Scripture, though it does not secure against error in the exposition of individual passages; and in the case of very ancient explanations, it is neither impossible nor improbable that they may sometimes rest upon a tradition springing from an inspired source. The strength of the argument derived from Jewish usage is increased when the interpretation so supported is at variance with the prevailing prejudices and carnal expectations of the people, as when passages descriptive of Messiah's

humiliation and sufferings are admitted to refer to him. In this class of predictions particularly, the more modern Jewish authorities are apt to deviate from those of earlier date, by attributing them to another subject than the Messiah. This is done in order to evade the force of the arguments drawn hence by Christians for the Messiahship of Jesus.

The Messianic quality, whether this be directly or indirectly exhibited, is the most important characteristic of the instructions of the prophets, and that by which their interest and value is chiefly determined. Their predictions of Christ are not detached and isolated utterances, standing by themselves, and having little to do with the rest of their communications. These form really the centre and the heart of every prophetic ministry. Other revelations are subordinated to these, grow out of them, or are arranged around them. Belonging as the prophets do to a great scheme of preparation for the coming of Christ, that which determines the relative position and rank of each is the function which they severally perform in regard to this common task of the whole; and it is this which gives its consistency to each individual ministry. The work allotted to any particular prophet in the plan of God must be estimated from this point. The ministry of each prophet may thus be received as a unit, designed to accomplish a particular result, to take a given part in the training of the people toward their predestined end, and entering as an individual member into the great whole of the entire body of prophetic communication, all of which, though distributed among different organs, acting without mutual concert or combination, forms yet in the design of God one connected and related system, appointed to discharge its own proper office in the general scheme of the Old-Testament economy.

We thus arrive at the idea, not merely of the harmony of prophecy, the consistency of the revelations made by all the various prophets, but its unity, and that not as an aggregate of independent masses, but an organic whole made up of concurrent and related members, a carefully-contrived and well-ordered system. The one plan of God directs and animates the whole. Individual prophets are the agents of his Spirit working in unison as they are sent by him, executing each his different task, but all belonging to the same general scheme, Christ being the end of the whole, and the key to each individual part.

Looking at the subject from this comprehensive point of view, we may trace certain general features of the plan of prophetic communication.

(1.) The first is its gradual and progressive character. The early revelations respecting Christ were of the nature of out-

lines; these were in later times gradually filled up, their obscurities removed, and whatever was lacking supplied. The promise to our first parents contained no more than the general idea of redemption, a victory over the tempter as the end of a painful struggle, the serpent's head crushed at the cost of a bruised heel. But there was a gradual progress from this point until the person and character of the Redeemer, and the nature and success of his work were distinctly brought to view. Trait after trait was added, and line after line, until all that was made known, which it was thought proper to disclose before the personal appearance of the Word made flesh.

This gradual unfolding, it is here to be observed, was neither demanded nor conditioned by any original and absolute necessity. While it is true that the possible extent of divine revelation is limited by the receptive capacity of those to whom it is made, there is nothing in the latest Scripture which might not have been made intelligible to the earliest generation of men, had God chosen to communicate it to them. The progressive character of prophecy arose simply out of the plan which, though marked as all God's plans are, by consummate wisdom, was freely adopted by the Infinite Spirit, as that by which he should conduct his revelation of mercy. As this was a plan of training for Israel and the world, it naturally carried with it that the simpler lessons should be first communicated, and that when these had been sufficiently illustrated and enforced, they should be followed by others which were more advanced.

In the actual conduct of this scheme it does not advance with mechanical regularity, and a uniform rate of progress, each prophet taking up the thread of instruction at the point where it was dropped by his predecessor, and carrying it an even number of paces, to surrender it to him that comes after. With all the general consistency of the scheme, the freedom of the divine Spirit, who bloweth where he listeth, asserts itself here, by making whom he will, and to whatever extent he pleases, the bearer of his messages. The respective fulness of the Messianic revelations is by no means graduated carefully by their chronological order. Each has a fitness to his place; but this does not in all cases arise from his going in all things beyond his predecessors. We do not learn more of Christ from Haggai than from Isaiah, from Nahum than from Joel. One prophet may even be commissioned to reveal some particular aspect of the truth, with a distinctness greatly beyond that attained by any who have succeeded him. Thus Isaiah speaks of the atoning death of Christ, and Jeremiah of the new covenant to supersede the vainishing one of Sinai, with a clearness equalled by no subsequent prophet. The advance, which is on the whole

manifest and undeniable, is not that of a dead mechanical progress, but is conducted with that free variety which belongs to the actings of an intelligent mind.

(2.) The revelations of prophecy are often related to contemporaneous or antecedent types, and derive from them, to a greater or less extent, their matter or their form. The progress of prophetic communication, which is thus on the one hand determined by the general plan of God, and modified by the free actings of that Spirit who giveth no account of any of his matters, is on the other hand conditioned in some measure by the history of the chosen people, who were the theatre of these revelations. God was conducting, by his revealing Spirit and by his gracious providence, two co-ordinate lines of preparation for the advent of his Son. While by his predictive word he pointed forward to his coming, and described with growing clearness the design and results of his mission, he seconded these instructions by his providence, raising up and placing before the minds of the people types and images, to represent to them the coming Saviour, and to prepare them to appreciate and welcome him at his appearing. These two schemes of instruction by prophecy and by historical types, while in a manner distinct and separately conducted, yet from being carried on contemporaneously, acquire a general correspondence, and their lessons are often interwoven. Accordingly, prophecy not unfrequently borrows its lessons from them. Thus, after Moses had been raised up and set before the people as the exemplar of the prophetic order, Christ was for the first time predicted as a prophet like unto him. Deut. xviii. 18. It was not until Saul's persecution of David had afforded the example of God's anointed suffering as such, and without fault of his own, and David's subsequent ascent of the throne gave a specimen of the true theocratic king, that the sufferings and the kingdom of Christ were made the subject of prophecy in the Messianic psalms. The sway of Solomon presented a new type, and the spirit of prophecy unfolded it in Psalm lxxii. Israel, God's servant, appointed to spread the knowledge of his name, suffering in Babylon, and restored by Cyrus, stood in a typical relation, [which Isaiah develops, (chaps. xl-xlvi.)] The idea of a universal empire was first represented in that of Babylon, and then Daniel was inspired to foretell that empire, absolutely without limit or end, which was to rise upon the ruins of this great monarchy and its successors, (chaps. ii, vii). The approaching repeopleing of the land, and the restoration of the temple and its ritual, were types which suggested and gave their meaning to Ezekiel's prophecies (chap. xl-xlviii). The actual rebuilding of the temple, under the joint direction of Zerubbabel, descended from David's line, and Joshua the high

priest, gave occasion to Zechariah to predict the union of the royal and the sacerdotal offices in Him who was to build God's true temple (vi. 13). While this obvious relation existing between prophecies and types should not be overlooked, neither should it be exaggerated beyond its true limits. This is done by Hofmann,* when he claims that the former are in all cases based upon the latter, the revelations of both being in each successive period precisely co-extensive, and God never foretelling anything by the mouth of the prophets, unless the fundamental idea had first been woven into the history of the people, and represented to them in the form of a type. The office of prophecy is thus reduced simply to the infallible detection and interpretation of co-existing types. There is, however, no warrant for such a limitation of its function; and the precise equipoise of prophecies and types, which it assumes as uniform at all times, does not in fact exist. The intimations of the future existing in the types, and the more perfect disclosures granted to the prophets, were graduated by the sovereign pleasure of Him who was the author of both. And though, as co-ordinate lines of instruction, addressed to the same people and directed to the same end, there are manifold correspondences between them, there is no absolute coincidence.

(3.) The prophetic communications of each successive period were adapted to the special wants of the people then existing. Besides the general end which they were all intended and adapted to subserve in the preparation for Messiah's coming, they had a special purpose to answer in the direction and the salvation of each successive generation to which they were severally addressed. Each generation of the people needed counsel specifically adapted to their own emergencies, which were different, in some respects, both from those of their predecessors and their successors. They needed to be warned against those particular forms of transgression to which they were immediately tempted, and supported under those trials by which they were peculiarly pressed. Their circumstances and their spiritual wants suggested those aspects of the truth, and those forms of communicating and expressing it, which would prove to them most impressive and beneficial. At the same time, this special adaptation to times and seasons is not only managed without prejudice to the general plan of the whole, but it really forms the method by which the latter advances; not indeed with regularly measured steps, but by sure and constant approaches to its destined end. The prophetic exhibition of Christ is accomplished by successive teachings, each suited to its own age and its own special design, but all combining

* Hofmann, *Weissagung und Erfüllung*.

to produce the general effect. The prophets may thus be likened to a grand orchestra. Each musician plays a part adapted to his own particular instrument, which taken by itself is designed to give a particular effect to the piece; and yet they are attuned in such precise harmony, and so contrived with reference to the various possibilities of the melody, that combined upon the oratorio of the Messiah, they bring out, as could in no other way be done, the full power of that magnificent production. The necessities of one period call for the presentation of the coming Saviour and his work under one point of view; those of other periods lead to the contemplation of them from different sides. And the necessities of the people, as they arise in the progress of their history, are themselves accommodated to the grand end to be accomplished, being of such a variety and character, that the instructions which they demand may complete the total of the revelations to be made respecting Messiah before his advent.

To the present corruption of the people, the prophets oppose the time when Jerusalem and its inhabitants shall be holy; to the sinfulness of the princes, and their impotence before their foes, that king who shall reign in righteousness, and be a covert from the storm; to the humiliation and oppression of Zion, her future triumph and glory; to the disastrous schism of Judah and Israel, the period of their complete reunion. When Judah were in apprehension from Syria, Isaiah reassures them by the promise of the birth of Immanuel. As a pledge of deliverance from Assyria, he points to the child that is born, and the Son that is given, whose name is Wonderful. In the foresight of Judah's captivity he shows how the great Head of his people must likewise pass through sorrow and humiliation to his glorious reward. Jeremiah predicts the loss of the ark, but speaks of the time when it would be no longer missed from the new effulgence of the divine manifestations; the approaching temporary interruption of the royal and sacerdotal offices gives him occasion to speak of him in whom they would be perpetual. When the predicted seventy years had brought about the period of the expected restoration, Daniel foretells that seventy weeks shall intervene before the advent of the great Restorer. The exiles are consoled for the meanness of the structure they had reared, as compared with Solomon's more splendid temple, by the promise from the mouth of Haggai, that this house should be filled with the divine glory in a higher sense than that which preceded it. Malachi warns the carnally secure of his coming, who should sit as a refiner and purifier of silver.

The conception of the Messiah, thus various enlarged from time to time, is not to be confounded with the accidental growth of a merely human idea, which has its birth in the mind of

men, and is the product of the circumstances which surround them. All that has the appearance of being casual and contingent arises from the divine adaptation of the instructions relating to the Messiah to the varying wants of those who were to be thus gradually trained to a proper apprehension of his character. With all the seeming divergence in the modes of his presentation by the different prophets, and the apparent inconsistency even of the characters separately ascribed to him, the fact that they all meet in Jesus Christ, and are seen, by the key furnished by his wonderful person, to be in perfect harmony with one another, shews beyond question that all this sprang from the mind of one who knew the end from the beginning.

(4) The prophets often largely adopt both the ideas and language of antecedent revelations. There is the same free variety here as in other features of the scheme which we are considering. The relation referred to sometimes consists in a resumption and further unfolding of the same themes. Thus, as an ancient prophecy approaches the time of its fulfilment, it may be reproduced with new enlargement and additional emphasis. Or an idea which is only faintly suggested by one prophet, may be expanded more and more by those who follow after, until it attains a magnitude and is invested with an importance such as could scarcely have been anticipated from its earliest form. A prophecy may be repeated in precise words from another prophet (compare Isa. ii. 2-4, Micah iv. 1-3), or with the adoption of much of its language it may be freely modified in form and arrangement, and receive large additions. Compare Jer. lxi. 7, &c. and Obadiah; Jer. xlviii. and Isa. xvi. This may even be done with application to a new subject, as in the book of Revelation the fall of the great Antichristian power is described in terms which are largely borrowed from the Old Testament predictions of the overthrow of Babylon. It is really an old enemy revived in a new dress, and the spirit of the ancient prophecy demands its destruction. Figures and symbols are likewise freely borrowed, *e. g.*, the symbols of Ezekiel's visions and of that of Zechariah are chiefly drawn from the Levitical institutions or the ritual. Or the coincidence with antecedent revelations may be found principally in isolated phrases and in allusions to expressions and forms of speech. All this may appear in one form in one prophet, and in another form in another, and to a quite different extent in different prophets.

Some of the older writers thought it necessary to assume in all these cases an entire independence of one writer upon another, and that the words, even where they might be precisely the same through long periods, were directly suggested by the

Holy Spirit to the minds of both. Others of later date, less careful of the credit of the prophets, or of the perfection of their inspiration, have charged these coincidences to servile imitation, and a want of originality on the part of the borrower ; as though, unable to mark out a new course of thought for himself, he was content with a tame repetition of what had been already said before. Neither of these opinions is well founded. The true doctrine of the inspiration of the prophets does not deny, but affirms the continued operation of the natural powers of their own minds, only elevated, assisted, and preserved from all error, both in the matter and the form of their communications. The familiar words of earlier scriptures would offer themselves no less readily to them because of their inspiration ; in fact, there were special reasons why they should be chosen in preference. Words of the Spirit, in his earlier revelations, flow naturally from the mouth of the organs of the same Spirit in later times. It is a mark of their oneness, an external sign of their inward unison. It serves to link them all together as parts of the same continuous revelation. It is a recognition of the authority of their predecessors, by which later prophets give the sanction of their own inspiration to earlier predictions, and likewise draw sanction from them for their own. At the same time, this gradual disclosure of future events, or gradual unfolding of the same truths by successive instruments, each delivering all that was given him to deliver, while yet the earliest outline implicitly involves all that was to come after, shews that the prophets were conducting a scheme which, so far from originating, they only themselves partially comprehended. The mind which draughted the early suggestions, which are so carefully and accurately expressed, must have been at the same time conscious of the idea in its full and final form, and have designed these later evolutions of it. In other words, the infinite intelligence of God must have both sketched the entire scheme, and assigned to each prophet his particular part in carrying it forward.

An incidental advantage of some importance arising from this relation of the sacred writers to those who have preceded them, is the evidence it affords of the canonicity and genuineness of the earlier books of Scripture. There can be no better evidence that a book was in existence and was regarded as of divine authority, than the fact of its being quoted or alluded to as such. Thus, in addition to other incontestable arguments in favour of the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch, one of great force may be derived from this indirect but sure testimony to its existence in all the subsequent inspired writings. Its impress is indelibly left upon the entire history and literature of the chosen people. The facts of the Pentateuch are everywhere assumed, its institutions shewn to be in operation, and its language cited or referred

to in a manner and to an extent which places its existence and authority beyond reasonable contradiction. The testimony rendered in its favour by Hosea, Amos, and Micah, has been exhibited in detail by Hengstenberg and by Caspari, and may serve as illustrations of this method of argument and specimens of the fulness of evidence bearing upon this point which the prophetic writings afford. A like defence may be made, and in fact has been made, by other writers, of the disputed chapters in Isaiah, which are used by Jeremiah and other prophets with the same frequency and freedom as his unquestioned writings.

This method of argument has, however, been pushed both by the advocates and the opponents of the genuineness of the inspired writings to an extravagance and excess which is little suited to win favour from sober minds. The coincidence of two writers upon a single expression, or a few isolated expressions, may leave it quite doubtful which was the original, or which borrowed from the other. And the attempt to settle all such cases with absolute precision by fixed rules, in themselves of doubtful truth or applicability, *e. g.*, that the briefer form or the more difficult expression establishes priority, lead to arbitrary and insecure results, and such as no sane man would think of relying upon for a moment in the case of modern compositions. The fact is, that with all the apparent definiteness in the principles professed, there is so much that is indefinite in the phenomena themselves, and so much that may with equal plausibility be alleged on either side, that different critics will in the same case arrive at precisely opposite conclusions, and will prove from the same data a given writer to be earlier or later than another, according as they have predetermined to do.

Another abuse to which this relation has led, is that of critical alterations of the text with a view of bringing these parallel passages into more precise conformity. This has arisen from the failure to observe that when the prophets incorporate into their own discourses or writings the language of antecedent revelations, they do so with the full consciousness of their own equal inspiration, and consequently use entire freedom in modifying it to their immediate purpose. Minute variations where there is a general resemblance are not consequently to be referred to faulty transcription and one text corrected by the other. Both are original, and both alike authoritative and inspired. All experience shews how much more likely transcribers were to err in the opposite direction than in the one here assumed. The tendency is much stronger to assimilate texts which had originally a slight diversity, than to create or increase a divergence. The fact that these trifling variations have been perpetuated with such absolute uniformity, is an argument, therefore, not of error, but of the strictest accuracy.

ART. IX.—*Mr Russell's Letter to the Bishop of Oxford.*

A Letter to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Oxford, upon the Defence of the "Essays and Reviews" in the April number of the "Edinburgh Review," 1861. By the Rev. ARTHUR TOZER RUSSELL, B.C.L. of St John's College, Cambridge, and Vicar of Whaddon, Cambridgeshire. Cambridge, 1862.

THE controversy originated by the publication of "*Essays and Reviews*" has by no means died out, nor do we see any likelihood of its early extinction. The suits still pending in the Court of Arches, presided over by Dr Lushington, keep alive both the literary and the ecclesiastical excitement occasioned by this new irruption of heresy, or rather infidelity, upon the English Church; and in whatever way these suits may terminate, the excitement will probably be greatly increased. If the essayists and reviewers are virtually or formally condemned, a whole host of sympathizers, both outside the church and within, will start up to defend them, or even to cast in their lot with them, as brave, outspoken, and persecuted men. If, on the other hand, the decision of the ecclesiastical judge be of such a nature as to shield them in their position within the Church of England, the friends of scriptural truth in that church will feel called upon afresh to vindicate the faith against the assaults of internal enemies that carry on the war with legal impunity.

The existing controversy cannot, indeed, stop at present, or at an early date, but must go on to its natural close, and will have, we trust, a triumphant issue. The gauntlet having been boldly flung down by divines and dignitaries of the Church of England who challenge the received doctrines of the Bible, and strike at the very foundations of the Christian religion, the summons to the conflict cannot be disregarded by the friends of divine truth; and the battle, so defiantly provoked, must be fought out to the last. Nobly has that battle already been kept up by many well-accredited champions. The "*Essays and Reviews*" have received abler and more elaborate answers than, from their intrinsic merits, they deserve. Though the objections and arguments they contain are even to the common eye obviously trite and superficial, or sophistical and inconclusive, their authors have been formally encountered and decisively vanquished on their own ground, and with their own weapons, by a number of learned and able opponents. Yet the errors and heresies they have ventilated, and the unclean spirit they have cast abroad over the land, have told to a large extent upon the English press and people. An infidel poison is at work both in the church and in general

society, producing symptoms of a sinister kind, and threatening the most deadly consequences. The professed opponents of Christianity rejoice in what they call a new accession of strength to their numbers and their arguments, while many alarmed and anxious friends have been trembling for the citadel of the faith.

We have no wish to add to that alarm, or to exaggerate the danger of the assaults that have come from enemies in the guise of friends. We are well aware that the heart of the Christian people of England is sound; that the recognised heads of the English Church are, with scarcely an exception, the defenders of scriptural orthodoxy; and that the common sense and honourable feeling of the country have revolted from the treachery and dishonesty of the essayists and reviewers. The Bible, and the great doctrines of the Bible, are, by the great majority of all denominations, more prized, if possible, than ever. But there is not the less need of vigilance, zeal, and controversial power on the part of those to whom we look as champions of the faith. It must be remembered that the "*Essays and Reviews*" have had an enormous circulation, that they are written with considerable literary skill, that they have all the air of new and important contributions to truth, and that their influence among many classes, and in various quarters, is undoubted and decidedly pernicious. Though the work itself, therefore, has been refuted over and over again, yet its fruits, literary and moral, of doctrine and of practice, must be constantly detected and exposed; the new advocates of its views must be encountered wherever they spring up; and thus the controversy, as a painful necessity, must be carried on for the vindication of truth and the exposure of error.

The publication of Bishop Colenso's work on the Pentateuch cannot fail to form a new element of strife, and to add fresh keenness to the existing warfare. That work, superficial as it is, and destitute of real learning, is eagerly welcomed by the rationalizing portion of the English clergy, and is sure to be largely circulated in quarters where it is fitted to do most harm. Another apparent triumph is given to the vaunted friends of intellectual freedom and theological progress; another great scandal offends the moral sense of all who are zealous for the honour of God's word, and expect common honesty in the conduct of dignitaries of the English Church. Bishop Colenso has done his best to pour oil upon the flame of controversy, and to give that flame a still more destructive character. He has made a burnt-offering of the Pentateuch, and is doubtless ready to treat a large portion of the other Scriptures in a similar way. What will be the immediate consequences of the step he has taken, it is yet impossible to tell. Convocation will censure

his book, and possibly condemn its author; but it is said that, in the present state of the law, the Episcopal offender can promise himself comparative impunity. Meanwhile, by the moral verdict of all intelligent defenders of the Pentateuch, he will be deposed and deprived, though, by a host of sympathizers, he will probably be hailed as bishop and martyr in foreign parts.

It is generally affirmed that this movement, of which the "Essays and Reviews" are but an index or sign, is the natural and expected reaction against the great Tractarian movement which reached its height some years ago. There is, of course, much truth in this, but it seems to fall short of a full statement of the case. There is at all times a proneness on the part of those who know not, or who reject the gospel in its saving power, to fall into dangerous error or actual unbelief. In the case of the wise and learned of the world, this proneness is aggravated by that pride of intellect to which the doctrine of the cross is foolishness. At particular periods, also, this spirit of unbelief, from certain obvious or occult reasons, shews itself, and produces its bitter fruits. During a great part of last century, Socinianism, or latitudinarianism, largely infected the clergy of the Church of England, and indeed of other churches, and ran its course till it was arrested by the great spiritual or evangelical revival that has lasted to the present day. We are now witnessing a new periodic outbreak of speculative infidelity, or practical Socinianism, among the professed teachers of the Anglican Church, and a considerable proportion of lay admirers. We see the old disease largely springing from the old cause,—a heart void, or emptied of gospel truth, a heart puffed up with intellectual pride, unsound learning, or philosophy falsely so called.

But there is another cause of this new and evil spirit of unbelief. The rationalism of Germany, on the wane in its native country, has been making great progress in the academic halls, and even in the parsonages of England. It is evident that the essayists and reviewers, without exception, have drunk at the fountain of German theology. They have been smitten with the mystic charms of the "higher criticism;" they have hailed as new and hallowed light the results of that criticism in the hands of its possessors; and, either forgetting, or despising the noble defences of the citadel and outworks of the faith reared by scholars of a former age, have taken up with old objections and arguments that, dressed in modern phraseology, look in their eyes quite fresh and conclusive. It is remarkable how completely they overlook the unanswerable pleas for the Bible and its contents that abound in the theology of Britain and of the Continent, and proceed to work as if these pleas were nothing,

or had been set aside long ago. Yet this is no unusual course with sceptics in all ages; they are in the habit of reproducing old errors in new forms, of clothing refuted cavils in another garb, and quietly assuming the unassailable defences of truth to be no defences at all.

The strange and sad novelty at this time is the boldness with which clergymen and professors of the Anglican Church avow heretical or infidel opinions, while they cling to their offices and preferments. This is something for which the English people were hardly prepared, and which is revolting to all honest minds. It is not the mere laxity of discipline in the English Establishment that has encouraged the appearance of such a phenomenon, though we all know that that laxity is lamentable and almost unparalleled. There is a miserable self-sophistication into which men fall who reject the truth to embrace error, and are consequently under the necessity of reconciling their position in the Church with their secret or avowed beliefs. We saw this exemplified in the case of many semi-Romanists, who, by arguments that truth and honesty alike disowned, persuaded themselves that they could consistently remain, nay, that it was their duty to remain within the pale of the Church of England. So we now find that Maurice and Jowett, Williams and Wilson, and many others of like spirit, cleave with apparent sincerity, and under a professed sense of duty, to that Church whose creed they have abandoned, and whose stability they are doing so much to undermine. It would appear that their very intellect has been depraved by the processes of thought and feeling through which they have passed. They will not, or rather now they *cannot*, choose the course which honourable and high-minded men, in their circumstances, would undoubtedly pursue.

We have already in our columns noticed and characterised some of the more remarkable works written in reply to the "Essays and Reviews," or to the defenders and apologists of the writers. Another valuable contribution to the existing controversy is furnished by this Letter of the Rev. A. T. Russell to the Bishop of Oxford. Mr Russell is already favourably known in ecclesiastical circles by his Life of Bishop Andrewes, his annotated translation of Jewell's Apology, his Memorials of the Life of Dr T. Fuller, and other highly creditable works. He is evidently a good scholar, and well read in the controversies of the day, a zealous, yet tolerant churchman, a Christian of an evangelical spirit, and a staunch supporter of that scriptural orthodoxy which he rightly conceives to be the true glory of the Church of England. His Letter to the Bishop of Oxford, which presents itself in the form of a goodly octavo volume of nearly 200 pages, is professedly directed against the celebrated defence

of the essayists and reviewers which appeared in the *Edinburgh Review*. This defence, or apology, is well understood to be the production of Professor Stanley of Oxford, the biographer of Arnold. It excited no little surprise and indignation in many quarters when it appeared; and it has ever since been regarded as a plausible and artful extenuation of the principles and conduct of the notorious seven. By this article Professor Stanley has fairly fraternized with the party of which the seven are the prominent representatives. He may not ostensibly hold all their views, but he is thoroughly imbued with their spirit, and in his heart prefers them to their opponents.

Mr Russell's Letter is by no means exclusively directed against Professor Stanley's review. It embraces, on the contrary, almost every topic discussed and every question raised by the essayists and reviewers, and by their defenders or their assailants. Nothing is too great or too small in the whole literature of the current controversy for Mr Russell's notice. With pencil in hand, he seems to have read every book, article, sermon, or pamphlet that has appeared on either side, and to have marked, or entered into a common-place book, all that struck him as worthy of note or comment; and what he has marked, or copied, he appears to have introduced in some shape or other into his letter. This exhibition of multifarious reading, and introduction of all manner of topics, renders his book digressive and discursive almost beyond description. But making allowance for this extraordinary exuberance of matter, and defiance of regular order in the march of his argument, we are constrained to say that his onslaught on the essayists and reviewers, with their sympathisers and defenders, is an eminently readable production, full of real learning; at once lively and instructive; pervaded by honest indignation; and, above all, breathing a manly zeal for the integrity and purity of those great Christian doctrines which the Anglican Church has hitherto preserved and defended as her noblest heritage.

It is impossible for us to give, in the space at our command, anything like an analysis of this performance, or to describe the windings and turnings of the chain of argument. In twenty-one sections Mr Russell discusses all the subjects connected with the controversy, in his own discursive yet pleasant fashion, and comes down upon the leaders of the rationalistic movement with a vigour and heartiness that are quite refreshing. While he exposes, with telling effect, the heresies and infidel spirit of Wilson and Jowett, of Rowland Williams and Baden Powell, he warmly, and we think justly, defends the inculcated orthodoxy of the late Dr Arnold, whom our modern English rationalists claim as actually one of themselves. With all his faults and errors, we are persuaded that the noble Arnold lived and

died in the firm belief of the great articles of the Christian faith. Mr Russell also does full justice to the talents and services of Professor Mansel, Bishop Thirlwall, and other accomplished defenders of true religion and philosophy. His praise is as hearty as his censure is decided; and he never fails to discriminate between the solid arguments of truth and the specious sophistries of error.

We give a few specimens of Mr Russell's style and spirit, in the hope that they may recommend him to the favourable regard of our readers. The following is one of many paragraphs that may be selected as a key-note of his composition :—

“ Certainly, if there be anything lovely or of good report in common honesty, I am too blind to perceive it in clergymen who, with Professors Jowett and Stanley, are banded against the doctrine of the Atonement, and who disingenuously profess to retain terms in utterly different senses from those which they are universally understood to bear. I cannot perceive aught but the most awful guilt in those who, with Mr Maurice, maintain, in direct opposition to the beloved evangelist, that our Lord was not a propitiation for our sins; nay, that God could not demand a propitiation without violating his moral attributes and the moral sense of his creatures. I live in sorrow, as I see such blasphemies tolerated month after month, shall I say year after year, in our own venerated communion. I have taken opportunities upon opportunities of giving vent to my grief and indignation. I owe it to my gracious God and Saviour; I owe it to his church; I owe it to this generation; I owe it to my dear native land.”

In page 69, where he adverts to the rejection by Dr R. Williams, of the 2d Epistle of Peter, Mr Russell, like a man who is a master of such subjects, thus rapidly summarizes the leading proofs of its authenticity :—

“ In the epistle of Firmilian, Bishop of Cæsarea in Cappadocia, to Cyprian, an allusion is made to the commencement of the second chapter; for to that, rather than to chap. iii. 17, his words respecting the apostles Peter and Paul, *qui in epistolis suis hæreticos execrati sunt, et ut eos evitemus monuerunt*, seem to refer. Leonard Twells also adds Novatian, about the middle of the third century. But in the fourth it was received in Palestine by the elder Cyril; in Cyprus by Epiphanius; in Syria by Ephræm; in Alexandria by Athanasius and Macarius; in Africa by Augustine; in Gaul by Hilary; in Italy by Ambrose, Philastrius of Brescia, and Rufinus; at Rome by Hilary; and, above all, it was confirmed by the judgment of St Jerome, who justly set aside the doubts that had been raised against this epistle on the alleged difference between this and the first epistle. Besides *Lardner*, the student who is desirous of satisfying himself upon the genuineness of the second epistle, will find ample evidence in its favour in the *Introductions* of *Fredner* and *Guericke* to the New Testament. It was clearly in the

hands of Clemens Romanus, who made use of it as the production of the apostle, in the 7th chapter of his epistle to the Corinthians. It was also quoted in the Shepherd of Hermas, in Justin Martyr's Dialogue, Irenæus, and Theophilus. Credner remarks that by the end of the fourth century it was received by the whole church."

Here is one of many similar passages directed against the scarcely disguised Socinianism of Professor Jowett:—

"What is the natural inference to be drawn respecting the nature of one whose name was not only the *Son of Man* but the *Son of God*? What must we needs think of one who declared that he was the only Saviour and the future Judge of all men? who said to his disciples that he was *Lord* of the Sabbath; that whosoever two or three were met together in his name, there was he in the midst of them; that he was their lord, and they and all men his servants; that he would be with them to the end of the world; that whosoever loved him, he would with his Father come and make his abode with him; who declared before his enemies that his life was in his own power, and that hereafter they should see him coming in the clouds of heaven; who on the cross promised the penitent thief that he should be with him that day in Paradise; who bade all that would have eternal life, fix their faith on him crucified; and who made the enjoyment of our immortality to depend on his own.—*Because I live, ye shall live also.* Such is the Christ of all the Gospels. Let Professor Jowett answer honestly, Is all this the history of a mere man, however exalted? Are all these the properties of any nature but the divine? Could such words as those of the Redeemer, as they are recorded in all the gospels, have been uttered truthfully but by one who was not only man but God? The half-representations, therefore, of Professor Jowett are misrepresentations of the gospels. The only natural inference of a candid reader is, that the Messiah whom they set forth was no other than *Immanuel, God with us.*"

Mr Goldwin Smith, Professor of Modern History at Oxford, has signalled himself, as is well known, on the Rationalist side, and has measured swords unequally with Professor Mansel. The paradoxes of Mr Smith, both in politics and in theology, expressed in a clever though flippant style, have given him a notoriety which his followers probably mistake for fame. Mr Russell has no mercy on this Professor and his flimsy speculations. In reply to Mr Smith's dictum, that human testimony, on which the historical evidence of revealed religion rests, is *always fallible*, he thus writes, like a true disciple of Chalmers:—

"That the Son of God once lived and died upon the earth, and rose again, all this comes to us on human testimony. But, replies Mr Goldwin Smith, such testimony is always fallible. Is there, then, no certainty in human evidence? Are there no criteria by which to test the credibility of human testimony? Mr

Smith cannot but be aware that to deny the existence of such criteria is contrary to the experience of the world and to common sense. He indeed admits that to act upon the fallibility of all human testimony would be impracticable in the affairs of life, in his own daily converse with the world. He admits that in ordinary cases we practically need no higher than probable evidence. Now, to a reasonable man, the evidence upon which the gospel history rests, comes with all the force of demonstration. By the laws of the human mind, by an appeal to his own experience of human nature, he is satisfied that the witnesses of our Lord's resurrection could not have been deceivers. He is in like manner satisfied of the truth of the whole gospel history. His faith is therefore as certain as was that of the apostles themselves. It is simply untrue that "the historical evidences of religion are necessarily and inherently of less than adamant strength." The fulfilment of not a few of the prophecies of both the Old and New Testament is so palpable as to unveil to us the hand of the Almighty. Yet is this an historical evidence as distinguished from moral."

Our author thus expresses himself in reference to the great doctrine of predestination, which he honestly and intelligently holds as laid down in the notable 17th article of the English Church:—

"It is not denied even by those who deny the truth of predestination, that God not only foresaw all things that should come to pass, but that all things will in the end work out one glorious plan of infinite wisdom. And now, how is this to be effected? Is it to be the result of myriads of contingencies, of chance and accident? If, indeed, there be in the minds of all creatures the kind of freedom that is demanded by those who deny the truth of predestination, then will a magnificent and consistent result, then will the ends of the Almighty in the permission of so much that now appears contrary to our anticipations of a scheme of divine government, be eventually produced out of a numberless series of independent and uncontrollable agencies. In other words, we must believe that whilst the material universe could not have arisen out of chance, it was not so with the far nobler kingdom of the mind. That without any law, and without any guiding hand, is acknowledged to have the power of fulfilling a series of prophecies describing the results of the actions of successive generations, those actions arising from no fixed principles, nothing in its own nature certain. This principle, which takes all events out of the hand of God and assigns the disposal of them all to chance, is the inevitable consequence of sacrificing the truth of predestination in order to clear up difficulties which the Scriptures themselves warn us to leave to that day when we shall know even as also we are known."

We had marked for quotation a curious passage on Baptism (pp. 177, 8), but we have not space for its insertion. Mr

Russell expressly repudiates the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration as it is commonly understood, and as it is held by a large proportion of the English clergy. But it is clear that he holds that when parents and sponsors have true faith, the children baptized are, in a true and important sense, regenerated. We do not follow him in his remarks on this point, but shall only say that we cannot subscribe to his views. The question of baptism is a very wide one, and is attended with peculiar difficulties. In the hands of English Churchmen it invariably assumes a somewhat enigmatic or mysterious shape. Even the attempts of excellent evangelical clergymen of the Anglican communion to explain the doctrine of their Church in regard to baptism are almost always unsatisfactory, unintelligible, or self-contradictory. The simple truth appears to us to be, that the doctrine of the Catechism and the Prayer-book cannot be fairly and thoroughly harmonized with Scripture.

In taking leave of Mr Russell, we renew our expressions of respect for him as an author, and an earnest minister of the Church of Christ. If men of his stamp abounded in every English diocese, we should expect better things and brighter days for the Church of England. But we trust that the truth which still pervades that gigantic establishment will resist and counteract the virulent poison with which it has been infected. If the friends of truth be united and active, standing by the pure word of God, and making to it their first and last appeal, this flood of infidelity will yet be stayed, and the citadel of the faith once more be saved.

Mr Russell, scrupulously accurate as he generally is, has fallen into a number of mistakes, some of which we wonder at. At least there are inaccuracies, or errors of the press, in his book, which ought not to exist. For example, in page 10, and elsewhere, he speaks of Sir *William* Herschel instead of Sir John,—a strange mistake for a Cambridge man to fall into. In page 80, line 7, we have *St Luke*, for *St Mark*, and in various foot-notes we have fallen in with false references. But what we most quarrel with is the quiet substitution [p. 84] of *St Bartholomew* for Nathanael. Mr Russell may be perfectly satisfied that the Nathanael of the 1st chapter of John's Gospel is none other than Bartholomew; but he has no right to settle a nice question in this off-hand manner. These, however, are small matters, and hardly worth any notice. We should not have noticed them at all, did we not like to point out the inaccuracies of an accurate man.

ART. X.—*Dr Cunningham's Historical Theology.*

Historical Theology: A Review of the Principal Doctrinal Discussions in the Christian Church since the Apostolic Age. By the late WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM, D.D., Principal and Professor of Church History, New College, Edinburgh. Edited by his Literary Executors. Two vols. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1863.

IN very hastily preparing an early notice of this work, we are painfully conscious of deficiency in every qualification but one. Dr Cunningham has said that for duly estimating the character and work of any man, one leading qualification is love; and it would be a confession of inhumanity and ungodliness to say that we are not deeply imbued with the "legitimate prejudice" of reverential love to the person (now, alas! the memory) of the great man, theologian, Christian, whom God has recently removed from among us.

The foremost impression produced by this work is that of pre-eminent greatness or power, greatness of learning all but unexampled, prodigious power of intellect, and noble, world-embracing catholicity of thought and heart, all concentrated upon the study, exposition, and defence of evangelical theology as a science. On this account alone, these volumes are a precious boon to the church. It has become the fashion among a certain class of would-be liberals in the church to think meanly of theology as a science, to declaim against positive doctrines, to proclaim that Christianity is a life, *and therefore* not a doctrine. Now, in point of fact, because our religion is a *life*, therefore it *must* be a doctrine. Christian life is originated and sustained by Christian doctrine believed, by the gospel truth received in faith and love as the food of the soul. *All* rational life emanates from *some* doctrine believed; the life which does not emanate from the belief of some doctrine is not Christian, is not even rational, is merely mechanical or brutal. So in church history, as exhibited by Dr Cunningham, we find that the prevalent practice of an age, its worship, discipline, and other outgoings of life, has always sprung from its prevalent doctrine, operative in practice, how obscurely soever apprehended in thought. And in his delineation of spiritual death as it exists in the members of evangelical churches in our day, he has most impressively shewn that, now that the old dogmatic Socinianism is out of fashion, one aspect of the absence of life is a sentimental vagueness of conception, a disposition to dream instead of believing, an aversion to positive truth, finding utterance in the unbelieving cant against doctrine and doctrinal system. Every one who is at all in earnest is earnest for some doctrine. Even the declaimers against doctrine, if

they be in earnest, are earnest for *one* doctrine—the doctrine that there is, or should be no doctrine. But, to a large extent, our generation, with its cry about “earnestness,” is really not in earnest about spiritual things, but sunk in effeminate sloth, in intellectual sybaritism, unaccustomed to deep and earnest thought, intolerant of deep and earnest thinking. And we trust that something will be done towards restoring the tone of its intellectual system by this work of Dr Cunningham. He tells us that the most speedy and effective method of shewing that *a* form of church government is prescribed in Scripture is to produce *one* form that actually is prescribed; and similarly, in answer to them who imagine that there is, or should be, no positive theology, no connected system of doctrines regarding God, we are disposed to refer them to *this* theological system, this real and great theologian. He is, indeed, a theologian of the grand old school, as devotedly attached to his science as any mediæval scholastic, or any of them whom he loves to describe as “the great divines of the 17th century.” Even the worn-out intellectual debauchee, who longs for nothing but a new “sensation,” will find a sensation decidedly new, something quite fresh and original, in the thorough sincerity, and life, and power, of Dr Cunningham’s discussion of “the great things of God.” They who pretend to superior enlightenment, *because* they will have no system of doctrinal belief, will surely be rebuked by the earnest belief in a system exhibited by this powerful and accomplished thinker. But, above all, modest inquirers, who seek not themselves, but the truth, especially the younger men and ministers who have, so to speak, exhausted their first impressions, and desire something deeper and broader than the superficial notions formed in early life, will cry “Eureka” so soon as they have begun to read this master-work of a great master in sacred thought. And many will be led to the study of theology by this noble sample of what has to so large an extent disappeared from our boastful, but really shallow and superficial age,—earnest, masculine, deep, and broad, and strong theological thought and belief. In this way, we trust, the author, though dead, will continue to speak, and mould the generation by the work which is his finished master-piece; will exercise, indeed, an influence far more deep and wide than, though God had left him among us, he could have exercised in the narrow sphere of the college class-room.

The power of the man and his thought leads to a corresponding power of utterance. His work is the work, not of a mere bookworm or recluse solitary thinker, but of a great orator. Of this we are reminded by every page of the book now in our hands. To elegance of style it makes no pretension; it frequently exhibits a lumbering carelessness of mere form that

is really affecting, as an indication of his utter obliviousness of everything but the matter in discussion; it has no beauty but what is necessarily implied in compact symmetrical strength. But in the fundamental qualities of clearness and strength it is a veritable model, the work of a man "whose speeches were battles, whose words were living creatures." He is perfectly free from the affectation of novelty, ostentatiously bent on telling us nothing that has not been said for substance "a thousand times before." But we know not any other writer who leaves upon the mind more of the feeling of freshness by investing the "old familiar" truth with the charm of novelty. Indeed, in the only legitimate sense, he is *original* in a high degree; he looks at everything until he sees it with his own eyes, and tells us, in his own words, precisely what he sees and thinks and feels. After being sickened with the slang of new and strange words, under which minnikins disguise the staleness and poverty of their thoughts, it is really most refreshing, a literary treat, to listen to the simple, nervous, masculine discourse, "the round unvarnished tale" of this true and powerful man.

Dr Cunningham's theology is purely *positive*. By example and precept he discountenances the method of reposing our faith upon the "doubtful speculations" of metaphysics and psychology. No doubt, as metaphysical science has reference to the unchangeable nature of God and man, of things as they *must* be in all circumstances, every really metaphysical truth must appear in the Christian revelation of God and man, of the moral universe as it has been, is, and shall be; and therefore the Christian theologian, as such, is necessarily brought into contact with some of the profoundest problems of metaphysics and theology. When Dr Cunningham was thus called to deal with such questions, he displayed abundant natural capacity for the office. For example, with reference to human freedom and responsibility, in connection with the Calvinistic *ærvum arbitrium* and absolute predestination, he shewed himself much better informed, and much more capable of dealing with the subject, under all its aspects, than even the *coryphæus* of mental philosophers, the great Sir William Hamilton.* But that revelation of a possibly great master in specu-

* As against Hamilton his success is complete. Hamilton, indeed, so far as such a man *could* be ignorant of such a subject, was *perfectly* ignorant of the actual historical relation of Calvinism to the philosophical libertarianism and necessitarianism; and Dr Cunningham, who was supremely honest, and would never speak on any subject unless he thoroughly knew it, had no difficulty on this and similar occasions in exposing the "reckless blundering" of Sir William. But in his own discussion of the question on its merits, What is the proper basis or condition of human responsibility? we are not sure that he has not for once made a slip. He does not rest in the fact that, though spiritually enslaved,

lative philosophy took the church by surprise. It was out of keeping with the ordinary course of Dr Cunningham's teaching. In early life he does not appear to have had the same breadth of philosophical culture which the younger generation have enjoyed since the revival of philosophical enthusiasm by Sir William Hamilton and others. Hence, perhaps, the want, in these volumes, of what is much to be desired, a comprehensive and adequate exhibition of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies, and of their influence in moulding the theology, respectively, of the primitive church fathers, and of the mediæval scholastics. But there is a more honourable reason to account for his indisposition to speculate, his cautious avoidance of every appearance of unwarranted speculation. On every page of his work we see that he had a profound reverence for the word of God, was persuaded that the theologian has no call and no right to "travel beyond the record" of the inspired Scripture, that in the province of theology proper our reason has no place nor office, except to sit as a learner at the feet of Christ, to become as a little child in order to enter the kingdom of God. The disposition on the part of church teachers to intrude their own speculations into this domain of Christ the prophet he regarded as a sinful lust, and one main source of the doctrinal and practical corruptions of the church in all ages of her history. He was far from saying or thinking that it is our duty, or that we have a right to accept with implicit faith, with indolent acquiescence, whatever may *appear* to be invested with scriptural authority. He was most careful and conscientious in the due use of cultivated reason, to discover *what* the heavenly teacher has said in his word. But once he had made the discovery, he was never moved nor shaken by any consideration merely speculative. He unweariedly inculcated the lesson, that it is our duty and privilege, with humble thankfulness, to accept "the things which are revealed," and to leave "the secret things" to "the Lord our God." Hence his teachings, which are luminously clear, are thoroughly dogmatic. He professes to deduce nothing from natural reason, to derive everything from the positive revelation of God in his

men are *naturally* free or rational, but brings in the fact of our fall in Adam, our federal head. Now, we are well aware that this latter fact has a most important function in the vindication of God's ways to man. But we are not certain that it ought to be represented as necessary to the demonstration, or lying at the foundation, as a *conditio sine qua non*, of our responsibility. We are disposed rather to believe that the proper and only ground of responsibility in the creature is rationality, or what theologians call natural freedom or ability. This, however, has nothing to do with the question between Cunningham and Hamilton, the question, *viz.*, Whether, in point of logic or of history, the Calvinistic doctrine is necessarily associated with any metaphysical theory of human will and action, libertarian or necessitarian.

word. This we regard as a feature of very great value in his work, by which it is most favourably distinguished, *e.g.*, from the great work of Stapfer, who carries to a pernicious excess the Wolfian method of deducing everything in a logical chain from a few abstract principles. By insisting upon drawing every important truth direct from the written word, Dr Cunningham delivers the student from the bondage of human systems, trains him to the really scriptural method of study, and leads him to hold in habitual reverence the Scripture itself, and make his theological study a continuous personal communion with that divine Master whom the Scriptures reveal.

As the result of his studies, we have said, Dr Cunningham makes no pretension to novelty in doctrine. He maintains that, in regard to the substance of revealed truth, nothing really new remains to be discovered; that on any vital point of revealed theology, nothing can now be said that has not been often said before; that the whole subject of positive Christian doctrine has been exhausted by "the great divines of the 17th century." This statement may be read by some of our readers with a sneer. But it is easier to sneer than to answer the statement, by telling *what* remains to be discovered, by pointing out *what* new thing has actually been discovered in theology since the 17th century. The last century, with its reign of rationalistic moderatism, witnessed the abandonment of the system of "the great divines." The present century has witnessed its partial restoration, coincident with the restoration of Christian life in the church, a revival of religion necessarily leading to a revived apprehension of positive Christian doctrine. But, though there have been many abortions, we are not aware of any real success, in the attempt to add anything to the substance or form of what has been "commonly believed" and professed by evangelical Christians since the Reformation and immediately post-Reformation period. We believe with Dr Cunningham, that the only thing apparently new which has been witnessed since that period is the rise of an Arminian church under Wesley and his followers, and of a rationalistic, pantheistic philosophy under the name of a Christian theology. The Arminianism of Wesley, of course, is not new. The infidelity of the rationalists is not really new. Its *positive* doctrine is either the old Socinianism, or the old pagan philosophy which was victoriously contended against by the fathers of the primitive church. Its *negative*, its assaults upon the Bible, and the Bible system, are in substance the same as were met and repelled by the primitive apologists, and by more recent Christian writers against the rationalising philosophy of the middle ages, and against the Platonizers, Socinians, and deists of the Reformation and immediately post-Reformation

time. The Romanising tendency of our English Puseyites has presented nothing with which the old divines were not perfectly familiar. And the infidelity in gown and bands which has recently begun to appear in the English Church, is notoriously stolen from the German infidels in gown and bands, who had stolen it from the English infidels, *not* in gown and bands, of an earlier and more honest generation. No doubt every new discussion has led to a more careful study of, and a deeper insight into the evidences and doctrines of Christianity. But as to the substance, of evidences and doctrines alike, if anything have been done within the last century and a half to add thereto, to widen our horizon, to bring forward really new matter, we have never seen it nor heard of it. In saying that nothing *has* been done, Dr Cunningham is not sporting a theory, but stating a plain fact, which nothing but mere ignorance of history will dispose any one to question. In saying that nothing *can* be done that has not been done already, he pronounces a judgment founded on his conviction of what the word of God reveals, as compared with the determination of the reformers and their immediate successors; a judgment which none can have a better right than he to pronounce, because a judgment which none can be better qualified, by fulness of knowledge, and clearness and calmness of mind, than he to form.

The system which, in Dr Cunningham's opinion, has been definitively ascertained from Scripture, is Calvinism in doctrine, and Free Presbyterianism in discipline. He is a decided Free Churchman, holding by the people's right to choose their office-bearers, and the spiritual independence of the church, under the mediatorial Headship of Christ; while holding at the same time that Christ, as God, is head of the nations, that the state is bound to be ruled in all things by his revealed will, and to do all that it competently can to promote his cause and kingdom on earth. He is a decided "true-blue" Presbyterian, believing that Christ has committed the government of his church, not to congregations, nor to prelatie bishops, but to presbyters, or elders, otherwise called bishops. But above all, he is a Calvinist, maintaining that man is by nature helplessly lost, and is and can be saved only by the free and sovereign love of God, giving salvation to whom he will, in what measure he will, because he wills it. He will be recognised in history, not merely as a Free Churchman, nor as a Presbyterian, but as a great Calvinist, occupying a place in his generation such as Augustine, and Calvin, and Turretine occupied in theirs. The Calvinistic system Dr Cunningham holds, not provisionally, as a half-way house to some more comprehensive system *in posse*, "looming in the future;" but definitively, as what has been ascertained to be *the* system revealed in God's word, *the only*

possible exhibition of all the Scripture facts regarding God and man, the only scriptural description of what God actually is, and has done, and is doing, in his relation to rational creatures, and specially in order to man's salvation. He therefore immovably rests in the conviction, that no new discovery can be made in theology; that any pretended novelty is either Calvinism under a new form, or some of the old errors in disguise which have been advanced against Calvinism, and which, *as opposed* to Calvinism, are, *ipso facto*, shewn to involve a lie. The singular clearness and power of his mind, and the vast amount of his admirably digested erudition, will make his work be studied with interest and profit by all who take an intelligent interest in theology as a science. But it will be specially dear to thorough-going Calvinists, as furnishing a new and powerful exhibition and vindication of what they believe to be "the faith once delivered to the saints."

It must not, however, be imagined, that he is one of those who keep continually harping upon "the five points." These points he does most vigorously defend in their place. But he never drags them out of their due place. He insists upon them only as being the legitimate and logically inevitable expression of that which all true Christians, who live by the word of God, believe in their hearts. He earnestly and thankfully recognises the good which he finds in men and systems that, in his estimation, come short of the completed system of Scripture truth. And in dealing with other questions, he is as clear and full as though the Arminian-Calvinistic points had never been heard of. For example, he is nowhere more elaborate and thorough than in discussing the *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesie*, the great protestant doctrine of justification by faith; and in exhibiting and exposing the whole antichristian system of Romanism, he is so full, even to exhaustiveness, that the reader might imagine that the popish controversy had been the one study of his life. Again, in his exposition and refutation of Socinianism, perhaps the most masterly portion of his work, he appears, not as a mere Calvinist, nor as a mere protestant, but as a catholic theologian, defending the faith of the catholic church. And once more, at the very beginning of his work, we find an account of the controversies, literature, and even biography of the primitive church, so full and clear as to indicate a thoroughness of patristic study rarely equalled by the most abject slaves of "the fathers." Indeed, on reading the work, one is impressed with the fact that its author was, not merely one of the most catholic Free Churchmen, but one of the most catholic Christian divines of our day.

It is sometimes said, that in taking our stand on the evangelical doctrines regarding the application of redemption, we

have retrograded from the primitive position in relation to its source, and come short of the fulness of life derivable from a believing view of the Trinity in Unity, and of the incarnation of God's word. We believe, on the contrary, that the evangelical doctrines of application *necessitate* a full and distinct recognition of the great facts of the Trinity and Incarnation in their relation to man's redemption. Our doctrines of application send us back to the facts, with the force of an inward necessity, originating and sustaining the feeling of a need of those facts as the *rationale* and life of the doctrines by which we live. Of the primitive Christians, whose attention was consciously directed mainly to the facts in their isolation, many received the facts of a Trinity and Incarnation as a cloudy and somewhat irrelevant speculation. The modern Christian holds them with a practical energy of thought and feeling proportioned to his intelligent recognition of their bearing upon his daily experience of sin, and want, and woe. And so in this work of Dr Cunningham, which is simply a luminous theoretic exhibition of what is living and moving in the hearts of evangelical Christians in general. His modern view-point does not in the least disturb or dim his views of the Catholic fundamentals, in their fulness of impressive grandeur; in the exposition and defence of them, Athanasius himself is not more earnest and powerful than he. In truth, the modern view-point is the Scripture view-point. The Scripture view-point is not the incarnation, but the cross. And no one can ever see the Scripture system, nor experience its full benefit, as God has revealed it, unless he take his stand upon Calvary, and look upon the whole revelation of God's word and providence in the light of his Son's atoning sacrifice.

From this central point of view, Dr Cunningham gives all the facts of revelation in their due place and proportions. No one of them does he propose to blink or evade. The thorough and intelligent Calvinist cannot keep harping on the "five points;" he *must* range over the whole expanse of revelation. This he will understand, if he understand his own system; this he will find, if he accompany Dr Cunningham. And the circumstance that Dr Cunningham gives a *complete symmetrical system* of revealed truth as a whole is no unimportant evidence of the truth of the system he gives. This argument he has himself illustrated thus:—Arminianism is no system at all, but a chaos of mingled affirmations of admitted Scripture facts, and attempts to explain others away. Popery exhibits a sort of system, which contains a great deal *more* than Scripture, and *therefore* a great deal *less* than Scripture. Apart from Calvinism, the only really complete coherent system professing to be founded on Scripture, is Socinianism; and the Socinian

system, when analysed in detail, is found to be, point for point, an elaborate evasion of the Scripture facts, and a substitution of unscriptural falsehoods in their place. Thus Calvinism alone has internal evidence of being *the* Scripture system; it, and it alone, is a complete, coherent exhibition of all the Scripture facts.

Dr Cunningham throughout this work makes continuous reference to the Westminster Standards. The pretentious *ignoramus* is in the habit of declaiming against creeds and confessions as fatal to freedom of thought. Dr Cunningham maintains that the only legitimate freedom of thought is freedom to seek and find *the truth*. Supposing that any truth has been definitively ascertained by the church, then no objection can be made, in the abstract, to her confessing it, and requiring her ministers to teach it, which will not apply with equal force to the nation's setting a professor to teach Newton's *Principia*, or Potter's *Mechanics*, or Euclid's *Elements of Geometry*. In its general form, the objection has no force unless it mean that there ought to be no recognised church-doctrine, *because* there is and can be no ascertained theological truth.

But it may be objected, in the concrete, that the existing creeds and confessions stand in no vital relation to the church of the present, that they are mere relics of the arbitrary disposition of the church of the past, imposing on men's conscience things not necessary to be believed, following a bad habit she had caught from the papacy. Now, on this question he who will seek the truth will find in Dr Cunningham an incomparable "guide, philosopher, and friend." His whole work, from this point of view, may be regarded as a logical and historical commentary on the Westminster standards; and, indeed, on the symbolical books of all protestant evangelical churches, especially the "Reformed" or Calvinistic. Our inquirer will learn, as he reads, that in framing her creeds and confessions the church has by no means played the tyrant. Some will insist upon being bound by nothing but the very words of Scripture. Dr Cunningham shews that this has been the invariable cry of heretics in every age; that the cry is in itself as unreasonable as it would be to refuse to be bound by the doctrine of gravitation, unless the mere word "gravitation" be written on every apple that falls to the ground; that what we have a right to insist on is the *truth* contained in the Bible, seeing that "*the meaning of the Bible,*" and not the mere words of it, "*is the Bible.*" He has shewn that in insisting upon a "form of sound words" not contained in the Bible, the church has employed the best means in her power for guarding *the truth* revealed in the Bible, assailed by heretics, who would corrupt her purity of doctrine, and thereby poison the fountain of her life. For example, the creed of the

churches regarding the person of Christ is summed up in the Shorter Catechism in the words—Christ as our Redeemer, “being the eternal Son of God, became man, and so was, and continueth to be, God and man, in two distinct natures, and one person for ever.” Under the guidance of Dr Cunningham, we learn that these few words embody the ripe results of whole ages of earnest thought, the decisions of the four great œcumenical councils of antiquity, which pronounced the ascertained Scripture truth regarding the person of our Lord, and thereby guarded the church against the following heresies—that he is not true God, or that he is not true man, or that in him the divine and human natures are confounded, or that they are not combined in a unity of person—every one of which undermines the foundation of that faith by which we live. The value of such definite dogmatic statements appears from the fact, that since that time the primitive church doctrine of the person of Christ has been accepted by the mass of Christians in every age and land; and now, throughout Christendom, is, so to speak, drunk in by every babe with its mother's milk.

So, too, of the creed of the churches regarding the saving work of Christ. Not only was it framed to guard against opposing error—Pelagian Sadduceeism and Popish Pharisaism—it expressed the living experience of God's saints, who had been driven to his word that they might find a balm to their bleeding hearts, a relief to their burdened conscience; and found them in the doctrines we now believe and profess. Augustine was prepared for defending against Pelagius the doctrine of the sovereignty and sole efficacy of grace, by a wondrously profound experience of our *impotency* by nature, and consequent need of a saving grace which is omnipotent and free. Luther was trained for his work of restoring the church to liberty and life by the resurrection of the truth of justification by faith on the righteousness of Christ, by an experience, no less profound, of our *guilt* by nature, and consequent need of nothing less and nothing more than Christ's atoning blood to cleanse the guilt away. These two facts, of our impotency and guilt, with the correlative facts of the sovereignty and omnipotency of God's grace, and the perfection of his righteousness in Christ, constitute the sum of that truth regarding God's work in Christ for our salvation by which God's people have ever lived. They are the sum and substance of the evangelical creeds and confessions. Calvin, and the Synod of Dort, Dr Cunningham shews, did merely unfold, into a harmonious and symmetrical system, what these two facts necessarily involve. And with reference to them, too, the value of church symbols is illustrated by history. The doctrine of Augustine, and his immediate successors, was

the instrument of a revival of religion in their own time, and of sustaining the life of the "hidden ones" who had their faith and hope in God through the long night of the middle ages, until, at the dawn of the Reformation, it reappeared like another Arethusa, and served as the *reveille* and battle-cry of those whom God had chosen as his instruments in leading the church forth from the Egyptian bondage of antichrist. But as it had received no formal sanction of œcumenical councils, Augustinianism was abandoned by the mass of church teachers and members, and the opposite doctrine was allowed to prevail without rebuke throughout the middle ages. On the other hand, the protestant churches inscribed the "doctrine of grace" on the forefront of their standards. Those standards have been cordially cherished by the mass of their office-bearers and members, just in proportion as these have been living the life which is by faith. Any dislike to them has been ordinarily found to originate, not in disinclination to the mere form of confessing an acknowledged truth, but in rooted (perhaps unconscious) aversion to the truth confessed. So of the Dutch Arminians at the beginning of the sixteenth century, of the English Arians and Scotch Socinians (in disguise) in the eighteenth. They began with professing to dislike merely the "bondage" of human words, while perfectly willing to accept the express words of God. But, mainly through the instrumentality of the creeds, the fact soon appeared, that what they disliked was not the mere form of a creed, but the substance of the truth believed. The creeds did excellent service, not only in detecting those wolves in sheep's clothing, but also in feeding the souls of the "faithful among the faithless," in the "dark age" of British and continental Moderatism; and in our own age have been instrumental in that reawakening to true spiritual freedom, in the belief and practice of the truth, which God has vouchsafed to the churches. And we believe that the Westminster Confession, as expounded by Dr Cunningham, the more it is really understood, will be found to have the fewer sentences and clauses which do not express some portion of scriptural truth, necessary to the church's being or well-being, fairly involved in the great facts of God's word, regarding his nature, and grace for our salvation.

But some will reason that though our doctrinal standards should have been admirably adapted to the church of the past, they are not equally well adapted to the church of the present. Now it is true that every generation of really living men must think for itself. One generation in one or more respects may outgrow its predecessor; in which case it may be necessary, or at least desirable, to reconstruct the old creed, so as to adapt it to the new frame of mind. *Ordinarily* the reason for this

reconstruction has been *a step in advance* in explicit recognition of the truth. For this reason the Heidelberg Catechism was supplemented by the canons of Dort; and the old Scottish Confessions were superseded by the Westminster standards. We have already stated that, in Dr Cunningham's opinion, *this* reason does not exist in our day, *no such* step in advance has, in fact, been taken since the seventeenth century. But there *may* have been an advance of another sort. A friend of ours once suggested that the seventeenth century, the age of logic in theology, may have introduced processes and distinctions which were necessary as a preliminary discipline and instrument of systematising, but which, like the scaffolding when the building is completed, may now be a mere incumbrance, as having no real place in the nature of things, the theological system as such. And it is a fair question, whether in our existing creeds there may not be minutiae which are merely logical excrescences on the system, and which can serve no good purpose in connection with the end for which our creeds exist, viz., to be the church's testimony to the truth of God, and her instrument at once of teaching and ruling her own members, and of determining who are fit to be entrusted (as office-bearers) with *her* authority to teach and to rule? But in order to be qualified to entertain and settle this question, it is evident that the church, in the first place, must be thoroughly established in the belief of the system which the standards exhibit, and, in the second place, must have a knowledge of the system, so comprehensive and minute, especially in its historical aspects, as to be able to estimate the real place and use of particular statements, to discriminate what, if anything, is merely a logical excrescence on the system, and to preserve the whole of what is really a vital part of the substance. For, under whatever pretence, to give up any part of truth once ascertained, is not to advance towards the full stature of manhood, but to retrograde towards the second childhood of intellectual barbarism, and moral and spiritual degeneracy. Now, we are by no means satisfied that such qualifications exist in the church of our day. We are not persuaded that God has called us to the task of reconstructing our creed; we believe that *the* task of our day is the extension of his kingdom among the heathen, by the propagation of that "doctrine of grace" which was vindicated by the reformers, and elaborated into system by their immediate successors. The mass of our church teachers and members are thoroughly satisfied with our creed as it stands. The leaders in the outcry against creeds and confessions are men notoriously hostile to the faith believed and confessed, such as the recent perverts to popery from the English Church, who would lead us back from the light and liberty

of the gospel to the dark bondage of antichristian Phariseism, or those who, like the "essayists and reviewers," would lead us forward, on the way of death, to the deeper darkness, the more ignoble bondage of infidel Sadduceism. But if we should be called to reconstruct our doctrinal symbols, and in order that we may be duly qualified for the far nobler task of healing the world by proclaiming the truth which they declare, it is necessary that we should first understand them. And for this end, were there no other, it would be labour well employed to make a thorough study of this *magnum opus* of Dr Cunningham.

As a specimen of the work, we subjoin the following extract on the objections to the atonement :—

"The only objections of a general kind to the doctrine of an atonement that are entitled to any notice, are these : First, that it involves injustice, by representing the innocent as punished in the room of the guilty, and the guilty thereby escaping ; secondly, that it is inconsistent with the free grace, or gratuitous favour, which the Scriptures ascribe to God in the remission of men's sins ; and thirdly, that it is fitted to injure the interests of holiness or morality. We shall very briefly advert to these in succession, but without attempting anything like a full discussion of them.

"First, It is alleged to be unjust to punish the innocent in the room of the guilty, and on this ground to allow the transgressors to escape. Now, the defenders of the doctrine of atonement admit that it does assume or imply the state of matters which is here described, and represented as unjust,—namely, the punishment of the innocent in the room of the guilty. Some of them, indeed, scruple about the application of the terms *punishment* and *penal* to the sufferings and death of Christ. But this scrupulosity appears to me to be frivolous and vexatious, resting upon no sufficient ground, and serving no good purpose. If men, indeed, begin with defining punishment to mean the infliction of suffering upon an offender on account of his offence,—thus including the actual personal demerit of the sufferer in the idea which the word conveys, they settle the question of the penalty, or penal character, of Christ's suffering by the mere definition. In this sense, of course, Christ's sufferings were not penal. But the definition is purely arbitrary, and is not required by general usage, which warrants us in regarding and describing as penal any suffering inflicted judicially, or in the execution of the provisions of law, on account of sin. And this arbitrary restriction of the meaning of the terms punishment and penal is of no use, although some of those who have recourse to it seem to think so, in warding off Socinian objections ;—because, in the first place, there is really nothing in the doctrine of the atonement worth contending for, if it be not true that Christ endured, in the room and stead of sinners, the suffering which the law demanded of them on account of their sins, and which, but for his enduring it, as their substitute, they must themselves have endured,—and because, in the second place, the allegation of in-

justice applies, with all the force it has, to the position just stated, whether Christ's sufferings be *called* penal or not.

"With regard to the objection itself, the following are the chief considerations to be attended to, by the exposition and application of which it is fully disposed of: *First*, that, as we have already had occasion to state and explain in a different connection, the sufferings and death of an innocent person in this matter are realities which all admit, and which all equally are bound to explain. Christ's sufferings were as great upon the Socinian as upon the orthodox theory with regard to their cause and object; while our doctrine of his being subjected to suffering because of the sin of others being imputed to him, or laid upon him, brings the facts of the case into accordance with some generally recognised principles of God's moral government, which, upon the Socinian scheme, is impossible. The injustice, of course, is not alleged to be in the fact that Christ, an innocent person, was subjected to so much suffering,—for there remains the same fact upon any hypothesis,—but in his suffering in the room and stead of sinners, with the view, and to the effect, of their escaping punishment.

"Now, we observe, *secondly*, that this additional circumstance of his suffering being vicarious and expiatory,—which may be said to constitute our theory as to the grounds, causes, or objects of his suffering,—in place of introducing an additional difficulty into the matter, is the only thing which contributes in any measure to explain it. And it does contribute in some measure to explain it, because it can be shown to accord with the ordinary principles of enlightened reason to maintain—first, that it is not of *the essence* of the idea of punishment, that it must necessarily, and in every instance, be inflicted upon the very person who has committed the sin that calls for it; or, as it is expressed by Grotius, who has applied the recognised principles of jurisprudence and law to this subject with great ability: "*Notandum est, esse quidem essentielle pœnæ, ut infligatur ob peccatum, sed non item essentielle ei esse ut infligatur ipsi qui peccavit* :—and *secondly*, that substitution and satisfaction, in the matter of inflicting punishment, are to some extent recognised in the principles of human jurisprudence, and in the arrangements of human governments; while there is much also in the analogies of God's providential government of the world, to sanction them, or to afford answers to the allegations of their injustice.

"*Thirdly*, the transference of penal suffering, or suffering judicially inflicted in accordance with the provisions of law, from one party to another, cannot be proved to be universally and in all cases unjust. No doubt, an act of so peculiar a kind,—involving, as it certainly does, a plain deviation from the ordinary regular course of procedure,—requires, in each case, a distinct and specific ground or cause to warrant it. But there are, at least, two cases in which this transference of penal suffering on account of sin from one party to another is generally recognised as just, and in which, at least, it can be easily proved, that all ground is removed for charging it with

injustice. These are, first, when the party who is appointed to suffer on account of the sin of another, has himself become legally liable to a charge of guilt, adequate to account for all the suffering inflicted; and secondly, when he voluntarily consents to occupy the place of the offender, and to bear, in his room, the punishment which he had merited. In these cases, there is manifestly no injustice in the transference of penal suffering, so far as the parties more immediately affected are concerned; and if the *general* and *public* ends of punishment are at the same time fully provided for by the transference, or *notwithstanding* the transference, then there is, in these cases, no injustice of any kind committed.

"The second of these cases is that which applies to the sufferings and death of Christ. He willingly agreed to stand in the room and stead of sinners, and to bear the punishment which they had merited. And if there be no injustice generally in Christ—though perfectly innocent—suffering so much as he endured, and no injustice in this suffering being penally inflicted upon him on account of the sins of others,—his own free consent to occupy their place, and to bear the punishment due to their sins being interposed,—there can be no injustice in the only other additional idea involved in our doctrine,—namely, that this suffering inflicted upon him is appointed and proclaimed as the ground or means of exempting the offenders from the punishment they had deserved; or, as it is put by Grotius, 'Cum per hos modos' (the cases previously mentioned, the consent of the substitute being one of them), 'actus factus est licitus, quo minus deinde ordinetur ad poenam peccati alieni, nihil intercedit, modo inter eum qui peccavit et puniendum aliqua sit conjunctio.' The only parties who would be injured or treated unjustly by this last feature in the case are the lawgiver and the community (to apply the principle to the case of human jurisprudence); and if the honour and authority of the law, and the general interests of the community, are fully provided for by means of, or notwithstanding, the transference of the penal infliction,—as we undertake to prove is the case with respect to the vicarious and expiatory suffering of Christ,—then the whole ground for the charge of injustice is taken away.

"The second objection is, that the doctrine of atonement or satisfaction is inconsistent with the scriptural representations of the gratuitousness of forgiveness,—of the freeness of the grace of God in pardoning sinners. It is said that God exercises no grace or free favour in pardoning sin, if he has received full satisfaction for the offences of those whom he pardons. This objection is not confined to Socinians. They adduce it against the doctrine of atonement or satisfaction altogether; while Arminians, and others who hold the doctrine of universal or indefinite atonement, adduce it against those higher, stricter, and more accurate views of substitution and satisfaction with which the doctrine of a definite or limited atonement stands necessarily connected. When they are called to deal with this Socinian objection, they usually admit that the objection is unanswerable, as adduced against the stricter views of substitu-

tion and satisfaction held by most Calvinists ; while they contend that it is of no force in opposition to their modified and more rational views upon this subject,—an admission by which, as it seems to me, they virtually, in effect though not in intention, betray the whole cause of the atonement into the hands of the Socinians. As this objection has been stated and answered in our Confession of Faith, we shall follow its guidance in making a few observations upon it.

“ It is there said, ‘ Christ, by his obedience and death, did fully discharge the debt of all those that are thus justified, and did make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to his Father’s justice in their behalf.’ Here the doctrine of substitution and satisfaction is fully and explicitly declared in its highest and strictest sense. But the authors of the Confession were not afraid of being able to defend, in perfect consistency with this, the free grace, the gratuitous mercy of God, in justifying,—that is, in pardoning and accepting sinners. And, accordingly, they go on to say, ‘ Yet, inasmuch as he was given by the Father for them, and his obedience and satisfaction accepted in their stead, and both freely, not for anything in them, their justification is only of free grace, that both the exact justice and rich grace of God might be glorified in the justification of sinners.’ Now, the grounds here laid for maintaining the free grace of God in the forgiveness of sinners, notwithstanding that a full atonement or satisfaction was made for their transgressions, are two : first, that Christ, the atoner or satisfier, was given by the Father for them,—that is, that the Father himself devised and provided the atonement or satisfaction,—provided it, so to speak, at his own cost,—by not sparing his own Son, but delivering him up for us all. If this be true,—if men had no right whatever to such a provision,—if they had done, and could do, nothing whatever to merit or procure it,—then this consideration must necessarily render the whole of the subsequent process based upon it, in its bearing upon men, purely gratuitous,—altogether of free grace,—unless, indeed, *at some subsequent stage*, men should be able to do something meritorious and efficacious for themselves in the matter. But then, secondly, God not only freely provided the satisfaction, he likewise, when it was rendered by Christ, accepted it in the room of all those who are pardoned, and this, too, freely, or without anything in them,—that is, without their having done, or being able to do, anything to merit or procure it, or anything which it involves. Pardon, therefore, and acceptance are freely or gratuitously given to men, though they were purchased by Christ, who paid the price of his precious blood.”

M.

XI.—FOREIGN THEOLOGICAL REVIEWS.

1862.

I. *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, Heft 4.

In this number we have the following articles:—1. HUNDESHAGEN on Zuingle and his work of Reformation compared with Luther. It is a lively and interesting sketch; and though we may not agree with the writer in every point, highly suggestive. 2. KLEINERT writes on, Who is the subject of the Prophecy in Is. lii. liii. 12, devoting particular attention to the article on the same subject from Bleek's Literary Remains, published some time ago in the same Review. In the next division, there is an interesting discussion on Creation Groaning, Rom. viii. 18–28; then analecta from Clemens Romanus's First Epistle; then Sengler on the Trinity. Under the heading "Reviews," we have a notice of Buttmann's New Testament; and Witte on the Gospel in Italy.

II. *Zeitschrift für die Historische Theologie*, Heft 4.

The first article in this number is by Dr Rippold, on Henry Nicolaes and the Family of Love, an essay serving as a monography on the history of the sects of the Reformation period. It is constructed so as to give a history of the anabaptist, antitrinitarian, and antinomian doctrines. The next article, by Dr Ebrard, on the Church of the Culdees of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Centuries, is an elaborate essay, but almost exclusively occupied with a statement of their mode of calculating Easter. The last article contains the documents connected with the case of Baumgarten of Rostock.

III. *Zeitschrift für die gesammte Lutherische Theologie*, 3 and 4 Quartal heft.

The announcement is made by Dr Guericke, that the place of joint editor will henceforth be occupied by Professor Delitzsch, who has consented to fill the position of the late Dr Rudelbach, which will make this periodical even more interesting. The Third Number contains—1. Another section of Rudelbach's Confessions or Autobiography. 2. Ströbel on the Revision of the Lutheran Bible; and 3. L. de Marées on the Nature and Significance of the Preaching of Scripture, particularly of the Old Testament. The Fourth Number contains the following articles—1. LINDNER: Explanation and Elucidation of some difficult Passages of the Old and New Testaments; 2. LAURENT on Queen Candace; 3. The Witnesses of the Reformation in Bavarian Swabia.

IV. *Jahrbucher für Deutsche Theologie*, Heft 3.

As this periodical comes into the reader's hands later than any of the others, the articles cannot be given to the end of the year. They are as a whole more valuable than are to be found in any other German Theological Review. Here we have—1. BURK on the notions "wisdom" and "knowledge" in the Scriptures; 2. EHRENFELCHTER on the grades of ecclesiastical instruction; 3. HASSE on the Pathology of Christian Hope; 4. SCHULTZ on the Doctrine of the Righteousness of Faith in the Old and New Testament. Appended to the Review is a new feature: an analysis of the best theological publications of Germany.

V. *Theologische Zeitschrift*, by Dieckhoff and Kliefoth.

This periodical has contained during the year a thorough discussion, by Kliefoth, of the symbolism of numbers in the Scriptures. We cannot say much in commendation of the three articles. But the refutation of Dr Kahn's Dogmatik by Dieckhoff is very valuable and sound. Huther gives contributions to the exposition of Philipians.

1863.

Theologische Studien und Kritiken, Heft 1.

The first number of this *Review* for 1863, which has already come to hand, contains the following articles—1. PLITT on the Significance of the Heidelberg Catechism in the Reformed Church; 2. EGGER—Sketch of Schelling's Philosophy of Revelation in its ground features. In the division of the *Review* set apart for thoughts and remarks, we have—1. Some elucidatory remarks on the 28th chapter of Job by one who is acquainted with mining operations; 2. BAUMLEIN on Papias' statement respecting the gospel of Mark; 3. PABET, one word more on James iv. 5. Next, in the division which bears the heading "Reviews," there is a review of Gess's work on *Prayer in the name of Jesus*, and the last article which Kling wrote before his death on Philosophy and Theology. The Number is closed by a short paper in *memoriam* of the latter by Ullmann.

Zeitschrift für die Historische Theologie, by Dr Niedner, Heft 1.

This entire number is occupied by a monography of a historical character, from the pen of Dr Rippold, on the history, doctrines, and sect of David Joris of Delft. It is the first article on this subject, and intended to be a second contribution on the History of the anabaptist, antitrinitarian, and antinomian movements.

FRENCH THEOLOGICAL REVIEWS.

Revue Chrétienne.

The Quarterly Theological Supplement for November is filled with a long dissertation on the subject of Inspiration by Pressensé, on the lax side of the question. We much lament to see such a tendency represented by this otherwise able *Review*.

Le Chrétien Evangélique.

This excellent periodical pursues its way, scattering sound doctrine and evangelical sentiment with a full hand. We have been interested with Professor Pronier's account of his visit to this country.

AMERICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEWS for 1862.

I. *The Princeton Review* for July and October.

The chief Theological Reviews of America are still occupied with warm discussions on the merits of Dr Hickok's Philosophy. The *Princeton Review* for July contains an estimate of that philosophy by one of its decided advocates, the paper being inserted for the express purpose of being subjected, along with other vindications, to an unsparing criticism. We shall endeavour to make room for some one of these articles in an early number, that our readers may be abreast of the discussion. There is besides an interesting article on Augustine, and another on the Diversity of Species in the Human Race. The October Number contains—1. The Matter of Prophecy, which we have extracted; 2. The Presbyterian Historical Society; 3. The Church and the Poor; 4. Plea for High Education and Presbyterian Colleges; 5. Christian Enterprise; 6. African Colonization.

II. *American Theological Review* for July and October.

This able *Review*, which defends Dr Hickok's philosophy, contains these Articles—1. On *Psychology and Scepticism*, by Dr Hickok; 2. On Comparative Grammar; 3. On the Origin of Idolatry—a criticism of Rawlinson and others; 4. The Temptation of Christ; 5. British Sympathy with America, written in a querulous tone, but saying many just things against our press. The October Number contains the following articles :—1. The Council

of Trent, from the French of Rosceux St Hilaire ; 2. The Rational Psychology and its Vindications, by Dr Hall ; 3. The Religion of the Indians ; 4. The Heretical Gnosis, from the German of Baxmann ; 5. Man's Place in a Natural System of Zoology ; 6. The National Crisis.

III. *The Presbyterian Quarterly Review for October.*

We have extracted from this periodical the long article with which our present number opens. The October Number contains the following articles :—1. Memorabilia of John Owen, a good appreciation of Owen's place in theology ; 2. The Pulpit a Civiliser ; 3. Alexis de Tocqueville ; 4. Alcuin the Teacher of Charlemagne, a good monography ; 5. The Two Rebellions, an analogy of faith, comparing that of the Ten Tribes and that of America.

XII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

THE EXEGETICAL.

The Revised Translation of the New Testament, with a Notice of the Principal Various Readings. By the Rev. H. HIGHTON, M.A., late Principal of Cheltenham College, and Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford. London Bagster. 1862.

This revised translation, the work of an accomplished scholar, alters as little as possible, and aims to shew that a revision of the New Testament by public authority is both feasible and may be made with advantage. The position he occupies will be understood when he says, "The execution of this work has convinced me that not only is our authorised translation the best ever made, either in our own country or in America, up to the present time (with the exception of the later published of the revised translations of particular books by Dean Alford and his four colleagues), but also that our received text is, *on the whole*, the best Greek text for popular use. The operation of the rules according to which the revision of the Greek text has been usually made is somewhat unfortunate in its results." We quite agree with him.

One important feature of this translation is, that translations of the principal various readings are placed in the margin. This will do a great service, as they shew to the English reader that all the alterations from MSS. are of no great importance, so far as the sense is concerned.

The translator has, on the whole, been successful in dealing with the three or four chief difficulties which any proposed revision has to encounter, viz., the particles, the prepositions, the tenses, and the use of the article. The reserve which he has exercised, and his reluctance to alter, have, in certain passages, been carried further than is desirable. Thus he still retains a number of words and forms of expression which might with advantage be exchanged for others which would more exactly bring out the sense. But his principle was to make only such alterations as appeared to him to attain to a certain degree of importance and of probability. The archaic garb and the idiomatic English are preserved. We regard this revised version as a decided success, and creditable in the highest degree to the Christian scholar who executed it. We hope to return to it more fully. S.

Notes on the Gospels, Critical and Explanatory. By M. C. JACOBUS, Professor of Biblical Literature. Edinburgh: W. Oliphant & Co. 1862.

Professor Jacobus's Notes on Matthew have been so highly appreciated in America, that they have run through thirty-three editions. While they are unmistakably Calvinistic, and also the fruit of learned investigation, they are happily free from technical language, plain, perspicuous, and withal elegantly expressed. We regard them as the best style of commentary for Sabbath-school teachers and heads of families, and there is little doubt that they will find at once a full recognition among us, as they deserve.

A Paraphrase of the Book of the Prophet Isaiah. By J. C. WHISH, M.A., with Notes from various sources. London: Seeley, Jackson, and Halliday. 1862.

This is a kind of book which we would gladly see greatly multiplied. It is what it professes to be, a laborious and painstaking study of Isaiah's prophecy. The paraphrase is good, and is deserving of commendation. The authorised version is retained in all cases where the sense of the original is clearly expressed by it, and the paraphrase is added only when the meaning is not very obvious. The notes display a praiseworthy amount of reading; and the whole production is scholarly and highly creditable to the author. While we say all this, however, we are not to be held as committed to the interpretation here given; all we wish to convey is simply our approbation of a good effort, and in the right direction. The result would be only good if all our ministers were to take up a book of either the Old Testament or New, and make such a study of it as Mr Whish has done. There is nothing so profitable as the study of a book of the Bible as a whole.

DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

Institutes of the Christian Religion, by John Calvin. A New Translation. By HENRY BEVERIDGE, Esq. Edinburgh: Clark. 1863.

This translation of Calvin's invaluable "Institutes" deserves to be well known, and it will be valued wherever it is known. While it is faithful as a version of that great system which embodies the thinking of Calvin's life, it is also a very readable English book. The translator has collated the Latin and French editions carefully; he has given the division and arrangement of the chapters of the Institutes; and given also the purport of the sections at the commencement of each chapter. Though no one will depreciate the elegant and happy translation by Mr Allen, of which a third edition appeared in 1844, the present version may be put upon an equality with it for precision and accuracy, while this one has the other advantages above mentioned. No one can estimate how important it would be if the religious readers who peruse only such works as partake of what may be called the tract style and character would acquaint themselves with such a system as is presented to them in this translation—a system so fitted to satisfy thought and to enlarge the mind, and withal, so scriptural that it may be called a biblical theology, giving the result of the most perfect exegesis.

The Christian Verity Stated, a Summary of Trinitarian Doctrine. By WALTER CHAMBERLAIN, M.A., Incumbent of St John's, Bolton-le-Moors. London: Wertheim. 1862.

We have been greatly pleased with this work, written in reply to Dr Beard's "Reasons for being a Unitarian." The way in which he speaks of the Trinity and the Eternal Sonship is replete with the true spirit of patristic theology, which he has not imbibed merely from the great writers of his

church, but from the sources. We are glad to see a work replete with so much patristic learning, which is becoming more and more rare in the Church of England, once so much distinguished for this sort of learning. He says, "May the time never come when the people of England shall be ignorant of, or indifferent to, those creeds," viz., the apostles', Nicene, and Athanasian. We might take exception to a few theological phrases in the volume not commonly used by the best writers, and not improvements. But as a whole it is the production of an accomplished Trinitarian, who defers to the Scripture alone, which he expounds with exactness, but who, at the same time, finds the truth, which is dear to him, freshly and clearly brought out in the writings of the Fathers. We warmly commend it to those who can appreciate the theology of such authors as Pearson on the Creed. The style is not equal to the thinking.

A Review of the Baptismal Controversy. By J. B. MOZLEY, B.D., Vicar of Old Shoreham, late Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. London: Rivington. 1862.

All his readers will acknowledge the honour that is due to this author for his logical ability and great theological learning. He reviews the baptismal views of Augustinianism, Calvinism, and Anglicanism. But his discussion does not touch the main difficulty of the subject as a practical question. Such as will allow no changes to be made upon the church offices, so as to adapt them to modern ideas of the necessary harmony between language and conviction, will, in all likelihood, hail the book as an impregnable defence of the formularies, at once temperate and skilful. And, indeed, if they are to be defended at all, it must be on Mr Mozley's ground. They, however, who wish the language of honest truthfulness in the words of worship, will not be satisfied by all the able and ingenious pleading of the author. The main difficulty is one which neither the authority of antiquity nor the non-natural acceptance of words, can silence or solve. It will rise up again for a solution of another sort, till the phraseology of worship and of inner conviction truly coincide.

In explaining how the Anglican Church came to apply the term "regenerate" to all baptized infants, Mr Mozley says (p. 157), "The Anglican divines surmounted the difficulty by constructing a new and special sense of the term 'regenerate' as used in connection with baptism, employing the term in this connection to denote only an implanted *faculty* for the attainment of goodness and holiness—a capacity to be improved, a power to be cultivated, an assisting *grace* to be used." He acknowledges that the Anglican *double* sense was an innovation in theology, the term never having been used in two different senses before (p. 158), and that the Anglican divines use it with considerable scruple and hesitation as to its *being* a true sense (p. 159). He adds, that there is no reason against such a use of the term, provided the sense is understood. But as the sense of the term "regenerate," as applicable to individuals, is different from that secondary sense in which it is applicable to the whole Christian body, the result, as he acknowledges, has been to confound and identify them (p. 161), and persons may argue for a long time on this question, if they do not compare at the outset their respective meanings of the term (p. 162).

The author has done much to prove that the language used in the Anglican formularies is an *advance* upon Scripture, that it cannot be proved by Scripture, and that it cannot be imposed as a doctrine. But he must take a step further. Although we sympathise with men who are held in the fetters of old ecclesiastical formulas, Patristic and Anglican, the true cure is not to set up a non-natural sense of words, but to change what is inadequate, for what, in Christian truth and simplicity, is an adequate expression of the Biblical doctrine on the subject.

Christian Faith : its Nature, Object, Causes, and Effects. By JOHN H. GODWIN. London : Jackson, Walford, and Hodden. 1862.

Mr Godwin is one of the professors of the New College, London ; and this volume is the congregational lecture for 1860. It was published after its successor. Since its publication it has called forth a considerable amount of discussion. It has been reviewed unfavourably in most, if not all, of the organs of the congregational body. A series of articles, condemning it utterly, appeared in the *British Standard* newspaper ; they have since been reprinted as a pamphlet, and are now acknowledged as the work of the Rev. Brewin Grant of Sheffield. We can hardly point to a book which, in a life so short, has made for itself so many enemies, and which has found so few friends. We are of the number of those which condemn it utterly. Beyond any reasonable doubt, the author, as far as he exhibits his thoughts in this volume, has departed from the faith once delivered to the saints. On all the important articles of that faith his trumpet, at the very best, gives forth but an uncertain sound ; and on that article of a standing or falling church, justification through the imputed righteousness of another, the book is altogether gone out of the way. Mr Godwin recognises no righteousness but the personal righteousness, the moral integrity and rectitude of God or of man. A.

History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ. By Dr DORRIS. Edinburgh : Clark. 1862.

Another volume will complete the translation of this important contribution to theology, when we shall take occasion to notice the work more fully.

MISSIONS.

Great Missionaries. By Rev. Dr A. THOMSON. T. Nelson & Sons. 1862.
What Hinders ? A Sermon preached in Surrey Chapel before the Directors and Friends of the London Missionary Society, May 14. 1862. By Rev. Dr ANDREW THOMSON, Edinburgh. 1862.

Missions are now a power in the world. Against a thousand antagonisms, they have won their way to that position, and it would scarcely be too much to say that they are slowly becoming the most potent moral influence that operates in our day. Not even the pursuit of gold, the universal passion, calls forth such exertions, or such calm, deliberate sacrifices as the cause of missions ; and the church, the flock, the pastor, or the worshipper that has not felt its influence has yet to experience the force of one of the mightiest motives which can propel the mind of man. It was missions that sent men to die for Christ in Greenland, to pine in the jungles of India, and to perish amid the snows of Patagonia. It was the same great cause that prompted many to face the cannibals of Erromanga and other islands in the South Seas, and brave all that is deadly in the climate of Sierra Leone. It was missions that led to those wonderful discoveries which have recently lifted the veil which long concealed the regions of Central Africa. From a little band of missionaries at Loodiana, far inland in India, there lately went forth a call to prayer, and millions after millions all round the globe fell on their knees at the call. Men who in youth sneered at "consecrated cobblers," and "apostates from the anvil and the loom," were compelled, before they died, to blush for very shame over the ribaldry which their ignorance or their hatred of truth had prompted. Those whom they contumeliously despised had subdued viceroys by the truth told in love ; had first incensed, and then vanquished the British Parliament ; had opened India to the gospel, and established or consolidated a system whose influence was to vibrate round the globe, and guide the churches till the last of the redeemed be gathered in.

Ignorance was abashed before such results, and the missionary is welcomed at last, even by mere politicians, as the great civiliser—witness the recent case of the Sonthals. We are thus emboldened to repeat that missions are now a power in the world. A missionary zealous, fearless, loving, Spirit-taught, is a king of men; and when the ephemeral notorieties who are deemed famous go out in darkness to be forgotten for ever, he takes his place among the true immortals, the real benefactors of the world, the “fellow-workers with God.”

In the volume and the sermon now before us, Dr Thomson, their author, has done what may help to give missions more and more their true place in the minds of men. The title of the sermon indicates the occasion which called it forth. It was addressed to the grand annual gathering of the Non-conformists—a kind of oecumenical congregation composed very largely, we might say mainly, of ministers; and the assemblages at these sermons are among the most solemn and important that any minister can address. We have heard some leading minds preach to these assembled brethren; and if others felt as we did when receiving impressions which will go with us to the grave, the value of such meetings can scarcely be overrated. Dr Thomson's sermon worthily sustains the credit of such assemblages, and ably supports the objects they have in view. He successfully and conclusively disposes of some difficulties still retarding the greatest of all enterprises, but to none of his sentiments do we more cordially respond than the statement that much of our missionary strength has hitherto been expended on what was necessarily mere pioneering. By the ever-needed blessing, an accelerated rate of progress, and an increased momentum, may now be expected. They would come were the “What Hinders?” which Dr Thomson exposes, taken out of the way; and that time *will* arrive, because God is working.

But it is of Dr Thomson's volume that we would chiefly speak, in order to commend both it and its great subject to all our readers, and far beyond that range, if we could reach it. We have here twelve sketches of as many great missionaries, vigorously and graphically written, with the strong points of their characters admirably brought out, and lucidly set before us. The volume obviously contains the pith, or the spirit of many more, read and mastered to furnish materials for commending these twelve heroes to the churches, where their memories may well be fragrant; and while the work is thus well adapted to our rapid and impatient age, it will, we hope, convey important truth into many minds which, but for it, might never have entered upon such studies, or never have searched for information far and near, as Dr Thomson has done with such obvious care.

We need not very minutely analyse the contents of the volume. Thousands, we trust, will do that for themselves. But we have here depicted John Eliot and his achievements among the red men of the west—the missionary whose “pains and prayers” made the desert blossom as the rose; and Brainerd the blessed—sometimes morbid and self-consuming—but withal, one of the most honoured of men since apostolic times; and Christian David of Herrenhut, with his intrepid bands, who made Greenland vocal with the good tidings all unknown before—a man whose history we think is here presented to us in a separate or continuous form for the first time; and John Williams, the man whose heroism in the cause of truth was blessed to carry the knowledge of it to about 300,000 savages; and who, with his own hands, built churches, houses, and even ships, to spread the gospel, dying a martyr at last in the cause; and John Theodore Vanderkamp, the once-noted infidel, but, by the grace of God, the still more noted messenger of mercy to thousands; and our own John Campbell, the meek, timid hero,—the indefatigable worker for Christ in many lands; and Dr Grant, the apostle, may we call him? of the Nestorians; and Ziegenbalg, and Swartz, and Carey, and Martyn, for India; with Dr Judson for Burmah,—all of them honoured far above princes, and prepared for their place among

those who turn sinners to righteousness, by many a struggle, and trial, and woe. The volume is thus, in a moral sense, a photographic gallery. Each honoured man is there representing some special aspect of the missionary work, its toils, its perils, and successes, or some peculiar adaptation for its many-sided duties; and altogether we know not any volume of the same size better adapted to give a right direction to missionary aims, or to impart, if blessed, a right direction to missionary minds. The young may here be interested, while some may be induced to face the question—Have I no call to walk in these men's footsteps? Shall I make the mere admiration of His servants a quit-rent to my Lord?

In no respect are we better pleased with this volume than as regards its buoyant hopefulness for the cause of missions. While deploring the lethargy of many regarding it, and not ignoring the difficulties which do still, and must long, impede our progress, Dr Thomson knows of a power which can master them all. He lets us see men grasping that power, and triumphing thereby; and when multitudes learn to do likewise, the time will be drawing on when our poor groaning world may look out for deliverance.

The Missionary Life and Labours of Francis Xavier, taken from his own Correspondence, with a Sketch of Romish Missions among the Heathen. By HENRY VENN, B.D. London: Longman. 1862.

Every one who has looked into the French life of Xavier, and formed any accurate idea of the devotion and zeal and gifts of that remarkable man and earnest Jesuit, must have had a desire to know more about him. It is the same feeling that prompts the desire in many to become acquainted with Port-Royal, or Madame Guion, or Fénelon. Dr Venn, the earnest secretary of the Church Missionary Society, has met this wish in the well-executed volume before us. We are here led to see the devoted missionary a burning and shining light; but no one will think better of Popery, or of the popish system of conducting missions, respecting which Dr Venn remarks that they have never succeeded, notwithstanding all the dazzling accessories or accompaniments which have sometimes gone along with them. The volume before us will do good in bringing out this fact, as well as in exhibiting to English readers, in a truthful way, the noble qualities of this devoted man—a Christian of a high order, notwithstanding his Jesuitism.

WORKS ON PRACTICAL RELIGION.

The Three Marys. By the Rev. A. MOODY STUART, author of the "Exposition of the Song of Solomon." London: Nisbet & Co. 1862.

Those who have made themselves acquainted with the searching style of Mr M. Stuart's teaching, will find in this pleasingly written work all his best peculiarities—deep experimental views of the exercise of grace in the heart, with a piercing insight into the phases of Christian character. The delineation is solid, and the exposition exact, without that ingenuity and fancy which have sometimes been carried a little too far in some of his other productions. The book deserves to be widely read.

From the Cradle to the Crown: or Days with Jesus. By the Rev. JOHN HUNTER, late of Halifax, N.S. London: Nisbet & Co.

This is a neat little volume, consisting of seven short, but thoughtful, chapters: the babe, the boy, the friend for every day, the worker, the sympathising kinsman, alone and lonely, the Judge. The style is elegant and clear, the matter is evangelical and fresh, and the whole tone and spirit highly commendable. Mr Hunter, while he walks in the old paths, does not walk precisely with the same gait, in the very same foot-prints, and at the

identical pace of his predecessors. He thinks and speaks for himself, and consequently he has produced a useful little volume.

The Risen Redeemer ; the Gospel History from the Resurrection to the Pentecost. By F. W. KRUMMACHER, D.D. Translated from the German by JOHN T. BETTE, with the sanction of the author. London : Nisbet & Co. 1863.

The character of Krummacher's sermons is too well established and too well known to call for any description or analysis from us. We content ourselves with noticing the appearance of the present volume, which has all the well known peculiarities of the richly gifted author. The translator has done his part well.

The Sympathy of Christ with Man ; its Teaching and its Consolation. By OCTAVIUS WINSLOW, D.D. London : Nisbet & Co. 1862.

Most of our readers are familiar with Dr Winslow and his books. We think that, on the whole, this volume is superior to most of its predecessors from the same pen. The matter is fuller and fresher. The subject is not so common as those on which Dr Winslow has formerly written. It is a delicate and difficult walk of theology ; but we think that Dr Winslow has kept his balance well between the divine and the human, and has produced a book which brings out a phase of our Lord's person and work all too little dwelt on by our modern divines.

Freedom and Happiness in the Truth and Ways of Christ. By the Rev. JAMES STRATTEN, more than forty years Minister of Paddington Chapel. London : Nisbet & Co. 1862.

Good evangelical discourses, having a value, not only to the flock to whom the writer has long ministered, but to a wider circle, though they have nothing particularly striking either in thought or style.

Nichol's Standard Divines.—Goodwin's Works, Vol. IV. Commentary on the Second Epistle of Peter, by THOMAS ADAMS.

This volume of Goodwin's works is particularly welcome, as containing the two practical treatises which have always found the greatest favour among the readers of his works, "Christ Set Forth," and "Christ's Heart in Heaven."

But the appearance of the first of a series of Puritan commentaries gives us particular gratification, as we have always considered this department of Puritan literature as one of its most important parts—perhaps its most important part. That they are prolix is not denied. But they who are acquainted with the manner of these commentaries can more easily read *all that is expository* in them than they can turn over any of the larger commentaries on Scripture, and they possess great value. We trust the enterprising publisher will find such encouragement as may induce him to bring out other treasures, such as *Gouge* on Hebrews, *Elton* and *Byfield* on Colossians, *Bayne* on Ephesians, and many others, which it would require a catalogue to name.

MISCELLANEOUS.

My Country. The History of the British Isles. By E. S. A. Edited by Rev. J. H. BROOME, Vicar of Houghton, Norfolk. London : Wertheim. 1862. 2 vols.

An unpretending but very interesting little history of the British Isles from a Christian point of view. It brings out many historical facts con-

nected with the religion and morals of our country, omitted by the secular historian, and deserves the attention particularly of youthful readers.

Calvin, his Life, his Labours, and his Writings. Translated from the French of FELIX BUNGENER. Edinburgh : Clark. 1863.

Bungener, already well known by his lively and interesting sketches in certain fields of church history, has recently published a *Life of Calvin*, which has been well received on the continent. It is to be hoped that it will help to bring back the attention of the continental churches to the real merits of Calvin, who has of late been as much neglected and cast off as he was once esteemed by them. The *Life* of which we here have a translation is written with historical accuracy and French vivacity, and can be read with an interest which the much more elaborate work of Henry has not called forth. The biographer evinces a sincere admiration for Calvin, though there are parts of the Reformer's system, and phases of his character, which it would require a mind more akin to Calvin's own to apprehend. Dr Cunningham's delineation of the Reformer supplies much of what Bungener wants.

Mick Tracy, the Irish Scripture Reader ; or the Martyred Convert and the Priest. A Tale of Facts, by W. A. C. London : The Book Society. 1862

"Mick Tracy" is a style of book with which we do not often, or greatly, concern ourselves. It is a novel, a religious novel. The design of it is to bring out the peculiarities of the papacy, as they are exhibited in Ireland. The pictures which the author draws are graphic, lifelike, and artistic. The life, the habits, and thoughts of the Irish priest, and the Irish peasantry, are well brought out ; they are fully and, we believe, fairly represented. The author fails, to our apprehension, when he attempts to delineate the words and ways of the higher classes of Irish society ; but, taken as a whole, the volume deserves commendation, and will, we doubt not, do good service in conveying right ideas as to the evil effects of the papacy on the Irish people. The pictures of the priests we believe to be no way overdrawn or caricatured.

Convent Life in Italy. By ALGERNON TAYLOR. London : Charles J. Street, Charing Cross. 1862.

"This volume is compiled from the writer's journal of several tours in Italy, made between the years 1856 and 1859." It is a poor book. The author of it is more of a papist than a protestant. He can engage *con amore* in all the parts of the Romish worship. He draws back only at the extremest point of transubstantiation. Hence we have popery neither from a popish nor from a protestant stand-point. There is no complete picture ; no perfect statistics ; no definite, decided, trustworthy facts. The medium through which they are seen is all and always *couleur de rose* ; and the result is unsatisfactory in the highest degree.

English Nonconformity. By ROBERT VAUGHAN, D.D. London : Jackson Walford. 1862.

This work, which owes its origin to the Bicentenary Commemoration of the Exodus of the 2000 ministers from the Church of England, was prepared by the author at the request of the Congregational Union. It is written with much vivacity and elegance, and is well adapted to the object which it was meant to serve—to "express opinions and feelings which are common among English Congregationalists."

The author might have dispensed with the introductory chapters, which go back to the early days of Christianity, and then bring before us the middle ages. "English Nonconformity" is not immediately connected with

either of these. With regard to the research of the volume, and the real information communicated by it, we cannot say, that beyond its lively, pleasant, and sketchy style, it brings before us anything but what every reader who has directed any attention to the Puritans already knows. One point for which we were prepared by the circumstances of its preparation, viz., the steady aim to put Congregationalism in its best light, is not only too much for the taste of any one who is not wedded to the traditions of that denomination, but too much for the authentic facts of history. We thought the day had gone by for that exclusive party spirit, and making capital of history for denominational purposes.

The part of the volume which continues the history of Nonconformity down to recent times, is one of its most interesting and most valuable sections, but only too succinct and sketchy. Though the book, true to its origin, is too narrowly denominational, yet it is a well written account, which the reader can peruse with interest and pleasure.

The following works on Practical Religion which have come to hand, we can only announce in the mean time, viz. :—

1. *The Believer's Treasure.* By D. DEWAR, D.D., late Principal of Marischal College, Aberdeen. Glasgow : Murray. 1862.
2. *Realities, or the Manifestations of God in past ages considered as earnest of the future.* London : W. Yapp. 1862.
3. *Saturday Afternoons, or Short Addresses to a class of Young Women.* by a LADY. London : Wertheim.
4. *Pentecostal Blessings.* By the Rev. DAVID PITCAIRN. London : Wertheim. 1862.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

APRIL 1863.

ART. I.—*Dr Hickok's Philosophy.**

Rational Psychology ; or the Subjective Idea and Objective Law of All Intelligence. By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D.D., Union College. A new and revised edition. New York : Ivison, Phinney & Co. 1861.

A System of Moral Science. By the same. Third edition. Same publishers.

Empirical Psychology ; or the Human Mind as given in Consciousness. By the same. Third edition. Same Publishers.

Rational Cosmology ; or the Eternal Principles and the Necessary Laws of the Universe. By the same. A new edition, with revisions and Notes. New York : D. Appleton & Co. 1859.

[THE object of the following article is to present a brief outline of Dr Hickok's philosophy. It has been prepared by one of his personal friends, who is a decided advocate of his system. To this its value, to the readers of this journal, is largely due. They must be glad to receive, from an able and accomplished writer, a view of this philosophy, which is not liable to the charge either of misapprehension or perversion. The article, therefore, is not to be regarded as presenting the estimate of the *Princeton Review* of Dr Hickok's system, but the light in which it is viewed by its adherents.]

DR HICKOK, though profoundly acquainted with German speculations, and constantly resorting to terms which they have made common, differs vitally from every German thinker, both as respects the starting-point and the termination of his phi-

* This article is from the *Princeton Review* of last year.—ED. B. & F. B. R.
VOL. XII.—NO. XLIV.

losophy. Though he is evidently in closer sympathy with Kant than with any other great leader of modern thought, yet the grand results of their thinking are diametrically opposite. It is the whole purpose of the "Rational Psychology" to establish what it is equally the aim of the "Critick of Pure Reason" to overthrow. With Kant, the being of a God, the freedom and immortality of the soul, and the substantial existence of an objective world, are all incapable of speculative proof. But we should not greatly err in saying, that the most noticeable feature in all Dr Hickok's thinking, is the confidence with which he affirms, and the persistence with which he maintains, the doctrine exactly opposite to this. If, aside from the simple presentation of his philosophical views, there is one aim which has evidently controlled him in what he has written, it is to attain a foundation upon which philosophical scepticism may be utterly overthrown. Each of his works is penetrated by the deep conviction of its author, that such a position can be reached, and that the method he has adopted is the certain way to secure it. This fact gives us the point of view from which his philosophy should be contemplated, in order to a comprehensive acquaintance with its scope and meaning.

Scepticism, according to Dr Hickok, is the necessary result of every system of thought which confines the work of the intellect to its judgments and inferences. These are, indeed, operations properly within its sphere, but if it can do nothing more, he argues, no judgment can ever be affirmed beyond a contradiction, nor the ground of any inference be established beyond a doubt. If, *e. g.*, the judgment: there is an external world, be denied by one who affirms that there is only a seeming phantasm, and that our belief in its reality is a dream, obviously the first judgment cannot escape this denial by a mere re-affirmation of itself, but only as it is grounded in another judgment, higher or more simple. Take then this higher judgment, *e. g.*, there is an external world, because we are so made that we must believe it, and immediately we meet the sceptical inquiry, How do we know that we are not so made that we must believe a lie? To remove this doubt renders necessary a similar procedure as before. We may say, *e. g.*, the wisdom and beneficence of the Creator could not allow our only modes of judgment to be necessarily deceptive, but this only opens the way to graver doubts, and more numerous questions; *e. g.*, How do we know that there is a Creator? and what evidence have we that he is wise and kind? The same is true with every possible judgment. It is liable, at once, to some kind of doubt, and the attempt to remove this, by means of some higher judgment, instead of eradicating the scepticism, only gives it a stronger hold in a deeper soil. That this scept-

ticism is inherent to all the processes of the merely judging or inferring intellect, Dr Hickok finds evidence alike in the nature of the process itself, and in its actual exhibitions in the history of thought.

We may, undoubtedly, attempt to avoid this result, by affirming that we find ourselves in the possession of certain "common sense" convictions, back of which we cannot go, and upon which we may confidently rest our declarations, that there is a world, and there is a God. Moreover, the sceptic himself cannot doubt, that he also possesses these same convictions, or at least that they are the inalienable heritage of the great proportion of mankind. Why is not this enough? To this inquiry it might be a sufficient reply, that notwithstanding the force with which this testimony of "common sense" is affirmed, neither the position of the sceptic has been materially changed, in consequence, nor his progress essentially checked. But, beyond this, the sceptic declares, that the deductions of his logic contradict these convictions of his common sense, and that he must, at least, doubt which of the two to believe. Still further, he presses the more momentous inquiry: Why should we believe these convictions of common sense, for how do we know that they may guide us infallibly? and to this, in the field which he occupies in common with his opponents, there is no satisfactory reply. It is, of course, easy to say, that this query is impertinent or absurd, or that it is impossible to answer it, because, we are so made, that we must believe these convictions—but the sceptic as easily replies: that this refusal to answer only confirms his doubt, and that the reason assigned for the refusal, is only a begging of the very question in dispute.

It is to meet these difficulties, and to overthrow all scepticism in its last resort, that Dr Hickok has laboured. His first inquiry is: Whether there may not be some power in the intellect beyond its capacity for connecting things together, and deriving conclusions of one judgment from another? Have we any faculty by which we can see truth in a light so clear that we shall need nothing but its own shining to reveal its absolute ground and reason? Can the truth be made to stand out before us as self-affirmatory, and needing nothing but itself for its support? Having *believed* that the mountains sustain the heavens, and that Atlas sustains the mountains, may we *know* that the heavens sustain themselves and embrace the mountains?

Dr Hickok answers these questions with an emphatic affirmative. In distinction from that faculty which can affirm one thing *because* of another, and which, in that it must *stand* something *under* every affirmation, is properly termed the *understanding*, he recognises, in the human intellect, a far loftier

capacity, whose province is to behold the truth, by an immediate insight, and in its absolute and self-affirming ground. This higher faculty, in that it, through the visible symbol, can *read* the truth, invisible to any eye of the sense or the understanding, is fitly named the *reason*.

This distinction between the reason and the understanding is fundamental in Dr Hickok's thinking, but we shall make the gravest mistake in supposing that it means no more with him than that distinction, in similar terms, which is so prominent in the Critical Philosophy, and whose fallacy, as there recognised, Sir William Hamilton, and Dr Hickok himself, have unanswerably exposed. With Kant, and with the, so called, German transcendental school, the reason is only a higher understanding. The two faculties differ only in name, not in reality. Both are essentially powers of judgment, which are so made that they attain their conclusions in a certain way,—the one directed by what Kant calls the *categories* of the understanding, and the other by what he terms the *ideas* of the pure reason. Neither of these has the capacity to look around or through either itself or its objects. Neither can therefore lead to absolute knowledge. Nothing which the mind receives can be known except as modified by its necessary method of receiving it, and this is equally true of both the reason and the understanding. The understanding *judges* that all its objects must come under the forms of categories of quantity, quality, relation, and mode—and the reason also *judges* that all its objects must be regulated by the form or idea of the absolute; but that these forms exist out of and independent of the mind which contains them, cannot be affirmed. That there is any quantity or quality, objective and real, the understanding cannot prove, and that there is any absolute outside of the mind which conceives it, the reason cannot know. Hence the distinction between the two faculties disappears, and the Critical Philosophy, as propounded by Kant, becomes justly liable to all the scepticism which has attended its development in the later German schools.

But it is a very different doctrine of the reason which Dr Hickok maintains. In his view, this is a faculty which differs as truly in kind, and not merely in variety or degree, from all others, as that which is truly spiritual in man differs from the animal part of his nature. Spirit is, purely and primarily, with him, self-consciousness—*i. e.*, it belongs to the very being of spirit that it should know itself. In this self-knowledge, there is involved an activity determining itself, and thus a self-direction—*i. e.*, spirit in *knowing* itself, *has* itself, and is thus, essentially, a person. Moreover, in this self-knowledge, and the self-determination which it implies, there

are disclosed two points of view from which the agency of spirit may be contemplated, and in which this agency becomes revealed as two distinct faculties of spirit, which may be named, respectively, reason and will. Reason is spirit, so far as it is self-knowing; and will is spirit, so far as it is self-directing. Spirit comprehends the two, and is, essentially, an activity which knows and determines, *i. e.*, directs itself.

In this conception of spirit, the reason becomes an original and broad capacity for knowledge. In knowing itself, it knows what reason is, and can thus detect reason whenever it passes before its eye. In its self-knowledge it has a standard by which it can measure all things which can come within its apprehension, and determine whether they be reasonable or not. It can thus become the artistic critic, the philosopher, and the moral judge. All objects of beauty, truth, and goodness, become known to the reason, and give it joy and satisfaction only as they fit and fill those archetypal principles which are found within itself, and which it knows as it knows itself.

It is the original function of the reason, according to Dr Hickok, to know not simply what is, but what must be. In knowing itself, it knows what is reasonable, and when this is clearly seen, its necessity is equally apparent. It is unreasonable, *e. g.*, that the world should exist without an author; and thus in "the things that are made," we clearly see the "eternal power and Godhead" of their Maker to be a necessary truth. It is unreasonable that this array of appearances, which the senses reveal, should be without a substantial ground; and thus we see in every phenomenon that its substance, and in every event that its cause must necessarily be. These are necessary truths, *i. e.*, not alone necessarily believed, but necessarily existent, because it would contradict reason were they otherwise. Moreover, in their necessity is also their universality. That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, must be as true of all spaces as of any one space; and the same is as obvious of all truths which the reason affirms. Dr Hickok thus terms it the *comprehending* faculty. It comprehends itself and the other faculties of the soul. It comprehends the phenomena and events of nature in their substances and causes, and these in their Author. By its own immediate insight, it knows eternal principles and necessary truths. But can it know anything other than the barest abstractions? and can its knowledge of these exclude all possibility of cavil or scepticism? These are, of course, fundamental inquiries, for the adequacy of the reason to its assigned work, either in philosophy or in life, depends upon them. It will at once be supposed, and not incorrectly, that Dr Hickok affirms both these points.

In reference to the former, his doctrine is, that there is in fact nothing which we truly know, in which some contribution of the reason is not an essential element. The reason furnishes an idea for every fact of knowledge, and only in the light of this idea can any fact be truly known. I may *believe*, *e. g.*, on the testimony of another, that the ratios of solid bodies are as the cubes of their homologous sides, and my confidence in the knowledge and truthfulness of him who affirms it, may be such, that my conviction of the truth will be as certain as if I had followed out the demonstration myself. But conviction of certainty is not knowledge, and I can only *know* this truth when I see its accord with those primitive ideas or axioms which are comprehended in the reason alone. To *believe* and to *know* may not differ at all in the certainty of their conviction, but the difference is entire in the ground on which this certainty rests. In the one case I rely upon something outside myself, and in the other, on what is disclosed within. And it is in this inner disclosure that the reason asserts itself, and that true science becomes attainable. Anything which contradicts its clear insight, can be no object of belief or knowledge. The reason immediately dismisses it as absurd, while anything which it sees to be in harmony with itself, it at once pronounces necessary and eternal. All mathematical truths become known as they are thus disclosed. The whole field of mathematics is thus a valid province for the reason's survey. Dr Hickok reverts to this in all his treatises, and maintains, by repeated arguments and illustrations, that no mathematical knowledge is possible, to man, except through his possession of reason.

In like manner with the realm of beauty. Unless immediately beheld by the reason, it is never known. The beauty in the landscape cannot be in aught which the bodily eyes behold, for the ox sees this as truly as the man. Neither can it be in any reflection upon this, for the reflective judgment presupposes, in the mind, a standard to which it must refer for its correctness. There is an eye within which sees the beautiful, and knows it as such, only as its light blends with its own. Using the bodily organ as its instrument, the reason becomes thereby awakened to an ideal in itself, and a sentiment in the object of its contemplations which accords with this. And it pronounces the object beautiful, just in proportion to this accord. The whole field of art is thus the province of the reason. No æsthetic criticism could be, unless the reason had its ideal of perfect beauty, by which it could measure every object of its contemplations.

In like manner with the entire domain of psychology. Neither the perceptions of the sense could be known as real, nor the reflections of the understanding as valid, save by the agency

of the comprehending reason. Dr Hickok's argument for this, though referred to in his other works, is fully unfolded in the first and second parts of the "Rational Psychology." Briefly stated, in our own language, it is this: How can I know that the phenomena which I perceive, are not mere phantasms? Now, the very inquiry presupposes that there is a higher faculty which must decide the question; but, aside from this, that the mind determines the issue solely from its rational insight, is clear, from a simple statement of the process of perception. For, all the phenomena which we perceive, we must construct in form, *i. e.*, we must limit them in respect of their space, their time, or their degree of intensity. We cannot perceive anything unless it be *defined*. But this is not enough. The object must also be *discriminated*, or there is no perception, *i. e.*, we must not only mark out its boundaries, and see *how much*, but we must distinguish its peculiarity, and see *what* the object is, before we can perceive it. In other words, perception cannot be, unless there be a *quantity* and a *quality* to the object. Now there is something in the mind which can overlook the whole perceptive process, and determine that such and such things are essential to it. In other words, the mind has an *idea* of what perception must be, if it be at all. It not only *believes*, it *knows* that no perception by the senses would be possible, unless the mind could distinguish and define the object it perceived. We could never perceive a sound, unless, in the process of perception, this were *distinguished*, *e. g.*, from a colour, and also *defined*, *e. g.*, as dull or sharp, soft or loud, &c.

But how does this prove the *reality* of the phenomena? Obviously, if the mind passes through this procedure, *i. e.*, if it finds itself distinguishing and defining quality and quantity, there is to it a real appearance or phenomenon. If the process of perception be real, so must its objects be. But how do I know that the perceived object is separate from the perceiving mind? Doubtless many objects which the mind perceives are its own subjective exercises, but it is equally clear that there are many separate from and independent of itself. For, if we notice carefully these objects, we shall see, that they divide themselves strictly into two classes, one of which is subject wholly to the mind's control, and the other not at all. Now this latter class, which come and go quite independent of the mind, and which it cannot change, either as to the time or the manner of their appearance, evidently have an agency, and thus a being of their own, separate from the mind which perceives them. They are as real as they are perceived, and they are as objective as they are real. The reality of an objective world is clearly beheld by that eye of the mind, within whose scope

the whole perceiving process is performed. This eye is the reason, by whose presence alone the inquiry respecting the reality of an external world becomes suggested to us, and by whose insight alone it can be answered.

But is this external world anything but a range of phenomena? Has it a substantial existence? We can only perceive phenomena, can we know aught else? True, if there be a substance, it cannot be *perceived*. While it may have quantity and quality, these are only its properties, not it, and no work of perception can therefore reach it. But it would be most unreasonable to say that there can be quantity or quality without some ground for these. If no substance be *perceived*, it is necessarily *thought*. The operations of the reflective understanding would cease at once, unless there were some substance beneath every phenomenon, as the ground of its reality. No phenomena could be connected together, and no thought would be possible, without a valid substance for the one, and a real subject for the other. Without these, all experience becomes a nullity; for the arising and vanishing of appearances, which come from naught and can be referred to naught, is not experience. There is a faculty in the mind which declares that unless there be something which cannot be perceived, then there is nothing which can be perceived. This faculty is the reason, and to it the mind assents with undoubting conviction. But beyond this, the same faculty sees that an external substance is not only necessary in order to any connection of phenomena, but in order to any communication of one man with another, respecting the phenomena of either. A man in a balloon, without compass or barometer, and in the midst of an impenetrable and constantly shifting cloud, has no means of determining his position, or the direction of his movements. This can only be fixed by its relation to something else which is also fixed. In like manner, the places and periods of any phenomena can only be determined, in their relations to each other, and to one whole of space and time, by their relation to something which is not phenomenal, and which, because it never appears, can give to every appearance a relative locality and duration. The reason sees that if we ever assign to one phenomenon a place and period in a whole of space and time, different from that of another phenomenon, and with determined relations to this, then there must be some permanent substance by which this may be effected. Our knowledge of substance is thus as clear as these determined relations are evident. There is, therefore, a substantial world, external to us, which the reason immediately beholds.

But can anything be known respecting such a world beyond its bare existence? The "Rational Cosmology" answers this

question in the affirmative, and professes to give some of those eternal principles which the reason beholds in the universe around us. It is at least true, that some such principles are affirmed by every mind. No one doubts, *e. g.*, that matter, wherever it exists, must occupy space. This is no induction from our experience, for not only does our experience come in contact with too small a portion of the whole creation of matter to warrant such a universal conclusion, but, more than this, we know that there could not have been any experience, even of matter, unless there were, separate from the matter, a space for it to occupy. It is a higher faculty than the sentient or reflective which affirms this, and this faculty is the reason. Again, we know that different matter cannot occupy the same space at the same time. To this all men assent, and yet the senses, at the most, can only testify that they never see this done, and the reflective understanding, at the farthest, can only apply this testimony to the whole of the *actual* experience—it cannot touch the possible. For aught our senses, or deductions resting only on these, can tell us, there may be matter without space, and different matter at the same time in the same space. Yet we know this to be impossible, but how? Obviously, only through some higher faculty of knowledge, which may appropriately be termed the reason, and which, whether we call it by any other name, does give us these eternal principles, as the necessary laws for the very existence of matter. But why may not this faculty, which does thus much, do more? Is it absurd to seek, is it impossible to find, other principles also? Certainly, if there be a creation, God must have had some reason for this, which, as eternally within himself, must have directed all the processes of his creative hand. It would be as irreverent to affirm, as it is impossible to conceive, that God was controlled by no reason in the work of creation. It is equally the demand of a true philosophy and a scriptural faith, that there should be an eternally controlling reason or wisdom, which the Lord possessed, “in the beginning of his way, before his works of old.” There must also as truly be a reason for every part of creation as for the whole, and which determined the Creator to make as he did every individual thing which he has made. And it is doubtless true that we are inquiring for this reason. The child does it. The man does it. The whole history of philosophy reveals only this inquiry as its guiding spring. Every man, even the most stolid, seeks a reason for the facts which he beholds around him. Attempts are made to answer the inquiry by making one fact rest upon another, or explaining the existence of one part of creation by the demands of another part. The stone falls, *e. g.*, because of gravity; or, the tides rise because

of the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the question, sure to arise, Why and what is gravity? or, Why and how do the heavenly bodies work thus upon the earth? is not thus answered. Moreover, if we give it any heed, we shall notice that this answer is only another statement, in a more general form, of the very fact for which we sought an explanation. To say that gravity makes the stone to fall, and that gravity is the power which guides the tides and planets, is simply to declare that that which does one thing does something else also, but nothing is thus explained. Our search for knowledge is thus answered by enlarging the field of our ignorance. Or, if we still persist, and meet the reply: Gravity is only the expression of the divine will in the control of matter,—or, the uniform way in which the Creator governs his work,—we are thus unavoidably reminded of the method of the ancient dramatists, who would introduce a deity (*ex machina*) upon the stage, merely to cut some knot in the drama which the ordinary personages could not untie. We admit that this resort was quite unworthy of the artist then, and we can hardly restrain the conviction, that it is no better befitting the philosopher now. The answer may, indeed, silence the inquiry, but the disposition reverently to propound it still remains, and is not, and cannot thus be stifled. When we seek a reason for a fact, we cannot be contented by another fact which must have its reason also. Is it not possible, therefore, that this disposition to seek for an ultimate reason, which the Creator has implanted so ineradicably within us, he intended us to use, in order that he might thereby conduct us to the satisfying object of our search?

The principles which Dr Hickok, in the "Rational Cosmology," affirms to be within the immediate insight of the reason, are very numerous, and nothing can exaggerate their importance if true. It is sufficient, for our present purpose, to take the first one which he lays down, and to give, in our own language, his thought and method of statement. This principle is, that *matter is force*, which Dr Hickok declares to be immediately beheld by the reason, and as necessarily and unchangeably true, as that matter occupies space, &c. But when he affirms that this, and the other principles which he propounds, are immediately seen, he does not mean that every eye at once beholds them, without any efforts to render the vision steady and clear. They are immediately seen, just as all mathematical truths are, which, however, may require long and arduous processes before they can be brought within the mind's range of view. All Dr Hickok's demonstrations in this book are that the reason sees these principles to be such, and that if thus seen, they need no farther proof, for they prove themselves. They stand revealed in their own light, and declare their truth with their own

voice beyond a contradiction. Now, that the reason sees matter to be force, may be revealed, first from the facts of our sensuous experience. For, what are these facts? What is it we experience? A certain body is visible, audible, &c.—what do we mean by this? Closely noted, it is that such a body has the power to affect our eye or ear in such a way. So also we say the body is hard, soft, fragrant, sapid; by which we can mean nothing other than that it has the power to affect us to the perception of these qualities. Thus of all the organs of sense. All that they can do, or reveal, is the presence of certain affections which certain bodies have produced; and thus all that we can derive, by *inference* from the senses, is, that the body which has caused the affection, *has* force. Force, therefore, is everything belonging to matter, of which we have any experience; and if we stood upon the basis of the so-called experimental philosophy, we should be obliged to say that we know nothing about matter, farther than its force. But we go beyond this, and declare that matter can be nothing but force; for to affirm otherwise, would be to contradict reason. Because, if we say that matter is an unknown something, to which force is communicated, but from which it differs, do we not see that even the capability to receive such communication, or to retain it, is itself a force, and that thus we are driven to the contradiction of declaring that matter has force before it has force? Or, if we take the position that force must have some substance to support it, and in which it may inhere, we meet with the same difficulty in a different word; for what is involved in this substance or support, but the very idea which we seek to exclude? Could it be a substance, standing under (*substans*) and supporting anything without force? What else, therefore, have we to do with matter than as a force! This includes all to which our experience testifies, while it excludes everything but itself from the conception of matter. It is not possible for us either to know that matter is anything but force, or to conceive that it can be. It is thus directly seen, and may be unhesitatingly affirmed by the reason, as an eternal principle, that matter is force. But what is force? Dr Hickok answers that it is action and reaction. This, he claims, will fill its whole conception. But if this be true, the origin of force, and mode of its origination, are at once revealed. For, whence can action come but from spirit, to which activity purely and essentially belongs? Spirit, therefore, must be older than matter and its author. But not every spirit—not the finite can create. They are already limited. Only the Absolute Spirit can make his act react upon itself, and thus produce a force which is truly his creation. And now that our idea of creation involves

exactly this process, is clearly seen. For, either creation is limited, or it is not. If we take the latter ground, we are both absurd and unchristian; for this is Pantheism, and we thus identify the Creator and the creature. But if we affirm the former position, what is this but declaring that the activity of the Creator restrained itself at the point where creation began, and that this self-imposed restraint is exactly what we mean by creation?

In all this view of its work it is not implied that the human reason knows all things, nor that a reverential faith in God can ever cease to be its crowning glory. Because finite, it must be limited in its knowledge, and because it cannot comprehend infinity, it must rest on One who can. But the finite reason knows the eternal and unfailing ground for this demand of faith, in that it sees that it would be most unreasonable to have it otherwise. It knows God, not because it does or can comprehend him, but because the truth of his being is mirrored in its own being, *i. e.*, in its self-knowledge, it finds that which would be contradicted by the denial of God. Coincident with the absurdity of doubting its own being, would be the absurdity if the finite reason should doubt the being of God. It knows him, not by the testimony of another, but by an intuition of its own. In Dr Hickok's own language,—“The conception of the non-being of the Absolute Reason involves the absurdity of conceiving reason to be unreasonable.”*

But this original knowledge of God, so clear, so direct, so impossible for the finite reason really to doubt, involves also a knowledge of many truths predicable of him. “He is manifestly a Person, having in himself the knowledge of all possible, and the self-determining will to execute all his own behests. To him there can be no beginning nor end, for there can be no time when he was not; and to him there can be no bounds, for there can be no place where he is not. He is unsustained and uncaused, for there can be no substance which he does not hold, and no cause which he does not originate. He is absolved from all dependence upon, and determination by, any other being than himself. Here is no abstraction, but the positive affirmation of the *I AM*; he who has being, and blessedness, and exhaustive fulness, in himself; even the being of whom it would be an everlasting absurdity to suppose that he was not, and was not blessed, and was not satisfied. Sense cannot perceive him; discursive thought cannot conceive him; only a spiritual discernment, the direct insight of reason, can behold him. All the attributes which our manner of conceiving apply to him, participate in this characteristic of absoluteness.

* “Rational Cosmology,” p. 86.

His wisdom is absolved from all dependence upon outward conditions. He has within himself the reason-view of all things possible to be put in objective being, in the plans or ideal archetypes to which they must conform; and his regard to that which is worthy of his own acceptance determines what of all that is possible shall also be actual. He is absolute liberty; for the one rule of that which is everlastingly worthy of himself, and securing his own dignity or glory, gives a repellancy and exclusion of all ends that might tyrannise and enslave. He is absolutely blessed; for in his constant holiness and steadfast purpose, fixed upon his own glory, there is no collision or disturbance, but the perpetual serenity of an unruffled flow of righteousness. He is absolute sovereign; for while the ultimate end of his own dignity is ever before him, and eternally directing all his agency, he, as supreme, has rightful authority and headship over all the beings that exist beside him, and may rightfully command in the ends of his glory, that they should serve him with unquestioning and constant devotion. He is, in fine, and as the most comprehensive form of expression, **THE ABSOLUTE GOOD**—good in himself, as supremely excellent, without any reference to a further end, and good as the source or supplier of all the good which any other beings possess and enjoy. He can be put to no use as a means to get something beyond himself; but as the end of all ends, all other things fulfil their measure in conspiring to present that to him which is in honour of him. The highest seraph and the humblest saint honour themselves only in their devotion to his honour.*

However it may appear to others, Dr Hickok evidently does not think it irreverent to speak of the Deity as controlled by principles. For principles, with him, are no *ab extra* chain stretched around the divine will, and guiding it perforce or by the nature of things; but rather are they the eternal archetypes of everlasting truth, which dwell in him as their uncreated ground, and which control him even as and because he controls himself. Dr Hickok confidently maintains that we could never worship God unless with the recognition that he is and must be eternally thus controlled. It is only, he claims, in the clear insight which our reasons possess of the truth that the absolute One, the supreme and perfect Spirit, will ever act worthy of himself, controlled alone by the unchanging behests of his own eternal glory, that we can feel any obligation to reverence, or any incitement to adoration. "It is precisely in this light," says the "Rational Psychology,"† "and solely in this presence, that we wake to the consciousness of what reverence is, and know that we stand before an awful majesty, where we

* "Rational Cosmology," pp. 86, 87.

† Pp. 436, 437.

must bow and adore. We may stand amid all the sublimities of that wonder-working *power* which is fashioning the material mechanism of the heavens and the earth, and we shall admire and praise in profound astonishment; we may look upon all the arrangements which, in the bounty of an ever-working *wisdom and kindness*, is diffusing sentient joy and gladness over millions of happy beings; and we may go with such as are competent to recognise their kind benefactor into his presence, and hear the ten thousand times ten thousand voices, in different ways proclaiming their *gladsome gratitude* as the sound of many waters, and we shall sympathise in their joys and praises with a rapturous delight; but it is only when I see all these standing in the presence of that absolute sovereignty and pure moral personality, who searches them all in the light of his own *dignity*, and judges them by the claims of his own *excellency*, and estimates their worth solely in reference to his *worthiness*; and when, also, I see that thus it behoved they should have been made, to be fit creatures of his ordering and accepting, and that he made them thus after the behest of his own uncreated reason, and in the light of his ethical truth and righteousness, and governs them, and holds them ever subordinate to his own moral glory and authority; it is in such a presence only, that I reverently cover my face, and fall prostrate, and cry from my inward spirit, 'Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty; heaven and earth are full of thy glory.' 'Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power, for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created.'" The spirit in which this passage is written pervades all the treatises of the author, many portions of which stir the soul as with an anthem, and awaken emotions which have no other so fitting expression as the exclamation of the apostle,—“For of him, and through him, and to him are all things, to whom be glory for ever!”

The importance of the reason in Dr Hickok's system is abundantly seen from the sketch we have given, and there needs little more for an accurate comprehension of his philosophic scheme. The functions of the reason are the architect of the whole. Both the basis and superstructure are laid and erected solely in the light, and by the working of a direct rational insight. The “Rational Psychology” furnishes his statement of what this power is, and his proof that it is. This is therefore not only the first of his works in the order of their publication, but the first, also, in the order of their systematic arrangement. The doctrine of the reason, as expounded in the third part of this treatise, is only evolved and carried out to its legitimate applications in whatever else he has written.

The "System of Moral Science" takes the rational rule of right as grounded in worthiness of spiritual approbation, and systematically applies this to the whole course of human conduct. The "Empirical Psychology" gathers the facts of the human mind as given in consciousness, and contemplates these in the light of that rational insight which detects their true and organic relations. The "Rational Cosmology" shews that the reason possesses ideas to which the universe conforms, and that no science of nature is possible unless the actual facts of the world around us are seen in living accord with the principles within.

The relations of this order of thought to philosophic scepticism remain to be noted, and may be comprehensively stated in a few words. The difference between the affirmations of the reason, which Dr Hickok propounds, and the dicta of common sense, as declared by Reid and the Scottish school, is simply this: the "common sense" utters what it universally believes, but for which it knows no ground; the reason declares what it beholds and knows in its own ground. The principles which the reason sees, do not need anything other than themselves for their support. They do not need to be proved, therefore, but only to be shewn. To demand a proof would be the absurdity of requiring a reason for reason. Reason affirms, declares, supports itself. If, therefore, anything can be shewn as revealed in the clear rational insight, this is sufficient, and we neither can gain, nor do we really ever seek any other ground than this. It is not simply because our powers are so weak that we cannot go beyond this; rather are they so lofty that they see in this the true ultimate, the self-supporting ground of all the rest. It is because we are reason that we rest in what is reasonable, and it would be to deny that self-knowledge which is our crown and royalty, could we look for anything beyond. It is only necessary, therefore, that the sceptic see a truly rational principle, and his scepticism is, so far as this principle reaches, for ever overthrown. If Dr Hickok's principles are true, and can be clearly shewn as such, no farther scepticism is possible in philosophy. A mind deeply imbued with this order of thought, could be no more sceptical than it could be unthinking.

In every system of philosophy, the relation of the subjective mind to the objective world has furnished a prominent theme of regard. How shall the two be brought into any such connection that the thought of matter shall be true, and the knowledge of it real? Upon this question the attention of every great thinker has been so diligently exercised that the different answers that have been given may afford a desirable method of classifying the different systems which the history

of philosophy reveals. All the forms of simple philosophical *Scepticism* centre in the doubt that any connection of mind and matter is possible. All philosophical *Mysticism* may be referred to the conviction that while such a connection is both possible and actual, it is also inexplicable. But while philosophers generally have neither doubted the fact of this connection nor failed to propound their methods of explaining it, it is quite obvious that every possible explanation must assume one of three general forms. I.—Mind and matter are intrinsically alike, and there is thus no difficulty in their relation. But this intrinsic likeness is liable to a twofold appearance, according as we view it in the resolving of mind into matter, or of matter into mind. In the one case there arises *Idealism*, which declares that matter is only mind degenerated; and in the other, *Materialism*, which affirms that mind is only matter refined. II.—Mind and matter are intrinsically diverse, and can be brought in contact only through a third somewhat. Here also we have a specific diversity of explanation. (1.) This bond of connection may be God, who brings the two together (a) only by his almighty power (*Descartes*); or (b) by the intervention of his will in occasional causes (*Geulinx*); or (c) by spiritualising the matter, so that we can see it in him (*Malebranche*); or (d) by a pre-established harmony (*Leibnitz*). (2.) Mind and matter may be attributes of one infinite substance (*Spinoza*). (3.) They may be opposite poles of the Absolute (*Schelling*). (4.) They are brought together by a superior principle, which unites them as matter and form (*Aristotle, Kant*). III.—Though intrinsically diverse, they have that in common by which they are related. On this ground stands *Plato*, with his ideas, and here also, in a classification of philosophical systems, is Dr Hickok's position. Spirit is, with him, essentially self-activity, with self-knowledge and self-determination; matter is essentially action and reaction, i. e., force. Matter may thus be the product of spirit, and cognisable by it. Such a conception removes the gulf, in other systems impassable, between the Creator and the creature, between the knowing mind and the material objects of its knowledge. But the two are not identified. The Creator is distinct from the creature, though he is in a true sense all in all, and all things live, and move, and have their being in him. The mind is different from its objects, though its activity and their agency meet in the common point of the mind's knowledge.

ART. II.—*Remarks on the foregoing, and other recent Vindications of Hickok's Philosophy.*

THE preceding article, from one of the most distinguished supporters and representative expounders of Dr Hickok's philosophy, we have cordially welcomed. We are glad to have, in a short compass, a clear exposition of that philosophy from an authorised source. It is something gained as the result of our strictures, that we have this system at length rendered to us in idiomatic and facile English, in a form, not only authentic, but as intelligible as the nature of the topics discussed allows. If it fails in its main object, this is not, in our judgment, so much the fault of the advocate, as of his cause. We think it confirms, instead of invalidating, our past strictures.

This is not the only attempt to vindicate this philosophy, and parry the criticisms, more especially of this journal, upon it, which have been called forth more immediately by the review of the "New and Revised Edition of Dr Hickok's Rational Psychology," published in our number for last October. That article, the present writer may be permitted to say (as it came from another source, well known by all concerned to be a distinguished divine in another branch of the church), has been favoured with rare proofs of its extraordinary power. It is very seldom that any disquisition on abstruse philosophical questions commands such general attention from friend and foe, in our own and foreign countries. In this country, it not only received special attention in the usual notices which the religious weeklies give of the quarterlies, together with high encomiums from persons eminent in philosophy, to whom the author was wholly unknown, but it was read with keen interest and delight by a much larger number than usually give metaphysical articles a careful perusal. Beyond our own country, it was honoured with most laudatory notices, and was republished in Great Britain. But, beside all this, it broke the reticency which, so far as we know, Dr Hickok has seen fit personally to preserve in reference to previous criticisms. It brought forth operose rejoinders in the *American Theological Review*, one by Dr Hickok himself in the April number, which had been preceded by one from his learned and accomplished coadjutor, Dr Tayler Lewis, in the January number, and is now followed, in this journal, by the exposition already presented to our readers, from a hand which we have good reason to suppose Dr Hickok would trust, as soon as any other, to discharge such an office. We refer to these unmistakable proofs of the high power of that article, furnished as well by Dr Hickok and his collaborators, as by manifold other demonstrations, for the

purpose of shewing that, whatever else he may see cause to do or not to do about it, he cannot afford to try to neutralise it by mere outbursts of irritation and contempt. Whatever he may accomplish in his search for the "subjective idea and objective law of all intelligence," or the necessary laws of world-building, he cannot afford such an attempt. To make it, is to confess that what is thus assailed cannot be refuted by argument. Whether Dr Hickok has not placed himself in this predicament, we will shortly inquire. Meanwhile, we have a few words to offer in regard to the communication of our respected correspondent.

And first, we will premise some things, by way of clearing the *status questionis*, which are applicable in various degrees, not only to the article of our correspondent, but to those of Drs Hickok and Lewis. The question is not, then, whether there are self-evident truths, above sense, which the mind has a faculty of seeing in their own light, intuitively, and without derivation by inference from any other truths. Nor is it, whether, especially in the mathematical, logical, and metaphysical, or what may be called in general the formal sciences, there are certain truths which are intuitively seen to be necessary, *i.e.*, such that their non-existence cannot be conceived without mental suicide. To deny them is to contradict reason and derationalise ourselves. It might be inferred from some parts of these rejoinders to our criticisms, that these truths were generally ignored or questioned, especially by the critics of Dr Hickok's philosophy in this journal, and that Dr Hickok had been called to the high office of reclaiming for them a due acknowledgment and authority in philosophy. We need not say that all such implications, whether intentional or not, are quite gratuitous. Self-evident and necessary truths, together with the faculty for knowing them, are neither overlooked nor denied by philosophers in general, outside of the Sensuous and Positive sect, nor by this journal, nor especially, by the critics of Dr Hickok in this journal. On the contrary, they are most strenuously affirmed in the principal notices of his works in our pages, as examination will abundantly shew. There is no special philosophical mission for Dr Hickok in this department. Whether he has not thrown all certainty of knowledge by our intuitions into doubt, is another and real question in this matter, on which we may have something to say; and, in reference to difficulties alleged in regard to which, his defenders will do well to say something, if they mean to escape the discredit of evading the true issues.

Nor is the question, what Dr Hickok meant to do. That he intended and endeavoured to correct the obliquities of Kant, to establish a real external world, a valid ontology, cosmology,

psychology, and theology, may be well enough admitted. Certainly we have not denied it. Nor have we questioned his piety, nor the devoutness and sublimity of some of his religious and philosophico-religious meditations. But whether, in making his great attempt, he has not undermined what he sought to establish, and laid down principles logically subversive of all foundations, is another question. To that we have addressed ourselves. And to the difficulties expressed by some of the ablest thinkers on this point, his apologists will do well to address themselves. Dr Hickok and his friends must not be too sensitive when we trace his system to pantheistic consequences. He does not hesitate to denounce modern philosophy, especially the prevalent religious philosophy, as "pantheistic."

Nor is the question, it is almost trivial to say, whether God acts according to perfect wisdom in the creation of the worlds, or whether rational beings can trace the signatures of his wisdom in his works? Those who read the vindications of Dr Hickok's philosophy now under review, can judge whether there is not abundant occasion for this remark, and whether much is not advanced in some of them, as if he were especially commissioned to maintain this truth, as being forgotten or impugned by his critics or others. The whole cosmical question raised by Dr Hickok is a very different one. It is whether the mind of man can know *à priori*, not merely some necessary truths or laws, such as we have already indicated; but that the only possible way in which God can produce matter is by his own antagonistic activities; whether such activities in counteraction being once given, the human reason can see *à priori* that they *must* operate so as to produce all and singular the forms and properties of matter organic and inorganic, mechanical, chemical, vegetable, animal, which now exist; that hence, God was shut up (not by the moral necessity of acting wisely in freedom, but by a physical and fatalistic impossibility of acting in any other way, whatever his wisdom may dictate) to the single alternative of creating what he has, or as he has, or not creating at all. This is what the vindicators of Dr Hickok's philosophy are called to defend; not that God acts wisely, and that we can see manifold traces of his wisdom, which who denies? And until some stronger defence of it appears than has yet come to light, we shall still reiterate our reprobation of such an attempt by mortal man; however able and ingenious, it is none the less perilous and presumptuous.

Turning now to the positive issues made by our correspondent, he says, "Scepticism, according to Dr Hickok, is the necessary result of every system of thought which confines the work of the intellect to its judgments and inferences." "That this scepticism is inherent in all processes of the merely judging

or inferring intellect, Dr Hickok finds evidence in the nature of the process itself." This is extraordinary language. First, it apparently confounds judgment and inference, as if they were mental processes equivalent and co-extensive. It is true that every inference is a judgment; but it is not true that every judgment is an inference, which is a judgment derived from another judgment. Judgments then are of two kinds—intuitive, and inferential or discursive. But these two kinds of judgments include all possible cognitions, and grasp the *omne scibile*. Every mental affirmation is a judgment. How can anything be known except by a mental affirmation that it is, or that it is thus and so? If, then, scepticism is the "necessary result" of intellectual operations in the form of judgments and inferences, where are we? Can we escape it? Can Dr Hickok rescue us from it, even by the exercise of the almost divine prerogatives he ascribes to the reason? for can reason, or any other faculty, know aright with certainty, otherwise than by judgments, however intuitive, self-evident, and necessary those judgments may be? Is self-affirmation less a judgment than any other kind of affirmation?

But let us attribute all this to some inexplicable confusion of ideas or terms which limits judgments to inferences. Let us assume that it is the object of the writer to maintain, as some passages would seem to imply, that we must have some faculty for judgments self-affirmed, and for grasping self-evident truths, which shine in their own light, without dependence on other truths for their proof. If so, we say again, this is nothing peculiar to Dr Hickok, nor questioned nor ignored by his critics. But, what is of more moment, he subverts the authority of such self-evident, ultimate truths, in his very argument for their necessity. For, in reference to these ultimate convictions, which we are so made that we cannot but trust them, whether in relation to objects of, or above, sense, he treats it as a fair question on the part of the sceptic, "How do we know that we are not so made that we must believe a lie?"—as a question, moreover, that cannot be fairly answered, until Dr Hickok leads us up to the faculty of reason, "whose province it is to behold the truth by an immediate insight, and in its absolute and self-affirming ground." But how does this help us? Is not the same question just as fair at this point, "How do we know that we are not so made as to believe a lie?" If the question is in place at all, it is in place here. The reason then must find some means of testing itself, as well as other faculties. It must be able to "look around and through itself and its objects," in order to test their reality and validity. And to do this, Dr Hickok finds it necessary to master the "subjective idea and objective law of all intelligence." This

is the explicative title of his "Rational Psychology." To this it has been objected, that such an attempt must be abortive and suicidal. Reason, which tries all the other faculties, must be tried by itself, before it can be found and validated. It is its own judge. Its affirmations are either valid or invalid, in themselves. If the former, it needs no testing. If the latter, it is an incompetent trier. The trier, it seems, needs trying. But he can only be tried by himself, and tried and tried, until he is tried out of being, certainly out of all authority. In short, if we are not permitted to know that our intuitions are trustworthy; if we must believe that it may be that "the root of our nature is a lie," and that consciousness "is a liar from the beginning," the foundations of all knowledge are subverted, and unmitigated scepticism is in the ascendant.

It is immaterial to us what terminology is employed to distinguish the intuitive from the discursive faculty. If any choose to follow the German distinction, to some extent naturalised among us, through the influence of Coleridge and others, by which reason is appropriated exclusively to denote the intuitive, and understanding the discursive power, we shall not take the trouble to contend with them. But whether reason, in the language of our correspondent, "has a standard by which it can measure all things which come within its apprehension, and determine whether they be reasonable or not" (pp. 373-4), is another question. Here we have joined issue with Dr Hickok. We hold that there is much that we can apprehend, but never can comprehend, *i. e.*, measure by the standard of our own reason, in the realms of Creation, Providence, and Redemption. Any other view is intolerably rationalistic, and hostile to faith, humility, and reverence. Still loftier exhibitions of the prerogative of reason, crop out in the writings of Drs Lewis and Hickok.

But it is, it is alleged, one of the great aims and achievements of Dr Hickok's philosophy, to validate our cognition of an external world, left doubtful, it seems, until established by his *à priori* demonstrations through the reason. All that we can know by the senses, it appears, "is the presence of certain affections which certain bodies have produced; and thus all that we can derive by *inference* from the senses, is, that the body which caused the affection *has* force." This is, for substance, the account which all these writers give of the cognition of external objects through the senses. All that we know immediately, say they, is certain affections or impressions in our own sensibility. But these are clearly subjective. All that we know of any objective reality is by inference from these subjective sensations. On this hypothesis, Dr Hickok's "Rational Psychology" proceeds, asserting the necessity, and

making the attempt to compass, by *à priori* demonstrations, what the senses themselves can never reach—a real and certain outer world. This ignores or denies the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of matter, so long emphasised by the soundest philosophers as true in itself, and vital to a valid doctrine of external perception, while it has been almost universally impugned or confounded by sceptics, idealists, and materialists.

The primary qualities are those which are inherent in body as space-filling substance, *i. e.*, as having extension and solidity. These are known immediately, especially by the touch and muscular energy, as objective and inherent in the body, and not as any mere subjective affections of our own organism. As has been unanswerably demonstrated, we have through these senses as decisive a conviction of an external non-ego as of an ego, and that the evidence for one is as strong as for the other. If consciousness is not to be trusted in the one case, neither is it in the other. The foundations of all knowledge and faith are subverted, and the blackest scepticism supervenes.

The secondary qualities, on the other hand, into which this school resolve the primary, are mere powers of producing conscious affections in our organism, occult in themselves, and unrealised until they interact with our organs, and evince their effects in the affections they thus produce. Of this sort are the odorous, sonorous, sapid, and, within certain limits, the visible qualities of bodies. The immediate knowledge thus given (with a possible qualification in regard to sight), is wholly subjective, limited to our own sensations. Consequently, if all the qualities of matter are secondary, it is impossible for us ever to gain a knowledge of it. Immediate knowledge of it is impossible; and by what conceivable process can we know it, unless immediately? Is it said that we can refer these subjective affections to it as their cause? But how is this possible, unless it be first known immediately, through its primary qualities? That we always, in our waking moments, do thus immediately know external body, or substance having extension and solidity distinct from ourselves, is undeniable. The earth on which we stand, or the chair on which we sit, is ever known immediately and intuitively as a somewhat extended, solid, and other than ourselves. Knowing thus the existence of external objects by their primary qualities, we can attribute the secondary qualities to them by inference; because, whenever they are present, given "affections" are produced within us; *e. g.*, the sensation of sweetness on the presence of the rose, of a certain sound on the striking of a bell. But, unless bodies were first cognised immediately, by their primary qualities, they could never be known through the secondary—not even by any

a priori demonstration, such as Dr Hickok attempts. Such demonstration may shew us the possibility that body may be—it never can prove that body is. Body can be known as existent only through the senses. If not proved to exist thus, then it cannot be proved to exist at all. How does our correspondent reach it? How does he shew that we “know the perceived object is separate from the perceiving mind?” Our readers have doubtless noticed his answer on page 377. His criterion is, that while many objects which the mind perceives are its own subjective exercises, those “which come and go quite independent of the mind, and which it cannot change, either as to the time or manner of their appearance, evidently have an agency, and thus a being of their own, separate from the mind which perceives them.”

We are afraid that this criterion of externality, said to be furnished by the reason to make up for the incertitude and insufficiency of sense, will not stand. How is it with the aches and pains and pleasures resulting from morbid or healthful conditions of the body, the alternate heat and cold induced by fever, the uncontrollable and immedicable anguish of the hypochondriac? Do not they, and much else which it is needless to specify, “come and go quite independently of the mind?” This mode of founding perception on the *a priori* demonstrations of the reason, after invalidating the certainty of it, in its own normal acts through its appropriate and God-given organs, is, and must be, a failure. It overthrows all certain evidence of an external world, and leaves the field clear for idealism and scepticism, and this none, the less, however contrary may have been the intent of the author.*

And this is all the more so, in view of the analysis of the inferences from our subjective affections as to their external causes, offered by Dr Hickok's philosophy, to which we have before adverted. “All that we can derive, by *inference*, from the senses is, that the body which has caused the affection has

* The following logical development into Nihilism of such germinant premises we copy from Hamilton's edition of Reid, p. 129:—

“The sum total is this. There is absolutely nothing permanent either without me or within me, but only an unceasing change. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even of my own. I myself know nothing, and am nothing. Images (Bilder) there are; they constitute all that apparently exists, and what they know of themselves is after the manner of images; images that pass and vanish without there being ought to witness their transition; that consist in the fact of the image of the images, without significance and without an aim. I myself am one of these images; nay, I am not even thus much, but only a confused image of images. All reality is converted into a marvellous dream without a life to dream of, and without a mind to dream; into a dream made up of only a dream itself. Perception is a dream; thought, the source of all the existence and all the reality which I imagine to myself of my existence, of my power, of my destination—is the dream of that dream.”

force." "Matter can be nothing but force." We ask, first, on this theory, how do we know the existence of any "body" or "matter" whatsoever? We know or infer "force," it seems, operating somehow and from somewhere, upon us. But do we, or can we, know any particular body from which such force proceeds? How do we know that this force may not be the activity of some spirit? This question, however, is more than needless, when addressed to advocates of Dr Hickok's philosophy. For the very core, the *punctum saliens*, of this philosophy is, not only that matter is force, and can be nothing else, that there can be no substance supporting and underlying this force, which is not itself force,* but this force is and must be the action of a spirit, even the Infinite and Eternal Spirit. Says our correspondent:—

"But what is force? Dr Hickok answers that it is action and reaction. This, he claims, will fill its whole conception. But if this be true, the origin of force, and mode of its origination, are at once revealed. For whence can action come but from spirit, to which activity purely and essentially belongs. Spirit, therefore, must be older than matter and its author. But not every spirit—not the finite can create. They are already limited. Only the Absolute Spirit can make his act react upon itself, and thus produce a force which is truly his creation."—Pp. 381, 382.

This is precisely what we have charged upon Dr Hickok's philosophy; that it really resolves matter into a mere act of God, and denies it to be an enduring product of such action, which is yet distinct from it; that it is thus, with regard to matter or the physical world, inevitably pantheistic. Moreover, we have said that we see no necessity for resolving matter into mere divine acts, which is not equally urgent with reference to spirit. Thus absolute pantheism emerges. The main premise of this argument is reaffirmed by our correspondent. We have seen no serious attempt to invalidate the reasoning and conclusion from it.

Dr Hickok, according to our correspondent, argues the possibility of a connection between mind and matter, and so of a knowledge of the latter by the former, because spirit is essentially self-active, while matter is divine action and reaction, *i.e.*, force; and so can be the work (*i.e.*, act) of spirit. This explanation itself needs explaining. Is not the power of knowing at all an ultimate self-evident fact, so plain that nothing can be plainer by which to explain it? And does not this theory explain all matter into a mere act of spirit, *i.e.*, virtually spiritualise it? This attempt to explain how mind can know

* See page 381. We leave to others the task of reconciling this with what is said of substance on page 377.

matter, is impracticable and absurd. Many of the old metaphysicians assumed the impossibility of an immediate knowledge of matter, because, as they said, the two were separated from each other by "the whole diameter of being." Hence they devised theories of mediate perception, through representative images, species, &c., to bridge over the chasm—all which logically issued in idealism. Dr Hickok tries to overpass it, by resolving matter into an act of spirit, and therefore intelligible to spirit. But really, is it easier to explain how we can cognize an act of spirit, than solid and extended substance, which is other than a spiritual act? Is not either sort of cognition ultimate and simple, and incapable of analysis or explication into simpler elements? And is it any desirable achievement in philosophy to attempt to solve the insoluble, and develop, in the solution, the germs of idealism and pantheism? As to the claim, that no process is scientific which explains phenomena and facts by reference to broader facts, or laws of higher generality, that as yet have no explanation but the creative will of God; or which falls short of an ultimate explanation by necessary laws; this virtually takes out of the realm of philosophy everything but the formal sciences of mathematics, logic, and metaphysics—which *per se* give no content of actual existence; and except such portions of the material sciences as are found *empirically* to furnish any conditions to which mathematical, or logical, or metaphysical principles are applicable. It is to deny that inductive science proper is science. For our part we deem that process scientific which refers facts and phenomena to laws, and laws of less to those of greater generality. If the only explanation of such laws be the creative will of Infinite wisdom, whose ways are unsearchable, this does not destroy the scientific character of the process, however any may stigmatise it as introducing a "deity (*ex machina*)," or as "enlarging the field of our ignorance." This last is the least of our troubles. In one sense, this is the end of all true philosophy. Dr Hickok and his philosophical friends will do well to "enlarge the field of their" acknowledged "ignorance" in matters too high, alike for us, for them, and for mortal man. No knowledge is more edifying than the knowledge of our own ignorance, or of the necessary limits of our knowledge. Quite enough of modern philosophical speculation has been too long in its sophomoric stage. "Let no man deceive himself. If any man among you seemeth to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise." 1 Cor. iii. 18.

The Articles of Dr's Hickok and Lewis.

As has been already implied, many of the more significant

points in these articles have been sufficiently ventilated in the preceding comments. They have, however, each some idiosyncratic features, from which the contribution of our correspondent is happily exempt, and which demand a little notice. We will first summarily bring to view some leading doctrines of Dr Hickok's philosophy, against which our review of his "*Rational Psychology*," in our Number for October last, was directed. And, since the allegations and arguments of that article were sufficiently telling, to bring him and his coadjutor out in essays designed to parry them, we will very briefly indicate the way in which they have done the work essayed, and the conclusion to which we are thus inevitably driven.

Dr Hickok begins with denying all immediate perceptions of outward things, and with denying the universal testimony of consciousness for such a perception. He holds that the mind is conscious only of its own sensations, which are wholly mental. "*The whole process*," he declares, "*is a thinking in judgments discursively, and not a perceiving of objects intuitively*" ("*Empirical Psychology*," p. 130). We are conscious of a sensation; but sense cannot tell whence it comes, nor reach an outer world. The mind first *judges* that the sensation has an outward cause. Secondly, it *judges* that that cause is material. Thirdly, the mind forms an image of that outward cause, of which no form or resemblance has reached the mind from without. Fourthly, the mind judges that the mental image is *like* the outward object. But, plainly, a judgment of resemblance cannot be formed unless the mind first knows the object resembled. On Dr Hickok's scheme we can never know an outward object, unless we know it before we know it; which is impossible and absurd. He therefore gives an idea of All Intelligence in which all intelligence is impossible.

But while he denies all immediate perception of outward things, he fully admits that the denial is contrary to the necessary convictions of consciousness in all mankind. He maintains that the demonstration of reason, is full, sound, and clear; that all such immediate knowledge of outward things in consciousness is impossible. "And now," he demands, "where are we, as intelligent beings? Consciousness contradicts reason; the reason belies consciousness"—"they openly and flatly contradict each other." "The nature of man as intelligent stands out a self-contradiction." "All ground for knowledge in any way is self-annihilated. The truth of our intellectual nature is falsehood, and there remains nothing other than to doubt universally."

To this statement of the problem, and to Dr Hickok's mode of solving it, we brought an array of objections, which wrought

wide conviction, and Dr Hickok has deemed himself called to answer in the *American Theological Review*.

And what does he respond? Of all the adverse reviews, he affirms that "it is most pitifully and painfully manifest that their authors were utterly incompetent to enter into the method or the meaning of the works;" and their objections are "but sorry blunders of their own ignorance;" and especially that the review in our October number "manifests throughout that the writer of it has an entire want of discernment of the philosophical distinctions between the phenomena and things in themselves, the being and the becoming;" that it is "uninstructed criticism;" and then "the most lamentable part of the matter is, that very extensively the ductile minds of coming labourers are passing on to their responsible life-mission under the like negative instructions and positive perversions." Dr Hickok affirms that "the speculation pursued in the 'Psychology' is often misconceived," but "more often entirely beyond the apprehension" of the reviewer. He admits that the only practicable answer would be to point out the items in which the "Psychology" has been misunderstood or misrepresented; but for this he says "there is not sufficient inducement;" and he makes no attempt to specify a solitary particular in which his works have been misrepresented or misunderstood, nor does he attempt in any way to meet a solitary position or objection of the reviewer. Manifestly much disturbed, and feeling the necessity of some answer, he avoids all particulars, waives all specifications, and contents himself with general declarations of the ignorance and incompetence of the reviewer; who, he says, may suppose his mistakes "to be the fault of the work itself in its obscure thinking and expression, but surely," adds Dr Hickok, "if it were too obscure for his apprehension, he was not bound to study it, nor to review it; certainly was not bound to review it till he had intelligently studied it." Has Dr Hickok then attained such a position in the philosophical world, that he may thus, *ex cathedra*, dispose of all arguments and objections against his philosophy, by simply alleging the ignorance and incompetence of those who make them, and that, too, without deigning to specify a solitary point in which that error or incompetence appears? Are we to suppose that Dr Hickok really fancies himself to have attained this high distinction and prerogative in philosophy, so that he may allege ignorance and perversions, by wholesale, with no attempt to specify the least particular? or is it more reasonable and more charitable to conclude that he was driven to assume this magisterial and supercilious attitude from the consciousness that no other reply could be given?

After giving an outline of the common history of ancient

philosophy, Dr Hickok earnestly maintains that all modern philosophy but his own is Atheistic or Pantheistic; that even our theology, on the principles received from Edwards, denies all freedom and proper responsibility to man, and, in its philosophic principles, ignores and rejects the God which its faith blindly assumes; so that in future conflicts the victory must be with the followers of Compe, and not with our theology. This is truly a sad case, with nothing to relieve it but the philosophy of Dr Hickok, which our theologians find it so hard to understand, and which, when they misconceive it, Dr Hickok will not condescend to explain, nor to tell where the misunderstanding lies. This Atheism and Pantheism in principle, which, it is alleged, now underlie all our theology, Dr Hickok says, "in the fullest meaning and closest application is the prevalent philosophy."* Without the aid of his Rational Psychology, which the reviewer, "in his blindness," has been "holding up to misguided derision and reproach," and which constitutes "the very defences and support of" our "creed"—without adopting this very Rational Psychology, he holds that our adoption of this creed can be "*nothing but unreasoning credulity.*" Alas for the Christian world, that till Dr Hickok arose, their belief in God and Christ, and in all the doctrines which constitute the "creed" of the Church, was "nothing but an unreasoning credulity."

This blindness of the Christian world Dr Hickok charges to the antinomy of using the logical understanding instead of the reason. Is it not possible that Dr Hickok has mistaken the prevalent philosophy, and that other men have, and use the reason as well as himself? He has certainly mistaken and misrepresented our review of October last on this point. He says of the reviewer, "To him all objects are just what and just as the senses give to us, and all investigation of them can

* The very slender pretext on which Dr Hickok brings this charge against our current Christian philosophy is, that it defines freedom to be the power of doing "as the being pleases."—*Amer. Theol. Review* for April, p. 216. This, he contends, fetters liberty, or substitutes for it a causal necessity which is destructive of it. Without stopping to inquire how pertinent all this is to any issue that has been raised in this controversy, we ask, where it puts Dr Hickok's system? Says our correspondent, "Dr Hickok evidently does not think it irreverent to speak of the Deity as controlled by principles." "He is and *must* be eternally so controlled." Now he is thus controlled, agreeably, or contrary to, his own pleasure. There is no escape from this alternative, unless in an unconscious pantheistic absolute. If the former, then Dr Hickok's system is in precisely the same plight as the prevalent Christian philosophy. He is, on his own shewing, a pantheist. On the latter hypothesis, it is still worse for him; for then God is controlled by principles of eternal necessity, against his own choice and pleasure. He is bound in chains of adamant fate, or of a blind, insensate law of pantheistic development. This attempt, therefore, to divert attention from the crushing objections to his own philosophy, instead of answering them, is not only weak, it is suicidal.

attain to nothing other than that which the logical faculty can make out of them."

Now, why does Dr Hickok use such language? He had the review before him, expressly and emphatically affirming the contrary, in these words: "We fully admit that man is rational. He is able to discern in objects of sense more than sense reveals, and what can be yielded by no mere analysis of the object of sense. He can discern wisdom, thought, beneficence; and know spirit, not in its substance, nor as having properties in common with matter. In design he sees a designer—not contained in the thing designed—a creator '*understood*'—not contained—yet '*clearly seen*' from the things that are made."

Dr Hickok may comfort himself in this matter; he has not only made this very strange mistake concerning his reviewer, but the prevalent philosophy, from the times of Reid, Buffier, Beattie, Edwards, and even before—the "*prevalent philosophy*" of all Christendom, as well as of the mathematicians, has been entirely familiar with the intuitions of reason beyond those of sense.

But let us notice for a moment the reply of Professor Lewis. Dr Hickok very properly questioned the reason itself, when he allowed reason to question sense and consciousness. He refused to *assume* the possibility of such a faculty as reason, but began by admitting "a drawn battle" between reason and consciousness, and then by inquiring "which or whether either be true." Professor Lewis begins with an entirely different sort of philosophy. He not only assumes that reason is infallible, but that it is not a human or created "faculty,"—is eternal, truly divine, bringing with it "*a priori* knowledge," "ideas that lie in the soul ready for use," and that "come with it from that supernatural and *pre-existent* sphere, in which the human spirit, so far as it is rational, had its supernal origin. Though physically, sentiently, individually, born in time, it shares in the universal reason, and breathes the higher life of the eternal and uncreated world." By the "universal reason" he can mean, in this connection, none other than the eternal wisdom of God. If man's reason is thus *divine*, it shares in the Godhead. Professor Lewis adds, "To know God at all, implies a *divine* faculty." He speaks of "*divine* reason," and "*divine* thoughts" in man; and of our having lost or misused the "light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world." What can this mean, unless that reason in man is the *Logos* which was incarnate in Christ, and by which every man possessed of reason is, so far, God manifest in the flesh?*

* Dr Hickok at times uses language on this subject scarcely less qualified. "Reason," he says, "can be conceived no otherwise than as a verity which fills eternity and immensity!" ("Rational Cosmology," p. 86).

The scheme of Professor Lewis, therefore, differs fundamentally from that of Dr Hickok, in that while Dr Hickok begins by doubting the existence and the possibility of reason, Professor Lewis not only assumes such a faculty, but assumes that it is eternal and truly divine, and comes furnished with *a priori* knowledge from its pre-existent sphere. If we admit the assumption of Professor Lewis, it does not follow that Dr Hickok can establish the being and validity of a faculty of reason, and reach an outer world, when he has once removed from under him every ground and possibility of certain knowledge, by declaring the falsity of consciousness, and the doubtfulness, and perhaps the impossibility, of reason itself.

What the doctrine of the Trinity can have to do with the question at issue, unless perhaps it may be to shew that Dr Hickok's *a priori* knowledge of the incarnation and redemption is valid, it is hard to tell. But Professor Lewis does not omit to give us his own views of the Trinity. He tells us that the only ground "on which a true Trinitarianism can be long maintained," is that which regards the Trinity as consisting in the Father and two of his attributes, "one the Wisdom, and another the Love of the Father." This is not the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

Professor Lewis defends Idealism, cites an "old Gipsy" as a true philosopher, because he doubted the existence both of the world and of himself. But the defence of Idealism is no defence of Dr Hickok's philosophy. Dr Hickok, so far from being an idealist, gives, or attempts to give, an ontological demonstration against idealism; while Professor Lewis not only lingers still in company with the "old Gipsy," but quotes Scripture to prove that the objects of sense are—not merely transient and changing—but that they have no real existence; while all things that are real are "above the world of sense for evermore." If, therefore, Professor Lewis believes the Bible as he interprets it, then where is it?

Professor Lewis maintains with much warmth that Idealism has had pious advocates, as pious as the advocates of any opposite scheme. Be it so; that does not affect the question whether Dr Hickok's scheme is rational and true, or whether it is self-destructive—and whether every scheme *must* not be self-destructive, which begins by doubting all our faculties, and by attempting to prove everything; thus requiring proof of the proof, and then proof of the proof of the proof, and so on for ever.

Professor Lewis denies that consciousness gives any testimony at all concerning an outer world: Dr Hickok affirms that the testimony of consciousness in all men is for an imme-

diate knowledge in consciousness of an outer world, but that its testimony is false or unreliable.

Suppose the insinuations of Professor Lewis against the manner and motive of the reviewer were all true; suppose the reviewer had, "for a certain purpose," got "under the wing of Princeton," while his "vocabulary makes it easy to determine his theological origin;" suppose he really did believe, as Professor Lewis insinuates, in the "power of contrary choice;" suppose he had really set forth "a great deal of pious nonsense," and held, as Professor Lewis represents him, that "if God should command us to hate one another, then malevolence would be right instead of love, deceit would be holy, instead of truth" (although the reviewer said nothing of the kind, nor anything from which anything of the kind could be gathered by any inference, however remote; but the representation of Professor Lewis is purely gratuitous, without the slightest foundation of any kind); suppose the reviewer had held all this—would it have weighed at all on the questions at issue—whether Dr Hickok's "Rational Psychology" really labours under the objections which are alleged, and which, if sustained, entirely invalidate the whole scheme? In every case Professor Lewis and Dr Hickok evade the true issue. They make no attempt to meet or to invalidate the position of the reviewer, nor to shew that they are inconclusive. They had every inducement and every opportunity to shew this; would they have utterly failed even to make the attempt, would they have confined themselves to other issues of their own making, and have dealt so profusely in insinuations and inuendoes, and resorted to allegations of ignorance and incompetence, had they not been conscious that their cause admitted no better defence?

How are the formidable allegations, which roused Dr Hickok and his friends from their silence, met by platitudes, however learned or lofty, on irrelevant issues, or by a volley of contemptuous and acrimonious epithets? Dr Hickok, in his poorly concealed acerbity, denounces the review as "*argumentum ab ignorantia ad ignorantiam*," without doing the favour to point out and prove the instances of alleged ignorance. We can afford to be more liberal towards him, and enlighten him somewhat as to the nature of the ignorance displayed in his vindication. It is, as we have shewn, deformed throughout by that most fatal of fallacies, irrelevant conclusions,—IGNORATIO ELENCHI.

ART. III.—*The Relation of Adam to his Posterity.**

THE Scriptures teach that sin and death came on all men through Adam. "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin." Sin and death *are* in the world, and the only question to be raised is, How did they come?

FIRST. *The sin of all men is in some way connected with the sin of Adam.* Every particular sin is in some way linked to that first sin. This is certainly a natural inference of sound reason. Sin has come down without interruption from the Fall, and has actually infected all mankind. The first child born into the world loved neither God nor his brother, but was a murderer. The whole world has so lain in wickedness, that not one human being has ever been justified before God, on the ground of character and works, but by faith only. The fact of moral depravity is universal; it enters into the experience of all men. Evil is natural to man, and is not expelled from the heart by any human effort. Now, so universal an effect must be due to a common cause. Some have attributed the prevalence of sinfulness to the influence of example, but this is just as absurd as to ascribe the universal tendency of water to run downward, to some chance impulse given to the first drop. There is a law of depravity in the race, that is as certain in its operation as any law of physics. Sin strikes its roots deeper in the soul than any habit; there is a common nature from which it issues; and this we must refer to the head, the first man. This inference, so legitimate in itself, we find confirmed by the Scriptures. "By one man sin entered into the world," depravity was diffused through the world of mankind, it passed from Adam to all others. "By one man's disobedience many were made sinners," all of whom he was the head, the whole race, come into the condition of sinners in consequence of his offence.

SECONDLY. *The death of all men is in some way connected with the sin of the first man.* We mean death of the body. This, however, does not include all that is signified by the word as used in the epistles, but does without doubt in some places enter chiefly into the idea. That Paul regarded the death of the body as a consequence of sin, and of our connection with Adam, is evident, not only from Rom. v. 12, 19, "Death entered into the world by sin, and so death passed on all men," "Death reigned from Adam to Moses," "By one man's offence

* This article is from the *Christian Review*, and, one or two phrases excepted, is a clear and forcible statement of a difficult subject.—ED. B. & F. R. R.

death reigned by one ;" but also from viii. 10, " The body is dead because of sin ;" and 1 Cor. xv. 22, " As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." Here the apostle is speaking of the death of the body, as is seen from the preceding passage, " For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead." Science has raised a doubt on this point. It shews that animals died before the Fall. But the Bible does not refer here to brutes ; the death of *man* comes by sin. Science further objects, that man, by his very constitution, is subject to death. He is mortal, and must return to dust. This is true of man now ; and yet the dissolution of soul and body, as it actually takes place, must, in harmony with the Bible, be put to the account of sin. Had there been no sin, man would have been translated to immortality without death, perhaps after the manner of Enoch and Elijah. Those who are alive on the earth at the coming of Christ shall never see death, but shall all be changed. Such, without sin, would probably have been the transition of mankind from earth to heaven. Adam was not created immortal, because he was to be put upon trial ; but if he had not fallen, he would have become immortal by eating the fruit of the tree of life. Gen. iii. 22.

THIRDLY. *On what principle did sin and death pass upon the whole race of man in consequence of Adam's first sin.* Here there are several theories with which we are not at all satisfied. (1.) That we actually committed Adam's sin. This is the Realism of Augustine, who maintained that we all were personally existing in Adam and consented to his sin. Now, this does not seem possible. Consciousness, knowledge of right and wrong, and volition, seem to be necessary even to any conception of an act of sin. (2.) That there was a mysterious identity of Adam and his posterity, by virtue of which we personally share with him the guilt of his first transgression. This was the view adopted and defended by Edwards. There was an organism, according to their theory, of some kind, by which Adam and his posterity formed one complex person, one moral whole, just as the whole tree is contained in, and developed from the first bud. By virtue of this union, that act of disobedience was morally, though not literally, ours. Now, if by the word *guilt* here, is intended moral turpitude or blameworthiness, we object that that is a personal thing, and not transferable. How can it be ? The consequence of that act may extend to the whole race, but the guilt must be restricted to him who did the deed. The depravity of our nature is doubtless propagated from father to child, but actual ill-desert abides with the sinner alone. (3.) That there is no causal connection of any kind between Adam's sin and the

moral condition of his posterity. His sin was the occasion, but in no wise the cause of theirs. According to this theory, the soul consists of activities only, without any substratum or entity, in which these activities inhere. There is no *ground* of the soul's exercises. Of course, therefore, there can be no propagation of depravity or any moral qualities; and it is absurd to inquire what is the manner of sin's origination in man, for spirit acts without manner. The sinful condition of the race, consequent on Adam's fall, must be referred to a divine constitution; in other words, an appointment of God, that, if Adam fell, all his descendants would voluntarily become sinners. This theory looks to us like nothing so much as a laboured process of self-mystification. When the wrath of God goes forth against sin, it will not terminate on abstract moral exercises, but will reach deeper, and penetrate to some guilty actor. Activity is not a concrete, but an abstract term. It expresses a quality or condition of some being or thing, of which it is predicated. This theory is just the old pantheistic notion back again, that man consists of qualities without distinct personality. Its advocates no doubt think they have an idea, and know what they mean! The simple fact is, that moral activities and exercises depend on, and are a manifestation of substance or essence, and do not exist separately. Again, to assert that there is no *how* to the action of spirit, is to talk against the common opinions of mankind. Certainly, the mental powers of the soul act according to fixed and well known principles. There are laws of thought. What is Logic, but the science of the *how* of the spirit's action in reasoning? Even the voluntary powers of man are under law. Any one who is not controlled by reason, whose will is so free that he does not act from motives at all, is commonly reckoned a natural fool. Further, to say that there is no moral state antecedent to and below volition, which gives to volition its character as right or wrong, is to contradict the facts of Christian consciousness. All theories aside, we feel that our will is in bondage to a sinful nature. Sin dwells within us, as a principle, deeply seated in our moral constitution; it is manifested in the first development of our moral feelings. We find a law that when we would do good, evil is present with us. With these facts of consciousness, the Scriptures agree. Sin, *ἀμαρτία*, is spoken of as something antecedent to moral sensibilities, and in or from which these spring. Thus, Rom. vii. 8, Paul says: "But sin, *ἀμαρτία*, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me every desire, *ἐκπόνημα*." Here evil desire, which is a sensibility, is represented as the work of sin. This *ἀμαρτία* is the sin-nature, or body of death.

On what principle, then, are we involved in the ruins of the

fall? What laws are possible in the case? We can conceive of only three.

1. There is the law of *Resemblances*, that like begets like. God, in the constitution of nature, has impressed this law on the entire vegetable and animal kingdoms. In the beginning we read, "The earth brought forth grass and herb, yielding seed after his kind, and the tree yielding fruit after his kind. And God made the living creatures of the sea after their kind, and every winged fowl after his kind, and the beast of the earth after his kind, and cattle after their kind, and every thing that creepeth upon the earth after his kind." By this law the different races of men remain distinct, and the characteristic traits of individuals and families are perpetuated often for many generations. We discover in children not only physical and intellectual, but also moral, likenesses to their parents. Hence, when Adam begat a son, it was in his own likeness, after his own image.

Some of the effects of the fall must, therefore, by this law of resemblance, have been communicated to the race by generation from Adam. Are souls propagated? All the analogies of life favour the view that they are. Hence this theory, kept clear from materialism, stands good until it has been refuted.

2. There is the law of *Liabilities*. By the principle of association, the consequences of many of our actions pass over to others, who had no part in these actions. The condition, characters, and destiny of men are affected very much by the conduct of others, over whom they had no control. This is a law which appears to pervade the whole of the divine government over this world, and without which the progress of society would be impossible. The illustrations of this principle are innumerable. A father, by excesses in his youth, may have sown in his body the seeds of disease, which will be carried to his posterity to the third and fourth generations. The crime of one man may involve many in poverty, suffering, and social degradation. And there are still more awful instances. A parent, by his rejection of the gospel, may open the gates of eternal death to his children and his children's children. What consequences were involved to the posterity of Esau and Jacob by the transfer of the birthright for a mess of pottage! Now, by this law of liabilities, the offence of Adam affected the condition of the race that issued from him. He stood at the beginning of the series, and hence his sin was more than any other sin, it was a fall; and from that moment every child of Adam must begin his probation on a lower plane of moral life, being the offspring of a father who had thrown off the authority of God, and opened a door to the tempter.

3. There is the law of *Representation*. By this law one

man becomes a public head, and personates many, so that whatever he does in his representative capacity, those whom he represents will be treated as if they did. They stand in the eye of the law in him, and he stands for them. The guilt of his public acts is theirs, not morally, but imputatively, that is, by a special legal constitution. Now, have we any examples of such a principle in the divine government, as actually established over us? We think it will not be disputed that a law of representation runs through the whole of the Old Covenant. The beasts that were slain as a sin-offering were treated as if bearing the sins of the people. The High Priest was regarded as the representative of all Israel before God. "Every high priest taken from among men is ordained for man in things pertaining to God." And it cannot be denied that the appointment of the Son of God to be our Saviour is a clear and illustrious instance of the same law. He was made the public head of the new race of believers. Whatever view of the nature of the atonement we may take, it must still be admitted that Christ was our representative with God; that is, that we are regarded and treated by God, not according to our own merits, but according to his; which is the same thing as to say that, in the view of the law, Christ stood and acted in our place, and we are justified by the imputation of his righteousness. But if we reject the idea that Christ was our representative, we must deny the doctrine of justification by grace through its merits. His death would then be no more to us than the death of any other good man; at least it was not a ransom.

Now, under which of these laws does the true theory fall? or will it come under all of them?

I. Is the law of resemblances sufficient to account for all the effects of Adam's sin on his posterity? By this law a mortal body, and a depraved mortal nature, may be transmitted by generation, and nothing more. Now, can all the results of that first offence be brought under, and limited to this law? We think not. For (1.), If we are connected with Adam only by this law, then we must believe that hereditary depravity is truly and properly sin, and deserving of condemnation, or we must deny that the present condition of the race is in any sense penal. But can the penal condition of the world be successfully denied? A curse still rests upon the ground, children are still brought forth in sorrow, the whole creation groaneth and travaileth together in pain until now; and who can say that all this is the natural consequence of the first sin? It cannot be, and if not, then the world is under a curse, a judicial sentence of God. And how much more dreadfully does this fact appear in the spiritual

history of man? Is it not true that God has treated us from the first as an apostate race? We begin our existence out of communion with him, and out of his favour. This unhappy condition is not all a consequence of our own sin, but is the fruit of a legal judgment. The same view is presented in the 90th Psalm throughout, "All our days are passed away in thy wrath," &c. It is also positively and formally asserted in the words of Paul, "By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men unto condemnation." And this judgment was also "by one offence;" that is, by the one particular sin of eating the forbidden fruit. Now, why was the stress laid on man's *first* disobedience? Was it simply because it was the first, and all other sins followed that in the order of time? Certainly not; but because by the special appointment of God, the condition of Adam's posterity was made dependent on his action *in that one particular case*. He must often have sinned afterward, but the judgment did not pass on all men from any of those subsequent sins. Admitting, then, that the condition of the race is penal, it would follow that if we are connected to the fall only by natural generation, or the law of resemblances, the ground of our condemnation or penal condition must be that which is thus transmitted, viz., hereditary depravity. It must therefore be actual sin. But this is very hard to believe. Can it be true that we are actual sinners at birth, personally ill-deserving before God? We are born into the world with a nature so perverse that it is sure to issue *in* sin, but we cannot conceive of that nature *as* sin. This theory is not less difficult to the mind than that which makes us actually guilty of Adam's sin, and is even more difficult than the doctrine of imputation. (2.) Taking this as the only law operating in the case, we should make the apostle teach a very grave error. The passage above cited, "As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men unto condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life," would then mean, As Adam was the source of a corrupt nature, *and so* of condemnation, in the same manner Christ is the source of holiness, *and so* of justification. But we are not justified on the ground of our holiness, but *as* ungodly, through Christ's merit. On the other hand, then, we are not condemned on the ground of our native corruption, but through Adam's transgression. The law of resemblance cannot, therefore, account for all the actual effects of the fall.

II. Can we bring any of these effects under the law of Liabilities? It is plain that in some aspects of our present condition we come under the operation of this law. The children born of Adam suffered by his expulsion from the garden and the tree of life, and their consequent introduction

into the world under circumstances of great physical and moral disadvantages. And the doom of toiling for bread in the sweat of their face, in ground cursed with briars and thorns, and not yielding her strength, has passed on every one of his descendants. By his sin, also, we begin our probation under most unfavourable moral conditions, being surrounded by evil examples, and influenced by the contagion of universal depravity.

Add, now, to these effects, those mentioned under the law of resemblances, and is there yet anything unaccounted for? Are the demands of reason and Scripture in the case thereby satisfied? We think not. The doctrine of Rom. v. 12-19 is: As Adam, the head of the whole race, was the source of condemnation to all, so Christ, the head of the new race of believers, is the source of justification to them. But how is Adam the source of condemnation? Bringing into use only the two laws which we have considered, it would be thus: By the fault of Adam, all men came into the world mortal and depraved, and pass their probation under other great external disadvantages; as a consequence of which, they all become actual sinners, and so are condemned. Let this be our explanation; then how is Christ the source of justification? It would be thus: By the free gift of Christ, all who are connected with him become holy, and so are justified. But here we are at once involved in error. We are not justified because we are made holy by Christ's obedience, but we are justified on the ground of that obedience, and holiness follows. Hence the other must be: By the offence of one, that is, on the ground of that offence, all are condemned. Nothing is said here of the effect of Adam's sin on the moral character of his seed, but of their legal relation to God; nothing is said of the depravity of Adam being entailed on his posterity, but of the sentence of law issuing from the first offence. The judgment transferred to all, was that of the one act of disobedience, the first transgression. In a word, the apostle is treating here, not of sanctification by Christ, but of justification; not of depravity by Adam, but of condemnation. As from the cross went forth the gift of life to and upon all them that believe, so from the tree of knowledge issued a condemnatory sentence of law to and upon every member of the race. No other view seems to give due force to the thought in this place. The effects of the first sin came on us not merely by the generation of a depraved nature and the influence of outward evil, but also by a legal constitution or establishment, according to which the posterity of Adam were to be involved in the consequences of his action in the one specific instance of the forbidden fruit.

3 Hence, we must call in also the law of representation.

Adam was the public head of mankind. By this law his descendants are involved in all the consequences of the guilt of his first sin, be those consequences what they may. We say, in the consequences of his guilt, but not in his guilt itself. There is here, under this law, only a transfer of penal consequences, not of personal blameworthiness. We are not unmindful of a common objection, that it is not just to have the innocent suffer for the guilty. But is not this said without due reflection? Why, it is the very law of our earthly life! We are always suffering for the guilty. We suffer daily, in body, spirit, and estate, for the faults of others. Christ also died, the just for the unjust. By the law of human fellowship and community of life, we are all bound up in the ill-desert of each. The imputation of Adam's sin, is, on this theory, the exact counterpart of the imputation of Christ's righteousness. His righteousness is not inherently ours, and the merit of it is not actually ours, but by this admirable principle of the divine administration, we are regarded and treated *as if* they were ours. So of Adam's sin. It is not personally nor morally ours, but by imputation only; and hence we are regarded and treated *as if* it were ours.

Complaint has been made of the injustice of such a legal establishment; but let it be seriously considered, whether redemption was possible by any other means. Remove the law of representation from the divine government, and there could be no salvation. Adam was the figure of him who was to come, and this law was made with him that it might be in existence when Christ came, and that he under it might secure our justification. How could infants be saved without such a law? Though guiltless of actual sin, they are yet subjects of natural depravity; and hence, for a development in holiness, they must be indebted to the Holy Spirit. But the grace of the Holy Spirit is the purchase of redemption. Now, they cannot personally appropriate this grace by faith in Christ; and if not comprehended under this principle, by which imputation is possible without personal appropriation, they would be left to work out eternal death by the development of their own depravity.

Have we any evidence that the sin of Adam having been charged to all mankind, redemption has actually intervened in behalf of all who die without personal transgression? It is a doctrine of the Scripture, that the resurrection of the body to eternal life, is a part of the purchase of redemption. "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." If, then, redeeming mercy does not underlie all who die in infancy, they could not be invested with glorified bodies among all the saved. Thus, the legal establishment made with Adam

opened the way for the establishment of grace in Christ ; and if none of the race actually perish because of imputed sin, and if all who are saved are saved because of the law of imputation, what vindication does the character of God require ? Imputation is a mediatorial arrangement, opening the way for redemption.

NOTE.—A few words on the right understanding of Rom. v. 12-19, may be in place here. There are two lines of interpretation. One takes the clause, "For that all have sinned," ver. 12, as the key to the entire passage ; and then the argument is : Death, the wages of sin, has been brought upon all by their own sin. Death reigned from Adam to Moses, before the law was given, because men were sinners, though not, like Adam, by transgressing a positive law. God charged them with sin on the law of nature, ii. 12. The other takes the first part of verse 12 : "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin," as further explained by verses 16, 18, 19, as the main thought. And this latter method is obviously the correct one. For,

I. The argument of the whole passage is : *In salvation by Christ, men are not treated according to their own merits, but according to his ; and yet this is no new principle, for it is illustrated also in Adam's relation to his posterity. The relation of Christ's obedience to our righteousness, is paralleled by the relation of Adam's transgression to our sin and death.* It is true, that all are infected with sin, that is, depravity, but this the apostle does not state. He is speaking, not of their personal sinful condition, but of their legal position, their outward relation to God. Thus, verse 16, the judgment was a judgment of condemnation, it was a sentence that condemned all. What was the ground of that sentence ? The apostle says, it was the *one offence*, verses 18, 19. While men are condemned for the sin of one man, they are justified for the righteousness of another ; for as they are all charged with sin, on the ground of Adam's disobedience, so they will all be regarded as righteous on the ground of Christ's obedience. Who does not see that the apostle is not speaking here *subjectively*, of the corruption of our nature through Adam, for which we are condemned, but *objectively*, of our legal standing with God ? To this, the clause "Many were made sinners," clearly refers. The verb used refers to station, *were placed or constituted sinners.*

II. The first interpretation mentioned is not exhaustive of the facts in the case. The death of those *who have not sinned* must be accounted for. The apostle here certainly means to lay down a law which would be applicable to the whole race, over whom death spreads. Now a large portion of the human family die antecedently to any transgression of their own.

III. The first part of verse 12, "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin," clearly means ; The sin of Adam was causative of universal sin and death. Would the apostle then immediately add : But the cause of universal death is the personal sins of men ?

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ART. III.—*Laws of Moral Influence.**

MAN is naturally a social being. He was made for society, and circumstances throw him into society, almost from the cradle to the grave. Being associated with others, he necessarily

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exerts an influence over them. He *desires* to exert such an influence. He desires to convince them of what seems to him to be true, and persuade them to such courses of life and conduct as are to him agreeable.

In a degree, this is true of all men, whatever may be their pursuits in life; yet it is more especially true of some men than of others. Some there are whose professional duties, whose daily avocations, engage them in almost continual efforts to instruct and persuade. This is the case with authors, teachers, and public speakers generally. Their *business* is, so far as they are able, to influence the thoughts and hearts, the words and actions, of those around them.

Such being the case, it has often occurred to us as singular, that the *laws* of moral influence have not been more frequently and carefully investigated. It can hardly be doubted that there *are* such laws; since to suppose the contrary would be to stamp utter folly on all attempts to exert a good influence, and make every instance of success in such endeavours a mere contingency.

But if there are laws of good moral influence, *what are they?* In other words, what are the *conditions*, the *circumstances*, under which we may confidently expect either to be influenced ourselves, or to influence others? Or, to render the case more definite and palpable, we will suppose an author to have readers, or a public speaker hearers, or an individual in conversation a circle around him, all of whom, in his judgment, need a change. They are all bent upon some course or practice, which to him is disagreeable, and from which he would, if possible, turn them away. He would persuade them to pursue what he deems a better course. Under what circumstances now may he hope to succeed? What are the *laws*, the *conditions*, to which he must conform, if he would not labour in vain and spend his strength for nought?

It hardly need be premised, that we do not inquire here after the impositions of rhetoric, the tricks of oratory, the arts, or rather the *artifices*, of persuasion; those by which truth is sometimes confounded, and error exalted—by which the worse is made to appear the better reason. These would be utterly unworthy our search, and, when discovered, would not pay the labour of finding them.

Still less would we inquire as to the means of strengthening a bad moral influence, and thus rendering the seductions of the wicked more powerful. But we inquire after those laws of moral influence which God has himself established, which he has laid deep in the constitution of man, which are uniform and powerful in their operation, and in the observance of which

the friends of virtue and religion may vastly increase their power of doing good.

These laws, so far as we have been able to investigate them, may be classed under the four following heads :

I. Those which respect the character and qualifications of him who undertakes to persuade others.

II. The state of mind possessed by those who are to be persuaded.

III. The materials to be employed in persuasion. And,

IV. The manner of employing them.

On these several heads it is proposed very briefly to remark.

In the first place, then, what must be the qualifications and character of an individual, in order that he may convince, and persuade, and exert a great and good influence upon his fellow-men ?

It is obvious that he must possess, and must be understood to possess, a competent *knowledge* of the subject of which he treats. If he is a school-teacher, he must have the knowledge requisite to such a profession ; or, if he is a public lecturer, or moral reformer, or preacher of the gospel, he must have the knowledge which might be reasonably expected in either of these departments of labour. Without this, he cannot command respect, or gain a hearing, or exert any favourable influence at all. He degrades both his office and himself, and is deservedly regarded with pity, if not with scorn.

Then, to exert a good moral influence, an individual must be himself a *good* man, and must have an established reputation as such. On this point, I appeal to the consciousness and common sense of all men. Who of us could be persuaded or morally benefited through the influence of a *bad* man—one whom we knew to be such ? Whatever other qualifications he might possess, his character would be an effectual bar in the way of all salutary influence. But if none but a good man can exert a good moral influence over us, no more can we, but upon the same condition, expect to exert such an influence upon others. Unless we can carry with us, wherever we go, a character without reproach, we may as well not go at all. We shall be objects of suspicion and disapprobation, if not of positive disgust. Our very name will excite feelings (we may call them prejudices if we please) which we shall not be able to overcome, and which will defeat all our endeavours to guide the minds of others in the way of holiness and truth.

And he who would exert an influence, must not only be in the general a good man, he must be *honest* and *earnest* in the particular department in which he is engaged. He must not be cold, dull, or indifferent ; nor must he be bribed into his regard for it, or be led to pursue it in the hope of ease, or honour,

or gain. An impression like this going abroad in regard to him (and it will be very likely to get abroad, if there is any foundation for it in truth) will detract greatly from his influence in promoting any good object. Be he teacher, or preacher, or whatever else he may, it will be a bar to his success in the difficult work of instruction and usefulness.

We remark, further, that in order to the full influence of his instructions, a writer or preacher must act in consistency with them. He must manifest his earnestness, not only in what he says, but in what he does. He must live and act as though what he taught was true, and he believed it. To do this is but to shew himself an honest man. To fail to do it is to make his sincerity questionable, or (which is the same) to incur the suspicion of hypocrisy, and this will detract most effectually from that amount of good influence which he might otherwise exert.

Public teachers, of all classes, often fail of their object through a want of consistency. A gospel minister preaches excellently on the Sabbath, and a deep impression is made, under the unobstructed influence of which many might be led into the kingdom of Christ. But, unfortunately, his earnestness has all been expended on the Sabbath. There is little of it visible through the week. The good impressions made—from being neglected, and, it may be, counteracted—become obliterated, and the hearts of the hearers are made harder than ever. Alas! that the effect of so many good sermons should be lost, and worse than lost, through the inconsistencies of those who administer them.

Let us next consider those laws or conditions of moral influence which have respect to the minds of those on *whom such influence is to be exerted*. This, obviously, is a very important matter. The influence of external motives depends almost entirely on the medium through which they pass, or on the particular state of that mind and heart to which they are addressed. The best instructions often fail of their end, owing to the untoward mental and moral condition of those who hear them. In what state, then, must the mind of the hearer be, in order that the motives addressed to him may have the desired effect?

The states of mind most favourable to good moral influence are those of *interested attention*, and of *confidence*. In the first place, the teacher or speaker must have the *attention* of those whom he addresses. Without this there is an insuperable barrier to any degree of moral influence. He may be ever so learned, eloquent, and impressive, if he cannot have the attention of those about him, he labours for their good in vain.

We need not here go into a consideration of the various methods of securing attention. This would lead us too far from the point in hand. It is enough to state the very obvious fact, that without attention no good moral influence can possibly be exerted.

And the public teacher must have not only the attention of his hearers, but their *confidence*. He must have their confidence in respect to several particulars; and, first, with regard to his *intellectual ability* and his *understanding of the subject of which he treats*. If they regard him as a novice or a simpleton, an ignoramus or a fool, whatever he may say will not be likely to produce much effect. Or, however high may be his intellectual endowments, if they regard him as unacquainted with the particular subject in hand, still he will be likely to plead in vain. If, for example, a farmer were to address lawyers on points of law; or a mere lawyer to address farmers on practical husbandry; if a mechanic were to address merchants on the subject of trade, or a merchant to address mechanics on the peculiarities of their respective arts; neither the one nor the other would produce much effect; and for the very good reason, that neither of them would have the confidence of his hearers, with regard to his knowledge of the particular subject in hand. The thought would continually arise in their minds: "Till you are better informed in respect to this matter, it is vain for you to attempt to instruct or to influence us."

Persons must also have confidence in those who address them, with regard to their *disinterestedness and integrity*. Our teachers may possess, and may be thought to possess, competent knowledge, still, if we listen to them under the impression that they are sordid, selfish, evil-minded persons, who have probably some design upon us, some sinister end to be promoted at our expense, of what avail will be all their instructions and persuasions? So far as moral influence is concerned, they will be utterly powerless. They will leave us no better than they found us. It is true of all men everywhere, that they must have confidence in the disinterestedness of those who address them, or their labours will be in vain.

Nor is this all. To be personally benefited by a public teacher, we must have confidence in his *friendship and goodwill*. Mere integrity and disinterestedness are not enough. We want to feel that those to whom we listen are our friends; that they feel interested in us and for us; that they sincerely wish us well, and are earnestly labouring to promote our good. A confidence such as this will beget affection on our part; will disarm prejudice, if any before existed; will open the mind and heart to conviction; and will render appropriate instruc-

tions resistless. A moral or religious teacher, who enjoys the confidence of those committed to him in the respects here specified, has them almost entirely in his power. He can direct their opinions and feelings almost at will. On the contrary, where this confidence is wanting, no amount of argument or eloquence will be likely to prevail.

If it be inquired here, How shall a public teacher acquire and retain the confidence of those whom he is called to instruct? We answer in a word, *by deserving it*. There is no other way. No trick, or artifice, or imposition, or deception, will answer the purpose long. The gossamer covering will be seen through. The mask will be torn off. The truth of the case will come to light, and then the author of the cheat will be in a worse condition than he was before he attempted it. The only way to insure confidence, we repeat, is to *deserve* it. Where it is really deserved, it will, in ordinary cases, be secured and retained. Where it is not deserved, if enjoyed for a time, it neither can be, nor ought to be, long possessed.

The third division of laws proposed to be considered has respect to the *materials* of moral influence which it may be proper to employ. These, of course, must be sound materials, correct statements and strong arguments are alone to be relied upon. An honest teacher will use no others; or, if he does, he may be sure that, in the end, they will do him more harm than good.

In our attempts at moral influence, we have occasion often to expose the errors and the faults of others, and attempt to remove them. We desire to remove evils of this kind which have been rendered dear, it may be, by long indulgence, and are supported by worldly, selfish considerations. Now we may be sure that, in such cases, persons will be exceedingly quick to discover any mistake or error into which their reprover may fall; to discover any lurking fallacy in his reasonings, or want of soundness in his conclusions, and a few discoveries of this sort will be enough to spoil all besides that he can offer. His reasonings, in the general, may be quite incontestable; but if mingled with these, there are occasional mistakes in point of statement, with here and there an unsound argument, or a false conclusion, those with whom he labours will rashly infer that they are all of the same character, and will dismiss them all as unworthy of regard.

Again, then, we say, in the important work of moral influence, correct statements and sound arguments are alone to be relied upon. Others may succeed occasionally and temporarily. The ignorant may be deluded, the unwary imposed upon, and a temporary triumph may be gained. But such a triumph invariably costs more than it comes to in the end. While a

few may be persuaded, many are disgusted, and more is lost ultimately to the cause of truth and virtue than is gained. Without doubt some important doctrines of religion have had a narrower reception, and less weight and influence than they otherwise would have done, on account of the variety of arguments, sound and unsound, by which they have been attempted to be enforced.

As to the *amount* of argument and motive to be employed in a given case, it may be said, in general, "the more the better," provided that the whole be sound and conclusive. This remark will hold good unless it be in very plain and trivial cases, where, to say all that could be said, might seem superfluous, if not burthensome.

The fourth class of laws to be considered has respect, not so much to the strength and soundness of arguments, as to *the manner in which they should be employed*. And this constitutes an important branch of the general subject, and one requiring to be carefully considered.

The first rule which suggests itself under this head is, that truth and motives should, in all cases, be *wisely adapted*. They should be adapted to the *intellectual* state and character of those whom we desire to influence. The considerations urged must not be either above them or below them. They must be made plain to the understandings of those who hear them; while they must retain enough of intellectual elevation to have influence with cultivated minds. That truth should be so presented as to be understood, is a rule which requires no illustration. Surely, no reasonable person could be influenced by the mere sound of words, the sense of which it was beyond his power to comprehend. As well might he be influenced by the singing of birds or the chiming of bells.

Truth should be adapted not only to the intellectual capacities of hearers, but to their feelings, their habits, their propensities, their prejudices; in short to their general state and character. In respect to all these points, the skilful dispenser of motives will study to make himself acquainted with those whom he desires to influence. He will know, so far as he may, the circumstances of their education, their habits of thought and feeling, the peculiarities of their disposition and character, and the good or bad influences to which they are exposed, that he may the better determine what considerations to urge, and how to urge them; that he may the more skilfully adapt truth and motives to their particular state and character.

Moral influences should also be adapted to the circumstances of *time* and *place*. What would be highly proper and persuasive at one time, in one place, and under a particular combina-

tion of circumstances, may be decidedly improper and repulsive at another. What would be, under some circumstances, like apples of gold on pictures of silver, would be, under others, like pearls before swine.

In the work of persuasion there is nothing more important than this wise and skilful *adaptation* of means. With it, an indifferent reasoner will often accomplish wonders, while without it, the most conclusive reasoner may ply his logic, and urge his arguments in vain.

Those who have to do with the *moral diseases* of men may learn a lesson here from the *literal physician*, whose business it is to prescribe for diseased bodies. The physician may have ever so much medicine on hand, and it may all be perfectly good medicine, well selected and prepared. But suppose he has no skill to adapt it and apply it. He goes out among the sick, and dispenses it here and there at random. Will he be likely to do any good? Will he not be sure to kill more than he cures? So an individual may dispense nothing but truth to the minds of men; he may use none but sound and conclusive arguments; and yet they may be so ill adapted, so palpably out of time and place, as to lose all their power; the result may be more an injury than a benefit.

We cannot better lay down a second rule, under the head of manner, than by saying, that the entire manner of a writer or public speaker should be *persuasive*. There is such a thing as a *persuasive manner*. There is also a *repulsive manner*. A persuasive manner is not a simple quality of writing or speaking, but one which comprises many ingredients. It includes, in a public speaker, clearness and compass of voice, ease and fluency of utterance, grace and propriety of action, a mode of address at once winning, conciliatory, and yet capable of rising to great energy and power. But on these qualities of persuasive speaking we need not now enlarge.

The persuasive speaker will be, of course, a *fair* speaker. He will treat those whom he addresses with perfect candour, giving them all the credit which they deserve, and making every allowance in their favour which circumstances will permit. He will treat them with even more than candour. There will be a kindness and tenderness of manner, a disposition to spare them so far as he may, and a manifest unwillingness to trifle with their feelings.

We have some beautiful specimens of this mode of dealing in the Scriptures. Take, for example, the first epistle of Paul to the Corinthians. This is, in some parts of it, an epistle of reproof. Disorders had crept into the Church at Corinth, and were tolerated there, which the apostle was constrained to reprove and correct. But, before reproving his delinquent

brethren, he must conciliate them. He must prepare their minds to receive reproof in a proper manner. And so he begins by commending and praising them, "I thank my God always on your behalf, for the grace which is given unto you by Jesus Christ, that in every thing ye are enriched by him, in all utterance and in all knowledge, so that ye come behind in no gift." After such an introduction, the apostle could say any thing to the Corinthians without offence. He could administer kindly all needed reproof, and they would receive it and profit by it.

We have a similar example in Paul's Epistle to Philemon, designed to effect the release of a runaway slave. Onesimus is sent back to his master with a letter, which, for courtesy, kindness, a subduing eloquence, an entire adaptedness to secure its object,—the reconciliation of the fugitive to his master, and his prompt release to become a fellow-labourer with Paul,—has no parallel in all antiquity.

We have still higher examples of the same kind, in the messages of the ascended Saviour to the Seven Churches of Asia. The most of these were messages of reproof,—sharp reproof; but in no case was the reproof administered until the way was prepared for it: "I know thy works, and thy labour, and thy patience, and how thou hast borne, and for my sake hast laboured, and hast not fainted. Nevertheless, *I have somewhat against thee.*" Admirable examples these of that kind of dealing, and that, too, in the most delicate, trying circumstances, which we would recommend, and which is attended always with the best results.

Of course this kind of treatment does not imply that a teacher or speaker should not be *plain* with those whom he addresses; or that he should not, when occasion requires it, be close and searching, pungent and faithful. He not only *may* be all this, but in many instances he *must* be so. Paul did not spare the disorderly Corinthians; neither did our Saviour spare the backslidden churches of Asia: "*Repent—*or else I will come unto thee quickly, and will fight against thee with the sword of my mouth." The object which the reprover has in view in dealing with those under his charge *demand*s that he be plain and faithful. He must expose their errors and their sins. He must warn them of consequences, and point them to a more excellent way. But let him be sure, meanwhile, that no harshness or unfairness escapes him; that every word is tempered with kindness and love. Let all who hear him see and be satisfied, that he reproves and warns, and urges home unwelcome truth, not because he hates them, or is angry with them, but because he loves them; not because he feels a pleasure in thus approaching

them, but because he *must*. In the manifest possession of a temper such as this, a writer or speaker may say almost anything, anything which the occasion in truth and fairness demands. The more of closeness and faithfulness he exhibits, provided he be, at the same time, tender and benevolent, the more likely will he be to labour with success.

We have said that the persuasive manner is candid and benevolent. It is also *earnest*. It *must be* earnest in order to be persuasive. We are all, to a great extent, the creatures of sympathy. We are so constituted that we can but sympathise with those who address us in tones of deep and solemn earnestness. If they feel, we feel. If they weep, we mingle our tears with theirs. If they are truly and deeply in earnest, we bow to their earnestness, and yield ourselves up to their influence. Especially is this the case, if they are persons in whom we have confidence, and who, in matter and manner, conform to the laws of moral influence which have been before laid down. Under these circumstances, a winning, conciliatory, earnest, persuasive manner, is commonly resistless. It carries all before it. It places an audience completely in the hands of him who addresses them, to mould and guide them at his will.

We add but another rule, under our fourth and general head, which is, that in our efforts to exert a good influence upon others, we must be *persevering*. If we fail in the first instance, we must try again, and never give over our endeavours so long as means and motives can be of any avail.

He who earnestly desires to do good to others, and who has been as yet unsuccessful, will anxiously search into the causes of his failure. It may be that the fault is in himself; that he has not the qualifications and character requisite to exert an influence; that he has not the confidence of those whom he addresses; or that he has not been able to secure their attention. It may be that his instructions are not sound and convincing; or that they are not adapted to the state and circumstances of his hearers; or that they are not made plain to their understandings; or there may have been some capital fault in point of manner; he may have been wanting in closeness and earnestness, in kindness and tenderness, or in that winning, conciliating manner, which is so apt to carry truth and motives to the heart. We repeat, the persevering pleader for truth and virtue will search into the *causes* of his failures, and will endeavour, so far as possible, to remove them. He will address himself to the work he has undertaken again and again, and will never abandon it so long as there is hope. Many persons, who conform to most of the laws of moral influence, fail lamentably here. They lack perseverance. In despair of

success, they leave their work half accomplished, and thus lose their labour, when a little more exertion would have secured the desired result.

It is not pretended that the above laws of moral influence are all of them of equal importance, or that where they are not all regarded, success is in no case possible. But thus much, we think, may be safely said : where the above laws are faithfully adhered to, the desired end does almost invariably follow. For there are laws which God has himself established ; which he has laid deep in the constitution of man ; and in the due observance of which the friends of morals and religion will not be disappointed. The desired end *will follow*, if the laws are faithfully observed ; and the probability of success will generally be in proportion to the degree of attention which is given to the laws. The slightest disregard of them will endanger the result ; while a general, palpable violation of them, can only result in perpetual disappointment.

1. It follows from the principles above discussed, that in his efforts to do good, a writer or speaker cannot rely on the mere *power of truth*. Much has been said as to the efficacy of light, and the resistless power of truth, "Great is the truth, and it shall prevail." Only let an individual publish truth, and persevere in the publication of it, and he need have no apprehension as to consequences. But let those who reason in this way remember, that truth alone is not sufficient to control the minds and hearts of men. The rays of the sun may harden as well as melt ; and it depends altogether upon the circumstances under which they strike, whether they shall do the one or the other. So truth may harden the heart as well as soften it. It may render it more obdurate and obstinate, as well as more yielding. And it depends very materially on the circumstances under which it is dispensed, whether it shall accomplish the one or the other. He who attempts to persuade by the *mere* presentation of truth (on supposition that he presents the truth) conforms to but *one* of the established laws of persuasion. There are others to which he *must* conform, or his presentations of truth will, in all probability, be unsuccessful.

It is important, indeed, in our attempts to influence the minds of men, that we have *truth* on our side ; that we have a good cause and sound arguments. But these alone cannot be relied on to insure success. We must know how to present our cause and urge our arguments. We must conform, in general, to the established laws of moral influence, or we cannot hope for a favourable result.

2. We learn, from the foregoing discussion, the folly and absurdity of certain processes of moral influence, or *modes of*

doing good, which, in some instances, have been adopted. One of these may not unfitly be denominated *the storming process*. Those who engage in it seem to make it their object to carry the human heart by storm. By terrific appeals, and violent denunciations, and not unfrequently by railing accusations, they think to overawe and confound the object of their attack, and bring him in cringing submission to their feet. Or they design to excite him, by their reproaches, to such violent opposition, that he shall become affrighted at himself, and surrender at discretion, as the only means of enjoying peace. Our objections to this mode of accomplishing a good object are, that where it will humble one, it will harden twenty; and that those who seem to be humbled under it, in most cases, are not truly so. They are terrified, unmanned, spirit-broken, and for the time subdued, but not truly melted, humbled, and reclaimed; and as soon as the pressure which crushed them is taken off, they shew that they are of the same mind and heart as before.

A kindred mode of accomplishing a good object, but which may be characterised by a somewhat softer name, we shall call the *driving process*. It aims, not so much to move and persuade men, as to circumvent and compel them. Instead of plying them with motives and arguments, it aims to hedge them about with difficulties, from which they cannot escape, or to overshadow them with a public sentiment which they dare not resist. When a plot of this kind has been duly ripened, and the snare is ready to be sprung upon an individual, his only alternative is *to yield or be broken, to submit or be rooted up*. We might urge many objections to this mode of effecting a moral transformation; but we will only say here, that *it does not effect it*. It may make hypocrites, but not converts. The change produced is but an outward and seeming one. The individual who, in this way, has been "broken in" to a certain system, or to certain measures, brings with him usually, not only an unchanged heart, but a stifled, smothered sense of injury, which, on the earliest opportunity, will shew itself in an open flame.*

Still another mode of influence, which has been often attempted, is by *exciting the sensibilities, and moving the passions*. Those who operate in this way think but little of truth, of instruction, of argument. It is no part of their object

* Our objection here, is not to enlightening the public mind, and forming and correcting public sentiment, but to the *use* which is sometimes made of what is deemed a correct public sentiment. Instead of submitting it to a candid inspection, and suffering it (so far as approved) to diffuse itself freely, it is made little else than an instrument of *public torture*—a means of restraining the liberty of individuals, and forcing the consciences of those who cannot in sincerity embrace it.

to enlighten and convince the understandings of their hearers. They make their appeals directly to the passions, and by moving and melting these, by drawing forth sighs, and groans, and tears, they expect to be able to gain the heart. It is a sufficient objection to this mode of doing good, that, as it is in its nature superficial, so the results of it, ordinarily, are of short duration. The seeming reformation, not being founded on principle or truth, will soon shew itself to be no reformation at all. The disturbed emotions will soon be quieted; the excited sensibilities will become calm; the tears which flowed so freely will be dried up; and then it will be seen that the deep springs of moral action, the mind, the heart, remain unchanged.

We have one objection, in common, against all the above modes or processes of moral influence. They are in palpable violation of the established and unalterable laws of persuasion. Of course, they cannot ordinarily result in persuasion, but in something which does, at best, but remotely resemble it.

3. In view of the preceding remarks, it may be easily accounted for, that some men labour in the cause of truth with so little success. They may not be men of feeble intellect; they may not be destitute of the requisite amount of knowledge; they may not be wanting in point of reputation and character; but they do not understand the laws of moral influence; or, understanding them, they grossly disregard them. They are not careful to *adapt* their instructions to the state and character, the circumstances and wants of those who hear them. Their *mode of address* may also be objectionable. Instead of being kind and winning, urgent and persuasive, it is cold and speculative, or severe and repulsive. No fact is more evident than that the power of mind over mind, in different individuals, is exceedingly various; and this diversity is to be attributed, not so much to an unequal measure of knowledge or gifts, as to the degree of regard which is paid, by different individuals, to the established laws or conditions of moral influence.

4. The subject of this paper commends itself to the consideration of all who desire to exert a favourable influence over the hearts and lives of their fellow-men. We would commend it, in the first place, to the consideration of those who are labouring, in various ways, to extirpate vice, and promote a reformation of morals. The *moral reformer*, whatever the vice may be which he undertakes to remove, has a nice and difficult task to accomplish, one requiring all his wisdom and grace, his skill, his energy, and perseverance. It will not be difficult, indeed, for the flippant declaimer to talk, and rant, and give himself consequence, in reference to almost any wrong. But so to apply the knife as to remove the sore; so to

dispense truth and motives as to induce the unhappy victim of vice, of his own accord, to put it away, is a very different matter.

If there is a man in the world who, in his intercourse with others, should pay a strict regard to the laws of moral influence, and to *all* these laws, it is the moral reformer. Without such regard, he may make a great deal of noise, but he will be sure to do a great deal of mischief. His cause may be a very good one, but he will so prejudice and embarrass it as to render it next to impossible for the most skilful hand to touch it afterwards.

We would also commend this subject to the consideration of *gospel ministers*. Every minister of Christ is, in the best sense of the term, a *reformer*; one whose duty impels him to go beneath the surface of things, and lay the axe at the root of the tree. He seeks to dry up the stream of human wickedness by first drying up the prolific fountain; to reform the manners and lives of men, by securing the sanctification of their hearts. Still, in all this important work, his sole instrumentality consists in exerting a moral influence in dispensing the truths and motives of the gospel; in endeavours to enlighten, convince, and persuade; and his success may be expected to depend (under God) entirely on the strictness with which he adheres to the established laws of persuasion. Without such adherence, he may be a man of talents and acquirements; he may be a man of piety, and preach the truth; he may make it his reliance, that he does preach the truth; but in all ordinary cases it will be a vain reliance. The truth, thus dispensed, it may be feared, will harden, and not soften. It will be more likely to repel than persuade. By preaching the truth, the gospel minister conforms to *one* law of moral influence—a law important and indispensable, we admit; still it is *but one*. There are other laws, let him remember, to which he *must* conform, or the appropriate results of preaching will not ordinarily be realised.

Nor let a minister think to evade this conclusion, by pleading the needed influences of the Holy Spirit. For how are these influences generally bestowed? In accordance with those laws of moral influence which God has appointed? or in contempt and violation of them? There can be no question here. God is, indeed, a sovereign in the dispensations of his grace, but not an *arbitrary* sovereign; and we find that, in all ages, he has proportionally blessed the labours of those ministers who have adhered to the laws of influence which he has established, and withheld his blessing from those who have violated them. The most honoured and successful labourers for Christ have invariably been those who, in matter, manner,

character, and everything else, have most faithfully observed the laws of persuasion.

Let, then, the minister of Christ acquaint himself with these laws, and adhere to them as strictly as though his entire success depended upon them; while, at the same time, he feels that all his springs are in God, and that without his accompanying spirit and blessing, he can accomplish nothing. Let him, first of all, secure the *confidence* of his people; their confidence in him as a scribe well instructed in the doctrines and duties of religion; as a man of piety and truth; as their devoted and untiring friend. Let him gain this confidence by *deserving it*; and having gained it, let him never abuse it. On the contrary, let him so live and labour as to continue and increase it. Let him preach to his people *the truth*, with all plainness and fidelity, and in a manner to arrest attention; reasoning with them out of the Scriptures, and urging home upon them the facts and motives of the gospel. And not only so, let him rightly *divide* the word of truth, adapting it to the circumstances of individuals, and giving to each his portion in due season. In *manner*, as well as in matter, let him study to shew himself approved, avoiding everything which will be likely to obstruct his message, and adopting studiously that mode of address which will be most likely to impress and enforce it. Let his intercourse with his people, and with all men, be in strict accordance with the truths he delivers, so that he may not undo, out of the pulpit, what he has been enabled to accomplish in it. Let him *persevere* in this course without weariness or discouragement, dispensing, line upon line, and precept upon precept, trying every likely and lawful expedient, and ever looking to God for his blessing, and the blessing of God will not long be withheld. Such a minister is wise to win souls, and *souls will be won*. He will be honoured on earth by turning many to righteousness, and will shine hereafter as the firmament, and as the stars for ever and ever.

ART. V.—*Dr Priestley.*

It is under the influence of the common law by which certain conditions of public sentiment, from their similarity or contrast to previous conditions, turn the mind forcibly back upon the past, that we have been led to this subject of reflection. If at first sight it seems to any one as if we had now got far beyond the days of such "men of renown," and had no more concern in their doings than in the exploits of antediluvian giants, or Og, king of Bashan, or any other ancient and eminent men of capacity in the same line, a glance at the present state of society will shew, we think, only too conclusively that the topic is not out of date, or the interest of it gone. It is sadly relevant to existing phases of thought and feeling. But even though it had been less so, we should have contended for the utility of making such a man the subject of deliberate contemplation. To study great men makes us great, they say. This man, the medallist of the Royal Society, the companion of Shelburne, the intimate friend of Franklin; against whom Horsley did not disdain to argue, and Burke to thunder in Parliament; whom that eloquent statesman esteemed, associated with, hospitably entertained, led on one important occasion arm-in-arm to a meeting of the Privy Council; and whom, even after a silent breach with him, he still deemed worthy of his denunciation as "a man of great authority, and certainly of great talents," must have been in some distinguished qualities unmistakeably above the common level. But whether he were really great or not, he did assuredly occupy a prominent place in the arena of political, scientific, and theological debate, and especially in the discussion of a subject the most profound, glorious, and vital to man, that could engage a human mind. It is conclusive proof of his ambition that he ventured, and of his powers and acquirements that he should venture with any credit or show of competency, into fields of study and of conflict so many and so varied. A brief sketch of his life, character, and work, will not be unseasonable, and should not be without benefit.

Priestley was born near Leeds in 1733. His father was in trade a "cloth-dresser," in principle a Calvinist, in practice a true Christian. At the age of nine he was taken under the kindly wing of a rich and pious aunt, who secured him a good education, and in 1752 sent him to an Independent academy at Daventry, under the superintendence of Dr Ashworth, successor to Dr Doddridge. Before this, he had been refused admission to the church, "not thinking that all the human race (supposing them not to have any sin of their own) were liable

to the wrath of God and the pains of hell for ever, on account of Adam's sin only." He was already an Arminian,—made so mainly through the influence of two Baxterian ministers, "whose conversation had a liberal turn, and such as tended to undermine" his "prejudices." At Daventry the same liberalising process went on. Both the students and the tutors were divided on such questions as "liberty and necessity, the sleep of the soul," and generally, "on all the articles of theological orthodoxy." With all things thus "favourable to free inquiry," and learning besides, as he imagined, a deeper philosophy and a warmer piety from Hartley's "*Observations on Man*," we do not wonder to hear him say, "I saw reason to embrace what is generally called the heterodox side of almost every question." His early impressions indeed secured to him still a belief, "more or less qualified," of the atonement; but after three years, he left the seminary an Arian.

The next three years were marked by equal progress in stripping himself of orthodox sentiments. At Needham Market, in Suffolk, where he starved on £30 a-year in ministering to an Independent congregation, he dropped the doctrine of the atonement, and part of the treatise which resulted from his study of the subject was published by Dr Lardner,—the other part being unpalatably ingenuous and daring, for it charged the apostle Paul with defective reasoning and ill-supported conclusions. But the discovery was too valuable to be hid from the world, and it was embodied in a separate treatise, which was afterwards inserted at intervals in the *Theological Repository*. With the atonement and the inspiration of Scripture, there vanished also from his creed "all idea of supernatural influence, except for the purpose of miracles." It is refreshing to find the size of his congregation keeping pace, inversely, with his advancing creed,—the original handful becoming ominously less; thus early did he find himself out of sympathy with his fellows, and so speedily did the principles he had imbibed prove their utter destitution of cohesive power.

Another series of three years was spent at Nantwich, in Cheshire, as minister of a congregation not exceeding sixty persons, "and a great proportion of them travelling Scotchmen." From this, in 1761, he removed to Warrington, where an academy had been instituted a few years previously for the systematic teaching of error in its purity. Priestley's post was that of classical tutor, his duty being also to teach elocution, logic, and Hebrew, varied by civil law and anatomy. His colleagues were Aitkin, the father of Mrs Barbauld; Forster, the naturalist; and another;—all of them Arians. Amid the labours and responsibilities of an important office, his pen was

amazingly fertile, the six years of his residence there being marked by publications on language, criticism, law, history, electricity, and education. But the *res angustæ domi* drove him to Mill-hill Chapel, at Leeds, in 1767. It was here that the lowest deep of doctrine was reached; and the hand that helped him down was Lardner's: "By reading with care Dr Lardner's letter on the Logos, I became what is called a Socinian." This letter is conclusive enough on the precise point discussed in it, viz., "Whether the Logos supplied the place of a human soul in the person of Jesus Christ;" but the demonstration of the negative was a refutation rather of Apollinarianism than Arianism—though some, called Arians in the early church, actually held that view—and it indicated a strong prepossession on behalf of the extreme opinion on the subject when Priestley so quietly accepted a demonstration of the *proper* as a demonstration of the *mere* humanity of Christ. In this situation, his restless pen ran on through many volumes of writing, on subjects as varied as those on which the presumptuous Talkative offered to enter; there were tracts for his congregation, pamphlets on the dissenting interest, a first pamphlet on air, essays on grammar and government, three volumes of the *Theological Repository*, and "Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion." But this is not all. He had the hardihood to undertake "the history of all the branches of experimental philosophy,"—a prospectus larger than that of Talkative. Of this vast programme he executed one part, viz., history of discoveries relating to vision, light, and colours, which the highest authority on optics has pronounced thoroughly unsatisfactory and superficial.

The next seven years of his life were spent as librarian and companion to Lord Shelburne, partly in Wiltshire and partly in London. In this situation he published four of the five volumes of "Experiments on Air," "Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever," "Harmony of the Gospels," in which the fundamental idea is, that Christ's ministry lasted only one year; and "Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit," in which he embodies the "firmest persuasion that man is wholly material, and that our only prospect of immortality is from the Christian doctrine of a resurrection."

On removing from this situation to Birmingham, where he was soon assumed into the joint pastorate of a congregation which he happily believed to be "the most liberal of any in England," he found himself in a position "highly favourable to every object he had in view, philosophical or theological," and it really is a pleasing picture he draws of companionship with such men as Watt, Withering, Boulton, Darwin, and others of kindred spirit, forming a lunar society which met for dinner

monthly; and of fortnightly consultations, held over the tea-cup with Socinian brethren, regarding the articles sent for insertion in the *Theological Repository*. But the peaceful occupations were widely interrupted by the sterner work of controversy. His "History of the Corruptions of Christianity," published in Birmingham, brought down upon him the vehement opposition of Horsley; and although, in his memoir, he passes over this encounter very briefly, he says enough to shew that he deeply felt its seriousness and difficulty. In order to settle the matter in dispute conclusively, he published a history of early opinions concerning Jesus Christ, a work, however, which Henley tells him he did not deign to read; and, to maintain the ground against all comers, he published a "pamphlet annually in defence of the Unitarian doctrine." Indomitable doctor! Like a true Briton, he did not know when he was beaten, but bravely busied himself planting defiant poles from which his stronger foes had torn away all vestige of a flag. But another storm, raging in a lower sphere, suddenly rose to trouble his serenity. The Test Act, which excluded dissenters from civil employments, had been vainly assailed in 1736, and again in 1737; and its repeal was now seriously agitated. In 1789, Priestley published a sermon on the subject, and was immediately assailed by a Birmingham clergyman, against whom, and all other defamers there, he wrote *Familiar Letters to the Inhabitants of Birmingham*. The mob answered him in their own style, by burning his chapel and dwelling-house, and demolishing the contents, attacking the houses of his friends, putting in peril the life of himself and his family, and making a feigned name necessary for his safe passage to London. Even in Hackney, to which he repaired, and where he succeeded Dr Price in the ministry, the fear of violence pursued him. It was disgraceful that so peaceful a man, and so brave a disputant, should have to live in a house taken under the name of another, to retire from the Royal Society, which declined his fellowship, and to find even the most innocent efforts for settling his family thwarted by the criminal hatred and the cowardly fears of his neighbours. We do not wonder that, although moderately successful in his congregation, happy in his scientific pursuits, and soothed by the congenial fellowship of Lindsey, a resigned Episcopalian clergyman, and Belsham, a resigned Independent professor, he should yet desire to leave a land that had ungratefully and rudely cast him out of its bosom. Accordingly, after declining the offer of naturalization as a French citizen, and the honour of a seat in the French National Convention, he left his native country in 1794, at the age of sixty-one, and landed in America. His residence there was at Northumberland, 130 miles from Philadelphia; and his

occupation, as before, was scientific and theological. Observations on the increase of infidelity, Notes on Scripture, Comparison of the institutions of Moses with those of the Hindoos, and last of all, a church history, which contributions from England enabled him to print, formed his chief theological publications. Although acquainted with Adams, and intimate with Jefferson, he kept himself aloof from politics, and indeed was never naturalised. Surmises regarding him circulated in plenty, coldness often met him, he lived in some respects an Ishmael in the land of his adoption; yet, in the main, he was courteously entreated, and on two occasions was invited to occupy a professor's chair. The quiet haven in which fierce storms had landed him, must have been very sweet to his placid temper, and soothing to his bitter memories of wrong. His religious opinions remained unshaken. No hardness of experience, no gathering of solemn shadows round him as his day darkened to its setting, no thrilling and awful prospects of immortality, had power to raise a single doubt of the soundness of his views. It was consistent, and but for the incalculable weight of interests imperilled, we might have said it was gallant, to stand by the crazy craft that had so often landed him on the rocks, and borne him so far and sadly from the track of sympathising fellowship. To him it seemed no slim and leaky boat, but a noble vessel built by God, and bound most surely for heaven. With this firm persuasion in him, we wonder not that his latter end was peace. But what a peace! A Stoic's, not a Christian's. "He dwelt upon the peculiarly happy situation in which it had pleased the Divine Being to place him in life; and the great advantage he had enjoyed in the acquaintance and friendship of some of the best and wisest men in the age in which he lived, and the satisfaction he derived from having led a useful as well as a happy life." "He desired me," says his son, "to reach him a pamphlet which was at his bed's head, Simpson on the 'Duration of Future Punishment.' 'It will be a source of satisfaction for you to read that pamphlet,' said he, giving it to one; 'it contains my sentiments, and a belief in them will be a support to you in the most trying circumstances, as it has been to me. We shall all meet finally: we only require different degrees of discipline, suited to our different tempers, to prepare us for final happiness.'" *Discipline*, what and where? His Institutes plainly tell; it consists in painful inflictions beyond the grave. But let him speak on: "And you little thing," speaking to Eliza, his grand-daughter, remember the hymn you learned, Birds in their little nests agree, &c. I am going to sleep as well as you: for death is only a good, long, sound sleep in the grave, and we shall meet again." Next day he died, after dictating alterations on some pam-

phlets, and exclaiming, "That is right; I have now done." And so he passed into the heavenly presence, having for his trust a life of industry, and for his hope a long sleep, and then perhaps a dismal waking to purgatorial pains that may last very long before they usher him into the accomplished bliss which lies all vague and shadowy on the further limit. Is this the gospel of the grace of God? Is this the life and immortality brought to light by it? Where is "the Lord our righteousness," and "Jesus Christ our hope?" Where is the shout of anticipated "victory through Jesus Christ our Lord, and the humble but ravishing prospect of being ever with him," and the framing of thankful lips to sing eternally, "Worthy is the Lamb?" Alas! this meagre faith is a miserable comforter, and worse than this, a lying prophet. We turn with shuddering from a scene so unnaturally and so treacherously calm, where the issues are so unspeakably momentous, and the preparation so conspicuously wanting. Well might his brother say, in his funeral sermon, "Not one in heaven will be more glad to find him there than myself." Well, too, and truly has it been said, The deathbed of Dr Priestley pronounces the damnation of Socinianism.

Such was the life of Dr Priestley; it devolves upon us now to estimate his *character*. Its main features lie on the surface. His natural *calmness* of temperament spreads like a subtle ether over all his writings, and gives them an air of impartiality, but, at the same time, a tameness and sluggishness of motion which makes them feeble and ineffective. The stammer of his oral delivery is faithfully reproduced, after its kind, in the languor of his published works. Judging even from the evidence supplied by himself, it would seem as if his heart also shared in the deficiency. In spite of abundant proofs of amiability, and a capacity for forming and retaining friendly relations in his own circle; in spite also of obtrusive pretensions to public spirit, and the actual existence of a large measure of it, even his friendships exhibit a dry, cold, unimpassioned self-possession; his love of country, generally smouldering under the damp of disapproving sentiments, never gets beyond a glimmer; his religious speculations have in them no soul of warmth, earnestness, or elevation; and his paraded hopes of social amelioration have in them no glow of fervent Christian interest in the spiritual welfare of men. In his main work as a Socinian champion, this nonchalance comes out so signally as to shock and appal us. He goes about the uncrowning of the King of glory with a light and careless air. The sacred courts of truth he traverses with composed and confident ease, as unconscious of a heavenly presence as one who should have taken the tabernacle of witness for a common

tent, and wandered through its precincts without awe, and handled its holy furniture without fear. As might have been expected, this coldness sorts worst of all with devotional subjects, and comes out into sharply-chiselled lines when he attempts to guide and stimulate religious feeling. In his "Forms of Prayer," a mournfully instructive book, this is illustrated even to painfulness. Pale and stiff as a statue he looks, without life, blood, or motion. His addresses to "the greatest and best of beings," as he delights to term the Father of mercies, are polite and ceremonious, thoroughly measured in their expressions of humility and confessions of sin, leading one to the belief that but for courtesy there would be nothing of the kind, and that the author wished to spare the feelings of God by making the apology of his noble creature as manly and as little degrading as possible. In the self-dependence of these so-called prayers, the same careless ease shews itself; the references to Christ are brief and cold, and never, of course, as to a sin-bearer; while, so far as we have observed, there is only one appeal made for the Spirit's help. Manifestly, Dr Priestley had suffered little by the fall, owed little to the Saviour, and had "scarcely heard whether there be any Holy Ghost."

Another, and apparently conflicting feature of his mind is its *precipitancy*. His conclusions grow from a mere glance at his premises. These premises frequently embody only half the truth, and this mingled with a moiety of falsehood. It could hardly be otherwise, for his knowledge, while extensive and varied, was superficial and inaccurate. He gloried in the speed of his writing. His refutation of Reid's Theory of Common Sense was written in a fortnight. His "History of Discoveries in Electricity," a twenty-one shilling book, was planned, executed, and printed in less than ten months, although he was almost altogether ignorant of the subject when he began, and spent much of his time in experimenting, and five hours daily in lecturing. Such rashness has ever been the special plague of theology. Even those who, on other subjects, would not have dared to speak or write at all without a thorough and searching investigation, utter their ignorant oracles with confidence on matters which most of all deserve and demand an humble, deliberate, and prolonged examination.

It is not surprising that Paine, the vilest type of smatterer, should have printed, without shame, profane and foul reviews of Scripture narratives, boasting all the while, "I keep no Bible;" but one does wonder that men of talents and self-respect should permit themselves to be ranked, however remotely, with such presumptuous and ignorant pretenders. We do not for one moment think of insulting Priestley by putting him on a level with Paine in this respect, though we

deny not there were plausible grounds otherwise on which the mob should have burned them in effigy together. Yet, in reading his works, we find ourselves involuntarily passing on him a running condemnation for the great vice of superficial examination, and this, too, with the vivid remembrance how regretfully he states that Franklin and other sceptics, both in England and France, lived in ignorance of the religion which they scorned. Instances of this haste and inaccuracy could be easily produced. Horsley has embalmed many of them. But they occur in his calmest didactic pieces. His frequent change of place, his variety of occupation as a man of science, a teacher of youth, a writer on politics, grammar, history, and metaphysics, his fondness for company, his frivolous expenditure of "not less than two or three hours a day in games of amusement," left him little real leisure for profound and accurate theological study. The issue is precisely such as we should have expected. He sinks no wells, and sends no deep drains into his subject; it is all surface water, commendably clear, but insipidly lukewarm. He takes up new views, and drops the old with amazing facility, and with an ease and coolness greater than he would have shewn in the mixing of gases, or the handling of an air-pump. But this representation would be one-sided if we neglected to mention that, while thus given to theological change, his changes were *all in one direction*. From the first divergence into doubts about our federal relation to Adam onward to matured Socinianism, his path was steadily downward. Never once does he trip, or swerve, or step backward, towards orthodoxy. His scientific career is not without witness of confessed error and corrected view, though even here we have a curious instance of tenacity in maintaining to the last a theory of Phlogiston, which his fellow-chemists utterly disallowed. But in the higher field of religious truth he proceeds with unflinching and ever-forward step. This persistency in error we can ascribe to nothing else than prejudice; and never, surely, did the mischievous working of a moral bias shew itself more clearly, or with more disastrous effect. Deeper than the deep calm of his nature lay this pernicious bent. We are unwilling to believe that at any period he was properly conscious of it; and there is abundant evidence that, during the whole of his prominent public career, he erred with integrity of mind, and a full persuasion of his correctness of sentiment. Even in torturing texts, and out-raging both common sense and Greek Grammar to make out his point, he seems acting "in all good conscience," and with as full a persuasion that he "ought to do many things" against the true doctrine of Jesus as the other persecutor had to imprison His true followers. The pride of his heart was in the error of his judgment; and as the spring was unintermitting,

so also was the stream perpetual, while the main current was secretly swollen by the tributary pride of consistency. What strange and lamentable things this wrong bias, animating a false opinion, is capable of committing, may be seen advantageously but most painfully in the following specimens of interpretation, culled from his familiar illustration of certain passages of Scripture :—"Jesus Christ the same yesterday," &c. "Here he means to express the unchangeableness of the doctrine of Christ." Isaiah ix. 6 means that "God, the wise and benevolent author of the gospel, will appear to be a wonderful counsellor," &c. ; or, "it may be rendered, the mighty God is my Father for ever." In John i. 1-3, "The Word of God means the power or energy of God, which is so much *with* God that it properly belongs to his nature," &c. Heb. i. 2, "By whom also he made (or appointed not the material) worlds, but the ages, that is, the present dispensation of God's government over mankind ;" "upholding all things by the word of his (that is, God's) power." "In verses 10-12 the apostle quotes an address to God, but without any hint of its being applied to Christ ; it probably expresses the great honour conferred on Christ on account of the dignity of the person who conferred it." "In John viii. 58, 'Before Abraham was, I am,' the meaning clearly is, that Christ was the subject of prophecy before the times of Abraham." The sublime description in Micah, "Whose goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting," may be understood concerning the promises of God, in which the coming of Christ was signified to mankind from the beginning of the world. Ps. v. 1-5, "This has very much the air of a proverbial expression, signifying great depravity of heart, and very early habits of vice. It was not intended to express a natural propensity to vice." Rom. v. 6, Christ died for the ungodly ; "the case is very different since that happy event." Eph. ii. 3, "By nature," &c. ; "the apostle did not mean by *nature* that internal frame, constitution, or condition of being wherewith our Maker hath formed us ; but that external condition, or those outward circumstances, in which divine Providence hath caused us to be born and live. 'Children of wrath,' that is, wrathful, furious, malignant, and mischievous persons." But enough of this miserable travesty of heavenly truth. It is a mighty delusion that could drag a man of sense, without shame, over such depths and heights of exegetic difficulty ; the tyranny, though unconscious, was highly criminal, for its being and force sprang from nature's proud predisposition against the humbling gospel of the glory of God.

These two things, hasty superficiality and wrong moral bias, are no strangers in the world now. The race of sciolists in theology is not extinct. Let any one attentively examine the

writings of our recent reviewers and repairers of Christian doctrine, and say whether ill-considered statement and inaccurate reasoning be not prominent in most. This superficiality comes out oddly sometimes in the grave and serious employment of old and exploded objections with an air of interest, and with the apparent conviction that they have renewed their youth in the limbo to which faithful men dismissed them long ago. Bolingbroke is said to have enlisted in his services a quotation at the nineteenth hand. Possibly it was accurate after all; certainly many modern specimens of objection are as void of strength as they are long in lineage. Mr Jowett actually employs, in the work of damaging the inspiration of the sacred writers, besides other oft-explained discrepancies, the difference between two evangelists in regard to the number of thieves who reviled the suffering Saviour; and herein he stands exposed in the cast-off clothes of infidelity. It is curious that this very objection, among others, was demolished by Dr Priestley. It is also interesting to know that one of his last productions was an answer to Darwin's notion of spontaneous vitality; while Professor Powell, in 1860, has not scrupled to affirm that "either development or spontaneous generation *must* be true." On the whole, it seems to us that Dr Priestley, with all his careless haste, deserves a decidedly higher place even in this respect than his more favoured successors in error. Nor is it different with the heavier charge of thinking and acting under a wrong moral bias. Modern theologues have more light shining about their steps, a more thoroughly defended orthodoxy before their eyes, and in their bosoms, if we do not misjudge appearances, a stronger and warmer flow of quasi-religious sentiment, and an influence of more elevated poetic taste than the early doubters of the same school; and this natural force in favour of the sublime and glorious peculiarities of the gospel, when overmastered, measures the guilty power which achieved the victory. What but a mighty prejudice, a proud preference, secretly and, it may be, unconsciously cherished, for that way of thinking which should leave the perverse will of man least cumbered by divine restraints, his lofty confidence least reproached by divine help, and his imperious reason least controlled and baffled by divine mysteries, could make men stoop to the retailing of old cavils, the invention of new quibbles, the exaggeration of Scripture difficulties, and such like means of warfare?

But to return to Dr Priestley. There was conspicuous in him a courageous *honesty* in declaring and acting on his creed. Whatever mental tortuousness there was in forming his opinions, there was none in maintaining them. We admire and pity him as we see him manfully upholding them against all

assailants, and following the evil spirit of error through all the "dry places" to which it led him. In his dealing with others the same quality is manifest. Lindsey promptly left his pastoral charge at Catterick to live in a mean house in London; Belsham as promptly left his professorial charge at Ashworth to resume it in the new college at Hackney; and these two honest men were his bosom friends. In his writings also we frequently light upon complaints of compliance with the Established Church by those who were at heart Unitarians. It is an interesting proof of his uprightness, that when Dr Kippis advised him to publish his "Observations on the Imperfections of the Sacred Writers," under the character of an unbeliever, he refused, "having always had a great aversion to assume any character that was not my own, even so much as disputing for the sake of discovering truth." There is a sad and painful *naïveté* in the frank confession which follows: "I therefore wrote the book with great freedom indeed, but as a Christian, and an admirer of the apostle Paul, as I always was in other respects." About the outskirts of this honesty a considerable amount of bravado may, no doubt, be seen lurking. The pride of championship helped also to abate the pain of odium, and to make the balance sway over to the side of bold avowal. It is true also that controversial straits often made him an unfair disputant; but in *declaring his opinions*, there was a magnanimous candour, which lifts him far above the general mass of his erring contemporaries. It took the toil of years to unmask the Arians Pierce and Hallet, in the first quarter of the century; nor was it done till they had gathered round them so many associates, equally unwilling to stand in the light as to distract, divide, and weaken the dissenting interest in England. Dr Lardner kept his famous letter on the Logos nearly thirty years in his desk.

The great movement of 1772, in which several hundred clergymen of the Church of England sought to be "freed from these impositions (the thirty-nine articles and the Liturgy), and restored to their undoubted rights as Protestants, of interpreting Scripture for ourselves," and which in Cambridge was supported by all the heads of houses and students except Isaac Milner, was in itself honourable enough, though very unreasonable; but the silent acquiescence which they gave before, and relapsed into afterwards, was in many cases altogether dishonest. In Scotland, Professor Simson put the church to the annoyance of a process which dragged it slowly along from 1715 to 1729, and in which, very significantly, the charge deepened from Arminianism to Arianism; and one of the strongest influences that drove Principal Robertson from his place of power was the rising current of opposition to established

formularies among those who had sworn to maintain them, and who yet in great numbers held, and in the case of Drs McGill and Dalrymple of Ayr, avowed and published, Socinian sentiments. But the partiality of heretical wolves for sheep's clothing has been conspicuous throughout the whole history of the church. Arius, Socinus, Arminius were all disingenuous, and their adherents commonly followed in their steps. Probably we shall never be done with it; certainly we shall not, so long as popular favour and richer pasture are found within the sacred inclosure.

But it is time to notice Priestley's *work*. In doing so there are other evident considerations besides the "quid humeri valeant, quid non" which dictate a mere glance at his political, scientific, and metaphysical achievements. From his earliest work, "On the First Principles of Government," in 1768, down to his latest on this subject, "Maxims of Political Arithmetic," in 1798, he was a strenuous assertor of liberty. At first "a Trinitarian in politics," as he describes himself, his regard for our balanced constitution passed into a declared republicanism. His principle that government should interfere as little as possible with the people, made him a free trader, and an opponent both of national education and national establishments. Yet he sought not the demolition of the establishment; it was only its reformation he aimed at; one item of the desired reformation being the lopping off of thirty-eight articles from its doctrinal basis. His political hopes, based as they were on the exclusion of human depravity, the largest factor by far in all social problems, were proudly and blindly sanguine; for he counted on "a glorious and paradisaical future."

In *science* his position was high and honourable, founded on important discoveries, chiefly in connection with air and electricity. Of this it will be enough to say, that in the *Philosophical Transactions* there are seventeen papers on these two subjects, and in other journals, or in the shape of pamphlets, more than thirty; that he pointed out the effects of light on vegetables, of respiration on the blood, and of vegetable respiration on vitiated air; and that in addition to these and other substantive discoveries he had the merit of pursuing simple, ingenious, and novel *methods* of investigation. For *metaphysics* he had far less capacity than he imagined, for there was in him neither depth nor breadth of intellectual vision. As a follower of Hartley, his psychology was nothing better than a physiology, for man was but a material organism, and his mental phenomena, as we speak, only vibrations of the corporeal, shadowy films of matter, nervous agitations, affections of the brain, variously sorted, proportioned, and modified. From the conjunct action of outward circumstances and the laws of physical

organisation there results a determinate and necessary line of thought, feeling, and conduct. This necessity, born of materialism, bore something like a practical fatalism, and was of immense but mischievous power in lightening conscience of its load of responsibility, in minimizing moral differences, and lending countenance to the idea of universal restoration. From this materialism there sprang naturally the belief that, with the suspension of the vital powers, all consciousness is suspended, and that when the body dies all thought and feeling cease, till Omnipotence quicken the buried dust.

But our purpose leads us from these aspects of his life and work to consider his prominent features and doings as a theologian, both controversial and systematic.

His early opinions, as we have seen, were Calvinistic, and from these he descended through Arianism to the lowest Socinianism. Many causes conspired to accomplish this. Probably we have embraced the most powerful of them when we mention his *experience*, his *temperament*, and his *times*. In noticing the first, we refer to the singular fact, recorded with melancholy calmness in his Autobiography:—"Having read many books of experiences, and in consequence believing that a new birth produced by the immediate agency of the Spirit of God was necessary to salvation, and not being able to satisfy myself that I had experienced anything of the kind, I felt occasionally such distress of mind as it is not in my power to describe, and which I still look back upon with horror." "The remembrance of what I sometimes felt in that state of ignorance and darkness gives me a peculiar sense of the value of rational principles of religion." It is a memorable and suggestive fact, that one of the greatest modern apostles of error was in religious character the child of stifled impressions and abortive seriousness. An anxious inquirer became a cold and self-righteous heresiarch. What dreadful perils compass the regenerating process! When a soul that has begun to soften under the heavenly quickening cools prematurely in the old mould, how terrible the iron temper it takes on! But in this case the hardening process was helped by his peculiar temperament; not indeed by this in itself, for other men as cool and unimpassioned have not shivered in the potter's hands, but because he plumed himself upon it, and nurtured it to his harm. To nothing could such easy calmness be more completely opposed and more conclusively fatal than to the excited earnestness, the vague fears, the profound and solemn questionings of a mind shaken into alarm by the divine Spirit, and brought tremblingly face to face with the Majesty of heaven, and with the tremendous prospect of an existence blighted and darkened for ever. To the proud and careless, such discom-

posure seems unreasonable, unworthy of a man, deserving only of resentment if it have personally assailed them. Even so, this poor Pliable struggled out at the wrong side of the Slough of Despond, and was seen henceforth, shall we not say it, on the streets of the City of Destruction, yet cherishing the delusion that he was still a Pilgrim. But even this proud and cherished indifference of soul might not have sufficed to turn him away from the very gate of life had he not been placed among currents of loose and dangerous thinking. His early Calvinism, as we have seen, yielded to the influence of Baxterian, that is, substantially Arminian, ministers,—Arminian, for it is a recognised phenomena in the history of doctrines, that the disciples go farther than their master; and the master here held, amid much confusion, a Calvinism so modified as to admit universal redemption, to affirm neonomian error, and to assign to human power much too high a place in the process of conversion. In Priestley, there quickly appeared a full-grown Arminianism. But here he did not stop. Probably with the motion on, and the descent begun, he would have continued the movement even if left to himself. But no sooner had he reached one stage, than strong influences conspired to lead him downwards to a second. The academy at Daventry was designedly open to every wind of doctrine. The vice was hereditary, for Doddridge himself gave too great a licence to discussions which implied that the grand doctrines of the gospel were still legitimately a debateable land, in which young spirits might wander freely, and believe or argue on either side, without presumption, irreverence, or danger. The senior teacher being mildly orthodox, and the junior vigorously unsound, it is not surprising that young Priestley, predisposed as he was, should commonly be found on the side of error. That error was Arianism. From the beginning of the century this plague had been abroad. Its ravages began within the Established Church, Whiston losing his mathematical chair in Cambridge (1710), and Clarke keeping his rectory in Westminster (1712), only by an explanation and promise of silence. But the damage done here, so far at least as immediately declared opinion and ecclesiastical troubles were concerned, was not to be compared with that inflicted on the dissenting body. In Exeter, two ministers already mentioned, viz., Pierce and Hallet, were turned out of their meeting-houses in 1719, after perverting the minds of many, not only by their public ministrations, but by their private influence; and the latter also by insidious dealing with students under his care.

Vigorous treatment checked the mischievous invasion for a little; but it soon recovered and grew apace, nurtured by equivocal statements, dry speculations, and omission of evan-

gelical doctrine, to make room for recommendations of virtue on the part of its advocates, by weak and baneful tolerance on the part of the orthodox, and by the prevailing pride of free-thinking in a land newly enfranchised with untrammelled thought and speech. The general dearth of warm religious feeling proved itself also at this time as always the natural habitat and nursery of error not only in England but in Scotland; and it is singular to mark the established moderatism of the north shaking hands with the dissenting heresy of the south, in conveying both to Foster and Lardner their degrees in divinity. The infection reached London and its neighbourhood; and then, as if its seeds had been secretly wafted northwards, and the moral epidemic had sent its pestilential breath, as does the physical, across a certain zone of territory, York, Cheshire, and Lancashire were suddenly seen under its blight. It was chiefly the Presbyterians and General Baptists that succumbed to it; but, as we have seen already, there was deadly work doing within the walls of the establishment, and over the general mind there had breathed a dark spirit of doubt from the Deistic controversy, even when Deistic conclusions were utterly repudiated. In this evil time of "free-handling" of everything, and attempted expulsion from the faith of all that mortified human pride and baffled human reason, Priestley's lot fell. At first he sank no lower than Arianism. Even during his incumbency at Warrington, he mentions that the only Socinian in the neighbourhood was Mr Seddons of Manchester, and that they all wondered at him. At this time there were few declared Socinians, Foster, Burroughs, and Lardner being the chief. But the descent from Arianism to Socinianism, though a great one, bears no proportion to that from truth to Arianism, the line of measurement in the one case lying wholly among creatures, in the other stretching across the infinite distance which separates them from the Creator. It was to be expected that, when the larger space had been traversed so easily, the shorter would soon be crossed. A gentle impulse sent him to the bottom of the steep descent; and from that descent we gather, in sadness, impressive illustrations of the power of an early taint of evil, the destructive pride of reason, the peril of unfettered doubting, the mighty progressiveness of error, and the penetrating influence exerted over the mind by the prevailing tone of religious thought and feeling. To this decided result, another circumstance connected with the times of Priestley greatly contributed, viz., the condition of civil proscription in which the dissenters had been and were then placed. To a strong mind, especially if it be also a proud one, any attempt at curbing produces stronger conviction, and more violent assertion of

opinion. Priestley's lines fell in times of restrictive laws, that were meant to protect truth, but only fettered freedom, and by striving to crush the young life of eager intellectual activity that was heaving in the land, only provoked the more impatient and resolute exertion of its powers in the prohibited direction. The Test and Corporation Act had put dissent under ban, and earnest but fruitless efforts were made, up to 1790, for its removal. The dissenting clergy were also compelled, in England, to give public adherence to the Thirty-Nine Articles,—a yoke under which they rightly groaned, and from which, after severe struggles in 1772 and 1773, they only escaped in 1779. Nor is this all. There were penal laws, designed to affect Arians and Socinians, which were in operation during the formation of Priestley's opinions, and were not repealed even by the exertions of Fox in 1792. We need not wonder that the resultant of two such forces as were thus operating together, should be the wider and more pronounced divergence of Priestley from established opinions.

When once fairly fixed in his last and lowest sentiments, he set himself to win adherents to them. It is one of his most frequent and weighty complaints, that Trinitarianism is the great obstacle to the conversion of infidels, Mahomedans, and Jews ; and the first and last of these he strove to reconcile to rational Christianity, by direct appeals to them. But his success did not equal his hopes ; for while, on the one hand, Gibbon refused to discuss the Evidences with him, infidels heeded not his arguments, and many Socinians passed over to the conterminous region of infidelity,—on the other hand, the Jews, through their representative, Levi, crushed him with the demonstration that, on the ground of recognised Scripture authority, common to the Trinitarians and their opponents, the former have correctly interpreted the claims of Jesus of Nazareth. In like fashion, Hindmarsh, the Swedenborgian, answered his proselytising efforts by denying him to be a Christian. But it was in his famous theological duel with Horsley, that his powers as a defender of the faith he had embraced were best displayed, most severely tested, and most conclusively discredited. Horsley was no common foe. In clearness of perception, in mental vigour, in the power of detecting readily the true inferences that lie hid in premises, and of expounding them in transparent and forcible language, no less than in accurate theological learning, he was immeasurably ahead of Priestley. His sentences come like the tramp of a legion—steady, strong, and terrible, with no sickly softness of feeling, or suspicion of possible error in logic, to make their pace halting or their assaults feeble. He is every inch a champion, with coat of mail, and weapon like a weaver's beam ; and though not seldom, in the march of his imperious arguments, the question

emerges, whether his heart had sufficiently yielded to the overmastering glory and tenderness that shine together in the central fact of the gospel—the holy of holies, which his hand had defended so well—yet more frequently there rises within us a hearty thankfulness that, in those testing times, the God of hosts had granted to his truth so sturdy a Goliath. His encounter with Priestley was on historical, not scriptural, ground, and he resolutely refused to be drawn from his well-marked purpose of demonstrating, on that ground, the utter incompetency of his antagonist. Priestley had, in his “History of the Corruptions of Christianity,” asserted, and striven to prove, “that the primitive church was simply Unitarian; that our Lord’s divinity was an innovation of the second century; and that the innovation was made by the Platonising fathers.” From this ground Horsley drives him in utter rout, sometimes spiking his guns, and sometimes turning them against him; proving him ignorant of the Greek language, the Platonic philosophy, and the current theological phraseology of the period; convicting him also of unfounded assumption, illogical reasoning, and garbling of authorities. It was work well timed and well done; for while it is true that, on the great question which lay at the heart of the strife between them, the main battle must be fought on other ground than that which he occupied, yet it is, beyond contradiction, among the impartial that he has, on the points discussed, conclusively cleared the flanks of the apologetic army, and left the pure Scripture argument standing, without fear of assault from the thickets of patristic lore.*

Dr Priestley’s main work as a theologian, appears to us to have been that of conducting Arianism to its proper terminus, and of giving consistent form and clear utterance to Socinian sentiments. The form, indeed, had before this nearly reached its theoretical completion, although, with Socinus himself, and Biddle, the father of English Unitarianism, Christ was still an object of lawful worship (*Life of Biddle*, vol. iv. of *Unitarian Tracts*, 1791), and the miraculous had not been altogether expelled from the Conception of Christ and the Composition of Scripture. It is patent, too, to common sight, that there is a natural consanguinity among Socinian doctrines, which makes the systematic grouping and completion easy. Dr Priestley arrived at his last results by a gradual process; but after advancing on a radius inward to the central point—the mere

* It was not to be expected that Priestley’s party would own his defeat; and we recently saw in a Socinian periodical, a most confident statement of the identity of Nazarenes and Ebionites, as proved by him. But a stronger witness on the other side is the subsequent rancour of young Priestley, Belsham, and the party generally.

humanity, and consequent peccability, of Christ,—and looking round on the whole field of doctrine, he could thence synthetically construct with ease a harmonious system. While a proud Pelagianism of feeling formed the soil on which Socinianism grew, the main Pelagian doctrine would not form so perfect and unexceptionable a rallying-point for the whole, as has indeed been proved by the simultaneous maintenance, by the same individual, of Pelagian and Trinitarian views. The name of *system* had no terrors for Priestley, such as it has for our delicate modern theologians. “Precise definitions of truth,” which so nauseate Dr Temple, and “theological distinctions,” against which Mr Jowett exclaims so frequently, were his current coin. “No branch of knowledge—religion not excepted—can be taught to advantage but in the way of system” (Tracts, vol. ix.). There never was a system more distinct and well-defined than his. It is as clear, compact, and firm as ice. Herein lies his chief excellence; and herein also lay his chief utility, as an instrument of good to the church. Acting as one of his own precipitates, he condensed floating sentiments, and brought them out to distinct and palpable existence, proclaiming to all whom it concerned, the real nature of the opinions that were creeping stealthily about the confines of the Christian community. It was a real service done to truth, when he boldly brought error to confront it in a tangible shape,—a shape not only definite enough to be met by the arguments of the apologist, but so bald and savourless as to be repelled by the feelings of the Christian. If the warning had been rightly taken, and if the candour which gave it had been honourably followed, we should not have seen Arianism and Socinianism battling then, as Arminianism had done before and Popery has done since, for a legal standing within the pale of the Church of England; nor should we have been startled, as recently we have been, by a resurrection of this baseness on the part of those whose “latitude” is, in some things, about as broad as that of the “wide dissenters.”

The actual scheme of Priestley is too well known to need a formal statement, but a few notices of his “Institutes,” and of his “Appeal to the Serious and Candid Professors of Christianity,” to bring out some salient points, may not be without interest. The first glance at these two treatises discloses the singular fact, that the brief Appeal of fifty-six pages controverts a great deal more of specifically Scripture doctrine than the Institutes, with its six hundred pages, contains. It is a skeleton creed, a faith mostly made up of articles of disbelief. This arises from his daring *exclusion of the supernatural*. The general principle in which his views on this point were embodied is thus expressed in his Life:—“I had become persuaded of the falsity of . . . all idea of supernatural influence, except for

the purpose of miracles." This sweeping canon carries off at once all spiritual agency from the constituting of Christ's humanity, the composition of Scripture, and the origination and maintenance of Christian life in the soul ; annihilating, at the same time, all diabolic operation, whether on men's bodies in the time of Christ, or on their minds since. He speaks with a little scorn of those who expect the Saviour "to cleanse them by some miraculous power ;" and affirms that "true religion, that alone which affords solid ground of hope towards God, consists in a change of heart, affections, and habits, which can only be brought about by serious resolution, and a vigorous and constant exertion of our powers." These powers were untouched by that catastrophe which, by a foolish misnomer, we term the Fall, for "all the evils that sprang from it are of a corporeal and temporal nature ; and, upon the whole, it is probable that our condition is more favourable to virtue than that of Adam," because of the entail of wholesome suffering which he happily left us. The human race, then, fell *upward* when Adam sinned : original sin is a myth, regeneration a fancy, special grace a calumnious untruth. The reservation, however, which Priestley makes, in limiting the area over which his general rule dominates, is a very large one. "Except," says he "for the purpose of miracles ;" and under this head he ranks Scripture prophecies. On these two points he comes decidedly into conflict with the tendencies of modern "free-handling" in theology. He did not dream of "the inconceivableness of imagined interruption of natural order," nor recognise "the rule of *universal subordination of physical causes* as the sole principle and criterion of proof and evidence in the region of physical and sensible truth." Dr Priestley counted on the permanence of the laws of nature with as much confidence as will the last man who shall deal with the oxygen which he discovered ; but his thoughts did not soar, with Professor Powell's, to a "grand conception of the order of nature," such as should inflexibly repel the interposition of its almighty Framer. He did not seek among the dross of his crucible the blackened wreck of a Christian argument ; as the glass of the astronomer has, it seems, disclosed a damning flaw in the Christian record, and the hammer of the geologist is like to demolish its credit altogether. So far was he from dreading at this point a breach in the bulwark of evidence, that he gives in his *Institutes*, much after the manner of Campbell, a cordial and thorough refutation of Hume. "A regard to truth is a natural and very strong principle in the human mind ;" "the general experience of human veracity *confirms* our disposition to give credit to human testimony ;" in these two sentences we seem to hear the anticipation of Chalmers's elaborate separation of testimony into

two classes, and emphatic reiteration of the growing confidence we repose in that which has about it the marks of trustworthiness.

On the question of prophecy, his utterance is equally clear. He gives it a prominent place among the evidential instruments, and never once insinuates, as was done before in a heathen, and recently in a Christian pleading, that any utterance, purporting to be a prediction, was really made after the event to which it referred. In regard to the Messianic prophecies, his voice is still the same; those which under recent tests have disappeared from the list, such as the Shiloh of Jacob, and Isaiah's meek Sufferer, whose wounds were for the healing of the nations, occupy in his system their proper place of honour and importance. But we need not wonder that on these two points his position differs so widely from that which is finding favour now. It was natural that, with his cold materialism in philosophy, and his bold utilitarianism in morals, the blight of religious misbelief should tell inwardly on the spiritual domain of gospel revelation, while it left the *frame* of supernatural operation standing; it is equally natural that in an age of finer tastes and loftier pretensions, which is both more scientific and more spiritualistic, this miraculous interference in the region of nature and history should be decried in importance, and disbelieved as a fact. But it is inexpressibly sad, that when Infinite Grace, stooping first to give us a most marvellous gospel, stooped again to stamp it miraculously with the seal of heaven, the creatures whom it yearns to embrace should coldly question these credentials, and strive to prove them fictitious and illusory; and it is mysterious, no less than sad, that *any* kind or amount of access to his own works, or influence upon them, should be denied to the glorious Creator by creatures who are illustrating every day, in their own person, by the action of mind on body, and through it on other matter, the possibility and the fact that the physical world is open to modification on all sides from the energy of will. This, however, does seem clear, that they who disbelieve, or doubt, or desire to reduce, the miraculous in Scripture, are doing so in practical denial of the greatest miracle of all, the Incarnation; for he who truly credits this transcendent mystery will think it neither impossible nor unnatural, but most reasonable, that all nature should reverently attend the steps of her manifested Lord.

While Dr Priestley retained in his system the miracles of Scripture, he dismissed, as we have seen, all idea of the inspiration of its authors. This point was reached very early in his career—when he was under twenty-five years of age; an evidence of his cool and daring independence, doubly so, from the

fact that he was traversing a region hitherto untrodden by his compeers. Doddridge had, indeed, spoken with dangerous rashness on the subject, in disallowance, for instance, of the inspired character of such things as Paul's advice to Timothy, "to mingle a little wine with his water;" and under his successor, a mischievous freedom of speculation on vital points was permitted. But the young preacher at Needham speedily outstripped contemporary opinion, shocking Lardner, and drawing down the warnings of Benson, by bold averments of Paul's "defective reasoning and ill-supported conclusions." More than thirty years afterwards, he affirmed in his *Institutes*, that "the writers of the books of Scripture have fallen into some inaccuracies; that their narration is not coherent with itself; that some things are frivolous and weak in their discourses; that they are misinformed with respect to a variety of incidental circumstances;" and in other productions, he alleged that they were "misled by Jewish prejudices," and that "their credibility is to be estimated, like that of other historians, from the circumstances in which they wrote, as with respect to their opportunities of knowing the truth of what they relate, and the biases to which they might be subject." In all this, he was perfectly consistent. As an Arian, he had an immeasurably feebler motive for guarding the sacredness of Scripture than that which bears on the Trinitarian, for to him it was the casquet of a jewel incomparably less precious; and the same pride of soul that made him superior to the need of a divine Saviour and a divine Quickener, would make him regard divine inspiration of Scripture as both useless and irksome. It was to be expected, too, that among those who were otherwise of his own way of thinking, the boldness of his advance would win him more adherents than its irreverence and recklessness scared. The move was not only a gratification of pride, as the over-leaping of a sacred enclosure, but a skilful succouring of their cause, inasmuch as it put the sacred utensils in their hands to be used with greater freedom, and at pleasure to be emptied out or mutilated, as might best suit their views. An Arian or Socinian cannot well, and will not long, remain in reverent acknowledgment of inspired authority. A Trinitarian *may* go with him in disowning it. Unhappily, the evidence is abundant. Yet are there certain *modes* of disowning it which start the painful question, whether the Divinity enshrined be truly and in soul embraced. When we find men charging the Bible with "barely consistent genealogies," "rhetorical exaggerations," "variations of fact, and inaccuracies of language;" affirming that it contains dark patches of human passion and error which form a partial crust upon it," and passages which "may be interpreted with the latitude of poetry," though

manifestly designed to be received as plainly historical; making and magnifying difficulties with an air of easy nonchalance: we are not surprised to hear one of them say, "Being, becoming, animating, or substance, thought, and conscious life, are expressions of a Triad, which may be also represented as Father, Son, and Spirit;" and further, "The Divine consciousness or wisdom, becoming personal in the Son of man, is the express image of the Father." But whatever may be the relation between the doctrine of the Divinity of the Word, and the Inspiration of the Record, it is too certain that, since Dr Priestley's day, a grievous laxity of view on the latter point has been troubling the church, and the nature, grounds, and limits of our dearly cherished Theopneustia have grown to form part of our staple theological discussion. The din of controversy has revived with new intensity around the disputed question. And now, new materials for the assault are available, which men have not been slow to handle. Sacred criticism working on the record, and physical science working beside it, have joined their forces to demolish its divine authority. With what result? In regard to the former, we can but say, that the assault has passed, and whatever friends once feared, or enemies still affirm, the shock has only cleared the rubbish from its bulwarks. And what has *science* done to rid the world of our sacred Book? First, it has shewn "the impossibility of any modification whatever in the existing conditions of material agents, unless through the invariable operation of a series of eternally impressed consequences, following in some necessary chain of orderly succession" (Powell); and so, as miracles are myths, Scripture is an imposture! The folly of this is as signal as its cool audacity. Let science go on and prosper. We have lent her often in one humble department our hammer and our sinews in rocky glen and quarry. She is not the foe but the handmaid of sacred truth, and God will make her bow at its shrine. Her researches give no back-thrust on the past; they can lay bare nothing more than actual phenomena and their connections; and invariable sequence to the end of time will not in the smallest measure invalidate the evidence of former interruptions. But, secondly, physical science "discloses palpable contradictions with Scripture," "Scripture contains erroneous views of nature;" its opening narrative is, "the speculation of some Hebrew Descartes or Newton;" yet "the writer asserts solemnly and unhesitatingly that for which he must have known that he had no authority." We deny the facts as alleged, and affirm that the grand immunity of Scripture from real harm amid the crash of advancing sciences, which their votaries wish to turn against it, forms part of its glory, and part also of its triumphant testimony.

And further, it must be said, that such statements as those last quoted, if true, fairly leave no alternative but the utter and total repudiation of Scripture, not only as uninspired, but as unworthy of the least esteem. There is no limited liability in the case. If the writers were capable of stating untruths in the name of God, they were dishonest and impious men; their book loses the stamp of heaven; it is base coin, and he is a public nuisance who attempts to utter it.

There is another topic classed by Priestley with those already referred to, viz., the *Atonement*. This also was surrendered by him in his youth. He held it to be *unnecessary, unjust, and unscriptural*. It is unnecessary both on God's side and man's; the former, because "God is essentially and of himself merciful and gracious, without the least reference to any other being or agent whatever, and forgives freely and gratuitously, upon our repentance and amendment, without any other atonement or satisfaction;" the latter, because man's nature is not depraved, his sins are either innocent weaknesses or trivial offences, and "the word of God always represents a safe and happy death as the consequence of nothing but a well-spent life." It is unjust, "for it can never be reconciled to equity to make the innocent suffer the punishment of the guilty." It is unscriptural, for Scripture abounds in "figures," and its "bold comparisons and allusions" must not be literally interpreted; redemption and ransom mean deliverance; "made sin," means "made a man;" to bear sin, means to bear it away; ransom for sinners, means for their benefit; to endure the curse, is "to die in a state of suspension;" sacrifices under the law were nothing more than "gifts presented as tokens of respect or homage, and in their original the same as prayer;" Christ was a "sacrifice for sin, because his death and resurrection were necessary to the confirmation of that gospel, by which sinners are brought to repentance, and thereby reconciled to God;" Christ is a propitiation, because through his religion "the world is reformed, in consequence of which God is rendered propitious to them;" and at no time did he "lie under the displeasure of God" for the people. Almost every one of these expressions has its parallel in recent discussion. There are, however, several grades of opinion on the question involved, and it is the lowest only that coincides with Priestley. This coincidence is sometimes curiously close; for instance, Dr Priestley, in a prayer of the most original description, made up for the most part of defaming and denunciation of Calvinists and Papists, thus gives his views: "Having lost the idea of the purity of thy nature, and thy regard to moral righteousness, as the only just ground of acceptance and favour with thee," &c.; and Dr Williams follows suit: "Abraham, &c., put

trust in a righteous God above offerings of blood;" "sense of divine approval comes of trust in a righteous God, rather than a fiction of merit by transfer." A higher class, greatly larger, we hope, and certainly by no means so "broad," recognising a personal Immanuel, recognise also the efficacy of his death, but repudiate the idea of substitution, and the penal endurance of God's wrath for sinners ("Tracts for Priests and People," Robertson of Brighton, &c.); while a third and higher class holds fast the vicarious endurance of divine displeasure ("Aids to Faith"). With the second class the great fact insisted on, as the main efficient in salvation, is the identification of Christ with his human kindred, constituting him head of humanity.

Now (1.) this is not a scriptural expression. Five times is he termed "head of the church," once "head of all principality and power," and once "head of every man." But this last expression manifestly has no reference to representation or identification, still less to identification for saving purposes; it indicates superiority, higher standing, greater authority. In this sense only can it hold that "the head of the woman, the man," and Christ; the "head of principality," Christ; the head of the church alone. It was "unto his brethren" in the house "he became like." The identification is a blessed reality; but it is sovereignly limited, and actually shared in by each sinner only when faith makes him a brother.

(2.) Granting this identification, the redemptive process is left in hopeless mutilation and mystery, if we go no further. "The gift of Christ's own will, and of his own being to the will of his Father, is entire and flawless. The self surrender stays not till the very life has been offered. Short of that point the sacrifice would not have been complete, there would have been something kept back" ("Tracts for Priests and People," No. III). This is truth, but not the whole of it. The very point in most request is left without an answer. Why was it the Father's will that he should *die*? It must have been at the call of some necessity, else would he have "spared his own Son." Surely the benignant Father did not, in mere arbitrary mood, exact these last filial pangs to know what strain that meek submissiveness would bear. Why did he will that sweat of blood and shuddering recoil of soul, and overwhelming woe that caused them? And why, after so touching and thorough a triumph of enduring love, did he press the trial further, till the crushed soul was forsaken, and the light of life was quenched in mortal pangs? What possible explanation of this most marvellous death-scene that creation ever witnessed can be given, but that which views it as the righteous doom of sin inflicted by a just Ruler, and borne by a holy Surety, both equally moved with astonishing love to lost sinners, and both

co-operating for their honourable rescue? So viewed, how grand, awful, and glorious is the cross, and how real and needful its pangs! The denial of this springs from low thoughts of the majesty of heaven on the one side, and, on the other, from feeble consciousness of sin. It is the deep sense of this that gives to the saints' everlasting cry, "Worthy is the Lamb," its reverence, humility, and rapture.

The third class has at least two subdivisions, marked off from each other by their views of the extent of the atonement. And here, we think, there comes in sight an illustration of the weakness caused by a fragment of error in the building of truth. The Bishop of Gloucester (in "*Aids to Faith*"), holds both substitution and universality, and herein he cannot hold his ground against Davies and Garden (in "*Tracts for Priests and People*"). A substitution, how can that be a real and effective process, and worthy of the great God, if it do not secure its purpose in all the represented party? If it be a substantial thing, with definite aim, and competent force to attain it, how can it embrace the whole world since it has not actually saved them? In the face of facts, the idea of a universal substitution is utterly untenable; but an identification, by which Immanuel came into partnership with the race in their griefs and pains, "approaching the whirling wheel, and being torn in pieces by it," however inconsistent with Scripture, is not inconsistent with itself. Nothing less, however, than a specific reckoning and vicarious endurance for sin will reach the depths of our condition, and provide both healing for man's conscience and reparation for God's law, any more than it can make up a consistent and full-orbed sphere of doctrine. God's honour, man's healing, these are the two grand objects to be secured by any plan of redemption. They are also the tests of all doctrinal systems.

Tried by these tests, the scheme of Priestley stands forth "naked and bare." It does not affect to contain a remedy, but to provide a help; and, by its shewing, the human creature may and should walk this earth with head erect and heart untroubled, holding, as he goes, grateful and humble, but not ignoble, intercourse with "the greatest and the best of beings," who has not been seriously offended, needs no vindication, and will inflict no very terrible misery. Nor does it contain anything to set forth or secure God's glory. The genealogy of this fatal defect it is interesting and instructive to mark. Its birth-place is in his natural theology; and from this, after vitiating his moral philosophy, it crept into his views of Scripture doctrine, the deductions of reason being admitted to modify, direct, and mould the statements of revelation. "The great design of the Divine Being in all the works of his hands was to produce hap-

piness ; there is no occasion to suppose him to be influenced by any other principle. Benevolence is the spring of all his actions ;" and thus God is secondary, and man supreme ; the conciliation of offended majesty and broken laws with the rebel's recovery is no difficulty at all ; there is no need of satisfaction, and no room for a surety ; the woes of life are paternal chastisements ; there can be no hell of everlasting pain, but even the fragrantly wicked shall be purged by discipline, and the whole race gather at last to the presence of God and the place of endless joy. Alas ! the heaven to which they gather cannot be the place where seraphs cry, " Holy, holy, holy ; the Lord of hosts," and where saints sing evermore, " Worthy is the Lamb to receive honour, and blessing, and praise."

There is not much risk of pure Socinianism growing into power. Both in the Old world and the New it has confessed its utter destitution of expansive force. It has, indeed, its weighty commendations to human pride, as being in its inmost character but a dogmatised naturalism, and as reducing to a minimum both man's criminality and weakness, his subjection to divine displeasure, and obligation to divine help ; and it may therefore be expected to perpetuate itself, in a conscious and avowed form, on the borders of the Christian community. Within that community there will be a large amount of real, though undeclared Unitarian sentiment, aye and until it cease to be a truth that " no man can call Jesus Lord except by the Holy Ghost." But while the central stream of spiritual interest carries in its current the largest mass of withered leaves, dead branches, and other debris, a certain limited amount will be ever found nestling in quiet pools at the side, covered with tainted foam. But God's word and man's necessities are too strong for human pride, and before them this poor system shrinks into a falsehood and a mockery. It is not only that, as a system, it is directly in the face of Scripture, and in its main doctrine is burdened with absolutely insoluble problems in regard to the place and nature of Son and Spirit, but that as a remedial power it heals not human woe ; it is at best but moonshine pale and cold, beneath which no summer blooms, and no fruits of harvest ripen ; to the prodigal it offers but the light of a delusive hope, which seems to lead him from his husks and misery, but which never leads him back to his Father's home. Indeed, the name of Father is paraded much ; but it is a Father who has no self-respect, ruling, yet hardly ruling, in a family where he meets no love, and receives no true obedience. And from this blessed name they have taken away its highest quality ; for, by denying the Son's divinity they have removed the object of unbeginning delight, and made the Father an eternal solitary, with no efflux or return of

love,* whereas we know that there circulated in the depths of the divine nature the joy of ineffable communion in which the fatherly and the filial met ; a communion in which we not only see, with wonder and rapture, the model and archetype of the tenderest human feeling, but practically find an environment of support and cheer for our frail foreboding spirits. But while Socinianism proper is too cold to be satisfying, too bald to be attractive, and has neither warmth of feeling nor force of movement to make it dangerous, the poison held in solution and combined with nobler elements is of deadly virulence. There is in prevailing sentiments much that bears the mark of Arianism, and much also that would be pantheistic, if it knew itself, and were honest ; of these the former probably will yield many converts to Socinianism, when some commanding influence, corresponding with that which Priestley exercised, shall pass like a colder current through the vapours in which they have shrouded the Saviour's person ; while the latter, if it solidifies into fixed opinion, will of course pass downwards " to its own place," the void of darkness, without God and hope, beneath Socinianism, and far on the other side of it. The danger is passed when the haze is dispersed. Meanwhile, it seems as if Satan had some great work on hand, when he is sending into the field the very adversaries that wrought such havoc before, bringing into doubt the radical depravity and utter weakness of man, the divine nature and vicarious endurance of Christ, the peculiar working of a personal Spirit in Christian hearts, the reality of miraculous interposition, and the sacredness of the inspired word ; and these adversaries, too, clad in garb more resembling the Christian's, with loftier and more enticing language, with show of holding a larger amount of sound doctrine, with still braver boasts of breaking away from all trammels of creed, custom, and settled opinion, with as genial and ensnaring an attitude towards superstition and error, and as flattering an elevation of noble manhood and its interests into the chief place of consideration. " Nevertheless, the foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal : the Lord knoweth them that are his."

* The difficulty of supposing a prior eternity, unoccupied by affection and beneficence, drove Dr Priestley to the belief " that there never was a time when this great and uncaused Being did not exert his perfections in giving life and happiness to his offspring," that, in fact, creation is unbeginning as God.

ART. VI.—*Missionary Work at Madras—Anderson and Johnston.*

True Yoke-Fellows in the Mission Field: The Life and Labours of the Rev. John Anderson and the Rev. Robert Johnston, traced in the Rise and Development of the Madras Free Church Mission. By the Rev. JOHN BRAIDWOOD, M.A. London: James Nisbet & Co. 1862.

As the work of the ministry is often best illustrated by the lives of ministers, so the character and working of missions to the heathen are often best seen in the adventures, toils, and triumphs of missionaries. We understand great principles best when we see them in action; and the spirit of an enterprise often appears most clearly in the characters and labours of those who embark in it and toil for its accomplishment. Philosophy is never more charming than in the lives of philosophers, and the Christian religion seldom wears such an attractive form as in the achievements of those faithful ministers of the gospel who, in civilised or in heathen lands, have done their work in the spirit of their divine Master. In the labours of missionaries, especially, the power and genius of Christianity are often seen to high advantage. Christianity, indeed, is eminently a missionary religion; its great Founder and His apostles were all missionaries; the church, in one of her leading aspects, is a missionary institute; and every member of the church is expected to exhibit a missionary spirit. Hence those men who by their special gifts and calling are missionaries to the heathen, and represent in distant lands the spirit of the Christian religion, are watched at home and abroad with peculiar interest; and valuable lessons are usually derived from their labours and sufferings. If we would ourselves know what missions really are, or would point out to ill-informed friends, or open foes, what Christianity is doing for the world, we must go to the biographies of departed missionaries, or ascertain correctly what their successors are doing in the mission field.

Our modern Protestant missions already possess a valuable literature of their own. It is especially rich in biography, that delightful, though often much abused, species of literary composition. The lives of David Brainerd and Henry Martyn are themselves sufficient to exalt the very name of missionary. They shew how the finest elements of human character, and the highest gifts of learning, may be found in the man who leaves all to preach the gospel to the heathen. The wonderful labours of missionaries like Swartz, Carey, Judson, Williams, and Lacroix, recorded in fitting biographies, also speak with power to the church, and even to the world. Such men have shewn on the high places of the field the divine energy of liv-

ing faith and burning zeal ; they have proved that Christianity carries with it all manner of blessings to mankind ; and by their success they have wrested the last argument from the enemies of missions.

We hail Mr Braidwood's volume as an important contribution to that missionary Biography which is at once so interesting and so useful. It furnishes a full and authentic narrative of the lives and labours of the Rev. John Anderson and the Rev. Robert Johnston, missionaries of the Free Church of Scotland at Madras, men whom their biographer has happily styled "true yoke-fellows in the mission field." If any man was peculiarly entitled and qualified to write this piece of biography, it was Mr Braidwood himself, long the loved colleague of the deceased missionaries, and also their true yoke-fellow in many arduous and fruitful toils. Their intimate friend and tried fellow-labourer for many years, he knew their very hearts ; he shared their joys, their sorrows, their hopes ; he fought at their side the same hard battle, and he participated in their noble triumphs. It must, therefore, have been with mingled feelings of sadness and satisfaction that he undertook to compose a literary memorial of his departed friends, and to set before the Christian public the origin and progress of that most interesting mission at Madras, with which the names of Anderson and Johnstone, and, we will add, Braidwood, must be honourably associated for generations to come.

This volume, as our readers will easily infer, has a double interest, being, in the first place, a biography of two of the best and truest missionaries that ever lived ; and, in the second, furnishing a connected account of a Mission in India, which is an admirable specimen of what may be called the *Scotch* missionary system. It is well known that the Scotch missionaries in India have, according to the instructions of their respective Churches, always directed their efforts, in the first instance, to the establishment and efficient management of missionary schools, for the purpose of leavening the Hindu and Mahomedan youth with Christian principles, and leading them to embrace Christianity, and even to become, when qualified, preachers of the gospel to their countrymen. This "educational method," as it has been called, is the chief characteristic of the Scotch Missions, though it has not been wholly neglected by the Missions of other countries. First systematised and successfully carried out by Dr Duff and his colleagues at Calcutta, it has been adopted and acted on with equal success by their brethren at Madras, Bombay, and other parts of India. We stop not to vindicate this method from the charges commonly brought against it, or to explain its peculiar adaptation to the state of a people like the Hindus. It is not inconsistent with the em-

ployment of other and more direct means of bringing the truths of the gospel to bear upon the Hindu mind, and it has, in point of fact, been usually associated with a variety of evangelistic agencies. We hold it to be neither derogatory to the character of the gospel nor inconsistent with apostolic practice, but a perfectly legitimate, and, in India, a most efficient and almost necessary means of thoroughly introducing into the very depths of Hindu society the quickening leaven of the Christian religion. But this authentic record of the missionary labours of Anderson and Johnston forms the best vindication of the system they adopted, and furnishes an effectual answer to every fair objection. To that record we now turn, and shall proceed to place before our readers some of its more salient and instructive features.

JOHN ANDERSON was born in 1805, in the parish of Kilpatrick-Durham, situated in the Stewartry of Kirkcudbright, which, with the county of Wigton, forms that interesting portion of Scotland which is known as Galloway. His father was a poor man in humble life, and afflicted with blindness, yet industrious, and able to work hard for the support of his family. His mother was an excellent, intelligent woman, full of strong affection, and possessed of much of that force and vivacity of character that distinguished her son. John was the eldest son in a family of nine children, and, as may well be supposed, endured much hardship in his youth. He was cradled and nursed in poverty; yet, like many of his class in Scotland, he obtained at the parish school the elements of a sound and wholesome, though limited, education. At a Sabbath school in the neighbouring parish of Urr, he received his first religious impressions. It was there, as he afterwards said, that the Lord Jesus found him, and implanted in his heart the incorruptible seed of the Word, which, though it lay long unfruitful, at length sprang up and flourished. The trials and hardships, the vicissitudes and adventures of his youth were more than usually varied and severe; but the force of his character surmounted all obstacles, and grace in his heart saved him from the power of many temptations. At length, after having obtained a scanty knowledge of the Latin language, he entered the University of Edinburgh, in his twenty-second year. His college career was distinguished from first to last. He became, by hard toil, one of the first Latin scholars of his day, and carried off not a few leading prizes in several of the classes. Professors Pillans and Wilson bestowed upon him well-won marks of distinction. Having completed his preliminary studies, he entered the Divinity Hall in the Session 1830-31, and enjoyed the high advantage of sitting at the feet of Dr Chalmers and Dr Welsh. While prosecuting his studies with singular energy and success,

he supported himself by teaching an evening school at Leith, or private pupils in Edinburgh, or by acting as tutor in a family. Like many young men at the Scottish universities, he had to work for the means of education at the very time his education was going on; and in his case, as in many others, the double toil implanted in his constitution the seeds of future weakness and disease.

Mr Anderson had that ardent temperament and joyous spirit which serve to attract friends and cement friendships. He accordingly drew around him many warm and sympathetic friends at the University; but distinguished among all his other associates were Robert Johnston, his future colleague in India, and James M'Cosh, now Professor of Logic at Belfast. With both of these kindred spirits, he had much true communion of heart and soul. Amidst much intellectual enjoyment and philosophical discussion, spiritual things were not forgotten by him or either of his friends. Both to Johnston and M'Cosh Anderson was in the habit of unbosoming himself, and revealing his inmost thoughts; and it is interesting to find the whole three men growing together in spiritual life, and engaged in teaching together a Sabbath school in one of the most destitute districts of Edinburgh. Professor M'Cosh, in an interesting communication which appears in this volume, speaks of the admirable tact and energy his friend Anderson shewed in quelling the rebellious spirits of the school. The skilful and vigorous Sabbath-school teacher in the Canongate of Edinburgh gave evidence of those rare powers that were afterwards so successfully exercised at Madras. But we must give the Professor's account of his first acquaintance with Anderson:—

“ Having attended the literary and philosophical classes at Glasgow, I had come to Edinburgh to be under Dr Chalmers. The faces were all new to me, and I observed those who were now to be my fellow-students with deep interest. It was not long before Mr Anderson struck me as being by no means an ordinary person. His frame was tall, thin, and angular; his countenance was sharp and strongly marked with small-pox; it looked weather-beaten, and altogether gave unmistakeable indications that he who bore it had come through trials and temptations. His picturesqueness was increased by reason of his wearing a long, flowing, blue camlet cloak. I cannot tell how it was, but, though he and I belonged to considerably different types of man, we soon drew towards each other. I know, indeed, what were the qualities which inclined me to him. They were a high, though not a peculiarly logical, order of intellect; a flowing style of conversation, proceeding from an overflowing heart; and a healthy piety, which did not consist in moods and fits, but in thankfulness, sincerity, honesty, generosity, an habitual sense of dependence, and consciousness of utter unworthiness, and love to the Saviour, which burst forth at times like a

flame. The one phrase which expresses the character of my friend was 'largeness of soul.' Every one saw at once that he was a high-motivated man, and that he was incapable of anything mean.

"I was drawn to him by intellectual qualities also. I felt the somewhat dry and consecutive bent of my mind (he used to compare me, in his bantering humours, to a scraggy mountain-ash, with, he acknowledged, some berries on it) relieved by his greater flow and freedom. I was inclined to allege at times that he did not reason altogether consecutively; but I found that he always arrived, as if by intuition, at a sound and good conclusion. We were soon discussing together all sorts of topics, human and divine, philosophic and theologic. We talked of the lectures of Chalmers, of the writings of Edwards, and many other great men, whom we agreed in admiring. In my pride, I thought he did not always grasp their processes; but he arrived by a way of his own at their results. In these discussions I was also interested by the loftiness of his sentiments, by the pure idiom and flexibility of his English, and perhaps, too, by the heartiness, at times vehemence, of his manner and gesticulation."

So truthfully and generously one remarkable man thus describes another. At intervals and by snatches Anderson told his friend much of his past history that nobody knew; but he always seems to have stopped short of a full revelation. We believe, indeed, that many of his earlier struggles and temptations were of a very sad and singular kind, and can never now be dragged to light. But always, when looking back on these passages of the melancholy past, he spoke with deep emotion of that Fatherly love which had watched over him, to keep him from much evil, and lead him by a way he knew not of. We find that, during his whole college life, he was actuated by a deep sense of religion, and that at length he applied to that able minister of the gospel, Dr Robert Gordon, to be received at the communion table. Dr Gordon soon saw what sort of a character he had to deal with, and so acted towards him as completely to win his affection and confidence. He assisted him in the most delicate and effectual manner, encouraged him to study for the ministry, and gave him constantly the most valuable counsel. The minister and the student became friends for life, knit to each other by the most precious ties. Anderson's admiration of Dr Gordon, heightened by the liveliest personal gratitude, became a sort of passion. The ardent and impassioned youth, who was full of a spirit of independence, and disposed to call no man master, yet seemed to be all affection and submission to the admirable minister of the High Church of Edinburgh.

Dr M'Cosh speaks of his friend's love of debate, and his skill and readiness as a speaker in the various academic societies of which he was a member. The writer of these pages well re-

collects his appearances in one of these societies, composed of rather a crude collection of students from the south of Scotland. Anderson was then a literary student of the third year. He had already acquired a reputation for racy eloquence and debating power. He spoke on all subjects, and never failed to arrest attention, if he did not always carry conviction. His tall, gaunt figure, usually set off in a camlet cloak, his abundant gesticulation, his half Scotch, half Irish accent that always seemed to give poignancy to his humour, only added to his popularity and power among his fellow-students. Like many other debaters in such societies, he often appeared to fight for victory as much as for truth ; but a vein of generosity always ran through his oratorical displays. He was not without egotism and great fondness of approbation, but he appeared to be conscious of these failings, and could bear rallying on them with good humour. He was manifestly ambitious, and brooked not well the rivalry of young competitors. But, with all his foibles, he was seen to be a man of fine intellect, genial character, and varied accomplishments, all whose qualities were under the influence of that divine grace without which there is no true religious life or moral greatness.

In 1832, Mr Anderson, being tutor in the family of that excellent man, the late Mr Alexander Cowan, visited Callander, and had the opportunity of enjoying, in his own enthusiastic way, the mingled beauty and grandeur of Highland scenery. His poetical spirit revelled in the magnificence of the surrounding landscape. In a letter to M'Cosh, he thus mingles his spiritual yearnings with fine natural emotions:—

“I am trying to realise some of the great truths of the gospel; and at such times I can truly say that I am happy. My dear M'Cosh, we have need of one another's sympathy and prayers. When I think of my dearest friends, I think of you. When I remember myself at a throne of grace, I remember you. I hope it will please God to make us count all things but loss that we may win Christ, and be found in him at last. I think we both need humility, and more singleness of eye for God's glory. Christ has promised to make his grace sufficient for us, and in that promise I desire to rest with fear and trembling. Yesterday evening I went out, reading 'Robertson's View of the State of Europe previous to the Reign of Charles V. ;' and sitting down on a green bank, which gave me a full view of the Grampians, I watched the effect of the declining sun on the inexpressibly grand and beautiful outline of those mountains. Lifting their blue summits to heaven, they lay bathed in floods of living light; and the sun, descending direct on the summit of Benledi, sat like a crown of glory on his majestic head. It was but for a moment, but it was a glorious one. The emblem of royalty fell gracefully from his head, which still shone with the excess of glory left. 'Oh that M'Cosh were here!' was

the spontaneous wish of my soul ; ' he likes a sunset ; he never saw a sunset like this.' "

We find our divinity student, in 1834, tutor in the family of Mrs Taylor, Troqueer Holm, near Dumfries. Here, while admirably discharging his duties, he found a tranquil scene of Christian usefulness, and rapidly grew in spirituality of mind. The time he spent at Troqueer Holm was in many respects the most precious and important period of his earlier life. " Under Mrs Taylor's roof," says his biographer, " he was ripened by grace and bodily affliction, and encouraged by successful spiritual labour for the arduous task that awaited him." He suffered much from ill health, the result of a constitution considerably broken with early hardship and severe study ; but, when his strength permitted, he not only performed his duty to his pupils, but did not a little evangelistic work in the neighbouring town of Maxwellton. He narrowly missed at this period being engaged as a travelling lecturer by a society in Glasgow, instituted to defend the Established Church ; for what is known as the Voluntary Controversy then raged in Scotland. Few were better qualified to deal effectually with popular audiences, and at first he was half inclined to accept the office, pressed upon him by friends in Glasgow ; but, strongly dissuaded by Dr Gordon, he gave up the idea, and soon saw reason to congratulate himself on his escape from a kind of work that promised little either for his physical or spiritual health.

His correspondence at this time with his friend Johnston seems to have been close and earnest, indicating zeal, growing spirituality, and a rising missionary spirit. With Dr Gordon, then at the head of the Foreign Mission Committee of the Scottish Church, he had also some interesting intercourse in regard to the possibility of his going as a missionary to India. Gradually was he prepared, and made not only willing but anxious to become a minister of Christ among the heathen. The state of his health, though improved, was yet such as to make the foreign more desirable than the home field of labour. At length he was licensed, in May 1836, by the Presbytery of Dumfries, as a preacher of the gospel, and in the following month he was appointed missionary of the Church of Scotland to Madras. He was ordained to this missionary work by the Presbytery of Edinburgh, on July 13. Dr Gordon preached the ordination sermon, and conducted all the services with great solemnity and power. Mr Anderson often afterwards spoke of his overwhelming feelings as his reverend father and friend laid his hand on his head with prayer and supplication, and addressed him in words of mingled tenderness and wisdom.

Having hastily, but most affectionately, bid farewell to his old blind father and his other relatives, he set out for London,

where he was to embark for Madras. There he had an interview with Dr Duff, who was at that time in Europe, and quite delighted that eminent missionary with his enthusiasm and originality of mind. When on the very eve of sailing, he writes to Mr Johnston in this singularly affectionate, and almost prophetic strain :—

“There is a perfect sympathy between your soul and mine in the great object of affection—the Lord Jesus Christ. We both desire to seek his glory, by doing the will of God, through the grace that he has already given, and has yet promised to give us. It shews itself in each of us in different ways ; but we have reason to hope that we are taught by the same Spirit. May Jesus honour us both to win souls, either at home or in India, as he pleases ! and if not, may he give us patience to suffer the will of God ! My affection for you, my dearest friend, partakes more of the spiritual, I have often felt, than the natural. This is easily accounted for from the nature of your mind. I will say no more about what I like in you. In so far as you resemble Christ in anything, I love you entirely. When we are perfectly like him, we will love one another with a perfect love. We are complete in him. Oh that we may abide constantly in him ! I foresee trials ; but greater is he that is in us than he that is in the world.”

After a long but pleasant voyage by the Cape, Mr Anderson arrived at Calcutta on the 27th December 1836. The following extracts from a letter to his father, written from Madras in March following, give some details of the voyage, and shew his truly filial and Christian spirit :—

“The passengers on board the *Scotia* presented me with a handsome Bible, which cost six guineas, as a slight proof of their kindness for me. We had prayers and a discourse on deck, or in the cuddy, every Sabbath, with the exception, I think, of four, and then I was either sick or the sea was too rough. There were prayers in my cabin almost every night. By-and-by nearly all the passengers attended regularly, and several of them manifested a deep concern for their souls, and much affection for me, especially at parting. Several of the steerage passengers and of the sailors heard the word of God gladly, and, I have reason to hope, with profit.”

“Pray for me, my dearest father, that I may look to him with a single eye, and love him with a constant heart ; and then all will go well with me, whether I live or die. I am sure you have been doing this ; for at certain times in the week I am surprised with God’s grace, and then I always feel as if you were one of those who are praying for me. In this way you have been often very near me, and you are always in my heart and in my prayers ; and so are also my brothers and sisters. I send every one of them a brother’s love, and they are all remembered in a brother’s prayers. May God bless, and keep, and save you all !”

It had been arranged that Mr Anderson should proceed to

Calcutta to get some knowledge of missionary work before going to Madras, the proper scene of his labour. He was cordially received at Calcutta by Messrs Ewart and Mackay, at that time in charge of the Scottish mission. Arriving at Mr Ewart's door late at night, he was saluted with the exclamation, "You are the very person I expected." On inquiring how that could be, as Mr Ewart and he up to that moment had been totally unacquainted with each other, the following explanation was made, which we give in Mr Ewart's own words:—

"For several years before coming out to this country, I spent most of my time in Edinburgh. One of those years, 1829-30, I enrolled as a theological student, and, of course, subscribed to the theological library. I continued my subscription for several years afterwards, and was consequently often in the outer hall of the library, but was personally acquainted with almost no one among the regularly-enrolled students. Often did I see in the hall, surrounded by a knot of fellow-students, one person, who some way or other specially attracted my attention. He seemed to be regarded as a referee on great points, and was generally occupied in expounding his views to hearers who hung upon his lips. I had no acquaintance whatever with him. I did not know his name; yet the moment we in Calcutta received intelligence of a new missionary having been appointed to India, I had an impression, of which I could not rid myself, that the person so appointed must be the same whom I have just described. And so it turned out. This led me to say to Mr Anderson, after the preliminary congratulations and good wishes had been given, 'You are just the person I expected.'"

During a residence of six weeks at Calcutta, Mr Anderson was actively engaged in examining the working of the General Assembly's Educational Institution, and gaining every kind of information that might be of use to him at Madras. He made many friends in that city, and preached several times with great acceptance. At length he sailed for his destination, and reached Madras on the 22d February 1837. There he was hospitably received by the Rev. M. Bowie, one of the East India Company's Presbyterian chaplains. On the 3d of April, in a two-storied house, Armenian Street, Black Town, "with a firm faith in God and in the power of his word and Spirit, he began his labours as a missionary of Christ with fifty-nine Hindu boys and young men." This school was instituted to succeed and supplant another seminary that had been set up two years before by the two Presbyterian chaplains, Messrs Bowie and Lawrie, and that did not fully realise the conception of a missionary institute. The new institution, with the consent of the Presbyterian community, was put entirely under Mr Anderson's control, and from the first he was its ruling, animating spirit.

From a prospectus drawn up by Mr Anderson, and published over the whole city, we give the following extracts, which will shew the nature of the education that was to be given in the school, and the professed, undisguised object of that education. The school was to be considered as offering the best English instruction, simply for the diffusion of the Christian religion.

"The object is simply to convey through the channel of a good education as great an amount of truth as possible to the native mind, especially of Bible truth. Every branch of knowledge communicated is to be made subservient to this desirable end. The ultimate object is that each of these institutions shall be a Normal Seminary, in which native teachers and preachers may be trained up to convey to their benighted countrymen the benefit of a sound education, and the blessings of the gospel of Christ.

"As soon as a proper class can be formed, the following branches will be taught:—English, including reading, grammar, and composition; writing and accounts; history, geography, arithmetic, mathematics, and algebra; the elements of astronomy and political economy; logic, moral philosophy, and natural theology; the evidences and doctrines of Christianity, &c."

We have here, as Mr Braidwood well observes, the germ and life-spring of the Mission, so far as plan and purpose are concerned. Mr Anderson's first grand aim was the *conversion to God* of the souls of his pupils; his second, the qualifying of such converts as were possessed of adequate talents, grace, and willingness, to become *teachers* and *preachers* to their countrymen; the third and final stage being, "the applying of such agents to instruct, convert, and form Christian communities in the land." Such is the method and spirit of that mission which, in accordance with the instructions he had received, and his own deep convictions of duty, Mr Anderson founded at Madras, and which, with his excellent colleagues, he carried on for many years with great vigour and success. He was just the man to commence and carry on an educational mission of this kind. His great love and practical knowledge of teaching, his thorough acquaintance with the Scriptures and the evidences of Christianity, his metaphysical acumen, enabling him to deal with the subtleties of the Hindu mind, his insight into human nature, his native energy of character, and the very ardour and vehemence of his temperament, joined to a deep and fervent piety, all combined to make him what he immediately became, a great missionary teacher, delighting in his work, and rising triumphantly above all obstacles. The obstacles he had to encounter were numerous and formidable; but in a joyous spirit of faith he faced them all, and went steadily on with his work. It was soon evident to the Christian public in Madras that no common man had come among them, and that the new missionary

school, over which he presided, would speedily tell upon the native population.

Still further to shew the nature of that school, and the missionary work of which it was to be the instrument, we give the following passage from the First Report :—

“The school in its present stage may be viewed as a Normal Seminary to raise up native teachers, imbued with Christian principles and with sound and useful knowledge, trained by their daily exercises and by teaching their several classes to the difficult art of communicating practically what they know. At a more advanced stage, which, in truth, is the ultimate aim, it will assume the form of a college for training as native missionaries all who shall willingly give themselves to this responsible work, who furnish substantial evidence of genuine love to Christ, who yearn over their countrymen with a desire to save their souls, and who are found to be possessed of suitable gifts and qualifications for the office. As regards its present working, the animating soul of the system is a thorough Bible instruction. Every branch of knowledge daily taught in the school is made subservient to this, *openly and without disguise*. When the Bible is read and explained, the school opens daily with prayer. There is a power in this book and a charm that make themselves felt among the Hindu youths. It is the key to their affections. It awakens and forms their consciences, and enlightens their dark minds. Nor does this in the least supersede anything useful in science or any branch of knowledge. It gives these their due place, and stamps them with their true value as a subsidiary part of truth.”

We cannot refrain from adding a passage of Mr Anderson's letter to the Committee in Edinburgh, as it flings a very clear light on his interesting and successful operations :—

“The school is daily increasing, there being now 180 on the list; and some of the most respectable young natives in Madras have, for the first time, begun to attend. But what is more encouraging still than the increase of the numbers, the desire to get knowledge seems insatiable. The only thing I want is a little more strength to give it to them. I begin my school with prayer in the presence of all the boys, and spend the first hour in reading the Bible with my own class, which now consists of 40. The behaviour of the boys during prayer would put an equal number of Christian youths at home to shame. As far as I can observe, the Bible lesson is relished as much, if not more, than any other, by almost all the boys who read it; and some of the young men prize it far above any other lesson. They pay a rupee (two shillings) for their Bible with the greatest cheerfulness. Two or three have come to me privately, asking to be taught to pray; and these are not the youths who are careless about their lessons, but the very best in the school. The simple reading of the Bible has produced a change

on the minds of others, which, by the teaching of God's Spirit, may make them all we wish."

The enthusiasm with which the missionary teacher carried on his work was something wonderful and irresistible. With his whole heart and soul he gave himself to the task he had undertaken, and day by day he rejoiced that he had left his native land to be a missionary at Madras. Mr Whitely, one of his first monitors, and for many years head master of the Triplicane Branch School, speaking of the early days of the Mission, says, "I can call to mind the prodigious energy with which he threw his whole soul into the work. In the very prime of his manhood, with a heart fired with zeal and buoyant with hope, and with a singularly powerful and vigorous frame, he was enabled to go through an amount of continuous labour, up to the full bent of his power, for hours together, with scarcely any discernible signs of fatigue. He had the rare sagacity to know how far to go, and where to stop, without sacrificing principle, or wounding unnecessarily the prejudices of others. By a happy mixture of firmness and kindness, he soon drew to himself the affections of a band of devoted students. Moving to and fro with restless activity, his words came forth warm and fresh from his heart, breathing life and power, and carrying away the minds of his hearers as if by an irresistible impulse."

Such was John Anderson in his Madras school when he began his missionary career, and such he continued to be to the last, amidst failing health and manifold hard trials; only, as his course approached its close, his spirit became still more sanctified, and he yearned still more earnestly over the souls of the heathen, young and old, for whom he had toiled with all his strength.

The first public examination of the new mission school took place in January 1838, little more than half a year after its institution. The result was most satisfactory and surprising. There was an attendance of 195 pupils, and the general aspect of the school was equal to that of any well-ordered English seminary. Civil history, geography, arithmetic, English grammar, and etymology, in short, all the usual branches of a sound English education, were the subjects in which the pupils had been carefully instructed, and, as the examination proved, with wonderful success. But there was one peculiar branch, Scripture history, in which remarkable progress had been made; and it was most interesting to observe the accuracy and intelligence with which scores of promising heathen children related the chief incidents in the biography of Scripture characters, and the great facts on which Christianity rests. The natural acuteness of the Hindu mind had been well and profitably exercised by an admirable system of mutual questioning and essay writ-

ing by the pupils, which Mr Anderson, like a skilful practical teacher that he was, had carried out with great judgment and effect. Impartial observers declared, in the newspapers of the day, "that this examination was an era in the history of the Madras Mission." It was noticed also at the time that the adult natives who had children at the school, or who favoured English education, took a great interest in the prosperity of the new seminary, as if it were in their eyes, not a danger, but a public benefit. Well might Mr Anderson, writing to the Committee at home, soon after the examination, say, "I have much reason to bless God for the way in which he has favoured our cause hitherto. I have succeeded beyond my most sanguine expectations. With a few checks and discouragements, the general feature has been a constantly growing prosperity, not merely as regards numbers, but in every other respect."

As was to be expected from the very success of his efforts, assistance from Europe was immediately needed and called for by Mr Anderson. His success was like to overpower him, and lest he should fall, and so the ground gained should be lost, another labourer was required to stand by him on the field. Most earnestly, therefore, in his letter to the Committee did he plead for such help. "My heart is in the work," he said, "and I want to succeed." The Committee, though straitened for want of funds, were so moved by his earnestness, that they instantly resolved to send another missionary to Madras, and opened negotiations with Mr Johnston, the man of all others that was most fit, and that Mr Anderson most desired. Mr Johnston was at this time acting as a home missionary at Wallacetown, near Ayr. He had already been looking to India as the final scene of his labour, and was prepared to receive favourably the Committee's overtures. A missionary spirit had been given him, and he was now all but ready to join his friend Anderson as a true yoke-fellow in the mission field.

ROBERT JOHNSTON was born in 1807, at Craigie Burn, near Moffat, Dumfriesshire, about thirty miles to the north-east of Mr Anderson's birth place. He lost his mother in early life; but the wish of his dying parent that he should become a minister of the gospel seems to have made a lasting impression on his mind. From his infancy he was surrounded with an atmosphere of humble household piety. His worthy father and his eldest sister, a woman of rare Christian worth, exercised great influence on the formation of his character. Having received the elements of a sound classic education at the parish school of Moffat, he went to the University of Edinburgh in 1827. He had previously done something for himself as a teacher, and like many young Scotchmen of his class, he supported him-

self, from the very commencement of his college life, by private tuition. By the time his literary course was completed, and he had entered the Divinity Hall, his heart, which, since he attended the Moffat Sabbath school, had not been without serious impressions, was imbued with a living piety. After passing through various spiritual struggles, and being deeply exercised in regard to divine things, he had taken that decided step which is the very starting-point of all profound and vital Christianity. There was a gravity in his deportment, and a solidity in his character, which commanded the respect of all his friends, and gave his opinions great weight with his fellow-students. We well remember his tall and commanding form in the Greek class, his accurate scholarship, and what may be called the moral influence of his whole demeanour. The professor and the students alike seemed to regard him with peculiar respect. He was evidently a diligent, well-principled, modest man ; of superior ability, of great industry, and undeniable worth. As his college career advanced, he associated, by a law of spiritual affinity, with the most devoted young men at the University. He was a friend of Robert M'Cheyne, Horatius and Andrew Bonar, Alexander Somerville, and other kindred spirits, who at once participated in, and aided the revival of spiritual religion which about that time began to make itself deeply felt in the Edinburgh Divinity Hall, and over the whole Church of Scotland.

But Robert Johnston's chief friend and most intimate associate was John Anderson. In many respects they were very unlike each other ; but their very dissimilarities only served to deepen their friendship. Anderson was ardent, vehement, impulsive, with a real touch of genius in his composition, something of a wit and a poet, and a good deal of an orator. Johnston was grave, solid, judicious, distinguished more by sound judgment than by any liveliness of fancy, and guided, even in his hours of relaxation, by strict principle rather than by anything like wayward caprice. But both the friends, as their intimacy increased, cherished a truly Christian affection toward each other, and grew together in spiritual life, in experimental knowledge of divine truth, and in that ardent evangelic zeal which led them to think of missionary work in India. The personal intercourse and friendly correspondence of these men during their college days, and when about to become preachers of the gospel, briefly but effectively described by Mr Braidwood, are beautiful and touching indications of their respective characters. They really were helpers of each other's joys and aspirations, encouraging, instructing, or comforting each other, according to the exigencies of the day and the hour. On the last day of the year 1834, Mr Anderson writes a long, beautiful,

and truly spiritual letter to his friend, in which he uses these, among many other like expressions: "My dear friend, amidst your arduous labours at present, look to Jesus. We must love one another in him, as our Elder Brother, that our friendship may ripen for eternity." Mr Johnston, in reply, writes as follows: "My only hope is fixed on the same Rock of ages on which you are resting; and I expect to be enriched with grace out of that undiminished fulness which is hid with Christ."

When Anderson was appointed to India, he strongly recommended his friend as his successor in the family at Troqueer Holm, in which, for several years, he had been a trusted and successful Christian tutor. With his usual earnestness he urged this matter, and when he had succeeded, he thus writes to Johnston from Edinburgh: "You cannot tell how happy the thought of your going to Troqueer Holm makes me. I meet with many friends here. God is very gracious. He is my best friend, my strength, my glory. Christ is more than ever the desire of my heart, and his grace is sufficient for me. Mind, you only go to Troqueer Holm to gather strength; and God, I trust, will shew you the way to India. Pray for me, my best friend, and I will pray for you." Mr Johnston's reply is worthy both of himself and his friend: "It gives me pain to think that I am to be so soon and so far separated from such a dear friend; and your pain must be tenfold more intense while parting with all yours in one day. But we must not allow ourselves to be moved by these things. Often have I thought of the words of Paul when almost overborne by the misplaced tenderness of his friends, 'What mean ye to weep, and to break mine heart?' I trust you will rebuke away what is sinful and distressing; and that, like a feeble child in the midst of danger, you will cling closely to your heavenly Father, and take fast hold of *Him*, and lean with an unsuspecting and unwavering confidence on the arm of your Beloved. How can those fear who obey the commandment, 'Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature?' Christ says before issuing it, 'All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth,' and then he promises his presence even unto the end of the world. Here then is enough for us."

It was when toiling as a home missionary at Wallacetown, that Mr Johnston was appointed missionary to Madras. He immediately prepared to set out for a scene of labour that had long been present to his thoughts. Having been ordained in Edinburgh on September 5. 1838, and received his final instructions, he proceeded to Moffat to take leave of his old father, and his other relatives. His father, who had long been excessively deaf, had often expressed a wish to see his son preach, though he could not expect to hear him. This wish of

the worthy old man was granted ; for his son had arranged to preach in his native parish before his departure. Having bid farewell to his family and friends, Mr Johnston proceeded by the Solway steamer to Liverpool, and from thence he went to London. He embarked for Madras at Portsmouth on 9th October, and, after a quick and pleasant voyage, reached his destination on the 24th January 1839. Arrived off Madras, he was in his cabin preparing to land, when Mr Anderson, to his joyful surprise, made his appearance. The two friends rejoicing together, and having more to say than they could find utterance for at the time, passed through the Madras surf in company, and soon found themselves surrounded by a sympathising group of European and native Christians.

But before he was joined by this new and congenial labourer, Mr Anderson and his school had passed through a very testing ordeal. From the first he had been aware of the difficulties and dangers connected with the subject of *caste*, and had foreseen that these might at any time suddenly involve him in the greatest embarrassment. But forewarned on this point, he was practically forearmed. Before the storm came, he had made up his mind how it was to be met. He had refused to admit into the school a number of *Pariah* youths that certain Europeans wished to place under his care ; for he resolved not even to appear to give offence gratuitously to the prejudices of his high caste pupils. At the same time, he was prepared to receive *Pariahs* who came spontaneously, or were sent by their parents, as he regarded the institution open to all classes and castes who wished to receive the benefit of a Christian education. In due time his principles were put to the test. On the 19th October 1838, three *Pariah* boys, bearing the marks of caste, found their way into the institution. As soon as they were discovered under their false colours, a great commotion arose among the other boys, and their parents were instantly up in arms. Some of the parents remonstrated with Mr Anderson, but in vain ; he took his stand on the Christian principle of doing good to all, independently of caste or any such distinction. The consequence was, that more than a third of the pupils, embracing many of the more advanced and promising, left the school. A considerable number of these were admitted into another school in Blacktown, instituted by a "Native Education Society" that was composed of European gentlemen. That society so far truckled to native prejudices as to respect caste, and thus to exclude *Pariahs* from their school. Mr Anderson strongly remonstrated with its Committee for receiving his runaway pupils, and thus weakening his hands when they should have been strengthened. The Committee, by the casting vote of their chairman, resolved to modify their rules, but to retain the

pupils they had received. This led to the resignation of nearly half of their number, who held Mr Anderson's views, and were anxious to sustain him in the conflict. But Mr Anderson, sympathised with and supported by a large proportion of the community, remained firm; and, though for a time overwhelmed with anxiety, he had at last the satisfaction of seeing the tide turn, and many of his best pupils come back to the school. With a tenacity characteristic of himself and his country, he held by strict principle, and abjured specious compromises. This *caste storm*, as he often afterwards called it, fearful while it lasted, served to purify the atmosphere. It helped to open the eyes of the natives to a great principle of Christianity, and was the means of overthrowing the power of caste in every other Christian school in the presidency of Madras.

In a letter addressed to the Committee in Scotland, Mr Anderson, after giving an animated account of the struggle, and the victory that followed, uses these wise and weighty words:—

“Our best policy now is to be quiet, firm, and gentle; for what is the use of argument, provided we do the thing? This matter looks more formidable on paper than it is in actual fact. Committees here may vex us at any pressing juncture; but patient, enduring labour will carry the day at last. There may be consequences, I confess, hereafter, that I cannot now foresee; but my firm conviction is, that we shall become stronger and stronger, and those who exclude the Pariah will wax weaker and weaker. Besides, this caste dispute will prepare us for greater trials in the case of a conversion. Our youths will be all the firmer by learning to act on principle. This is a land of fear and of supple compromising. It is a land of bad faith. The air of our moral atmosphere is bad for a tender conscience. There are honest men, of course, in spite of the uncongenial climate.”

Mr Johnston, in every respect qualified for the work that awaited him, flung himself into it with his whole heart, and at once became an enthusiastic missionary teacher. He entered entirely into the views of his friend, and cordially approved of the system pursued. Soon after his arrival, we find Mr Anderson thus writing of him: “Johnston has begun with a Scotch energy that quite refreshes my heart, and which is the very thing for India. I think it is very plain that Providence has sent him here. Our sympathy is fresher than if we had never parted. I hope he will prove a help to my spiritual life and strength.” So rapidly did the new missionary make himself master of the details and general management of the institution, that Mr Anderson, a few months after his friend's arrival, found himself free to make an experiment, on which for some time his heart had been set. This was the establishment of a branch school at *Conjeveram*, a famous and peculiarly sacred city, forty-five

miles from Madras. It had always been his wish and his hope, that from the large presidential cities of India, missionary schools and educational influences should spread or radiate over the surrounding towns till the whole land should be enlightened. He lost no time, therefore, in making an experiment in Conjeveram, an *experimentum crucis*, as it may be fairly called ; for that city has for ages been a stronghold of Hindu idolatry, and a centre of all idolatrous influences. Over all Southern India, Conjeveram is famed for its sacredness and antiquity, for the magnificence of its temples and processions, the imagined power of its resident gods, and the great sanctity of its Brahmans. At its great annual festival, usually a *hundred thousand* worshippers, drawn from all parts of India, crowd its streets and shrines. In such an abode of rank idolatry and bigotry, in the very den of idols and their fanatical devotees, did Mr Anderson begin a little school for the introduction of the Christian faith. Everything seemed to be against his success ; even true Christian friends shook their heads doubtfully when he entered upon his task. But he trusted in the living God, and his faith overcame all difficulties. At first he had only eleven youths in his school, including four monitors he had brought with him from Madras ; but that number gradually increased to forty, and many of the pupils were of a very superior character. Only six weeks after the commencement of the school, Mr Anderson thus writes to his brother at Madras : " All is prospering well ; an immense desire to learn ; no difficulty now but labour and patience ; nearly forty on the roll. Still God is our refuge and strength." A few days after he had an attack of cholera, which was then raging in the place ; but, kindly attended to by Dr Sanderson, a gentleman long and well known in the Madras presidency, he speedily recovered. In a few days he appeared again at his school, gave it in charge to two trusty monitors, and immediately returned to Madras.

The third public examination of the Madras Institution, which took place in January 1840, revealed a state of remarkable progress and prosperity. No less than 246 pupils, of all the different castes, were present ; twenty-six belonged to the branch school at Conjeveram, of whom twelve were Brahmans. There were also present nine Mahomedan youths, representing an important class of the Indian population. All the classes shewed wonderful intelligence and advancement. A young Brahman thrilled the hearts of all present by the simple, touching way in which he repeated the Second Psalm. Sentiments were expressed, and parts of essays were read which were quite inconsistent with Mahomedanism and Hinduism. A Christian element seemed to pervade the whole school ; the Bible and lessons from the Bible were read and repeated, made the sub-

jects of weighty questions, and gave rise to most truthful and interesting answers. Yet none of the pupils, or monitors, had made any profession of Christianity. Precious seed had been implanted in the hearts of many of them; but Mr Anderson could only say, "I have good reason to know that some of these young men are not far from the kingdom of God, if they have not already entered it." By this time the Institution had given a sound English education to six hundred native youths, and reared up ten native teachers. A leaven of Christianity had already begun to work in numberless native families in and around Madras; and it was evident to the eye of faith that results of a blessed kind could not be long delayed.

But while boys by the hundred were thus admirably educated, and brought within the reach of Christian influences, nothing had yet been done to reach their little sisters who seemed devoted by oriental jealousy and heathen bigotry to lives of total ignorance. Even Mr Anderson, far-sighted and ardent as he was, for a long time almost despaired of bringing native girls within the pale of Christian education. From the very commencement of his work, he had turned the matter over in his mind, and took counsel regarding it with experienced Christian friends. But it was only at this period that he deemed it prudent to make a serious effort to accomplish that which was absolutely necessary to the success of his missionary enterprise. He sounded some of his monitors and advanced youths on the subject of female education, and induced some of them to make an attempt at teaching their sisters or wives in their own houses; "but the scowl, the opposition, the torrent of abuse and threats from the seniors of both sexes, were too strong for the moral courage of the domestic reformers, who covered their faces and shrunk back with dismay." Yet this abortive experiment did not wholly discourage the two missionaries, and, before long, their fondest hopes regarding female education were amply realized.

Meanwhile their institution for boys flourished apace, and its management was based on a fixed and well-considered system. It was now understood by natives as well as Europeans to be open indiscriminately to youths of all castes and classes. The Bible was daily read by, and expounded to, the pupils, and all the leading doctrines of Christianity were clearly presented to their understanding. But the highest as well as the humblest branches of a good English education were, at the same time, carefully and regularly taught. By means of a system of monitors, by mutual questionings among the pupils, by the writing of essays, and by other appliances of the intellectual system of tuition, full justice was done to all the classes in the school, and an extraordinary degree of healthy mental activity

was developed. Every step in this process of education plainly told, as it was intended, against idolatry and in favour of Christianity. That the pupils also might value the blessing they received, they had to pay, as a school fee, half a rupee per month, and had to purchase their own books. They gave freely, for example, a rupee for a copy of the Scriptures. The monitors, likewise, who were carefully trained by Mr Anderson himself, many of them being formed into accomplished native teachers, were paid for their services at the rate of from twenty to thirty rupees a month. Thus in a few years this institution had acquired the character and aspect of a long-established and high-principled seminary.

In April 1840, the two missionaries were cheered by a visit of Dr and Mrs Duff, then on their return to Calcutta. They had visited, on their way, the mission at Bombay, and were now glad of the opportunity of inspecting the work at Madras. Dr Duff, with his accustomed energy, set himself to examine what had been done by his brother missionaries, and to lend them a helping hand in passing the scene of their labour. "He flung himself," says Mr Anderson, "heart and soul, into the business of the institution, on the very day he arrived, for nearly four hours. Many of our boys were in a state to receive benefit from him, the crust being taken off by the training they have received. Dr Duff preached to them; and it was quite thrilling to see how he set them on fire by the truths which he exhibited to them in touching and graphic figures, with an energy of manner altogether his own. Their bright eyes seemed to say, as they sparkled with delight, 'This man loves the natives, especially native boys.'" Dr Duff, writing about his preaching the gospel to the youths of the institution on this occasion, says, "Talk and dream who will of not being able, *directly* and *formally*, and in the *home* sense, to *preach the gospel* in our Indian mission-seminaries, I do most solemnly aver for myself, that never, never, when addressing an audience of fellow-Christians in my native land, had I a more *sensible consciousness* of reaching *the understanding and the heart*, than I experienced when pouring out my soul on the theme of man's lost and ruined state by sin, and of man's redemption through a crucified but divine Redeemer, in presence of the assembled youth of the General Assembly's Institution, Madras."

Before the conclusion of 1840, a school at *Nellore*, an important town 110 miles north of Madras, founded by a Dr Cooper, for the education of the natives, was offered to the mission, and, after due consideration, accepted. It was partially endowed, and otherwise supported by local subscriptions, so that its adoption involved no additional expense. A similar school at *Okingleput*, a town 35 miles to the south, was also

received as a branch of the Madras Institution. Steps were also taken to open another branch school at *Triplicane*. Meanwhile, the school at Conjeveram, conducted by Ramanjooloo, an excellent native teacher, flourished beyond expectation, and became more than ever a wedge of Christian influence inserted into the fabric of heathen idolatry. Mr Anderson, who went to attend the examination of the school about this time, thus expresses himself concerning it:—"I sat in silent astonishment listening to the thorough way in which Ramanjooloo questioned my little flock on the great truths of the Bible, and to the answers which they gave. May the Spirit of Christ write the word of life in their hearts!" Of the conversion of this native teacher, Mr Anderson by this time had the highest hopes. He vehemently desired, yet in a manner dreaded, his baptism. He yearned over the soul of the youth now not far from the kingdom of God; but he knew that his public baptism would shake the mission to its very foundation.

Early in 1841, the Rev. John Braidwood, with Mrs Braidwood, arrived at Madras to reinforce the mission that, though threatened with dangers, was still flourishing and full of promise. Mr Anderson met, and conducted "through the surf," his old and much-desired friend, with his valuable partner. Mr Braidwood, sent out at first as a missionary by his fellow-students, and supported for a time by their efforts, had long cherished a true missionary spirit, and was fitted both by gifts and graces to be a worthy colleague of such men as Anderson and Johnston. For years he had known these men as intimate friends; he had long shared their spirit, and been ready to walk in their steps; and now he was come to enter upon, and participate in their labours. The three missionaries had been educated at the same University, had been active members of the same missionary association in Edinburgh, and had been successively teachers in the same Sabbath school on the banks of the Nith. They were now, greatly to their common joy and comfort, united at Madras in the same noble and fruitful missionary work. After lives of glorious toil, the two who were first on the field have entered into their rest; the other, though spent with many labours, survives to be their faithful and loving biographer.

For a time, the three missionaries and Mrs Braidwood resided together in the mission-house, Blacktown, carrying on their work with united energy, and extending their operations as opportunity offered. A branch school was opened at Triplicane, chiefly for the benefit of Mahommedans, an important and vigorous portion of the Indian population. In about a month, thirty pupils, Hindus and Mahommedans, attended this seminary, which was conducted by Mr Whitely. Meanwhile the roll of the

parent institution amounted to 420 pupils, and 200 more attended the other schools. But greatly to the trial of the missionaries' faith, there were yet no conversions. Many of their best and most intelligent pupils were in a hopeful state, convinced of the sin of heathenism, and of the truth of Christianity; but not one of them had yet expressed a wish to be baptized, and to take up the cross of Christ. Mr Braidwood thus describes the admirable, intellectual, and moral machinery by which the minds and hearts of the numerous pupils were at once expanded and brought into close acquaintance with the highest truths of the gospel:—

“Meanwhile, the work went on with glowing vigour. Every effort was put forth to enlighten the understanding and awaken the conscience. An enthusiasm to learn, and to excel, filled every breast. All the youths were brought together every morning, in the large west room of the building, and there the word of God was expounded and applied with fervent earnestness, and prayer was offered up. Throughout the day, the missionaries threw their strength into the different classes, as they went on from study to study under their monitors, and at once impelled forward the minds of both the pupils and their teachers. On Saturdays the pupils were arranged in three separate divisions, each under a missionary. For five or six hours they were engaged in repeating the portions of scriptural truth they had learned during the week, and in being catechised and addressed according to their capacity. On Sundays the first-class youths, with the monitors, were encouraged to meet all the three missionaries in the forenoon, when their minds were exercised familiarly and closely on the great truths and principles of the Bible, with readings from D'Aubigné's *History*, the *Pilgrim's Progress*, Robert Hall's *Discourses*, *Romaine*, &c.”

At length, in June 1841, Mr Anderson had the inexpressible pleasure of baptizing, in the mission-house, two most intelligent and promising converts, Rajahgopaul and Venkataramiah, who had long been students and monitors in the institution. Possessed of fine natural abilities, and amiable dispositions, these lads had profited rapidly by the admirable training they received, and were strongly attached to Mr Anderson as their devoted teacher and warm-hearted friend. After an inward struggle of intense severity, which is scarcely to be described in words, they both resolved to take the great step of publicly embracing Christianity. The conflict between a sense of Christian duty, and the power of natural feeling, was tremendous; but faith finally prevailed and enabled them to pass safe through the fiery trial. Their baptism gave rise to a very solemn scene; and the consequent excitement among the natives in Madras was unparalleled. Mr Anderson, describing the scene in the mission-house, when the youths were baptized, says:—“We felt

for the time being, as if we were sensibly placed in the midst of some of the scenes in the Gospels and in the Acts of the Apostles. We felt the presence of God passing from heart to heart. When I asked Rajahgopaul what was his grand motive for wishing to be baptized, he replied, with deep feeling and modesty, 'The love of Christ constrains me ; he has suffered so much for me, I am bound to do his commandment.' Upon asking Venkata-ramiah whether I had held out any improper inducement to lead him to be baptized, he instantly answered, 'No ; nothing but Jesus Christ crucified.' When I put to them the question, 'Do you now renounce, in your baptism, Hinduism, idolatry, and *caste* ?' they both explicitly answered, '*We do.*'

The immediate effect of these baptisms was the almost total dispersion of the pupils attending the institution. The attendance sank from *four hundred* down to seventy pupils. The rage and indignation of the Hindu community rose to a hurricane height. The parents of the lads got a warrant issued against the missionaries, on the plea that their sons were detained against their will. But, in presence of the magistrate, these sons witnessed a good confession, declaring that they remained in the mission-house entirely of their own free will, and were determined to abide by the profession they had made. When leaving the police-office with the converts, Mr Anderson and Mr Johnston had a narrow escape from the fury of the crowd, and a rescue of the young men was attempted. But, through the interference of the magistrate, Mr Bell, the whole party were preserved from the hand of violence. All Madras, however, continued for days to be deeply moved, and great crowds surrounded the mission-house, breathing threatening and defiance. Mr Anderson, during the whole time of trial, shewed a rare combination of prudence and firmness, giving no needless offence to the natives, and keeping out of their way, though surrendering not one iota of principle. Along with the two converts residing in the mission-house, and his European brother, he spent many precious hours in spiritual exercises, and found great relief in the offering up of thanksgiving and prayer. So dreadful and prolonged was the excitement out of doors, that for six weeks Mr Johnston and himself did not think it safe to leave the house. But they had all the more leisure to pray for, and send letters to the other youths whose spiritual welfare lay near their hearts, "the half-awakened, half-convinced teachers, and advanced students." In a short time, another precious and promising convert was baptized, Ettirajoolo, who had suffered much at the hands of his relatives for Christ's sake, and who nobly cast in his lot with his persecuted brethren. This new triumph of the truth gave unspeakable joy to the missionaries ; but it was like to complete the desolation of their schools.

The attendance at these schools sank indeed very low ; yet in the few weeks the lowest limit was passed, and the Mission began to recover from the shock. "A month after Ettirajooloo's baptism," says Mr Braidwood, "there were only twenty-four in the lower division of the school, and scarcely any in the upper ; a month later the twenty-four had increased to fifty, with thirty in the upper division. The few made immense progress, and out of these few two very useful agents afterwards sprang. There was not only great intellectual ardour and tried feeling in the pupils ; there was the pressure of a powerful, a divine element, a living faith in a living Redeemer ; and this, manifested daily in the converts, impressed a new character on the work." Meanwhile, Mrs Braidwood made an encouraging attempt to open a school for *caste* girls in Rayapooram, a suburb of Madras. This school soon contained a number of engaging girls, and was for a time "a most hopeful and delightful little garden, fully occupying Mrs Braidwood's time and strength." Though it was eventually given up, it formed an experiment of a useful kind, and was the first fruits of a coming harvest.

In the same year the *Madras Native Herald*, a fortnightly religious periodical, was started by Mr Anderson and his friends, to be another engine of Christian usefulness. It was carried on with great vigour, and soon began to operate powerfully upon the native mind. It was read extensively over the city and presidency, was greatly relished by former and existing pupils of the institution, and startled by its fearless exposure of error both the Hindu and the European community. In its pages the living truths of Christianity were brought into contact with the rank delusions of heathenism, religious discussions were spiritedly carried on, and the weapons of lawful controversy wielded with terrible effect. Oral discussions that had been discontinued during the late storm, were resumed on the Wednesday evenings. What the Christian champions and their Brahman and other opponents advanced, was taken down *verbatim*, and published in the *Herald*. In this way light was continually let in upon heathen darkness. But the adversaries of the truth were active in their way, and actually availed themselves of the stale arguments of European infidelity. "They have raked up," says Mr Anderson, "Paine's ashes, and the ashes of other infidels, to poison and destroy the minds and the belief of some of our most hopeful youths, now forcibly cut off from us ; we are labouring to counteract them, and to provide our flock with the antidote."

Things had now taken a turn for the better. The annual examination, held in January 1842, brought together from all parts 278 pupils. Sir Edward Gambier, who presided, expressed his cordial approbation of the whole system of instruction, and

emphatically acquitted Mr Anderson and his friends of all blame in reference to the late commotions. Large funds for missionary purposes began to be subscribed by Christian supporters of the work in Madras, and thus the work was in many ways extended and made more effective. At Nellore the mission prospered greatly. Mr Johnston, on going to visit the school, found "a little flock of a hundred, all waiting, clean, and full of life and happiness." The teachers and the more advanced pupils were thoroughly acquainted with the great facts and doctrines of Christianity, and wanted but the breath of the divine Spirit to make them living and most intelligent Christians. When the Madras Institution was opened in February, 180 youths were present on a roll of 220, and the missionaries resumed their work with a joyous feeling of relief and hope. The school at Conjeveram was still in a promising condition. The teacher, who had kept steadfast during the late troubles, remained at his post; and, convinced of the errors of heathenism, seemed on the very brink of conversion to Christianity. Still further to cheer the missionaries, a communication was received from two Edinburgh congregations offering the means of enabling the three native converts to study for the Christian ministry.

The struggle between light and darkness at Madras, intensified by the late baptisms, seemed to give for a time fresh life and energy to the idolatrous processions that abound in that city. Mr Braidwood gives the following description of one of these processions which took place at this time:—

"In April, one of Siva's festivals (Kutchel Easwaren) sends forth its deadening influences. Morning and evening, for many days, sometimes at midnight and sometimes long before the dawn, crowds of idolaters pass our windows, carrying their gods. Lesser idols are brought from their temples to give importance to the principal one seated on a platform, which is supported by poles, and carried along the streets by forty or fifty sweating coolies. In front of it walks a band of temple-women, without fear or shame, parading their ornaments. After it come Brahmins chanting a hymn, their foreheads and naked arms rubbed with ashes, their heads, as usual, bare; hand in hand they walk amidst the vast crowd, Satan's chief and willing servants. Cymbals, tomtoms, and pipes accompany; rockets ascend at intervals; flaming torches and blue lights in base effrontery contend with the moon's pure brightness. A maddening joy shoots through the immense multitude as they drag the idol on its car past our door. There is no lack of willing arms: mothers make their tender daughters lay their hands on the huge ropes. The idol is decked with jewels and flowers; agile Brahmins at its feet receive cloth and money from the worshippers, and give in return a hallowed piece of a cocoa-nut. Idolatry is a living power; rich and poor mingle in the concourse, and many respectable

women, seldom seen except on such occasions. How appalling the multitude ; how strong the delusion ; how vitiating to purity ; how degrading to reason ; how dishonouring to God !”

One of the heaviest trials known to missionaries is the lapse into heathenism or immorality of promising candidates for baptism, or of professed converts actually baptized. Several trials of this kind, keenly felt, but instructive in their way, at this period came upon the missionaries. Soobaroyen, a pupil of five years' standing, and a great friend of Ettirajooloo, gave manifest signs of real conviction ; and, after a severe inward conflict, expressed a desire to be baptized. Mr Anderson, with the full concurrence of his colleagues, accordingly baptized him, and joyfully received him into the church. The youth at first firmly resisted all the importunities and threats of his father and other relatives ; but in about a fortnight he suddenly and secretly left the mission house, and was afterwards seen with the usual marks of heathenism on his forehead. But a still more grievous disappointment followed. Ramanjooloo, the accomplished and trusted teacher of the school at Conjeveram, long convinced of the truth of Christianity, and admirably versed in its doctrines, after various struggles of extraordinary severity, at length sought baptism. He was baptized in Mr Braidwood's house, in presence of several Europeans and natives. He formally renounced Hinduism, idolatry, and caste, for ever, and that very evening broke his caste by sitting down at table with the missionaries. He had immediately to pass through the usual dreadful ordeal, and, deaf to many entreaties, was impressed by the frantic grief of his mother. “ Let me go,” he at length cried to one of the missionaries ; “ she gave me my body, and you gave me my soul ; I will give my body to her, and my soul to you.” Quite moved by natural feeling, he went back to his mother and friends, resolved, perhaps, and thinking himself able, to withstand all their allurements. He went and fell. Poor Ramanjooloo “ was trailed through all the mire of heathenism, and cast out miserable and madman-like for two long years.”

The sixth annual examination, held in January 1843, was presided over by the Marquis of Tweeddale, Governor of Madras, who spent several hours in witnessing the intellectual and moral exhibition. Three hundred and twenty-four pupils were present, of whom twenty-three were Mahomedans from Triplicane. The wonderful effect of Scriptural truth in opening the minds, and bringing out the latent energies of the natives, was more apparent than ever. In all branches of English education, including mathematics, the progress made by the senior pupils was equal to anything seen in a superior British school. But all the pupils shewed decided marks of moral cul-

ture and intellectual development. The three converts preparing for the ministry appeared in all their vigour and amiability, the fine first fruits of an expected spiritual harvest. Everything betokened the presence of a Christian purpose of an exalted kind in the institution,—the rearing in and round Madras of a *native ministry* to preach the gospel to their countrymen. Referring to this examination, Mr Anderson thus expressed himself:—"It is impossible to convey the impression made by parts of the examination on the numerous audience present. Never before did the institution so well sustain its missionary character, or so strikingly exemplify the power of the word of God in elevating the mind, and in giving dignity to the thoughts, and purity to the affections, of those converted by it. In the two grand points of our scheme, theology and science, the examination of the first class was all that could be wished."

While the missionaries were rapidly repairing the breaches made in their schools, and carrying on the work of instruction with redoubled vigour at Madras, Nellore, Conjeveram, and Triplicane, an event of the highest importance occurred in Scotland which considerably altered their position. This was the memorable Disruption of the Scottish Church, which took place on May 18, 1843. For this event all the missionaries at the three Indian presidencies, thirteen in number, were well prepared. It had been anticipated for a twelvemonth or more before it happened, and the missionaries had ample time to make up their minds as to the course they would take. The three brethren at Madras, with their fellow-labourers at Calcutta and Bombay, including Dr Duff and Dr Wilson, unhesitatingly joined the Free Church of Scotland, and continued in connection with that body their missionary work. The Madras brethren felt like many others the painful rupture of valued personal ties, but they shrank not for a moment from the path of duty. They felt peculiar pain in ceasing to hold correspondence with the venerable Dr Brunton, the Convener of the Foreign Mission Committee, who had always treated them with Christian courtesy, and kindly sympathised with them in all their difficulties and trials. But the step they took, and all their consequent proceedings, were dictated by high principle, not by personal feelings. From the 1st July they ceased to draw their salaries as missionaries of the Established Church, and cast themselves, like their brethren at home, on the liberality of the Christian people of Scotland.

Many Christians in Madras and its Presidency, who had liberally supported the Mission, continued, and even increased, their liberality at this trying juncture. Funds for meeting current expenses were freely supplied, and the work of the

Mission suffered in nothing. In a very short time, no less than £1500 was subscribed by Christian friends at Madras for missionary purposes. The missionaries, as hitherto, looked to Scotland only for their salaries; and from the first days of the Free Church, these salaries were provided. They went forward, in faith and in hope, to found a "Free Mission Church for Natives and Europeans." They had the support of a good conscience and a noble cause; many true Christians were drawn towards them with new strength of affection; and the affairs of the institution and its affiliated schools began to wear once more a smiling aspect. The great question of female education, pressed upon them from home, again engaged their serious attention; and they at length succeeded in getting a number of caste girls to accept of an English and Scriptural education at the hands of Mrs Hutton and Mrs Whitely, wives of two of their teachers. They were but feeling their way in regard to this momentous subject. Decided success was yet at some distance.

In March, 1844, the three missionaries, in virtue of instructions and powers transmitted from the Free Church of Scotland, formed themselves into a Presbytery. They were now authorised to license and ordain duly qualified native converts, to preach the gospel and administer the ordinances of the Christian faith. All the other functions of a Presbytery they were ready to exercise, as their work and duty might require. The three converts that now lived with them, and prosecuted their studies under their direction, continued to make rapid progress in learning and in spiritual experience. Their work and studies at this time are thus described:—

"Our three converts are going forward in their studies for the ministry with great diligence and alacrity. They now teach God's word, each to a class of about *fifteen*, two hours every day. It is delightful to observe the interest that they take in this work, and the spirit and individuality with which they make the truth bear on the hearts and consciences of their pupils. In mathematics, history, theology, and Greek, they are making distinguished progress. Every morning, too, one of them takes his turn in the family prayer, before which, each gives a short account of the treasures he has found in the private study of God's word. They are in the habit of rising at five o'clock to begin their devotions and studies. At times they are helped in prayer to breathe out living desires, and to take hold of God's promises for the conversion of the heathen, and for the mortification of indwelling sin struggling within their own souls. We are comforted by knowing that our friends at home pray for them, that they may be kept by the mighty power of God standing fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made them free."

During the same month the Institution received another shock,

as of a moral earthquake, from the conversion of Viswanauthan, a fine young Brahman of nineteen. This youth made a noble confession of his faith, and withstood firmly the usual ordeal of family distress. His case convulsed the native community, and flung it into a perfect paroxysm of rage and fear. On the day after his baptism, only 75 pupils appeared in the English department of the institution, 300 of the most hopeful and advanced having vanished. The missionaries had expected all this, but it was no less painful to witness. In five months, however, the breaches were repaired, as far as numbers were concerned; yet most of the advanced pupils that had been removed never returned. But the panic in regard to conversions spread over the country, and damaged missionary schools of every description. The heathen raged, and began to think of means by which they might check, or altogether prevent, the preaching of the gospel, and the use of the Bible in schools. In the mean time, Ramanjooloo, who had for two years endured all the agony of a conscience-smitten apostate, but who had at length been brought to true penitence, was solemnly re-admitted into the Church. He publicly confessed his past sins, and detailed with great power his miserable experiences when in a state of apostasy; whereupon he was addressed, with singular fidelity and tenderness, by Mr Anderson. His wife, Aleemalummah, broke her caste, associated with Christians, and began to receive instruction in English. She eventually joined her husband in the sincere profession of Christianity, being baptized by Mr Anderson at the close of the year. Her baptism marked an era in female education at Madras. The number of female pupils—many of them girls of caste—under regular instruction now greatly exceeded 200, and there was every prospect of a large and constant increase. The instruction was given partly in English, and partly in the two leading native languages, Tamil and Telugu, which, it should be stated, were also largely employed in the boys' schools. From this period, female education, in connection with the mission, continued to make steady progress, and was the source of many blessings to a large portion of the native population.

Our limits do not admit of a detailed account of this missionary work during the ensuing laborious and eventful years. We have already given a good specimen of the working of the educational system, and of the characteristic labours of Mr Anderson and his like-minded colleagues. We have arrived at a period when the Mission, having survived the shocks and storms that assailed its very existence, had firmly taken root in the land, and was spreading out its arms in various directions. Henceforth, schools for boys and schools for girls, all pervaded with Christian truth, flourish side by side; male and female converts

are gathered into the Church ; baptisms, as usual, are succeeded by convulsions, but do not eventually injure the educational movement ; a "Free Church," composed of native and European Christians, flourishes under the pastoral care of the missionaries ; the three converts, under training for the ministry, teach classes, and publish to their countrymen, as occasion offers, the tidings of salvation ; cases of apostasy, or of strong convictions deliberately stifled, give rise to great sorrow in the mission-house, but fail to arrest the progress of light and truth in the schools, in the city or in the country. In the whole history which Mr Braidwood has given with such fidelity and modesty, we trace the energy of Mr Anderson, as of a master-spirit ; but it is an energy which is at once tempered and assisted by his two judicious, prayerful, and indefatigable yoke-fellows.

At length, in 1846, a great step, in rearing up a *native agency*—that darling object of the mission—was taken by these brethren at Madras. Mr Braidwood thus describes it :—"On March 25, the Free Church Presbytery licensed in due form, and with great solemnity, the first three converts, P. Rajahgopaul, A. Venkataramiah, and S. Ettirajooloo, who had now been nearly five years under training. The event was most memorable, Mr Anderson conducting the service with more than his usual spiritual power and affection. His wise and weighty counsels [published in the *Native Herald*] are worthy of the frequent study of every Hindu preacher of Christ's everlasting gospel. 'It was my privilege,' he writes, 'in the presence of a large assemblage of natives, East Indians, and European ladies and gentlemen, to license them. My friend Mr Johnston opened the service with a most solemnising and comprehensive prayer ; I addressed and set them apart ; and Mr Braidwood closed the proceedings with another fervent and elevating prayer. May what was done that night by us on earth be ratified in heaven ! for it deeply concerns our mission and the cause of Christ among the heathen. I can say with Paul, "Now we live, if ye stand fast in the Lord."'"

The following May and June, four other Hindu lads were baptized : Ponumbalum, a pupil of the Chingleput school, who came one morning to the mission-house, footsore and weary, having travelled all night a distance of thirty-five miles, saying that he wished to flee from the wrath to come ; Sungeevie and Ramanoojum, who, after a long struggle against the truth, were finally subdued by this arrow from Scripture, "He that believeth not is condemned already ;" and Socndrum, who had attended a large Bible-class taught by Rajahgopaul, and been, mainly through the influence of that teacher, brought to the Saviour. In September, four other converts were added to the church, youths of different and conflicting castes, but by the power of

grace made to be of one heart and one mind. The case of one of them, Ragavooloo, became celebrated, as it gave rise to a decision in the Supreme Court, by which *discretion*, more than *age*, was recognised as the ground of determining whether a Hindu youth is at liberty to go where he pleases. The scene in the court-house and the neighbouring streets, occasioned by this decision of Sir William Burton, the chief judge, is strikingly described by Mr Braidwood. Mr Anderson, as specially obnoxious to the infuriated crowd, was exposed to great danger. "The Brahmans in front of the court-house," he writes, "were thousands strong. As I passed to the registrar's room, the whole multitude hooted and groaned, and threw dust in the air. My friend Mr J., and eight of the converts, had been labouring fervently in prayer for us. At half-past five I found my way home, along with the three young preachers. The more the Lord works on our behalf, the more will the enmity and opposition of the heathen increase. The whole city is shaken to its centre. The Hindus are set on our utter ruin, and meditate a meeting of all the castes, to prevent parents, by heavy penalties, from henceforth sending children to our schools. We believe that the God whom we serve will, in due time, confound this confederacy, and make the great events now passing over our Mission, tend to the furtherance of His gospel, and the glory of His name, among the heathen."

The "meeting of all the castes" was actually held, and drew up a very violent memorial to the Court of Directors against the missionaries and their operations. But, though supported by a number of irreligious Europeans, the memorialists made nothing by their violent efforts, and their rage gradually spent itself. The Mission, meantime, though outwardly shaken, continued in other respects to prosper. Large new premises were purchased with funds liberally supplied by Christian friends on the spot. The Free Church of Europeans and native converts increased in numbers and in Christian love. On the administration of the Lord's Supper, its communicants were now found to amount to 43, of whom 21 were Hindus. The girls' schools made decided progress, both in numbers and efficiency. Mrs Braidwood, along with their regular teachers, rendered great service to these interesting supplementary institutions, destined to be important auxiliaries in spreading the gospel. The confidence and zealous support of the Christian public were freely given to the Mission, which was now generally admitted to be one of the most powerful and effective instruments ever contrived for loosening and shaking the whole fabric of Hindu idolatry.

On January 29, 1846, Mr Anderson was married to Miss Margaret Locher, a native of Zurich, who had come to Madras as a teacher of a female school in connection with the Ladies'

Association of the Established Church of Scotland. Having resolved to attend the Free Native Church for her spiritual benefit, she had been constrained to give up her situation, and had joined the Free Church. She engaged to teach in the female schools, and her services were of a very valuable kind. Her Christian zeal and energy commended her to all the missionaries; and on marrying her, Mr Anderson found a helpmeet in every way fitted to promote his own happiness, and forward the great work in which he was engaged. Shortly after his marriage, two Tamil and three Telugu girls of caste, under deep conviction of sin, and of the truth of the gospel, applied to Mr Anderson for Christian baptism. They were received into the mission-house, and put under a course of complete Christian instruction, of their own free will, and greatly to their delight. Their relations having failed to concuss or arrest them by legal means, or the usual threats and blandishments, the entire native community was again flung into a state of wild commotion. Mr Anderson thus describes the immediate effect of this movement upon the girls' schools:—"On Friday, out of 170 girls in our Madras school, only three came back—two heathens and one native Protestant girl. We fully anticipated this, and had counted the cost. On Friday, only one girl came; on Saturday and yesterday none. So that, for the present, the Madras girls' school is swept away. Should it please the Lord to keep the five dear girls steadfast, and up to this time they are delightfully peaceful and happy in the love of Jesus, we have more than a compensation for the loss of the school. Besides, we must believe that the Lord will restore it in due time. At Triplicane, on Saturday, instead of one hundred girls, Mr Johnston only found thirty-eight; and all the mission schools of other societies have suffered greatly by the panics." At this time, ten sons in the gospel, and eight daughters in various stages of advancement, were living in different parts of the mission-house, eating and drinking with the missionaries, and supported mainly at their expense. There was no safety or peace for them in the houses of their heathen relatives; and, as yet none of them had been enabled to procure Christian homes of their own. But in the mission-house, all of them, even the tenderest girls, were safe under the protection of British law. The case of Mooniatta, one of the girls, was tried before the Supreme Court, and occasioned immense interest and excitement both among Europeans and natives. Both the judges, Sir W. Burton and Sir Edward Gambier, after hearing lengthened arguments, and personally examining the girl in open court, pronounced a decision, which practically secured perfect freedom of conscience and of action for all converts, male or female, who had arrived at an age when they could form an

intelligent opinion, and give intelligible reasons for their conduct.

During the year following, 1847, the work of the mission, amidst many trials, made progress. The hearts of the missionaries were often agonized with fears and apprehensions for their spiritual children, or for their more advanced and promising pupils. Never did workers on the mission field more entirely fling themselves, heart and soul, into their work. In August three more Hindu youths were baptized; and in October, the five caste girls, who had been living in the mission-house, for their special instruction, were similarly received into the Church. On the subject of the baptism of these girls, "the first fruits from among the native females," Mr Anderson thus speaks with mingled wisdom and tenderness:—

"People seem to think, that in the progress of education, conversion will happen some time or other, as a matter of course. It will never take place but by the Lord Jesus putting his finger on the heart, and turning it. This is the only way in which it can be done. Time is nothing in this or any other country as to *conversion*. It depends on the will of Him who can create a way, and who can make the young willing in the day of his power. Truly this work of grace in Mooniatta and her sisters has been one of the sweetest consolations to us from God. He has enlarged them; he has given them a desire to hear his word; he has enabled them, when reproved for being disobedient at times, to confess their sins; and after they have confessed, his love has moved them to act in a very different way from what they did when they were idolaters. We could have baptized them with a good conscience in April, but we thought that since in this country, as in every other, there are many Christians who walk more by sight than by faith, since baptism is not regeneration, and since faith is the great instrument without which none can be saved; we thought it better to wait a little, and we went on instructing them more fully in the gospel."

Soon after these baptisms, another occurred, of perhaps a still more interesting character. This was the baptism of Ummance Ummah, the grandmother of the eldest of the five caste girls baptized in October. "She is," writes Mr Anderson, "a respectable-looking grey-haired woman of fifty, and the first fruits of our mission from the aged. For three years, she sat under the Tamil preaching of our three young preachers on Sabbaths. She appears truly to believe in Jesus; and her answers to my questions about her baptism were most intelligent and touching." This grey-haired grandmother, with the young baptized girls, continued to grow in grace, and to give great satisfaction to the missionaries and all their Christian friends. Up to this time, twenty-six converts had been bap-

tized, three of whom, however, had fallen away. A little flock of native believers, intelligent, tried, and select, was thus gradually formed in connection with this blessed Mission. Meanwhile, the three first converts, now preachers of the gospel, all able and spiritually-minded men, were doing effective service in the mission field. "Our three preachers," writes Mr Anderson at this time, "continue to grow in grace and usefulness. It is amazing with what spirit and unction they preach both in Tamil and in English, and with what earnestness and individuality they make their appeals to the conscience. It is seven years since they came to us for baptism, forsaking all they had; and truly, up to this time, the Lord hath given them a hundred-fold. Oh that He may keep them steadfast and unblameable to the end!"

By this time, the mission had fairly got over most of its initial difficulties. It had taken firm root in Madras and the chief neighbouring towns, in spite of all its enemies, native or European. The unconquerable energy of Mr Anderson and his colleagues had prevailed over opposition that would have daunted most other men. The chief difficulties of the mission now were those that sprang from its increasing success. Increased funds were required every year for the adequate support of the various schools, and the enlargement of the mission premises. Great liberality in support of the Mission was displayed by Christians of all denominations in Madras; but the Free Church herself, labouring under many difficulties in regard to her home work, failed to render the missionaries all the help they urgently required. Yet the work was not greatly hindered; the Lord provided for its continued efficiency and success. Not only many natives were constantly receiving blessings from it, but many Europeans, military and civilians, had reason to be thankful for its existence. At this period, a great number of the soldiers of Her Majesty's 25th Regiment, stationed at Madras, attended the weekly prayer meeting, and the ministrations of the Free Native Church. These men, many of whom had been previously converted at Cannanore through means of Mr Hebich, a German missionary, were distinguished by their deep and consistent piety. They rejoiced greatly in the privileges they derived at the hands of the Scotch missionaries, and the three native preachers. But this is only one of many instances of spiritual benefit derived by our own countrymen from missions to the heathen.

In the spring of 1849, Mr Anderson, completely exhausted with his severe and long-continued toil, was ordered off to Europe. He took with him his beloved son in the gospel, Rajahgopaul; but, with singular self-denial, he left Mrs Anderson behind him to compensate as far as possible for his absence. On his leaving,

the teachers, converts, and pupils of the institution, presented him with an affectionate address, and with the sum of £100 to procure his portrait, with a view to its being placed in the public hall. His reply "was so full of pathos, power, and truth, that it moved every heart, and drew tears from many an eye." Dr Duff, then on his return to Europe, landed at Madras from the same steamer in which Mr Anderson and his young friend embarked. This eminent missionary was delighted with the work he saw at Madras, and cheered the remaining brethren with his presence and counsels. He visited and examined all the schools, preached in behalf of the mission, and did everything in his power to encourage and comfort all its members. "This visit," says Mr Braidwood, "was singularly opportune, helping to bind what was broken, and to impart no little comfort." At this time, *ten* schools had to be supported in full efficiency, and all the elements of a Christian education had to be imparted to upwards of *thirteen hundred* pupils. Great pecuniary resources and immense personal efforts were constantly needed; but no part of the work stood still a single day for want of these requisite appliances. Mr Johnston, though dreadfully exhausted by absorbing and consuming toil, laboured on with wonderful energy and devotedness, like one now loaded with a double responsibility. The calm wisdom and quenchless zeal of the man came out in all their native power. Never did minister or missionary more thoroughly make it his meat and drink to do the will of his Heavenly Father. His colleague, Mr Braidwood, in all things like-minded with himself, manfully carried on the work, and fought the battle by his side; and both of them were mightily helped and cheered by the devoted services of their native brethren.

Mr Anderson's visit to Scotland created a new interest in the remarkable mission at Madras. Wherever he and Rajahgopaul went, they diffused around them what may be called a Madras influence. So thoroughly penetrated was Mr Anderson's mind with his own work in India, that he cared not to speak of anything else, as if he had become a man of one aim, and one idea. "Mr Anderson *Madrasizes*," said the late Mr Hewitson, who stayed with him for some time under the roof of that admirable mother in Israel, Lady Foulis. He always carried with him fresh and interesting letters from converts at Madras, which he was ready to read to his friends, and make the basis of lively illustration of the work to which his whole energies had long been entirely devoted. A man of varied accomplishment and great conversational power, he yet seemed to have given himself over to one ruling passion, a desire for the salvation of the heathen at Madras. Missions in India lay near his heart; but the mission at Madras was engraven upon

his heart itself. Such enthusiasm may appear to some narrow and exclusive; but it is usually the mark of a generous servant of the Lord, who has chosen out for himself some noble work, and made it the great object of his life. Rajahgopaul's appearances in public, and his demeanour in private, were singularly winning and impressive. Whether addressing the Free Assembly, or preaching the gospel from some of the chief Free Church pulpits, he displayed remarkable ability, and intense earnestness. It was universally felt that such converts as he, so thoroughly decided, and so highly trained, were well worth any amount of labour in the great work of Indian evangelisation.

Mr Anderson succeeded in collecting among liberal friends in Scotland and England, £3000 for mission premises, and had the further happiness of presiding at the ordination of the Rev. James Drummond, as a fourth missionary to Madras. Miss E. Locher, Mrs Anderson's sister, was also engaged as a female missionary teacher by the Ladies' Association. The mission at Madras, meanwhile, flourished greatly in regard to the number of pupils, and the liberal support of Christian friends on the spot; but Mr Johnston was too plainly breaking down under his manifold and most onerous labours. Mr Hislop, the Free Church missionary at Nagpore, in Central India, had been detached to Madras as a temporary coadjutor, and rendered effective assistance. But still the work was overpowering in spite of Mr Johnston's heroic efforts, and the vigorous help of his fellow-labourers. There had been various baptisms, and consequent agitations; there had been much to harass the bodies and souls of the missionaries, to fill them with anxiety, to overwhelm them with grief. But the work prospered, and the schools, in spite of all trials, were fuller than ever. The annual examination had passed off admirably, and Mr Johnston had filled the place of his absent friend with wonderful energy. But the tall frame of this noble man was now bent and exhausted with the toils of years undergone in a sultry climate, and aggravated by his being condemned to pass most of his time, night and day, in confined and unwholesome apartments. He had been enduring a martyrdom which the Church he served so faithfully should have been forward to alleviate, or to avert. Mr Anderson having heard of his colleague's exhausted and dangerous condition, determined to return to Madras earlier than he had intended, or than his medical friends advised. In October 1850, he left his native shores, along with Rajahgopaul and Miss Locher, and in December they all arrived safely at Madras, where they received from their waiting friends a most glad and cordial welcome. "Joy and thanksgiving abounded," says Mr Braidwood; "there was but one element of gloom, Mr Johnston's sadly weak and broken state."

Mr Anderson's return gave a fresh impulse to the Mission, flourishing and prosperous as it had been in his absence. Commodious new premises were purchased at Triplicane, and soon crowded with 330 pupils; female education, through Mrs Anderson's prayerful labours, made progress every day; and in all the schools there were signs and symptoms of new life and energy. The school at Conjeveram, begun by Mr Anderson with seven pupils, was now attended by two hundred and ninety-three, assembled in a good house with three rooms, and was enriched with a clock, a library, a pair of globes, and some first-rate maps, a well-watered garden in front, and two separate school huts for the vernacular pupils. During the last twelve years, hundreds of the flower of the Conjeveram youth had been leavened by the vital truths of the Bible; and the girls had recently been receiving a similar benefit. The school at Nellore was attended by upwards of three hundred scholars, and was also diffusing Christian influences in an idolatrous city. But while these things cheered a missionary's heart, Mr Johnston, now quite prostrated with the continuous labours of twelve years, was obliged to leave for Europe, taking the voyage by the Cape of Good Hope. He was carried on board in a palanquin. When asked, on leaving, by Mr Anderson, what book he would like the converts to give him, he said, with great emotion, "Baxter's Saint's Rest." With mingled serenity and sadness, he took leave of his beloved colleagues, and native brethren, never to meet them, with one exception, in the body again. Like a valiant but wounded and dying soldier, he was borne off the field, where he had toiled and fought so nobly, to finish his testimony, and yield up his life in his native land. Mr Braidwood, in just and fitting terms, thus describes his admirable friend:—

"For the sake of the great Master's cause, Mr J. had continued his labours and watchings a year and a half longer than medical advice warranted. In the absence of Mr Anderson, he preferred sacrificing his life rather than that the Mission should suffer loss. Both his body and his mind had been worked out, and if ever there was a martyr to a great and holy cause, it was he. If the converts of the Mission are found wanting in a self-sacrificing devotedness, it is not for want of an illustrious example. Comfort and ease, health and life, he laid on Christ's altar, with a love and simplicity never surpassed. The trials and triumphs of the Mission bound him to his colleagues, and they leaned on him and loved him because of his close walk with God, his faith and meekness, and his power of enduring hardness as a good soldier of Jesus Christ. He bore up the Mission, not only by active exertions, but by prayer, rare disinterestedness, and holy compassion. European Christians, native converts, even blind Hindoos and hard Mahomedans, felt the weight of his character, and the depth and purity of his principles.

By all he was esteemed; by many deeply loved. His former and present pupils shewed their gratitude and affection to him by collecting a sum for his portrait, to be placed in the institution."

Mr Johnston arrived in London in June, after a pleasant voyage, by which his shattered health was considerably recruited. In a few weeks he repaired to his native Moffat, and met, with mingled joy and sadness, the relatives that had survived his absence of thirteen years. He next went to Edinburgh, where he was warmly received by Dr Gordon and other honoured friends. But to avoid the cold winds of the east coast, he was sent to Arran under the kind care of Lady Foulis, and in that romantic and salubrious island he gained a little more strength. He ventured to return to Edinburgh in December, but found that there was little prospect of his ever being able to return to Madras. His presence in Edinburgh, however, did much to increase the interest in the Madras Mission. His absorbing interest in that mission, his counsels, his prayers, his earnest personal appeals, made a deep impression upon all who came near him, and told upon the church at large. To a great extent through his influence and personal exertions, not only a large sum was raised for sending more missionaries to Madras, but three excellent young men were moved to go out as missionaries to that part of India, Messrs Blyth, Campbell, and McCallum, whose names are now well known in the history of the Mission.

Meanwhile, the state of affairs in Madras was in many respects alarming. The work of the mission prospered as usual, but the missionary staff was sadly weakened. Miss Eliza Locher, in the midst of her years and usefulness, was suddenly cut down two months after Mr Johnston left. Mr Drummond, who arrived from Europe the following May to take Mr Johnston's place, almost immediately broke down, and was obliged to return home. Mr Anderson, who had returned to Madras too soon for his own health, was in a very weak condition; and it was evident that Mr Braidwood, if his life was not to be sacrificed, must soon quit the field for a season. But for the three native preachers, the work of the Mission could hardly have been carried on with any great vigour or success. It was necessary, therefore, that these excellent labourers should be ordained, and thus be enabled to fulfil all the functions of the ministry. They were accordingly ordained by the Free Church Presbytery of Madras, in November 1851. Mr Anderson presided at the solemn service, and addressed his three brethren in these, and in many other, weighty words:—"Hold up Jesus as crucified for you: preach Him because you believe upon Him, because you pierced Him, because your sins were laid upon Him, and He bore them all away; and because He is your salvation, your

righteousness, strength, and glory. If you thus preach Christ the Lord who bought you, He will preach by you. The more you honour Him, the more will He exalt you, and His glorious gospel by you."

Mr Braidwood, now quite unfit to continue at his post, left Madras with his family in February 1852, and was welcomed by his friend Johnston in Scotland in the following July. The two missionaries, a fortnight after, took part in the ordination at Edinburgh of Messrs Blyth and Campbell. Mr Johnston also delivered a very impressive address at a meeting held about the same time, to commend to the divine blessing the Rev. John Fordyce, who was about to proceed to Calcutta in the cause of Native Female Education. But he soon again sought the climate of Arran for the further improvement of his health which now appeared to be partially restored. In that island, however, after a few weeks of deceptive hope, he was suddenly seized with a dangerous illness. He was brought back to Edinburgh, and surrounded with all that human skill and Christian sympathy could supply. Recovering a little strength, he dictated to Mr Braidwood a long and touching letter addressed to Mr Anderson, and in a sense to all the brethren at Madras. At its close he used these words: "Yet a little while, and our work of faith and labour of love are all at an end. Give my love to every member of the Mission; I am often in the midst of you. May the Lord strengthen your faith mightily, and cause His saving power to break forth on the right hand and on the left. Do not sorrow on my account. I know in whom I have believed, and that to be absent from the body is to be present with the Lord." The conversion of souls in India, the prosperity of the Madras mission, and the welfare of all its members, occupied the dying missionary's thoughts night and day. When setting in order his earthly affairs, he also resolved to bequeath his library to the Mission, for the purpose of assisting native agents in their education for the ministry.

Mr Johnston's complaint was consumption, and as it had now for some time been making rapid progress, his end was not far off. But he lingered for months after his last decisive attack of illness in Arran. In the house of Lady Foulis, he was ministered to with a care and tenderness which only Christian affection could inspire. He wrote or dictated various letters to Madras, and received others in reply. The affection Mr Anderson and he express for each other is unsurpassed in the annals of Christian friendship. But we must refer to the biography itself for the last expressions of faith and feeling on the part of these noble friends. If separated in the body from his friend at Madras, he was most affectionately waited upon to the last by his other beloved friend, Mr Braidwood. We have no space

for the insertion of the very tender and touching account Mr Braidwood gives of his brother's last moments, and the bright hope with which they were cheered. Mr Johnston died on Tuesday, 22d March 1853, and on the Saturday following, his mortal remains were laid in the churchyard of Moffat, to mingle with the dust of his kindred, in the certain hope of a blessed resurrection.

But we must bring this lengthened article to a close. We might advert, did space permit, to the interesting events which, about this period, took place at Madras in connection with the mission, and to the admirable accounts of them given by Mr Anderson in his letters. But we have written enough to shew the nature and progress of the work, and to indicate the character of the men by whom that work was begun, and so nobly carried on in the face of great difficulties and discouragements. Soon after the news of Mr Johnston's death reached Madras, nearly twenty converts, of different castes, were baptized at three different times by Mr Anderson. A "Johnston" scholarship, of twenty rupees a month, was founded for the encouragement of native education, mainly through the exertions of Rajahgopaul and Venkataramiah, who raised a sum of £700 for the purpose. The increasing toils and anxieties connected with the mission, the intelligence of Dr Gordon's death, the continued absence in Europe of Mr and Mrs Braidwood, and other causes of labour and sorrow, all combined to weigh down Mr Anderson's shattered frame, and render him unfit for the vigorous discharge of his usual duties. As a matter of ordinary prudence, he ought for a season to have retired from the field. To this his medical adviser urged him; but his heart was so wondrously bound up in the Mission that he could not think of quitting his post, especially in the absence of Mr Braidwood, a veteran like himself, and whom he looked for to take his place. At last, indeed, it became to himself and to others a matter of doubt, whether he would suffer more by being forced to leave his work, than by being allowed to remain at it. In January 1854, he was cheered and helped by the arrival of another missionary, the Rev. James Mackintosh. His spirit was soon after greatly refreshed by the baptism of three medical students, and their reception into the Mission church. That church now numbered *ninety-four* members, having been reinforced with fifteen converts during the last year. In May, Mr Anderson baptized at once no less than eleven converts of various races and castes, some of rich and influential families, and one of them a Mahommedan. Nagalingum, one of these eleven converts, was an ingenuous, intelligent lad of fourteen, the heir to a property worth £7000. This property, in terms of a late and just enactment of the Indian Government, abolishing the old Hindu law, he did not forfeit from embracing Christianity. His rela-

tives made desperate attempts to carry him off ; but his faith remained unshaken, and he was preserved from falling into hostile hands. His case was taken into the Supreme Court ; but the judge, Sir C. Rawlinson, having questioned the youth in English, again affirmed the great principle, that a person of his years and understanding was at liberty to act for himself in matters of religion.

Meanwhile a new and powerful agency, which the missionaries had long laboured to establish as the crown of their evangelistic work, was in full operation. This was the employment of native ministers of the word to preach the gospel to their countrymen in their own languages. Every Sabbath at Madras, Nellore, and other places, the tidings of salvation were proclaimed in Hindostani, Tamil, and Telugu by Rajahgopaul, Ettirajooloo, Abdool Khader, and other converts. Sometimes, in one day, as many as two thousand souls, Hindus and Mahomedans, heard the joyful sound. Great was the excitement produced in the native mind by this new missionary activity ; but the effect, on the whole, was salutary, and the word began to tell in various ways upon a community long sunk in the spiritual death of heathenism. The native church by this time numbered 100 communicants, of whom fifty-eight were sons and daughters of the Mission. The communion was occasionally dispensed by Rajahgopaul, who ministered in the sanctuary with an unction, a tenderness and power that failed not to impress every heart, native or European. Female education also prospered greatly, the schools containing upwards of 400 girls, most of them highly interesting and promising. At the close of the same year four more candidates for the ministry were licensed to preach the gospel by the missionary Presbytery. These were Mr Joseph Frost, an East Indian, and three native converts, who had all been carefully trained for the work to which they were called. Not long after, three elders were chosen and ordained as office-bearers in the native church. Thus, while native inquirers or converts were constantly coming in, and the divine blessing was specially resting on the Mission, the work of church organisation went steadily on, as if in preparation for the loss of that true and brave spirit who had been honoured of God to lay broad and deep the foundation of a pure gospel church at Madras.

It was on Sabbath, March 4. 1855, when Rajahgopaul baptized seven new converts, that Mr Anderson, worn down with many toils and cares, was seized with his last illness. A severe bilious fever, superinduced on an exhausted nervous system, soon prostrated what was left of his strength, and brought him near the gates of death. His tried medical friend and beloved Christian brother, Dr Lorimer, watched over him with tender

and assiduous care, and at one time there were hopes of recovery. But, after various fluctuations of the ebbing tide of life, he was pronounced to be dying, and called to pass through the last solemn scene.

"On Thursday the 22d," says Dr Lorimer, "decidedly unfavourable symptoms appeared; and on the afternoon of that day I considered it my duty to acquaint him with his real state. It was a most solemn and painful duty. The Lord was with him and with me at the time. I was supported to do this, and he was supported to receive it in such a way as a man of God and servant of Christ only can. 'The Lord's will be done,' he said; 'if to live longer and to work for Christ, I am willing; if not, his holy will be done.' I have never witnessed such a death as his. He was enabled to offer a noble testimony for Christ. 'O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?' were among the few last words he uttered. I took farewell of him about half-past six P.M., when he said, 'The Lord reward you for all your work and labour of love; be faithful unto death, and thou shalt have a crown of life.' I went down to the mission-house early in the morning, long before the sun rose, but his spirit was fled, and I saw the great and noble man stretched in death. Early in the morning I went down again, and the body in the open coffin was placed at the end of the hall, with the head under the clock. A large congregation had assembled; all the native converts, male and female, and their dear families,—many East Indians, a good many Europeans; Mrs Anderson and Mrs Campbell sat at the head. Mr Campbell read the 15th chapter of First Corinthians in a very impressive manner; and dear Rajah then came forward, and, standing beside the body of his father, offered up the most impressive prayer I ever heard. I took Rajah and Venka with me in the carriage which immediately followed the hearse, and the concourse of people was very great. At the grave, Mr Blyth was enabled to offer up a most affecting and earnest prayer. Constant and daily inquiries were made about him by the Governor, the councillors, &c. He was greatly esteemed by Lord Harris. The inconvenience of not having a separate place of worship was greatly felt. Nothing was more in his heart for many months past than the obtaining of a building of this nature. Humanly speaking, had Mr Anderson taken advice and left India last year, he would have been alive now. But he considered it his duty to remain at his post. He has saved the Mission from great trouble, and more than this you know; but his life was the forfeit."

The affliction into which the Mission was plunged by the death of this noble servant of Christ, and the spirit he displayed in his last moments, are thus tenderly described by his greatly loved son in the faith, Rajahgopaul:—

"My beloved and esteemed father, Mr Anderson, the founder and head of the Madras Free Church Mission, fell asleep in Jesus

on the morning of Sabbath the 25th instant. The Mission is plunged into indescribable grief. From the oldest down to the youngest child, all are shedding bitter salt tears over him. It looks as if a sudden, terrible whirlwind had taken him away from the warm, living, and affectionate embraces of his many sons and daughters. There is a gap—a painful, crushing, desolate gap—felt and seen everywhere in the Mission, in the heart of every one. It was lately he was moving in our midst, all life and affection. His voice was heard in the class-room, from the pulpit, holding forth the gospel of the blessed Jesus, pressing him home upon the hearts and affections of the native Christians, and the heathen rising generation. He was with us in his familiar fatherly simplicity and tender affection; embracing the very children; counselling us, and instructing us in the fear of the Lord; touching the inmost springs, sympathies, and affections of our souls by the fire, energy, and unction of the Holy Ghost that so richly dwelt in him. But now he is gone; the Lord has taken him away. It is the Lord. By this mysterious afflictive dispensation we are bowed down; yea, crushed to the very dust. With this servant of the Lord is bound up the spiritual history of all,—of every convert of our Mission; the tenderest associations, touching and solemn incidents connected with the eternal interests of our souls, *under God* the growth in holiness, and knowledge, and comfort of the holy Ghost,—were entwined with him."

"He said on more occasions than one, '*Not my will, but the will of my heavenly Father be done, whether it be in my obeying, suffering, living, or dying.*' This was not mere desperation, for he had a strong desire to live to the last, for the sake of his children. The Mission was dear to him always; it was uppermost in his soul; he loved it more than life; self-denial, years of suffering, death itself was not too great to nurse and mature it. As if he had received immediate inspiration from on high, he uttered the following with divine assurance; the solemn pathos with which he spoke indicated the heart that was full:—'*I feel that the Mission will never want men to labour, nor means, nor converts, nor institutions, to teach; there will be no want of money, for the people of all denominations will support it; for the Lord has his hand here.*' He spoke with great freedom about his reliance upon the finished work of Christ. He said, '*I do not wish to speak about anything wonderful. I have a simple faith in Christ that is worth all the world.*' "*And so shall we ever be with the Lord.*" "*The redemption that is in Christ Jesus.*" . . . Looking to Venka and me, he immediately said, '*My precious sons, look after everything connected with me. In conducting such a large work, it requires much wisdom, Christianity, and faith. My Rajee, you write to Mr Braidwood, and tell him that I have deep affections for him.*' When he commended Mrs. Anderson once and again to our tender son-like care, I thought of the words of Jesus when he saw his mother and the disciple whom he loved. Once he said to me, holding my hand

with a firm grasp, in a deep affectionate tone, 'Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a crown of life.' At another time, holding my hand in the same affectionate way, with tears running down his eyes, he said the same words. These are memorable words, and they seemed to flow while his heart was tender and open, and its affection gushing out freely; they seemed to come bathed in love."

"Early on the morning of the 22d he asked me how the converts were, and then he said, 'Rajee, go down and tell all the converts that Mr Anderson sends his love to them all. I am weak and exhausted; but in the spirit of faith and hope, which is in Christ Jesus, I am still holding on. Tell them to watch and pray for me.' In the afternoon he wished to see the children. They all passed by his bedside. He took every one of them with the greatest tenderness, and kissed them. That day he sank gradually down; there were bright intervals on other days, but there seemed to be clouds gathering; the feeling of weakness grew upon him. On Friday the two doctors warned us that he was not far from his Master's home. For him to live was Christ, and we could not doubt or hesitate for a moment that for him to die would be an infinite gain. He said in the morning in a sudden way, but calmly, and with profound thought, 'I must have time to comprehend, to believe, and to love my God.' We thought singing would please him, and beloved Mrs Anderson sung the beautiful hymn,—

'How sweet the name of Jesus sounds
In a believer's ear!'

Our beloved father joined us, and sung several lines. His voice was failing, but the music of the heart was audible. We sang next Mr Anderson's favourite hymn,—

'Hark, my soul, it is the Lord.'

He struck up the last verse, and sung it alone. Then he made an extempore verse, which he sung with great feeling. Suddenly he exclaimed, 'Lord, I am poor, I am sinful; by nature I am proud, but thou hast redeemed me!' He bade us stop; it was too much for his body. Alluding to Mrs Anderson, who was out, he said, 'The Lord gives her touches from heaven,—do you not see?' Mr Moffat assented, saying, 'The Lord sustains her wonderfully.' Mr A. exclaimed, with melting tenderness, 'Oh, be kind to the poor widow.' I can never forget the mingled feeling that thrilled my soul,—that Mrs A. was soon to be a widow, the first widow in the Mission! He spoke of the kindness of Dr Blacklock to him, and commended him as a man who loved Christ. When observing us weeping, he would say, 'Now ye have sorrow, but I will see you again, and your heart shall rejoice, and your joy no man taketh from you.'

At four o'clock on the Sabbath morning, Mr Anderson had entered into his rest. A few hours after the youthful converts,

male and female, came in little parties to gaze on the remains of their departed father. Dissolved in tears, they passed the bedside of the holy dead, and took the last look of that countenance which had long beamed upon them with unutterable love. On the evening of the same day the funeral took place, the largest ever seen in Madras. Every demonstration of profound respect for the memory of a great and good man, a Christian hero who had fallen nobly in the field, was made, both by the European and native community. On the following Sabbath Venkataramiah preached a funeral sermon from the words, "*Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord.*" "He described," says Mr Braidwood, "the rest and the reward of Christ's servants, and drew from a loving heart and sound judgment a true and impressive portrait of Mr Anderson, and shewed how God gifted him, sustained him, employed him, and at length had satisfied him with everlasting blessedness."

The Madras Free Church Mission, the origin and progress of which we have thus traced, still bears the impress imparted to it by its two first missionaries. Their heroic and devoted labours bear blessed fruit at this day, and will be felt at Madras for generations to come. They were cut down in the midst of their career, but they were enabled to do a work which was sufficient to crown with honour the longest life. It is not by mere length of days that usefulness is measured, but rather by the quantity and quality of the work done. Anderson and Johnston, loving and lovely in their lives, and in their deaths not long divided, lived fast and laboured hard in the service of their great Master. By the time they had reached the ordinary meridian of human existence, they had become veterans on the field, ready to be summoned away to their reward. They had also laboured to such purpose, and so filled their chosen sphere with their own noble spirit, that others who enter upon their labours cannot fail to be stimulated by their example, and to toil with energy like their own for the good of that Mission which they founded.

The history of that Mission is its best vindication. It was, as we have seen, entirely educational in its origin, but it has been highly evangelistic in its results. Like the kindred missions at Calcutta, Bombay, and Nagpore, it has furnished a powerful lever for elevating the Hindu mind, and been the honoured instrument in the conversion of many Hindu souls. Its operations and methods have been signally blessed from first to last, and we cannot conceive what valid objection can be urged against the principles on which it is based. The production and preparation of a native Christian agency for the spread of the gospel in India are points on which most intelligent supporters of missions are now agreed. And if the neces-

sity and advantage of such an agency are now recognised generally over the church of Christ, the success of this Madras Mission has very largely contributed to such a result. We forget not the high claims of the Calcutta Free Church Mission, and the signal services of Dr Duff in defending the missionary system, which must ever be associated with his name; but the labours of Anderson and his colleagues appear to have been peculiarly useful in flinging the strongest light on all the details of the educational method, and in meeting effectually the most plausible arguments that can be urged against its principle or its working.

Mr Braidwood has performed his task in a spirit of love and reverence. He has done full justice to the memory of his sainted friends, letting them speak for themselves, and be seen in their works. But he has not done justice to his own share of the missionary work which he records. He has forgotten himself in his zeal to do honour to the departed. Yet his own name will never be forgotten at Madras; it will always be mentioned with the deepest respect, and held worthy to be joined with the names of Anderson and Johnston. This biography is alike honourable to his zeal and his accomplishments. The spirit of a man of faith and true missionary breathes in every page. The book, doubtless, like almost every other of its kind, admits of some improvement. Some little historical links that we miss near the beginning might very properly be supplied. The materials bearing on the progress of the Madras Mission might occasionally also be more elaborately wrought up. But the book itself is an interesting and valuable contribution to our missionary literature. It is fitted to help the cause of missions over the church of Christ, and to kindle a missionary zeal in our theological halls. If it be the means of raising up more true missionaries for India, especially for the loved Madras field, one great aim of the excellent author will doubtless be accomplished.

ART. VII.—Dorner on the Immutability of God.*

On the Right Conception of the Dogmatic Idea of the Immutability of God, with special reference to the mutual relation between God's supra-historical and historical existence. By J. A. DORNER.

IN the inner depths of the cultivated world of Greece, even at its most flourishing period, there lay the consciousness that it had acquired its wealth, as it were in an illegitimate way, by robbery from the divine. This is strikingly expressed in the legend of Prometheus, and in the recollection of a breach with an earlier religion, which is also connected with his name. The beauteous Hellenic world knew that it had come into being not under the blessing of the old gods, but in some measure under the disfavour of the new, whose chief was conceived of by the spirit, or rather by the accusing and excusing thoughts of the evil conscience, as jealous of the power of the emancipated human spirit. Thus, amongst the Greeks, the enjoyment of the bright present was mixed with a presentiment that it, and along with it the rule of the self-made gods of Olympus, would ere long pass away. Below the fair surface of a free, elevated life, there was a deeply-rooted consciousness of bondage and unhappiness; and it may be said, that in this tradition, the spirit of the Grecian people confesses itself to be at once fettered and free, we know not which most emphatically. It doubts the right of its gods; it doubts not less its eternal right to exercise itself freely in politics, art, science; and it doubts the endurance of its works. That the new stage of its spiritual life is not blessed and consecrated by the old stage of its faith, and has therefore not brought about a lasting advancement in the knowledge of God, but a further departure from the divine—that is the reason of the deep schism which the deeper spirits of Greece, such as *Æschylus*, feel and express.

This restless and unquiet age of ours, pressing so boldly forwards, and yet after all so weary, has something Promethean in it. It also is a living contradiction, in which a feeling of increased freedom is united with the unbreakable fetters of a deep discomfort, an inner desolation and unhappiness of heart. The feeling that our cultivation, too, has not an altogether good conscience before God, is more widely spread than is supposed. The gifts of this cultivation have not been blessed and conse-

* This article is translated, with considerable abridgment, from the *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie*, vol. i., part 2, 1856, and vol. iii., part 3, 1858, and is of great value as a review of German opinions on the subject of which it treats.—Ed. B. & F. E. R.

crated by the faith of our fathers, but the free consciousness of the outer world has been developed to a disproportionate strength. One of the two hereditary forms of the doctrine of God in its abstractness and pure spirituality does not, it is true, offend the "cultivated" spirit of the times, but, at the same time, it affects it so little, that it is only natural that in its newest phases it should ignore it, and seek a less distant God in its own breast or in nature. The other form, full of life as it has always been in the simple faith of Christians, seems, to modern cultivation, offensive, unworthy, yea, childish, from its faith in a particular providence, which makes God dependent on the interests of the world, and especially on the prayers of believers. Evil intention is not always, perhaps indeed rarely, the origin of this. Theology must bear its share of the blame, for it has too little sought to heal this deep schism in our popular life, and to arrive at a clear and fixed doctrine of God. Such a doctrine, it is true, is not necessary to the existence of faith, but only to its increase. For "the cultivated world," however, it is in the highest degree necessary, that it may not lose through spiritual dulness its point of connection with the Christian faith. The world of the present day, regarded in the mass, is not without the sting of conscience reminding it of God; but, on the one hand, it is not in a position to sacrifice the great results of human culture to the old faith; nor, on the other hand, can it maintain this faith along with them. There is something Titanic in this age of ours; something Titanically bold, yea, daring; something, too, Titanically unhappy. That faith in God, which blessed and guided earlier times, is shaken for thousands. The idea of a living God has become a phantasm, a terrifying, spectral form; and already, as man cannot live without a God, different forms of deification of the world spring up to fill the empty place of faith with superstitious belief in matter or in humanity, or in its works, politics, art, and science. While this process is going on in every stratum of our people, and the foundations not merely of Christian but of human existence are being undermined, hundreds, in the different stories of the superstructure, find time to dispute with their brethren about minute questions of confessions, but wonderfully few hands are raised in the department of thought and science to check the undermining which, if it were to succeed, would bury us all in ruins. Science alone, certainly, cannot counteract the danger which is prevailing so strongly amongst our people. The church must double her exertions, her love, and care; and she practically does so in some measure in her home missions, and otherwise. But science must not be idle, if the preaching of the church is to be enlightened and accommodated to the spirit of the times. The evil is to be traced

to the want of speculative thought among the people. The awakened senses of the time hunger and thirst for Realism after we have so long lived in Idealism. This in itself is not to be blamed, but to be praised. If the old scientific doctrine of God can be shewn to have suffered in general from an idealism which withdraws God from the world into an abstract elevation, the theological doctrine of God will be furnishing its proper contribution to the wants of the time, if it vindicate for the idea of God a powerful realism, which shall fill with new spirit and life the powerless abstract conception of Him.

We will in what follows take into consideration only one point of the doctrine of God. It is the point, however, on which, in the present state of matters, the greatest weight seems to rest,—the scientific formation of the doctrine of God. It is one which concerns most closely the interests of religion; and so many questions gather round it, that a satisfactory treatment of it may be regarded as a condition of the renewed establishment and authority of the living Christian idea of God in "the cultivated world" of the present. We will discuss *the correct conception of the dogmatic idea of the immutability of God*, with special reference to the relation between his supra-historical and historical existence, without pretending to completeness. If, in doing so, we are obliged to oppose many views which bring forward doubtful propositions contrary to the traditional doctrine of the divine immutability, our meaning, as the subsequent course of this article will sufficiently shew, is not that that traditional doctrine of God in the Dogmatic of our church needs no purifying development, but that we need improvements, which can be shewn to be so in truth.

It is now frequently said, that the interests of philosophy and of science in general, are opposed on this point to the interests of piety. We shall have to put this saying to the proof, for an essential difference between the two, about the first principles of the doctrine of God, must make a final separation between them, and lastingly injure both.

Until recently, it was specially the idea of the personality of God, about which the philosophical and theological doctrine of God was occupied. The more noted religious philosophers of the present day, teach and demonstrate, almost without exception, the absolute personality of God; for example, H. Ritter, Chalybäus, Weisse, K. Ph. Fischer, Fichte, Ulrici. They recognise that neither is the infinite truly thought, if it is conceived of only as the limitless *res extensa*, nor consciousness, if it is so conceived that the infinite cannot be an object of it. Nothing definite, however, is expressed as to the more concrete idea of this personality in itself, and in its relation to the world.

The most various conceptions of God are still reconcilable with the idea of a personality, as a self-knowing and willing being. God is called personal, not less by the Deists, the older Rationalists, and the Socinians, than in the supernaturalistic Theism of mediæval Catholics and Protestants. But in our days, there is a third doctrine opposed to all these, which is constantly spreading more widely, and which claims preference, because it as far as possible represents the personality of God as similar to that of man, and thereby brings him nearer us, while the traditional doctrines of God in the catholic and evangelical churches are found abstract, dead, and cold, unsatisfying to the religious feeling. It does not hesitate directly to contradict the old propositions about God's immutability, and takes at one time a more anthropomorphic, at another a more anthropopathic (or theopaschitic) form.

The denial of the immutability of God has been long common amongst those who denied his absolute personality; but those who held fast the latter, maintained the former all the more firmly. In our times, however, things are changed. Tendencies to theopaschitic and anthropopathic views are at present widely spread, even among excellent men. Theoretically, though, from their point of view, inconsequently, they, for the most part, seek to avoid the notion of mutability, and bring prominently forward the idea of God as an absolutely perfect personality. Still, the divine purpose of love, and the supposed interest of the world, whether of creation and government, or of the incarnation, leads them to conceive of mutability, self-diminution, passivity, and actual endurance in God, even to the loss of self-consciousness.

We generally find, however, that these men first introduce their propositions about a mutability in God, not in their doctrine of God, which is not so framed as to admit of them, but in a supplementary way when they treat of Christology, or at the soonest, when they treat of the creation of the world.* The reason of this procedure—a blameworthy one, at least in a scientific light—is that they think that Christology first shews them the necessity of their doctrine. Christology, they say, (which, it is true, conditions historically the Christian idea of God, while objectively or really Christology must be conditioned by the idea of God), demands imperatively the modification of the idea of God in the direction of mutability, since otherwise Christology becomes an impossibility, a contradiction. This being the case, we cannot separate their propositions about or against the immutability of God from their Christological doc-

* So, *e. g.*, Thomasius, Hofmann, Ebrard. Liebniz is more strictly scientific.

trine, as the latter professes to be a demonstration of the former. We shall test the demonstrative power of this standing argument for the mutability of God, so far as to see whether their theological hypothesis really contributes anything to Christology.

In the conclusion of my work on Christology, I have already made some remarks which bear on this subject ; but, in order not to give a disproportionate place to the most modern phenomena, I had there to employ a brevity which bears no satisfactory proportion to present requirements. For it cannot be denied that, in the theology of the present day, Theopaschitism, especially in application to Christology, has spread to an extent which compels a more thoroughgoing treatment of it, especially as it asserts that it has discovered the solution of the Christological problem. As it has already assumed various forms, of which we have as yet no general view, we shall, in the first place, give a survey of these forms, as a part of the modern history of doctrines, and afterwards proceed to test the foundations of these cognate theories in a positive discussion of the theme of our treatise ; for a final decision upon the scientific value of these theories must depend upon the more general question how we are to conceive of the relation between the supra-historical and the historical existence of God, especially in reference to the attribute of immutability.

Theopaschitic views have appeared in the church at various periods ; amongst the non-ebionitic Jewish Christians in the primitive times ;* among the followers of Gnosticism at the end of the second and beginning of the third centuries ; in the school of Apollinaris of Laodicea (for this strong, scientifically trained man is not himself guilty of the fancies which are found in his school) ; among the monks who shouted in Antioch, One of the holy Trinity has suffered ! At the time of the Reformation they were held by the Anabaptists, Hofmann, Menno, Simonis, and Corvinus ; during last century by Zinzendorf. But Theopaschitism has had a peculiar colouring, or a different purpose, as often as it has appeared. Its oldest form, which is previous to the development of the doctrine of the Trinity, and therefore receives the name of Patripassianism, betrays as its source the religious interest which finds the divine work of suffering, redeeming love actually accomplished in Christ, and seeks to secure the significance of the work by ascribing a share of it to God. A similar notion prevailed in a rude way in those monks ; more tenderly, but leading to strong anthropomorphism, in Zinzendorf ; and in Bushnell and Steinmeyer among moderns, about whom I have spoken more particularly in my work on Christology. By others, especially in connection

* Cf. Schneckenburger, *et al.* *Evangelium der Aegyptier*, 1834.

with the Valentinian system, Theopaschitism has been made to serve the interests of a Cosmogony or Christology. The spirit enchained in matter is, as it were, a suffering God or divine seed ; an idea further developed by Manichæism, with its *Christus patibilis*, and prevalent till far on in the middle ages. It is also Dualism, but less a pantheistic Dualism than one already leavened by ethical elements, which appears amongst the Anabaptists at the time of the Reformation, and teaches that Christ cannot have taken part in polluted matter, and that therefore the incarnation is rather to be conceived of as the Logos changing himself into a pure man in Mary, or forming a body for himself out of his heavenly substance. The cause of the most modern Theopaschitism is different, in so far, at least, as its representatives seem to be conscious of a cause. It is connected with the position which the problem of the incarnation occupies, since it has been incontrovertibly proved and generally recognised that the unity of the person of the God-man is unattainable in the way of the old Dogmatic, which represents the humanity as raised, from the conception onwards, into the *consortium* of the divine hypostasis, nature and idioma. Many modern theologians, both Lutheran and Reformed, are strikingly agreed in this, that, while the old Dogmatic seeks to solve the problem of the incarnation and of the unity of the person of the God-man, in the way of the exaltation of humanity to divine majesty, they hope to solve it in the way of the humiliation of God, which they believe to be necessary for the purpose.

All confess that the truth of a human development in Christ must at no price be given up ; but for this reason they think themselves obliged to say that the Logos, in order to be one with the growing man, must give up his own absolute mode of existence, in order to bring himself quite to the level of the beginning of a human life. So, say those who speak more logically, can the proposition of the Lutheran Dogmatic be maintained, that, since the union the Logos is no longer *extra carnem*. But if it be supposed that the one and indivisible Logos united his existence with the God-man at first only partially, and was in another relation not yet united with him, this would lead, they think, if not to a double Logos, at least to a twofold mode of existence of the Logos during Christ's humiliation,—that in Christ, and that out of Christ.* Not the growing humanity, but the Logos himself,

* If it is not possible for the Logos to have a mode of existence in time, besides his eternal existence, while yet he must in the latter will the former from eternity ; if it is inconceivable that the man Jesus, on the ground of that double will of the Logos, should stand at once in time and in eternity ; how can we reconcile with this that it is possible for the Christian, through the

according to them, has given up the possession as well as the use of all the attributes which relate to the world, such as omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and therewith the government of the world, with its majesty. Nay, since in the *unio personalis* with a growing human child there was no place for the eternal glory, the divine attributes, which he possessed apart from the world, he has given up in real *κίνησις* this his divine mode of existence, and brought himself to the level of the commencement of a human life, retaining his essential love, holiness, wisdom, and power.

The old doctrine of God was wont to conceive of the attributes of God, in their living power, as so intimately bound up with his nature, that they themselves form his living essence, and are not accidental in the idea of him, nor can be laid aside for the sake of any work like the incarnation, which is itself conceived of as accidental. When this modern theory modifies as it requires the doctrine of God, and does not introduce its propositions as a supplement in its Cosmogony or Christology, we shall be told that in God the whole inward actuality of his attributes is something accidental to him; that is, that he himself, in his essential nature, is only a finite power. But let us pass in review the principal supporters of this theory among ourselves.

*Sartorius** is the first after Zinzendorf who gives expression to such opinions. As it cannot be denied that the knowledge and even the self-consciousness of the child Jesus was a growing one, he thinks that the Logos, in order, notwithstanding this, to form a unity with him, had "shut or turned away his eye." In a later work† he makes more attempt to preserve the immutability of God. "It is false and degrading to say that the Godhead, which can neither lessen nor change itself, has, at a certain time, ceased to be itself, has given up the possession of all or any of the divine attributes, and exchanged its divine nature with another, or modified it by another. To affirm this, is altogether to deny true divinity to the Son. The possession of essential power and glory the Son of God never renounced, but the perfect use of them as man;" that is, as the connection shews, during the growth of the assumed humanity the Logos did not make full use of that unlimited power and glory, though he continued to possess them. How we are to conceive of the possession of unlimited power without the exercise of it, is not specified. We should think it as

Holy Spirit, to have such a twofold mode of existence, in eternal life, or in heaven, and on earth?

* *Dorpater Beiträge*, I. 348. *Die heilige Liebe*, II.

† *Die Lehre von Christi Person und Werk*, 1853, pp. 26-30.

difficult as to conceive of the possession of omniscience without the reality, or the exercise, of such knowledge. In this we see the tendency to consider as suspended only the power of the Logos over the world, in knowing and willing. But the theory cannot stop here, for a human infant can as little be clothed with the essential divine Logos in his eternal reality in God, as with the world-ruling Logos.

Accordingly, it is only logical if others, less cautious, go further. So, specially, König; and after him, Thomasius, Hofmann, Delitzsch, Ebrard, Lange, Liebnier, Gaupp, Schmieder, Steinmeyer, Hahn, Kahnis, &c., &c.

König says,* "The *kenosis*, the self-emptying, is the great idea, through the revelation and scriptural apprehension of which a true Christology is alone possible. It implies the free self-limitation of the Logos." He does not hold that the inner fulness of the Logos was given up, but the *θέξα* which relates to the world,—his omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence. Still less does he hold, as is often understood, the transformation of the Logos into a man, in which the significance of the form in which he appeared (*μορφή*) belonged to humanity; but the Logos, according to him, made himself finite for the sake of more easy union with a finite creature, and the free choice of the man is determined and promoted by the indwelling Logos. He does not make it clear what he ascribes to the *σάρξ* assumed by Christ, and he says again that the Logos emptied himself so that by free action he advanced to self-restoration, which seems to point to an identity, and not merely a union, of the self-emptied Logos and the human soul. We must commend him regarding the incarnation as founded on the infinite love and spirituality of God, and the development of Christ as accomplished from within. But whether assuming finitude, even to the loss of consciousness, be really suitable to love, we shall have to consider hereafter.

Thomasius, who is superior to König in Christological learning, has given forth a similar view. We shall speak of him, however, afterwards, because he is the most zealous, though not the most logical, supporter of this theory, and because he is entitled to demand that we should pay most regard to the more complete statement of his views which he has given in the second part of his *Dogmatik*. Originally,† in connection, as it seems, with Hofmann's doctrine of the divine Spirit separating itself for the production of the nature of man,

* *Die Menschwerdung Gottes in Christus und in der Kirche*, Mainz, 1844, pp. 338-345. Cf. Dorner, *Lehre von der Person Christi*, Abth. I. 177; Abth. II. ii. 811, 812.

† *Christologische Beiträge*. 1845.

he was of opinion that, as in every man the divine Pneuma forms the foundation of the Adamitic personality, so in Christ the Logos, having divested himself of his glory, made his absolute life the foundation of a human nature; that the Logos, so emptied and united with a human nature (occupying in it the place of the Pneuma in us), was the power or germ of the whole holy development of the God-man, which went on according to the laws of our nature. His views having been objected to in several quarters, Thomasius has lately modified them considerably, and omitted the Apollinaristic part of them. It will afterwards be seen whether these emendations have increased the consistency of his opinions.

Of the authors above named, *Gaupp** remains most true to the simplest form of the thought that the Christological problem is to be solved by the *κένωσις* of the Logos. He properly finds fault with the old Christology, for this reason amongst others, that its doctrine of the union of humanity with the Logos by exaltation, makes too little account of the anthropological foundation. Reason and freedom, the divine image, should be regarded as essential attributes of man, instead of attaching importance to secondary things, and then declaring human nature incapable of real participation in the divine attributes. Human nature should be viewed as capable, when sanctified and glorified by the Spirit of God, of receiving the whole fulness of the Godhead into itself, without ceasing to be human nature. But the Godhead, according to him, cannot dwell in man without self-emptying. "Incarnation would be a contradiction, if the continuity of the divine self-consciousness were not interrupted." The result of this self-emptying is, that the Son of God constitutes himself a human spirit, assumes from without soul and body through the Holy Ghost, and subjects himself to a purely human development. All his majesty and all his divine attributes were laid aside, and, as it were, stored up with the Father, that from that time onward he might be completely man. Thus, we should have a Logos without the divine attributes (the unity of which is commonly called the divine nature), because they cannot be at the same time attributes of an incipient human life. For the same reason, he conceives of the Logos as without the personal self-command involved in the idea of the Ego. This doctrine of depotentiation at once suggests the question: If the Logos has given up his nature and his Ego, what is there of himself remaining? *Gaupp* answers, his *existence*, from which he is to be developed as an Ego common to both natures. All that he has laid aside, he shall, as man, again labour for and *merit*.

* *Die Union*, 1847, pp. 27-38, 72-51, 96-117.

Delitzsch * similarly says, that the Logos has reduced himself to the root of the divine essence (which, in each of the three persons, is the will, related as *prius* even to consciousness), and thus has been able to make himself the subject of a human personality, and to become the object of a consciousness, which, though it has his now twofold nature as its content, is yet not twofold, but single. In this solution of the problem, "obtained in a psychological way" (?) he corresponds with Thomasius and Hofmann.

According to *Hofmann*, the unknown divine quantity, which, as revealed (in Christ), is called Son, came forth from the Father for the purpose of creation, and God entered into a *κίνησις* to create the finite world. As generally the Trinity, according to him, is real separation in God, but only for the sake of the world, or because God determined to be the archetype of the world, so specially, what the doctrine of the church calls Son, is only God made finite. Of the inner divine essence we know, according to Hofmann, nothing; even Scripture teaches nothing precise about it; but God has, out of love, come forth from himself, and made himself finite, "has come into inequality with himself," in order to become the principle of the world in which he "will complete himself" as its archetype.† This self-emptying God is indeed above the world, nay, of the same essence with God; but this is recognised much as the Arians recognised it, among whom the Logos often came at last to be regarded as the instrument of the world's creation, or even the world itself in its fundamental unity. Arianism avowedly attached great importance to the changeableness (*τρεπτόν*) of the Logos; distinguishing from him the unchangeable, ungenerated God. With Hofmann, this individual, who is finite, yet at the same time a God, is also changeable, but by the power of his will. God, however, is involved in this changeableness, in so far as that individual owes his independent existence out of God to God's making himself finite, and not to a creative act of God to which Arianism always inclined, in order not to force the *τρεπτόν* into the essence of God himself, whether in the form of emanation or *ἀποκρίσις*. But Hofmann sees no need to take objection to this changeableness of God, nor to fear a commingling of God with the finite, if only the will of God, which has the power to change, takes the lead. Of this power that God, who has already become finite for the purpose of creation, again makes use, because of sin. He who before had power over the world, though in inequality with the inner trinitarian relation, assumed, by a second *κίνησις*, the form

* *System der Biblischen Psychologie*, 1855, p. 204, seq.

† *Schriftbeweis*, I., 234 seq., 241; II., i. 20.

of a servant; exchanged "the predicate" *θεός* for the "predicates" *άνθρωπος* or *σάρξ*. "He has (now) ceased to be God, in order to become man."* The incarnation is thus an assumption of the "predicate" Man, instead of the "predicate" God, by means of his ceasing to be God. Identity with the previous supramundane individual, which might seem in these words to be denied, is yet, of course, asserted, and his substance, conceived of undoubtedly as divine, continues to be the proper nucleus of what is now designated by the predicate Man. This individual, however, has given up the divine attributes (predicate), and assumed the human instead. He has reduced himself to mere being, to potency; the actual modification of this being, i. e., his existence, is henceforth human. Such an assumption of merely "human predicates," without a human substance or soul, seems rather docetic. Christology becomes thereby a mere theophany. But Hofmann is convinced that "all formulæ must be given up which are derived from the designation of the incarnation as a union of the divine and human natures."†

Ebrard is of the same opinion. He is aware of, and rejoices in, his agreement with Hofmann.‡ But he attempts to represent as the original theory that of the Reformed Church, that the self-emptying of the Son consisted in his being clothed with a human actuality or form of existence, instead of the divine actuality or form of existence of the Logos. He, however, still more openly denies a human soul in Jesus different from the Logos, and calls the embodied Logos a man, because he assumed a certain number of human predicates, "a human form of existence."

Liebner represents the *κένωσις* in a more speculative way, as *itself* incarnation.§ But he tries to make it more conceivable, and to avoid a mutation of God into a lower nature, or a mere potentiality of himself, by a trinitarian foundation. As, according to him, the Son, in the process of love, eternally surrenders his fulness to the Father, who just as eternally pours it back into the Son, the *κένωσις* of the Logos consists merely in

* *Schriftbeweis*, I. 146.

† Since Hofmann recognises, apart from the body, no humanity of Christ, but only human predicates of the Logos, it is clear that this "human" individual cannot attain such an independent standing before God, as the work of atonement demands. Vicarious expiation would become necessarily a mere exhibition, if the Son of man is not a true man with a human soul, who in the power of the Logos offers the expiation, but only a veiled God. Instead of expiation, this gradually developing God can offer only obedience by which fellowship with God may be restored. Thus, the defects in Hofmann's doctrine of the atonement are closely connected with those of his Christology.

‡ In "Herzog's Encyclopædia," Art. *Ascension*. Cf. *Christliche Dogmatik*, II., 34 seq., 143 seq.

§ *Christliche Dogmatik*, I. 286 seq.

the momentary cessation of that process of love during the growth of the Incarnate, by the will of the Father, but with the consent of the Son. The incarnate Logos draws back to himself, by piety and obedience, the divine fulness which he had before, in order to confer it on the body which he has assumed, and through it upon humanity and nature.

Attempts have been made to ground this theory exegetically, but with little satisfactory result.

This is now the place to speak of the theory of *Thomasius*. The chief points in his view, as he now seeks to justify it,* are as follows:—The Son of God has not transferred humanity out of itself, or himself into it, for the eternal Logos is neither in himself man, nor has he changed himself into a man. If he had, he would not be of our race, nor any longer God. But the incarnation presupposes the distinction between the divine and human natures. Humanity is *assumed*. The eternal Son of God, who is not a nature, but a person, has, without making himself less than divine, or humanity more than a creature, placed himself in a relation to it, which gave rise to a real personal unity of life. This result has been attained because the incarnation is not merely an assumption of human nature, and still less of a human individual, but implies a self-limiting of the divine, both in its mode of existence and of working. If the eternal Son of God in the assumed finite nature remains in the unlimitedness of his divine being and working, there is still a duplicity; the divine surrounds the human as a wider circle does a narrower, stands, as it were, behind the historical Christ, or hovers over him. Here there is a twofold mode of existence, a double life, a double consciousness. The Logos in the *status exinanitionis* is or has something which does not pass into his historical manifestation. This seems, however, to destroy the unity of the Ego, at least it gives us no subject in which God in his totality, the fulness of the Godhead as it subsists in the Son, has become man.

But as Docetism would be unavoidable if the Son had at once communicated his fulness to humanity, God must have determined himself to an actual participation in the mode of existence peculiar to us. This *Thomasius* translates into the proposition, that the eternal Son, the second person in the Godhead, has thrown *himself* into the form of human limitation, into the limits of temporal existence; and thus the assumption is at the same time a self-limitation of the Son of God. This self-limitation does not refer only to the power of the Logos over the world in his omnipresence and omniscience, but "the absolute life, which is the essence of the Godhead,

* *Christi Person und Werk*, 1855, II., 63, 128, 185, 216, 232, 275.

exists now within the narrow bounds of a human life ; absolute holiness and truth, the essential definition of God, develops itself now in the form of human thought, the absolute love has taken a human form, it exists as a human feeling in the heart of this man, and the absolute freedom exists as human self-determination." The Son of God exists nowhere, since the act of *unio*, apart from this man, possesses no proper power, no separate consciousness, no independent existence. He has become man in the totality of his nature ; his existence and form of life is that of a man made up of spirit and body, conditioned by time. Thomasius holds that all this has taken place without the Logos thereby ceasing to be God. This sounds more cautious than Hofmann's expression, "He has ceased to be God, in order to become man." According to Thomasius, the Logos remains completely himself, the Son of God, essentially one with the Father, the absolute life, the absolute truth, holiness, love, the same Ego which in the beginning was, and was God. Although he gives up his absolute self-consciousness, yet he remains the same subject, or "the same person," for "self-consciousness is not the same as personality." Besides, the self-limitation was performed out of love, and is therefore not the negation, but the very exercise of his nature, which determines itself so, and therefore continues unchanged.

This self-emptied Logos is a *deus potentialis*, a finite individual, which is still in itself infinite (which may be said of man also). He has, under the condition of human development, so far lost himself that he needs the influence of the Holy Spirit to regain his divine actuality. His miracles, &c. are not the works of the Logos in him, but of the Holy Spirit, who has endowed the God-man for his office with extraordinary gifts. The whole development of the God-man is not carried on by the indwelling Logos, but, as in any other man, by the Holy Spirit. Jesus is, as regards his whole earthly history, conceived of ebionitically. Only it is affirmed that the Logos, depotentiated, is in this man.

Such an unconscious, depotentiated God is in reality nothing else than a created individual, the potentiality of an archetypal man, made in the image of God. Does such a *κένωσις* help us in the least to understand the incarnation ? The *κένωσις* promises something when it is supposed that the Logos is changed into a human soul, for then the unity of the person would be beyond dispute. But Thomasius, recollecting the rejection of Apollinarianism by the church, stops half way. Though he grants, with the church, that Christ had a separate human soul, he yet holds to his *κένωσις*, which was originally intended to prove the absolute unity of the person of the God-man. As

if it were of any use, or could make the union of the two natures more easy, to take away from the Logos his absoluteness! On the contrary, it is far more difficult to conceive of the Logos being united to a human soul as a finite spirit than as absolute, because two finite spirits can never make one. The duality of similar finite individuals, which Thomasius, with his *κένωσις*, arrives at, is so far from being the solution of the problem, that it gives rise to a new and superfluous problem, how, namely, two such similar individuals, which stand in one another, or beside one another, in a dead relation, can be a living personal unity.

But Thomasius does not fail to protest against regarding the Logos as a finite individual. He ascribes to him essential holiness, wisdom, power, that cannot be lost; he regards the *κένωσις* as a deed of the Logos, and not as something undergone by him; nay, he regards it as a continuous act, and explains that what he says of the Redeemer falls entirely within the sphere of the economic Trinity, and that the immanent Trinity is not affected by it, for the incarnation is an act of will, and *eo ipso* of consciousness, more precisely an act of the eternal Son, which, coinciding with the incarnation, becomes thenceforward the continuous deed of the God-man.* But by this distinction between the economic and immanent Logos nothing is gained, but much lost. For, if the economic Trinity and the inner essence of God are to be so distinguished that not the eternal immanent Son of God becomes man, but some other naturally subordinate quantity, the Trinity becomes, in a Christological point of view, a matter of indifference, if it can be retained at all. And as regards the continuity of the *κένωσις*, according to which the willing and conscious Logos would seem to be hovering eternally over this *κένωσις* or its result, we must ask, Does this will of the Logos attain the result which he intends or not? Does he achieve his self-emptying or not? If not, why does he will it? If he does, then this reflexive act has so emptied him that he cannot be at the same time the unemptied, full and active, self-emptying Logos.

In all these inharmonious propositions of Thomasius we can recognise no advancement of the Christological problem, but only a well-meant eclectic attempt, which is not sufficiently shy of putting together what is inconceivable, nay, contradictory.

One presupposition which leads so many excellent men to follow in the track of the *κένωσις* we have described, is the idea that it is necessary for Christology to conceive of the *unity* of the God-man as perfect from the beginning, and excluding

* *Christi Person und Werk*, ii., 187, 273.

progress of an ethical and physical kind. This presupposition is the reason why they fix their regards stedfastly on the way in which the unity of the person of the God-man is to be arrived at, and prevent any attention being paid to other sides of the problem. But so closely is one problem here connected with another, that in so doing they infringe upon the unity of the person in more ways than one; some by making it an identity of the humbled Logos and the human soul of the God-man; others by a dead homogeneous duality; and all by setting before them as their object a unity fixed and perfect from the first, instead of conceiving of it as growing and unfolding with the growing humanity. This theory, therefore, is unconsciously connected with the error which is *in these* combated by it, which excludes true growth in Christ.

The considerations here advanced against modern Christological Theopaschitism are confirmed by the work of *Gess*, which is distinguished among all other attempts of this description by logical acuteness and an earnest endeavour to be in harmony with Scripture.* The author ventures, in honest love of truth, to think out to the end the principle which he has adopted, and openly to give expression to its results, and holds to that form of Theopaschitism which I must agree with him in thinking the only logical one. He regards the Logos as having metamorphosed himself into a human soul, developing itself in a truly human way. He extends the self-emptying, not to the use only, but also to the possession of the divine attributes. The incarnate Logos must, he thinks, like every other man, acquire for himself holiness and the other predicates. He grants, without reservation, that for the thirty-four years of the earthly life of Jesus, the Trinity itself was changed; that the Father no longer poured his fulness into the Son; that the Holy Spirit no longer proceeded from him as well as from the Father; that the maintenance and government of the world were not during that time carried on through the instrumentality of the Logos; but that the Father had for the time ceased to generate the Son; that the Holy Ghost alone proceeded from him; and that he ruled the world along with the Holy Ghost alone. The great merit of this work is its logical carrying out of the hypothesis of the *κένωσις* of the Logos, by which we are enabled to form a decisive estimate of its value. So carried out, the hypothesis is seen to imply not merely in general a change in God, but specially a change in respect of his eternal holiness. God can, according to *Gess*, change himself, without injury to his essence, into a form of existence in which not merely actual holiness is

* *Die Lehre von der Person Christi.* Basel, 1856.

given up, but also the possibility of sinning is assumed. He justly claims the latter as a part of true *human* freedom, and shews that Thomasius and Hofmann, in not claiming this freedom for Christ, have not reached the true and actual humanity of the God-man. But even this acute and determined carrying out of the hypothesis of the *xristos* of the Logos has no Christological support, because it is only apparently of service towards the solution of the Christological problem. For, however distinctly Gess demands God's participation in suffering, as necessary for the work of the God-man, he cannot mean that the atonement is conceivable without the true humanity of Christ, through which he is of like nature with us. Gess, however, does not make out for the God-man a humanity true and similar to ours, just as certainly as, on our view, the Logos is not transmuted into a human soul. Consequently, the interest of the doctrine of the atonement is opposed to a hypothesis which does not bring out a humanity different from the Logos.

We have now shewn that Christology has nothing to gain from any of the different forms of Theopaschitism which at present prevail, and therefore can afford no proof in their favour. This, however, affords no scientific decision on the real question at issue. We have still to inquire: How does the Christian idea of God stand related to the supposition of a change in God? Does it absolutely exclude it? or does not God's intimate living fellowship with the world rather so strongly demand it, that, if we adhere to the absolute unchangeableness of God, we shall be reduced to the notion of a dead relationship between God and the world, in contradiction to the highest interests of Christianity? Even though we should have to answer this question in the affirmative, the interests of Theopaschitism would not be furthered, but the task would be forced upon us of gaining a foundation for a more living understanding of the relation of God to the world in Christ, in the individual believer, and in the church.

We have seen that the opinions of many of our contemporaries on the unchangeableness of God, which used to be held by every one as an axiom, have been actually shaken, and that, therefore, theology must investigate this question anew, in order to establish a satisfactory doctrine in this important matter on a clear and firm basis. The attempt so to establish the idea of the unchangeableness of God, that it shall be in harmony with the whole system of Christian belief, may be most securely made if we *first* inquire:—A. In what points an alteration in the old ecclesiastical doctrine is demanded by science and religion in the interest of the idea of God as the

living God; recognising at the same time—B. That it would be a false idea of God as living which should do away with his unchangeableness. After this, we may hope, *secondly*, to shew the necessary and true union of the unchangeableness and the life of God in a higher principle, which will at the same time contain the supreme rule for correctly laying down the relation between the supra-historical and the historical life of God. In conclusion, we shall attempt, *thirdly*, to exhibit the importance and usefulness of what has been arrived at, by applying it to some main points of Christian doctrine.

I.—A. Formally, the old Dogmatic was quite correct in falling back for its conception of God's unchangeableness upon his *simplicity*. Unchangeableness is only the negative side of simplicity, *i. e.*, of the continual identity of the divine essence in all relations and in all its perfections. From Augustine downwards, the simplicity of God has been appealed to in proof that our various expressions regarding God express no objective differences, that none of the divine attributes is anything different from the others, that God *is*, and not merely has, all his attributes, for "that is simple, which *is* what it has." There is in God, therefore, no distinction of substance and accident, of potency and act, of matter and form, of general and special, of higher and lower. Hence, also, neither ethical nor physical movement, from which follows exaltation above space and time. His knowing is therefore willing, and his willing knowing; the two are objectively one, they are both God's essence, which by their separation would become changeable. "But change is a kind of death." Hence God's decree also, as absolutely unchangeable, is identical with his essence. His essence itself is to be thought of, not as potency, but as *actus purissimus*; consequently, God eternally wills and knows, with one and the same pure act, both himself and the world of his decree.

Certainly God is not complex, but it does not follow from this that all those distinctions have no place in God. The old Dogmatic contradicts in these Platonic propositions its own Trinitarian doctrines, especially if the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit are thought of as constant and not as finished in one act. But though God is not complex, he is the eternally self-establishing; and this self-establishment of God contains a plurality of momenta, the inseparable unity of which, not the identity or homogeneity, is the divine essence and life. The divine being could not be living, but only dead substance, or lifeless law, if it were without the distinction of establishing and established life, or if there did not inhere in the one divine life an eternal issuing from itself and return into itself. Similarly were God absolutely simple, a unity

without distinction or contrast, he could not know or will himself, no reflexion upon himself, no transparency for himself, no blessedness would be conceivable. This may be made still more plain in regard to God's ethical essence. As the absolute life eternally constitutes itself from the Trinitarian distinctions, and subsists only in them, so with the absolute love which is not a merely simple idea.

Objective reality must also be granted to the distinction between the physical and the spiritual definitions of the idea of God, in such a way that the former are subordinated to the latter, since otherwise the distinction between physical and spiritual in the world would become a mere untenable appearance. Thus we make God himself an analogue of nature. If we deal honestly by the fact of self-origination, even the distinction of potency and act cannot be so entirely done away with, as that we should think of God as only one of the two, namely as *actus purissimus*, as if perfection lay only in it; but if his Trinitarian self-establishment is enduring and not accomplished once for all, God must be thought of as eternally and simultaneously absolute potency as well as absolute realisation, by virtue of the eternal divine life-process. This, to speak figuratively, is possible only if the life of God form an organism, a circle of life, or, to speak logically, if the eternal and absolute self-realisation of God eternally lays the foundation for itself, which cannot be without the always absolute actuality of existence. From this it follows, that if the divine life should want, even for an instant,* but one of the momenta of which it is eternally made up, the other momenta would also cease to exist, for they are all self-conditioning and mutually conditioned, they stand and fall with one another. In the trinitarian life of God, therefore, there is nothing of the distinction between accident and substance. There is nothing in God's essence which does not exist, and there exists nothing in God whose existence is not necessary. *Essentia Dei involvit existentiam* is true also of the perfections which characterise the divine essence. If everything which is really a prerogative could not be united in one being, there could not be one God, or there would be nothing in itself good, and therefore necessarily existing in the necessary divine being, but God would be only *liberum arbitrium*, and that would be good to which this *arbitrium* determined itself. Thus the good would be something only contingent, and with this supposition would be introduced a distinction of general and special in God which cannot be granted in the perfect spiritual personality.

But can we not apply the distinction of general and special

* As the modern Kenosis of the Logos will have it.

to God *with reference to the world*? For if there is a world of things, God is not all being; but in the universal being, which comprehends God and the world, he is a special being. It would be superficial, however, to stop here. For the being of God and the being of the world do not belong to the same species of being. God's being is self-origination, and the speciality in which he stands opposed to the world, is the distinction of the universal cause of everything possible and actual from the effects.

In this absolute eternally completed existence or actuality of God, which is life eternally producing itself, is already expressed his exaltation above change and above the limits of space and time. For apart from the world, change in God would be conceivable, only from the more imperfect to the perfect. And as there can be no divine original powers above God, space and time must be within God, eternally established and willed by him, having their archetypes in him. The completed circle of the divine eternity keeps temporal succession under, because the effect in God is just as eternally perfect as the cause; whereas in the finite world, that circle becomes a straight line, because finite beings are not from the first what they are to become. So also separation in space is a possibility always overcome in God by his absolute actuality, and his infinitude is no diffusion. Separation and succession are imperfections of reality always excluded in God by his absolute perfection. But still the possibility, which would at once become reality, if the power of return into himself did not eternally correspond to the power of issuing from himself, forms the ground of an understanding, how there is possible for God a knowledge of separation and succession in the world, and a creative conception of it.

The idea of creation does not on the whole harmonise with a doctrine which denies all distinction in the essence and attributes of God. If God is not altogether comprehended in this, that he is the cause of the world, but is something in and for himself, his knowing and willing of himself cannot be identical with his knowing and willing himself as the cause of the world. More particularly, no one denies that the world was absolutely in God as a thought. It existed originally only as an object produced within the divine understanding. But it is conceived by God as fleeting and changeable, otherwise it would not be thought and willed as it is. Consequently, the divine understanding is burdened with the changeable, and that not as contemplating it merely, but as producing it in idea. Further, if the changeable owes its subsistence, however brief, to the divine will, that will must have ceased to work in the case of what is past, and if something else be produced, the production of it is

a change in God's working. Must we not then say generally, that though God eternally knows and wills what gradually appears in time, yet the effective, productive willing is by no means so eternal as the idea of the world? Here we have a change in God's living activity.

We reach the same result in another direction, if we take the word of Scripture, "in him we live, and move, and have our being," together with this other, "I will dwell in them, and walk in them," which expresses purpose. Man is not created to live independently without God, after he has become a being distinct from God. Nor is he designed, on the other hand, to rest like a child in its mother's bosom, surrounded by the divine power, but he is to exercise a proper causality of a secondary kind. God will not stand to him in the relation of a purely determining power, or of an objective law. But because, whether they will or not, they live, move, and have their being *in him*, he will dwell and walk *in them*, as those who will and know themselves in accordance with God's eternal idea of them. And it is undeniable that God, in so far as he dwells in them, leads a historical life in the world, and comes into contact with time, and that his life gains an ever wider extension by progressive deeds conditioned by the receptivity of men. By the world of free powers it is made manifest that God could not establish the world, which he willed, by a word of almighty power spoken in the beginning. For what would remain for freedom if its work was accomplished without it? If there were nothing but the almighty word creatively establishing the course of nature, the divine activity (which would then be merely upholding) must be covered by this course of nature, and everything be not less nature's work than God's. Farther, as regards God's relation to free powers, though they are at every moment absolutely dependent in their being on God's upholding activity, it is not sufficient to refer everything on God's side to his almighty will alone. The relation of love, which is aimed at in the creation of free powers, is opposed to the absolutism of mere power, in place of which comes the intercourse of love. And since a love of the creature to God would be of little worth which was the result of an irresistible determination, the causality of God must have wrought so powerfully in the production and maintenance of free powers as to give them the power of opposing God and his love, that their free surrender to God in self-sacrificing love may be a new good, valuable to God himself, which could never have been attained through almighty power. But if God wills the establishment on the stage of nature of a second world, the free world of a loving family of God, we must further say that the relation of love between God and

man must become a mutual relation, as is required by the nature of love ; and we must therefore teach that God himself enters in the ethical world into a relation of mutual working. The original helpless condition and poor ethical endowment of man, as well as the law of development to which he is subject, are only conceivable if a succession of free human actions is necessary through which divine love may condition its working, and measure the kind and manner of its self-communication. Though these divine acts are eternally comprehended, in fore-knowledge of the acts of free powers, in the one divine decree, yet this decree itself is a decree of production in time, and under the conditions of human freedom, and though God has assuredly purposed in will and knowledge the whole from the beginning, the producing will is not always equally present for everything, but advances with the history of the world, is itself historical. There is a deep truth in the distinction between the producing and the commanding will of God which is found in Luther, Calvin, Schleiermacher, for God does not at once produce the good which he sets before him as his aim. But in the old doctrine of God this distinction remains without motive or foundation.

From what has now been said, it follows that the divine *omniscience* also has a historical side. If there are free powers in the world, there are free resolutions of the creature which have the ground of their possibility in God, but the ground of their reality in the free nature, and not in God. Hence God cannot,* through his self-knowledge, know these actions as real, but only as possible. (?) He cannot, therefore, have a knowledge of the real world of free natures through "the simplest eternal act of his self-knowledge," but by a distinct act of recognition, however this may be conceived of. This implies that the divine decree, in so far as it embraces not merely the design of the world indefinitely, but that which shall be realised, must be, not a simple, but a compound, and, so to speak, a mediated quantity. From himself, God has a knowledge of the free world which embraces all the possibilities of the exercise of freedom. The knowledge of the actual course which freedom will pursue comes to him from the world of free natures. Without this factor, however, the divine decree which is realized cannot have been established ; the knowledge of free acts which shall come to pass forms, as it were, the creature's contribution to the divine decree. We cannot, therefore, with the old divines, identify the divine decree with the divine essence by means of the divine will, but it contains a factor derived from the world—derived, however, in such a way that God's knowledge is not passive

* See p. 376, Note.—ED. B. & F. E. R.

as ours is, but precedes reality in the shape of an approving thought of possibility.

Further, we cannot be satisfied with the proposition that for God there is no true past or future, but that everything stands before him in eternal unchanging present. For, if God did not know what is in reality past as past, and what is future as future, but both only as equally present, he would know neither as what it in truth is. The truth in this matter may be thus expressed: the past is as unforgotten (but as past), and the future as clearly known (but as future), by him as if it were present. God's knowledge, therefore, advances along with reality, and this presupposes a motion, a change in God's cognitive activity. This may appear unimportant, but the living relation of God to the world essentially depends upon it. For it would satisfy neither science nor religion if God had not, *e. g.*, towards man, a disposition corresponding to his varying circumstances, but only one eternally the same for past, present, and future. God would, in that case, have no part in human history; he would remain, in truth, the eternal law, standing immoveable against the world, once for all condemning evil and approving good: but if we are to think of him as a living law, he must partake in the doings of the present, whether as a lawgiver or a judge, and this introduces change into his action.

B. In what has now been said, it is hoped that some propositions have been disposed of, which have too long burdened theology, and held, as it were, in fetters the idea of a living God. The second point is of equal importance, the removal, namely, of conceptions of God as *living*, by which his unchangeableness and true exaltation are endangered. That Pantheism in its various forms had so many followers after the period of prevailing Deism, is to be ascribed in great part to thirst after a living God. But theology must be on its guard, in the reconstruction of its doctrine of God, against injurious influences from this quarter, from which it has already suffered so much.

What then is the false element in the Pantheistic system, and what are we to regard as the reason why the unchangeable absoluteness of God and his living personality, which the highest forms of Pantheism attempt to unite, always in the course of its farther development, separate and repel one another? The error of Pantheism does not lie in thinking too highly of the world, for it does not ascribe to it self-origination; nor in thinking too highly of the absolute God, for that is impossible; nor in bringing God and the world into too close conjunction, for Christianity conjoins them more closely than Pantheism ever did. But it lies in this, that the necessary actuality of all

the perfections of God is lost sight of, and he is viewed merely as a potency. We must maintain, above all things, the eternal and absolute self-realisation of God in himself. But it is by no means implied in this, that, as the old theology will have it, the distinction between potency and act has no meaning for the being and working of God. On the contrary, only on the ground of the eternally realised and unchangeable perfection of God can we speak of his life within the world, and within history, and of change in this life.

Modern theology, it is true, recognises this in general, but still obscurely and with a mixture of pantheistic views. Some think, as has been seen, that in order to historical life in a finite world, God made himself finite, ceased to be absolutely realised God; and this leads on to the further steps of the Son's becoming a mere potency of God, in order to becoming man in Christ. This follows in the steps of the pantheistic doctrine, that God is mere potency, more or less deprived of absolute divine reality. Others think they improve upon this by assuming, in the interest of the living personality of God and his life in history, a kind of reduplication of God, employing for this purpose the old distinction between the immanent and economic trinity, as if the problem of Christology could be solved by the help of the pantheistic proposition, that actuality or perfect reality is not necessary to the existence and the idea of God. The speculative problem, on the contrary, is to recognise the eternal absolute reality of God in himself, which never reduces itself to a mere potency, as the basis, the potency, of the world and of the historical life of God; and, on the other hand, to see in God manifesting himself in history, him who, as the eternally perfect, has power and freedom to create, redeem, and perfect the world. Christology gives us the archetype, the perfect form of the union of God and man, and the way in which the union is conceived in it, decides a series of other dogmas. How could it be true and worthy of God, that Christianity should have overcome heathen religions and philosophies by a fragment of the very doctrine which has its home in the pantheistic schools.

II. We shall now attempt to establish dogmatically *the necessary and true unity of the unchangeableness and living personality of God.*

There is a widely-spread prepossession that inadequate, nay, incorrect conceptions of God are necessary, and, as it were, innate in man, since we cannot but think of God, especially in matters of religion, as finite and like man. But, if we should seriously believe in an essential contradiction between the true God and the God of the pious, between knowledge and understanding, it would be destructive not only to religion

but to science, whose work would be in vain if it stood in necessary contradiction with that which occupies the central position in the spiritual organisation of man. It is, therefore, among the primary moral duties to have a confidence in the essential harmony of understanding and knowledge, which regards the disagreements between them as contingent and capable of being removed, because connected with sin. This, however, implies that they are amongst those things from which Christianity has already redeemed us. This confidence is especially becoming in every Christian, and in all Christian theology. The fundamental fact of Christianity, the incarnation of God, is the solution, in fact, of the problem of the union of God's unchangeableness and living personality. In the God-man, man's likeness to God, which includes a knowledge of God, is not only confirmed, but brought to full realisation. As humanity in the person of Christ has truly known God, so Christ will have his knowledge imparted to others, he seeks for those to whom he can reveal it by his Spirit, Matt. xi. 27. And as Christianity recognises in him, not merely a new higher revelation of God, but the final completed revelation—for, thenceforth, everything else is only a further revelation of Christ—it behoves it to make its knowledge of Christ fruitful for the doctrine of God. The deep things of God are unsearchable, and to attain a more lively consciousness of this, is an essential part of the knowledge of God. A sound theology can never forget the enduring distinction between faith and sight. But that does not prevent Christianity from demanding faith in a harmony of understanding and knowledge, such as the apostle recognises as already existing in the germ in all Christians when he speaks (Eph. i. 18), of the eyes of the understanding which faith opens. To this, then, must we be always advancing, to the purer and more scientific expression of what faith contains in principle, and the eye of the believing understanding perceives, in order that a more harmonious doctrine of God, penetrating into greater heights and depths, may become in its own way the victory that overcometh the world, may condemn unchristian ideas of God as spiritual idols, and lay them in the dust before the only true living God. The Spirit of the Son, which faith receives, will be able to free even the world of thought from everything falsely anthropomorphic, and to shew such conceptions to be only hindrances and interruptions of the truly godly life; and not less to raise to its proper honour what the religious understanding cannot give up, however anthropomorphic it may sound, and to shew that it is divinely reasonable, because "God made man in the image of himself, and therefore man thinks of God in the form of man."

God is not unchangeable, as we have seen, in his relation to space and time, nor in his knowing and willing of the world and his decree. On the contrary, in all these respects there is change. God lets himself be determined, without, however, that unchangeableness being brought into question, which is necessary to the idea of God in the interest both of religion and science. In what then consists the essence of the unchangeableness which we must ascribe to God, and which is the norm, the source, indeed, of the changes which are reflected from the world upon God? On the other hand, God's living personality cannot consist in his taking upon him the "lot of finitude," in his being or becoming mere potency, for a life purchased in such a way would be the very opposite of true life, would be a partial slumber. Where then is the centre and the essence of the divine life?

We answer, in the same thing which constitutes the central point of his unchangeableness, not in his being or living as such, for these in themselves physical categories only lead us continually back to Deism or Pantheism, but in his *moral nature*. In this have we the highest norm for the relation between God's supra-historic and historic life.

God is to be conceived of, *first*, as the ethically necessary being, or the Holy One; *secondly*, as the ethically free. Through these two, God realises himself eternally as self-conscious, holy, and free Love.

* Let us consider, 1, how the ethical idea of God can secure his unchangeableness; and, 2, how it can secure his living personality.

1. God is love, 1 John iv. 8. The ethical in God is God in his deity. All so-called proofs of the existence of God are, correctly understood, only preludes to the ontological proof, which acquires its truth through the ethical which must be thought, and, if thought, is thought as existent, because it is the absolutely worthy which alone has its foundation and end in itself, is alone absolutely an end to itself. In the ethical idea of God, therefore, self-origination attains its true meaning and absolute proof. God wills and establishes himself eternally, because he as love assumes so completely into his will that which is in the highest sense necessary, the ethical, that his freedom is entirely identified with it. And everything which exists or may be thought in God, exists for this love, is willed by God for it, and as it requires, so that the love of God contains the highest security for everything which can be called a divine attribute. All the divine powers and attributes exist not for themselves, as if they were absolutely valuable and necessary in themselves, but for absolute love.

Thus the ethical idea of God leaves room for life and move-

ment in God, nay, it allows change to be reflected upon God (which must, it is true, spring from an ethical motive), provided only one thing be preserved intact, the ethical unchangeableness of God. This must remain unmoved; must also be eternal actuality in God, can never in God himself be mere or even partial potentiality. A love ceasing to love out of love, even for a moment, would be no love. Such love has a place only in the system of Pantheism, which recognises a potential love, a sleep of love, because it knows no true love. Instead of this, the God of the Old and New Testaments is not without eternal assertion of his ethical nature, not without righteousness which deals with and watches over what is absolutely worthy in itself. The absolute divine love is chiefly directed towards itself; is reflected in itself, self-conscious, self-having, and self-willing.

2. But just for this reason, this fixed self-assertion or righteousness, the true, *i.e.*, the ethical, unchangeableness of God, does not exclude, but includes, the tendency to self-communication (which is frequently identified with love), and therefore the life. The love of the personal God wills, just because of his love of himself or self-assertion, a world of personal beings as objects to which it may communicate itself. That is included in God's love of himself, because within the sphere of God himself the self-communication of pure love cannot in the proper sense take place. Its unselfish purity only appears where there is no possibility of its receiving back what it gave (Luke vi. 3).

Let us try shortly to shew the conformity to Scripture of the principal thoughts now thrown out. However high a place the unchangeableness of God occupies in the Old Testament, it brings strongly forward also the living personality of God, which brings him near the world in historical deeds, and regards the course of the world as something nearly concerning him and his honour. This world, in general, which he has called into being, has a worth in his eyes; he finds in the creature, after it is made, something "very good" which he had not before. God holds a different relation to the created world from that which he held to it while being created; his action is of one kind in creation, of another in preservation (Gen. ii. 1-4). The earth has he given to the children of men, and the central point of its history, before Christ, is the history of Israel. This contains a history of his deeds which have for their end the planting of his sanctuary on the earth, that is, in humanity, while, notwithstanding his omnipresence, the earth is his footstool, but his throne and his sanctuary are in heaven. Isa. li. 16. These divine doings in the Old Testament not only do not leave the impression that God always willed and did

only the same thing, which received different modifications according to the varying circumstances of men; but though a unity of purpose unmistakeably prevails in them all, yet movement and elasticity are equally manifest; the divine facts of salvation accommodate themselves to the requirement of the time. The divine consecution is not that of a mechanism of nature, of a blind law of nature, but moves on through apparent inconsequences and with a flexibility (Ps. xviii. 27), which allows to human freedom an influence which conditions the divine action. This living participation of God in the world is so strongly expressed in the Old Testament, that one can find in it as well an anthropomorphic mobility as a fixed unchangeableness. Even where God alters his mode of action, and prophecies, for example, do not come to pass, which were on the point of being fulfilled, when they were uttered, but are not fulfilled because the presupposition has been changed, under which they were made—a case much more frequent in prophetic literature than is often supposed [?]¹—yet he ever remains, according to the Old Testament, like himself in an ethical respect; nay, this self-likeness and ethical unchangeableness is precisely the *reason* why he does not always maintain the same relation to the changeable human race, but changes, not in his action only, but in his disposition towards men. It is not the case, according to the Old Testament (and the New), that by sin only the relation of man to God has been changed, while the relation of God to man remains the same. The latter certainly always preserves its purely ethical character, but this very ethical unchangeableness, in its living concernment with every point of the creative life, in its worthiness or unworthiness, is the basis of constant changes in the disposition of God towards changeable man. All this receives confirmation from concrete applications in the New Testament (Sec. III.).

According to what has been adduced, we must not deal rashly with so-called anthropomorphisms in Scripture, but are rather enabled to give larger scope to what has been called biblical realism. If the ethical unchangeableness of God is firmly maintained, we may, without injury to the idea of God or the divine majesty, believe that movement and change are reflected upon the world of God's thought and will; nay, we have in the ethical idea of God the principle which requires such reflection, and lays the foundation for a living historical relation of God to the world.

III. To test the fruitfulness of the results now gained, let us exhibit their application to the main fact and doctrine of Christianity, the incarnation and atonement in Christ.

According to the principles already laid down, the central point of history, the appearance of Christ, has always stood

before God, as sure as if it were eternally present, but not as real. God did not really unite the world before Christ to himself; he knew it not as presently reconciled, but as to be reconciled, and in course of being reconciled. It is therefore not the case that God looks upon the world before and after Christ in the same way, and that through Christ only the relation of the world to God was changed, and not that of God to the world. It is an inadmissible opinion that God has at every period since the fall purposed to accomplish the incarnation, and to call the God-man into existence in the pious men, the prophets and kings of the Old Testament, but was prevented by their sin; while they became types of Christ, because, though imperfectly, they exhibited elements of the God-man. For, if God's working had been always unchangeably the same in this respect, the incarnation would always have failed until it succeeded through human freedom; Christ would not stand sufficiently alone, and the divine eternal idea of the personality of individual believers would be altered. For they would all have been destined to be God-men; now through sin they have become ruins, which can still succeed through redemption in becoming God-men. Instead of this, therefore, we shall say, God has, according to the counsel of his grace, eternally willed the incarnation; but he has not willed to effect it at every period, but only when the fulness of the time had come, in which the maturing of human receptivity was an element; what he did before Christ was to prepare this receptivity.

The appearance of Christ indicates something new in God's working in the world, and is also a new reality for God's knowledge. As in Christ the actual reunion of God and humanity has taken place, the foundation of this new beginning is laid in a new deed of God, which, though belonging to the divine plan, had not before existed. The decree, as such, is not the principal thing, but the history and reality for which the decree is only a means. Further, the idea of the incarnation includes, not merely a deed of God, but a new being of God himself in the world, which before existed only in potency or in decree, and came to reality first in Christ. *Mansit, quod erat, factus est quod non erat.* If this reality were no more to him than the eternal decree, it would have only a Docetic significance. History would introduce nothing new, would have no real result, but would be at best a sign of the eternally existent, and not to be distinguished from doctrine. Where, then, would there be place for love? For it is the very nature of love, and therefore required by the ethical idea of God, that it does not remain mere thinking or teaching, but communicates itself to historical humanity, taking part in it, in order to give it part in itself.

This participation of God in history is of special importance to the Holy place of the Christian religion, the atonement. It is an essential part of the Christian faith that God has not merely revealed, through Christ, an eternal reconciliation of God with sin, for there is no such thing, but rather a real, serious separation, divine displeasure against sin and sinners. The Christian faith is that, because in the person, doing, and suffering of Christ something not before existing, and which first in him became possible, has been realised, namely, satisfaction to divine justice, therefore God looks upon humanity differently from what he did before. For, beholding it as it is now, but was not before, he sees it not without the real possibility of the reconciliation of all* individuals, which belongs to the whole race. And so humanity as a unity before God is no longer merely an object of the divine *ἀποχρί*, because of the coming reconciler, but he looks upon it now as furnished with means of reconciliation which it lacked before, but which it now has in him who is destined to be its head. Displeasure towards the sinful race of man is not now unaccompanied by good pleasure in the Son of man, who belongs to it, and in fellowship with whom all may become objects of the divine good pleasure, nay, for whose sake God can take the initiative in offering grace to sinners. For he has died, not only for those who believe, but for all,* although all do not come to the actual enjoyment of that which stands open to all; they can put disbelief in Christ between them and reconciliation in him. If they do, they put in the place of the expiated and forgiven sin a new sin, for which Christ can have made no atonement, the rejection of Christ.

The passion of Christ, again, requires no self-losing of the Logos or of consciousness. The significance of his work rather depends upon the most intimate and living participation of the whole person of Christ in humanity. Far from the divine life in him having suffered, in his sacrifice of himself, obscurity or destruction, it was rather the powerful deed of his inextinguishable life, his conscious life of love (Heb. vii. 16; ix. 14), that was called for in his sacrifice. His love was not for a moment given up, or restrained, or consumed in the fires of suffering, but had to assert itself, and did assert itself, when he was surrounded by the darkness of death. He does not pass through death "into a condition of complete unconsciousness and powerlessness, his self-consciousness is not lost," the darkening of the sensible side of his consciousness deprives him of his consciousness neither of the Father, nor of himself, nor of the actuality of his love.

* Here, and in one or two other phrases (see p. 374), we may trace the influence of Lutheran views on Dorner's generally precise and correct thinking.—*Ed. B. & F. E. R.*

It will be manifest, I hope, from the dogmatic investigation now engaged in, that any opposition to the modern doctrine of *κίνωσις* in Christology (which is the exact contrary of the old church doctrine, since in the latter the humanity, in the former the divinity, is the *κινούμενον*) is based on far-reaching principles, and that the maintenance of this opposition in detail is an important task at the present time.

ART. VIII.—*Recent Attacks on the Pentateuch—Davidson and Colenso.*

1. *An Introduction to the Old Testament, Critical, Historical, and Theological.* By SAMUEL DAVIDSON, D.D. Vol. I.—The Pentateuch. Vol II.—The Historical Books. Williams & Norgate. 1862.
2. *The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua critically Examined.* By JOHN WILLIAM COLENSO, D.D. Part I., 1862; Part II., 1863. Longmans.
3. *Historisch-Kritisch Onderzoek naar het Ontstaan en de Verzameling van de Boeken des ouden Verbonds, door A. Kuenen.* Leiden. 1861.
4. *Kurtzgefasstes Exegetisches Handbuch 13 Lieferung.* Von AUG. KNOBEL. Leipzig. 1861.

READERS on seeing us bent upon saying something, like all the world on Dr Colenso's books, will heartily beg, we believe, to be spared the following things:—

First, Any mournful ejaculations of ours over right-hand defections and left-hand fallings-off, and all reasoning by exclamations, a kind of syllogism of which most readers can themselves make slight use at a pinch—the present age being supposed to demand, not ejaculation, but argument, or if ejaculation, at least also argument. The phase of things we have to contemplate is certainly lamentable, but for that reason the less of lamentation and the more of earnest treatment applied to it the better.

Second, Any abuse of the writers of whom we are going to speak; though the old and orthodox way (and Dr Davidson is yet orthodox in this point at least) was, first of all, soundly to rate an opponent, and then, though this was not always thought necessary, to seek to confute him—it being now considered both somewhat ungenerous to an opponent, as well as somewhat arrogant in behalf of one's self, to ascribe the defections of his reason to the natural corruption of his heart; and, indeed, it being also apparently undeniable that there are many excellent men sadly given to scepticism; and, on the other hand, many men given neither to scepticism nor excellence. No one denies this in theory, but many are inclined to forget it in the treatment of such men, and to expose them to a severity and

rigour of judgment, as if the denial of one truth involved the denial of all, and as if this obliquity of the intellect were entirely inconsistent with any rectitude of conscience. False and ungenerous, and inhumanly assumptive as such suspicions are, if possible more false on the other side, is the unscientific cant which is fond of expressing itself to the effect, that if the heart be right, the opinions of the head are of the least possible consequence. There is unmeasured *petitio* in that "if." As well argue that, if all the lines from a point within a figure to its circumference be equal, it is of the least possible consequence whether the figure be a circle or not. The lines cannot be equal unless the figure is a circle. And the heart cannot be right if the head be wrong. Perfect rectitude of soul is incompatible with partial aberration of intellect. For the human mind is not an opaque sphere like the moon, of which one side may be densely dark, while the other is intensely illuminated; the mind rather is a transparency of which the side visible, the emotional and religious nature, in a word, the life, exhibits accurately everything on the other side, so that every fleck, and bar, and cloud, projects in the light upon the heart its dark and distorting shadow.

Third, Any use of that mode of reasoning which has of late justly become so popular in our country, which consists in telling a man that he has broached no new heresy, such is the poverty of his invention; that all he has said has been said a thousand times before, and better, and as often triumphantly confuted; and we now, with equal triumph, confute him by telling him this:—there being yet alive some people who insist that if an opinion start up here and there and everywhere, boldly forcing itself upon us in all the literature of the age that is most read, and loudly proclaiming itself as an element in all the thinking of the age that is most approved, it cannot be said to have been definitively trodden down. Indeed, those who employ this argument, and they are not few nor mean, seem to us to resemble a physician, who, having already dispelled some corruption of the humours from one part of the system, and being called upon to administer to a new outbreak, should, instead of patiently treating it, begin to apostrophise and upbraid it with being nothing new, but the same old disease in a new place and form, with being already cured and unworthy of the notice of a respectable practitioner. The cry of "nothing new" is not without its use. But, like the harangue of the leader, in which he reminds his followers of former triumphs over the very foes now confronting them, it is not meant to be the substitute for fighting these foes anew, it is meant to excite enthusiasm by memory of past conquests, to keep the hearts that are troubled quiet, to make the victory

easier, and the triumph more complete. And, in truth, to assert that a modern heresy is nothing new, is but partially exact. If, in one sense, there is nothing new under the sun, in one sense also there is nothing old. The heretic in this case is new. The public ear into which he pours his heresy is new. The mental elaborations and culture out of which it rises, and which propel it, are new. The social conditions and general mental soil into which he casts it are new. In a word, the great life tendencies and processes out of which the thought springs, and with which it eagerly combines, are new; and it must be met in the circumstances and under the forms in which it is presented; and if the enemies of truth are never weary assailing it, its friends need not weary in defending it.

And, finally, readers will wish to be spared any discussion in detail of the contents of the above works. Hearing that Dr Davidson has now matured his beliefs (he will excuse the word if too strong), and judging them somewhat crude aforetime, they will want chiefly to know what those beliefs now are, and, above all, whether there be in them any coherence, any root, be it philosophy of religion in general, or theory of revelation in particular, out of which, legitimately, if not necessarily, they grow.

It will conduce to clearness, and the more exact knowledge of our whereabouts, to state generally what the writers on whom we are commenting seem still to believe. Thus the doctrines with which we are not concerned will lie behind us, while those under discussion will clearly stand out in our front. In the case of Dr Colenso, to effect this separation is very difficult. He has nowhere given any indication to what extent his faith in the cardinal Christian doctrines has been affected by his disbelief in the authority of Scripture. He informs us that many inquirers have anxiously pled with him to state at once in what way Christianity, or the common acceptation of it, suffers by his discoveries. He can only bid them wait. His time is not come yet. Possibly, he does not quite see his own way. But a little distance before, if not even close upon him, clouds and darkness settle down. He cannot, or he will not, meantime venture to forecast the exact issue of his destructive principles. Utter denudation of all that is outward, sheer self-stripping of every rag of belief which has not been spun out of the elements of his own soul, the annihilation of all between and besides himself and his merciful Father, may be the consequence; and if we can trust him, he is ready for it. This we take to be the meaning of his allusions to the cries and gropings after one great Teacher and Father among heathen peoples; and should he be thrown down to the same level with them, with himself and his God he will not despair. This certainly

seems the fair construction to put on Dr Colenso's language, although, both from the mental character of the man and the condition of his mind at the time of writing his first volume, we were not disposed to consider his words of so grave importance. The bishop is an impetuous, open-mouthed man. He cannot repress or conceal. What is working within he must, like Elihu, give vent to, that he be relieved. In his prefaces, he lays bare his whole mental state, with its brusque honesty and yet childish littleness, and ignorance, and want of balance. His thoughts ferment and boil within him, and he must blurt them out to the first convenient listener :—

“ Since then, at an uncertain hour,
That agony returns,
And till my ghastly tale is told
This heart within me burns.”

Though without the instinct or discrimination of the Mariner, he insists on roaring his awful tale into all the world's ears. Men of this kind usually exaggerate. Their doubts are killing, their difficulties stifling, their anxieties harrowing ; life is an agony ; they are burdened, bent, crushed ; they would that the “ fever called living ” were over at last ;—all is tragic and superlative. And something of this quality seemed to attach to the bishop's first volume, and from this cause. Granting, too, that he was sincere, which we cannot doubt, there is a kind of despair that seizes on a man when some belief which he judged to stand on eternal foundations, and on which most other beliefs themselves repose, is felt to give way beneath his feet. He feels himself sinking, surrounded by the ruins of his former stability ; and as he falls, heaven and light recede and grow dim, while the bottomless darkness yawns beneath, and a kind of dizziness and desperate blankness comes over the soul, as if the loss of this one truth carried with it the loss of all truth. This seemed to us the condition of Dr Colenso's mind when he penned his first volume ; and most speculative minds have been in the condition for moments, at least, till, by a desperate energy, they recovered themselves ; and thus we attributed less to his broken sobs, that half indicated the slow recession of Christianity also from his view, than may really have been due to them. It is less pleasing in the second volume, where the man is out of sight more daring and self-possessed, and where doubts and disbeliefs, that were written in the former only because they could not be stifled, are justified with singular hardihood and sophistry, to find the same hints of “ modifications ” of Christianity. As he says, we must wait. What Dr Colenso does believe is this :—that great part of the Old Testament, at least, is fable, even cunning forgery, written not because believed to be true, but in spite of being

known to be false, and for interested ends; and that the apostles and their Master were ignorant and fallible men.

Dr Davidson has presented much fuller materials for forming a judgment on his theological position, but from various causes certain information is near as hard to discover in this confused mass as it is to glean from the far scantier details left by Colenso. The latter writer is clear, and orderly, and mathematical; his results naturally arrange themselves into formulas; he is a clever advocate, thoroughly master of the facts of his case, which he marshals in their most imposing order, and brings down upon his adversary with overwhelming force and rapidity; and though he seems compelled by his mental structure, under a singular species of self-sophistication, to conceal the probabilities, and exhibit in their most glaring light the difficulties, of a historical statement, he never leaves any one in doubt as to his object or the means which he judges most available to obtain it. On the contrary, we labour under the following difficulties in pursuing Dr Davidson's meaning:—In the first place, he is smarting still under the sharpest sense of wrong and hardship at the hands of his former co-religionists. This irrepressible bitterness proclaims itself openly in every page of his work, which thus too often, instead of a calm theological essay, becomes a loud and brawling personal invective. All moderation and judgment is lost; passion angrily shakes the balance of truth; and too frequently the author unwittingly rushes into positions not recommended by the truth of the sentiments themselves, or the philosophic cleanness of the words in which they are conveyed, but because the sentiments are most opposed to the views of his former friends, and the language may be made a vehicle for heaping indignity and vituperation on the heads of "Evangelicals."

Again, it is known from of old that Dr Davidson is no strict philosopher, although his talk of philosophy is abundant, and philosophic terms such as "pure reason" and "preconscious state" meet us in alarming number and quality; that scheme or theory of one thing or other he has little or none; that his grand principle is, Sufficient unto the case is the discussion thereanent. Here he writes an Introduction to Scripture, and he informs us neither what he intends by Introduction—though a mere glance at his book tells us that he intends the "divers matters" commonly embraced under the title; nor what he means by Scripture, and earnest perusal of his volumes will not enable one with any clearness to discover. This characteristic belongs to Dr Davidson and all that class of writers of whom he is a specimen, that they never discuss principles in themselves, and apart from the cases which may happen to involve them. Whether this arise from a certain bluntness of vision which

cannot separate between the accidental case and the essential principle embodied in it, but capable also of being embodied in many such cases ; or whether it arise from the preference of the author, who dislikes and distrusts abstract statement, or fancies others to dislike it ; or whether it be due to mental lethargy, or to the accidental quarter from which the authors in question advance to the discussion of their problems, we cannot say. This we can say, that the peculiarity is very marked and very troublesome, entailing on us many a toilsome hunt for principles, through a broken and tangled region, by no means sure of catching anything after all is done, or sure indeed that anything exists to be caught. This must be remembered in our construction of Dr Davidson's principles, that we have had to gather the isolated fragments from beginning to end of two huge volumes, then to piece them together according to what would have been our own plan, uncertain whether that be the plan of the author, or whether he had any plan. We believe, on the whole, that Dr Davidson has at no time had before his mind any compact or even complete theory of revelation, and that the broad general statements which he not unfrequently sows about him embody isolated notions which either have unconnectedly struck his own mind, or more probably been found in some of the numerous works perused by him, but have never been assimilated and combined with other notions, so as to form a harmonious system, the parts of which should mutually control and balance each other. Hence, we find the two singular phenomena, that he occasionally in different places insists on several general principles, which, if he had really understood them, would have been seen to exclude each other ; and that, on the other hand, he fancies some one principle to exclude others, when the two are quite and easily reconcilable.

Once more ; this want of personal thinking or incapacity for it, this state of being by nature utterly unprovided with adequate digestive apparatus, combined with a somewhat voracious appetite for books, and a mistakenly assumed power or obligation to write, results in a production not only chaotic and rude, and self-combative in its thoughts, but not unfrequently obscure and hard to construe even in its expression. Dr D. is both an inconsequent thinker and an ungrammatical writer. Witness his definition of Scripture :—

“ They are *human* books, having *such a divine* character and aspect, as it befits the wisdom and perfections of the Deity for man to conceive of, and for his truest servants of old to be mirrored in” (p. 129).

Very plainly, if Dr Davidson is to have any influence as a critic, he must begin by possessing himself of the instrument of

intelligible speech. So helpless is he in the hands of the language, which rather employs him than is employed by him, that occasionally when meaning to be bitterly heretical, he utters the most savoury orthodoxy. He denies that the dying prophecy of Jacob can be attributed to that patriarch, because, says he "although we do not dispute the possibility of the predictive spirit being in Jacob, we must reject its utter improbability in the case of any patriarch." *Reject its improbability!* what could the Inquisition ask more? He rejects, too, the view of those who explain allusions and names in the Pentateuch of a later age than Moses, by supposing a revision by some theocratic man such as Ezra, on the ground that the passages in question "belong to their respective connections as much as any other part of the text, and cannot be pronounced later appendages. They are not all *explanatory*. Some add nothing to the perspicuity of the places in which they occur; on the contrary, they occasionally disturb and embarrass the sequence" (p. 14).

This argument is new. A passage cannot be an interpolation, because it embarrasses the sequence. Dr Davidson's theory of composition is founded on his own style; the text is uncorrupted whenever the sentences embarrass each other. It must be admitted, however, that the author's periods cannot always be charged with disturbing each other, from the fact that they are often quite unconnected. They come down like a hail-storm, thick and sharp, but independent. Thus with language that sometimes expresses ideas the opposite of those which the author meant to express, and that sometimes expresses no ideas whatever; with principles not presented in any connection or order, but scattered throughout a thousand pages of letterpress, indirect, elusive, and contradictory; with conclusions, straggling, undisciplined, and unwilling to marshal, and when marshalled, ready to fall to and slay each other, the critic of Dr Davidson's work has a delicate task, and when his task is over, he can be sure only of what the author has said, by no means of what he intended to say.

The main doctrines of revealed religion Dr Davidson has not disputed. He is no atheist or pantheist; he believes in God distinct from nature and man, and in nature and man distinct from God. Further, as to the relation of these, he certainly holds that the one is not eternal, while the other is; that the one is the product of the other's creative hand. That man is a child, however, of only 6000 years he will hardly admit; neither will he concede that this primal miracle of creation entitles us to suppose any other miraculous disturbances of nature once created. Again, the author is no Arian or Socinian; he asserts a trinity of persons in the Godhead, the same in substance

equal in glory. He is no Dokete; he maintains that the Son of God became flesh, and dwelt among us; that he died for our sins, and passed into glory. As to the precise significance of this death, while he admits that some Jewish sacrifices were piacular and propitiatory, and that in some way unconsciously to themselves the authors of the sacrificial system, in their dim gropings after peace with God and truth, stretched out their eager hands in the direction of Christ, yet his death is not to be considered penal and instead of man, but atoning and in man's behalf. Dr Davidson does not speak explicitly; we judge this to be his meaning (p. 290 foll.). Indeed, this view seems to follow naturally from his somewhat extensive doctrine of the Spirit on the one hand, and from his theory of man's present and former moral condition on the other. Man, in his estimation, is now certainly sinful, but it is equally certain that he was never holy. Holiness and sin are not things of creation, and make but things of attainment and exercise of will. Man was created morally neutral. That does not mean having no preference one way or other to good or evil, which is impossible; nor, with good and evil full in view, in a condition of self-debate, which to decide for and pursue. It means in possession of powers, and ready to go forward to the exercise of them. Possession of such powers is neither moral nor immoral, the first voluntarily putting of them forth will decide the question of morality. In man this use was wrong, he fell. Dr Davidson, with his habitual negligence, does not explain to us whether man fell the first thing he did, or if not, whether his life previously was merely vegetable or infantile; and if so, how a man, in the full maturity of his powers, could lead such a life.

Further, according to our author, the image of God in which man was created by no means consisted in a state of holiness and intelligence, it consisted in the consciousness of God in the soul of Adam. He leaves us, as usual, impatient for fuller details respecting the limits and contents of this consciousness, whether it was the mere idea of a superior being, or whether such a nude idea be possible without attributing some character to the being; if such a character was included in the consciousness, whether it must not have been the character of purity, and if so, whether such consciousness of a pure being could exist without giving a *bent* in the direction of purity to the mind entertaining it. Because, if it did so, here is man a being morally pure, before he has, by the exercise of his powers, attained morality. On all this we are without information; the questions have not presented themselves to Dr Davidson. We know, from him only, that the fall must have been a thing greatly to be wished, because, though innocence was lost, "the

possibility of spirituality was attained," wherefrom we gather that, in the author's opinion, a man finding himself standing still, cannot go forward, without first of all turning round and going backwards.

Again, by the fall the image of God was not lost.

What makes man to be man is reason and free will. Free will is not liberty to do what you will, but liberty to will one way or other. No doubt corrupt natures, and unfavourable conditions, and strong passions, and these indulged till they rise into habits, lay temporary shackles on the will. But it cannot be absolutely paralysed, with divine help it will burst its chains asunder. And this help is always at hand. Unfallen man had communion with God; God has communion with man fallen. His Spirit is in contact with all his creatures; he comes like a gentle and blessed tide, bearing them on and up. He never leaves them. He is like an atmosphere around and below and within all souls, lifting them up by his insensible pressure, on which they need but spread their wings to be borne away into the calm heaven above. This doctrine of the Spirit is an important element in the author's scheme, which we shall meet again as the significant factor in his theory of revelation. When to this doctrine of the Spirit, an essential fragment of the author's anthropology, we add such a sentence as this, "The life and death of the Son of God in our nature, becoming a motive power to raise man to be heirs of God, realised all the anticipations that lay beneath men's superstitious notions of sacrifice, cleansing the worshipper's conscience from dead works, and creating him a new man, with the life of God active within him," we should, with ordinary writers, decide this view of Christ's death to be opposed to what is generally received as orthodox. With Dr Davidson we can rarely decide one way or other. Elsewhere (vol. ii. p. 476) he admits that the idea of *vicarious* suffering is found in the last part of Isaiah, though then for the first time, and that Christianity resumed and adopted the idea. But whether this adoption by Christianity was justifiable, or, like much more in early Christianity, a mistake, Dr Davidson has not intimated. It seems, on the whole, at least not justified by the Old Testament, for in the portion of Isaiah in question no allusion is to be found to Christ; indeed, in the Old Testament, a suffering Messiah is unknown; and "there is no foundation in the Old Testament for asserting that the great legislator of the Jews *intended* sacrifice as a representation of the sufferings and death of the Messiah, or a declaration of the doctrine inculcated in that future fact" (vol. i. p. 291).

In criticising these authors, our interest turns altogether around two points, their method and their results: their method

being considered to embrace the pre-supposed principles on which they set out, and the critical tests which they determine to apply. While the results of Davidson and Colenso in great measure coincide, on one great article their methods differ. Dr Davidson assumes at the outset that the miraculous is, without further discussion, false. Dr Colenso expressly repudiates this presumption; he can believe anything, if sufficiently attested. At the same time, curiously, though more moderate in his preliminary principles, the Bishop arrives at results considerably more extravagant than those of his dissenting brother.

The following theories seem to underlie these and most modern works on the Old Testament. First, that Scripture, in its origin and contents, except its pure monotheism, very much resembles other national histories. Ancient history, as a whole, is said to be enveloped in distant haze: the beginnings of things everywhere are obscure. The stream, now broad and imposing as a sea, once trickled noiselessly down the rock; once struggled in such weakness, that the mountain shepherd, whose hand tore aside the long grass and dipped his lips in it, scarce could fill his mouth. No one lives who saw its birth, or saw those who witnessed it. Traditions of it that have come from afar, and backward reflected poetic conceptions, are all that describe it. Legend and myth are the sole elements of primitive history. And there is no good ground, it is said, to except the beginnings of Jewish history. Jewish writers derived their information just as others. They heard from their fathers. They observed, they wondered, they mused, they dreamed; they were pious children of the great foretime; and its men and its monuments stood out in gigantic relief with the set sun of antiquity behind, and their great shadows thrown before, and reaching forward to the thinker's feet, who moved in awe and contemplated his own littleness in the twilight greatness of the past; and thus he writes a history which is not a record of facts, but a book of ideal sketches.

Now this assumption, that profane and biblical history belong to the same class, is belied by all the history of the past three thousand years, by every man's conscience and life at this day, by the practice and conduct even of the men who lay this theory at the foundation of their critical labours. Why will these men not take Aristotle's *Ethics* to the pulpit with them? why will they not discourse from the *Manual of Epictetus*, or the *Tusculans* of Cicero? Practically, the Bible is acknowledged to be unique in its contents and unparalleled in its influence. And if, whether by its own peculiar structure and contents, or by those made use of in some way by God, it has moulded and humanized the nations who have read it, while those ignorant of it have remained morally barbarous,

the presumption that it originated in the same way, and may be expected to contain historical developments of the same kind as other books, is one so decidedly false, that it is precisely the opposite way. As mere thoughtful men, accustomed to gauge events and their causes, as mere practical thinkers, we are obliged, from the plain matter of observation that the influence of this book is of a sort and of an extent to which nothing else is comparable, to presume that its origin and its contents are quite unlike those of any book whatever.

A second theory is, that when Scripture writers compose history, it is for the same ends, and thus in the same manner that profane writers compose it; that the characteristics of a fact or movement in national life that secure it attention in the Bible, are the same as those which would commend it as important to a secular historian. Hence, starting with an idea of the "stream" of history, of the channels of industry, and the lines of thought, and the currents of human activity, that all empty themselves into this great result, and aware that all these flow on incessantly and without break, critics look that Scripture history should proceed in the same uninterrupted way, keeping this great stream in view, and sedulously bringing up all the lesser forces conspiring to swell it; and when they are disappointed, they fancy that great movements have been overlooked for want of materials, that wide chasms are left open because no means was at hand to fill them up or bridge them over, and thus that such a history cannot be the work of a man contemporary with the events which he records. Thus Dr Davidson complains of the scantiness of details regarding Hur, the supposed brother-in-law of Moses, and even regarding Moses himself, and thinks contemporary history could not so write of its most powerful forces. And Dr Colenso everywhere demands a fulness of detail, which, if given, even the world would not contain the books that should have been written.

Now, certainly, the writers of Scripture consider it their mission to present a particular view of history. They look upon history, or at least upon their own, as a series of events directly brought about by God for the purpose of "redeeming" men. This redemption is properly from sin, but redemption from sin is often really, and more often symbolically, redemption from great heathen powers and world monarchies; and as history to the Jew was a progressive phenomenally acted out redemption, we may look that he will give prominence to all occurrences where the "redemption" is manifest and imposing, and throw into the background events of less apparent divinity and significance. Thus, Scripture history will not be a level, unbroken narrative; it will consist of a series of points, a line of towering heights, lighted up by the luminousness of heaven

itself, while between will lie abysses with thick-pressed shadows on their face, only faintly penetrated by the reflection of the light above. Hence the gaping chasms which continually discover themselves ; large eras, such as the 430 years' sojourn in Egypt, such as the 40 years' pilgrimage in the wilderness, such as the repeated prostrations of national life and paralysis of religious progress under the Judges, which contribute nothing, except at their glorious issues, to the development of redemption, being dismissed with scarce a passing word of mention.

Again, a third theory is, that on all questions of era, and most questions of authorship, the *indirect* internal evidence of the books of Scripture is the only reliable testimony. The indirect evidence is that which a skilful Hebraist is capable of eliciting from the mute pages of the Bible, by a rigid investigation of grammatical forms ; of peculiar phraseology ; of set terms current at a particular epoch, unknown previously, and soon again extinct ; of historical allusions and presuppositions ; in a word, of the general elements of the writer's consciousness, which will, of course, represent the social and national bearings of himself and his people at the time—all teaching and speech basing itself on certain well understood conditions at the moment of its utterance. This testimony, if we can elicit it, being involuntary and in spite of the writer's self, is sure to be trustworthy. The direct testimony again, it is said, even if it were not very scanty, is very suspicious. In profane history, if an author makes an assertion, though we are entitled to question its accuracy, we need scarcely doubt his sincerity in making it. But in Scripture, not only is an averment questionable in itself, it is questionable whether the author was sincere in putting it forth. They were fond of personating their highest heroes, such as Moses and Joshua ; even of personating God himself, and clinching the dictum of their own private religious feeling or political expediency with a *Thus saith the Lord*.

The moral schism and contradiction which this theory introduces into the nature of the men in question, has always been considered an objection fatal to it. And if to this we add the impossibility of such barefaced forgery of the divine sanction, enough appears to convince us, that when the Bible writers put forth an assertion, they did so in all good faith. And, as to the critical method in question, while, of course, no scholar will neglect it, the startling inconsistency of the results it yields in the hands of different critics sufficiently testifies to its untrustworthiness as an exclusive or independent instrument.

Once more ; another theory, or rather a phase of the last, is, that not only are the averments of the Old Testament of little weight, but so likewise are those of the New, whether made

by apostles, or even by Christ himself. The necessity of going this length was imposed upon the defenders of the above indirect method, by finding its results clearly contradicted by the words of the Lord reported in the gospels.

The difficulty was first met by supposing that where Christ speaks of the Pentateuch under the name of Moses, he was merely adopting current phraseology, and neither affirming nor denying a fact, with which he was not immediately concerned. The argument is legitimate, but only very partially applicable. Again, it was said that Christ argued with the Jews, and confuted them on their own principles, assuming these as meantime correct. This argument also is lawful, but of narrower application even than the last. Sometimes Christ did so argue and teach. But no general basis of this sort can be assumed to underlie his teaching, for thus not a word would come direct from his own heart, his conversations would be merely clever dialectic on the superficial platform of Jewish superstitions. Finally, it was seen, that if the moral character of Christ was not to be involved, he must be held to have been really ignorant. In critical questions, his information corresponded with that of his contemporaries. So Davidson and Colenso. The question of Christ's intellectual infallibility at first sight scarcely seems to bear discussion, but, when looked at more nearly, it displays several points on which debate may be hung. In the first place, it is argued, that the Lord's human nature being true, was necessarily limited; limitation implies intellectual error, inasmuch as, unless full knowledge be possessed of a thing in all its sides and relations, that is, unless knowledge be infinite, it must be inaccurate. To have a partial view, is really to have a false view. Thus, Christ's human intellect, from its nature, was not only fallible, but fell; and thus we anticipate erroneous intellectual judgments from him. Further, Scripture assures us that he grew in wisdom and in stature. His mind grew as his body grew, under ordinary human conditions of maturity, drinking in ordinary instruction, adopting current human notions, so that he had a "human culture," precisely that of his age, perhaps the highest, and broadest, and manliest, yet with many of the misconceptions, and much of the critical prejudice of his time. Finally, Scripture introduces him on one occasion affirming decidedly his own ignorance.

Let us not do these men the wrong to confound their sentiments with that repulsive theory which attributes moral fallibility or peccability to the Lord. And, let us urge in reply to them—first, that intellectual limitation does not necessarily imply error in judgment. There is nothing existing, which, in all its relations, our minds fully know, and yet there are many

things and relations on which we form judgments absolutely accurate. The above theory assumes, that to know partially, is also to partially know—that because our knowledge does not extend to all things, it is not knowledge of things to which it does extend. In which case, we cannot venture to say, that we know that we do not know. There lies no necessity in Christ's limited human nature, even regarding it as uninformed by the omniscience of the divine, of error in any of the questions forming the subject of his words recorded in the gospels.

Again, to the Lord's apparent ignorance, which makes its appearance only once in the gospels, we oppose the numerous instances of his omniscience recorded there. He is expressly said to have known all things : when far distant, he knew the death of Lazarus ; he read the thoughts passing in the breasts of his adversaries. If it be said that, religiously, in all things concerning his kingdom and mission, he was infallible, but in common matters ignorant and weak as other men, this is to make an assumption having no ground whatever in psychology. There cannot be religion without intellectual conception of its object ; a fallible intellect must give a distorted image of God, and thus a false religious faith and system. On every principle of psychology, if Christ was intellectually fallible we have no guarantee that his conception of his Father was more adequate than our own, that he who came to reveal God knew him better than those to whom he would reveal him ; we have no guarantee that he did not form extravagant notions regarding himself, and his relations to men and God, and his whole life's purpose and mission. And what can possibly be more a piece of national culture than national morality ? and does not one nation regard as the sublimest act of worship what another shudders at as horrible inhumanity, or unspeakable pollution ?

If the question be shifted from psychological to economical grounds, and it be argued that Christ, having the Spirit in his fulness, would be supplied with all knowledge necessary to the fulfilment of his mission and the apprehension of his true standing towards men and God, but left to his own ordinary resources in other things, just as he was left to the common expedients of ordinary men for the usual conditions of his existence : we reply that economical or dispensational are the true grounds to discuss the question upon ; that it is quite nugatory to draw any distinction between things essential to his mission and things indifferent, for surely, having regard to the exigencies of his church in all times, it was essential that he should utter nothing false, and that, as to his using the common expedients of men for supplying himself with the means of subsistence, and for defending himself, this arose, as he himself expressly declares, not from want of power to supply himself

otherwise, but because he willed it to be so. And in all probability, his declared ignorance is to be so explained. No doubt, the problem of the relation and intercommunion of the two natures of our Lord's person is to us one quite insoluble. The control and stoppage which he exercised over them; the abeyance into which one seemed to recede, in order to permit the trial of the other, yet the full personal worth and reality of all transactions done even by the inferior nature;—all this is to us mystery. But we have to think that Christ was one and indivisible in his personality; that this personality was not human, but divine; that his humanity was God's human nature; that he was the express image of the Father, full of grace and truth; that he came to utter truth, and that alone; that he was the true light, in whom was no darkness at all; and thinking thus, we cannot think any error in him, whether of word or life. And he says, *Moses wrote of me*; and thus, as matter of faith, it must be held, *first*, that Moses penned some parts of the Pentateuch, and that these related to Christ. Whether these were direct allusions to the Messiah, as those passages in Deuteronomy regarding the Prophet, or those in the section Balaam, expressly by the Talmud attributed to Moses; or whether the Lord refers to the indirect allusions to himself contained in the sacrificial system; or, perhaps, both, as is most probable;—in any case, we are bound to say Moses wrote of Christ. *Second*, Christ speaks generally of the Pentateuch under the name of Moses. He used, in this respect, no doubt, current human language. He nowhere says Moses wrote all the Pentateuch, as he says, He wrote of me. This current language can be fairly justified if Moses wrote some part, or at least the chief part, if he was the most important writer of the five books, contributing the main elements of the legislation. In no other way could his name be fairly used as the author of the Pentateuch; and therefore, to this extent, at a stride, we go in the criticism of the Pentateuch.

Again, general tradition, which is always strong presumptive evidence, cannot be satisfied without assuming this much, at least; it seems to demand much more. Fair criticism will adhere to the law, which even moderate continental critics like Bleek obey, that everything in the Pentateuch is to be supposed to be Mosaic which cannot be shewn to be inconsistent with the authorship of Moses.

We think it hardly worth while to notice Colenso's *method* of examination. On the one hand, there are certainly the strongest possible presumptions in favour of the historic credibility of the Bible, rising from the homage done to it for so many centuries by Jews and Christians, and from the authority conceded to it by the highest teachers of our religion, Christ

and his immediate followers. On the other, there are many difficulties in Scripture, things that seem hard to reconcile with each other, with science, with humanity,—things which have been the perplexity of devout souls in all ages. Thus, a double mode of viewing Scripture arises, according as our eye lights on the one or the other of these two sides. Orthodox thinkers accept the first as the authoritative view, and regard the appearances on the other side as *difficulties* which may often be more apparent than real, many of which can be explained, and some of which perhaps cannot. And they do not hold themselves bound to loosen every knot; materials may not be at hand; insoluble riddles occur in all ancient histories, from mere deficiency of data. Other thinkers feel strongly impelled to advance to an idea of Scripture through the avenue of the difficulties, which they do not regard as accidental obscurities, but essential characteristics. Dr Colenso belongs to this class. The tendency is perhaps indicative of a certain mental type. Necessity lies on such men to strip themselves of all external wrappings, wound about them by education or tradition, and clothe themselves by their own effort anew. Such characters are valuable, and no advance in truth could be gained did they not exist; they become dangerous only when they proceed to their task on false principles, or ill-balanced, or not sufficiently stored with thought and information. Perhaps this class of minds are rarely well-balanced, because their inherent boldness and adventure degenerates too often into temerity, or even impiety. Dr Colenso has certainly fallen into the gravest mistakes to which such a mind is exposed.

His argument regarding the Pentateuch is twofold. First, the Pentateuch contradicts the necessary conditions of time and space; therefore it is not authentic history, and therefore not contemporary with the events it describes, nor Mosaic. Second, the Pentateuch contains narrations of events later than Moses; therefore it is not contemporary history, and therefore not authentic nor Mosaic. Concerning Dr Colenso's results, it seems to us that the following five positions may be fairly maintained:—

1. Some of his difficulties have arisen from imperfect knowledge of Hebrew,—fancied by him to be competent.

2. Some of his difficulties have arisen from reading passages superficially,—the means of solution being really at hand, but overlooked by him.

3. Some of his difficulties are begotten by either his peculiar natural idiosyncrasy or the one-sided bent his mathematical studies have given to his mind, rendering him ill-fitted fairly to make allowances for the omissions of a hurried narrative, and the inexactness of ordinary language. Dealing for a long

period of his life with mathematical evidence seems to have quite unfitted him for judging by evidence merely probable.

4. Some of his difficulties have arisen from the strong pressure of others on his mind, pre-disposing him to find contradictions, till he has unconsciously strained portions of the narrative to produce them.

5. Some of his difficulties are real and notorious; and while much may be done to ease them, complete removal is hardly in our power.

Ex pede Herculem, we give a specimen of each. Chap. x. of part i., treating of the passover, illustrates our first position, and, to a large extent, also our fourth. In the face of the narrative, Exodus xii. 3, which indicates that the people were charged to prepare for the passover, certainly before the tenth of the month, Colenso endeavours to shew that they were commanded to choose lambs, and chose them, to keep the Passover, and kept it, to quit Egypt with all their families and flocks, and quitted it,—all in one day. And this, from the number of people and extent of country, being impossible, the narrative is unhistoric. His argument is founded on the pronoun *thi*, *this*,—

“For I will pass through the land *this* night” (v. 12); *this* night, the bishop argues, must imply the night on which the command was given, on which the speaker spoke. Now, Dr Colenso, knowing some Hebrew, is perhaps worse appointed for criticism than if he knew none. He knows that *zeh* means “this,” i. e., the actually near in place or the present in time, and fancying that *this* exhausts its meanings, he does not know that anything already referred to becomes in the speaker’s mind definite and present, and may be cited by the near demonstrative *zeh*. Already, certainly before the tenth, perhaps on one of the earliest days of the month, Moses had been directed to make the people choose their lambs or goats on the 10th, and keep them till the 14th, when they were to be slain, and eaten in haste and marching order, and the blood sprinkled on the door-posts, all on the 14th,—“for on *this* (14th) night I will pass,” &c. So much is this the usage that the historian of the flood says, On *this* (already mentioned) *day*, Noah entered into the ark. On Colenso’s principle, the history of the flood was written on the day Noah entered the ark. It is consoling to humble people that even a bishop cannot alter the laws of speech.

An example of the second class of difficulty occurs in chap. vi., headed, “The extent of the camp, &c., compared with the daily necessities of the people.” Dr Colenso argues that a camp capable of accommodating two millions of people must have been near as large as London, and yet the narrative presumes easy communication of all parts with the outside. Now, there

was not one, but four camps, and in cases where the "outside" is mentioned, it cannot be shewn that this meant the general outskirts. And if it could be shewn, no such easy and rapid communication with the outside seems to be presumed. There is, indeed, the notable passage about the "paddle" on the weapon, and the most pathetic part of the author's book occurs where he describes the Israelites trudging *six* miles to the suburbs, for the common necessities of nature. Such an outrage on humanity would bring a less ardent defender of human rights than the bishop across the Atlantic. But the *camp*, to the outside of which those possessed of "weapons" were to go, was merely the *military* camp (as the Hebrew *חֵיִל מַחֲנֶה*, *כי תצא מחנה*, *when thou goest out as a camp*, *i. e.*, on military service, certainly means), a thing existing only when the army was on active service (Deut. xxiii. 12), and containing in it only the military so serving. In the war with the Midianites, Num. xxxi., this camp consisted of 12,000 men. In Lev. vi. the priest is commanded to take the ashes of the daily burnt-offering outside the camp, to a clean place; and from the condensed narrative this might seem to be done every day, and in such an easy way, as would indicate rapid intercourse with the outside. That the ashes were not carried out every day appears from Lev. i. 16, where a "place of ashes" is mentioned as lying beside the altar. No doubt, the daily ashes were emptied into this place close by the altar, and this receptacle cleaned from time to time, and its contents carried without the camp. So Knobel,—a writer who, though a rationalist of the most advanced order, is one of the fairest, and certainly the most scholarly and thorough critic of the Pentateuch living.

Of Dr Colenso's incapacity to understand the ordinary uses of language, especially of highly-coloured, hyperbolic, oriental language, every page of his volume affords examples. Every word must have a signification mathematically justifiable, or the narrative is unhistoric. All the factors and quantities of the problem, on all its sides, must be accurately supplied, or it is unworkable. Thus, if it be said that the Israelites went out of Egypt *armed* (though that is nowhere said), Colenso insists that they were *all* armed, and with the most approved weapons, and asks, How did such slaves procure them? The curious blunder runs through his whole work, that every one of the 600,000 males given by the census carried warlike tools. Now, these were the men over twenty years of age, liable to be drafted certainly, but when the conscription was actually made, in the Midianitish war, only 12,000 men were called out. Would it be difficult for such a number to beg, or borrow, or seize weapons ere leaving Egypt, or for ten times as many to possess themselves of some defensive implement or other, which

might be called arms? Again, if it be said that the people dwelt in *tents*, Dr Colenso assumes that they *all* had tents, and all dwelt in them, and these tents of the newest modern construction. Now, anything in the East is called a tent,—the meanest booth, a few branches propped against a rock to defend from the burning sun, any shawl or rag hung from a pole. Professor Porter gives some interesting details as to the proportion of tents to people among modern tribes, and declares there are not half-a-dozen small tents among a thousand people. They all sleep in the open air, not only in the desert, but even on the roofs of their houses in the great towns (p. 26). At no season of the year is shelter necessary from the cold. Professor Porter tells us that a single house in London, even at mid-summer, would consume more fuel than a whole Arab encampment (p. 25), and that the use of milk is general instead of water, when that cannot be found. Perhaps the most amusing instance of the bishop's perversity is his criticism of the word "all." Moses and Joshua addressed all the congregation, a multitude as large as London—can such a narrative be historic? De Quincey, in his account of the flight of the Tartars, tells us that the leader of the movement addressed 80,000 deputies of families,—“all saw, and many heard.” And we presume it was so when Moses spoke. The use of the word *all* is exceedingly vague in all languages, especially Eastern. Suppose we were to anticipate Dr Colenso in applying his method to the New Testament, and begin with the following passage,—“Then went out to him (John) Jerusalem, and *all* Judea, and *all* the region round about Jordan, and were *all* baptized of him in Jordan, confessing their sins.” Passing over all mention of women and new-born infants *going* out, let us fasten on the numerical difficulty alone. Under David the population of Palestine was about five millions; at present, it is about two. In the days of John it cannot have been less than three. And certainly the parts of the country mentioned would include more than half of the whole, or about one and a half millions of men, women, and children who trooped to John, to Elim, near to Salem. Generously casting away the half million, let us suppose a million of souls baptized by John; for we cannot imagine that a great many came out of mere curiosity, without troubling the over-worked Baptist to perform on them the ceremony, because Mark adds, and were *all* baptized. Suppose, then, John to have been such an adept that he could dispose of a subject in a couple of minutes, this would give 30 an hour, and if he worked as hard as a factory operative—a thing impossible under a broiling sky—300 a-day, or 1800 a-week. This would amount to nearly 100,000 in a year, and to a million in *ten* years. Thus,

John, to do what we all believe he did, must have baptized, without intermission, day after day, for ten weary hours a-day, for the uninterrupted space of ten long years. And the same narrative which implies this, implies also that John did not baptize, perhaps, longer in all than a few months. If all does not mean all, will not mathematics come to an end?

Dr Colenso is without doubt conscious of sincerity and singleness of endeavour after truth. We have every confidence in his honesty, little in his judgment, and none in his results. We detect the nearest approach to conscious unfairness in Chapter xv., the "Sojourning of the Israelites in Egypt." The Pentateuch says plainly that the sojourning of the children of Israel which they sojourned in Egypt was 430 years. The Septuagint considers the period of the patriarchal sojourn in Canaan to be included in this measurement; and Dr Colenso, departing from his frequently expressed will, to adhere to the statements of the Pentateuch itself, adopts this view, too plainly in order to arrive at the shortest possible period, and to render the great increase of population the more grotesque and incredible. Finding what seemed so many contradictions, his judgment has become warped, and he strains the passage in order to find another. Again, in order to find only *four* generations (*i.e.*, persons, not eras) between the descent into Egypt and the exit from it, he endeavours to cast discredit upon the Chronicles, which give in different families six, nine, or even eleven personal generations, implying a space of at least 400 years. In opposition to Dr Colenso we lay down the following canons respecting genealogies: 1. It was the custom in registers to omit many insignificant names, and supply only great stepping-stones; one individual to represent all the men living together, that is, in time about a century. 2. Therefore, when two lists are given, it is a sound principle to accept the longer as nearer to complete accuracy. 3. We may suspect even the longest lists to be defective. Because, 4, a man is often described as the son of another when he is only his nephew or grandson, or descendant in general. There is no reason to doubt that the genealogies even of Moses and other important families are very defective, and that the Jews sojourned 430 years in Egypt.

Even making allowance for all that can be said in reply to Colenso, there are considerable difficulties in the narrative. Besides the utterly insoluble one, so far as certain conclusion is concerned, of the *first-born*, the tremendous numerical amount of the people at the Exodus is a very staggering thing; so much so that all imaginable theories have been propounded in order to diminish the numbers, but certainly unfairly, for the 600,000 is inextricably woven into the whole narrative. How

could such a multitude be descended in so short a time from so few men? We have to bear in mind that the multiplication partook of the miraculous; that, counting households, in all probability some thousands went down; that, counting the "mixed multitude" united to the Israelites, many thousands more than they came up. Ethnological combinations were effected at this era, of which Scripture affords not an inkling. Even Ewald thinks the numbers of the Exodus trustworthy. Again, if the people were two millions strong, how could the *seven* Canaanitish nations be each said to be "greater and mightier" than they? The narrative certainly says this; and it says at the same time that their cities "were walled up to heaven," and that men were as grasshoppers before them; i.e. (counting a grasshopper at half-an-inch), these "children" of Anak were 150 feet high. Again, how could a people two millions strong be in danger from the beasts multiplying against them? Let it be remembered that at all times Palestine was infested with wild beasts, which even in the time of David were both numerous and daring; that the danger feared would arise if the Canaanites were driven out in *one year*, which implies a constant series of exterminating battles, when agriculture would be neglected, and the country denuded of its population, the strong drafted off to fight, and the weak deported into the towns for safety; that in point of fact, when part of the population was carried into Assyria, the wild beasts did overpower the remaining and new inhabitants;—and where now is the absurdity?

Leaving Colenso to the mercies of his numerous tormentors, and whose wishes further information to the cloud of witnesses, in the shape of "replies," "examinations," and "reviews," with which the earth and mankind are now oppressed, we proceed to give some outline of Dr Davidson's theory of revelation; premising, in the first place, that our object embraces merely an exposition of his views, and not also a refutation, and that for want both of time and materials our exposition must exhibit numerous defects and chasms.

Dr Davidson is in the strictest sense a rationalist. There is a particular individual reason, and there is a general human reason. The two are not different, but coincide. The general attains to consciousness of itself and other things in the individual. By "reason" is meant human nature acting according to its essential laws, and speaking out its inherent principles. We do not know how Dr Davidson would arrive at essential laws and inherent principles, with such a doctrine of man's condition prior to the fall as he promulgates; but that is his business, not ours; and the fall occurred so long ago that we suppose he would resent any recurrence to an event so ancient and out of

the way. Man is perennial, he stands before us at this day—endowed with reason. We start from that. This reason or human nature uttering itself of course has several sides, and to these its utterances correspond. In particular, it has a religious and an ethical side, and with these meantime we have to do. Religion broadly embraces all the relations between man and God, morals all those between man and man. It may happen that these relations cross; it is at least a sound principle that God cannot do to man what man cannot do to man. Reason may not promulgate all details regarding such complex relations, but it will enunciate principles to which all details must subordinate themselves and correspond. Thus reason is rather a negative test than a positive source; and so far perhaps most people would hardly care to differ from Dr Davidson.

But reason is not barely negative. Advancing along the line of his religious nature, Dr Davidson finds himself in possession of a philosophy of the supernatural, a theology in the strict sense ready-made. His reason supplies him with the knowledge and with the conception of God. That conception, given by God himself, must be true and Godlike; anything anywhere that contradicts it must be denied; anything that seems to do so must be explained. Of course this conception embraces not merely the nature and attributes of God; but, as the simplest consequence, also the manner of the divine action, and the mode of his self-communication. It is a conception not merely of God immanent, but much more of him energetic. This is equivalent to having a philosophy of revelation, and with the addition of a little psychology, one also of religion. Such conception he thinks prior to and independent of all revelation, which comes not to alter it, but assumes it as a channel, and comes through it. Thus, as the conception impresses its mould upon the revelation made, much more must it condition and dominate over the revelation received:—"Every part of Scripture must be explained in such a manner as is consistent with right reason and the known attributes of the Deity. Just conceptions of the supreme Being should precede and regulate the method of exposition"—by which Dr Davidson does not mean that if we advance to Scripture with inadequate conceptions of God, we shall fail to penetrate into the full depths of its meaning; but that, without just conceptions, we are not qualified to *criticise* it, and separate the false from the true, and preserve ourselves from being dangerously misled. It is assumed that many parts of Scripture contradict reason, and thus, if the latter is not on the alert, and wide awake, a man may be thrown down under the shackles of the most enfeebling superstitions. Reason informs Dr Davidson that God is spirit; his reasoning adds,

that any manifestation of him to the senses audibly, visibly, is impossible; therefore all such things, and they are not few, contained in Scripture, are to be explained as poetry, legend, fable.

Of course Dr Davidson plays upon himself a double trick here—he confounds his own experience with the general reason of the race; and he mixes up real apprehension by the human senses of the divine essence with the perception of some form or sound presented to them directly by God. If reason mean the general sense, religious or other, of human nature, to this sense theophanies and sensuous intercourse of God with men at all times seemed not only reasonable, but also actual; and to the majority of the Christian world, so far from being unreasonable at all times, these things appear most credible even at the present day. That the divine essence is cognisable by the senses, no one for a moment imagines. But the question is this: When the Old Testament saints are said to have seen and heard God, is such sight and hearing to be interpreted exclusively and always of mental or spiritual apprehension, or also sometimes of actual perception by the outward sensuous ear and eye? Dr Davidson says, the former always, the latter is unreasonable and impossible. This is a hard saying. We dislike to hear things called impossible. If a man declares he cannot believe a thing, that concerns him; when he declares the thing impossible, that concerns us. This particular matter can be impossible only from the nature of things—mind and matter; or from the divine proprieties. Of the latter, Dr Davidson is a decided judge, we are not; and its discussion belongs rather to the general question of the miraculous. If it be impossible, from the nature of things, that men should have sensuous apprehension of God, that must mean that God, who created matter and moulded it, is now incapable of so acting upon it as to ally himself with any material form, or of so influencing atmospheric agencies as to present a real voice to men's ears. This on the one hand; and on the other, it also means that he who planted the senses has now so small power over them that he cannot cause them to see a form and to hear words. It will be argued that all this is both unbecoming God and unnecessary, seeing he could communicate as well directly with the spirit. That which God could do need rarely be discussed; that he could *as well* communicate with one element of a creature constituted of two, as with both, is certainly an assumption which has not the merit of being even reasonable. If God was to give a revelation of his will to man at all, two things seem to imply that this revelation would at times at least be given sensuously. The first is, that man, to whom it is given, is a sensuous being, and it is probable that God will neglect no means of

influencing him ; the second is, that the highest revelation of God, the incarnation of his Son, is a sensuous revelation ; and as this is the climax and convergence of all others, we presume that others will, both as of a kind with it, and as prophetic of it, partake of its characteristics. Dr Davidson thinks otherwise :—

“ We conclude, therefore, that all the appearances of God in *corporeal form*, are the fictitious dress, or oriental drapery of legendary narratives and poetry, serving to set forth in vivid form the idea of a divinity unveiling himself to the world of mind and matter over which he rules. In this manner only can the infinite Jehovah be worthily apprehended, by regarding him as pure Spirit ” (p. 242).

The same, of course, is true of speech said to be addressed to men’s ears as of forms presented to their eyes. This matter, however, is of somewhat wider interest, as it introduces us to the positive side of the author’s theory of revelation, so far as its manner is concerned.

“ When, therefore, God is described as *speaking* to men, he does so in the only way in which he who is a Spirit can speak to one encompassed with flesh and blood ; not to the outward organs of sensation, but to that intelligence which is kindred to himself, the fountain of knowledge. . . . God *spake* to Abraham is tantamount to saying that the consciousness of God in Abraham was a strongly impelling motive. . . . It was not by the audible voice and visible appearances of deity that the leader of Israel from bondage was guided ; but rather by his own mind and conscience enlightened from on high ” (p. 232 fol.).

In *itself*, this theory of the manner of revelation might not seem of much consequence. It is merely to assert that all revelation was made in the way we know some at least to have been made. But its effect on the historical part of the Old Testament is disastrous. It carries away, as with an overflowing flood, all the circumstantial narratives of the divine appearances to Abraham, to Moses, to Joshua ; wipes out the writing from the pages of our Genesis, and leaves great speechless abysses, into which we look down, murmuring, “ darkness there, and nothing more,” where before we beheld a merciful God and Father, tending, and teaching, and bearing up in his arms his infant creature man. That which from afar we saw moving athwart these dreary centuries, and deemed the form of God, it is not He, it is only the shadow of man projected back from the position he occupied and the stature he had reached three thousand years ago.

That God, being mind, cannot communicate with men otherwise than directly to their spirits, seems to need some stronger

proof than mere assertion ; and that though he could, he will not communicate otherwise, cannot modestly be maintained by men to whom so little is known regarding God. Indeed, we doubt whether it would not be easier to prove that he cannot communicate with men otherwise than through their eyes and ears, very much for the reason that men cannot otherwise be communicated with. For where can example of any different kind of intercourse be pointed out? In what way can God influence or communicate with mind? In what way can he influence matter? What are the elements of difference between the two ways that make it an easier task for him to influence mind than matter? Declare unto us, for thou knowest. It may turn out that there is no great influence exerted in any way, even on the mind in the act or matter of revelation. The following passage passes beyond the manner of revelation, and defines its contents :—

“The Eternal One reveals himself *through and by* men, in conformity with the gradual development of the human mind. The growth of man’s apprehension of God marks the progress of revelation. The *divine* in man—that which allies him to the Omniscient—unfolds itself in harmony with the law of its nature, giving expression to itself in sensuous forms. God speaks to man, or man speaks of God, agreeably to the era described or the idiosyncrasy of the writer. A knowledge of the Supreme, *more or less imperfect*, characterises all such communications. The communications are human, but they are also *divine*, as being the utterances of the divine in man at the time. They are, in short, a *divine revelation*.” (P. 234.)*

Those who know Dr Davidson and his master, Hupfeld, will recognise in this extract the main elements of their common theological system. First, there is “a divine in man.” The words are not poetry, nor indicative of comparative elevation merely above other creatures, nor the possession of excellent gifts and powers, they express literally and logically a divine element—the Spirit of God. This divine Spirit, given to man at his creation, is what makes man to be man. Gifts, aspirations, “ideas” of truth and God, earnest longings and cryings for the light, are but workings and manifestations of it, but scintillations and lambent flickerings of this inner and inextinguishable divine fire, tending ever towards its great nativity with irrepressible longings, as the sparks fly upwards. The fall, in theological phrase, or the universal succumbing of men more or less to the influences of the sensible, and the self-elevation into usurped domination, which, after all, is not rule, but anarchy of the flesh, did and does not utterly overpower

* See more fully Vol. ii. p. 438, fol.

and silence this spirit, which still remains in man, who thus still retains the capacity of salvation. To *convert* is to restore this spirit, at least in principle and beginnings, to its original place of authority. To *save* is to gradually cast off the load of rubbish which oppresses the smouldering embers of this spirit, to expose them to the atmosphere of divine influences, to waken them, to fan them into heavenly and all-consuming heat. This is done greatly by exposure to the "divine" in the constitution of things, most of all by intercourse with God, mediated now by his Son, Jesus Christ. Thus this spirit, being truly of God, may be called *divine*; being truly part of man, and his, it may be called *human*. When it speaks man speaks, but it ever speaks conformably to its high origin—its utterances are divine. God speaks to man, God speaks in man, man speaks of God—these three are one. Man speaks, and the communications are human; it is the spirit in man that speaks, and the communications are divine. Man having by nature a divine element in him, gives forth divine utterances. Thus, secondly, external revelation consists, not in some truths made known to man from without, but in truths matured in man within; not in something uttered to him by the divine out of him, but in something spoken out by the divine in him. If we could use such a comparison, human nature resembles a buried city, where untold treasures, and masterpieces of skill and beauty, and all glorious things lie entombed in rubbish and the debris of ages. To excavate is to reveal. The more penetrating and extensive the excavation, the wider and grander the revelation. Nothing is added, it is merely displayed. There is no need of addition. To draw aside the cloudy curtain of the night, and reveal the glittering heavens, is a less glorious exhibition than to raise into newness of life this marvellous, dead city of Man-soul. Suppose these heaps of dust, these crumbling temples of extinct superstitions that once awed the spirit, these ruined theatres, where it formerly masqueraded, all to be raised, and in succession thrown off by an inherent, gradually expansive energy from within, till the soul stood again unencumbered and free, that would represent the process of revelation. Thus revelation is identical, or at least one side of which the other is sanctification, which latter is the basis of justification.* Inspiration, again, is but another name for revelation. And written revelation is merely the expression of the inner revelation, being gradual and progressive, according to the progressive self-unveiling of the spirit, being imperfect and in weakness, according to the struggles of the spirit to disengage itself from the rude elements superimposed upon it, and its partial, though

* See Hapfeld on the 51st Psalm.

ever greater and more trustful success. It is scarcely needful to say that a revelation or inspiration of this kind does not possess, though, of course, in certain cases, it may admit of infallibility:—

“The thing called inspiration was a spiritual apprehension on the part of the sacred writers, which admitted of many degrees, some persons being more highly inspired than others. If their knowledge of divine things was *graduated*, they could not be *infallible*” (p. 179).

Neither, of course, could the writers of Scripture have any special command or mission to write. That would be a special revelation, which is by its nature excluded:—

“Where it said, *the word of the Lord came, &c.*; thus saith the Lord: Son of man write, . . . nothing more is meant than that inspired men gave expression to their inward consciousness. It is not intended that the Deity *really spoke* to their external organs of hearing, or that they received a *distinct commission* to write. They were moved by their own spiritual impulse to utter or write the extraordinary intuitions of truth, which the Spirit had enabled them to reach, . . . they said that the Holy Ghost *spoke* by them, or *uttered such words*, when their inward prophetic consciousness was revealed to others. . . . In short, God *spoke* to them, not by a miraculous communication, foreign to human experience, but by the inward voice of spiritual consciousness, which daily and hourly tells every one, if he will listen, what his work in this world is, and how he should do it” (p. 239).

And from all this can be perceived at a glance what is the proper attitude for the enlightened human consciousness of the present day to assume towards Scripture. To exhibit this more strikingly, Dr Davidson fastens on an extreme case, reported in 2 Sam. xxi. 1. There was a famine of three years in the days of David, and when inquiry was made concerning the cause of it, “*the Lord answered*, It is for Saul and for his bloody house, because he slew the Gibeonites.”

“Surely,” says Dr Davidson, “Jehovah could not decree the slaughter of innocent grandchildren, nor even sanction such barbarous cruelty. This *answer* resolves itself into a priestly sentiment, calling for vengeance. . . . What is attributed to God is only the idea of the person or persons who assume to speak *in his name*. It must be judged by the standard of morality implanted in the breast of common humanity, and not yet effaced. Its *absolute rectitude* cannot be determined otherwise than by the pure reason of mankind. No remark is necessary to shew the atrociousness of the priestly response relative to Saul’s descendants, which is alike revolting to justice and benevolence” (p. 237).

It will thus be seen, in addition to all other things visible in these extracts, that Dr D. takes the present conditions of

humanity and the earth to be their absolute conditions. Man's present method of intercourse with God, has been the method from the beginning. God's way of governing the world now, and administering the processes of nature, has always been his way. The supernatural, whether the word be spoken of the laws of man's spiritual nature, or of the laws of his material habitation, or the universe in general, has absolutely no place in God's government. Suspension of law once established, interference in process once set in motion is, by the mere thought of it, dishonouring to the great Being who sees the end from the beginning, and knew the purposes he had in view in projecting any evolution, however complex and prolonged. Dr Davidson goes as far on one occasion as to name the laws of nature "eternal" (p. 221); but that, no doubt, is careless hyperbole. In more sober speech he calls them "unchangeable" (p. 103), and explains the miraculous elements of the Pentateuch as legendary, and the "exaggerations of a later age" (p. 131.)

We can hardly close without referring to the positive results of Colenso and Davidson. These results are, indeed, the results of fifty other volumes, both more scholarly and more original. Colenso's investigations give Samuel as the author of the first rough cast of the Pentateuch, and some of his successors as the supplementer and perfecter of the great work. The Bishop needs only two individuals; Dr Davidson, following as his divinity Hupfeld, requires four. Colenso's arguments briefly are these:—

1. There are two *names* in the Pentateuch used to designate the Supreme Being; these names indicate a duality of authorship.

2. The name Elohim is the original and more ancient name, and was used by the author of the first sketch of the Pentateuch. Even this outline must have been composed long after Moses; e.g., after the original inhabitants had been expelled from the Holy Land, from the word, "the Canaanite was then in the land;" even after the establishment of a monarchy in Israel, from the passage—"These are the kings that reigned in the land of Edom, before there reigned any king over the children of Israel" (Gen. xxxvi. 31), therefore not earlier than the time of Saul.

3. Who could have composed the Elohist document, but Samuel? Let him be assumed meantime as the unknown factor needful to solve the problem of composition.

4. If we examine this Elohist element, almost no traces of the name Jehovah appear. Proper names are compounded of *el*, not *jah*. Exceptions are, Jochebed, Joshua, and Moriah. Only the two first really contain the name, and the fact is

important, unless they are unhistoric. Certainly, the almost utter absence of the name *Jehovah* in compounds down to the era of David is a singular phenomenon.

5. The Pentateuch, as shewn in vol i., is utterly unhistorical. Its statements are quite unreliable. No less unreliable and incredible are the Chronicles. These give multitudes of names compounded with *Jehovah* even during the Egyptian bondage. But the fact, that in some way or other the name *Jehovah* attained to general currency in the time of Moses, shews these names to be unhistoric. The unscrupulous chronicler, falling out of materials, *invented* them.

6. What then are the earliest writings of the Hebrews of which we know the date, and in which we can place any confidence? The Psalms. History begins with the Kings; the events of David's life and reign are presumably reliable. No doubt, the superscriptions to the Psalms are traditional; but they repose on real tradition, and are not pure fabrications, and are to be accepted generally, unless disproved by good internal arguments.

7. Comparing these superscriptions with the internal data of the Psalms admitted to be Davidic, this curious result appears; the Psalms composed by David in his earlier career, chiefly employ the name *Elohim* for God; those written in later years, chiefly the name *Jehovah*. This cannot be accidental. Manifestly, by the latter part of this king's life, the name *Jehovah* had attained to a much wider currency and more familiar use than it had enjoyed in his youth.

8. It is therefore probable that the name came into use under Samuel; and, in all probability, this theocratic man, in order to have a designation of the God of Israel distinct from that applied to the neighbouring national gods invented it, and to give it greater sanctity and speedier currency and admission into men's mouths, stamped it with the hallowed paternity of Moses. Samuel avoided the use of the name while writing the patriarchal history, till he arrived at the time of Moses, and used it chiefly henceforth. The name being quite current by the time his successor resumed and completed his work, that writer used the two names indifferently throughout, or the name of *Jehovah* mainly.

Such are Colenso's results in Part II.; and, except that he has called the Elohist by the historic name of Samuel, they do not differ much from those of many who have gone before him. He claims to have been the first to observe and use the singular appearances of the divine names in the Psalms. There he is mistaken. These phenomena have long been observed,* and

* And described with great minuteness by Delitzsch, in his "*Symbolæ ad Psalmos Illustrandos Isagogicæ*," Lip., 1846.

are quite as inexplicable as the same phenomena in the Pentateuch. Delitzsch tabulates the usage of the different names in the five books of the Psalms respectively as follows:—

	i.	ii.	iii.	iv.	v.
Jehovah,	272	30	44	103	236
Elohim,	15	164	43	—	7

Without entering into this curious question at present, the following positions can certainly be maintained:—

1. In the Psalms, and therefore in all probability in the Pentateuch too, the use of the names Elohim and Jehovah is not reducible to a question of writers nor of dates. The same writer used different names at different times; different writers used different names at the same time; the same writer used different names at the same time. David wrote Jehovistic as well as Elohistie psalms in his youth; and Elohistie as well as Jehovistic in his old age. For instance, Ps. xxxiv., “when he changed his behaviour before Abimelech,” is purely Jehovistic, the name actually occurring sixteen times; while Ps. li., relating to the matter of Bathsheba, is purely Elohistie. Again, Ps. lvii., “where he fled from Saul in the cave,” is purely Elohistie; while Ps. lix. of the same era is half and half, and Ps. xviii., apparently of the same date, is purely Jehovistic. And even the 90th Psalm, of which there is no cause to doubt the Mosaic authorship, is Jehovistic, while the Psalms of Asaph, David’s contemporary, are Elohistie.

2. Further it is evident, in conformity with the above peculiar phenomena, that two processes went on with regard to these names simultaneously; original Jehovistic pieces such as the song of Deborah, which continental criticism unanimously accepts as genuine, were altered into Elohistie, as appears from Ps. lxviii.; while on the other hand pieces originally Elohistie became transformed into Jehovistic. Compare Ps. cviii. with Ps. lx.

3. Most evident of all is it that the Psalms of David, even the earliest, are not conceivable without taking into account the prolonged influence of a *written* law; e.g., Leviticus, in which the names Jehovah and Elohim are both used. Cf. Davidson’s *Introd.*, i. p. 51.

How these things are to be explained passes knowledge. Some will form their theory, and the wiser will be content to profess nescience. Hupfeld has said that the position that the divine names indicate diversity of authorship is one of the surest gains of modern criticism. While admitting that no tolerable explanation of the usage has been proposed from any other quarter, the theory of diversity of authorship seems to us to rest on the most barefaced begging of the question. For,

1. Surely to affirm that the use of two divine names is significant of two authors is a gross *petitio*. It is to assume that the names are identical in meaning ; that were they so like God and "Deity," the same writer could not employ both ; that there is no other way of explaining the usage—and all without even examining the question.

2. If it be said the passage Ex. vi.—"by my name Jehovah was I not known to them"—implies that the name was first made known to Moses—this also is a gross *petitio*, even a double one. For it assumes, first of all, that such interpretation of the passage is correct, which it cannot be ; and it assumes that this interpretation, if correct, is credible against the whole testimony of Genesis, which puts the name in the mouth of Eve and the Patriarchs from Noah downwards ; and these critics know how much more valuable such silent involuntary testimony is, than any more formal declaration of a writer whose motives for making it are quite unknown to us, and need not be considered too high. On what principle are we to believe this single statement, and throw discredit over a widely extended history ?

3. If it be said that the two things, though of little weight separately, have considerable when put together, we reply : two things which are each worth nothing when taken alone, are both worth nothing when added together.

4. If it be further argued, as it is, that the divine names in question are always surrounded by a specific circle of ideas and manner of phraseology accompanying each name distinctively, and that this demonstrates difference of authorship, we reply again, that even if the assertion in question were based on truth, the conclusion drawn from it is a *petitio* ; and further, that the assertion so made is hardly to any extent true. The fact that a peculiar phraseology does not encircle the two names respectively, but surrounds sometimes one and sometimes another, has led to the curious development of the theory that there were two writers employing the name Elohim, one of whom, however, used the phraseology, and moved among the ideas peculiar to the person who employed the name Jehovah. It is only in the fundamental document or elder Elohist's outline that anything like a peculiar terminology is apparent. And that this is to some extent the case no sensible Hebraist will deny, though it has always to be remembered, when we see use made of this fact in the disruptive criticism, that the process is usually circular—a certain phraseology being tentatively assumed to define the limits of the documents, and then proclamation made that the documents are distinguished by broadly marked phraseology. But even were all that is said of phraseology and ideas true, it would be to beg the question to conclude diversity

of authorship from such a fact. For if the names be of distinct, and one of very deep significance, as they are, each will appear floating in a distinct atmosphere of thoughts, conveyed in necessarily very divergent words. But we concede that no theory fully explains the use of the names, nor of the setting in which they appear. Only we maintain that the theory which explains the usage by means of different writers is beset with graver difficulties than those it comes to relieve. The question is one not unlike the question of the manner of composition of the three synoptical gospels. Speculation falls back exhausted before the arduous height it has to climb.

Now only two hypotheses may be said to have much claim to support—first, that which assumes the presence of *two* hands, an Elohist who projected an outline, and a Jehovist who supplemented and filled it in ; and *second*, that which assumes *four* writers, an elder Elohist who projected the work as before, a younger Elohist independent of the former who gave a life of the Patriarchs, a Jehovist independent of both who began at the creation, and a Redactor, who united the three documents, with the necessary alterations to avoid sheer contradiction and present a narration reasonably connected. The first view is defended by Delitzsch and Kurtz, by the latter chiefly, out of deference to the former. Colenso is inclined to adopt the theory, of course with important deviations as to trustworthiness of the narrative and era of the authors. It is now generally admitted by all the best heads on the continent that the theory in this form is not tenable ; that on the same principles by which *two* writers are assumed, at least three if not four must be assumed. Even Delitzsch practically concedes this. Hence all the profoundest Hebraists except Ewald (like Ephraim, a wild ass keeping by himself), Knobel, Hupfeld, and their followers, such as Boehmer there and Davidson here, abandon it in behalf of the quadruple authorship. By a fundamental law of the theory, Elohist ideas ought to accompany the name Elohim, but too frequently this name occurs like a drifted boulder embedded in Jehovistic strata. Hence a new wing must be added to the hypothesis ; there was a second writer who employed the name Elohim, but standing nearer the Jehovist in time and development of religious ideas, he used much of his thought and phraseology. Once more, it sometimes happened that peculiar Jehovistic veins of thought and language were found to streak and variegate the most undoubted Elohist formations. The final addition was put to the hypothesis : the editor is the author of these fragments ; writing not earlier than towards the time of the captivity, he was familiar with both names and both circles of religious thought, and he employs them all indifferently.

Thus the theory, amidst conflict and assault, has perfected itself. Wherever it presented an assailable point it put out a new defence, until now it is impregnable, because it has a hypothesis to meet every possible objection. Its present form appears thus :—

Elder Elohist.—Here we find the name Elohim and Elohist ideas to Exod. vi. Jehovah and Elohist ideas thereafter.

Younger Elohist.—Elohim and Jehovistic ideas throughout.

Jehovist.—Jehovah and Jehovistic ideas throughout. Elohim and Jehovistic ideas throughout.

Redactor.—All sorts of names throughout. All sorts of ideas throughout.

This exhausts the possibilities of a theory. No conceivable objection can tell against a fabric of this construction. If we say, Here is Elohim with Jehovistic formulas, the answer is ready : The passage likely belongs to the junior Elohist, possibly to the Jehovist, who not unfrequently uses the name Elohim. If we say, Here is Jehovah with Elohist formulas, the answer is equally ready. If the passage occur after Exod. vi., it may be referred to the elder Elohist ; if before, as Gen. xvii. 1, it must be an interpolation of the Redactor's. In short, the theory is perfect, and by perfecting it has destroyed itself, because nothing is peculiar to anything. Allow us to make any supposition regarding the Pentateuch, and to meet objections as they rose by a new supposition, and we could infallibly prove our first hypothesis.

D.

ART. IX.—*Rudelbach on Inspiration.**

The Doctrine of the Inspiration of Holy Scripture, with reference to the most recent investigations of the Subject by Schleiermacher, Twisten, and Steudel, historico-apologetically and dogmatically developed. By A. G. RUDELBACH.

CHAPTER I.

HISTORICO-APOLOGETIC SECTION.—GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

"IN Christianity"—so a theologian expresses himself, whose system is regarded by far the most of those who have to do with the science of our time as the living commencement of a thorough reformation of dogmatic theology—"the idea of *inspiration* is a thoroughly subordinate one; for it is not applied

* This Article appeared at the commencement of Rudelbach's *Zeitschrift für Lutherische Theologie*, and has been much referred to since.—ED. B. & F. E. R.

to Christ, nay, not even to the apostles (with whom rather everything is traced back to the instruction of Christ), but to the apostolic writings; and if, then, it be undeniable that the church of the Lord existed almost two hundred years before Scripture obtained its peculiar validity, there would be really nothing more wonderful than to give inspiration the first place in Christianity." This sentence of Schleiermacher's,* whatever be its value in other respects, is exactly suited to place us in the midst of the conflict with respect to the church-doctrine of inspiration, which we seek, first of all, as our starting-point. For, apart from the certainly wonderful demand which runs through that system, that Christianity and Judaism, the Old and New Testaments, the prophetic and apostolic writings, are to be looked upon by Christians as two heterogeneous religious factors—a view which, consistently carried out, would touch the boundaries of Marcionism—is it not clear, that by that assertion the Christian Church is placed in conflict with itself, and that in a cardinal point? Or would Schleiermacher, or will one of his scholars, be able to dispute with us, that the first act of the witnessing church, so far as we know it, was just the joyful assent to the whole testimony of Jesus and the apostles? that even without reference to the closing of the canon, it was firmly held in all its leading points as Scripture inspired by God in the first two centuries? that in the organic formation of this complex of divine revelations, which from the beginning were laid in Scripture, *one* side of the peculiar activity of the most ancient church consisted, which was just as hearty and strong in this conviction as in that of a continuous activity of the Holy Ghost, out of whose infinite fulness these first testimonies were taken and brought to light? And if we go back to the original ground, that of the Testament itself—in which the whole church is not only described as it was founded, but also foreshadowed according to its development up to the last time, similarly to the picture of the tabernacle which God shewed to Moses upon the mount (Exod. xxv. 40)—is the relation at all a different one? Is not the equality of the Old Testament with the New, as respects their divine origin, so established by the utterances of Jesus and his apostles, that the Lord not only attached his discourse and development to it (Luke v. 17–21), but would have the rays of his divine human person and of his deeds discerned therein? (Luke xxiv. 25, 27; John v. 39.) And with respect to the apostles, as often as they describe the features of their Lord and Master, do they not postulate these in innumerable passages as a fulfilment of what had been before written, so that,

† *Der Christliche Glaube*, 1 Bd. (Berlin, 1827), s. 113.

as it were, the whole prophetic code lives over again in their testimony, and appears quite in meridian splendour, like Moses and Elias beside Christ on the mount of Transfiguration? * Yea, did not the whole apostolic testimony, as it was proclaimed loudly and publicly in the churches, base all the chief articles of the faith upon the prophetic prediction (Acts ii. 25, *et seq.*); did it not prove what God had placed in their hands by appeal to Scripture? (Acts ii. 16, *et seq.*). Or is it, perhaps, a superfluous addition, when the apostle Paul assures the Corinthian Church, that he delivered to them that which he received, that Christ died for our sins *according to the Scriptures*, and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day, *according to the Scriptures*? (1 Cor. xv. 3, 4.) Manifestly such a use of the scriptures of the Old Testament presupposes their infallibility, which necessitates the belief in a divine inspiration; and apostolic scripture will certainly not be inferior to prophetic, as surely as the fulfilment is not inferior to the prediction, and the apostles were the living foundation of the spiritual Israel, of which Jesus Christ is the corner stone? Is it possible, then, for the idea of inspiration to be quite a *subordinate* one, related merely to the apologetic argument through the medium of Scripture? And will one thus, without more ado, whatever he thinks of the position of this doctrine in the organic contents of systematic theology, be able to reject the fundamental consideration, which impelled the Lutheran systematic theologians to provide for the theory of inspiration a firm footing and logical completion in the system, the more so, as by that step they have certainly never in any way thrown into the shade the fact of Christianity as one originally and ever afterwards produced by means of the Spirit?

But, manifestly, that principle of Schleiermacher's is only a lever for the rejection, not so much of the *form*, as of the *substance* of the older church theory of inspiration, as well as a necessary element in the mode of contemplation of that systematic theology, which, above all, boasts of being "a system of

* Lastly, the exegetical investigation of our day has, it seems, arrived at this point, where certainly the church stood at the very beginning, that the recognition of the meaning of the expression so often recurring in the gospels—*ὡς εἰρητεύθη*, as involving a real connection between the prophecy and its fulfilment, is no longer denied by more judicious expositors. That grammar, even against the will of those who handle it, must give testimony, formally at least, to the faith, is not to be overlooked as an apologetic element in the Christian argument, and in reality was never overlooked by the ancients when the case occurred. The meaning of that formula (comp. e. g. in the first evangelist, Mat. ii. 15, viii. 17, xii. 35, xxi. 4, xxvi. 56, xxvii. 35) is manifestly no other than what is in the word itself, that the fulfilment happened with this design among others, to bring to light the truth of the prophecy. Every such divine testimony is a mode in which the Father glorifies himself in the Son.

doctrine according to the principles of the Evangelical (i. e. of the United Lutheran and Reformed) Church." The way was paved, however, for this view, by the whole theological activity of the eighteenth century, so far as it was an activity which shunned the church confession; and just as in the attempt of Lessing to found the whole of Christianity, torn from the historical testimony and the historical argument, singly and alone on "the proof of the spirit and of power," we perceive a deep fundamental harmony with Schleiermacher's system,* so we know, that already Töllner,† and after him Griesbach,‡ celebrate as the triumph of advanced knowledge, the view, that the substance of the faith is safe, whatever be the result of the investigations respecting inspiration, because "the divine authority of revealed religion does not depend on the pages of revelation." This great and bold security would certainly have been in its place if it had proceeded from the ground of faith; but it looks only like a fleshly defiance, and is demolished by the simple remark, that even holy Scripture itself is certainly at least a most important, indispensable part of the institutions of God, who would have the revelation through Christ attested and handed down to latest times; and that therefore it is impossible for the Christian faith to regard with indifference the inspiration of Scripture by God.

Perhaps it was these observations which force themselves on every unprejudiced beholder, or, as is also possible, the quietly warning church-conscience, which impelled one of the later systematic theologians, who build upon Schleiermacher's foundation, partly in opposition to the system accepted by him, to seek a compromise by acknowledging the essential elements of the earlier theory of the Lutheran Church, and to lay down a canon which apparently was to solve all difficulties in this province. It is Twesten, as is well known; the results, however, of his investigation, which, as being one of the more important in recent times, cannot be passed over here, may be summed up in what follows: that inspiration extends not only to doctrine and prophecy, but also to the historical element of holy Scripture, not merely to the matter, but also to the words; the former, however, only in as far as the historical element has significance for the Christian consciousness, and the latter only in as far as the choice of use of words stands connected with

* In reality, the idea of Lessing (see his *Theologische Nachlass*, Berlin, 1784, p. 159, et seq.) stands far above Schleiermacher's development, in as far as in the former the genuine idea of the miracle, be it only in appearance, is held fast, in the latter it has completely disappeared. See Schleiermacher's *Dogmatik*, I. c., p. 117.)

† Töllner, *die göttliche Eingebung der heil Schrift*, Mitleu, 1772, p. 3.

‡ Jo. Jac. Griesbach: *Stricture in locum de Theopneustia*, Opusculum. Vol. ii. (Jenae, 1825), p. 299.

the inner religious life.* It might appear rude to demand more, and yet we must remark in the interests of truth, that the reconciliation thus offered is no true one. Rather the objective church theory must take its stand on the assertion, that it is not the Christian or (as Schleiermacher usually designates it as the organising principle of his dogmatic theology), the pious consciousness that can decide what parts of the divine word are inspired and what not, and how far inspiration extends in each particular case, but that conversely the word of God itself (and that Scripture is the most faithful mirror of this, must certainly be granted even from that standpoint) is the only infallible regulator and test for the pious consciousness.

What we miss not so much in this latter attempt, manifestly influenced by the church doctrine, as in almost the universal treatment of the theory of inspiration by the moderns, is a threefold element. In the first place, this idea is discussed without recognising its deep and everlasting root, *the personality and the personal working of the Holy Ghost*. Here, if anywhere, lies the irreparable injury, just as the imposing and venerable element of the old dogmatic building has its foundation especially in this, that men believed in a living, working, creative, inbreathing, inspiring spirit, who in reality spoke through the prophets, and led the apostles into all truth. Thousands of theologians have already denied the personality of the Holy Ghost in their hearts, before the word meets them—"Thus spake the Lord to me," "We speak not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth" (1 Cor. ii. 13); naturally they become doubtful as to the transcendental element which such expressions contain, and whether there is objective truth in them, and seek to explain away the mind of the Spirit according to their fleshly mind. On the contrary, where one accepts the reality of the testimony of Scripture with respect to itself, and on the word of its author, the true starting-point of the doctrine is at once given, and all remaining definitions have no longer any difficulty for the believer; not as if he blindly and without examination accepted everything, but the light of the Spirit, in whose revelation he believes, spreads itself proportionally over all parts; and enlightens him with a distinctness which holy Scripture praises in the sublimest expressions (2 Cor. iii. 18). *Without the perception of the working of the Spirit, as some-*

* Twenten's *Vorlesungen über die Dogmatik der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche*, 1 Bd. Hamb., 1826, p. 422. In a similar way had Griesbach before attempted to solve the whole question; see his *Strictures in locum de Theopneustia*, l. c., p. 810.

thing thoroughly real, it is impossible to reach an adequate conception of inspiration. So it is an element very much missed in the more modern systems, which bear at most a church-colouring in appearance, that there is no genuine conception of the word of God, as it is not only found in holy Scripture, but as it conditions the existence of holy Scripture itself. For this is the first way in which Scripture gives testimony to itself, that it is the word of God to men, at separate periods of revelation; it is true, with ever-increasing clearness up to the final fulfilment, but, at all stages, in all periods, with equally divine certainty. We rightly see in this the ἀρχικώτατον of Christianity, the fruitful root which stretches forth with equal power through both Testaments, and is continually rendered fruitful by the heavenly dew of revelation. But of such an ἐγγασκόν ἐφημα as Origen,* and the ancients in general, designate the prophetic word, people now-a-days wish to know nothing; they reject it therefore as a monstrous representation, that the power of this word extends to the outermost circles of the testimony borne by it, and have the daring, with Herder, to call the operation of God a magic one, inspiration an "inconceivability" (Unbegriff), which overturns all sound views of things.† Thus inspiration, instead of being as it ought the most complete expression for the communication and guidance of the Holy Ghost to those whom God had entrusted with his word, becomes only a disturbed shadow of human thoughts; the divine element is robbed of its testimony to itself, and human reflection resting on itself, and therefore self-annihilating, is made master over it.

In closest connection with the want thus described, stands the whole theological mode of action, according to which one moving onwards in this direction has professedly tested and sifted the inspired materials of holy Scripture. The immeasurably great can be measured only by a standard furnished by itself; without the condescension which lies at the foundation of the whole revelation of God, no understanding even of the revealed word would be possible. As the love of the Son, which transcends all thought, nevertheless clothed itself in deepest humiliation, so has the Holy Ghost according to the believer's apprehension, as it were, humbled himself; the theatre of his self-abasement is, however, just that holy Scripture in which he did not disdain to make that which is smallest in the eyes of men the object of divine representation and support, just as God wishes to be known as our God and Father

* Origen's *Homilia* xxxix. in *Jeremiam* (Ed. Huet., tom. i. p. 199).

† Herder, *von Geiste des Christenthums*, 6 Abschn., *Werke zur Theologie* xii. Bd. (Tüb., 1806), p. 111.

in general by this, that even the hairs of our head are all numbered. It is at root the same thing, transferred to an analogous department, which the apostle Paul describes to us as the *plan of God* in the whole of revelation, that he "hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise" (1 Cor. i. 27). With this standard the wise after the fashion of this world are unacquainted; therefore they fasten on that which appears to them trivial, which, however, is in reality only a small thing, which the Spirit of God has accepted, a garment in which he has clothed himself, and which is just as little in a position to disturb the order and the fundamental thought of the divine whole, as, e. g., the observation, that we are not acquainted with the destiny of many beasts, gives us the right to doubt divine providence and the highest wisdom of arrangement in this respect. How many thousand times since the days of the Anomœans * has the mantle of Paul, which he left behind at Troas (2 Tim. iv. 13), been compelled to do duty as one of the strongest reasons of challenge against verbal inspiration, so that it has really reached a higher honour with the more recent unbelievers than the mantle of Elias. But, manifestly, this mode of controverting the fact of inspiration in its totality from what is isolated, apparently contradictory and unsuitable, is a true *λύειν τὴν γραφὴν*, since it is, on the contrary, from the whole of Scripture that we first gain a sure estimate of the parts, and are thus able to adjust and harmonise what at first sight appears to us strange.

The question here is, as the deceased Steudel, quite according the sense of our church, remarks, "respecting the import of the word as something true in itself, so that it bestows truth on him who apprehends it, not that the latter, by his subjective apprehension, first stamps it as truth." † The province of inspiration is in general most intimately bound up and interwoven with that of revelation. In order, at the outset, to make the connection visible, we shall attempt the following representation. According to our view, there is a threefold series of *technical ideas*, which represent to us partly the nature and origin, partly the workings of revelation; which, resting on a biblical foundation, determine every dogmatic operation, and also, as they are livingly known or not, its relation to the true faith. As the *innermost* or central series, we place in the fore-front the *ideas of salvation* properly so called, which, issuing from heaven, make their way into the human heart, and express

iv * Hieronymi *Præmium in epistol. ad Philemonem* Opp. ed. Victoriam, tom. . p. 211.

† In the treatise, *Ueber Inspiration der Apostel und damit Verwandtes*. See *Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*. [The translation appears in *B. & F. E. Review*, Oct. 1862.]

alike the activity of God in the blessing of man, and the whole preparation of a man of God based on it; the ideas of regeneration, justification, sanctification, faith, election, and calling, and everything that stands connected with them. On the soundness of these ideas depends the whole church life, and therefore the side of it which falls to the department of knowledge. The Reformation has given the most splendid proof of this. But these ideas point us to Scripture itself, to the prophetic-apostolic testimony. As ideas of salvation, they wish at the same time to be *scriptural*; the word of God is their touchstone and everlasting foundation. Thus we stand before the *second* series of technical ideas, which express partly the nature and partly the character of a divine word to men, whose origin, destination, and issue must exhibit to us the powers of eternity, provided the eternal God is the author and upholder of it. Whoever has recognised in its deep truth the striking words of an ancient witness, "*Nullus sermo divinus nisi Dei unius, quo prophetæ, quo apostoli, quo ipse Christus innuit,*"* will easily perceive that not only the grounding element (*das begründende*), i. e., the word of God, but also the *guiding element*, i. e., inspiration, and the *individualistic element*, i. e., the *affectiones Scripturæ sacræ*, are technical ideas in the same sense. Lastly, the *third* circle, which, again, includes and carries in its bosom this last, are the general ideas of *miracle, mystery, revelation of God*, which likewise mirror themselves in all the other technical ideas, and ideas of salvation. For who will deny that the latter, to which we give this name in the strictest sense, are a mystery to the natural man, a "hidden wisdom, which God ordained before the world unto our glory" (1 Cor. ii. 7). And do we really err when we understand *inspiration* immediately connected with holy Scripture, i. e., that the word of God unaltered, and yet suited to every spiritual necessity of man, has passed over into Scripture as a *miracle* of the wisdom and mercy of God? The anthropomorphic and yet the gloriously God-manifesting character of every word of Scripture is just what we wish to indicate by the doctrine of inspiration. With these principles before our eyes, it becomes clear how all inward corruption of the church has continually arisen from the disfigurement of the ideas of salvation properly so called, while on the other hand, the open enemies of Christianity have chosen rather the universal ideas of inspiration, of miracles, of revelation, as the objects of their attacks.

If we have thus explained the value and significance of the idea of inspiration, then what is still to be added by way of

* Tertullian, *de anima*, c. 28.

illustration as to its application, and the obvious importance of the question, may be put in small compass. We do not think we say too much when we assert that all theological operations depend more or less on the clearness and efficacy of the idea of inspiration. First of all, the certainty of standing on the basis of a word in reality divine, which penetrates and enlightens us in the measure in which we receive it, according to the apostle's expression, as a divine sermon, as a demonstration of the Spirit and of power, contrasted with all human wisdom (1 Cor. ii. 1, 4; comp. 1 Thess. i. 5; ii. 13), is a certainty not at all to be replaced. In this way the investigation and exposition of Scripture, too, first receives the right anointing oil, and becomes a spiritual gift and a church office in the true sense, when we allow ourselves to be guided by the fundamental thought, that here divine wisdom herself speaks with her disciples, that streams have here been opened, which spring up to everlasting life in the spiritual man. Not less will the representation of doctrine in a scientific garb be determined by this knowledge. The proper depth of every dogma ends ultimately in the all-sided fruitfulness and intensity of the divine word. And on what depends the unction of the sermon, provided one does not mix it up with the straw-fire of human and earthly enthusiasm, but on this fact, that the preacher draws from the pure and really divine source with the firm trust that all Scripture inspired by God is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness? Church history itself will certainly be animated by another spirit, if it not merely makes a principle of the leaven of Christianity in general (the latter according to a subjective view), but surveys all the development of the kingdom of God from the firm basis of faith, grounding itself on the word of the Lord.

But while we make the Church theory of inspiration, especially as it has been expressed and developed in our Evangelico-Lutheran Church, the object of a new representation, and just because for the above-mentioned reasons we think we see in it a pressing need of our time, it is not alone the mass of objections raised in the most recent times against that theory, and in defiance of history, but regard for the development of the doctrine itself, which decides us to take a *historico-apologetic* path for our introduction, before we pass on to the *dogmatic* representation on the ground of holy Scripture. We shall, however, proceed in such a way that, along with the apologetic aim intended to clear the way and to shew the futility of the opposition, we shall quote, not so much isolated expressions of the fathers and teachers, which can never furnish a complete picture, as exhibit, as far as may be, the leading points which

shew the development of the dogma, We mean to comprehend the matter in a few great periods, thus :—in the *first*, we have the whole patristic age,—in the narrower sense, the first eight centuries ; in the *second*, the middle ages ; in the *third*, the positive tendency of thoughts since the Reformation ; and in the *fourth*, the negative-destructive, acquainting us with the mixture of heterogeneous elements out of which the vacillating character of the representation of this doctrine in more recent systems has arisen. At the same time, we shall not neglect to mention the single apparent or real diversities occurring in the history of doctrines.

CHAPTER II.—DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOGMA OF INSPIRATION IN THE ANCIENT CHURCH.

The Grecian and Eastern modes of contemplation have been separately taken into account as a historical element in the formation of doctrines. As it cannot be denied that in the Grecian Church the speculative form of the doctrine of the Trinity came to light during the first three centuries, so the anthropological foundation which led Christianity over into the general life-sphere of the faith is more the peculiarity of the Latin Church and its greatest representatives, *Tertullian, Cyprian, Augustine, Jerome*. Yet this distinction is by no means absolute ; the points of transition from the one tendency to the other were already furnished by the exchange which took place between different lands ecclesiastically. Thus, we know the intercourse between Asia Minor and Rome, and again, between Italy and the churches in Gaul and Africa, was already very extensive in the second and third centuries, —a result certainly to which, according to Irenæus's remark, the "*potior principalitas Romæ*," the primitive character of this church, together with the enviable situation of the city outwardly, by which a common intercourse was always secured,* contributed not a little. It ought not, therefore, to take us by surprise if we find in Tertullian, for example, dialectic details respecting the doctrine of the Trinity, although not in the Grecian style yet in a similar sense, and in Irenæus, whose Greco-Asiatic culture is placed beyond doubt, the fruitful beginnings of an anthropological treatment of the whole doctrine of grace and freedom, which from that time became almost regulative for the Greek Church. But there are also departments where that peculiar distinction between the Greco-Eastern and the Romo-Western mode of treatment does not at all make its appearance ; and to these belongs the doctrine of *inspiration*. There is scarcely any one point respecting which, in antiquity, there prevailed a greater and happier

* Irenæus *adversus hæreses*, lit. iii., c. 8.

unanimity ; and certainly one hews out broken cisterns if he wishes with a more recent investigation to set the Hellenic-fettered view over against the freer Jewish one.* Here we may mention, in striking contrast to the last part of this assertion, the chief passage of Josephus, which must be of such decisive importance to us because the great Jewish historian speaks as a man of the people who does not wish to express a new theory, but only what stood written in the hearts of all his countrymen. His observation of the manifest contradiction of the Greek historians, and of the secret catering of most of them for popular favour, leads him to the uninterrupted series of priests, and the succession of prophets among the Jews, up to the times of Artaxerxes Longimanus. He rightly lays stress on the fact, that in the series of Jewish sacred writings, which in 22 books embrace a period of about 4000 years, not even a shadow of contradiction is found ; and if he assigns the *ἐπινοία ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ* especially to those who described the oldest and most remote period of Jewish history, this is not done with a view to deny the inspiration of the prophets, for he knows no other boundary of sacred, divine Scripture than just their ceasing, the interrupted prophetic *διαδοχή*. What he adds by way of challenge to the haughty Greeks is excellent :—“ By deed we shew *what faith* we repose in our own Scriptures. For although so long a time has already gone by, yet no one has ventured either to add anything to them, or to take anything away from them, or in any way to alter them. For it is, as it were, natural to all Jews at their birth to look upon these as doctrines of God, and to cleave fast to them, and, if necessary, joyfully to die for them. Often has it been seen before now that many prisoners of our people endure the most frightful tortures, and all sorts of death, rather than speak a word against the laws, and the Scriptures which are joined with them (the prophetic). Who among the Greeks would have suffered for such a thing? and although all their writings were to be annihilated, yet none of them would, on that account, expose himself to the least injury.”† In reality, the pregnant idea of the “divine word,” which the great Jewish statesman and commander held equally with the lowest among his people, is the best proof to us that the Jewish view of inspiration, which the oldest parts of the Talmud also make as clear as day, was in no respect a free one, in the sense in which that investigator understands it ; here the *ἱερά καὶ κεραία* (Matt. v. 18) itself had, up till the final fulfilment, and for the sake of it, a value not to be surrendered. To the expressions of Philo of Alexandria, also, we

* Baumgarten-Crusius, *Dogmengeschichte*, p. 883, et seq.

† Josephus *contra Apionem*, lib. i., c. 7, 8 (*Ed. Geneva*, 1691, p. 1036, et seq.).

can appeal in this matter, as well as to his whole practice,—for his allegorizing method pre-supposes,—like that of Origen (although a hundred times more arbitrarily and loosely), an idea of the all-sided fruitfulness of the words, which he interpreted indeed according to his guosticising dreams; and though he has partly erred, according to our conviction, in the definition of the psychological basis of prophecy,* and on many occasions partly generalises too far the idea of the prophetic,† yet we may, with full warrant, speak of expressions like these as hitting the truth:—“Ἐρμηνεύς γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ προφήτης, ἑνδόξου ὑπαρχόντος τὰ λειπεία τοῦ θεοῦ.”‡ But farther, what is designated the “Hellenic-fettered” view of inspiration might most easily vanish as arbitrary assumption, if we were convinced by the following statement, that here the pure church element prevailed. That alleged “Platonism of the Fathers,” on the basis of which also Baumgarten’s view stands, is only an incomplete historical survey, since the affinity was a real one, only as Plato himself, as several passages of his writings shew, had obtained an obscure knowledge of ideas, which, by a path unknown to us, had found their way from the East, their proper home, into the West.§

According to this explanation, it devolves upon us to shew separately that inspiration was recognised as a fact in the ancient church, how the doctrine respecting it was formed, and how the application of the idea was accomplished.

I. The ancient church teaches with one accord, that all the canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are inspired by the Spirit of God, and bases on this the *perfection* of Scripture, as a divine whole, the recognition of which cannot be prejudiced by human imperfection and fragmentary knowledge. “The Scriptures,” says IRENÆUS, “are perfect; for they are spoken by the word of God and his Spirit; while we, in the degree in which we are inferior, and stand at the greatest distance from the word of God and his Spirit, are in need of the knowledge of his mysteries. No wonder that this is our

* The principal passage on this subject (Philo, *quis rerum divinarum haeres*, ed. Hoeschel, p. 516 sqq.) we shall have occasion to explain in the second section.

† In the passage above quoted, *e. g.*, it is said, p. 517, “Πάντι δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀσείῳ ὁ ἱεὺς λόγος προφητεῖαν μαρτυρεῖ.”

‡ Philo *de praeiis et pœnis*, ed. Hoeschel, p. 918.

§ As is well known, this is the universal view of the fathers, with the exception, perhaps, of Lactantius (see Lactant. *Institut. div.*, lib. iv. c. 2). We mention only the following leading passages:—Justin. Martyr, *Apolog.* i. c. 44; *Cohortatio ad Graecos*, c. 14, 20, 24; Clem. Alex. *Stromata*, lib. v. c. 6, p. 662; Origenes *contra Celsum* lib. iv. c. 89; Eusebii *Præpar. evangel.*, lib. xi. c. 8; Augustin *de Civitate Dei*, lib. viii. c. 11. (The last named has brought forward the very probable opinion that Plato, by means of investigations and conversations, had learned many of the fundamental thoughts of revelation.) Among the moderns, Ast (*Platons Leben und Schriften*, Lpz. 1816, p. 107, 870) has felt himself compelled to recognise at least the Eastern source.

case in spiritual and heavenly things, and in such as belong to revelation, since much of that which lies at our feet (I mean what is in this creation, which is felt and seen by us, and with us) is withdrawn from our knowledge, and we leave them to God. What misfortune is it then, if, in our investigation of Scripture, since the whole of Scripture is spiritual, we resolve some things according to the grace which God bestows upon us, but we leave others to him, and that not merely in this present time, but also in the future, that God may always teach, and man may always learn, what is God's? Thus, we shall preserve our faith, and persevere in it without danger; the whole Scripture, given us by God, will be found in harmony with us; the more obscure passages will harmonise with the plain, and the plain will furnish the solution of the more obscure; we shall feel, as it were, the key-note in ourselves, which praises God, who has made all things." * This perfection of Scripture which is based on its inspiration, is thus expressed by ORIGEN—"The sacred books are pervaded by the fulness of the Spirit. There is nothing either in the prophets, or in the law, or in the gospels, or in the epistles, which does not spring from the fulness of the divine majesty." In the same sense Irenæus represents the origin of the four gospels as a divine work, which, by its plan and number, much more by its contents, proclaims the divine author. "Because there are four regions of the world," says he, "and four principal winds, and the church, moreover, is spread over the whole world, with the gospel as its pillar and foundation and spirit of life, it is therefore right that it should have four pillars, which breathe forth from every quarter incorruptibility, and give life to men. Thus, it is manifest, that he who created all things, the Logos, who sits above the cherubim (Ps. lxxix. 3), and keeps all things together (Heb. i. 3), after he appeared to men, has given us a four-fold gospel, which is held together by one Spirit."† The divine causality, by means of which holy Scripture, as inspired, has arisen, is sometimes, as in this passage, and often elsewhere, ascribed to the Logos, at other times to the Holy Ghost and his ἐπινοια.‡ Hence the designations of the apostles and prophets, as λειτουργοὶ τῆς χάριτος τοῦ θεοῦ §, ὄργανα θείας φωνῆς || σωμα θεοῦ ¶ πνευματοφόροι,** χριστοφόροι,†† θεοφορούμενοι.‡‡ Hence the thousandfold

* Irenæus *adversus hæreses*, lib. ii. c. 44; *ed. Græle*.

† Irenæus *adversus hæreses*, lib. iii. c. 11 (p. 221 *ed. Græle*).

‡ And indeed both modes of designation are often used interchangeably by one and the same writer. § Clem. Rom. *epist. i. ad Corinth.* c. 8.

|| Athenagoræ *legatio pro Christianis*, c. 7; Clem. Alex. *Stromata*, lib. vi. c. 17, p. 698 (*ed. Sylburgi*). ¶ Chrysos. *homilia xix. in Acta App.*

** Theophilus *ad Antolycum*, lib. ii. c. 9.

†† Athanasius *contra gentis*, n. v. p. 5, F.; *de incarnatione*, n. x. p. 56, A.

‡‡ Just. Mart. *Apology*. i. c. 35. Theophilus *ad Antolycum*, lib. iii. c. 12.

quotations of holy Scripture, alike of the Old and New Testaments, where the individual writer, as it were, steps into the background as a mere instrument compared with him who was regarded as the author of the testimony, God the Holy Ghost,* and therefore it is said either simply without naming the *apostle or prophet*, "As the Holy Spirit of Christ has spoken;"† or naming him, "The Holy Ghost speaks by the apostle or prophet."‡ Hence, finally, the innumerable designations of holy Scripture as a divine whole by means of the expressions—*θία γραφή, κυριακή γραφή, θεόπνευστοι γραφαί*,§ *celestes literæ*,|| &c. Hence, Origen, in his celebrated work "*concerning beginnings*," touches merely in passing on the doctrine of inspiration as a generally known and acknowledged presupposition.¶

II. As a necessary consequence of this principle, the ancient church clung fast alike to the INFALLIBILITY and the SUFFICIENCY (the living independence and fulness) of holy Scripture; just as it was taken for granted that they ascribed to the divine witnesses, not merely *axiopistia*, but *autopistia* (i. e., that they must be believed for the sake of their infallible author), not merely for the sake of that by which he has produced and confirmed faith in his word. "I reckon it," says Eusebius, the father of church history, "a piece of audacity, if any one were to presume to say, holy Scripture has erred;"** and Origen calls it "a confident belief of Christians, that the evangelists have committed no mistake in the reports of Christ,"†† The sufficiency of the God-inspired Scripture is a chief bulwark with Athanasius, from which he assails the false heathen religions.‡‡ Justin Martyr calls the prophets "trustworthy witnesses of the truth, who are raised far above all proof,"§§ while on the other hand he very often places before our eyes the confirmation wherewith God has sealed their testimony when he points partly to the agreement of all the prophets with one

* Greg. M., *Moralia in Job.*, Praef. c. 1; "Quis haec scripserit, valde super-vacue quæritur, quum tamen auctor libri Spiritus Sanctus fideliter credatur." Theodoret. *Protheoria in Psalmos*.

† Clem. Rom. *epist. i. ad Corinth.* c. 13 (Passages from Jer. ix., and 1 Cor. ix. put together); c. 16 (Isa. liii. wholly, and Ps. xxi. 7); Cyprian *de opere et elemosynis*, p. 197. (*ed Fell*): "Loquitur in Scripturis divinis Spiritus S.", p. 198; canenta atque exhortante Spiritu S."

‡ For example, Cyprian *de imitate ecclesiæ*, p. 111 (ques designat in Psalmis Spiritus S.") Idem *de opere et elemosynis*, p. 201; "Loquitur per Salomonem Spiritus S." Clem. Alex. *Cohortatis ad gentes*, cap. i. p. 7. Ejusdem *Pædagog.* lib. i. p. 106 A.

§ Clem. Alex. *Stromata*, lib. vii. p. 761 B.; lib. vi. p. 662, C. Euseb. Cæsar in Ps. p. 698 E.

|| Lactant *Instit. dir.* lib. iv. c. 22.

¶ Orig. *de principiis*, lib. iv. c. 1

** Eusebius in Ps. p. 129 B.C.

†† Orig. *Comment in Matthæum*, p. 227 B. (*ed Huet*) Comp. the well known passage, August. *Epist.* xcvi. (*ad Hieronym.*)

‡‡ Athanasius *contra gentes*, t. i. p. 1, B.

§§ Just. Mart. *dialog. cum Tryphæne*, c. 7.

another in a series of several thousand years,* partly to the glorious fulfilment of their prophecy,† as a double sealing (in the history of the Church and of the world) of the divine truth.

III. Farther, if Scripture is the word of God to men, inspired by his Holy Spirit, there will be nothing useless, nothing superfluous in it (even in its greatest riches, just as in nature the greatest and wisest economy is observed, but every word will have its goal, its aim, the sphere of its activity. The two principles, that of the INTENSITY and of the EFFICACY of the word of God, complete and explain each other; by the establishment of both, the ancient church has made known its high and deep thoughts in this respect. There is an oft-recurring statement in Irenæus, "There is nothing superfluous or without sign and import in holy Scripture;"‡ by *sign* he understands, in his intellectually rich language, what points to and reveals God and his economy to us; by *ὑπόθεσις* the substance of the faith with which, according to his theory, everything historical stands connected, and is, in this connection, but as it were, a hieroglyphic of God, to explain the former. "Supposest thou," says Origen, "that the evangelist has set down this in vain, that the blind man threw off his garment and came to Jesus? I believe that no jot and no tittle is in vain in the instruction of God to men.§ For we can by no means say of the writings of the Holy Ghost, that there is anything superfluous or idle in them, although many a thing may appear dark to many. Rather let us turn the eye of our soul to him who gave commandment to write this, and ask of him understanding, that if there be a weakness in our soul he may heal it, or if we be children in understanding, that the Lord who protects the weak may stand by us, and may train us, and bring us up to man's estate." || "No wonder," says he, in his excellent 39th Homily on the prophet Jeremiah, "that every word which proceeded from the mouth of the prophet was effective, and performed the work to which the word was adapted. I believe, moreover, that every writing miraculously inspired by God, and taken into his word, is effective. In reality, there is no

* Just. Mart. *ad Græcos cohortatis*, c. 8 (in finem). Comp. Theophilus *ad Antiochum*, lib. i. c. 36.

† Just. Mart. *Apologia* i. c. 81–51, Justin looks upon prophecy in general as a *necessary* element in the divine economy, that men, when the fulfilment of what was predicted occurred, might be able to recognise and test the divine truth in the word which was spoken thousands of years before.

‡ Irenæus *adversus hæreses*, lib. iv. c. 34—"Nihil enim otiosum, nec sine signo, neque sine argumento (*ὑποθέσει*) apud enim." Repeated almost in the same words, lib. iv. c. 38.

§ Orig. *Commentar in Matthæum*, p. 428 (ed. Huet).

|| Orig. *Homilia* xxvii in Numer., Opp. ed Bered, tom. ii. p. 375, B.

jot or tittle written, which was not to accomplish its work for those who understand how to use the power of the words."* The great expositor will have it, that what is true of the *living* word, belongs also to the *written* word, first in itself and then in relation to us, so far as we apprehend it in the spirit in which it was written, the spirit of faith. The passing over into Scripture, which has taken place *according to the will of God*, can rob the word *in itself* of nothing of its power and efficacy; on this supposition rests the whole idea of inspiration.

IV. The doctrine of holy Scripture, says the ancient church farther, is throughout the same; the same Spirit of the Lord can bear only one and the same testimony. As is well known, the "science falsely so called" of which the apostle speaks (1 Tim. vi. 20) had already, in the first centuries, as it were, taken to itself a body in the Gnostics. Among many artifices wherewith they darkened the simple gospel truth, one was the assertion, that the Old Testament is not only imperfect in itself, but that it makes known another God than the New,† and again, that one apostle contradicts another. In opposition to this, Irenæus rose up, with whom the development of dogmas in the second century reached its climax, and shewed in his chief work, "that all the gospels have made known from the law and the prophets *one* God, the Creator of heaven and earth, and have taught us *one* Christ, God's Son, and that whoever does not approve of him, despises not only those who were in fellowship with the Lord, but the Lord Christ himself, yea, despises the Father also, and condemns himself, inasmuch as he fights against his own salvation."‡ In agreement with the latter speaks Clement of Alexandria, the defender of a better gnosis, which recognised the basis of the word, and seldom went too far. "The law and the prophets, as well as the gospel, lead, in the name of Christ, to one and the same knowledge."§ He sets forth, as the design of his celebrated *Stromata*, after he has considered in passing the theology (the doctrine of God

* Orig. *Homilia xxxix. in Jerem.*, p 189.

† Worthy successors of the ancient Gnostics, though with far inferior mental endowments, and for the most part with shallow views, are the Rationalists, who, exactly like the former, represent the Old Testament God as one, who knows no fatherhood, but only wrath, and who, in glaring contradiction to the deep prophetic testimony, "Doubtless, thou art our father, though Abraham be ignorant of us, and Israel acknowledge us not: thou, O Lord, art our Father, our Redeemer: thy name is from everlasting" (Isa. lxiii. 16), falsely bring up against the God of revelation the shameful charge, that he always left himself without a witness as to his nature among the chosen people. It deserves to be remarked that, just as all erroneous doctrines proceed from unbelief in the person of Christ, the Incarnate One (1 John iv. 3), so must they in their development necessarily assail the fatherhood of God also; for "whosoever denieth the Son, the same hath not the Father" (1 John ii. 28).

‡ Irenæus *adversus hæreses*, lib. iii. c. 1.

§ Clem Alex *Stromata*, Lib. iii. p 456, c. .

outside the economy of salvation), "that he intends to examine what is delivered us by prophecy, that when he has proved the all-sided validity of Scripture according to its really divine authenticity, he may be able to move through it from part to part as on a chain, and shew, in opposition to all heresies, the *one* God and Almighty Lord, who is made known purely and truthfully by the law and the prophets, and the blessed gospel."* Origen expresses himself similarly respecting the position of the gospels, and the prophets, and the water of life, which is presented to us alike in the law and in the apostolic writings.† With the same weapons Athanasius contends against Apollinaris: "Let there be held up before us," says he, "the word of our faith (the rule of faith) and the standard of the gospels, the preaching of the apostles, and the testimony of the prophets."‡ "The church," says Epiphanius in his compendium of the general faith, "which is begotten of *one* faith, believes what is really made known and really commanded her. Everything that apostolic Scripture, that the whole of holy Scripture testifies, is true; for it is one and the same God who is made known in the law and in the prophets, "in the gospels and in the apostles, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, one God, to whom be honour, and power, and glory, for ever."§

V. Having shewn the general idea and its compass, we proceed to look more closely at its intellectual elements. Inspiration, according to the view of the most ancient church, is to be understood first as a *passive* state, in which the human element was not so much pushed into the background, or pressed down, as filled and elevated by the divine enlightenment. To this view belong first of all the passages from the oldest apologists, in which they compare the receptive soul of the prophets and apostles to a stringed instrument which the Holy Ghost touches, in order to draw forth life-tones from it.|| "Their task," says Justin Martyr, "was merely to surrender themselves entirely to the working of the Spirit of God, that the divine plectrum, descending from heaven, might make use of holy men as of a harp or lyre, in order to reveal to us the knowledge of divine and heavenly things."¶ In this expression we have at once the substance and the justification of this view so often foolishly misinterpreted. It is true a *passivity* is spoken of, but not an emotionless and unconscious one; and

* Clem. Alex. *Stromata*, lib. iv. p. 475, Comp. lib. iv. p. 570, A.; lib. v. p. 561, A.

† Orig. *Comment. in Ezech.*, p. 201, C. (ed. Huet)

‡ Athanasius *contra Apollinar.*, lib. ii. n. 4, p. 949, C.

§ Epiphanius *σύνομος λόγος*, Operum, tom. i. p. 1101.

|| Athenag. *legatio pro Christianis*, c. 9.

¶ Just. Mart. *ad Græcos cohortatio*, c. 8.

we may well allow to the intelligence of sensible men this much, that they saw that the stringed instrument, whose tones arise from the vibration of the chords, is one thing, and that the heart of man animated, touched by the Spirit of God, the spirit of man, which the Lord not only renews, but fills with divine life, is another. From the nature of the workings of grace in general, we shall arrive at a right decision as to the relation of the active and passive elements in the highest working of grace, which we designate by the name of inspiration; the former the soul, carried away from the unrest and the turmoil of the earthly life, inwardly apprehends God, so still more in the latter God preserves and carries on the manifestation in his word. The most important element in this view is indicated admirably by Basil the Great (provided the celebrated commentary on Isaiah is by him), when he says: "The prophets, whose tranquil soul the divine love irradiated, were, as it were, looking forward, when they saw the future before them as a present. But just as it is not every material that is fitted to take up reflected images, but only that which has a certain smoothness and transparency, so the activity of the Spirit is not visible in all souls, but only in those which have nothing awry or perverted in them."*

VI. Having noticed, in connection with the above, that, with the ancients, prophecy, in the right sense, embraced everything by which God revealed the hidden wisdom, be it as to the present or as to the future, by speech, vision, action of the prophets,† we shall give some definitions, at once explaining and circumscribing that canon, and giving more detailed hints as to the carrying out of the theory of inspiration in the ancient church. If, for example, the misinterpretation of these definitions respecting the passive condition of the prophets were well-founded, then their mental life must have been a thoroughly low one; they must have experienced the condition which heathen authors picture to us in the case of their sibyls and inspired persons as a *μανία* or *ἔκστασις*. But nowhere is the distinction between the inspiration of nature (which, with a correct symbolism, sought the lower regions, caves, &c.) and the really divine inspiration more sharply drawn than with the teachers of the ancient church. While Philo speaks of an *ἰδὲος κατεχόμενη* *μανία*, as the peculiar ecstatic foundation of prophecy,‡ this representation does not occur at all with the most ancient

* Basilii M. *Commentar. in Esaiam*, Opp. tom. i. p. 379 (ed. Bened.)

† Irenaeus *adversus haereses*, lib. iv. c. 37: "Non solum *sermone* prophetabant prophetae, sed et *visione*, et *conversatione*, et *actibus*, quos faciebant. Quasdam (dispositiones) per visiones videbant, quasdam per verbum annuntiabant, quasdam vero per operationem typice significabant, universa prophetice annunciantes. Compare Just. Mart. *Apologia*, i. 40.

‡ Philo, *quæ rerum divinarum hæres*, p. 515 sqq.

church teachers, with the exception, perhaps, of Athenagoras;* but they all teach with one consent, and, indeed, just as a criterion of the *true* inspiration, that prophecy moves throughout on the basis of self-possession and intelligent consciousness. How great interest the ancient church had in this assertion one sees from this circumstance, that *Miltiades* wrote a special book, in which he shewed "that the prophet cannot speak in ecstasy."† The *Montanists* form the opposite party, whose doctrine, with respect to this matter, is thus expressed by Tertullian,—"*In spiritu homo constitutus, praesertim cum gloriam Dei conspicit, vel cum per ipsum Deus loquitur, necesse est excidat sensu, obumbratus scilicet virtute divina.*"‡ But the ancient church rejected, along with Montanism, this view entirely; Epiphanius most fully expresses himself respecting this matter, laying down, at the same time, the Scripture motive. "Let us," says he, "compare what is asserted by these parties with that which is undeniably contained alike in the Old and New Testaments, which is also seen and predicted in truth, and thereby test which is true prophecy and which is false. The true prophet spoke with complete tranquillity of the mental powers, so that one thing followed another in a certain order; he spoke by the Holy Ghost, and therefore uttered everything with great confidence. Therefore, also, the prophet is called in the Old Testament a *seer*, and with the vision, which contains the words of the Lord, the command is oftentimes bound up to make known to the people this vision, and these words, in the name of the Lord. Hence, also, we meet with passages, e. g., in Ezekiel, where the distinguishing element of the clear consciousness appears even in the prophet's opposition to that which he was to represent symbolically (Ezek. iv. 14). According to this fundamental view, Daniel is designated as one on whom especially God conferred wisdom and strength (Dan. ii. 22); he interprets Nebuchadnezzar's night-visions and riddles, and, through the gift of the Holy Ghost, which furnished him with the sure explanation, he portrays this solution with self-possession and firmness. What these parties allege, on the other hand, as prophecy, neither has clearness in its substance, nor is their talk about it self-consistent; their words are confused and perplexed, and without any accuracy of thought."§ Basil the Great recapitulates the same reasons (just

* Athenag., *legatio pro Christianis*, c. 9.

† Euseb. *Historia Eccles.*, lib. v. 17. The fragments quoted here of this writing—which Eusebius has, besides, at second hand from the work of an anonymous ecclesiastical writer against the Kataphrygians—are only few. Compare Nicephori *Hist. Eccles.*, lib. iv. c. 24. The apologist Miltiades flourished under Marcus Aurelius and Commodus.

‡ Tertullian *adversus Marcionem*, lib. iv., c. 22.

§ Epiphani. *adversus haereses*, lib. ii tom. ii., haeres. 48, c. 3 (in the epitome).

as with him, in general, the beginnings of a theory may be most clearly perceived), when he says, "Some suppose that the prophets prophesied in ecstasy, so that the human spirit was, as it were, overshadowed by the divine. But this is against the premise of the divine indwelling; for how can the Spirit of wisdom and knowledge deprive any one of his senses? Light cannot produce blindness, but, on the contrary, awakens up the natural power of seeing. If the sacred writers were wise, then must they also certainly have obtained understanding."* That criterion, then, was used by the teachers of the first centuries as a sure and efficient one, in order to distinguish *prophecy* from *soothsaying*—not merely in the result, but in the whole structure and *character* of the two they wished to have this distinction carried out. With reference to this, the comment of Chrysostom on the words of the apostle Paul, 1 Cor. xii. 1, 2, is excellent. "The apostle," says he, "when he wished to speak to the Corinthians of spiritual gifts and their use, first erects the partition-wall betwixt *μαντία* and *προφητεία*. Because he could not, from the predictions themselves (as they were current simply as such in the church), adduce the certain proof—for the internal proof of its truth prophecy does not bring with it at the time it is given, but at the time when it is fulfilled,—he points, as it were, with the finger to the character of the *manteia* (the heathen soothsaying) of the *false* prophets, when he says, "Ye know that ye were Gentiles, carried away unto these dumb idols, even as ye were led."† When any one in idolatry, he means to say, pos-

Compare Hieronymi *Proem in Nahum* (Opp. tom. v. p. 171): "Non enim loquitur in *extasi*, ut Montanus et Prisca Maximillaque delirant, sed, quod prophetebat, liber est *visionis intelligentis* universa quae loquitur, et pondus hostium facientis in suo populo visionem." (Similar expressions by him: *Praef. in Habacuc in Jesaiam*.) Of course this neither denies the relative obscurity of the prophets, which had its foundation in the divine economy, and which always contained a light in a dark place, until the fulfilment raised it to complete sun-like clearness (2 Peter i. 19); nor is ecstasy, as an oft-recurring prophetic condition, entirely denied; this only is asserted, that it is thoroughly inadmissible to represent ecstasy as the psychological foundation of prophecy, as Hengstenberg also, in his *Christologie des alten Testaments* (I. i., p. 298 and following), has done. We shall be under the necessity, in the second part, of resuming this investigation.

* Basilii M. *Commentar. in Esaiam, Proem*. 5. (Opp. Tem. i. p. 381.)

† ὡς ἀν ἡγεσθε. When Chrysostom explains this *ἡγεσθε* by *ἐκσεσθε*, *ἀδελφισθε*, he has, according to our opinion, come nearer the truth than Theodoret (adh. 6), who understands it of the general condition under idolatry. At any rate, a *dark power* is here to be thought of, and it is just this positive principle of heathenism which had stepped into the place of the light of revelation,—a powerlessness under the appearance of higher wisdom and power, which Chrysostom contends against. It is just the *πνεῦμα διαβόλεον* here at ver. 2 (certainly *in contrarietate*, as Theodoret expresses himself), which is described in opposition to the *πνεῦμα θεοῦ*, v. 3.

sessed by an unclean spirit, was practising arts of soothsaying, he was *carried forward, as it were, a captive* by the spirit, not knowing what he said. For this is the peculiarity of the soothsayer, to fall into an ecstatic condition, to suffer outward compulsion, to be pushed, drawn along with violence, dragged onwards like a maniac. Not so with the prophet; but, with cool mind, with self-conscious tranquillity, and knowing what he says, he expresses everything. By this thou art to distinguish, before the result, the soothsayer and the prophet.* The heathen inspiration is in general to be distinguished from the sacred in its foundation. "When Pythia," says Origen, "comes in ecstasy, and is beside herself, what sort of a spirit must it be that spreads darkness over the mind and the thoughts?"†

VII. By means of mere definitions the ancients sought to make the idea of prophecy clear, and to free the theory of inspiration from difficulties. We mention here two points, which afterwards come to be spoken of often enough. The one refers to the prophetic element, which appears to lie outside the circle of revelation, as it made its appearance, for example, in *Pharaoh, Nebuchadnezzar, Balaam, Caiaphas*. As regards the former, Basil the Great gives the answer, when he starts the question itself, whether, in certain junctures which nearly affected his kingdom, God gave to these also a gift of foresight in such things as were to be accomplished in themselves? Balaam, however, and Caiaphas shared in prophecy, not because of their purity of heart, but for the sake of the objects of the divine economy;‡ in other words, they entered, as it were, as actors into the divine world-drama. Farther, the ancient teachers make a distinction betwixt the inspiration of the *prophets* and the *apostles*, not with respect to the divine truth, which was the object of inspiration, nor with respect to the operation as one absolutely divine, but with respect to the continuity of the mental state thus produced. "It is one and the same Spirit," says Novatian, "who made himself known in prophets and apostles, only that he wrought in the former at moments, in the latter continually; in the former case being imparted in measure, in the latter fully poured out; in the former communicated partly, in the latter richly."§

VIII. Inspiration which is to deserve the name of an operation of God must extend to *words* as well as *things*. The

* Chrysostomi *Homilia* xxxix. in 1 Cor. xii. (Opp. x. p. 812, ed. Francof).

† Origen *contra Celsum*, lib. vii. c. 4 (p. 334 ed. Spencer).

‡ Basilii M., *Commentar. in Esaiam Provem.*, c. 4.

§ Novatian. *de Trinitate*, c. 29. Just so Jerome appears, at least in one aspect, to understand the matter, when he remarks at Ezek. xi. 24, that after the vision ceased which brought the prophet in spirit to Jerusalem, he returned to himself. (Hieron. *Comment. in Ezechiel proph.*, xi. 24.)

unity of the two in the divine consciousness necessarily implies the indivisibility of the operation in a divine scripture; and it is impossible that teleologic elements can here furnish a standard for the distinction, since the whole of holy Scripture was God's design, and a part of the plan of his kingdom. This was perceived by the ancient church with great clearness. Hence Origen ventures, without fear of being misunderstood, as if he wished to claim life for that which is in and by itself inanimate, to speak of "letters of the Holy Ghost;"* and Irenæus argues from the word with which the genealogy of the Lord begins in the evangelist Matthew (τοῦ δι' Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ ἡ γέννησις οὕτως ἦν) that the Holy Ghost, by means of the word *Christ*, has here guarded against the monstrosities of later teachers of error, as if he would say, "This Jesus is our Emmanuel."† To the same effect, Chrysostom says that often in a word of Scripture there lies a whole series of thoughts.‡

IX. It is not so much these isolated expressions as the whole method of proof from Scripture in the ancient teachers, the principles of exposition, even where they were misinterpreted, and finally, the general use of Scripture by all Christians, which was not only approved, but made the duty of believers—it is these things that give us the assurance that in the ancient church they always proceeded on the supposition of a *verbal inspiration*. In the first place, the *ostensio s. probatio ex Scripturis* is demanded as a *necessary* and *indispensable* thing; for "otherwise our statements and expositions are unworthy of belief; by the mouth of two or three witnesses must every word be established."§ Tertullian, however little he wished to deviate a hairbreadth from the rule of faith, yet urges his opponents, where he is treating of the meaning of this rule, to "proof from the Scriptures,"|| and commends the Romish Church also for this reason, because she "connects the law and the prophets with the gospel and apostolic writings, and imbibes the faith from these."¶ But if we look more closely how the ancient teachers handled this weapon, it is clear that the leading of proof appears to them as something complete, when it is shewn from Scripture, as a divine whole, that the Lord has continually given testimony to himself that the Spirit has never contradicted himself; and alike in the smallest

* Orig. *super Numer. homilia* xxvii.

† Irenæus *adversus hæreses*, lib. iii. c. 18.

‡ Chrysost. *Homilia* xlix. in Joann. :—

"καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μίας λέξεως
ἔνσιν ὁλόκληρον εὐαγγέλιον."

§ Orig. in *Jeremiam Homilia* i. p. 57 (ed. Huet).

|| Tertullian *adversus Praxeam*, c. xi.

¶ Tertullian *de præscriptione hæreticæ*, c. xxxvi. : "Legem et Prophetas cum Evangelicis et Apostolicis literis miscet, et in de potat fidem."

thing and in the greatest the same divine economy is mirrored which wrote the faith in the hearts of Christians. This organic method of proof from Scripture we ought to learn from the ancients, as well as the lesson that we must have a living apprehension to be able to furnish a living proof. From innumerable examples of this description, which we meet more frequently the farther we travel back into antiquity, and which give place to a fragmentary method the farther we move forward beyond the boundary of the fifth century, let just a single one from Irenæus be adduced—one of these deep, penetrating glances to which we are accustomed in him: "Thus, then," says he, "has the Father manifested himself to all, when he makes his word visible to all; and on the other hand, the word shewed the Father and the Son to all, when he was seen by all. Hence the righteous judgment of God falls upon all, who have indeed equally seen, but have not equally believed. For by creation itself the Father reveals the Word (by whom everything was made), and by the world the architect of the world, the Lord, and by the creature the artificer who made the creatures, and by the Son the Father who begat the Son; and of this also all speak equally, but all do not believe equally. Thus has the Word, by means of the law and the prophets, preached alike himself and the Father; and all the people heard him equally, but all did not believe equally. And by the Word himself, when he became visible and palpable, the Father was manifested (John xiv. 9), and although all did not believe him equally, yet all saw in the Son the Father; for that which is invisible of the Son is the Father, and that which is visible of the Father is the Son. Therefore all called him Christ when he was present, and spake of him as the Son of God. Even the unclean spirits, when they saw him, said, 'We know that thou art the Holy One of God.' And the devil, when he tempted him, said, 'If thou be the Son of God,' so that all indeed saw and spake of the Son and of the Father, but all did not believe. For it was necessary that the truth should receive testimony from all, and should prove a means of judgment, for salvation to believers (John xi. 4), for condemnation to unbelievers, in order that all might be rightly judged, and that the faith in the Father and in the Son might be confirmed and attested, alike by those of the family, because they were friends, and by strangers (John x. 5), because they were enemies." *

* Irenæus *adversus hæreses*, iv. 14. It is enough to give an idea of this penetrating and all-comprehensive method of handling Scripture. One sees, without our mentioning it, how almost every sentence contains a view, which embraces revelation as an organic whole, and that the substance of Scripture, if I might so express myself, shines through the single words—a circumstance to

Just as the method of proof from Scripture is pervaded by a spirit which throughout had understood the contact and influence of the Holy Ghost in the apostles and prophets as something exceedingly real, so is the principle of exposition in the ancient church such an one, as faith itself accepted, not as something that had first to be created, but as something wrought and attested by the Spirit of God. With great firmness Justin Martyr, even in his time, rejects the purely *philological* interpretation of the Jewish teachers, and reminds them how they neither knew the fundamental thoughts of Scripture, nor could they escape manifest contradiction in the professedly grammatical exposition.* The false principles on both sides are brought together by Theodoret, in his Prologomena to the Psalms: on the one hand, the *insatiable character of allegory*; on the other, the *false historical* view according to which they rather rendered assistance to the Jewish exposition than shewed themselves as the disciples of the faith.† By the first definition he has manifestly indicated the error into which Origen had fallen; but who does not see that even this mistake was bound up with a deeper fundamental conception of holy Scripture, which, starting from the criterion of the all-sided fruitfulness and organic arrangement, mixed up *application* with *exposition*, and thus fell into much that was arbitrary? At all events, Origen is, as we have already seen, a defender of the strictest theory of inspiration.‡ It is, however, not only the exposition of Scripture, as it was everywhere practised in the ancient church, but also the reconciliation of apparent contradictions, *e.g.*, in the gospels, where it was undertaken, that shews us inspiration as a fact everywhere presupposed. We name only the well known and still much

which the Scripture passages subjoined by us point. In a future treatment of Irenæus (for he has not yet obtained a *worthy* one), it will be one of the chief tasks to trace back all such Scripture allusions, of which the bulk of his doctrine consists, to their source, which hitherto has been done by *Grabe* and *Masseuet* only in very imperfect measure.

* Just. Mart. *dialogus cum Tryphone*, c. 84 and c. 112.

† Theodoret *Protheoria in Psalmos*, Opp. ed. Sirmond, Schulse, tom. i. p. 608.

‡ Origen distinguished, as is well known, a threefold sense of holy Scripture,—the *historical*, the *mystic*, and the *moral* (Origen *Homilia* ii. in Genes., p. 65, B.C. ed. Bened.). How he was led to this he tells us himself, in another passage; he started, namely, from this, that in holy Scripture, in order to conceive it as an organic whole, one must distinguish *body*, *soul*, and *spirit* (*Homilia* v. in Levit., p. 209 C. ed. Bened.). By carrying out the principle, one easily sees the error of the view. For just as the spirit is only in the living organism, and the soul the connecting link between it and the body, so is the spiritual sense of Scripture inseparable from the historic contents; and as the soul shines through the body, so the one certain and clear sense of every word of God is reflected in manifold ways in all arrangements of the kingdom of God, without thereby justifying a *twofold* or *threefold* exposition of the word.

to be prized one of Julius Africanus between the two genealogies of Christ in Luke and Matthew. Just as he, after he had finished the task, concludes, "Whether this be the case or not, yet the gospel remains certainly true,"* so the ancient church, in general with similar cheerfulness, concluded that God's word, in every separate part, contains the true revelation, and that the apparent obscurities lie rather in our limitation of view than in the imperfection of Scripture.

One part of the use of Scripture is the proof founded thereupon for the doctrine, another that by which Scripture is applied to the edification of believers; and in this direction also the ancient church has perceived the sufficient attestation of the Spirit to Scripture. In a beautiful manner Tertullian, in his apologetic work, brings to light the whole procedure of the Christians in this matter. "We come together," says he, in communion that, as a closely connected band as it were, we may offer up prayers to God. We come together for the repetition of holy Scriptures, when the condition of the present times urges us either to admonish one another or to bring to one another's remembrance. There we nourish faith, stimulate hope, make confidence strong by means of these holy utterances, and the discipline of the commandments is to us an increased means of awakening. There one is encouraged, there one rebukes another, there the divine discipline is put in exercise; for great is the weight of the judgment in the view of those who hold it for certain that they stand here before God's face."† The use of Scripture was most intimately connected with all spiritual practice; it had, according to the view of the ancients, the promise of God. "If our Lord Jesus Christ," says Origen,‡ "finds us engaged in such employments and exercises, then will he not only deem us worthy of taking up his own abode with us, but if he sees this feast ready, he will also bring the Father with him." Hence they recommended the daily reading of holy Scripture, that believers might draw at all times from the wells of the Holy Ghost;§ according to the testimony of Theodoret and Basil the Great, the psalms of David were in the mouth of all, and people sang them not only in their houses, but upon the streets and roads.|| They enjoined upon the more youthful and the simple that they were merely to read holy Scripture with the confident faith, that here was God's word; while it was enjoined on the experienced,

* Julius Africanus ap. Euseb. Hist. eccles., lib. i. c. 7.

† Tertullian Apologeticus, c. 89.

‡ Orig. Homilia xx. in lib. Jos., p. 44 A, ed. Brned.

§ Orig. Homilia x. in Genes., p. 87 F.

|| Theodoret Protheoria in Psalmos, Opp. tom. i. p. 602; Basilii M. in Psalm. Opp. tom. i. p. 90.

and those trained for Scripture expositors, the "Deuterotes," as if it were not wished to forbid the investigation of the profoundest meaning of the words.*

X. Because the ancient church everywhere maintained the idea of the *personality of the Holy Ghost*, in order to lay the foundation for the belief in Scripture as a *work of God*, a certain breadth might occur, when a judgment was pronounced as to the outward phenomena and circumstances amid which that came to light. For if we must maintain, in the sphere of the workings of grace in general, that the Spirit distributes to every one severally as he will (1 Cor. xii. 11), then along with this greatest freedom of the divine causality, the matter, the form, and everything which belongs to the visible, is also an object of the same freedom. The highest order shines through the lower, but at the same time incorporates it, and makes use of it as a visible form; as, for example, the miracles of Christ were performed in connection with, in, and upon perishing nature, and oftentimes did not despise the natural vehicle itself. In the sphere of inspiration, we observe in the same way that the sacred writers oftentimes had, besides the impulse of the Spirit, outward occasions, definite rational aims (as *Luke* in his gospel), that their style is noways uniform, but sometimes soars on the wing of divine sublimity, sometimes descends in all stillness, simplicity, yea, apparent meanness. If one were to range this *apologetically* among the highest aims of God, who in contrast with his thoughts teaches us his hidden ways, and has clothed revelation itself as well as the outward appearance of the Lord and all his Christians in outward meanness, in order that the inner greatness might shine forth the more gloriously, the *believing* view would indeed be satisfied; but we first gain clear insight when we consider that the sphere of grace in general does not do away with human freedom, but rather elevates bondage to freedom. That the teachers of the ancient church so understood that apparent contradiction in contemplating the matter of inspiration, must certainly be granted, when we consider that, with all impartiality, they have preserved undisturbed both the divine causality and the human occasions and phenomena; and indeed it is not, as might be supposed, one series of teachers who maintained the former, and another the latter (in which case we might be charged with having ourselves dragged in the solution, rather than explained the view of the ancient church), but both are found together in the view of one and the same teacher. Here

* Eusebii *Præparatio Evangelica* xii. 1. Among the Jews, remarks Eusebius, they were accustomed to call the proper exegetes and expositors (*Hermeneuten*) *Deuterotes*. He has the name דְּאוּטְרוֹטִים in that sense.

we are above all confronted with Jerome, of whom, if of any man, one might maintain a free Jewish view, if in general there were anything true therein (and in reality the Romish Church has laid hold of many of these expressions, in order to generalise the idea of inspiration, and to extend it to every word of the church). He asserts that the apostle has been in reality foolish with the foolish Galatians, and has made use of quite simple proofs, which the foolish even can understand; he has often allowed himself to proceed so far in the Hebraising diction that one may well see it is meant in earnest, when he says of himself, 'Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἰδιώτης ἐπὶ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ γνώσει (2d Cor. xi. 6); lastly, he has not avoided even grammatical solecisms. But if Jerome mentions that foolish argumentation in the epistle to the Galatians, he at the same time traces it back to an artful prudence,* and the remark is natural, that even in the human folly a divine wisdom lies concealed. When, as at Gal. vi. 1, and at Ephes. iii. 1, he finds fault with the constructions as ungrammatical, he himself soon annihilates this stand-point when he glories in being a defender of the apostle in that very thing; for, says he, it would have been impossible that he, a Hebrew of the Hebrews, destitute of all splendour of speech, and ornament of words, and charm of eloquence, could have been able to convert the whole world to the faith of Christ, unless he had proclaimed the gospel, not in words of human wisdom, but in the power of God; they are God's depths that he proclaims, which the polished Greek language is scarce able to grasp.† Thus, all that Jerome remarks does not lie *outside* the circle of a word inspired by God (who can measure his instruments, and what he puts into their mouth not according to limited human views), but *inside* the same. That the other church teachers did not regard the relation between the outward phenomenon and the working of the Spirit in inspiration in another light, is evident. The same Irenæus, who compares the gospels to the *κλίμακα* and the four spirits of the world, is the very man among the most ancient witnesses who gives us the most complete information as to what had been ascertained with respect to the occasions for the gospels,‡ and with exactness brings out the peculiar character of each.§ In one and the same writing Augustine assures us, while he is explaining the apparent diversity of the evangelists in their reports respecting John the Baptist, that it need not surprise us if the sacred reporters narrate matters sometimes in more, sometimes in fewer words, "*ut quisque*

* Hieron. *Commentar. in epist. ad. Galat.*, lib. ii.

† Hieron. *Commentar. in ep. ad. Ephes.*, lib. ii. (ad. cap. iii. 1).

‡ Irenæus *adversus hæreses*, lib. iii. c. 11.

§ *Fragmenta Irenæi*, ed. Grabe, p. 471.

*meminerat et ut cuique cordi erat ;** and again, that we ought not to say, Christ has written nothing, since the apostles were merely his hands in writing.† With regard to Eusebius of Cesarea, who is the first to specify in a more comprehensive way, according to ancient reports, the occasion and circumstances amid which the gospels were written,‡ and thinks the apostles did not trouble themselves much about composing books, since they had a more excellent office, which was beyond all human power ; yea, that they were as if compelled to write,§ it is well known that he not only maintained the inspiration of the canonical Scriptures in the strictest sense, but even founded a proof for the divinity of Jesus upon the authority and the diffusion of the sacred writings.|| The view of these teachers was manifestly this, that the one thing does not exclude the other, that the external phenomena in general do not exclude the reality of the highest working of grace. Rather we shall be compelled to see in the outward occasions a PROVIDENTIAL element, which, along with the free activity of the apostles, was gathered up by means of inspiration into a higher order ; and there arises an untruthfulness and a misleading element in the view only, when one wishes to detach that providential element for itself.

XI. The doctrine of inspiration completes itself in the ancient church in two directions : on the one hand, when they shew its stretching over into the doctrine of the gifts of *grace* without misapprehending the distinction between the *Spirit* and the *spiritual charisma* ; and again, when they brought forward proofs for inspiration. The former is far more important than the latter, since, to touch on the latter but briefly, such a proof can mean nothing more than to bring to remembrance that by which Scripture generally authenticates itself as divine (just as we see from the quotations in *Junilius* and *Cassiodorus*) ;¶ at most, the remark about its living form, in the

* *August. de consensu Evangel.* ii. 12. Augustine here subjoins, in addition, a twofold apologetic consideration : that the word of God, as being eternal and unchangeable, transcends all phenomenal form, although it has been communicated, according to the divine economy, in signs and languages belonging to time ; and that the variety in the apostolic reports laid the firm foundation of the preaching that followed, which could not always be in the same words.

† *August. de consensu Evangelist.*, iii. c. ult.

‡ *Eusebii Histor. eccles.* iii. 24.

§ *Eusebii Histor. eccles.* i. c.

|| *Eusebii de laudibus Constantini*, c. 17.

¶ *Junilii de partibus divinae legis*, ii. 29 : " D. Unde probamus, libros religionis nostrae divina inspiratione esse conscriptos ? M. Ex multis, quorum primum est ipsius scripturae veritas, deinde ordo rerum, consonantia praeceptorum, modus locutionis sine ambitu puritasque verborum. Additur conscribentium et praedicantium qualitas, quod divina homines, excelsa viles, infacundi subtilia nonnisi divino repleti Spiritu tradidissent. Tam praedicationis virtus, quam, dum praedicaretur, licet a paucis despectis, obtinuit. Accedunt his testificatio contrariorum, utilitas consequentium, exitus eorum, quae per accep

narrower sense, might be so named, which again would trench rather on the efficacy of the word of God in general. But, as respects the former, Justin Martyr teaches with great definiteness, that if any one believingly reads the writings of the prophets, he can obtain saving knowledge; that of course the prophets confirmed their doctrines by true miracles, while the false soothsayers were filled with an unclean spirit, and deal with lying powers, and that this certainly shews the finger of God; but that one must ask above all, that the gates of light may be opened to him; for "no one can see and understand this, unless God and his Christ give unto him to perceive it."* The first and highest charisma is, according to Basil, that of prophecy; the next, which calls for no less solicitude, is the understanding of the things expressed by the Spirit. To this he refers the "discerning of spirits" (1 Cor. xiv. 29), and then sets down as the separate charismata which we have to obtain by prayer, the *λόγος γνώσεως*, to see the hidden things of God; the *λόγος σοφίας*, to put right and arrange what is in brief compass (1 Cor. xii. 8); finally, "the gift of teaching," to be able to edify the hearers.† In another way, and perhaps more suitably, Chrysostom explains that apostolic terminus, when he refers the *λόγος σοφίας* throughout to the highest gift of the Spirit (as a Paul and a John, the son of thunder, had it), but claims the *λόγος γνώσεως* for all believers in general, as a knowledge which was not always connected with the gift of teaching and of representation;‡ but it is clear as well in the latter as in the former explanation, that it was just the gifts which were in operation in the church that were regarded as a living continuation of that original highest gift (without, however, being identical with it), and, at the same time, as the right key to the understanding of the latter.

XII. The great unforced unanimity of the ancient church then respecting the doctrine of inspiration cannot possibly be connected, as some more recent authors have done,§ with a peculiar theological stand-point, as, for example, the *Alexandrian*, or be at all explained in that way; nor is the idea thus developed to be understood as the preparation for a freer view, which might first make its appearance afterwards; but, on the contrary, from the very opposition which occurs scattered here

tationes et figuras prædicationesque prædicta sunt. Ad postremum miracula jugiter facta, donec Scriptura ipsa susciperetur a gentibus." Comp. Cassiodori *divin. institut.*, c. 16.

* Just. Mart. *dialog. com. Tryphone*, c. 7.

† Basilii M. *Commentar. in Esaiam*, Prooem. c. 1, 2.

‡ Chrysos *Homilia* xxix in 1 ep. ad Cor. (xii. 8); Opp. x. p. 816. Likewise Theodore ad. h. l.

§ Among these Neander also, *Kirchengeschichte*, ii. 2, p. 749 and following.

and there in this period, it may be clearly shewn how deeply that doctrine had entered into the consciousness of the church. Leaving *Gnosticism* out of view, whose speculative tendency was every way an antichristian one, and which, therefore, was under the necessity of rejecting a great part of the documents of revelation without scruple, while it explained away the rest in its own favour, there are properly only two points which here come under consideration, but which, thus isolated, are very characteristic. As is well known, the Anomœans represent positive Arianism properly so-called; the errors, which with the head of the sect still appeared under a church-colouring, they preached naked and unconcealed; no wonder, therefore, that they did not allow themselves to be embarrassed by the most definite Scripture expressions. But the way and manner in which they rejected these was partly new; for, as Epiphanius informs us, when they were driven by argument into a corner, they took to flight, and said—"This or that was said by the apostle as a man;" or also, "Why dost thou hold up the Old Testament against me?" If we look back to the way in which Bishop Alexander from the beginning of the controversy used Scripture against Arius,* and the fathers assembled at Nice likewise, we easily see that the continuation of this heresy could reach its aim and accomplishment only by the denial of the divine inspiration of holy Scripture. But Epiphanius dismisses them with the short remark, that it is quite in order, that they who refuse to know Christ should still more refuse to honour his prophets and apostles.† Quite as characteristic is the conduct of Jerome towards these Anomœan teachers of error, if they are the same heretics whom he mentions in his preface to the Epistle to Philemon. They rejected this epistle on this ground among other frivolous grounds, because the apostle has not always spoken from Christ; nay, that the continual indwelling of the Spirit along with the necessities and infirmities of human life is not at all possible; that the apostle himself when he says, "Yet not I, but Christ liveth in me" (Gal. ii. 20), has presupposed a state, where this was not yet the case; that it agrees ill with his challenge to the Corinthians,—"Since ye seek a proof of Christ speaking in me" (2 Cor. xiii. 3), or with his mentioning in another passage his cloak which he had left at Troas, and in the Epistle to the Galatians with his expressing the pious wish, "I would they were even cut off which trouble you" (Gal. v. 12); finally, that according to the assurance of the voice of God himself, the holy Ghost

* *Socratis Histor. eccles.*, i. 6.

† Epiphan. *adversus hæreses* lxxvi. *Aëtii salutis Confut.* vi. Opp., tom i. p. 991, seq.

descended upon none but upon Jesus. Against this bombast, to which the recent objections held forth as acute are not a whit inferior in shallowness, Jerome satisfies himself with remarking that when one asserts that the Holy Ghost is driven away by corporeal things and necessities he cannot rest till, with Valentinus, Marcion, and Appelles, he assumes a god of worms, of grasshoppers, &c., in opposition to the God who made heaven and earth.* The matter in question was too deeply rooted in the consciousness of believers, for the teacher to think anything else worth their while, than to hold up its own mirror to the inflated nonsense.

The second contribution proceeds from a church teacher, whose other merits cannot certainly make us forget that he has handled holy Scripture with great want of reverence, and partly in a profane spirit. It is the head of the Antiochean school, *Theodore of Mopsuestia*, who has been so often commended in more recent times as the founder of the correct grammatico-historical exposition, which latter with such an ancestor has really pronounced its own sentence, the more so as Theodoret's interpretation, who belonged only outwardly to this school, in no respect recognised the same principles, but coincided with it at most in the opposition to false allegorising. Now, grant that in the three-chapter controversy much angry vacillation occurred; granting also that the fifth Ecumenic Council (at Constantinople, 553) attained its object but very imperfectly; it was certainly right in the rejection of Theodore of Mopsuestia's whole mode of viewing and handling holy Scripture. No judicious and believing Christian will misunderstand the source from which sprung attacks like the following, which are extracted from Theodore's third book against Apollinaris—"The book of Job has risen as a poem on heathen soil; the Song of Solomon is a tedious bridal song, of a character neither prophetic, nor historical, nor instructive, written in a similar way to that in which *Plato* afterwards wrote his *Symposion*; finally, Proverbs and Ecclesiastes contain, it is true, good doctrines, and Solomon received certainly the λόγος γνώσεως, but not the λόγος σοφίας, the prophetic gift."† Let it merely be remarked, that partial as was this contradiction, yet no one, neither Pope Vigilius, nor the Council which resisted him, would recognise in this anything but a meaning inconsistent with Scripture as the word of God. Theodore has so great an interest for us,

* Hieron. *Prooem. in epist. ad Philemonem*

† *Acta Concilii Constantinople*, ii. Collatis, iv. 65, 71, ap. Harduin. *Acta Concilii*, tom. iii. p. 87, 89. The text in Harduin is somewhat confused, inasmuch as the statements of Theodore are mixed with inferences, without this being indicated by a mark of division; but this is by no means the case with what we have extracted.

only because he is in reality the living type of the more recent so-called critical investigation. But here certainly philosophy must preserve its rights, that what is inconceivable is for that reason unsubstantial; and he who, like this church teacher, will fight against a work of God or the smallest part of it with atoms of thought, has done more than a vain work.

[The article next adverts to the scholastic divines and the Jewish teachers of the middle ages.]

X.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

Letters of Samuel Rutherford, with Biographical Sketches of his Correspondents. Edited by Rev. ANDREW A. BONAR, Glasgow. Two vols. Edinburgh: Kennedy. 1863.

This is by far the best edition of Rutherford's letters that has ever appeared, nor is it likely that any subsequent edition will supersede it. The editor, in many points like-minded with the author whom he lovingly elucidates, has ransacked every corner for information, and done all that probably can ever be done to put the reader in a position for appreciating these precious remains of one of the most holy and Christ-like men that Scotland has to enroll among her worthies. We need not refer to the life and times of Rutherford, nor to the general characteristics of his glowing piety, after the beautiful sketch which Mr Bonar has prefixed to the letters. But we have always felt that Rutherford's mind, from the fact that he so strongly realised and loved the personal Saviour, and because he was richly imbued with the views of the Redeemer's headship prevalent in Scotland—a doctrine of peculiar value in leading spiritual minds to a lively mode of contemplating the God-man—is a more modern cast of mind than many of his age. The freshness of these letters to modern readers may be explained in this way, and it is an element not found in any of his Puritan contemporaries to the same degree.

The superiority of this edition to every other will appear from a statement of what the editor has done for it. "Attending carefully to the chronological arrangement, the editor has sought, by biographical, topographical, and historical notices, to put the reader in possession of all that was needed to enable him to enter into the circumstances in which each letter was written, so far as that could be done. The explanatory notes, the appended glossary of Scottish words and expressions (many of them in reality old English), the index of places and persons, the index of special subjects, and the prefixed contents of each letter will, it is confidently believed, be found both interesting and useful." Besides the ten additional letters which appeared in the edition of 1848, there are two additional letters added since that time. We trust that the appearance of these attractive volumes will win many new readers to letters the most precious in church history.

Lectures on the Epistles of Paul to the Thessalonians. By JOHN LILLIE, D.D., First Presbyterian Minister, Kingston, N.Y. Edinburgh: Oliphant. 1863.

Dr Lillie is a distinguished Scottish student, though now naturalised in

America. He has here successfully applied the results of a critical study of the Greek text to the uses of popular instruction and the edification of the church. Every one who knew the author's antecedents would be prepared for ripe scholarship, a reverent appreciation of the sacred word in its import and connections, and they will find all this interwoven with the more popular elucidation of the text in a singularly suggestive and edifying way. It is, we must add, strongly imbued with premillennial views of Scripture, but calculated to be highly instructive and useful to all who really desire to get into the meaning of God's word.

Brief Historical Explanation of the Revelation of St John, according to the Horæ Apolyptice of Mr Elliott. By H. C. TUCKER, Bengal Civil Service. London: Nisbet. 1863.

This little work, as an abridgment of Mr Elliott's "*Horæ Apolyptice*," will be useful to many who have not access to the larger work. It is well executed, being originally planned as one of a series of school-books for native Christians in India.

The Redeemer: a series of Sermons on certain aspects of the Person and Work of our Lord Jesus Christ. By WILLIAM ROBINSON CLERK, M.A., Vicar of Taunton. London: Bell & Daldy. 1863.

This little volume is what it professes to be,—a series of sermons. They are sermons so good and sound that, in these days of abundant heresy, it is quite refreshing to read them. We are surprised to find a man who holds and teaches so much truth, not being able to see his way a little farther. He sees and explains fully the doctrine of the headship of the two Adams; and yet he can say, "that man was created anew in Christ—in him the human race received a new head." The whole theology of the book is at war with such statements as these. On the author's own principles, such a statement as that means universal salvation, which yet he does not hold. His chapter on "The Hope of Israel" would satisfy neither the millenarians nor the ante-millenarians. It is not often we read a volume of sermons in which there is so much to praise, and so little to blame. We may add that there is a gracious blending of the practical with the doctrinal.

The Argument of St Paul's Epistle to the Christians in Rome traced and illustrated. By the Rev. C. P. SHEPHERD, M.A., Incumbent of South Lambeth Chapel. London: Bell & Daldy. 1862.

This exposition of the Epistle to the Romans is in the form of sermons. It is as yet incomplete, reaching only to the close of the eighth chapter. The form of the exposition is about the most difficult to manage, and generally the author has delivered himself in a "popular" manner, which increases the difficulties against which he has had to contend; yet the exposition is one of no common merit. The author thinks, and therefore speaks for himself, and that with a singular force, clearness, and simplicity. We differ *toto celo* from his conclusions: he looks at the epistle from an Arminian stand-point; altogether misunderstands the phrase, "the righteousness of God," which is the key and key-note of the whole: yet we have learnt a good deal by looking at the old familiar words through a totally different medium. The first sermon, in which the author strongly puts the necessity of always considering that you are not dealing with a gathering of chapters and a series of texts, but with a letter; that you ought always to remember who writes, to whom, when, why, and the state of mind of the writer as well as those who are addressed; all this is wisely, clearly, and ably put, and that introductory sermon deserves high and

special praise. We shall be glad to see how the author deals with the ninth and the eleventh chapters. We expect he will be able to bring out fully the meaning of that eleventh chapter, in its close connection with all that precedes it from the very beginning of the *épistle*. It is not often that we can speak of an Arminian, both in so kindly a way and in such terms, as we can speak of this.

Life in Heaven. By the author of "Heaven Our Home" and "Meet for Heaven." Edinburgh: Nimmo. 1863.

The author of this volume tells us, in his preface, that 75,000 copies of his two former works have been sold in this country alone. He calls this, "unlooked-for success." We think him right in his own estimation of himself; for certainly a poorer book than this, or its two elder brothers, we have hardly ever read. We are utterly at a loss to discover the possible cause of the public appetite for the sort of reading herein provided for them. It is not the style; for that is clumsy, full of poverty-stricken repetitions of phrases, tautologies, and heavy. It is not the matter; for that is as dull, heavy, and commonplace as the style. Is it the subject? and, if so, are men's own imaginations so very poor that they are glad to rest in cloudy creations of this sort, formed for them by the toil of another? This last is the worst of the three volumes of the anonymous author, who has got on to an inclined plane whose lowest limits have now been reached. Surely the writer did not mean to be humorous, nor to burlesque a subject so sacred; but if the last five chapters of "*Life in Heaven*" be not a burlesque, what are they? We have long speeches by Isaiah, Abraham, Lazarus, John Newton, Locke, Bacon, Milton, Cowper, Pollock, which are simply ridiculous. Isaiah, if he speak now such manifest stuff as this author puts into his mouth, has lost much of his power since he left this world. All these writers have sensibly deteriorated in their style; they have all lost their individuality; and most of them have somehow got a hold of a great number of Scotticisms, Cowper especially, which they had not when they spoke or wrote in this world. Really, people ought to form a judgment on books for themselves, and not buy books simply because they are industriously puffed into notoriety.

Old Friends, and what became of them. By the Rev. J. B. OWEN, M.A., Incumbent of St Jude's, Chelsea. London: Nisbet & Co. 1862.

Under this somewhat quaint title we have, in nine chapters, a series of biographical sketches, partly real and partly imaginary, so far as it appears, bringing out in a very forcible way some of the strengths and the weaknesses of human nature. The author has looked on man and his ways with an observant eye. Shrewd, kindly, and clear-sighted, he has gathered up and garnered many a fragment which, under other auspices, would have been left behind, lost, or trampled under foot. The style is sharp; there are no superfluous words. There is a dry caustic humour, which acts on the reader as a constant tonic; and under Mr Owen's hand, old things look new in the new dress, or in the new companionship with which they are introduced to us. The volume may be very safely and very cordially commended to our readers, as a wise, thoughtful, and very suggestive book, worthy of its able and accomplished author.

The More Excellent Way; or, Links in Love's Chain. Seeley, Jackson, & Halliday. London. 1862.

The execution of this volume is not worthy of its design. It is a series of chapters on each of the separate characteristics of charity, as given by the apostle Paul in his glowing eulogium—Charity suffereth long, is kind,

envieth not, vaunteth not itself, &c., &c., through sixteen chapters. It is an idea worth taking up, and fully working out. This volume would be a help in no way.

Ulrich von Hutten, Imperial Poet and Orator. Translated from Chaffour-Kestner's "*Études sur les Réformateurs Du 16 me Siecle.*" by ARCHIBALD YOUNG, Esq., advocate. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1863.

This is a translation, and though we have not compared it with the original, it bears many internal marks of being a good translation. The biography is brief; the facts are few; the philosophy of the stirring events in which von Hutten took a part so active and prominent, is hardly attempted; but the volume is a good and useful contribution to our English biographical literature. Few readers, we presume, will close this volume without a desire to know more fully the facts of Von Hutten's life; and the extracts from his published works are so rich and racy as to whet the appetite for more. The translator has added a valuable series of biographical notes, in elucidation of the text, where occur many names less generally known than usual to mere English readers. The volume is to be commended.

A History of the Christian Church from the Nativity of our Lord to the Reign of Constantine. By the late EBENEZER SOPER. London: Houlston & Wright. 1863.

Posthumous works need careful and competent editors. A history without a table of contents, with no headings to books or chapters, with few references to authorities, with no index, and by an author whose name is totally unknown in the world of letters, is of very small value. Had the matter composing this volume been edited in a competent way, and had the wants we have indicated been supplied (with the exception, of course, of the last), a work might have been produced of some permanent value. The editor's competency for his task may be judged of by the following extract from "the preface:"—"It is to be regretted that those persons who hold Romish doctrines devote more attention to ecclesiastical *history* than is given to it by evangelical Christians. Romanists delight to appeal to 'catholic antiquity.' It is not so well known as it should be, that they may be vanquished in argument on the ground which they claim as their own."

A Reply to the Strictures of the Rev. J. H. Hinton, M.A., on some Passages in Lectures on Christian Faith. By JOHN H. GODWIN. London: Jackson & Walford. 1862.

In our last number we noticed Professor Godwin's "Lectures on Christian Faith." Our readers will remember that Mr Godwin is professor of exegetical theology in the new Independent College in London. Mr Hinton, the Baptist minister, wrote a pamphlet containing some very severe strictures on Mr Godwin's book. This is Mr Godwin's reply. We give a few extracts, that our readers may form some notion of this extraordinary production for themselves. "The evangelists believed in the divinity of Christ, and in his sacrificial death, as fully as St Paul; but they have not taught these doctrines exactly in the same way," p. 9. This is his own summary of what he teaches on the doctrine of justification by faith. "I have said again and again that *trust* in the Saviour does ensure salvation, and that a man is immediately judged to be *right* by God when he has faith in Christ, this faith being only a sincere acceptance of him, our Lord and Saviour; and this *being right*, comprehending his uprightness, his relation to Christ, and his hope of all that is contained in the promises of God." This is all. Speaking

of the same doctrine on the next page, he says, "*I have ventured to call in question what may be called the Protestant interpretation of the peculiar language of St Paul*, but only to shew that all the truths which are set forth according to one mode of understanding terms are as clearly and certainly set forth according to the other, and that we need not suppose any change in the signification of words, or any semblance of fiction," pp. 18-21. Again, p. 22, "The interpretation of the peculiar phraseology of St Paul which has been received by protestant churches for some centuries was not held in the early ages of the Christian Church." Again, p. 31, "According to Mr Hinton's statement, the great work of the gospel seems to be in the assurance that so much suffering has been endured in our stead, and so much work has been done in our stead. This view appears to me very different from that of the Bible, and alien from the spirituality and universality of the gospel."

The Exodus of Israel : its Difficulties Examined, and its Truths Confirmed, with a Reply to Recent Objections. By the Rev. T. R. BIRKS, M.A., Rector of Kelshall. London : the Religious Tract Society. 1863.

So far as we have had time to read and examine this book of Mr Birks—and we have got through the greater portion of it—we have been impressed with the conviction that it is one of the best, if not the best, of the replies to Bishop Colenso that has yet appeared. It is elegant, scholarly, thorough. He does not spare the bishop; but his rebukes are administered in the tone and spirit in which a Christian man should correct an erring brother. We sincerely wish that every reader of the bishop's book could only be induced to read the reply of the presbyter. We have felt that the reply of Mr Birks on all the points he has taken up has been most triumphant and complete. He meets the bishop fairly, and faces the difficulty as fairly; there is no evasion, no hypothesis hastily concocted for the occasion, but a calm, manly dignity, conscious of its strength, which inspires you with a feeling of the goodness of the cause so gracefully and chivalrously defended.

The following works, which space prevents us from noticing more fully, we cordially recommend, viz. :—

- Lewis's *Divine Human in Scripture* (Nisbet).
- Dr Bonar's *Short Sermons* (do.).
- Dr Hamilton's *Morning by the Sea of Galilee* (do.).
- Gailey's *Submission and its Reward* (do.).
- M. Dods's *Prayer that Teaches to Pray* (Maclaren).
- Griffith's *Fatherhood of God* [Title Unhappy] (Hatchard).
- Hebert on *Clerical Subscription* (Macmillan).
- Dr Alexander's *Young Communicant* (Elliot).
- Professor Young's *Science and Scripture* (Lockwood).

An anonymous work, entitled "*The Destiny of the Human Race*" (Simpkin), we can only condemn. It is a clever universalist advocacy of a probation in another life for those who have not embraced the Gospel here.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

JULY 1863.

ART. I.—*Clement of Alexandria and his Apologetic.*

No writer of antiquity has left us a more complete picture of the ancient world than Clement of Alexandria. If we were required to reproduce the philosophy, the religion, the literature, the manners of the most illustrious representatives of heathenism, and if we were confined to a single author as our source of information, the author we should choose would undoubtedly be Clement. The age he lived in was one which had little life of its own, and whose hope it was to resuscitate the past. It was a learned age and a critical age, though its learning and its criticism were alike superficial. It gathered up all the treasures of the past; and the eclectic spirit which had characterised Alexandria since its foundation, and which its position seemed to destine it to mature, was never more vigorous than when Clement took up his abode in the Greek quarter. The character of the age, and the character of the city in which he lived, were well represented in his own upbringing and disposition. By birth a Pagan, and by conversion a Christian, he understood the position of the two great parties in the world of religion. Born in Athens, personally acquainted with Italy, Syria, and Asia Minor, and finally settling in Alexandria, he combined in his own person the erudition and system of the West with the profundity and warmth of the East. In his boyhood he may have seen the keen eye and humorous play of feature in the face of Lucian, Pausanias investigating antiquities, and Diogenes Laertius collecting his anecdotes; in his manhood he must have seen Ammonius bending under his sacks of grain, and venting scraps of philosophy to his fellow-porters as he recovered his breath; and when he found that

the two Philostrati and Sextus Empiricus were to be the leaders of his age, he may have thought that Diogenes Laertius had not lived too soon to write the lives of all the philosophers. In his boyhood he had heard the regrets of the old men who had seen the glory and prosperity of the golden age of the empire ; during his travels he may have been one of the crowd which crushed into the Roman amphitheatre that day when Commodus, as the "Roman Hercules," slew with his own bow one hundred lions, and prostituted the imperial rank to a service which had been prohibited as scandalous to the senators and knights ; and in his prime he felt the persecuting rage of Severus, and was forced to flee from his pupils to a safe obscurity in Cappadocia. He had the best opportunity, therefore, of judging what the real condition of the world was and was likely to be.

It is impossible to ascertain the exact date of his settlement in Alexandria. It was probably about the year 190 ;* and in a year or two afterwards he was ordained a presbyter of the church, and succeeded Pantaenus in the catechetical school. It was to Pantaenus that he owed the first satisfactory instruction he received ; for all that he had acquired hitherto was a distaste for everything but the Stoic philosophy, which, as Brucker says, "*ambabus amplexus est manibus*," and the terminology of which he used to the last. Alexandria was at this time perhaps the greatest emporium in the world ; allowed by the Romans to hold the second place. Every known race had its representatives on the quays which Alexander had founded to be the exchange of the Eastern and Western worlds. Its climate was counted the most salubrious, and its natural beauty of position was equalled by the magnificence of its buildings. In the words of a traveller† who saw it two centuries after Clement, "I could neither satisfy myself with gazing, nor could I overtake all that was worthy of observation ; whatever I looked at seemed to be unique and unrivalled, yet other sights pressed their claims, and could not be passed by. The extent of the city so strove with its beauty, and its size with the number of its inhabitants, that neither seemed to yield to the other. The size seemed greater than measure could include, and the population too great for number to overtake. As I continued to look around me, the city appeared too large to be filled by any number of inhabitants, and yet the number of men appeared so enormous that I was forced to doubt whether any city could be large enough to contain them." In this beautiful, busy, and dissipated city, every vice of heathenism, and the

* Cave, who gives the opinions of the learned on this point, puts it somewhat later.

† Achilles Tatius, in the beginning of the 5th book of his romance.

most sumptuous pomp of idolatry, were constantly before the eyes of Clement. He had witnessed the most impressive worship of nature in the gorgeous feast of the sun, when the city rivalled the sky in brilliance of illumination. Autumn after autumn, as the nights grew longer, and as the gay colours died away from the earth, he had seen the venerable priests of Isis lead out the sacred bull, with his horns gilt and his body veiled in black silk, to testify "their sadness and heavy cheer." And he had seen the same priests go forth by night to the sea-side, clad in their sacred vestments, and carrying the consecrated ark and the vessels of gold, celebrating with shouts of triumph the finding of Osiris, and the restoration of life and fertility to the earth. Everything that paganism had to attract, to deceive, to bind, was matter of daily observation to the man who was destined to become not only the most voluminous, but in many respects the most sagacious of Christian apologists.

In Alexandria, Clement had also opportunity to acquire that learning which was essential to qualify him to meet the mental condition of religious inquirers in the second century. It was at least as important to gain the philosophers and scholars of the museum as the mechanics of the docks and building-yards, or the porters of the warehouses. It was not enough that he should be sufficiently acquainted with Homer and the other sources of Greek mythology to expose the infamy of the history of the gods; it was not enough that he should have sufficient acuteness and dialectic skill to divest the mysteries of their pretensions to bestow immortality on the initiated. His office as teacher of the Christian school exposed him to the interrogation of all who had difficulties about the new religion. The cavils which were concocted by the wits of the museum, the theories which were broached in the dining-hall of the professors, would naturally find their way to the ears of Clement. To gain a victory over the Christian teacher would be enough to make the reputation of an aspirant to the degree of the pagan doctors. And so Clement drew around the young plants which were under his charge the hedge, as he calls it, of a learning at least equal to, and probably very far superior to that of any who was likely to attack them. In the library of the Serapeion, doomed to be destroyed in another century by fanatics professing the same religion as himself, he found all that was needful to furnish him against the most erudite of his antagonists. That he made abundant use of the valuable stores here laid up, is sufficiently evident from the number and facility of his quotations. Excepting Athenæus, probably no ancient writer could be named who cites 400 authors; but if we are to reckon second-hand quotations and sayings of the philosophers, a much larger number than this must measure

the reading of Clement. Where so much time has been spent upon reading, we do not expect to find evidence of much time spent in reflection; where the mass acquired is so great, we anticipate that it has not all been assimilated, and that much of it is carried as a burden, making the movements of the mind heavy and uncertain. Yet it is scarcely fair to say with Brucker,*—"Suffocaverat vir eruditissimus immensæ lectionis copia judicium." He had, at least, a decided aversion to foolish or useless learning, and would have joined in the regret of our modern utilitarian—

"What numbers shenth'd in erudition lie,
Plung'd to the hilts in venerable tomes,
And rusted in; who might have borne an edge,
And play'd a sprightly beam, if born to speech."

Indeed, Clement expresses the same sentiment under what some may deem a prettier figure. "The wells," he says, "which are unused stagnate, but clear waters gush from those that are used. What profit is there in wisdom if it do not instruct the hearer?" There were many in his own day who told him that no good thing could by any alchemy be extracted out of pagan writings, but at the utmost he can only be accused of not being always judicious and logical in his use of pagan ideas. He might, perhaps, have been the better of the advice given afterwards by Gregory Nazianzen—

"At ista, queso, cuncta fac cautus legas,
Prudenter ex his colligens quid utile,
Fugiensque quicquid noxium est et pestilens.
Apis æmulari cura sit sapientiam,
Quæ flore in omni sessitans, ex singulis
Idonce carpit esse quod videt utile."

However, no one will deny that it was proper that a man in Clement's position at Alexandria should be a man of thorough culture, should understand his adversaries' position—should be able to use against them suitable weapons, and should strengthen the catechumens with such instruction as would be of practical value to them. The question which lies so close to this,—How far the Christian teachers of Alexandria were justifiable in introducing Christian ideas to the cultivated minds around them, under philosophical garb and in philosophical

* Every one who desires to understand the position, and to estimate the teaching of the Alexandrine writers, will naturally turn to Brucker, and will be amply rewarded by the dissertations in his third volume devoted to this subject. The *Dissertations* of Le Nourry are long, but contain much useful information. They are reprinted in Migne's *Édition of Clement*, which is very complete, and worthy of all praise. An interesting, original, and satisfactory account of Clement is given in Pressensé's *Histoire de l'Eglise Chrétienne*. To those who merely desire a faithful rendering in English of large portions of Clement's writings, Bishop Kaye's work will be acceptable.

forms—how far they were right in Platonizing—is a more difficult question to answer. Much historical investigation, much philosophical ability, and much plausible argumentation have been expended by accusers and defenders. And probably the question will continue to be settled by each investigator, in the same manner as it was settled by the Fathers themselves; those who had studied and admired the platonic philosophy making liberal use of it, and those who had not done so condemning its use as profane. There is no doubt, however, that even the fundamentals of the Christian faith are obscured in the writings of Clement, by the philosophic clothing in which they are presented. It would be easy to select passages from the *Stromata*, which would be quite in their place in the *Phædo* or the *Theætetus*, not so easy to collect passages which would fully exhibit the scriptural doctrine of redemption. Yet, there is no mistaking the piety of Clement; his reverence for Scripture is equally unmistakeable, and his anxiety to bring all men under its influence is patent on every page. And it cannot but occur to one who enters at all into the spirit of his writings, that there must have been some real efficacy in the mode of persuasion adopted by one who had himself been won from the same position as those to whom he appealed now occupied. He had been a highly educated pagan, he was now a sincere and devoted Christian; surely he must have had some knowledge of the path which led from the one position to the other. Is it likely, that when inducing others to the same transition as he had himself accomplished, he should have forgotten or omitted to use those inducements which had been effectual in his own case? Or is it likely that those inducements which had proved effectual with him, would be of no avail with others of the same cast of mind, and of the same habits of thought?

In estimating the service done by Clement, it has, perhaps, been too little considered that his position in Alexandria gave an apologetic cast to the whole of his teaching. We do not suspect Paley of Arianism because his *Evidences* contain no explicit teaching on the doctrine of the Trinity. We do not consider the speech of Paul on Mar's Hill defective, because it does not enounce the doctrine of the atonement. The writings of Clement are not all professedly apologetic, yet he has read them very carelessly who does not feel that this is the character of the whole, and that, if Clement is to be fairly estimated, he must be judged by an apologetic, and not by a systematic standard. What he would have done in those numerous works he promised to write, what he did in those nine which the old world saw and lost, we cannot tell; but his extant writings clearly shew that if he was to teach in Alex-

andria at all, he must do so apologetically. Two of his three great works are professedly to the heathen; and the *Stromata* seem to be little more than a collection of such discourses as he held from time to time with his pupils, and with pagan inquirers. They bear all the characteristics of such a compilation. There is a great deal of repetition, and a want of order scarcely conceivable, except on the supposition that the work was written at intervals, as he had occasion to explain matters to his pupils. There is also a vivacity and animation which brings us into the presence of the author, and we seem rather to listen to one who speaks, than to read the words of a writer. Now, if this be the origin of the *Stromata*, its excellence varies with its fitness to meet the questions and doubts of the most highly educated class in Alexandria at the close of the second century. These questions were of the same kind as had exercised the mind of Plato centuries before:—How are the finite and the infinite connected; or, what is the world, and how is it related to God? Has man any special connection with God, and how may this be realised and confirmed? What is the soul of man, and what may it become? And how is it to achieve its destiny; especially, is it by some kind, and what kind, of liberation from the body? If Clement did not answer these questions, he had no chance of being heard by the class among which his lot was cast. Christianity, by giving the real answers to these questions, and by putting the answers in the hearts of many whose ears were unused to philosophic diction, had excited an almost universal attention to the questions themselves. What had been interesting to the few, became important to the many. The appetite which had been dormant was excited as soon as the proper food was presented. Christianity no sooner put within men's reach communion with God, than men who had till now been content with the world thirsted after God. But at this juncture, Paganism made a last stand. It saw now what the nature of man required; Christianity had developed the wants of the soul, as Paganism had never done. But could Paganism not satisfy these wants as plausibly as Christianity? Sagacious men began to see that there could be no going back now to the old state of things; but might not a pagan philosophy be framed which should satisfy these new demands? After all, had not Plato anticipated these very demands, and might not something yet be made of what he had done towards practically satisfying the craving of men after a higher life? It should at least be tried.

It was, therefore, with the beginnings of Neo-Platonism, which professed to be a saving religion as well as a philosophy, that Clement had in the first instance to do. He constantly endea-

vours to persuade men that Christ is the only teacher who has the truth to give. He does not deny that the ancient philosophers had some light, but maintains that they borrowed a great deal from the Jews, and that all that they had was given them only as a preparation for the fuller truth of Christianity. These are the ideas to which he devotes whole books of the *Stromata*, and which recur again and again throughout the whole. The attitude he maintains towards philosophers is that of an inquirer in the same path, but further on. They are below, striving upwards; he stands above, where the dawn has struck. He continually assures philosophers that they are right so far—that there is a divine element in man—that men are capable of holding fellowship with God—that there is a life for the soul of man pure from sin. All this philosophy had taught, and all this, Clement insists, philosophy was right in teaching, and delights to recall the beautiful forms in which this teaching had often been embodied. But here, he says, is the difference between Christianity and philosophy, that Christianity has received the truth which philosophy was only groping after; that there is only one whose teaching can develop that divine element in man, only one who can bring man to God, only one who can heal, purify, and strengthen the soul. He comes even nearer to the philosophers still, by granting that this one teacher had been their teacher also, though he had not given to them the fulness of the truth. The Word, he says, who now enlightens Christians, has been in all antiquity the instructor of philosophers. All this is true, and may have induced men of philosophic leanings to look with a kindlier eye upon Christianity. Yet this uniform presentation of Christ in the one character of a teacher is not merely defective, but deceptive. Redemption comes to be nothing more than the reception of Christ's teaching, the soul being purified, and, in the Platonic sense, redeemed by the truth. Faith comes to be nothing more than the mental belief of the revelation of Christ, and this is placed as the foundation of all spiritual progress, in the same sense in which the older philosophers had postulated intuition as the basis of knowledge. Any other view of redemption will be found with difficulty in Clement's writings; yet the occasional passages in which the correct view is found, are satisfactory in regard to Clement's personal belief.

While, therefore, Clement can scarcely be said to have brought forward the characteristic differences of Christianity, he adopts the method which he judged most suitable for winning the attention of philosophers. And further, it is probably true that what Clement had both originally and habitually prized in Christianity was, the solution which it afforded of the highest problems of philosophy, and the practical aid he

received from it for leading a holy and godly life. He felt more keenly the distance to which sin had banished man from God, and the blindness and weakness it had begotten in the soul, than the guilt or danger of it. Having to do with men whose souls were aspiring, rather than with those whose consciences were condemning them, he took them as they were, and shewed what there was in Christianity suitable for them. He was perfectly aware that his position was a doubtful one, and he maintained it, on the conviction that it was the most useful he could take up. That he had carefully considered the course he should adopt in dealing with incipient Neo-Platonists, is proved by the pregnancy of his sentences when he defends his position. He meets his assailants at three different levels, first maintaining that philosophy is a good thing (*θείαν θεωρίαν* "Ἐλλήσει δεδομένην"), meaning, however, by philosophy, "not the Stoic, nor the Platonic, nor the Epicurean, nor the Aristotelian, but an eclectic philosophy, compounded of all the good and wise things that have been found in any of these." Again, descending from this highest position, he maintains that "though philosophy were useless, yet if it be useful to establish its uselessness, it is useful." This is something more than a sophism, and would probably give pause to his assailants. But his favourite argument is drawn from necessity. He must become a Greek to the Greeks (*τῷ γὰρ ὁμοίω τὸ ὅμοιον ἰδιδασκέμεθα*), he must fully appreciate their difficulties before he can remove them, recognise the truth they hold before he can add to it, and see their error from their own point of view (*πιστός ὁ μὲν ἱμασιρίας ἔλεγχος*.)^{*} But in every defence which Clement makes of philosophy, it is implied that there is a better thing than philosophy, the *ἀληθεια καθ' ἡμας*. With all that he grants to the philosopher there comes the appeal, Submit yourself to Him from whom all truth in every age has proceeded. Perhaps Clement had reason to be persuaded that the men to whom he was sent would not think of Christ at all, unless he were presented in this light. Perhaps the terminology, which to us appears defective and deceptive, may have admitted of a wider interpretation than we can now discover. While it touched philosophy on the one side, it may have comprehended more of the Christian idea than appears to us. If we take Clement's writings as we have and understand them; if we say, "This, and nothing more than this, is what Clement taught as Christianity, and would have men to live by;" if we form Clement's creed out of his extant works, and give to each article a higher or a lower place, according as it has a larger or a smaller place

* See the *Pædagogus*, throughout; and the *Stromata*, lib. i. c. 2-7, and lib. v. c. 3.

allotted to it in his discussions : then we must conclude that his views of Christianity were too much coloured by his philosophic upbringing and habit of thought, and that his hearers must have received a false impression of his religion. But if we conceive that what we have of Clement's teaching is only preliminary, if we look upon him simply as a guide to, and not as an expositor of, the truth ; if we believe that he expected that those whom he won to Christ as his pupils, if not yet as his disciples, would go on to learn much more than he had led them to anticipate : our conclusions must be somewhat modified. "*Cum enim hanc eclecticam philosophandi rationem non Alexandriam modo, sed et omnem fere orbem literatum atque philosophicum, occupasse cerneret, multaque passim adduci videret, quibus commendari posse gentilibus philosophis Christianam religionem credebat, eandem viam sibi ingrediendam statuit, ut rem Christianam juvaret*" (Brucker, iii. 422). The redemption of which he generally speaks is certainly, in its mode, little more than the Platonic enlightenment and purification of the soul, yet without this there is no Christian redemption. The faith he argues for is short of the Westminster idea of saving faith ; yet without the belief of the revelation of Christ, and the surrender of the mind to his teaching, there is no reliance of the soul upon him. To have spoken of redemption and faith as we speak of them might have been unintelligible to those men out of whose speculations Neo-Platonism was rapidly taking shape ; to speak of them as Clement spoke might introduce the scriptural idea.*

The apologetic of Clement has, of course, a destructive as well as a conciliatory side. He is unsparing in his exposure of the folly and wickedness of the pagan worship and practices. As might be expected, his *Logos Protreptikos*, or hortatory address to the Greeks, differs considerably from the Apologies of Minucius, Justin, or Tertullian. He has not the advantage of Justin's hazardous position, nor does his fearlessness, though unsurpassed by any of the apologists, appear in so interesting a light as if he had been pleading at the tribunal of Cæsar. His address does not possess the picturesque and dramatic attractions of the Octavius, but his impassioned earnestness, which throughout breaks through his reasoning in loving and pointed appeal, raises him above all his predecessors and contemporaries. His assault upon the heathen position is conducted with all the vigour of Tertullian, but with far more than

* Pressensé thus describes Clement's position : " Il est l'apologiste des gentils, l'apôtre de la Grèce cultivée, et il plaide la cause du Christ devant un aréopage idéal ou siègent comme juges tous les grands philosophes de l'antiquité. Il parle leur langue, il les prend au point de développement moral et religieux où il les trouve pour les amener à la vérité complète."

his love, care, and skill. Whatever he says of idolatry is sensible and convincing, is based upon an unusually extensive acquaintance with the mythology and literature of the Greeks, and reminds us, by its animated and cogent reasoning, of the *Epistle to Diognetus*. "The Parian stone," he says (pp. 50 and 78),* "is beautiful, but it is not Neptune; the ivory is pleasant to the eye, but it is not Olympian Jove. Let your Phidias and Polycletus, your Praxiteles and Apelles come, and let them say which of them has made a breathing image, or out of earth moulded the soft flesh. Who liquefies the marrow? Who set and jointed the bones? Who strung the sinews? Who inflated the veins, and poured blood into them? Who stretched the skin around? Where is he who made the eye to see? Who breathed into the body the breath of life? Who endowed man with righteousness, and promised him immortality? The Creator of all things, the supreme Artificer and Father. He alone made such a living image when he made us. But your Olympian Jove, the image of an image, widely differing from the reality, is the dumb work of Attic hands. Why, then, ye foolish and vain, have ye forsaken heaven to pay honour to earth? For is not this image of earth, and does it not receive the form which ye worship from the idea and hand of an earthly workman? I have learned to tread earth, and not to worship it." The characters of the gods are elaborately exposed, and their shameful histories brought forward from the most received authorities, poets, historians, and philosophers. "These gods," says Clement (p. 28), "let your wives worship, and bid them pray that their own husbands become like their gods in temperance. Let your boys be brought up to reverence these characters, that they may themselves become such men, and shew in their own persons the image of the divine impurity." He dwells also upon the folly and immorality of many superstitions to which the heathen clung, for no better reason than that their fathers had sanctioned them by their practice. He rebukes (p. 82) "the pitiable and paltry superstition of the men who think that God speaks through crows and jackdaws, but is silent through man; who honour the crow as God's messenger, but persecute the man of God, though he comes not croaking and cawing, but speaking articulately, and communicating reasonable and profitable instruction; him, alas! they seek to slay when he calls to righteousness, for they neither accept heaven's grace nor evade its punishment. For they believe not God, nor understand his might. But his hatred of wickedness is incompre-

* The references are to the pages of Potter's edition, which are given in the other editions.

hensible, whose love of man is ineffable. His wrath cherishes punishment for sin, while his love blesses the penitent.

Clement has also much to say regarding the narrowness of any philosophical religion. He presses the arguments that have since become common. "The teaching of our Master has not been confined to Judea, as philosophy to Greece. It has poured itself through the whole world, persuading Greeks and barbarians of every race, in all cities and villages, instructing whole families together, and enlightening individual believers wherever one was found hearkening to the truth; and having already won to the truth not a few even of the philosophers themselves." And not only has *the* truth thus an inherent property which secures its spread, it is also indestructible. It is available for all kinds of men, and if crushed out of one region springs up in another. "Greek philosophy, if the ruler happens to prohibit it, there and then perishes; our doctrine has, from its first enunciation, been opposed and denounced by kings and princes, by governors and rulers, using against it armies of satellites and countless hosts of assailants, exerting their whole force to cut us off from the earth. Yet our doctrine flourishes but the more; for it does not perish like human teaching, nor fade like a powerless gift—for no gift of God is powerless, but remains unrebuked and undestroyed, since it is written that to the end it will be persecuted" (p. 828). He brings forward as a further distinction of Christianity, its applicability to women as well as to men. This distinguishes it from philosophy, and asserts its claim to universal reception. "If men and women have the same God, then one 'Pædagogus' belongs to both, and both have the same virtue. There is one church, one temperance, one modesty, common food, conjugal marriage, breathing, seeing, hearing, knowing, hoping, obedience, love,—all are alike to both. They whose life is thus common have also a common salvation" (p. 103). These words are sufficient evidence that Clement was thoroughly aware of the mission of Christianity, and confident in its power as the revelation of the true God. It is interesting, too, to find this early and distinct appreciation of the dignity of woman followed up in the "Pædagogus" by such precepts and counsels as would enable the gay and luxurious women of Alexandria to forsake the vicious and dissolute habits in which they had been reared, and become patterns in all modest, matronly, and Christian conversation.

From these passages it will already be conjectured what is the positive evidence on which Clement mainly depends for the proof of Christianity. From these it will already be seen that Clement trusts mainly to the truth being its own evidence. He views the heathen as "feeling after, if haply they might find

God." His work is done when he has presented Christ to them. He starts from the truth received in common by himself and the heathen, that man is made to know, worship, and imitate God; he goes on to shew that the gods whom they and their fathers have been worshipping deserve neither worship nor imitation; and his apology is complete when he has shewn the true God revealed in the Word. Not that he follows this or any other order, but that these are the elements of his task. He believes that if Christ be set fairly before the soul of man, the soul will recognise him and acknowledge him. His aim is to persuade the *φιλοσοφος* to become *φιλολογος*; and believing that man was made by the Word and for the Word, he believes also that there is that in man which will know and cleave to the Word. In the very first sentences of the *Logos Protreptikos*, in opposition to oracles, poets, and philosophers who had led men astray, Clement sets forth the Word of God (*τὸ ἄσμα τὸ καινόν*) in his office of teacher, and tells how he has come to open the blind eyes and lead the wanderers to righteousness, to declare God to men, to conquer death and bring corruption to an end, to exhort (*προτρέπειν*), instruct, and reconcile men to God. So that while he is careful to maintain that the love of God to man is not a new thing, nor his pity now for the first time active (*ἀλλ' ἀνωθεν ἀρχῆθεν*), the whole power of his address consists in his presentation of Christ as the one Teacher of truth and the sole provider of life. These words may be taken as the motto of the piece,—*παλαιὰ ἡ πλάνη, καινὸν δὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια φαίνεται*.

It is impossible to reproduce in a translation the rapidity and rhythm of Clement's eloquence, and the surprising happiness of his phraseology, or to convey any idea of his inexhaustible vocabulary. It is difficult even to preserve the warmth and energy of his appeal; nor can a few detached passages produce an impression such as is felt on the perusal of the connected and cumulative whole.* Yet such is the wealth of the original, that, though much be spilt in the translation, enough may remain to shew the nature of his argument, and that he is worthy of the title, "le fondateur de la grande apologie."

"Man is born to have connection with God. As, then, we do not force the horse to plough nor the steer to hunt, but apply each animal to its natural employment, so, of course, man, being made

* Yet what Pressensé says, with something of plaintive simplicity, is quite true:—"Nos lecteurs ne sauraient se faire une idée de tout ce que ses écrits ont de confus, parce que nous n'avons cité que les passages les plus beaux sans le suivre dans les détours infinis de son style." The quotations in Pressensé must give every reader a high idea of Clement's power of expression,

for the contemplation of heaven, a heavenly plant,* we exhort to the knowledge of God. We counsel him to prepare godliness as his proper, special, and peculiar maintenance (viaticum) for eternity. Till the ground, we say, if you are a tiller of the soil; but with your tilling, know God. Sail, whoever loves the sea; but call upon the heavenly Pilot. Has the love of a military life possessed you? then hearken to the Captain whose signals are in righteousness. . . . Let us not, let us not be enslaved nor grovel in the mire like swine; but as the true children of the light, let us look up and use our eyes to the light, lest the Lord prove us bastards, as the sun the eaglets. Let us repent and pass from ignorance to knowledge, from foolishness to wisdom, from licentiousness to temperance, from unrighteousness to righteousness, from godlessness to God. It is a worthy venture to desert to God. 'The earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof.' How then do you dare to luxuriate in his possessions, and be ignorant of their Lord? Quit my earth, the Lord will say to you; touch not the water which I cause to spring, neither gather the fruits which I ripen; pay the price of your sustenance; O man, recognise your Lord; thou art the peculiar workmanship of God; how then can his property become another's? . . . Believe, O man, in man and God;† believe, O man, in him who suffered and is adored—the living God. Ye servants, believe in him who was dead. All men, believe ye in him who is the only God of all men. Believe, and receive salvation as your reward. 'Seek ye the Lord, and your soul shall live.' He that seeks God is taking steps towards his own salvation. Hast thou found God? Thou hast life. Let us then seek that we may also live.‡ For the reward of finding God is life in his presence.—(P. 84.)

"The word which enlightens us is more to be desired than gold. Let us receive the light, that we may receive God. Let us receive the light, and we shall become the disciples of God, and it will instruct us how we have wandered in our search after God. Since thou, Lord, leadest me by thy light, through thee I find God, and from thee I receive the Father. I become thy co-heir, since thou art not ashamed to call me brother. Let us, then, cast off, let us cast off our oblivion of the truth, our ignorance, and the darkness which dims our vision like a mist; and looking upon him who lives, the true God, let us greet him, Hail, Light! for upon us who were plunged in darkness and buried in the shadow of death hath light from heaven shone, purer than the sun, sweeter than this life below. That light is life everlasting; and whatsoever partakes of it lives. And the night does homage to the light, and setting

* φιλόθειον ζῶον is a title of man in the *Pædagogus*.

† A title given to Christ in an early part of this address is, ὁ μόνος ἀμφω θεός τε καὶ ἀνθρώπος.

‡ ζητήσωμεν ἵνα καὶ ζήσωμεν. For analogy of alliteration, cf. λήθη ἀληθείας. For the sense, cf. p. 89, where he says, θάνατος γὰρ αἰδίου ἀμαρτία.

through fear, gives place to the day of the Lord. All things are become sleepless light; and the setting has believed in the rising. This is the new creation. For the Sun of Righteousness rides prosperously, and visits all mankind alike, imitating the Father, who 'maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good,' and sprinkles upon all the dew of truth. He it is who has brought the setting to the rising, and has raised death to life through the cross (literally, crucified death to life); and having snatched man from destruction, he has translated him to the skies, transplanting corruption into incorruption, and transforming earth into heaven, as the husbandman of God."—(P. 88.)

Throughout the *Pædagogus*, as well as the other treatises of Clement, there abound the fullest and most distinct assertions of the pre-existence and absolute divinity of Christ, often very happily worded and always delivered with a hearty and reverential warmth. Such passages as the following frequently occur, "The Lord, despised by the eye, was worshipped in act, the Expiator (*ὁ καθάρσιος*), and Saviour, and Propitiator, the divine Word, the most manifest and true God, equalled to the Lord of all (because he was his Son and 'the Word was in God'); neither disbelieved when first announced, nor unrecognised when, taking the person of man and formed in the flesh, he acted out the drama of man's salvation.* For he was a genuine combatant, and fought along with the creature; and, being very quickly made known to and distributed among all men, caused God to shine on us more swiftly than the rising sun diffuses his beams in obedience to the same fatherly will. He revealed God, and shewed from whom and who he was, by the things which he taught and did—the Peace-bringer, the Reconciler, the Word, our Saviour; a fountain, giving life and peace, poured over the face of the whole earth; through whom, so to speak, the universe has now become a sea of good." Shortly after, he again breaks into a laudatory description. "This is the word of incorruption who regenerates man, restoring him to truth; the goad of salvation, who drives out corruption and chases death away; the builder of a temple among men, that he might make God to dwell among men. Sanctify this temple; let pleasures and luxuries, like the flower of yesterday, be abandoned to the wind and the fire, and wisely cultivate the fruits of temperance, and dedicate thyself as the first fruits to God, that not the work only, but the grace also, may be of God."

The address closes with an eloquent appeal put into the

* These expressions, *ὑποστάσιον* and *ὑποφωτιστής*, borrowed from the theatre, might, in some writers, be susceptible of a Decetic interpretation, but are certainly free from suspicion in Clement.

mouth of the Word, and opening with language familiar to Greek ears (p. 93) :—

“Hear, ye myriad tribes, yea, all men who are endowed with reason, Barbarians as well as Greeks : I call upon the whole human race, whose Creator I am by the will of the Father, come to me that ye may be arrayed under the one God and the one Word of God. Be not satisfied with excelling all irrational animals in reason, since to you only of all mortal beings do I grant immortality. For I wish, I wish, to share with you this grace. I confer upon you a benefit perfect and entire, incorruption. I freely give you the word, the knowledge of God ; myself I wholly give to you. This I am, this God wills, this is the harmony, this the whole good pleasure of the Father, this is the Son, this Christ, this the Word of God, the arm of the Lord, the power of all things, the will of the Father. Of these there have been from of old many images, but images without resemblance. I am come to direct you to the archetype, that to me ye also may become like. I will anoint you with the unction of faith, through which ye put off corruption, and I will shew to you the naked form of righteousness, through which ye ascend to God. Come unto me, all ye that labour, &c. Let us hasten, let us run, O God-beloved and God-like images of the Word. Let us hasten, let us run, let us take his yoke, let us be urged forward to immortality by this noble charioteer of men. Let us form part of his triumph entering the presence of the Father. The noblest spectacle to the Father is the Son Eternal triumphing. Let us, then, be ambitious of sharing in such honours, let us be the favoured of God, and obtain the greatest of enduring possessions, God and life. Christ is our helper. Let us take courage in him. . . . But enough of words, yea, too much has been already said, drawn on as I have been by this opportunity which God has given me, of inviting you to salvation. For the words which tell of a life that has no end nor cessation are ready themselves to run on endlessly. To you, now, this remains, that you make choice of the most profitable, judgment or grace ; since, for my own part, I do not think it worth while deliberating which of the two is better ; nor indeed is it justifiable to weigh destruction with life.”

In such passages as these Clement sets the Word in presence of the Greeks, declares his nature, his properties, and his work. He makes abundant use of Scripture for the purpose both of defining more accurately the person of Christ, and of persuading men of the sincerity of his desire to guide them to God and immortality. He thus answers the questions which were being asked on all sides, and to which philosophy had professed to give the only satisfying answer. Clement tells men of Christ, and says to them, This is he who can bring you to all you seek. Is not this he whom you seek ? Will not your destiny be achieved in coming to him ? Clement thus rose above the position of the earlier Apologists, and anticipated much of the

modern Apologetic. If this religion, says Clement, be not what you need, reject it; if it be, acknowledge and use it. "We who are sick have need of a Saviour; straying, we need a guide; and blind, we need one who can lead us to the light; thirsty, we need the living fountain, from which, if we drink, we shall no more thirst; the dead need life; the sheep a shepherd; the children a *pædagogus*; yea, all humanity needs Jesus; lest, wandering and sinning to the end, we fall into condemnation, but rather, being separated from the chaff, be gathered into the Father's garner," (p. 147). He knew that there was an absolute harmony between the necessities of man's nature and God's religion. To use his own language, there was an eternal relation subsisting between the *Pædagogus*, or the Word, and the men whom he had made. In all men there existed that which made them capable of recognising and following Christ, and this was to him final proof that Christ was to be followed. If any other teacher can teach more or better, if any other can penetrate the human spirit to a greater depth, or draw with a stronger attraction, let him be followed.

The detailed enunciation of Christian precepts, and the elaborate display of Christian life, which form so large a part of the writings of Clement, were necessary to the fulfilment of the task which his position demanded. The problem of philosophy, the great difficulty to all thinking men, had always been, and continued to be, How is the perfect man to be formed, and what, in the first place, is he? Man is, undoubtedly, a very superior creation; how is it that he so continually exposes himself to his own contempt, and falls short still of all the glories he seems with such justice to arrogate? Is there no possibility that he should actually achieve his high destiny, and become all he is capable of? To these questions philosophy had her answers; and Clement, in pursuance of his plan of meeting the philosophers as much as possible on their own ground, shews how the soul is purified in this life, and what conduct is proper to those who have entered the Christian school. After explaining, as was particularly needful to his audience, that the proper expression of our knowledge of God is in the life, he enters with much detail upon the inculcation of Christian duty. He has been much censured for his performance of this part of his task. It has been urged against him that, instead of laying down principles of action, he has busied himself with trifling and ludicrous minutiae, and that "he sets before us little or nothing that is at all fitted to promote the cause of genuine Christian holiness of heart and life." It would be nearer the truth to say, that while he does lay down (and with admirable terseness) principles of conduct, and set before us (and with admirable power) much that is fitted to improve the spirit, all

this is overlaid and partially obscured by a detail that would be wearisome were it not ludicrous. We expect a system of morality ; we find a code of table etiquette. We expect to sit at the feet of a Johnson ; we are introduced to a Chesterfield. We lend our ear to the counsels of a spiritual adviser ; and we hear the prescriptions of a valetudinarian. We are instructed how to lie at table, how to laugh without violating decorum, and how to sneeze or cough without distressing our neighbours. We are told that it resembles the lower animals to sniff the steam of a savoury dish, that it is unseemly to speak with the mouth full, and precarious to drink in the same condition. We are cautioned against lying in carved bedsteads, because such harbour reptiles ; against using any perfumes which neither relieve the head nor strengthen the stomach ; against wearing the hair on the head too thick, because that injures the brain, and against wearing it on the chin too thin, because that is effeminate, for the beard is older than Eve, and the sign of a superior nature. If our hair is grey, we must not dye it ; and if we have no hair at all, we must not wear another person's. If we wear rings, they must bear no unseemly devices on them, but a dove, or a fish, or an anchor. A lady, however wealthy, ought not to wear dresses which attract the eyes and the calculations of men, though she may dress so as to please her husband. She must not wear sandals covered with gold and precious stones, nor so trim her hair that she is afraid to move her head. All this is curious, but not very edifying to a modern reader. But along with this, and interwoven with it, are found such manly and sensible injunctions, such devout though allegorising allusions, and all so well said, that one is carried on with not a little interest. And we believe that an age which was given up to such senseless customs, and which wallowed in such abominable practices as are here denounced, required as definite and detailed admonition as we find in the *Pædagogus* of Clement. As Bishop Kaye very well observes : " His intention was to deliver rules for the guidance of his fellow-Christians in the common intercourse of life. Many of his rules are puerile, many grounded on false principles ; but there is mingled with them much that may even now be read with profit, much that is fitted to give a religious tone to the mind, and to inspire it with the love of purity and virtue. When, too, we censure the minutiae into which Clement descends, we should bear in mind that, situated as Christians then were, it was desirable to draw as marked a line of distinction as possible between their manner of life and that of the heathens, by whom they were surrounded."

As might have been expected, the Christian use of wealth was a favourite theme with the Alexandrian censor. Not only

is it handled at large in the excellent discourse entitled, "*Quis dives salvetur*," he also recurs to it in various parts of his writings. His view of it will be understood from the following :—

"Wealth, indeed, seems to me to be much like a serpent; unless you know how to catch it without risk, and can lift it up by the tip of the tail, it will double back and fold round your hand and bite you: just so wealth, whether in the hand of the prudent or unwary, is a desperate thing to wriggle and catch and bite, but there is a possibility of a man using it so magnanimously and wisely as to charm the brute by the incantation of the Word and himself remain unhurt."

Again, in the fine chapter on "*Simplicity the best viaticum for the Christian*," he says:—

"Why are such dainties prepared? Is it to fill one belly? Why such an array of drinking vessels? Why such heaps of ornaments and such crowded wardrobes and cabinets? For thieves that slip into other men's clothes and for lickerish eyes. It becomes us rather to set out for the truth girt and light; as our Lord says, 'Carry neither purse, nor scrip, nor shoes,' i. e., do not burden yourselves with that wealth which can only be stored in purses; do not cram your treasuries as those who stuff a wallet with food, but share with them that need; neither trouble yourselves with beasts of burden and a train of servants, who (because they bear the burdens of the wealthy) are figuratively called 'shoes.' Let us then dispense with a multitude of utensils, with cups of silver and vessels of gold, and a crowd of domestics, and let us receive industry and simplicity as the honourable and seemly companions of our journey. Let us walk in harmony with the Word, and even if we have wife and children, a household will prove no burden which has learnt to follow a wise guide, and the wife who loves her husband will walk as he walks."

"A good support on the heavenward journey is the double strength of simplicity and wise gravity. As the foot is the measure of the shoe, so is the body of each one's requirements. What is over and above, all ornate furnishings and moveables, are merely a burden. One who is pressing to heaven, and has his way to force, should take bounty as his staff, and sharing with the afflicted and hard pressed, become himself partaker of the true rest. For as wells which are fed by a perennial spring rise always to their old level, however abundantly you draw; and as the milk flows to the breasts which give suck, so bounty, the good fountain of benevolence, shares and distributes itself to the thirsting, and is yet again increased and filled. For he who has the Word, the Almighty God, is independent, and never runs out of anything he needs. For the Word is a sufficient possession, and the source of all welfare."

After these quotations, our readers will scarcely be prepared for the assertion that Clement "exhibits plain traces of the operation at once of what have been called the ascetic and the

mystic systems of morality." There are, indeed, statements in Clement which might be set side by side with the sentiments of Fenelon's "Dissertation on Pure Love," or Madame Guyon's "Torrents;" but there is throughout the writings of the Alexandrian, a broad and wholesome practicalness, a modern common sense, which sets him at a distance from the French Pietists of the seventeenth century. The charge of mysticism may, however, be established, but the charge of asceticism cannot be allowed. The position of Clement as the orthodox champion against Valentinus and Basilides, if nothing else, forbade him to lean to asceticism. His attitude towards philosophy laid him under a like necessity to vindicate the rights of the body. "The soul," he says (p. 639), "is the better part of man, the body the inferior; but neither is the soul essentially good, nor the body essentially bad." The author quoted above as making these charges has been unfortunate in the instances he has chosen to confirm them. He says, "On the one hand, he prohibits indulgences, which the Scriptures do not condemn (as second marriages); and, on the other hand, he releases men from obligations which the Scriptures impose,—as, for example, when he denies the necessity for regular times and seasons for prayer and religious exercises, upon the ground that men ought *always* to cultivate a devotional spirit." Upon the first charge, we ask the reader's attention to the following words of Clement which represent his whole teaching on the point (p. 511):—"A single marriage (*μονογαμία*), and the seemly dignity attached to it, we admire; saying, however, that we ought to be sympathizing, and to bear one another's burdens, lest some one, thinking he stands, himself also fall. And respecting second marriage, the apostle says, If you burn, marry." The same opinion is expressed in the 12th cap. of the third book of the *Stromata*; and how any one can have read that book, (wholly occupied as it is with the subject of marriage), and have failed to see that Clement is professedly and effectively opposing ascetic tendencies, we are at a loss to understand. The instance cited in support of the second charge is not more happy. Clement's own words concerning prayer, which he nowhere contradicts, but everywhere confirms, are these (p. 851; they occur in one of the most beautiful and instructive chapters of the *Stromata*): "The whole life of the Gnostic is a holy festival. His sacrifices are prayers, and praises, and the reading of the Scriptures before meals; psalms and hymns during meals, and before retiring for the night: and during the night, prayers again." It is quite true that Clement declares that the Gnostic, or more advanced Christian, is not dependent on the seasons and places to which others confine their worship; at the same time, he distinctly commends both stated hours

and special occasions of prayer. He does maintain that the perfect man is always in the enjoyment of communion with God ; in language of great beauty and force he represents the joyful and constant fellowship of the trusting soul with God, and tells how God hears not only the voice, but the thought ; but he nowhere denies the necessity of stated and special prayer.

This latter point is, however, of less importance, as Clement is undoubtedly the forerunner of Dionysius in mysticism. The Gnostic of Clement is in all the leading features of his character the mystic of La Combe and the Archbishop of Cambray. Almost all that is found in the "Maxims of the Saints," or the "Orationis Mentalis Analysis," may be found in the sixth and seventh books of the *Stromata*. In these books, it is Clement's object to describe the spiritual condition and outward deportment of the true Gnostic ; and, in the judgment of one whose voice in such matters has much authority, "Clement's portraiture of the perfect Christian is one of the noblest things of the kind that the world ever saw ; yet the assertions cannot always be defended." It would have been marvellous indeed, if, in a communion swarming with heresies of every name, Clement had seen the simple truth and been able to declare it with power, and yet without over-statement. The errors of the French Quietists must be laid partly at the door of the Church of Rome, for, though they had no thought of abandoning her communion, the recoil from some of her doctrines drove them further from the truth than they might otherwise have departed. Any one who takes an interest in Mysticism, will find it interesting to pursue the analogy between the ancient and modern forms of it, and to trace something of its history. The superiority of the Gnostic to the common believer, everywhere assumed in the *Stromata*, this is the very point which Bossuet saw to be the foundation of all Madame Guyon's error, and which he first assailed. "The doctrines which you advance, Madame, involve the fact of an inward experience above the common experience of Christians." That this is attained by contemplation of pure divinity, that this contemplation unites the soul with God in a manner that passes the experience of ordinary faith, and that this is the perfect bliss and final state of the soul, these are the assertions which are as unhesitatingly delivered by Clement as by any professed and full-blown mystic. The *anabasis* of Clement's Gnostic, i. e., the exemption from, and not the controlling of, natural desires and passions, his superiority to pleasure and pain, his effortless self-command, and his pure love of God, these are the well-known features of the later mystic, who has attained to the state of pure love, who has entered the blessed haven of abandonment and consecration.

and has now no will but the will of God ; who has ceased to form definite desires and expectations, but passes a life of silent prayer in mute dependence on the purpose of God.

If Clement is guilty of all that is laid to the charge of the Pietists, it would be difficult to prove him quite innocent of helping out the philosophical mysticism of Plotinus. That Plotinus listened to as many teachers as were within his reach, until he found in the doctrines of Ammonius Saccas all that his soul sought, we know on the authority of his biographer, Porphyry. That he was very well acquainted with the teaching of Clement, we have therefore every reason to believe. That his system had much in it by which he might be convicted of purloining from Christianity, is recognised on the most superficial examination ; and it is scarcely credible that he should not have been most powerfully influenced by that Christian teacher, who most nearly approximates to the tone of Plato, and who anticipates his own doctrine of the absorption in the divine essence of the soul that is exalted and purified by contemplation. Yet he who concluded that because Clement was philosophical and mystical he was therefore the father of Plotinus, and solely accountable for his birth, would shew his ignorance of Neo-Platonism, as much as he who argued that because Clement was a mystic he was also an ascetic, would shew his ignorance of modern pietism. In this very article of asceticism there is a striking difference between the teaching of Clement, who recognised in the body the well-furnished palace of the soul, and that of Plotinus, who "refused to permit his picture to be taken, because it would unduly perpetuate the image of a body he deplored, and avoided all mention of the date and locality of his birth, as too dark and miserable an epoch to be remembered."*

We may be induced to be somewhat more lenient to the early philosophical theologians, when we compare their firm grasp of the doctrine of the Trinity with the shambling discourse of Tertullian regarding this fundamental of our creed. And a little attention to the position of the Alexandrians convinces us that their Trinitarian teaching was in some degree dictated by their philosophical leanings. If the word had been the teacher of philosophers from the first, then the pre-existence and divinity of Jesus is almost of necessity maintained. The necessary foundation of all Clement's apologetic is, "Our teacher is Jesus, the holy God, the guiding Word of all humanity" (p. 131). Without the divinity of Christ, the argument of Clement can make no way whatever ; the doctrine of the Trinity is involved in each step of it. No doubt his posi-

* Archer Butler's *Ancient Philosophy*, ii. 362.

tion led him into error, as well as prompted him with much that was true. His defective view of the wrath of God was due partly to his philosophising tendency, and partly to his commendable but extreme opposition to those who believed in a Demiurge. His whole teaching on the articles of faith and free will bear evidence that it was directed against the false Gnostica. And in the chapters in which he most distinctly delivers himself on these points, he expressly combats the errors of Valentinus and Basilides. Had they not maintained that a man's spiritual destiny had nothing to do with his own will, Clement might not have been tempted to pronounce that a man's own will had everything to do with his faith. But we cannot enter now upon the wide subject of Clement's dogmatic. Suffice it to say, that all his writings are very worthy of an attentive perusal, that they are not only historically interesting, both as reflecting his own times and as exhibiting the ages that were then past, but are also so fresh and vigorous, so erudite and yet so hearty and devout, as to command, if not our uninterrupted admiration, at least our constant love. And if his style has those faults which were mentioned above, it is also possessed of a characteristic beauty, purity of expression, and force of phrase, and is relieved by an occasional brilliance and rapidity of logical discussion which might vindicate for him, more than for any who has claimed the title, the epithet of the Christian Plato.

ART. II.—*Dr Nicholas Murray.**

Memoirs of the Rev. Nicholas Murray, D.D. (Kirkman). By SAMUEL IRVING PRIMER, D.D. New York: Harper & Brothers.

THERE is, perhaps, no department of literature in which greater or more numerous mistakes have been committed than in Biography. The cause of this has been, that gratitude, or affection, or possibly self-interest, has been allowed to usurp the place of sober judgment, and thus deliver itself of an effort to embalm mediocrity; or else a really deserving subject has, from the operation of the same spirit, been so gorgeously or extravagantly dressed up, that the identity of the portrait with the original could scarcely be recognised. To say nothing of the numerous books designed to perpetuate characters whose

* From the *Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review* for January 1863.—*Ed. B. & F. E. R.*

mission on earth has been only for evil, it may safely be asserted that if all which are of mere negative tendency, or which emblazon gifts or graces that nobody ever saw in the persons commemorated—thus performing a work of creation rather than a faithful description—if all these were to be put out of the way, not only would there be a vast reduction of many of our libraries, but a very perceptible thinning out of not a few of our book stores. This, however, is only admitting that biography shares the fate of all other good things, and that, while it is fitted to accomplish great good, by preserving the remembrance of eminent talent, or virtue, or usefulness, or all of these blended, it is liable to be perverted, belittled, or turned into an instrument of positive and even great evil.

It is hardly necessary to say that these remarks have been suggested to us in connection with this memoir of Dr Murray, only in the way of contrast; for we have rarely taken up a book that is more strikingly illustrative of the real value of biography than this. Dr Murray was anything but an everyday character—the qualities both of his mind and of his heart were marked by a degree of individuality that would effectually prevent his ever being confounded with anybody else; while there was a vigour and elevation pertaining to both his intellectual and moral faculties, which were felt, not only as an attractive influence, but as a positive power. And then his life was so manifestly directed and controlled by a wonder-working Providence, the sober realities of his history, while at first view they seem to take on the air of romance, when they come to be scrutinised by the eye of faith and reverence, are seen to have been marvellously shaped and stamped by the divine wisdom and goodness. Both his life and character, then, formed a most fitting subject for the biographer; and public expectation would have been sadly disappointed if no extended memoir of him had appeared. In accordance with an earnest wish expressed by many of his friends, shortly after his lamented death, it was determined that a memoir of him should be prepared; and to no hands could it have been more appropriately committed than to those by which it was undertaken. Dr Prime had been in relations of fraternal intimacy with Dr Murray for many years, and from his very frequent intercourse with him, especially as a contributor to the *New York Observer*, had the best opportunity of forming an accurate estimate of his character. Besides, everybody knows that he is one of our most graceful and attractive writers; or if there are any who have not found it out until now, this volume surely will make the revelation to them. It was a grand subject for his skill and taste, and, we may add, genial sympathies, to work upon; and we are sure that those who expected most are not

disappointed in the result. We fully accord with the public verdict, so far as it has already been made known, that this is one of the most instructive and interesting pieces of biography which we have met with for a long time from either side of the water.

The first thing we meet, on opening this volume, is an engraved portrait of our departed friend, which almost startles us by its well-nigh matchless fidelity to the original. Those to whom his face is most familiar will find it difficult to criticise anything in respect either to the features or the expression. The intelligence, the kindness, the firmness, the good humour, are all there. Truly, it is one of our manifold blessings that, by a process that takes but a few moments, and costs but a few pennies, we may have secured to us a life-like image of not only those friends from whom we are temporarily separated on earth, but those whom we can hope to meet no more till we go to mingle with them in other scenes.

Of the life of Dr Murray, which the memoir presents with great fidelity, and in much more detail than we should have thought possible, we can give but the merest outline. He was born at Ballynaskea, in the county of Westmeath, Ireland, December 25. 1802. His parents were both Roman Catholics. His father was a man of some consideration in the neighbourhood in which he lived, but he died when this son was only three years of age. When he (the son) was about twelve, he was apprenticed as a merchant's clerk in a store in Grannard, near Edgeworthstown, where he remained three years, but he was so badly treated by his employer that, at the end of that time, he ran away, and returned to his mother's house. In spite of his mother's importunity to the contrary, he resolutely refused to return to his clerkship, and having made an arrangement with his brother, which secured to him the necessary means of crossing the Atlantic, he embarked for America. Up to this period, he had been buried in the deepest darkness of Romanism. His education, at least so far as the elementary branches were concerned, had not been specially neglected; but of the true religion he knew nothing; and though he conformed to the Romish rites, and in the main accepted his hereditary prejudices as having the authority of a divine revelation, his mind was too essentially reflective not to be occasionally oppressed with difficulties which he knew not how to solve.

He arrived in New York in July 1818, nearly penniless, and was of course cast entirely on his own resources. Wandering about the streets of that city in quest of something to do, his attention was directed to the printing establishment of the Harpers, which, though not as great then as it has be-

come since, was already a highly enterprising and prosperous concern. Here he became engaged as a clerk, and here now commenced a friendship between himself and his employers which proved a source of mutual satisfaction and benefit through a long succession of years. His mind, naturally active, was quickened by the new light into which it was brought ; but, instead of accepting that light and turning it to good account, its first effort was to leap from the darkness of Romanism into that of infidelity. He quickly felt, however, that he was not on firm ground yet, and God's wise and gracious providence soon brought him in contact with influences that put both his intellect and his heart to moving in the right direction. He was led, as he would have said, *accidentally*, to hear a sermon from Dr Mason ; and so deeply was he impressed with the force and majesty of the effort, that he went again and again ; and at no distant period he saw the infidel fabric which he had reared for himself in ruins at his feet. About this time he was brought into intimate relations with some of the Methodist brethren in New York, from whom he received important encouragement and aid, and at one time it seemed not improbable that he might become a member of that communion. Circumstances, however, subsequently pointed him in another direction ; and when his mind had become sufficiently enlightened, and his confidence in the genuineness of his own Christian experience sufficiently strong to warrant it, he made a public profession of his faith by becoming a member of Dr Spring's church.

As he very soon, in his intercourse with his Christian friends, developed much more than ordinary talents, and withal an earnest desire to consecrate himself to God in the ministry of reconciliation, some benevolent individuals quickly originated a plan for gratifying his desire, and securing him to the sacred office. In accordance with this plan, he went first, through the offerings of a considerate charity, to Amherst Academy, where he remained prosecuting his studies, preparatory to entering college, for about nine months ; and then, in the autumn of 1822, he entered the Freshman Class in Williams College. Throughout his whole college course he had a high reputation in respect to both scholarship and deportment ; and he graduated with high honour in the year 1826.

Immediately after leaving college, he became an agent of the American Tract Society, and laboured for a few weeks in its behalf very successfully in Washington County, New York. He then entered the Theological Seminary at Princeton ; but, at the end of the year, in order to relieve himself of pecuniary embarrassments, took another agency under the Tract Society at Philadelphia, where he established a branch society, and

finally accepted an invitation to become its secretary. Here he continued eighteen months, and then returned to Princeton and resumed his place in his class, having kept along with them in their studies during his absence. He was licensed to preach, by the Presbytery of Philadelphia, in April 1829.

After preaching for a short time, with much acceptance, at Morristown, New Jersey, he went, in the capacity of a domestic missionary, to Wilkesbarre, Pennsylvania, and very soon received and accepted a call to become pastor of the church in that place. Here he was ordained and installed in November following, and was not only highly acceptable in his ministrations among his own people, but was greatly respected and honoured throughout the whole region. When the church in Elizabethtown became vacant, by the removal of Dr M'Dowell to Philadelphia, their attention was immediately directed to Dr Murray, as a suitable person to become his successor; and he, having accepted their unanimous call, was installed as their pastor in July 1833.

Here Dr Murray found his last field of labour; for though he was called to at least half-a-dozen of the most prominent churches in the land, besides being invited to two theological professorships, and several other positions of great responsibility and usefulness in the church, he was never willing to break the tie that bound him to this congregation. But his field of labour was far from being comprised within the limits of his pastoral charge—indeed, his field was literally the world. His earnest devotion to his Master's works, in connection with his high executive talent, made it easy for him to respond to the numerous claims of the church for his services, in almost every department of benevolent effort; and he seemed as much at home in each as if his training had been exclusively in reference to it. To the several boards of the church, especially, he lent an unremitting and powerful influence; while towards the Princeton Theological Seminary he manifested not only the watchful fidelity of a constituted guardian, but the gratitude and affection of a devoted son. He kept steadily at his work until the revelation was suddenly made to him that his work was done. Almost before his nearest neighbours were aware that he was not in his full health, the startling intelligence went abroad that his connection with all earthly scenes and interests had closed. He died on Monday evening, the 4th of February 1861, and his funeral was attended by an immense throng—all of whom seemed like mourners—on the Friday following.

Dr Murray made two visits to Europe,—the first in 1851, the second in 1860. It was an event of no small interest in his life to return to his native land after an absence of more than

forty years, especially considering the varied experience of which, in the mean time, he had been the subject, and the wonderful transition he had made from the bigoted Romish boy, going to seek his fortune, to one of the most influential and honoured Protestant clergymen of his day. When he reached his birthplace and the home of his early years, he was well nigh overwhelmed by comparing what he saw with what he remembered ; a few who had been his youthful companions remained, but both they and he had changed so much as to have got beyond the point of mutual recognition, and they gazed at each other in vain to discover the least mark of identity. The shadows of Romanism hung just as dark and heavy around the endeared spot as ever ; and though he was not disposed, during his brief visit, to assail needlessly the prejudices of his friends, especially as he could not remain to reason the matter out with them, yet neither could he refrain from letting fall a note of solemn admonition upon the ear of his two brothers, the only surviving members of his father's family ; and in order to give the greater impressiveness to what he said, he took the opportunity to speak to them while the three were standing together beside the graves of their parents. On both these transatlantic visits he made the acquaintance of many eminent men, and attracted great attention by his frequent appearance on public occasions in connection with what had previously been known of his history. He was deeply interested, both on the continent and in Ireland, in watching the operations of that religious system under whose blighting influence he had received his early training ; and everything that he saw only served to make him more grateful for the deliverance he had experienced, and more earnest to do his part in dissipating the wide-spread delusion.

Dr Murray's outward appearance and manners were but a faithful reflection of the intellectual and moral qualities which formed his noble character. With a strongly built and robust frame, he combined a countenance expressive of high intelligence, of great decision, of imperturbable good nature, of exhaustless humour. His manners, though simple and unstudied, were gentlemanly, and there was a bland and genial air about him that, of itself, would have rendered him an attraction in any circle. He had enough of the Irish accent to have his nationality recognised anywhere, but not enough to be regarded by anybody as an imperfection in his speaking. Into whatever company he might be thrown, he was almost sure to be recognised as a leading spirit ; and yet there was nothing in his manner in the least degree assuming or dictatorial. He had a rich vein of native wit, and was not slow either to give or take a joke ; but his wit was usually a bright and genial sunshine—

very rarely the depository of anything that could rive or blast. Though he was one of the busiest of men, no one was more ready than he to welcome his friends, and no one more able than he to render them contented and happy.

Dr Murray's intellect was clear, vigorous, discriminating, and in the highest degree practical. It was not metaphysical, either in its tastes or its habits, but it found its element rather in the region of common sense, and amidst the sober realities of life. While he was a diligent student, and kept himself thoroughly informed in respect to passing events, he was a great lover of method, and all his various duties seemed to be reduced to a rigid system. First on the list of his duties for the week was his preparation for the Sabbath; and before Monday had passed, his sermon (for he wrote but one sermon a-week) was so far advanced as to be beyond all peril of failure. There were always the evidences upon his study-table that he did not rest in the judgment of commentators in respect to the true meaning of his text; for there was the Bible in its original languages, which, without claiming to be an eminent Greek or Hebrew scholar, he freely and constantly consulted.

Dr Murray's power in the pulpit was the result of a combination of qualities and influences. First of all, he carried thither beaten oil—his sermons, instead of being only an apology for sermons—the product of mere scraps of time, and got up from sheer necessity, were evidently the result of continuous and earnest thought; and the elaboration bestowed upon them, instead of making them profound philosophical disquisitions, made them as clear as the light and as pungent as barbed arrows. For nothing were they more distinguished than the union of brevity with strength; there was a certain sententious air about them, which, while it arrested and enchained the attention, would sometimes make a mighty deposit of truth in the mind, which it would not be easy to dislodge. Then his appearance in the pulpit was eminently commanding; with great dignity and solemnity he had great force and animation; and no one who heard him could doubt that he felt that he was dealing in momentous realities. Sometimes, indeed, though very rarely, a sentence would drop from him that would cause a general smile to pervade his audience, owing to the strong natural proclivities of his own mind in that direction; but it was evidently unintentional on his part, and the effect upon his hearers was only momentary. All the discourses that we have heard from him would lead us to concur in the judgment we have heard expressed by some of the most intelligent of his stated hearers, that few men, of any period, wield the sword of the Spirit with greater skill or power than did Dr Murray.

But if the pulpit, as was said of old Herbert, was Dr Murray's throne, in the sense of its having been the place where he put forth the greatest power, there was no position pertaining to his ministry in which it did not seem easy for him to wield the appropriate influence. In the pastoral relation particularly, he was a model of prudence, watchfulness, tenderness, and fidelity. He regarded his whole flock with an affection scarcely less than parental; and he was always upon the lookout for opportunities to do them good. There was no office of kindness that he was not ready to undertake even for the humblest of them. As he was eminently qualified to be their spiritual guide—to counsel them in their difficulties, and comfort them in their sorrows, and help them in their duties—so his familiar acquaintance with many of the forms of worldly business often rendered him a very competent adviser in respect to their temporal concerns; and hence nothing was more common for him, after praying at the bedside of one of the dying members of his congregation, than to be put in requisition for the writing of his will. This remarkable facility at worldly business, while it never acted as a temptation to him to forget any of the duties of his high vocation, was really an important auxiliary to his usefulness in his relations to his people.

While Dr Murray fulfilled with scrupulous fidelity and promptness the duties which he owed to his immediate charge, he was always ready to respond to the more public claims that were made upon him, in connection not only with his own denomination, but with the church at large. In all meetings of the Presbytery, the Synod, or the General Assembly, he was, by common consent, recognised as one of the controlling spirits. In debate he was logical, clear, self-possessed, and not lacking in due respect for his opponents, however widely or earnestly he might dissent from them, though nobody could ensure them against an occasional avalanche of extemporaneous wit that would point back to the Erin Isle. His views of the public interests of the church were enlightened, sober, comprehensive; and to the promotion of these interests his whole ministry was carefully and diligently directed. But while he was, from conviction and from association, thoroughly a Presbyterian, he had a warm side for every true follower of Christ—he was at home among all evangelical denominations; and even those who were not evangelical, he treated with kindness and respect, while they, in turn, felt the attraction of his warm and generous spirit. The day of his funeral was a day of general mourning at Elizabeth; and from the universal demonstrations of grief, extending even to the Roman Catholics, one might have supposed that the whole population had been sitting under his ministry.

We must not omit to say, that Dr Murray acquired an honourable distinction as a writer. While in college, he accustomed himself to use his pen, not as a matter of duty only, but of pleasure ; and he was an occasional contributor to one or more of the newspapers in that region. He began, at an early period in his ministry, to publish occasional sermons, but the first thing from his pen, which especially drew public attention toward him, was his first series of Letters to Archbishop Hughes, concerning which there was a general expression not only of decided approval but of strong admiration, while yet their authorship remained a secret. These Letters, as well as those which succeeded them, though addressed to a dignitary of the Romish Church, only contemplated him as the representative of Romanism, and were really designed to bring the light of truth in contact with as many of the members of the Romish communion as they might reach. No man could have written on that subject under greater advantages than Dr Murray ; for while he was perfectly familiar with the whole ground, and testified from out of the depths of a bitter experience, he knew by what avenues the deluded votaries of the system could be most successfully approached ; and the lucid and sententious deliverances of his pen, already referred to, were fitted to lodge themselves in the mind, both as a light and as a power. His Letters to the Archbishop—some or all of them—have found their way not only into most European countries, but into the heart of Asia, and are read in some four or five different languages. They are characterised by a force of argument, an amplitude of illustration, an earnestness of appeal, and often by a scathing sarcasm, that give them a decided prominence among standard works on the Romish controversy. If Dr Murray's mission was more in one direction of public usefulness than another, probably it was like that of Paul,—doing good to his brethren still sitting in the darkness from which he had escaped ; and the immense circulation which his books on this subject have already gained, would seem to be a pledge that they have as yet only begun to accomplish the work to which they are destined. But he did not limit himself to this particular field, but wrote several other works, of great practical interest, upon every page of which the characteristics of his own peculiar mind are unmistakeably impressed. His book on "Preachers and Preaching," published not long before his death, is full of common sense and deep wisdom, and is admirably fitted to minister both to the dignity and the efficiency of the pulpit. It would be well if every student of theology, and every young minister in the land—to say nothing of those who are older—would read and inwardly digest this work, until

they have become thoroughly familiar with its teachings, and fully imbued with its spirit.

It is scarcely necessary to add, after what we have already said of the kindness and warmth of Dr Murray's affections, that he never appeared to greater advantage than in the privacy of his own house. In the relations of husband and father, there was a beautiful blending of love and dignity, to render him one of the most admirable models we have ever known; and his friends who used to have the privilege of visiting him, always reckoned the days spent under his roof as among the brightest of the year. He had a just appreciation of character, and did not admit persons to his confidence with undue haste; but when he had once recognised one as a friend, it was no easy matter to dislodge that person from his heart, and there was hardly any sacrifice which he was not ready to make for the promotion of his happiness or usefulness.

From the mere glance which we have taken of Dr Murray's life and character, as they are both so admirably portrayed in the Memoir, and, we may add, as we knew him in the intimacy of an endeared friendship, it is manifest that his career was marked by extraordinary activity and usefulness. Some men, while they are very good at some one thing, and perhaps know how to ride a hobby at tremendous speed, are good for nothing else. Not so Dr Murray. When he stood in the pulpit delivering God's message; or when he was ministering to the sick or the sorrowful, or performing any of his more private pastoral duties; or when he was giving direction or impulse to the movements of some ecclesiastical body; or when he was nerving his intellect and his heart for a desperate encounter with the man of sin—in any one of these cases you might have supposed that he had planted himself on the spot where, of all others, he was most at home; and yet, at the bidding of circumstances, he could occupy any other of those departments of duty with the same graceful facility, and the same decided and desirable results. With this remarkable power of adaptation, and an industry that rarely has a parallel, both controlled by strong religious sensibilities and a deep feeling of obligation to the Master whom he was pledged to serve, it is not strange that the accumulated results of his not very protracted life exhibit an amount of service rendered to both God and man, which it is rarely the privilege of the church to record in respect to any of her ministers.

We can only hint at two or three of the most obvious lessons which have occurred to us, as we have passed over the pages of this remarkable book. First of all, every one, surely, who has ever learned to reverence or recognise God's hand, must trace it in the whole course of Dr Murray's extraordinary life.

Who would have conjectured that his being born of Roman Catholic parents, and educated to a belief of the absurd doctrines, and an observance of the equally absurd rites, of the Romish Church; that the cruel treatment of the man to whom he was apprenticed, leading him unceremoniously to quit his service, and his coming a forlorn and nearly penniless boy to this country, in spite even of the earnest remonstrances of his own mother—who would have believed that this was to form an essential part of the preparation for the high stand he was to take, and the important part he was to perform in our American church? Had it not been for his early experience of the cold horrors of Romanism, he never could have wielded such a pen of fire in exposing them; and had it not been for the unkind and almost savage bearing of that Grannard merchant, there is no reason to believe that he might not have lived and died in as deep darkness as either of his brothers. Surely God worked in a mysterious way to make out of material that seemed to promise so little that noble minister of the gospel, whose name has become as a household word almost all over Protestant Christendom. Shall not such facts as these lead us to trust our God as well in the darkness as in the sunshine, and to wait patiently and reverently for the mysteries of his providence to develop their own explanation?

Another lesson which this volume most impressively teaches, is the vast importance of that form of the charity of the church which looks after the education of her indigent and promising sons. There was Nicholas Murray, with great natural gifts, with a warm and generous heart, and withal struggling into the kingdom of heaven, and yet doing his daily task, like any other hireling boy, at that great printing establishment of the Harpers; and even though, along with his regenerate nature, there might come aspirations for higher usefulness, yet with them would naturally be associated the thought that he was a stranger in a strange land, and that he might well afford to be satisfied if he could earn his daily bread. But as God's gracious providence would have it, he fell in with some of the benevolent men in Dr Spring's church, who, being struck with his intellectual superiority as well as his decided demonstrations of Christian principle and feeling, offered themselves to him as auxiliaries if he would study for the ministry. We cannot say, indeed, what might have been accomplished by his own sanctified energies both of mind and heart, if no aid from without had been proffered to him; but there is no doubt as to the fact that these excellent men not only gave him the first impulse towards an education with reference to the ministry, but furnished the first facilities towards the carrying out of this object. He never forgot the debt of gratitude he owed them while he lived;

and now that the beneficiary and the benefactors have met on a nobler field, where they can trace the results of that first movement in favour of his education by a brighter light, can we doubt that, in view of this experience, their hearts are knit together more closely, and drawn forth in offerings of more intense thankfulness to their common Father?

And why should not this example stimulate a multitude of others to go and do likewise? Young men in indigent circumstances, but of pious aspirations and great capabilities for usefulness, are scattered everywhere; and all that is needed in order to render them, perhaps, even pillars in the church of God, is for the hand of Christian charity to be stretched out for their encouragement and help! Is not this an object worthy of deeper consideration, of more liberal offerings, than the church has yet bestowed upon it? Especially, shall not those public institutions, which contemplate exclusively this object, find increased favour in the eye of our rich men, who, in consecrating themselves have also consecrated all that they possess unto the Lord? Is it too much to hope that one effect of the circulation of the *Memoir of Dr Murray* will be that many gifted and excellent young men will have a way opened for them to enter the ministry, who otherwise would have lived and died, perhaps, in the drudgery of some humble secular vocation.

And, finally, what an example is Dr Murray to all young men, and to all ministers of the gospel, of vigorous and self-denying effort! The same heroic resolution, the same unflinching diligence, the same fearlessness of difficulties and obstacles which marked both his earlier and his later developments, if associated with the same high tone of spiritual feeling which he exemplified, would throw success and triumph into the path of any young man; and to the minister of the gospel, of powers even greatly inferior to those which he possessed, they would be a pledge for extensive usefulness and an honoured name. Let those who read this book, and learn what it is possible for one man to do, then settle the question with themselves whether they are labouring for God and the church up to the full measure of their ability.

We cannot take leave of this work without thanking the author for having so gracefully and tenderly embalmed the memory of his friend and ours, and at the same time conferred so great and permanent a favour upon the whole church. When scores and hundreds of memoirs—even of those which have had their brief day of being talked about and admired—shall be numbered with the things that have been, we confidently predict that this will be holding on its way with posterity, and performing its great work with undiminished power.

ART. III.—*The True Place of Man in Zoology.**

Contributions to the Natural History of the United States of America. By LOUIS AGASSIZ. First Monograph in Three Parts. I. *Essay on Classification*, &c. Vol. I. 4to. Boston, 1857.

THE "Essay on Classification" in Professor Agassiz's "Contributions to the Natural History of the United States of America," is a very remarkable treatise, in a very remarkable work, for our own, or for any country. The prospectus was for ten volumes, on as many important, though not the best known, parts of American zoology, with full descriptions, and most ample illustrations, from the embryo to the perfect animal, at twelve dollars the volume. The first four of these have been issued, and have fully satisfied the high anticipations of the patrons of this great enterprise; to provide for the expense of which at least eight hundred subscribers were necessary on reasonable calculations of the work to be done; but so high did the author stand in scientific estimation, and so generous were his views of what the character of the work and its illustrations should be, that it is said the list of subscribers exceeded twenty-five hundred, more than thrice the number anticipated—a patronage of more than princely munificence. All this was without any special effort. The support of the enterprise, therefore, may be considered certain, even though a considerable falling off from the subscription list should take place; and the distinguished author, with his fair prospect of life and health, may be reasonably expected to complete the work, the value of which he will richly enhance by the number and excellence of the illustrations which this noble patronage will enable him to furnish. Of the volumes already published, the first two contain, besides the *Essay*, the *North American Testudinata*, or *Turtles*, with thirty-seven splendid plates; the next two present the *Acalephs*, with forty-six plates; and the four taken together constitute the most gratifying earnest of those which are to follow. All true lovers of Natural History must rejoice in the progress and the promise.

Of such a work the appropriate introduction should be the richest and most complete *Essay on Classification*. This was the more necessary, on account of the different views held by naturalists on this subject; and to many who assume as the basis of their systems, the material organs, or what is commonly called the natural or physical organisation, this *Essay*

* From the *Biblical Repository and Princeton Review* for January 1863.—*Ed. B. & F. E. R.*

will be held to be transcendent. At least, in all but some of the minor subdivisions, it will doubtless be placed at the head of their systems. But apart from the admiration it will elicit from practical zoologists, and other admirers of nature exhibited in scientific detail, and illustrated by art, this Essay will excite a special interest in all who love to trace the operations of the Divine mind in the works of his creation. Under this aspect, however, it presents not only the most extraordinary excellencies, but also very grave defects; some of which, in both kinds, we propose to exhibit here, in order that the true and only consistent place of man in zoology may be made to appear.

I. The Excellencies.

1. All must agree with Professor Agassiz, that sufficient progress has now been made in the knowledge of animal life to form a correct system of arrangement. Passing from the first imperfect classification, in the *Systema Naturæ* of Linnæus in 1735, to its great improvement in 1761, and thence to its final revision by its author in 1766, we come to the system of Cuvier, which is a great advance beyond all that had preceded it. In all the subsequent "Anatomical Systems," from that of Cuvier to that of Leuckart in 1848, of *eight* of which Agassiz gives the details with remarks, the departure from the views of Cuvier seem to have been inconsiderable, except in that of Ehrenberg, in 1836. Of prominent "Philosophical Systems" of zoology of the German School, *three* are specially detailed and reported on in this Essay. Next to these are given the "Embryological Systems," *four* of which are finely commented on, as in the preceding cases. This short statement with respect to *fifteen* systems—and these are not all—must convince us that enough has been, or ought to have been, done by zoologists to enable a competent author to propound a system truthful and complete, at least in all the fundamental divisions. These, in their most general form, must be obvious and accessible to all observers. Accordingly we find that some zoologists, in each of the three modes of investigation, *i. e.*, anatomical, philosophical, and embryological, do agree with each other in certain respects, on the four primary divisions of the animal kingdom, as given by Cuvier; or, as Prof. Agassiz writes, on "the natural primitive relations of animal life," *viz.*, vertebrates, articulates, molluscs, and radiates. And if this classification were confined to animals below man, it would call forth no opposition. There is, however, a classification more fundamental and broad,*

* This more fundamental distinction was made, also, by Aristotle, as has just been pointed out by the writer, as he concludes this article, by a distinguished Greek scholar. It, with the grounds upon which it rests, will be introduced in the proper place, both for its antiquity and wise discrimination.

which was made by Ehrenberg in 1836, and also by St Hilaire in 1856 ; but this is barely referred to in the Essay.

2. The general views of Prof. Agassiz on the real object of classification, are worthy of philosophy and of the truth. He maintains the existence in animals of departments, *i.e.*, of "branch, class, order, family, genus, and species, by which we express the results of our investigations into the relations of the animal kingdom." Naturalists generally have admitted the real existence of species, and sometimes of genera ; but they have too often considered even genera, as well as the superior divisions, to be the result of human contrivance, or as a matter of indifference ; whilst these ought to be neither. With respect to such arrangements, Agassiz asks, "Are these divisions artificial or natural ? Are they the devices of the human mind to classify and arrange our knowledge in such a manner as to bring it more readily within our grasp, and facilitate further investigations ; or have they been instituted by the Divine intelligence as the categories of his mode of thinking ?" In a note he adds, "A system may be natural ; that is, may agree in every respect with the facts of nature, and yet not be considered by its author [or by others], as the manifestation of the thoughts of a Creator ; but merely as the expression of a fact existing in nature, no matter how." This is a just exhibition of the perverse thoughts of a host of naturalists, with which the admirable, and truthful, and exalting views of the author of this essay are in striking contrast. For by most naturalists, no respect has been paid to that original and grand idea of Plato, of a primordial plan or conception in the mind of the divine Architect, according to which all things were formed and have their operations carried on. From ignorance or design, their systems have originated in very different conceptions. This is illustrated in the Linnean system of botany, *artificial* in its general structure, and yet *natural*, in that it presents a host of facts accordant with nature. Such also, in part, is the so-called "Natural Method," which superseded that of Linnæus, and such, to a considerable extent, was his early zoology. The system of Cuvier shews the least possible respect to the development of a divine plan.

In opposing all artificial classification, Agassiz maintains the obvious and all-important, but often forgotten principle, that the order of the system is to be "inherent in the objects themselves," so that in truth the arrangement shall be "but translations into human language of the thoughts of the Creator." Throughout the Essay the distinguished author often adverts to the design or plan in nature as proof of one intelligent and wise Creator. Speaking to this purpose, he says : "If there is any truth in the belief that man is made in the image of God, it is surely not amiss for the philosopher to endeavour, by the study

of his own mental operations, to approximate the workings of the divine reason, learning from the nature of his own mind better to understand the infinite intellect from which it is derived." And surely the *perfect* system of zoology must contain and exhibit the divine plan, both for the instruction and elevation of the sincere student of nature, and for spiritual communion with the Father of spirits in the glorious temple of his works.

Another thought, as admirable as it is just and worthy of a scientific naturalist and a true philosopher, is the following :— "I cannot," says our author, "overlook nor disregard here the close connection there is between the facts ascertained by scientific investigations, and the discussions now carried on respecting the origin of organised beings ; and though I know those who hold it very unscientific to believe that thinking is not something inherent in matter, and that there is an essential difference between inorganic and living and thinking beings, I shall not be prevented by any such pretensions of a false philosophy from expressing my conviction that as long as it cannot be shewn that matter and physical forces do actually reason, I shall consider any manifestation of thought as evidence of a thinking being as the author of such thought, and shall look upon an intelligent and intelligible connection between the parts of nature as direct proof of the existence of a thinking God, as certainly as man exhibits the power of thinking when he recognises their natural relations." In a note in this connection, also, he makes the significant admission, that to the minds of many naturalists "the name of God appears out of place in a scientific work, as if the knowledge of secondary agencies constituted alone a worthy subject of their investigations, and as if nature could teach nothing about its author." Must not intelligent man be under a *moral obligation*, in the study of the works of nature, to recognise and honour their infinite and benevolent Creator and Ruler ?

3. Professor Agassiz explains the reason for the course thus pursued by many naturalists in the following way, viz., that they "are no doubt prevented from expressing their conviction that the world was called into existence and is regulated by an intelligent God, either by the fear of being supposed to share clerical or sectarian [theological] prejudices ; or because it may be dangerous for them to discuss freely such questions, without acknowledging at the same time the obligation of taking the Old Testament as the standard by which the validity of their results is to be measured." Is this an adequate and satisfactory reason for not "expressing their conviction" of the origin and government of the world ? Another explanation is stated thus :—"There are physicists who might be shocked at the idea

of being considered materialists, who are yet prone to believe that when they have recognised the laws which regulate the physical world, and acknowledged that these laws were established by the Deity, they have explained everything, even when they have considered only the phenomena of the inorganic world, as if the world contained no living beings ; and [or] as if these living beings exhibited nothing that differed from the inorganic world."

Further, in our author's view, it is not enough to see only the "adaptation of means to ends," and the "connection of organs and functions," in the things and creatures of earth, in order to trace the divine plan so industriously ignored by those naturalists who are here alluded to. For, as he states, "we find organs without functions, as, for instance, the teeth of the whale, which never cut through the gum, the breast [of the male] in all the class of mammalia ; these and similar organs are preserved in obedience to a certain uniformity of fundamental structure, true to the original formula of that division of animal life, even when not essential to its mode of existence. The organ remains, not for the performance of a function, but with reference to a plan." This he beautifully illustrates, also, by the "unity of structure of the limbs of pinnated animals, in which the fingers are never moved, with those which enjoy the most perfect articulations and freedom of motion." To these may be added the "blind fish" of the Kentucky Mammoth Cave, in which Dr Weyman discovered the "rudiments of eyes, left them as a remembrance" of the general type of fishes, with respect to this organ of vision. If so, "the blind crawfish and the blind insects" of that cave probably have rudimentary eyes ; and inasmuch as these crawfish have the optic nerve, may it not be that their eyes are so delicate as to afford them the vision necessary for their location ?

4. Professor Agassiz is perfectly explicit on the question of "equivocal generation," and on the errors in the explanation of phenomena which are more or less remotely connected with that idea. Of a certain class of physicists he says :—"Mistaking for a causal relation the intellectual connection observable between serial phenomena, they are unable to perceive any difference between disorder and the free, independent, and self-possessed action of a superior mind, and call mysticism even a passing allusion to the existence of an immaterial principle in animals, which they themselves acknowledge in man." "It is further of itself plain," he adds in a note, "that the laws which may explain the phenomena of the material world, in contradistinction from the organic, cannot be considered as accounting for the existence of living beings, even though these may have a material body, unless it be actually shewn that the

action of these laws implies, by their very nature, the production of such beings. Thus far Crosse's experiments are the only ones offered as proving such a result. I do not know what physicists may think about them now ; but I know that there is scarcely a zoologist who doubts that they only exhibited a mistake." It is gratifying to find Prof. Agassiz so explicit upon these experiments of Mr Crosse, whom he himself introduced to the public.*

5. Prof. Agassiz is decidedly opposed to the notion so common, and yet so baseless, of accounting for the works of nature by the operation of physical laws, or inherent forces, or co-existing powers. When the zoologist sees and understands something of the divine plan, according to which creation has been moulded and produced, he can no longer tolerate the "desolate theory which refers all to the laws of matter, as accounting for all the wonders of the universe, and leaves us with no God but the monotonous, unvarying action of physical forces, binding all things to their inevitable destiny." This is implied, indeed, in previous quotations, but here the question is argued at length. "It is the object of the following paragraphs," he says, "to shew that there are neither agents nor laws in nature known to physicists, under the influence and by the action of which, these [organised] beings could have originated ; that, on the contrary, the very nature of these beings, and their relations to one another and to the world in which they live, exhibit thought, and can, therefore, be referred only to the immediate action of a thinking being, even though the manner in which they were called into existence remains for the present a mystery." The whole argument is too long for insertion here ; but it may be safely stated that it is triumphantly sustained ; and the conclusion is certainly in accordance with right reason, and with the general understanding of the teachings of infinite wisdom. For we may well ask, in the words of our author, "What evidence

* These experiments were made in 1837, and are now hardly remembered. Mr Crosse found that in the operation of the galvanic current upon the silicate of potash, some little eggs and insects appeared in the solution ; which were figured by him to shew their (the insects') form, head, body, legs, and bristles. Numbers of these insects were examined in England and France ; and their place was ascertained under the genus *Acarus*, or mite ; in which, and even in their species, the French naturalists agreed with the English, although they had no belief in this new and philosophical mode of creation. Yet it seemed to some that the electrical current had developed the work of creation, and produced organs of life, for the insects lived and moved. What a triumph of science ! But short was the exultation ; for in other careful experiments, which excluded external interference, the insects failed to crawl into life. Mr Crosse himself finally supposed that the eggs, and perhaps some insects had fallen into the silicate material, and had thus been developed in the common method.—See *American Journal of Science*, vol. xxxii. July 1837, and vol. xxxv. January 1839.

there is, in the present state of knowledge, that at any time these *physical agents have produced anything they no longer do produce* ; and what probability there is that they *may ever have produced any organised being ?*"

6. Prof. Agassiz adopts the conclusions of geologists, drawn from their discoveries of the remains of animal life in the fossiliferous rocks—from the oldest to the newest of this vast amount of rocks on or near the earth's surface—that *various forms of animal life are found together* ; that they all belong to the four great and commonly received divisions of the mere animals ; and that there is good reason to believe we have the knowledge of the "earliest types of the animal kingdom" which have existed on our globe. "We find," he says, "everywhere below this oldest set of fossiliferous beds, other stratified rocks, in which no trace of organised beings can be found." Thus both zoology and geology carry us back to the period when *organised bodies began to exist*—a great fact in the history of our earth—even to the "lowest deposits formed since the existence of organised beings upon earth." To say that the fossils might have been formed from older beings, or that Plutonian or other action may have obliterated all trace of such remains where they once existed, is to depart from the true ground of science, viz., *facts*, and to rest on mere supposition.

7. Finally, to mention no other particulars, Prof. Agassiz is a firm defender of the permanence of species ; which, in this day of perverse speculation in natural history, is a high honour. The theories of specific changes in plants and animals, maintained by Lamarck and Darwin, as well as by others, have shaken many naturalists, if they have not overwhelmed them with doubts. Not so with Agassiz ; in illustration of which only a few references need be given. Thus, he says, "Between two successive geological periods, then, changes have taken place among animals and plants. But none of those primordial forms of life which naturalists call species are known to have changed during any of these periods." "Geology shews that at different periods there have existed different species ; but no transition from those of a preceding into those of a following epoch has ever been noticed anywhere." "The Egyptian monuments," and the "most careful comparison" of the animals found on them, with "living specimens of the same species" in Egypt, shew "that there is not a shadow of a difference between them for a period of five thousand years ;" also, that "many of the so-called varieties, which are supposed to be the product of time, are as old as any of the animals that have been known to man." It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that the same animals,

as the horse, ox, elephant, lion, tiger, bear, sheep, &c., have been known to man from time immemorial. This "permanence of the specific differences which characterise every organism," no doubt depends upon the immaterial principle, or the peculiar living force of each organised being.

To illustrate the permanence of some species, Professor Agassiz gives his calculations of the time during which the coral insect has been at work in forming the coral reefs of Florida; this he estimates at eight thousand years for each of the four reefs. But there are other suppositions equally plausible, viz., that these reefs have all been growing at the same time in water of suitable depth, and then have been raised by some upheaving power, of which geology has abundance in the earth ready for use; or that their growth was more rapid in their early formation than in recent times, since they have come to be examined. Thus the age of these reefs might be reduced far below that here assigned to them, and even brought within the compass of six thousand years.

These and other excellencies of this essay will receive the fullest commendation. They exalt the distinguished author as a wise man, even more highly than he is exalted as a most accomplished zoologist by the scientific part of the work.

But even the wisest may fail in some things—"to err is human"—and we must now, though unwillingly, undertake to point out some of the errors or defects of that *system* of zoology to which Professor Agassiz has committed himself, and of those arguments for its support and defence into which it has led him in this essay.

II. *The Errors or Defects.*

The grand error of the Essay is involved in the principle thus stated: "To me it appears indisputable that this order and arrangement [viz., that of the four great divisions in the system of zoology by Cuvier,] are based upon the natural, primitive relations of animal life." Under the phrase "animal life," he means to include all that he understands to belong to human life. In this he makes himself clearly understood; for in discussing, in the first section, the "Fundamental Relations of Animals," he shews that the "leading features of a natural zoological system are all founded in nature;" and this "natural . . . system" he finds in that of Cuvier, in which man is classified as a mere animal. Besides this, he condemns the separation of man from the mere animals in the zoological systems of Ehrenberg and St Hilaire, as in the following words: "I cannot, therefore, agree with those who would disconnect mankind from the animal kingdom, and establish a distinct kingdom for man

alone;" and elsewhere—"I must object to the admission of a distinct kingdom for man alone." This is explicit; and the idea is fully carried out in the reasonings and illustrations yet to be considered.

Here it is to be observed that there are two principles upon which this classification of man with the mere animals may undertake to defend and maintain itself. The first of these is to deny to the rational and moral powers any place or influence, as a characteristic of beings, to determine their position in classification or arrangement; the second is, to assert a rational and moral nature in all, at least in all the higher animals; and consequently to deny that this nature is any distinctive characteristic of humanity. To the latter of these views Agassiz seems to incline, although the arguments he advances in defence of his system do not all harmonize with this supposition; whilst most of those naturalists with whom he agrees in adopting Cuvier's system, seem to incline to the former view.

Yet are there no grounds for this exclusion of the reason and moral nature, as a distinctive character in classification, but the strongest arguments against it. For the intellectual and moral powers are a part of nature, and of our nature, as much as our senses, or bodies, or skeletons, or any part of our physical structures. The spirit or soul of man is the work of the Creator no less than his body, and is the most important element in the system of nature. No system can be true and complete, according to nature, which leaves out this element. It is as natural for man to discern between right and wrong, and to feel approbation for what he sees to be right, with condemnation for the wrong; in other words, to experience the operations of the conscience, or moral sense, as it is for a dog to bark, or for a lion to roar, without any moral feelings. With this sense of the words *nature* and *natural*, no exception can be taken to the statement that the "leading features of a natural zoological system are all founded in nature." But in the sense in which they would be taken by most of Cuvier's followers, as exclusive of the most significant and exalted characteristics of humanity, the statement is a grievous falsifying of the primitive facts of nature. For certainly the conscience is a primitive fact of man's nature, which is not formed by language, study, or habit, and which, thanks to the Father of truth, no system can ever annihilate.

Meanwhile, it is fully admitted that man has an animal nature, and should be treated of as subject to its laws, wherever he is not elevated above them by those superior traits of which no trace is found in the brute. He is no less a vertebrate, a mammifer, an air-respiring and a warm-blooded animal, than he is exalted immeasurably above the whole sphere of animal life

by his articulate language, and by his rational, moral, and religious nature. But upon what principle of science is his place in zoology made to depend upon the lower characteristics of his nature, to the entire exclusion of all those in virtue of which man is man? Is it not self-evident that in a truly scientific method and classification, the more significant and exalted characteristics of his nature, in which he is distinguished from the mere animal, would be of greater weight in determining his true place, than his less significant and lower traits in which he is identified with the brute?

Struck with this, one would think, most obvious truth, two distinguished naturalists have separated man from the mere animals in their systems of zoology. In that of Ehrenburg there are only two great divisions, viz.,

First Cycle, Nations, Mankind—One distinct Class.

Second Cycle, Mere Animals.*

These divisions depend on other differences than those of Cuvier, but no less palpable. They need not be detailed here. It is obvious that Ehrenberg based his system of zoology on the "natural, primitive relations of organised beings," and that the order in these fundamental divisions is "inherent in the objects themselves." Ample authority is this one name of Ehrenberg.

In the system of St Hilaire,† organised bodies are classed in three great fundamental divisions, called kingdoms, viz., 1. Vegetable, 2. Animal, 3. Human. The first has vegetative life, the functions embraced under *nutrition* and *reproduction*. In the second, *animal life*, exhibited in *sensibility* and *mobility*, is added to vegetative life. In the third kingdom, containing man alone, *moral life* is added to vegetative and animal life. "The plant *lives*; the animal *lives and feels*; man *lives and feels and thinks*." In the *feeling* of the animals are comprehended their passions, instincts, and whatever mental operations belong to their nature and condition. So also, the *thinking* of man comprehends all the faculties, functions, and exercises of his *moral* nature.

Here, again, it is evident that this system, which depends upon the structure and organisation for the very different *vital* powers, is based on the "natural, primitive relations" of organised beings, and that the order is "inherent in the objects themselves."

It is obvious, also, that while Cuvier formed his four departments on branches of animated nature on the ground that there

* See Agassiz's Essay, p. 200

† Histoire Nat. Generale des Regnes Organique, par I. Geoffroy St Hilaire, Paris, 8vo. 1856.

are four "distinct plans of structure," his system is not so elementary in its higher groups, as that of St Hilaire, whose three organic kingdoms are designated by three different vital functions. But admitting this quadriform structure, though it is controverted by some zoologists, where is the evidence that it is the character which unfolds the divine plan in the case? Surely we must conceive of the Creator's plan as best interpreted by those traits and characteristics of his creatures which are of the highest importance, and which most fully evince his greatness and goodness. Which, then, of these different systems, it may be asked, the more ennobles man, and gives the higher glory to his Creator—that which makes man's place in zoology to depend exclusively upon his physical structure, or that which takes into consideration, also, as a distinguishing character, his moral life—that which teaches us to think of man only as a vertebrate with the other vertebrates, or that which directs our thoughts to his moral and religious faculties, which raises him far above the mere animals, assimilate him to the angels, and constitute that "image of God" in which he was created? The fundamental principle of the latter, to say the least, is no less scientific than that of the former, whilst it reveals in a far more striking manner the glory of the Infinite Intellect.

This view is confirmed by consideration of the great and radical difference which exists between man and the mere animals. The highest class of these, *i. e.*, the mammals—and we need not refer to any others—have the five senses, by which they receive impressions from external nature, and have distinct perceptions of objects; they have the common appetites, desires and emotions, which, as they are gratified or not, are the sources of enjoyment or suffering; they like and dislike, choose and refuse, compare and reason,* at least to some extent; they are conscious of their feelings, desires, and knowledge, and evidently remember with great accuracy, distinctness, and tenacity; they are subject to various passions, have strong attachment to their kind, and take great care of their young; they associate and contrive for their own support, defence, and protection, and for the construction of their nests, burrows, houses, and the like; they have an unerring instinct by which they are prompted and guided, without instruction or experience, to the most important

* The following instance, similar to many others which have been published, is given here on authority that, if known, would command unhesitating belief. A gentleman saw a crow fly up from the ground with something in its beak, which it dropped from a height of 100 or 150 feet above the earth. This was repeated several times. Attracted by the sight, the gentleman rode rapidly to the spot, and found that it was a land-tortoise which the crow had been carrying up and dropping. Its shell was already fractured, and the meat was laid bare. The crow, by his reasoning and experiment, had procured for himself a delicious feast, which he was left to enjoy,

and wonderful operations and results, for their support, and the continuation of their species ; they have a mode of communication, a sort of language, corresponding to emotional sounds or interjections, and capable of conveying information from one to another, yet entirely distinct from the articulate and conventional languages of mankind ; some of them are susceptible of instruction, so as to understand many of those sounds and signs which human beings alone are capable of making, and so as to perform many acts of which, without instruction from man, they are totally incapable ; in fine, they manifest the phenomena of will, and often great strength of purpose or decision.

Now as any or all of these exercises or acts in man are held to be the manifestations of mind, so they must be regarded as proofs of a similar power in the brute. It is wholly unscientific to explain the same series of phenomena in man and the mere animals by different hypotheses. This power, call it mind, or soul, or understanding, they share with man. It belongs to the animal constitution in each, and, as far as this animal mind goes, it seems to be an inseparable attendant of sensation and voluntary motion. For what could sensation effect without knowledge ? and what benefit can we conceive of as resulting from voluntary motion without intellectual motives, ends, objects ?

It is true, however, that in the mere animals this mind partakes more of the nature of feeling than of thinking ; and it is wholly employed upon the objects of sense. It is the universal practice of man to speak of the *feelings of animals*. In the power of instinct they greatly excel man ; from which we should anticipate as great inferiority in their intellectual or reasoning faculties. Philosophers, however, have not been able to agree altogether in what the inferiority of animals to man consists, although they have commonly recognised it as essential rather than accidental or circumstantial. Mr Locke placed it in the want of the "power of abstracting." The "having of general ideas" he called "an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to ;" they "have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words, or any other general signs."* This great and essential inferiority of the brute to man, involves another equally important, viz., the want and total incapacity of articulate and conventional language. Thus, says Max Müller :† "The one great barrier between the brute and man is *language*. Man speaks,

* Essay on the Human Understanding, book ii. ch. 11, sec. 10.

† Müller's Lectures on the Science of Language, pp. 354, 8vo. New York, 1862.

but no brute has ever uttered a word." The adaptation of man to society, to established laws and civil government, for which the highest of mere animals have no power or faculty, is another distinguishing characteristic. Still another grand difference is presented by Prof. Agassiz himself: "If," he says, "there is anything which places man above all other beings in nature, it is precisely the circumstance that he possesses those noble attributes, without which, in their most exalted excellence and perfection, not one of these general traits of relationship, so characteristic of the great types of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, can be understood, or even perceived. How, then, could these relations have been devised without similar powers?" [*i.e.* similar powers in the Creator.] Is not this difference enough to place a man in a class by himself, viz, his having faculties to the conception of which the highest brute does not and cannot attain?

The above differences are confined to the sentient and intellectual faculties, between which in man and in the brute there is certainly a broad distinction, however much their operations, within certain limits, may resemble each other. The range of the intellectual powers is very different also in different animals of the highest and lowest classes; but in the highest it is vastly inferior to that of ordinary men, even in the lowest savage state. The reasoning process is very limited; no abstraction, or apprehension of general principles, or demonstrative reasoning, seems to be attained, or attainable; most of the great ends of their being seem to be secured by instinct; and how near soever the reasoning process in animals may approach to that in man, the wide separation is still palpable. The same is true of the voluntary powers.

But all these differences taken together are as nothing compared with that which is manifested in the fact that man is endowed with a *moral nature, a perception of right and wrong, and a feeling of moral obligation*, of which not the least trace appears in the highest of mere animals. This moral power—this feeling of moral obligation—cannot be confounded with sensation, intellect, or volition, nor with all of these taken together. For the moral sense, or the sense of moral obligation, respects a different class of things, either objects or relations, and has an entirely different quality and nature, as is apparent in the works that have been written on morals and religion as compared with those on the understanding or reason, on rhetoric or logic, and also in the common convictions of intelligent and thoughtful men. Yet the language of Professor Agassiz, and of some others, seems to imply a disregard of the true moral element of human nature, and to exclude such as are truly moral sentiments, by exhibiting a merely intellectual

affinity or likeness in man to the divine excellence. It is strange—it is wonderful—that this moral sense, this feeling of moral obligation to God and man, has not always been taken as the palpable and distinctive character, property, or power, separating man from the mere animals! Probably the failure to discriminate precisely between the moral and intellectual faculties has been at the bottom of the prevalent objection to the existence of a mind, or an immaterial principle in the brute.

It is upon these clearly ascertained and essential characteristics, which do not appear in the brute, especially upon that of the moral nature, that we claim for man a place in zoology distinct from that of mere animals. For it seems evident from what has been said, that the true classification of organised bodies must be substantially that of St Hilaire, which distinguishes them into three separate kingdoms, each of which, as we have seen, is determined and defined by a peculiar and an essential characteristic, inherent in the constitution of its subjects. The characteristic of the first kingdom is vegetative life; of the second, animal life, superinduced upon the vegetative; of the third, moral life, superinduced upon the animal. Thus the first stands as the foundation; the second includes the first, and rises above it; the third includes the second and first, and crowns all. The vegetative life, including nutrition and reproduction, has not one property of the peculiar animal life, of which the characteristics are sensibility (including all the operations of the animal intellect) and voluntary motion; nor has the mere animal one property of the distinctively human or moral life, the characteristics of which include the capacity of the knowledge of abstract and moral truths, and the feeling of moral obligation and responsibility. Hence the life of man is elevated immeasurably above the sphere of that of any, even the highest, of the mere animals.

It is gratifying to know that this classification of organised bodies is no discovery of modern times, inasmuch as it is substantially that of Aristotle himself, who may not improperly be styled the founder of Natural History. In his *Ethics*, in order to determine the highest good of man, and the means of obtaining it, he found it indispensable to ascertain first the true and distinguishing characteristic of human nature. Accordingly he recognises the general properties of organised bodies in the plant, the animal, and man, and asks: "What would be the proper peculiarity of man?" He answers to this effect: "Life seems to be common to him with the plants." "We are then to set aside the life of nutrition and growth." "Next to this follows a certain sentient life, [*i.e.*, the life of sensation, perception, affection, and understanding,] and this man has, in common with the horse, the ox, and every animal."

... "There remains now a certain practical [acting] life of a being who possesses reason."* By *reason* here, as elsewhere in the writings of Aristotle, is plainly intended, not that understanding which belongs to animal life, but that power of intellect by which man is distinguished from the brute, viz., that by which moral obligation is acknowledged and felt, and duty is performed.

Strange indeed would it be in the arrangements of infinite wisdom, if the proper characteristic of man had not been discoverable until nearly six thousand years of his history had passed away, and then only by anatomical investigations accessible but to a very few. Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, to mention no others, clearly apprehended and set forth the distinguishing characteristics of the mere animal nature, and exhibited the great peculiarity of man as elevated far away from the sphere of brute life. By the method of common sense, i.e., by analysing the characteristics of organised beings, they seized without effort, and held with the utmost firmness, the distinguishing character of man.

Hence it is plain that every system of zoology which does not recognise this distinction is false, its foundation is a falsehood, and instead of revealing, it hides the plan of the Creator, which it ought to disclose.

Moreover, it is evident that only upon this arrangement, which confounds man with the mere animals, is it possible for Professor Agassiz to maintain his doctrine of eight or more independent creations of man in eight or more distinct provinces or faunas. For his principal arguments are derived from the animal nature of man, and from the analogy of the human to the brute creation. Just in proportion to the amount of difference ascertained between man and the animals, is that analogy weakened, and the conclusion invalidated. Hence the unanswerable objection to those distinct provinces for man is, and must ever be, that his higher physical, his far more exalted intellectual, and his transcendent moral powers, place him at an immeasurable remove from the highest of mere animals, elevate him far above the laws which may confine them to particular locations, and enable him to be, as he is found, truly and properly, a cosmopolite.

Recurring now to the statement that animals feel, think, compare, judge, and have various affections and passions which seem to imply an immaterial principle in them, it is to be observed that this, in virtue of the broad differences already pointed out, does in no sense make them human; nor does it

* Aristotelis *Ethica Nicomachea*, B. i. cap. 6; B. ii. cap. 3; and B. iii., on the Soul.

imply the immortality of their thinking principle. The question so often asked, What becomes at death of the mind of the brute? may be safely answered by another, in the words of an ancient wise man, "Who knoweth the spirit of a man that going upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward into the earth?" The spirit of man aspires to immortality; that of the beast gives no such indication; it may wholly perish with the body; and for aught that appears, it may be far better for the animal itself that this should be so; while its place may be filled with an equal, or a better form of life. Besides, the fact that the carnivorous species have a place in the divine plan, is a striking exhibition of the low estimate which should be formed of the life and mind of animals. Indeed, it is conceded that the existence of species which require animal food, as of man, for example, is a proof of the divine benevolence. With what repugnance would the slaughter of animals for food, and even for sacrifice, and their destruction generally, be viewed, if it were believed that in any or every such case, a life or mind of moral endowments were consigned to dissolution with the body. It is the moral nature of man which gives him his priceless estimation, and assures to him immortality.

For wherever the intellectual and moral natures are brought together in the unity of one and the same consciousness, moral obligation at once arises, the creature becomes subject to a higher law—the moral law of the Creator; and while we know of no reason for the continued existence of mere thought or intellect, especially in its lower forms, we do know of an imperative reason for the continued existence of the *moral* creature, until the whole object of moral law shall be accomplished, and the creature shall have responded to all the obligations of its moral nature and relations. If the minds of animals be supposed to survive their bodies, it must be for reasons not implied in their mere existence, and without the least evidence in nature that such is the fact. The moral nature of man, on the contrary, involves his immortality, with which are inseparably bound up all his wisest, purest, and highest aspirations.

With these views we are prepared to understand correctly those exhibitions made by mere animals, which are thus described by Professor Agassiz: "When animals fight with one another, when they associate for a common purpose, when they warn one another in danger, when they come to the rescue of one another, when they display pain or joy, they manifest impulses of the same kind as are considered among the moral attributes of man." But these indications are the mere workings of their animal constitution, involving so much knowledge and such passions as are essential to their self-defence and pre-

ervation. To call these "moral" feelings is a perversion of language, unless it be intended to designate the workings of the animal *mind*, as distinguished from the operations of the material body; and then it would seem that *mental* would have been a better word. Even if they are of a *similar* kind to those of the animal nature of man, no one attributes to them guilt or merit, right or wrong, praise or blame, because no one has discovered in the mere animals the least evidence of a moral sense, or of moral obligation. They are mere animal impulses. But man is always held responsible for these feelings, because he is confessedly endowed with a moral nature, by which he discerns between right and wrong, is sensible to moral obligation, and is capable of controlling his passions and actions in conformity with the wise and benevolent moral laws of God.

But since the above operations belong to the natures of man and beast alike, let it be granted that, in the words of Professor Agassiz, there is not "a difference in kind between them," in so far as they are *animal operations*, does it follow that the highest endowments of man are also to be found in the brute? Agassiz seems to maintain this, where he says, "The gradations of the moral faculties among the higher animals and man are, moreover, so imperceptible, that to deny to the first a certain sense of responsibility and consciousness [conscience], would certainly be an exaggeration of the difference between animals and men." That the animal has consciousness in the sense that it is aware of its own sensations, feelings, volitions, desires, memories, and impulses, must be admitted by all; but that even the highest of mere animals has any sense of moral responsibility or conscientiousness, or acting of conscience, or feeling of right and wrong, has never yet been discovered. This is something which is seen to belong not to the brute, but exclusively to man. The one is thence held to be a *man*, and the other a *brute*.

Now this assumption—for it is no more—of "impulses of the same kind" in man and the brute, is the sandy foundation upon which this classification of man with the mere animals is built. No mighty storm and wind, it would seem, can be required to overthrow it. But let man be separated from the brute in a class by himself—a change easily effected—and the whole fabric of this zoological system is built upon a rock; its firmness, symmetry, and beauty challenge the admiration of every beholder. God smiles upon it.

The doctrine maintained by Agassiz, "of the existence in every animal of an immaterial principle similar to that which, by its excellence and superior endowments, places man so much above animals," is to be received not without due qualification.

For the force of the words "*similar to*," is that of *the same as*, or, according to the previous statement, "*of the same kind*." Of this no proof is offered but that already quoted; and none whatever can be produced. Man's superiority does not consist merely in a higher degree of powers the same in kind with those of the brute, but in powers entirely distinct and diverse in kind from everything yet discovered in the mere animal; of which powers "the roof and crown" is the moral sense, the religious principle. This is the distinction marked in that well known definition, *Man is a religious animal*.

A statement before published by Professor Agassiz is amplified in this Essay, shewing us his fixed opinion on the subject, in the following words: "A close study of the dog might satisfy every one of the similarity of his [the dog's] impulses with [to] those of man, and that those impulses are regulated in a manner which discloses psychical faculties in every respect of the same kind as those of man, . . . and though all these faculties do not make a philosopher of him [the dog], they certainly place him in that respect upon a level with a considerable proportion of poor humanity." This, probably, is the most extravagant assertion ever made by a philosopher, with respect to the exalted powers of mere animals, even those of the dog! Has the distinguished author truly considered the force of this language, and estimated the results involved in it? Let us consider these for a moment. For if this assertion be true, and the common attributes of humanity be maintained, the dog is moved by the same sense of rectitude as man; is actuated by the same sense of honour and uprightness, has the same discernment between right and wrong, is the subject, like man, of moral law, may properly be required to worship and revere his Creator, and must be the subject of rewards and punishments under the divine government; and, further, is possessed of the same inalienable rights as man, viz., those of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." All this, and much more, results inevitably, upon the supposition above stated, from the doctrine that the dog is endowed with "psychical faculties in every respect of the same kind as those of man." Now, if this be truth, of course it is all right. But, palpably to all men but such as these philosophers, it is not true. For whatever be the instincts and intellect of the dog, with all the teaching and training ever given him, the moral sense, the feeling of right and wrong, has never been developed—the dog has no such faculty or power. But if, on the other hand, the dog be held, as he is by Professor Agassiz, to be the same animal, of the same characters, as known and described from all antiquity, then it follows, from the assertion that his "psychical faculties [are] in every respect of the same kind as those of man,"

that man is degraded from his high position, as the moral image and likeness of his Maker, to a level of kind, though not of degree, with the mere animals, and even with the dog. This last is the fair understanding of Agassiz's words in this place; as it is one legitimate consequence of that classification in zoology which ranks man with the brute. But there is no truth, there is nothing of the divine idea, nothing of the thought of the Creator, in all this; for whilst the moral sense remains in man, the lowest "of poor humanity" will continue to be possessed of psychical faculties *differing in kind* from, and immeasurably exalted above, those of the dog.

Another illustration of Professor Agassiz's views upon this subject merits special attention. "Who," he says, "can watch the sunfish (*Pomotis vulgaris*) hovering over its eggs, and protecting them for weeks, or the catfish (*Pimelodus catus*) move about with its young, like a hen with her brood, without being satisfied that the feeling which prompts them to these acts is of the same kind as that which attaches the cow to her suckling, or the child to its mother?" [the mother to the child?] . . . "Who is the investigator, who, having once recognised such a similarity between certain faculties of man, and those of the higher animals, can feel prepared in the present state of our knowledge, to trace the limits where this community of nature ceases? And yet, to ascertain the character of all these faculties, there is but one road, the study of the habits of animals, and a comparison between them and the earlier stages of development of man. I confess I could not say in what the mental faculties of a child differ from those of a young chimpanzee."

Now it may readily be admitted that in the above instances the *animal feelings* of the parents for their offspring are similar, even the same, in their nature, except so far as they may be modified by the peculiar form of animal life in each. But in the mere animals those feelings are wholly instinctive; and does it follow that the human mother can have no other than instinctive animal feelings, nor any additional affections for her offspring? Is she not endowed with a moral nature and feelings, which are unknown to the brute? Is she prohibited by any law of her nature from the exercise of these in her affection for her child? Surely, the human mother, from her nature, has feelings for her child, which are peculiar to her, and which do not at all shew themselves in the *storge* of the brute. And this is in accordance with the judgment of mankind. For if the cow neglects her calf, and it dies, the matter rests there—she is not blamed or punished. But if the human mother neglects, or voluntarily injures her child in any way, so that it perishes, how great is her guilt, and how justly does she suffer

the penalty of her crime ! Whence now comes that penal law or statute which she has violated, but from the common sense and common consent of all mankind, that her relation to her child is different in kind from that of the brute to its young ? And the profoundest reflections of the greatest, wisest, and best of men, vindicate and sustain this spontaneous judgment of humanity—they affirm that it is right to punish the woman, and that it would be wrong to punish the cow. The true and sufficient reason for this difference is, that all men believe and know that man is made in the image of God, while the brute is not. It needs, therefore, no uncommon power or daring in the “investigator” who attempts “to trace the limit where this community of nature [in man and the animals] ceases.” Ordinary talents and acquisitions are abundantly competent. No difficult or abstruse investigations are required. Embryology has not given, and cannot give any light on this subject ; the subtle analysis of the lowest and most obscure animals helps not this case ; the correctness of the orders in the highest division of mere animals, *i. e.*, the mammals, avails nothing here ; but the knowledge of the powers, endowments,* and habits of men and the higher animals, is what is necessary for this investigation ; and this knowledge is accessible to all. In order to be qualified to investigate this subject, one need not be an expert naturalist, in the technical sense of the word. The first and great divisions of organic bodies, vegetable, animal and human, are already given—they are palpable to sense on presentation of fully developed specimens of each. No extensive examination, or wide comparison, is necessary to ascertain the difference between mental and moral characteristics. Indeed, all the facts urged by Prof. Agassiz against separating man from the mere animals, are manifest to all intelligent observers, and many of them have been a thousand times remarked ; they had, moreover, been considered pertinent and strong, but they are not incapable of satisfactory explanation ; and they become less and less important as the examination of the human and animal powers becomes more full and particular. He “confesses, indeed, that he cannot say in what the mental faculties of a child differ from those of a young chimpanzee ;” but if he means, that the two are too

* At the late meeting of the British Association, the President of the Zoological section, Prof. Huxley, after the reading of a paper by Dr Owen on the brain of man and that of the gorilla, said that this was not the way to distinguish man from the monkeys ; that such discussions were futile ; and gave his opinion that the difference between man and the animals was to be found, not in the toes nor in the brain, but in the “moral and intellectual” characters or powers. The value of this, from so great and distinguished an anatomist, can hardly be over-estimated.

young to *exhibit* any difference, he only asserts that he cannot distinguish because the differences are not yet developed, which may be easily believed; and if he means, they do not exhibit any difference in their mental faculties because there is none, let that be distinctly understood, with all the consequences which must flow from the doctrine; but we can discover no reason why that assertion should be restricted to the young, since, if it be true of them, it must be true also of the old. Evidently, the true method requires the examination and comparison of the faculties of a mature man and a mature chimpanzee. A knowledge of the "earlier stages of development" of either man or the animal, or both, is of no value for the determination of the differences between them. And when mature specimens are examined and compared, even the somatic characters of the two are found to be so diverse that they are placed in different divisions; whilst in the qualities of their minds they are so different, that the one has human or moral life, and the other is entirely destitute of every such manifestation. Their young inherit their distinctive properties, and are sure to develop or manifest them in due time, according to a law of nature settled and fixed from their creation. A creature may be too young to manifest its specific characters; as it may not be possible to determine from the egg what shall be hatched from it; and as the embryo may be too little advanced to exhibit the characters of its class or order; but what does all this amount to, whilst we are able to predict with perfect certainty that the offspring of a man will prove nothing else but human, and that of a chimpanzee nothing else but an ugly chimpanzee? There is no uncertainty here, although the argument for classing man with the animals, which Prof. Agassiz founds upon the fact that the faculties of the young of both are undistinguishable, has no force whatever upon any other supposition. And whilst he concedes and maintains that, according to the immutable laws of nature, the elements and forces in a child will not be developed into a monkey, nor those of a young monkey into a child, it is difficult even to conceive of any rational object for which he makes the statement that whilst they remain undeveloped, the faculties of the one cannot be distinguished from those of the other.

We are now prepared for the positive statement that "this community of nature [between man and the animal] ceases" *where the powers cease to be the same*. Between the vegetable and the animal is the community of vegetative life or power; and this community of nature ceases where the animal life begins. In like manner, between the animal and man is the community of vegetative and animal life; and this com-

munity of nature ceases where the moral life begins, which belongs exclusively to man. The fixed and unchangeable limit between man and the animal is just as easily and clearly traceable as that between the animal and the vegetable.

The structure of the higher monkeys places them, in this particular, in the next rank to man; but even in this respect they are entirely distinct from him, as has been shewn by Professors Owen and Weyman, the very highest authorities, and by others. In intellect they are probably inferior to the lion and elephant, perhaps to other animals; and being absolutely destitute of moral powers, they are placed at immeasurable distance from man.

The protest which has been made by many philosophers, and naturalists too, against the classification of Cuvier, and the wide difference "between man and the monkeys," which that protest maintains, has not arisen, as Agassiz intimates, from the ignorance of the Greeks "of the existence of the orang-outang and chimpanzee." Many of those who have protested, and do still protest, against it, have known little or nothing of the ignorance or knowledge of the Greeks upon this subject. They founded this distinction on those characters which *man is known to possess, and which the brute is known not to possess*. The discovery of the orang-outang, the chimpanzee, and the gorilla, has not diminished the difference in the least. If Aristotle had been as well acquainted with them as are the modern naturalists, he would have discovered in them no more semblance of that moral power which he gives as the distinctive character of man, than he discovered in other animals. Agassiz himself finds his chosen example of what he pleases to call moral faculties, not in the monkey, but in the dog, and the dog was as well known to Aristotle as it is to Professor Agassiz. It is the modern naturalists alone, with no new facts which bear upon the point, who profess to find so little difference between man and the brute—a view utterly repudiated by Aristotle. Even Linnæus forgot, or disregarded, or never knew, the distinction given by the great heathen philosopher and naturalist, when, as quoted by Agassiz, he (Linnæus) said in 1746: "*Nullum characterem adhuc eruere potui, unde homo a simia internoscatur.*" True, he afterwards made the discovery of structural differences, so as to place man in the first order, and the monkeys in the second order of his corrected zoology in 1761; but neither Linnæus, nor Cuvier, nor Agassiz, has made the distinction so clearly presented by Aristotle in the grand moral peculiarity of man; by which he separated him from all the animals in a class by himself. This, indeed, is not a mere nominal classification, but one based upon the distinctive characters of organised beings.

The protest is stronger, made by more and louder voices now than ever before. Indeed, there is reason for another protest from the great body of naturalists against such views as Professor Agassiz has here presented, as being unfounded in history, and unsupported by any facts or fair considerations; whilst, if there were any need of it, we would cordially sustain his "protest against the bigotry spreading in some quarters, [where?] which would press upon science doctrines not immediately flowing from scientific premises." For we maintain that the classification here advocated is strictly "scientific," inasmuch as it is founded upon palpable facts and well-known principles of the highest consequence in science and morals. If there is bigotry in asserting and urging upon naturalists and philosophers the moral faculties or powers, as distinctively and exclusively characteristic of man, it is the bigotry of Aristotle, and others among the wisest of the heathen. Repelling, therefore, with our author, every influence "which would press upon science doctrines not immediately flowing from scientific premises," we maintain that if there is any truth in natural history established by scientific examinations, carried on through the whole historic period, it is this, that *no brute has "psychical faculties in every respect of the same kind as those of man;"* and that no dog, no learned pig, no orang, chimpanzee, or gorilla, is, in this respect, "on a level" with any real specimen of true, though "poor humanity."

Professor Agassiz undertakes to support this doctrine of intimate relationship between men and animals, by an argument derived from a supposed analogy between the inarticulate cries of different species of the same family of animals, and the various languages of the human race. This part of the Essay is very remarkable, as exhibiting views of language which must astonish the comparative philologists, to whom we leave it; for we cannot examine it here, and we abstain from attempting to characterise it by any descriptive terms.

He shews also that the psychological characteristics of man and of the animals possess a high interest, inasmuch as mind and soul have a value superior to that of matter, even in its most highly organised forms. To this we fully subscribe; yet we can hardly accept in its full extent the following assertion: "The natural history of animals is by no means completed after the somatic side of their nature has been fully investigated; they, too, have a psychological individuality, which, though less fully studied, is nevertheless the connecting link between them and man." Now, we have seen that the community of nature between man and the brute is that of vegetative and animal life, the latter including the animal mind or understanding, with its passions and instincts; also,

the animals are linked to man by their organised structure. But their "psychological individuality" is totally destitute of the moral element, which is the predominating characteristic of the "psychological individuality" of man. So far, then, is it from being true that this is "the connecting link between them and man," that it is precisely in their psychological characters that the animals are most distinctly and broadly separated from man.

From this point of view we are enabled to appreciate other statements of our author, in which he anticipates a new paradise for us in our future life, as follows: "Most of the arguments of philosophy in favour of the immortality of man, apply equally to the permanency of this principle in other living beings." How little of truth there is in this we have seen in the fact that the moral and religious endowments, the grand reason for immortality, apart from which all other reasons together have little or no force, are confined to man alone of all the creatures of earth. But Professor Agassiz continues: "May I not add that a future life, in which man should be deprived of that great source of enjoyment, and intellectual and moral improvement, which result from the contemplation of the harmonies of an organic world, would involve a lamentable loss; and may we not look to a spiritual concert of the combined worlds, and all their inhabitants, in presence of their Creator, as the highest conception of paradise?" Many will admit the possibility of this; but most of those who do will exclaim, Is this the paradise of God? Has this world stood so long, and displayed such a multitude of wonderful operations for thousands of years, to have the same "harmonies of an organic world" repeated on a grander scale? Is it not more probable that these earthly wonders will have answered their object and come to an end, and that they will be followed by higher wonders of knowledge, more glorious displays of moral excellence, and more transcendent works of the infinite Creator? But are such speculations scientific? And if philosophy must indulge in them, how much does she need for her guidance, to hear that voice behind the veil which assures us that all things there will be light, and peace, and love—not painful research and seeking, but full and eternal enjoyment.

Before closing this article, it is necessary to recur, for a moment, to a statement by Professor Agassiz, which has been already noticed, "of the close connection there is between the facts ascertained by scientific investigations, and the discussions now carried on respecting the origin of organised beings." To this he adds: "According to some they originated spontaneously by the immediate agency of physical forces,

and have become successively more and more diversified by changes produced gradually upon them by these same forces. Others believe that there exist laws in nature which were established by the Deity in the beginning, to the action of which the origin of organised beings may be ascribed ; while, according to others, they owe their existence to the immediate intervention of an intelligent Creator." Of these different views, the first two, as already explained, our author shews to be insupportable, and philosophically absurd, from the evidence of thought and design, and from the fitness of organised beings for relations to, and benevolent association with, each other, which cannot be found in unthinking forces, nor in laws ever inoperative apart from mind ; and he adopts the third view, that they must be derived from an intelligent and infinite Creator. How these organised beings *began to be*, there are no facts in nature to shew ; from this source, only possible and more or less probable hypotheses are, or ever can be, accessible to man. The common opinion is, that the vegetable kingdom, by a divine fiat, was evolved in full maturity of plant and fruit, or seed, already fitted for the wants of the animal kingdom ; which was next created by a similar fiat, in all its multitude and specific diversity, and consequently surrounded with the necessary provision for the support of its life : in fine, that man was the crowning work of the infinite Creator, and was formed in the perfection of his powers, with articulate language as readily flowing from his lips, and with as much facility of spontaneous action in all his members, as is the case now with a mature man. This certainly was the philosophical view of Moses, not to plead here his claims to inspiration, which have never been invalidated—a view for its rational probability, as we think, never yet paralleled. But Professor Agassiz believes that organised beings were "created as eggs ;" and that the "conditions necessary for their growth must have been provided for ;" also, that these "conditions must have been conformable to those in which the living representatives of the types first produced now reproduce themselves." The method here indicated is conceivable and not absurd, as we think, because infinite wisdom and power can be limited only by absolute impossibilities. But when we consider these conditions of the fertilised eggs in which the first types "now reproduce themselves," and what an amount of continued care and attention and contrivance must have been necessary, although no special good seems to result from the long and slow process, how much more simple, grand, and divine appears the other procedure, viz., that all the types were at first created in the *full maturity of their frame and*

powers! But in either mode of creation, as well observed by Agassiz, "the transmutation theory furnishes no explanation of their existence," viz., in reference to causation, because organisation must have existed before transmutation could have begun.

Finally, it should be observed that the four distinct plans of organisation in the zoological system of Cuvier, adopted by Agassiz, break up that "unity of composition," for which St Hilaire, the father, contended, which has since been sustained by the son, and which we might expect to be prominent in any arrangement which claims to be an expression of the divine thought. For it is not enough, as clearly shewn in this Essay, that a system should present the facts of nature in their relations, and thus exhibit the harmony that reigns in the works of the Creator. All this is done by the system of Cuvier in the plastic hand of our author. But any system which is truly the expression of the divine mind must assign to every creature its true rank, according to the characteristics and powers of its nature. Especially is it necessary that to the noblest creature should be assigned a distinct and the highest place in the classification. Thus, if Agassiz had followed St Hilaire, or Ehrenburg, or even Aristotle, instead of Cuvier, he would have ranked man in an independent and separate division, and placing all the mere animals as consistently, he would have presented the divine plan in that true "unity of composition" by which the works of infinite wisdom are ever characterised. For, whether we consider articulate language, the power of apprehending and reasoning upon abstract and necessary truth, and upon the relations and affinities of the organic kingdoms—or the moral power, the sense of right and wrong and of religious obligation, in virtue of which man alone is made in the image of God—whether we consider any one, or all of these together, as characteristic of man, he is thereby dis severed from, and immeasurably exalted above the mere animals, (in the highest of which not one of these traits appears), and by the thought and mind of God he is appointed to stand at the head of the creation in a division and a rank by himself. Zoology is thus brought into harmony with the divine plan. Science is perfected. God is honoured.

But Professor Agassiz has committed himself to the classification of Cuvier, which ranks man as an animal, and nothing more; and it is in defence of this system that he is led into that systematic disparagement of every thing distinctively human, and unto that extravagant exaltation of the faculties and powers of the brute, which we have signalised in this

paper. This is the explanation of what, in such a man, were otherwise inexplicable—the system required it at his hands. What the tendency of this system must ever be whilst it continues to be held is here revealed in the most striking manner, viz., to degrade man. But it is comforting to know that discovery and science are moving in the right direction to ensure its overthrow. If, indeed, man is nothing more than an animal, and has no traits differing in kind from those of the monkey, the elephant, the ox, the lion, the dog, then, and not otherwise, this system may stand. But if it is no less untrue than it is repulsive to common sense and to the human heart, that men and brutes have psychical faculties and powers in every respect the same in kind—yea, if man is man—the system must fall; and reason and conscience will come to fill their proper place in determining the classifications of zoology. God speed the day!

ART. IV.—*Politics and the Pulpit.**

PUBLIC attention has been frequently directed of late to what is generally understood by "*preaching politics*." We propose to state a few principles, of permanent use, pertaining to this subject. Confused and inconsistent notions concerning it are entertained by many. Some are very jealous of any allusions from the pulpit to matters affecting the State. Others insist that the pulpit shall be out-spoken and explicit in the advocacy of their own favourite policy. So long as the ministry is a power in the world, its influence will be deprecated or invoked in aid of all objects where power is coveted. Few men have objections to the preaching of politics, so long as it is their own politics which are preached.

A clergyman preaches a discourse which he thinks is demanded by the perils of the country. The doctrine he advocates is distasteful to certain conductors of the political press, who forthwith censure him for transcending his proper vocation. He is accused of meddling with subjects which do not belong to his profession. He is distinctly informed that if he ventures to intrude into such an arena, his high and holy calling will be

* This interesting article, distinguished by its talent and enlivened by its humour, appears in the *American Presbyterian and Theological Review* for January 1868, and is from the pen of the Rev. William Adams, D.D., New York. The latter portion, in which the author gives vent, though in the best spirit, to his political views on the present war, we omit.—ED. B. & F. E. R.

disgraced, and the white robes of his office will be sullied by the missiles with which he will certainly be pelted by excited men. Ere long the pulpit speaks again, from another quarter and in another tone. It promulgates doctrines now which happen to be agreeable to the very men who before censured the clergy for presuming to speak at all on such subjects, but who now congratulate themselves, the country, and religion itself for such wise, wholesome, and timely counsels. "Now the ministry is doing its proper work. It does not stand aloof from those practical concerns which affect the well-being of society, but as God's most beneficent agent, it is shedding the light and authority of heaven on the interests of time."

Herein is a manifest inconsistency. Silence and speech at the same time, and in regard to the same subject, cannot both be right. That is no pendulum which swings only on one side. Surely there must be some fixed principle pertaining to the subject which ought to be ascertained, otherwise the Christian pulpit is destitute of all dignity, exposed by turns to flattery or contempt.

As to the *chief and distinctive object* of the Christian ministry there can be no diversity of opinion. It is to announce those truths which affect man in his highest relations—to God and immortality. Unlike other teachers who, beginning with the lower ascent to the higher, the Christian ministry are appointed to proclaim those truths which relate to the *supreme* interests of our race. In the act of doing this, irrespective of all earthly distinctions, ignoring all those strata and conditions of society which the Apostle intends by "knowing man after the flesh," the teachers of religion are by an insensible and indirect process contributing most to that secular prosperity which others make their direct and exclusive endeavour. Elevating man in the scale of character, by introducing him to an immediate fellowship with his Maker, you are sure to confer importance on all which concerns his relations to his fellow-men and this present life. We need not expand this thought, that intelligence, freedom, law, order, enterprise, commerce, arts, industry, wealth, follow in the train of the Christian religion. Any tyro in history and geography will admit as much. He who preaches then, as he is bidden, repentance toward God and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ, employing himself with those distinctive and germinant truths which are his peculiar themes, is contributing more than he knows to the welfare of states, and the true prosperity of nations. In this sense, political reforms are embosomed in the doctrine of justification by faith, and national progress is insured by Christian devotion.

True religion should pervade the whole of man's being. The

Sabbath, the closet, the church, are not its exclusive sphere ; his business and his politics belong to it as well. By politics we understand his relations to the State. It cannot be admitted that these and other secular interests, as they are called, are too common and unclean for contact with religion, since the broad requirement of the Scripture is that whether we eat or drink, or whatever we do, we should do all to the glory of God : and if political duties and relations are not to be pervaded by the spirit of religion, then are we involved in the practical solecism, that there is a large part of our existence which is necessarily irreligious ; and still farther the necessity is entailed of a sufficient number being detached, even in the millennium, to rig and work the ship of state, an ungodly crew, beyond the suspicion of all sanctity and piety. This common distinction between the secular and the religious is a convenience of speech for certain purposes, but it conveys a falsity, since in the better generalisation of the New Testament religion covers the whole extent of our being, the countless variety of our interests and relations ; just as the sea fills all the bays and inlets and creeks with its in-flowing waters.

From these general principles, in this form, there can be no dissent. The difficulty is in the application of the latter principle on the part of the ministry, in an official capacity, to *specific cases*.

Perhaps it will help us, in reaching the truth on this subject, if we refresh our memories with a few historical facts. The time was, in our ancestral land, when, Church and State being combined in one organism, the clergy with few exceptions were little more than the tools of the throne. "Tuning the pulpits" was a very significant expression, as used by Queen Elizabeth, to describe the subserviency of courtly chaplains in advocating the royal will. We are conscious of pitiful regret for the times and the men, when it was not uncommon, if a preacher expatiated with anything of freedom, for a gruff Tudor voice from the royal pew to bid him return from his "ungodly digression and keep himself to his text."

Life cannot always be cramped and fettered, and at length there arose an order of men who claimed the right to declare the truth of God, in utmost freedom, accountable only to its divine Author.* The assertion of religious liberty necessarily prepared the way for personal and political liberty, and Hume himself, tory and sceptic as he was, was compelled to admit that English Puritanism was the root and life of all true English freedom.

* What Jeremy Taylor has called the "liberty of prophesying" in his famous *θεολογια εκκλησιαστικη*.

The colonisation of New England was a *religious* movement; and to subtract from it the direct and positive influence of church and ministry, would be like taking out the bones and soul from the human body. Those colonists have been often censured and ridiculed for the ecclesiastical requirements which they exacted in political relations and magistracies. The truth is, that at that time every nation in Christendom required religious conformities of those who officiated in affairs of State. That which was peculiar and novel on the part of the Puritan colonists was that their ideas of the church and of religion went beyond the outward form, to a heart-renovation;—a new test which repelled and disgusted the adventurers who had no sympathy with spiritual religion.

So the foundations of our national life were laid. There are two distinct periods in our national history, when the agency of the clergy was very conspicuous, the object of reprehension or encomium by different parties. The first of these was at and during the revolutionary war, and the formation of a new government, independent of Great Britain. The second was from the change of politics under President Jefferson, culminating in the war of 1812, and extending down, with a gradual diminution of prejudice and violence, to a time within the memory of most of our readers. Consulting these several periods we shall find much to admire, and much to censure; many mistakes, many fidelities and proofs of wisdom.

When troubles arose between the American colonies and the British government, the whole structure of society was shaken, and men of all professions and pursuits were compelled to avow their sentiments and choose their position. At this distance of time it is common to suppose that the action of the American people was unanimous in advocating independence from the British throne. This was far from being true. The people were divided among themselves. The crown officers and many of the leading and opulent citizens were opposed to separation from Great Britain. The result was invective, reproach, and violence—distracted counties, towns, and parishes. The idea of multitudes was to resist what they held to be unjust and oppressive on the part of the British Crown; to demand the sanctity of charters—the right of representation; but not to sever themselves as integral parts of the British realm. In this assertion of colonial right and justice, the clergy with wonderful unanimity sympathised; but God intended more than they at first foresaw. The rock once loosened from its bed was destined to roll on notwithstanding all obstructions. The idea of national independence gained familiarity and force; and at length the struggle began. There was a necessity that the clergy, in common with all other citi-

zens, should adopt one side or the other. Some for a while hesitated to commit themselves to what appeared to be *irreligious* rebellion. Their scruples were founded on religious grounds. The Episcopal Church, with some notable exceptions, was particularly conspicuous in this position; indeed, some of the early pamphlets relating to the Revolution inform us that the hostility to Great Britain cherished by the Congregational and Presbyterian ministers was imputed to a sectarian origin, as being moved by the fact that the Episcopal Church was sustained and established by the parent country. The precise state of many among the American people, in the incipient stages of the Revolution, will better appear from a few examples.

Dr Jonathan Mayhew, one of the best names of New England, at that time the pastor of the West Church in Boston, published a thanksgiving sermon in May 1766, on the occasion of the repeal of the Stamp Act, from the text: "Our soul is escaped as a bird from the snare of the fowlers; the snare is broken and we are escaped." This discourse, full of patriotism, is pervaded with the idea that justice had been done, the wrong redressed, and the difficulty adjusted. It was dedicated to William Pitt. On the 22d of June 1775, Dr William Smith, Provost of the University of Pennsylvania, preached a sermon in Christ Church, Philadelphia, in which he "pants for the return of those halcyon days of harmony during which the two countries flourished together as the glory and wonder of the world"—and while demanding that Britain should do justly with her colonies, he affirms that the idea of independence from the parent country is "utterly foreign to their thoughts, and that our rightful sovereign has nowhere more loyal subjects, or more zealously attached to those principles of government under which he inherited his throne." Another instance yet more to the point. Dr Duché, of Philadelphia, is known as the divine who opened the Continental Congress, in 1774, with prayer. In 1776 he was appointed chaplain to the Congress, but at an early stage of the war he manifested a decided opposition to independence, and in a long letter to General Washington endeavoured to dissuade him from the cause to which he was pledged. Dr Zubly, of Savannah, in 1775, a member of the first Provincial Congress of Georgia, preached a sermon in that year at the opening of that body, impregnated with the spirit of patriotism and liberty, but strongly discountenancing the independence of the colonies. These examples will suffice to shew how great was the hesitation on the part of many, and this on ethical and religious grounds, to a severance of the body politic. As Christian men they dreaded schisms in Church and State. The discourses from which we have drawn

our illustrations were delivered in the *beginning* of the war, when ethics were not yet classified and adjusted by facts. With a very few notable exceptions—such as the witty and eccentric Dr Byles of Boston, whose connection with his congregation was dissolved in 1776 because of his toryism—who was denounced in town meeting as an enemy to his country, and afterwards tried before a special court on the charge of praying for the king; receiving visits from British officers, and remaining in the town during the siege—who, in his own words, was “guarded, re-guarded, and disregarded”—the vast body of the unprelatical ministry of the country advocated the Revolution, in public and private, on Christian principles. They justified the war on religious grounds. They believed that human rights and liberties would gain by its success. They had the sagacity to foresee its issue. Among the most faithful of religious men, modest and painstaking in their parishes, there was no concealment of their sympathies. Many of them went as chaplains into the army; among them Dwight—*clarum et venerabile nomen*—and he retains in his lyrical collections that paraphrase of the Psalms which is now dropped out of our books, as judged to be obsolete :

“ Lord, hast thou cast the nation off ?
Must we for ever mourn ?
Will thou indulge immortal wrath ?
Shall mercy ne’er return ?
Lift up a banner in the field
For those that fear thy name,
Save thy beloved with thy shield,
And put our foes to shame.
Go with our armies to the fight
Like a confed’rate God,
In vain confed’rate foes unite
Against thy lifted rod.
Our troops shall gain a wide renown
By thine assisting hand,
’Tis God that treads the mighty down
And makes the feeble stand.”

Scarcely was there a battle-field in the Revolutionary war, where the clergy were not present, as chaplains or surgeons, to cheer and bless. Their patriotism was a thing of general admiration. They reasoned themselves and the country out of all hesitancy and scruples, as they knew how to reason. They abounded in what Sir John Hawkins calls “precatory eloquence;” calling down the blessings of the Almighty upon the country; and the depth and sway of their influence in achieving the independence of the colonies cannot be too highly extolled. Withal, it was with them a time of great personal privation and hardship. They shared in the largest measure

the calamities of the country. They practised the extremes of frugality to eke out their scanty subsistence. They were exposed to violent opposition in their distracted parishes. But they were, as a body, brave, patient, meek, pious, patriotic, and learned—an honour to any land. Under God, we owe it to the ministry of that day that the morals of the country were not hopelessly wrecked in the convulsions of the Revolution. The profession emerged from the war with increased credit and honour, and with the confidence, respect, and gratitude of the people. The war over, they led the nation in song and thanksgiving on the shores of the sea they had crossed, and forthwith addressed themselves to their appropriate work, in conservation of the liberties which the Revolution had helped to secure. A few here and there were left in a most pitiful predicament. In tacking ship they had missed stays, and were stranded on a lee shore. In proof that no human ministry is infallible, some had misjudged the case, and were forced to suffer the consequences. What was the state of feeling in those parishes, where the minister retained either loyalty to the British crown or a professed neutrality, may be inferred from a single incident. Rev. Dr Burnet, of the Presbytery of New York, was settled in Jamaica, L. I., and at the return of peace felt himself obliged to resign his charge. At the close of his farewell service he gave out the 120th Psalm. Whether the muscles of the choir were equal to its musical intonation, or the minds of the people to its devout response, tradition does not inform us :

“Hard lot of mine, my days are cast
Among the sons of strife,
Whose never-ceasing quarrels waste
My golden hours of life.

“Oh! might I fly to change my place,
How would I choose to dwell
In some wide, lonesome wilderness,
And leave these gates of hell.

“Peace is the blessing that I seek:
How lovely are its charms!
I am for peace; but when I speak
They all declare for arms.”

We come now to the second period referred to, when the preaching of some of the clergy on political affairs was of a most notorious character. A change had taken place in political parties, and it was so marked that the clergy could not conceal their sentiments. With few exceptions they had been on the side of Washington, and bore the name of Federalists. When this unanimity was disturbed by the election of Mr Jefferson to the Presidency, they inveighed against it in some instances with a tremendous emphasis. It must be borne in mind that party spirit was then at fever-heat. Families and

neighbourhoods were set at variance—church-members of different parties refused to pray together, and young people from families of different political preferences would not dance at the same assemblies. Never before or since did the spirit of party prove itself so ardent and violent. It was a new experience for the country. The clergy thought that it portended worse than it proved. The people of New England especially looked with horror upon French infidelity—French revolutions—which they had associated with the new party in our own land. The French Republic had just before decreed the abolition of all religion, and the enthronement of human reason. All Christendom was convulsed with terror. In 1798, President Adams appointed a day of national fasting. Doubtless this association was in part the cause of the hostility which they manifested towards Mr Jefferson and his party. The clergy stood aghast, thinking that the country was ruined. They thought that they would be unfaithful to a solemn trust, if they did not lift up their voice in testimony. It amuses us, at this distance of time, to read what they said and did. Some of the sermons of that day have a historic renown. Such, for example, as what is known as the Jeroboam Sermon of Dr Emmons. It was on the day preceding the annual Fast-day in Massachusetts, in the year 1801, that the acute metaphysician of Franklin sat in his study, greatly perplexed what to preach on the ensuing day. What he did preach was never forgotten. It was just after the inauguration of Mr Jefferson, and Jeroboam was made that day to play a parallelism which would have astonished himself. The curious analogy is a rare specimen of long-drawn, solemn, and withering rebuke. After it had been extended through nearly two hours, it hardly needed at its close what, according to the phraseology of the day, was called an “improvement,” which was given in these words: “It is more than possible that our nation may find themselves in the hand of a Jeroboam who will drive them from following the Lord, and whenever they do, they will rue the day and detest the folly, delusion, and intrigue which raised him to the head of the United States.”

We are referring now to facts which need some explanation; for which much may be said in apology, but nothing in justification as a model of duty for ourselves. The mistake was that in the intensity of feeling which then prevailed there was no discrimination between what was ethical and what was partisan. Opposing the new administration on one point, because of its supposed affinity with French Atheism, some fought it at every point, *pugnis et calcibus*—embargo, gunboats, alien and sedition laws, no matter what—wherever it shewed its hand or head.

These political antipathies were long-lived. They culminated during the war with England, in 1812. But they cropped out long after whenever they could claim a show of decency. Some of the sermons preached during that period were of a most extraordinary character. No physical appliances of dried orange-peel or caraway-seed were necessary to keep audiences awake, under those pulpit deliverances. One denounces Napoleon Bonaparte as the "first-born of the devil," and Thomas Jefferson and James Madison his twin brothers. Another takes for his text the 8th verse of the 109th Psalm: "Let his days be few; and let another take his office." The "Bramble" sermon of Dr Osgood, of Medford (founded on the parable of Jotham, Judges ix. 14: "Then said all the trees unto the bramble, Come thou, and reign over us"), is as famous as the Jeroboam sermon of Dr Emmons. There was no circumlocutory preaching in those days. Velvet phrases and uncertain inferences were alike discarded. It is reported of one minister, that for a considerable time he was accustomed to pray for the chief magistrate that God would "gently and easily remove his servant by death." It will be remembered by many of our readers that on a certain year a worthy gentleman in Massachusetts, after being a candidate of the democratic party for governor for twenty years, was finally elected to the office by a majority of one vote. It will also be recollected by all whose early life was passed in that State, that the custom prevailed, whenever the governor issued his annual proclamation for thanksgiving, of sending by the sheriff of the county a copy of the same, on a large hand-bill, to be read from every pulpit, which document invariably closed, after the signature of the governor, with the pious exclamation, "God save the commonwealth of Massachusetts!" On the year referred to the newly-elected magistrate issued his proclamation in the usual form. It is said that a venerable clergyman, of the old party, laid the broad sheet over his reading-board, and after performing the professional duty of reciting it, with an ill-disguised aversion, actually announced the official signature with this significant intonation: "Marcus Morton, governor? God save the commonwealth of Massachusetts!" It is for an important purpose that we have referred to a few of those notorious incidents which belong to the history of the American pulpit.

Admit that such acts and expressions on the part of the ministry were mistakes, never to be imitated; much should be said for their exculpation. In the first place, the instances of such distinctively political preaching were comparatively few. The very notoriety which these have attained is in proof that the great body of the ministry, whatever may have been

their private sentiments, addicted themselves faithfully to the great concerns of their office. In many instances, those who had practised this method of political preaching lived to express their personal regret for the same. The late Rev. Dr Lyman, of Hatfield, at the instalation of his successor, used language truly pathetic in the acknowledgment of what he regarded as a great mistake in his own ministry. Another thing to be said in their vindication is, that such utterances were not on the Sabbath day, but perhaps without exception, on fast-days, or thanksgiving-days, or what was always celebrated in New England by a sermon—election-day. Still another thing should be said. The clergy of that period had been educated to regard themselves as the "moral police and constabulary of the country," and silence, sudden and complete, was more than could be expected of mortal man, when on the losing side, after a lifetime of explicit and applauded testimony. Nor must we forget to add that, in times of high political excitement, the words of a minister, in prayer or sermon, received a construction from interested and jealous parties which they were never intended to bear. Minds surcharged with political partisanship will pervert and exaggerate, and apply the simple utterances of a minister, in a way which might well astonish him. Rev. Dr David Ely, of Huntington, Connecticut, is described as one of the most prudent, faithful, spiritual pastors of his times. In a season of great political excitement, it was reported by persons hostile to him that he had preached on political subjects in a neighbouring parish. It was thought proper to trace the report to its source. The neighbouring parish was visited and the inquiry made, "Did Dr Ely preach politics when here? Yes. What did he say? Well, sir, if he did not preach politics, he prayed politics. What did he say? *Say?* he said, 'Though hand join in hand, yet the wicked shall not go unpunished.'" Seasons there are when auditors are so magnetized with partisan passion, that they put their own sense on the language of a preacher, exaggerating or misapplying it, so that in the presence of such a suspicious and watchful jealousy he stands no chance at all, unless he adopt the resolution of the psalmist on a certain occasion: "I will keep my mouth with a bridle, while the wicked is before me."

This rapid survey of a very extended historic period, with its motley assemblage of incidents, may help us in our undertaking to state some of the principles which should govern the Christian ministry in their official relations* to political concerns. Starting from that which we hold to be the grand design of the gospel and its appointed heralds—to save the souls of men—whatever their nationality or their politics, we

hold that everything pertaining to the sphere of *morals* belongs to the province of the Christian theologian and preacher. We emphasise the word which helps us to discriminate between what has been right and what wrong in the practice of the pulpit. What is distinctively *ethical* may be discussed in its proper time and place on Christian principles. There are ethical principles which should govern our conduct in political relations. There are many things pertaining to what are called politics which involve no special relation to morals, concerning which a minister may have his personal preference, but which it would be highly indecorous for him to introduce and urge officially. The relations of morality and immorality to political economy are many; but we would hardly judge that theories of free trade, and taxation, and naval architecture, and embargoes, were the proper material for pulpit instruction. Are we required to give the rule which should govern a minister in his treatment of those political questions which are directly related to morals? None can be given, beyond this—they should be presented according to the *proportion of faith*; in the right season; and in the right manner. The whole gradation must be left to the **GOOD SENSE** and **ENLIGHTENED JUDGMENT** of the preacher himself. If he is lacking in these qualities, no number of specific directions would be of any avail. Topics in the whole range of moral relations, from the highest to the lowest, belong to his sphere—but the order, frequency, and emphasis of their discussion must depend on seasons and necessities, which cannot be defined in advance.

Some things, however, may be made more specific. Happily we live in a country where there is no alliance between Church and State. No political power, organised or unorganised, may prescribe and dictate what a minister shall preach. This freedom, however, has two sides or aspects; for neither may a preacher prescribe or dictate to his hearers what they shall think or do, except in those cases where he has the authority of the Supreme. We touch at once the secret of popular jealousy in regard to pulpit utterances. These have been made, sometimes, with arrogance and assumed authority. There was a time when the clergy wore big wigs and an imposing official dress; and it was expected that their opinions would be received with deference by a reverential parish.

“For still they gazed and still the wonder grew
That one small head could carry all he knew.”

The time has come when opinions do not prevail because uttered *ex cathedra*. If an incumbent of the pulpit indulges in crude thoughts, immature judgments, ebullitions of feeling,

and false reasoning, he must expect animadversion, correction, and refutation. Another cometh after him and searcheth him. No one would curtail the freedom of the ministry, but the ministry must remember that there is a freedom and right of judgment for the pews as well as the pulpit. We should not for a moment hold controversy with a man whether he ought or ought not to assert and promulgate the will of God, when *he knows it*—and to challenge the obedience of all men to that supreme authority. But when he assumes the same tone and manner of authority in reference to matters unwritten, involved and debateable, we may surely ask him to exhibit his credentials. We will be the first to submit to his dictation when we have actually seen the seal of heaven in his hand, and are satisfied on the capital point of his divine legation.* The occult principle which has occasioned all the rancour and hostility excited by the interference of the pulpit is this assumption of divine authority in behalf of what is nothing but an individual opinion. If the man who derives his opinion, simply, by his own confession, from the personal study of the Scriptures, and who has enjoyed none but ordinary aids, who can advance no pretensions which others may not also challenge, is entitled to speak in the tone and to exercise the authority of a prophet or apostle, then what was the necessity of the extraordinary powers wherewith prophets and apostles were endowed? A vast distinction is there between the prodigious pretensions of the zealot demagogue and the modest expression of an individual judgment.

Every minister of the gospel is entitled to the same freedom of opinion and preference on all subjects as other men. Paraphrasing the language of Shylock, he may say: "I am a minister: Hath not a minister eyes? hath he not hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer as other men? If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us"—we will not add with the Jew, "shall we not revenge," but we will say, "shall we not shew you how to bear it?" This freedom of judgment allowed him, no minister has the right to protrude officially his private opinions and preferences in regard to matters which do not affect the sublime moralities of his vocation. Especially to indulge in personalities, in partisan advocacy or military criticisms in the pulpit, whatever right or liberty he may claim elsewhere, is a public scandal and wrong. It would seem to

* Isaac Taylor.

be the doctrine of some preachers, because *they* had certain opinions in regard to men and measures, therefore they are bound on all occasions to avow them, going through the world, like the iron man Talus in the drama, and his iron flail battering down whatever opposes their private sentiments. The meanest thing which crawls on the earth is a man who, for his private advantage, will follow and cringe and swallow his own opinions; but the noblest form of manhood is he who holds his personal opinions on things indifferent in reserve for the sublime end of another's advantage—as the apostle himself has expressed it: “I become all things to all men, if by any means I might **SAVE SOME** ;” that nobility and grandeur of Christian motives imparting versatility of address, and deportment in the use of his varied faculties and opinions, lest he should frustrate that object—the salvation of the soul, which was his disinterested and lofty intention.

ART. V.—*The History of the Church of Geneva.**

Voltaire et les Genevois. PAR J. GABEREL, Ancien Pasteur. Joël Cherbuliez, Genève. 1856.

Rousseau et le Genevois. PAR GABEREL. 1858.

Histoire de l'Eglise de Genève. 3 vols. PAR GABEREL. 1858-1862.

Calvin, sa vie, son Oeuvre et ses écrits. PAR FELIX BUNGENNER. J. Cherbuliez, Genève. 1862.

Genève Religieuse, au dix neuvième siècle. PAR le BARON H. DE GOLZ, Chapelain de l'Ambassade de Prusse à Rome. Traduit de l'Allemand. PAR C. MALAN. Fils.

CALVIN, ROUSSEAU, VOLTAIRE! It may seem strange to see these names associated together. But, different as have been their works, all the three have left an impress upon our modern civilisation which is still far from being effaced. All the three were great demolishers in their day—ruthless destroyers of time-hallowed abuses; but, while the first destroyed only what was false, in order to leave room for a noble and solid edifice founded on the everlasting Rock, the second destroyed to build on the shifting sand of an imaginary virtue inherent in man, while the third destroyed for the sake of destroying; and, like his infernal master, rejoiced in the ruin and desolation he

* We have been indebted for this article to the Rev. Clement de Faye, Protestant Pastor at Lyons, who has written a number of interesting and valuable pieces on France and French Protestantism.—ED. B. & F. H. R.

wrought. We know that the triumphing of the wicked is but short, and that the pure and holy edifice reared by the greatest of uninspired men whom the world has yet seen will once more arise in all its pristine splendour. But, in the mean time, Voltaire's and Rousseau's doctrines seem destined to get the upper hand, and overthrow the existing European régime, and the very extreme of *ochlocracy* which at present rules Geneva will probably ere long overspread the whole Continent. Our aim, however, is, not to trace out the different phases of political life in Geneva, but with the aid of the works mentioned at the head of the article, to give a rapid sketch of the history of its church from the time of its establishment by Calvin till our own day. At the same time, the religious history of Geneva is so closely associated with its political history, that we shall not be able to speak of the one without occasionally touching on the other.

As M. Bungener's work upon Calvin is already in the hands of the English-speaking public, we need not enter into details concerning that period. "Geneva," as that author remarks, "had been given to Calvin to conquer," and his success was complete, as far as human imperfection can go. The Genevese voted freely for the *Ordinances* :—

"The Ordinances," says Gaberel, "were a pitiless code for poor human weakness; they bound the will irrecoverably. The people could not afterwards allege that they had been deceived as to the bearing of the laws they were sanctioning. For several weeks they could meditate at leisure on the articles proposed; they knew the value of their decision, and when, twice on the 20th November 1541, and again on the 2d January 1542, they came to the Cathedral of St Peter's, and after each article, raised their hands in acceptance of it, the vote was an affair of conscience between God and themselves, for no human power could impose such an engagement. They were 2000 citizens, perfectly free, and masters of their own town. The Genevese people were absolutely sovereign; they knew no other limit to their legislative power than their own will, and this people voted the ordinances from the first chapter to the last. They engaged to frequent public worship regularly, to bring up their children in the fear of the Lord, to renounce all debauchery, all immoral amusements, to maintain simplicity in their clothing, frugality and order in their dwellings."*

The chief ecclesiastical authority resided in the Consistory, composed of the pastors and twelve elders, elected annually by the Council General, in concurrence with the pastors and the other councils. The Consistory was to meet every Thursday to see if there were any disorder in the church. It could

* Hist. de l'Eglise de Genève, Tome i. p. 345, 346.

cite before it any person it chose, but did not employ any force to constrain the parties to appear, nor to put its sentences into execution; it simply warned the Council, and the Council "took order."

"If the action of the moral tribunal instituted by Calvin was rude in our modern point of view, that body shewed itself rigorously impartial, making no distinction between the social classes, punishing with equal severity the highest magistrate and the meanest burgher, the millionaire and the peasant, the military chief and the simple soldier."*

This picture is completed by the following remarks of the Baron de Goltz. Speaking of the time immediately following Calvin's death, he says:—

"The discipline of Calvin, the introduction of which had occasioned so many struggles, was at length definitively established in the customs of the people. By degrees, the whole physiognomy of the town was changed, and strangers visiting Geneva carried away an impression of unequalled purity of morals. Though the Consistory had still from time to time to shew severity, yet it may be said that the disciplinary rules had penetrated into the habits of the new generation. All excesses, noisy festivals, luxury in furniture, in clothing, or in food, had entirely disappeared from public life. It is from this epoch that are to be dated those characteristics of seriousness and composure for which the Genevese are remarkable, and the dry tone and stiff-starched demeanour with which they are sometimes charged."†

As for the State, the supreme power was vested in the Council General, composed of all the citizens. The executive for civil order resided in the Four Syndics, the Little Council of twenty-five members, and the Great Council of 200. When the Commission of 1542, of which Calvin was a member, was drawing up the new constitution, they wished to put the election of the Great Council, which had hitherto been in the hands of the Council General, into those of the Little Council. Calvin, with his usual far-sightedness, perceived the danger of this step, and strongly opposed it.

"I conjure you," said he to the magistrate, "to allow the Two Hundred to be named at all times by the Council General. Do not abandon the republican principle by which all power ought to emanate from the assembled burghesses. So long as the town is in danger and the magistrate is working with all his might along with the citizens for the safety of the country, no one will dream of disputing the authority; but if a prolonged time of peace bring about prosperity, you will manage matters mutually with the Two Hun-

* Hist. de l'Eglise de Genève.

† Genève Religieuse, 29, 30.

dred ; then the people will begin to talk, the citizens will lose confidence, and the Council General will sooner or later retake the right of which you are now depriving it." "It was," adds M. Gabarel, "perhaps the only time in which Calvin was not listened to. If the election of the Two Hundred had been left to the Council General, the revolutions of the eighteenth century would never have caused blood to flow on Genevese territory."*

The sequel will shew that their mistake was one of the main causes of the fall of Geneva.

For sixty-eight years Geneva had to defend her faith and her independence by force of arms. The Catholic powers employed open violence and secret fraud against the bulwark of Protestantism, but the Lord was to her as a wall of fire round about her. At length, on the night of the 12th December 1602, in time of peace, the Duke of Savoy, having with the pope's concurrence hatched a foul treasonable plot for the ruin of the city, attempted to take it by surprise. This "Escalade" has remained as famous in the annals of Geneva as the Gunpowder Plot in those of England. About 7000 troops had been distributed in the different Savoyard towns near Geneva, but in small companies, so as not to excite suspicion. On the night appointed, they met in the ravine of Vetraz. The duke, who had secretly left Turin, joined them at Etrembières. The ladders had been placed, 400 soldiers had succeeded in gaining the ramparts, and the duke in his impatience had already despatched couriers to Turin, Madrid, Rome, and Paris, to announce the downfall of the Protestant capital. The whole enterprise was defeated by the merest accident. A light appeared ; it was the watch making the round. The besiegers threw themselves on the Genevese soldiers, and precipitated five of them into the moat ; but the drummer escaping, alarmed the town. The tocsin sounded, and the citizens, rushing out of their beds, fought with the despair of men who have every thing to lose, and succeeded in repulsing the enemy. The duke, who had remained outside waiting the issue, was advancing with military music sounding, when he met his discomfited general, hardly able to stand. On hearing that all was lost, "Miserable booby !" he exclaimed, "you have made a fine business of it" and without another word, he returned to Turin. In his sore perturbation he had allowed a day to pass without countermanding his couriers, so that, as he went along in his melancholy retreat, he found all the towns and villages preparing fetes to welcome him. At Annecy, near Geneva, he could see the mules laden with the sacerdotal ornaments which

* Histoire de l'Eglise de Geneve, tome i. p. 321, 522.

were designed to have decorated the cathedral of St Peter's, where François de Sales was to have celebrated mass on Christmas-day. Seventeen Genevese had perished in the combat, and twenty were covered with wounds. On the following morning (Sabbath), the people crowded into the churches, and Theodore de Beza, whose extreme deafness had prevented his hearing of the events of the preceding night until they were almost over, offered up a prayer of thanksgiving for their marvellous deliverance; the people then sung that 124th Psalm, which has so often cheered our own forefathers in similar circumstances.* Peace was signed on the 21st of July following, amid the acclamations of both Genevese and Savoyards, while the unfortunate Charles Emmanuel, deserted by his friends, and despised by his foes, was forced to drink to the very dregs the cup of humiliation that he had mixed for himself by his unprincipled treachery. "Oh!" he exclaimed in his despair, "to be forced to sign a treaty which brings me down to a level with the heretical rebels of Geneva!"† The political independence of Geneva was now secured; her church was at its culminating point; Theodore de Beza had nobly borne the burden left him by Calvin; intellectually, socially, politically, and religiously, Geneva was the brightest spot in Europe. The persecuted churches of France looked to her as their earthly paradise; the refugees were received with open arms, and either remained debtors to her hospitality, or were passed on to the other cantons, where they could serve God with freedom of conscience. We cannot better conclude this cursory sketch of the palmy days of Geneva, than by quoting a few words from the work of M. Gabarel:—

"The Genevese of the sixteenth century committed one of those deeds of saintly daring which seem folly in the eyes of men, but which are in reality the safeguard of nations heroic enough to attempt them. Geneva had been the representative of a great right, *liberty of conscience*; she offered an asylum to all the martyrs of the faith; she had put her hand to the work, and pursued her career without casting a look behind. Politicians and calculators may, if they please, see a sort of madness in a republic, without strength or riches, proclaiming religious and moral liberty in the face of Italy, Spain, and France, united for the triumph of Romish despotism. But the God of the faithful ones who hold fast the truth confounded human prevision; he surrounded our town

This psalm would be doubtless sung to the measure which we have borrowed from the Genevan Psalter, adapted to the peculiar metre, beginning, 'Now Israel may say, and that truly,' &c.—*Ed. B. & F. E. R.*

† M. Gabarel, in the 2d volume of his *History of the Church in Geneva*, gives a detailed account of the "Escalade," composed from various manuscripts written at the time.

with that celestial protection, against which the plots and the rage of the mighty broke in vain. Thus Geneva, without arms and without territory, accomplished her perilous mission; and remaining faithful to the principle of her nationality, the city of Calvin saw herself the object of Divine favour, and enjoyed a prosperity, a respect, and an outward security, which the most powerful States in the world do not often obtain."—(Gab., vol. i. p. 466.)

But the worm was already at the gourd; the vineyard which the Lord had fenced, out of which he had gathered the stones, and which he had planted with the choicest vine, began to bring forth wild grapes. In endeavouring to trace a few of the causes of the decline of the Church of Geneva, we shall follow the details given by M. de Goltz, rather than M. Gaberel, who, in his anxiety to vindicate the church (of which he is a minister), only sees in the saddest mutilations of doctrine an "individual interpretation" of one and the same truth. In fact, he loudly proclaims, as the double principle of his church, *the gospel received as a divine authority, and upon this basis, liberty for every one to form his faith according to the light of his reason, the direction of his conscience, and the help of God*; and this double principle he hopes may become the only confession of faith of the church of Jesus Christ.

From the fact of the election of the Grand Council being in the hands of the Little Council, composed of the principal families of Geneva, the Council General lost its importance; the government tended to become more and more aristocratic, and the Grand Council became, after a time, completely dependent on the Little Council. The burgesses tried to regain their lost authority, while the Little Council did all it could to strengthen its new position. Hence, as Calvin had foreseen, arose continual contests between the two parties. It is easy to see how, in a little state like Geneva, where the principal magistrates were often chosen as members of the Consistory, this state of things reacted on the church. The Council granted immunities to those of its own class at the very time it was executing the law in all its rigour in regard to the other classes. This came to such a point that, in certain cases, members of the nobility refused to obey the citations of the Consistory. During the course of the seventeenth century the authority of the Consistory went on decreasing, while, in all that pertained to church organisation, the Venerable Company took its place.

"It may be affirmed that the Company had seized all the ecclesiastical power. By that means the Consistory had been reduced to a mere tribunal of morals, and by the end of the century, the old regulations having been entirely set aside, the institution of the Consistory came, by the very force of things, to lose all its significance.

Thus, in the beginning of the eighteenth century, instead of consisting of double the number of laymen to that of the clergy, the proportion was reversed, and the meetings were, contrary to the rule, always presided over by the moderator of the Company. The Council of the Two Hundred, notwithstanding reiterated petitions, did not venture to put its hand to the revision of the ordinances; what held it back was evidently the fear of awakening the political pretensions of the Council General: it preferred leaving the Company to make such changes in the way of administration as it thought proper, and abstained from interfering." (Goltz, p. 69.)

Another cause of the decay of the church of Geneva is to be found in *Nepotism*. The names of the same families are to be found, in about equal numbers, in the Little Council and in the Company in the beginning of the eighteenth century; and whereas, according to Calvin's ordinances, the Company was to be composed of the town and country pastors, along with the divinity professors, about the same time we find on the register that such a one, pastor at Satigny, is received into the Venerable Company, with the rank of a town pastor, in consideration of the services of the first Syndic, his father, and of the rank and services of his grandfather. Thus it was only by special favour that the rural pastors were allowed a seat in the Company. *Patronage* had also taken the place of popular election in the call of pastors to vacant charges. The ancient prescription was, that "when a charge was vacant, the Company, along with a deputation from the Council of State, subjected the candidate to a severe examination as to their manner of expounding holy Scripture. The Council then retired, and the election was made according to the absolute majority of the voters. The choice of the candidate approved of by the magistrates was announced to the people from the pulpit on the following Sabbath, the members of the church were invited to transmit to the Syndics any objection they might have to allege against the newly elected pastor.* Calvin had intended, by the triple influence of the government, the clergy, and the people, to guarantee the choice of pastors against all kind of favour or patronage; but the history of the Church of Geneva shews how dangerous it is to place any authority whatever between the people and this right that has been conferred upon them by the Head of the church himself. About this time the right of nomination to vacant charges seems to have been altogether in the hands of the Company, and in the registers are to be found proposals that such and such a young man, "*nominis illustris*," be named to such and such a place. M. de Goltz remarks that, in reading these documents, the terms, a man of *good family*,

* Gaberel, *Hist. de l'Eglise de Genève*, tome iii. p. 334.

and a man of *merit*, seem to be almost synonymous. At the end of the seventeenth century we find a stranger (Leti) complaining "that the youth of the good families, who enjoy credit, and would have more means for studying than others, do not care to do so, because they are sure to have the good civil and ecclesiastical charges without much study. The other young men care just as little about study, because they know that all the wisdom of Solomon would be of no use in advancing them, in the absence of the necessary relationships. (De Goltz, p. 71.)

We cannot wonder that, with all this, the church lost its hold upon the people. They began to look upon it with the same antipathy which they felt towards the higher classes, with whom they associated it. But all these abuses were merely symptoms arising from a deep-seated malady that was preying upon the vitals of the church, namely, the decay of vital religion. Up to the beginning of the eighteenth century, the ministers of Geneva were sound in doctrine, but the soul that animated Calvin's system had fled, leaving the lifeless skeleton of a dry, arid formalism. This paved the way for the introduction of false doctrine.

John Alphonsus Turretine, the son of the able defender of orthodoxy, was the first to introduce Arminian views into the church of Geneva. Possessed with the idea of bringing about a union between the different branches of the protestant churches, he confined himself to moral teaching, leaving completely in the background the "mystery of godliness." He made a difference between what he called fundamental and secondary doctrines, and tried to get the symbolical books, which he regarded as the main obstacles in the way of union, abolished. His teaching was so successful, that in less than twelve years the adhesion to the Consensus ceased to be obligatory on ministerial candidates, and after several struggles, in all of which the orthodox party went on losing ground, on the 1st or 17th of June 1725, it was resolved unanimously, with the exception of two dissenting voices, that all creeds and confessions should be abolished, and that in future nothing more should be required of the candidates than a simple declaration of their belief in the holy Scriptures, to the following effect: "You profess that you hold the doctrine of the holy prophets and apostles, as it is contained in the books of the Old and New Testaments, of which we have a summary in our Catechism." At the same time the moderator is charged to instruct those whom he receives to the holy ministry *not to treat* in the pulpits of any curious and useless matter that might tend to disturb the peace of the church.* In mentioning the

* Gaberel, Hist. de l'Eglise de Genève, tome iii. 177.

Catechism care was taken to say that they were not obliged to follow it in everything.* Besides, the time was just at hand when it was to be set aside for one by Osterwald, which, in its turn, made way for another still more in accordance with the doctrines of the day.

Things were in this state when Voltaire formed his diabolical project of "perverting this pedantic city, which keeps up the remembrance of its reformers, submits to the tyrannical laws of Calvin, and believes the word of its preachers."† It was in the year 1755 that this philosopher took up his abode on the Genevese frontier. He opened his batteries in the shape of a theatre; and having engaged the famous actor *Le Kain*, the seduction proved too strong for the Genevese. He writes to d'Argental, "I am expecting *Le Kain*: he will recite verses to the children of Calvin; their manners are greatly softened down; they would not burn *Servetus* now." And a few days later, "Well, I have succeeded; I made nearly the whole Council of Geneva shed tears! *Le Kain* was sublime, and I am corrupting the youth of this pedantic city." From that time forward the theatre became one of the institutions of Geneva.

As was to be expected, Voltaire was not slow in perceiving and taking advantage of the equivocal position in which the Genevese clergy had placed themselves. In order to compromise them in the eyes of the other protestant churches, he composed, along with D'Alembert, the article upon Geneva, destined to appear in that writer's *Encyclopædia*. After speaking in flattering terms of the Republic in general, and of the simplicity of the Protestant worship, &c., the article continues—

"Religion there is reduced almost to the worship of one God, at least among all those who are not of the common people; respect for Jesus Christ and for Scripture is perhaps the only thing that distinguishes the Christianity of Geneva from pure Deism. Several of the ministers do not believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ; they hold that it is not necessary to take literally what is offensive to humanity and reason in the Holy Scriptures. Their religion is pure Socinianism. Rejecting everything that can be called revealed mystery, they imagine that the principle of true religion is not to propose for belief anything that shocks the understanding."

This dubious praise produced a deep impression upon the Company. The decision of 1725 had been kept a profound secret, and now the changes they had admitted in their doctrine were exposed to the world; and by whom? By those infidels to whom the Republic had extended its hospitality! A com-

* De Goltz, *Genève Religieuse*, p. 52.

† Gaberel, *Voltaire et les Genevois*, p. 2.

mission was appointed to draw up a manifesto of principles by way of answer to the article. In this manifesto it is said—

"We protest against the assertions of the *Encyclopædia*, and declare that our great principle, our constant faith, is, to hold the doctrine of the holy prophets and apostles, contained in the Old and New Testaments, as a divinely inspired doctrine, the only rule of our faith and manners. We hold that life eternal is to know God, and him whom he has sent, Jesus Christ His Son, in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily, and whom he hath given us for Saviour, Mediator, and Judge, that all may honour the Son as they honour the Father."

In regard to this document M. de Goltz remarks:—

"It would be unjust to entertain the least doubt as to the sincerity of this manifesto; on the contrary, this document gives us the exact measure of the sum of evangelical doctrine which, after ripe reflection, the Company had decided on not abandoning. The terrible accusation of Socinianism is not looked in the face; it is not annihilated, as it could so easily have been by a clear, explicit, complete, and precise confession of the opposite doctrine; the accusation, it must be confessed, is rather eluded than repelled. The fact is, that at bottom the doctrine of the Trinity (as that doctrine is to be found in the Athanasian creed) had been abandoned. When the preachers spoke of the indwelling of the fulness of the Godhead in the man Jesus, their meaning was not the incarnation of God—'God manifested in the flesh'—but merely that the man Jesus had been endowed with the forces of the Godhead, or else that in him a divine being had clothed himself in human nature."—*De Goltz*, p. 85-86.

D'Alembert asked Voltaire to arrange this affair, which afforded a good opportunity for the malicious and witty scoffer to crow over the embarrassment of the ministers:—

"Come now, let us see; you are not so very angry at the bottom of your hearts because the *Encyclopædia* says that you are of the same opinion as Origen and the two thousand priests who protested against Athanasius? You feel very sore, do you, because a few burly Dutchmen call you heterodox! Come now, you are not so angry; be like Dorina, who loved Lycas. Lycas boasted of it; Dorina, who was very glad of it, said, Lycas is not very discreet, to have betrayed my secret. D'Alembert is Lycas, and you are Dorina."*

Jean Jaques Rousseau at first took up the defence of the venerable Company against Voltaire, but afterwards, in a moment of irritation at the authorities of Geneva for having publicly burned his *Emile* by the hand of the public execu-

* Voltaire et les Genevois, p. 54, 55.

tioner, he launched out into bitter invectives against the whole Republic. The ministers did not escape his withering sarcasm:—

"The ministers of Geneva are asked if Jesus Christ is God; they dare not answer. A philosopher casts a rapid glance upon them; he sees through them; he sees them to be Arians, Socinians, Deists. He says so, and in so doing intends to honour them. Immediately alarmed, terrified, they assemble, they discuss, they get into a fume; they know not which way to turn; and after reiterated consultations, deliberations, conferences, the whole ends in an amalgam, in which they neither say yes nor no. O Genevese! your ministers are a singular set of people! One cannot know what they believe, nor what they do not believe, nor even what they appear to believe. Their only way of establishing their belief is to attack that of others."^{*}

It is painful to add, that with the people as well as the pastors of Geneva, religion had become little more than a sort of patriotic emotion, a civic virtue. The "Church of our Fathers" was held in high esteem and veneration as something bound up with the life and liberties of the Republic, but it exercised little influence on the character. They were indignant to see the hospitality they had granted to the poet rewarded by the most determined conspiracy against their laws, and customs, and all morality. Voltaire, on the other hand, spared neither time, nor money, nor calumny, nor falsehood, in working out his plan. He seems to have been more in earnest than all his adversaries put together. In order to attain this end, he denied all knowledge of his own works, and even wrote to the Council denouncing them. At another time he got his tracts published at Amsterdam or London, and then warned the Council of the arrival of "a parcel containing philosophical dictionaries, gospels of reason, and other trash, which I despise;" and while the package was being seized, an immense cargo was passing the frontier at another point. Indignant at finding themselves over-reached, the magistrates seized all the copies of these works on which they could lay hands, and had them publicly burned by the hand of the executioner.

Voltaire had then recourse to a new stratagem. He got a number of his tracts published under religious titles. For the first two or three pages the matter contained in them was unexceptionable, but by degrees it turned to blasphemies. Attention having been awakened to this proceeding, the sale of them

* "Voltaire, too, rails at them in his usual malicious style: 'Alles, vieilles perruques! Ce n'est pas votre plate douceur qui vous tirera de mes griffes!' 'That icy head,' as Fresson said of him, 'which enclosed a volcano in constant eruption' was more than a match for these moderate pastors who had 'determined only to appeal to calm reason, and never to go beyond,' what M. Gaberel calls, 'truly Christian moderation.'"

became impossible. But "the old devil of Ferney" was not to be balked. He got "his productions distributed gratis, resorting to all the little manœuvres he could imagine. Certain Genevese entirely at his service, connected with the highest as well as the lowest classes, did not scruple to second his views, and their services were completed by those of a well-paid troop of hawkers. In short, the pretended sermons were to be found everywhere. Entering the shops under pretext of making some trifling purchase, the conspirators contrived to slip impious pamphlets under papers or parcels, taking care, if there were young women at the counter, to select those tracts best fitted to pollute the imagination. Hawkers went through the *ascents* of the town fixing these libels to the bell ropes, or slipping them under the thresholds of the doors; piles of them were found in the watchmakers' cabinets, and little boys confessed that a *gentleman* had given them threepence to lay the packets on their masters' work-table. Every evening on the benches, in the public walks, papers were found intentionally forgotten. Not only so, but means were found for introducing them into the classes of the college; the scholars found these little tracts among their exercise books; and those who know how attractive anything mysterious is at that age, will easily believe that the little books were not given up to the masters or the parents till they had been read and devoured. The Voltarian propaganda went still further: In the places where lectures were given to the catechumens, the catechisms were often replaced by books of the same size, similarly bound, and containing these perfidious dialogues in which the infidel triumphs over his Christian opponent at will. To crown all, portable philosophical dictionaries were bound up under the semblance, and with the title, of Psalm Books, and left on the seats of the church of the Madeleine, at the young men's service."*

While Voltaire was carrying on this crusade, the less ignoble but no less dangerous Deism of Rousseau was penetrating perhaps deeper into the heart of the masses. The following is the Baron de Goltz's judgment on the influence exercised by this dangerous writer:—

"If we were treating of social development, and not exclusively of religious life, we should not hesitate to assign to Rousseau in the former sphere an influence as decisive as that of Calvin himself. It is him we have to thank that everywhere, in practical writings, in revolutionary tactics, in the habits and discipline of family life, instead of the humility, seriousness, and fear of God which characterise the Christian, we find an indescribable ideal of man as he is

* Voltaire et les Genevois, p. 104.

by nature, in the name of which, contrary to all reality and experience, virtue and purity are held up as essential to mankind. Unfortunately, the impassioned and deeply moving style by which this man's writings are distinguished enabled him to exercise a powerful sway over the most elevated minds and the noblest hearts of his time."*

In 1778, these two men both passed off the stage. They had sown the wind, and only eleven years later the nations began to reap the whirlwind. Geneva followed the example of France. In 1794, the reign of terror was inaugurated; blood flowed freely, and all crimes against the fortune, life, and liberty of the citizens were legalised. The churches were abandoned and all but shut up for about a year; and at length, on the 20th of April 1798, without striking a blow, the French troops took possession of Geneva amid the stupor and woes of its inhabitants. And these were the descendants of the men who so nobly beat back the stranger on the famous night of the *Escalade*! How are we to account for this change? Geneva had forsaken the Lord, and the Lord forsook her! Thus fell the city of Calvin, the bulwark and asylum of Protestantism!

The captivity of Geneva lasted for sixteen years, but the effects of it are even yet far from being at an end. The lightness and frivolity introduced by the French soldiery succeeded in uprooting what still remained of the old Genevese austerity. But what wrought the greatest change was the emancipation of the Roman Catholics. Until the revolution, the latter could not become proprietors on Genevese soil. On the annexation of Geneva to France, they were admitted to equal rights with the Protestants, and in 1810, one of the churches was ceded to them. The influx of strangers, refugees, artisans, and the spread of French science and literature too, have contributed to change the social aspects of this city. - "In face of a Roman Catholic immigration, which went on increasing every day," says the Baron de Goltz, "and the characteristic of a town of strangers, and tending more and more to become so, Geneva received into its bosom an enemy ever ready to overturn the existing state of things, and irretrievably to destroy all that could recall the 'Protestant Rome.'"

The government had been reconstituted pretty much on the model of the ancient government, but once more its aristocratic tendencies proved its bane. In 1846, the ultra-radicals, joining with the Roman Catholics, enabled a small but determined minority to vest the supreme authority in the hands of M. James Fazy, a man of consummate talent, but utterly devoid

* *Genève Religieuse*, p. 79.

of principle. Cafés, theatres, and all sorts of noisy amusements, began to be systematically encouraged, and the government went so far as to abstain from repressing public scandals. M. Fazy has even established gaming tables. The youth are emancipated very early; and, instead of the religious instruction formerly given in the public institutions, the pupils are taught *political economy*.

"The new constitution, taking for its starting-point the idea of individual rights, has made it its first business to secure for them the greatest possible extension, to surround them with every sort of guarantee, and to sacrifice to them every other consideration. According to this principle, the most frequent application was made of what was called the popular sovereignty. Henceforth the totality of the individuals of the male sex who had reached a certain age was comprehended under the name of *people*, and to this *people* was confided the supreme decision in all important moments of the *life* of the State. In order to prevent any kind of particularism, *one and the same* electoral assembly was instituted for the whole republic. The Council of State and the General Council are elected biennially by this people."*

What a contrast! cries our author: radicalism and ultramontaniam uniting to rule over "Calvin's city!" With this new organisation of the government, came the re-organisation of the Church. The same principle of *universal suffrage* was applied to it. All authority was taken from the venerable company, and put into the hands of a consistory, composed of twenty-five lay members and six ecclesiastics, elected by all the Protestant citizens *convened in one assembly*. Ministers are chosen to vacant charges in the same way. The Baron de Goltz says, "When we ask ourselves what is the fundamental idea of a church for which this organisation is framed, we truly do not know what to answer."

But let us leave the old church,* for we know that it is not there that Calvin is to be found, and conclude with a few words upon the blessed Revival which it pleased God to grant to Geneva in the beginning of the present century. The movement, which began by eight students meeting to read the Epistle to the Romans with a stranger (the late Robert Haldane, Esq.), who could only hold communication with them

* Genève Religieuse, p. 505.

* It would not be fair, however, were we to omit stating that a great change for the better has taken place in the National Church of Geneva, especially within the last twelve years. The consistory is composed of conscientious men; the popular elections having hitherto been on the right side. The pastors too have felt the counter-shock of the revival, and the old rationalistic party is greatly diminishing. Only there is nothing to guarantee the continuance of this state of things.

through the medium of an interpreter, has gone on waxing deeper and wider, and spreading its salutary influence through Switzerland and France. It is deeply satisfactory to see how many of these young men entered with all the ardour of their first love into the missionary field. The account of the labours of Neff in the Hautes Alpes, of Pyt in the Pyrenees, and of Bost in Alsacè, occupy several interesting pages. These were not the days of missionary societies, as our author remarks; each man, as soon as he received the truth in his own heart, felt himself called upon to communicate it to others. Fault may be found with their way of doing things, their hasty zeal, and, at times, their want of tact, but they were men full of faith and courage, who quailed not before obstacles. Dr Malan, as was to be expected, occupies a large place in De Goltz's narrative. His struggles with the Company, and M. Bost's trial for defamation, and his acquittal, shew that the government dealt justice without partiality.

The Baron de Goltz, writing in view of Germany (for which he apprehends an approaching struggle, leading to the entire separation of Church and State), is anxious that his countrymen should profit by the experience of the separated churches of Geneva. This leads him to dwell at length on the divisions and internal dissensions which had well-nigh proved fatal to them. On leaving the National Church (with the exception of Dr Malan and his adherents, who joined the Secession Church of Scotland), these brethren constituted themselves into a church founded on the Congregational system, which they pursued to its extreme limits. This left them particularly open to the entrance of Plymouthist views, which did a great deal of harm. At length, however, the adherents of Mr Darby withdrew, and, in 1849, the other evangelical Christians, with the exception of Dr Malan and a small congregation who adhered to him, united to form the Evangelical Church of Geneva. They adopted a short Confession of Faith in sixteen articles, of which the Baron de Goltz says, "It is a testimony rendered by this Church, in spite of the opposition by which she is surrounded, to the authority and inspiration of the whole Scriptures, the divinity of the Saviour, and reconciliation by his blood, justification by grace alone through faith, and the efficacy of the Holy Spirit in the heart" (p. 537).

In this new organization, the Presbyterian principle gained a complete ascendancy over congregationalist tendencies. The prejudices against the Methodists have greatly diminished since they have possessed men of the standing of Merle d' Anbigné, Gaussen, and La Harpe, Piket, &c. Our author devotes a chapter to what he calls the theological individualism of Vinet and his school, and, while recognising the importance of his work, he

does not hesitate to point out the flaws in his theology. In conclusion he remarks, that "Experience has proved that the Evangelical Church, with its Confession of Faith, has taken deep root among the population of Geneva, and its existence may be regarded henceforth as secure. Thus, in spite of the changes that have taken place in the bosom of the National Church, the Evangelical Church must hitherto be considered as the centre of living souls in Geneva" (p. 545). K. D. F.

ART. VI.—*Revision of the Authorised Version of Scripture*
—*St John's Gospel.*

The Gospel according to St John, after the Authorised Version. Newly Compared with the original Greek, and Revised. By FIVE CLERGYMEN. Third and revised edition. London: Parker, Son, & Bourn. 1863.

A PERFECT translation of the Holy Scriptures is one of those ideals at which biblical scholarship is bound constantly to aim. The great majority of professing Christians must always be dependent for their knowledge of the inspired Word of God on versions into the vernacular tongues; and it is an evident duty which the learned owe to their less favoured brethren, to endeavour to make such versions as accurate as possible. There will always be room for exertion in this matter. Perfection is not here attainable, even by the utmost effort, any more than in the other works of man. But there may be many degrees of approximation made towards it; and there is no nobler task for the biblical scholar than to be ever striving to bring out, with more and more exactness, the precise import of the infinitely precious, because divinely-inspired, original text.

It is in some points of view a very solemn position which the possessors of sacred learning occupy, and one which entails great responsibility. They stand as interpreters between God and their fellow-creatures upon earth. But for them, the volume which contains a revelation of Heaven's will must remain a sealed book to the far larger proportion of mankind. To them, in a peculiar sense, have been committed the oracles of God. And far from cherishing that spirit of pride or exclusiveness which prompted the Roman lyricist, in a consciousness of his own superior gifts, to exclaim, "*Odi profanum vulgus et arceo*," it must ever be reckoned both their privilege and duty to lead the unlearned as near as possible to that shrine from

which the voice of Deity speaks, and to convey to them an accurate acquaintance with its communications.

Our readers are all familiar with the numerous and striking testimonies which have been borne to the excellency of our ordinary English version. Few indeed are the translations, either ancient or modern, which will not suffer in comparison with it. In many respects it challenges our warmest and sincerest admiration; and we cannot but feel thankful to a gracious Providence that, now for two centuries and a-half, the light of divine truth has, through its medium, shone in so pure and uncorrupted a form upon the churches and families of our country.

The very text from which our English version was made, has, in a wonderful manner, endured the ordeal of criticism. This could scarcely have been anticipated, when we consider the meagre resources which were available to biblical critics at the time when it was formed, and contrast with these the vast materials for textual criticism which have since then been collected. Not one of the most ancient MSS. of the New Testament which time has spared us, had been critically examined at the date when what is known as the 'Received Text,' and from which substantially our English version is derived, was fixed. Yet all the investigations that have, since the days of Erasmus, and his immediate followers, been carried on by Walton, Mill, Wetstein, Griesbach, Lachmann, Tischendorf, and others, have not disclosed the necessity for almost any important changes being made in the common text of the New Testament. Some verses, indeed, such as 1 John v. 7, and Acts viii. 37, have been clearly shewn to have no claim to stand in any edition of the sacred Scriptures. And many other slight changes would, no doubt, require to be made in the readings of our English Bible, if these were to be rigidly conformed to the results which have now been reached by the science of textual criticism. But when we reflect how trifling, in general, such alterations would be, and how criticism, after fluctuating for a time in respect to some important readings (such as between *Κυρίου* and *Θεοῦ* in Acts xx. 28), has now finally acquiesced in the reading adopted in our ordinary version, we shall find great cause for satisfaction in regard to this fundamental point, and abundant reason for gratitude to a wise and superintending Providence.

Our authorised version is also distinguished by many of the highest merits which can belong to a translation. In its general character it may be not inaptly compared to the Syriac Peshito version, which was, in all probability, formed not long after the apostolic age, and which is not only the earliest, but one of the most excellent of the many extant translations of the New Testament. Like that precious legacy of primitive times,

our English version is marked at once by fidelity and freedom. Both represent with great accuracy the meaning of the original text, yet both preserve, in a remarkable degree, the idiom of the language in which they exist. Both are, for the most part, abhorrent of paraphrase, while, at the same time, both avoid that literal scrupulosity which, while it strives to exhibit the precise meaning of the original, is one of the most certain means of misrepresenting it. Sometimes, according as the Syriac or English furnishes the greater facility for an exact and expressive rendering of the Greek, the advantage appears on the side either of the ancient or modern version. But, generally speaking, both translations seem of almost equal excellence ; and it would be difficult perhaps to say which of them, as a whole, is to be preferred. In no respect does our common version suffer from a comparison either with this or any other translation of the Scriptures in existence. Simplicity and dignity of style, rhythm, perspicuity, and correctness are, on a wide and comprehensive view, the qualities which belong to it, and give it a very high and honourable place among all the versions of the Holy Scriptures that have ever been produced.

It will not be deemed by our readers at all inconsistent with this estimate of the excellence of our authorized English translation, when we now add that we are staunch friends of all reverent, scholarly, and well-considered attempts at its revision. We rejoice to see piety and learning engaged in this work. We would fain have our common people put on terms of as great equality with scholars as possible, in regard to the means of obtaining an accurate acquaintance with the revealed mind and will of God. And we have only to reflect for a moment on the very long period which has elapsed since our present version was made, in order to feel that, while that version only is in their hands, they must read the Scriptures at no little disadvantage. Biblical science has made immense strides since the times of James I. A vast number of additional MSS. have been discovered and collated. Great light has been thrown upon obscure passages both in the Old and New Testaments. More exact principles of interpretation have been adopted and brought to bear on the sacred text. The Hebrew language especially has been far more accurately studied in connection with the cognate dialects of the great Shemitic family. And to mention nothing more, our own language has greatly changed in character since the authorised version was made, so that many words occurring in that version are either totally unintelligible to the common people at the present day, or suggest to them a very indefinite meaning, if not even one which is altogether erroneous.

Now, it is very true, as has already been said, that neither the additional stores which have been collected for the purposes of textual criticism, nor the more thorough acquaintance which is now possessed with the original languages of Scripture, as well as the greater delicacy and care with which the minutest points are attended to in translation, lead to any very important or essential modification of our views as to the signification of Scripture. But, taking all things together, we do find that the scholar occupies, at the present day, a very high vantage-ground as compared with his unlearned brother, who must be entirely dependent on the common version for his knowledge of the word of God. The former has at his command the fruits of all the sacred learning of more than two centuries. He knows what changes are to be made in the text, and what on the received interpretation of Scripture. He sees the true meaning of many passages which an obsolete phraseology renders obscure to those acquainted only with modern English; and he can frequently trace a precision, beauty, and suggestiveness in the words which the Holy Spirit has employed, that have been unnecessarily sacrificed in the terms which were at first adopted, and are still retained, in the common translation.

Accordingly, a vast mass of emendations have been proposed on the authorised version. Many of these may be silly enough, but it would be vain to deny that a multitude of others rest on a solid foundation. There is a deep-seated feeling in the community that the English Bible is not altogether what it ought to be. Every now and then this feeling breaks forth in intelligible utterance, and the cry for revision is heard. Parliament is appealed to, ecclesiastical assemblies discuss the subject, and the newspapers are filled with correspondence and arguments on both sides of the question. It seems for a time as if something must be done, under public and competent authority. But the practical difficulties in the way of doing anything are soon felt, or imagined, to be insuperable. For one thing, there is a large party who, from sentimental or superstitious motives, will not hear of any change. In their eyes, the very errors of the English version are sacred. It has now happily long outlived that opposition and vituperation which, almost as a matter of course, greeted its introduction into the world, and has enlisted in its favour those strong conservative feelings which were once arrayed so vehemently against it. But, besides this unreasoning opposition to all change, there are many powerful arguments which may be brought against every attempt at innovation. Our present version is the common Bible of all English readers throughout the world, and forms, as it were, a sacred bond of union between them, which ought not, it is said,

on account of any fancied advantages flowing from a new translation, to be severed. It is, moreover, common to all churches and sects, so that amid their many divisions, they still appeal to its venerated pages—an advantage that would at once be destroyed by any attempt to supersede it by a new translation. Its words and phrases, also, have been familiar to our ears from infancy, and are connected with so many solemn and tender associations in our minds, that we can hardly listen to any argument which would persuade us to have them altered. In short, obscure as in some passages it confessedly is, its style is in general so stately and perspicuous, and the somewhat antiquated aspect which it now presents is so well fitted to increase that feeling of reverence with which the word of God ought ever to be regarded, that, it is argued, a change which would, on the whole, be an advantage, is scarcely a possible achievement; and therefore, shrinking from any effort at amending it, we should be content to learn from its pages, as our fathers through so many generations have done, the way to holiness and heaven, and be grateful for its many excellencies, while we willingly forget its trifling errors.

Under the influence of these and other considerations, the cry for revision from time to time dies away, without leading to any public and united effort. But it is not on that account altogether without results. Individual scholars devote themselves to the onerous task of Bible translation, and every now and then present the fruits of their labours to the world. And there is manifestly a demand for such works. This is strikingly shewn by the fact, that a translation of the New Testament, founded on Griesbach's text, by a well-known scholar, has already passed through some four or five editions, and that although its merits, which are far from small, must be largely counterbalanced in public estimation by the decided doctrinal bias which many of its renderings indicate towards Socinianism.

Among those who have of late years been occupied in this work of Bible revision, a high place must be assigned to those five clergymen of the Church of England, whose labours have just been brought to a close by the publication of the third edition of their revised translation of *St John's Gospel*. The names of the authors are a sufficient guarantee for the general character of their work. The first name appended to the brief preface prefixed to the present edition, is that of Bishop Elliott, whose writings are among the most valuable in the exegetical literature of England, and who combines, in a remarkable degree, the most honest and fearless criticism with the profoundest reverence for holy Scripture. The next is that of Dean Alford, the well-known editor of the Greek New Testa-

ment, and whose merits, as a critic and expositor, are too generally recognised to need any more than a mere passing mention. The third name is that of Dr Moberly, head master of Winchester School, and well known as an eminent scholar and theologian. The fourth is that of Mr Humphry, author of a scholarly and instructive Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles, and who, amid the multifarious labours of a London pariah, has still continued to devote himself to the work of sacred criticism and exegesis. There was also a fifth name—that of Dr Barrow—prefixed to the first edition, but owing, we believe, to his having obtained a distant appointment, he has had no part in the preparation of this final revision of St John's Gospel.

The portions of Scripture which have engaged the attention of the Revisers just named, are, besides St John's Gospel, the following:—(1.) The Epistle to the Romans; (2.) The Epistles to the Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, and Colossians; and (3.) The Epistles to the Corinthians. We propose at this time to restrict our attention to St John's Gospel, and inquire, how far, in our humble judgment, the emendations on the authorised version, which have been proposed under such high authority, are worthy of approval and acceptance.

The plan laid down by the Revisers, and the principles by which they were guided, appear to us to have been of the most judicious character. They did not rush on the gigantic and responsible—we would add, needless and presumptuous—task, of preparing an absolutely new translation of the New Testament, or any part of it. They took the authorised version as the guide and basis of their own. Their work was *revision*, and not *translation*, and thus they have most carefully and successfully avoided the rock on which so many analogous projects have made shipwreck—that of needlessly and offensively departing from a version every word of which should remain for ever sacred, unless the imperial and resistless claims of truth and accuracy demand that it should be altered.

It has been their object, they remark (Preface to First Edition, p. v.),

“not to re-translate, but to revise the authorised version. For that version itself, framed according to the directions of King James I., upon the Bishops' Bible, together with Tyndale's, Coverdale's, Matthew's, Whitchurch's, and the Geneva Bible, is by no means to be regarded as a separate translation, having its own independent merits or demerits, but as the genuine English Bible, communicating, as in a channel, the life-blood of the Holy Scriptures in the intelligible 'vulgar tongue,' down from the first time when, by the blessing of God upon the Reformation, they began to be unfolded to the general understanding of the people. From that version, so laborious, so generally accurate, so close, so abhorrent of paraphrase,

so grave and weighty in word and rhythm, so intimately bound up with the religious convictions and associations of the English people, we have not lightly departed. Never, indeed, we may venture to affirm, have we done so without distrust, and, as we believe, sufficient cause for the departure. The cases of such departure have been principally these :—

“*α*. Where the translators have mistaken the meaning of the Greek. There are few such cases in St John.

“*β*. Where more accurate scholarship has shewn some, generally slight, alterations to be necessary. These cases are many and various.

“*γ*. Where English words have undergone some change of meaning since the revision of 1611. Cases of this kind are not uncommon.

“*δ*. Where the authorised version has appeared to be inconsistent with itself. It should, however, be borne in mind that the revisers of 1611, in their Preface, expressly claimed the liberty of translating the same expression in the original by different English synonyms.

“*ε*. Where we have been able to give additional force, or to bring out the full meaning of the original more perfectly. These changes are, of course, very various in their particulars.

“In departing, however, from the authorised version, we have been careful to maintain, as far as we could, the rhythm, in itself so weighty and beautiful, and the archaic form, both of words and sentences, by which it is characterised.”

There can be but one opinion as to the judiciousness and good sense displayed in these guiding principles. All the causes of change mentioned are evidently valid, and no others, we believe, could be added which would warrant further alteration. There is indeed one important omission. The text of the original, where it has been positively or probably determined to have been different from that represented in our common version, ought unquestionably to lead to change in the translation. But the Revisers have, in respect to St John's Gospel, left this point for the most part out of consideration. They do in several passages depart from the received text, where criticism seems to them to have finally decided in favour of a different reading ; but they have judged it better, upon the whole, not to give a revised text along with a revised translation. Their reason for not doing so is, that the true text is still not a little uncertain, so far as the Gospels are concerned. The great mass of materials available for settling it has, they remark, been as yet but imperfectly examined ; and they have therefore, except in a few passages, declined to consider the question of various readings, or to depart from the text usually received. This procedure is in harmony with that spirit of caution which has distinguished their whole enterprise, and is in its principle worthy of all admiration. We are disposed,

however, to think that it has been carried somewhat too far in the particular now under consideration. The *text* which he will follow is the very first point which must be settled by a translator of Scripture. And we can hardly admit that any one who engages in the work of revising our present English version fulfils the obligations resting upon him, if he quietly ignores the evidence which has been collected, and the results which have been reached by textual criticism in the course of the last two centuries, and saves himself all the trouble and responsibility of deciding on the true readings of Scripture, by continuing to follow the received text. We cannot help regretting that the benefit has been lost which might have been derived from the judgment of such able critics as our Revisers, with respect to the genuineness of passages like John v. 3, 4, and vii. 53—viii. 11.* The plea which they advance for refusing to deal with such questions seems to us inadmissible. If accepted, it would for ever prove an effectual bar to all progress. The *difficulty* of deciding a controverted point can never lessen the *duty* which calls us to decide it. And that every one who sets forth an edition or translation of any part of Scripture is bound by the most stringent obligation to follow what he believes to be the true reading of the original text, appears to us manifest. In this as in other things he must of course be guided by probability. If, before making any change on the received text of Scripture, one resolves to wait till all possible sources of evidence have been examined, and all doubt finally dispelled, then it is clear that he will wait for ever in vain.

“ Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis; at ille
Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis ævum.”

Who can say *when* all the materials which Providence has preserved to us for settling with comparative certainty the original text of Scripture will be examined or even discovered? New MSS. of the most ancient and valuable character have but recently been brought to light, and others may yet be found; but what biblical scholars have in the mean time to do with, and in faithfully using which their obligations are exhausted, is just the evidence which research has hitherto placed in their possession. We hold it therefore a serious defect in our Revisers,

* They enclose the latter passage here referred to in brackets, and observe that it is wanting in the best MSS., but give no opinion as to its genuineness; the former passage is inserted without remark. Their whole conduct in reference to the text seems somewhat arbitrary and inconsistent. Thus, they take no notice of the authority for inserting the word *Ἐβραϊστί* at chap. xx. 16, though the evidence in its favour appears quite as strong as that for several of the other readings, different from the received text, which they have adopted. In like manner, *ὁμοῦ* is preserved (xvi. 8) against overwhelming authority.

that they did not undertake the responsibility, and incur the difficulty, of settling what, according to the best judgment they could form, was the true text of that portion of Scripture which they sought with greater accuracy and effect to present before the mind of the public; and we trust that the precedent which they have thus unfortunately set will not be followed by others who may, in regard to the work of Bible revision, tread in their steps.

With this exception, the principles which have guided them in their work have our warmest approbation. Especially do we admire their great guiding rule to make as few changes on the authorised version as possible. Our first, second, and third advice to every one who ventures on the labour of amending the ordinary English translation, would be summed up in the one word—*preserve*. Nothing but the most evident necessity can, to our mind, warrant one word of alteration. And we would apply this rule as stringently to the *order* in which the words are placed, as to the words themselves. When the ear has been long accustomed to the generally musical flow of the English translation, nothing is more disagreeable, or even irritating, than to find the old rhythm destroyed by a transposition of the words, except the benefit of the change be at once great and obvious. We confess that we wish our present Revisers had been somewhat less liberal in the changes which they have made in this respect. It is true that we can generally see the reason which has influenced them in making the alteration, but we do not the less in several cases regret it. We shall give some examples afterwards of passages in which the change of order seems really of sufficient importance to be admitted. But these are exceedingly few in comparison with the others in which the very opposite holds good, the alteration either being in itself without warrant from the original, or deriving such very doubtful sanction from the Greek, that the familiar order of the words ought to have been preserved in English.

Having made these general remarks on the principles which have ruled in the execution of this revised translation, we now proceed to look at the revision itself. And we have no hesitation in saying at once that it is, in many passages, a decided improvement on the ordinary version. The Revisers seem to us, both by the example they have set as to the manner and spirit in which any amended translation of Scripture should be gone about, and by the positive success which has attended their efforts, to have made a valuable contribution to the perfecting of our English version of the Holy Scriptures. At the same time, we venture to add, with unfeigned diffidence, that, in our judgment, there are several respects in which they have either failed to improve the common version by the changes which

they have proposed, or have even fallen considerably beneath it. And to *fail* in any amendments which they have suggested is in fact to incur condemnation. Nothing but a decided improvement will justify alteration. Many of the changes which they have made are, we believe, necessary and valuable corrections, and therefore most worthy of adoption. But there are others which we humbly conceive to be either the reverse of improvements, or so equal in value to the ordinary translation, that the advantage of accepting them does not outweigh the disadvantage of alteration. We shall now set before our readers some of the most important examples belonging to these heads respectively, noticing *first* those passages in which the revision seems to us a decided improvement on the common version; and *secondly*, others in which the benefit of change is either doubtful, or the advantage seems positively to lie on the side of the authorised translation.

First, then, we are to look at some passages in which the revision seems plainly preferable to the ordinary English version. Every chapter furnishes us with several examples, from which we select the following :—

Chap. i. ver. 11, ‘He came unto his own, and his own *people* Received him not.’ The word “people,” inserted by the Revisers in the second clause of this verse, is evidently required by the original. There is a manifest distinction indicated between *ἴδια* and *οἱ ἴδιοι*. This distinction has been lost both in the Peschito and our common version. Luther has preserved it by rendering the former “sein Eigenthum” and the latter “die Seinen.” Our Revisers remark how gladly they would have been more definite in the translation of the first, as well as the second, clause, but could not satisfy themselves as to the word to be adopted. Selection is truly difficult, but must, we think, be attempted in both clauses, if in either. Upon the whole, Campbell’s version, “He came to his own *land*, and his own *people* did not receive him,” is perhaps as good as any which our language will afford, though, like the German version, it sacrifices the verbal correspondence observable in the Greek between *ἴδια* and *ἴδιοι*.—Ver. 21, “And they asked him, What then? Art thou Elijah? And he saith, I am not. Art thou the prophet? And he answered, No.” Two manifest improvements are here made. It is an evident advantage to read *Elijah* rather than *Elias*, (and so with all other proper names, the more common form being that which ought to be universally adopted), and it is a great gain to have *ὁ προφήτης* literally translated “the prophet,” when the reference is plainly seen to be to the divine ambassador who was expected to precede the manifestation of the Messiah, instead of “that prophet,” as in our common version, in which the meaning is very obscure.

Ver. 30, "This is he of whom I said, After me cometh a man which *taketh place* before me; because he was before me." This is an important emendation. The rendering of *ἔμπροσθεν μου γίγνεται* in our common version, both here and at ver. 15 (the words seem an interpolation at ver. 27), by "is preferred before me," is plainly liable to serious misconstruction. Ver. 45, "Philip findeth Nathanael, and saith unto him, We have found him of whom Moses, in the law, and the prophets, did write, Jesus, the son of Joseph, who is from Nazareth." The difference of order, and the more emphatic rendering of *τὸν ἀπὸ Ναζαρέθ*, here adopted, seem fully justified by the advantage which is gained in point and distinctness with reference to the words of Nathanael which immediately follow. We are also inclined to think the renderings "witness" in ver. 7, instead of "a witness;" "have seen" and "have borne," ver. 34, instead of "saw" and "bare;" and the translation of ver. 42, (with the exception of the initial "But," the genuineness of *ὁ* being more than doubtful, and the proper translation of it, if the word be admitted into the text, being certainly "and")—"But Jesus looked on him and said, Thou art Simon the son of Jonas: thou shalt be called Cephas (which is by interpretation, Peter)," decided improvements.

Chap. ii. ver. 3, "And when the wine failed," as a translation of *ὁ οἶνος ἐλείψατο*, is plainly preferable to the ambiguous rendering of the authorised version, "And when they wanted wine." Ver. 24, 25, "Yet Jesus did not trust himself to them, for that he knew all men, and because he needed not that any one should testify of man; for of himself he knew what was in man"—is, in several respects, a gain on the authorised version. We rather prefer, indeed, the rendering of *ὁ* by "but," instead of "yet," here adopted, there being no sufficient reason for the change, but in all the other alterations in the verses, there seems to us a decided advantage in the new translation. The change of construction in the original between *ὁ* with the infinitive in ver. 24, and *ὅτι* with the indicative in ver. 25, is lost in our common version, and the strength of the passage is thus somewhat weakened. The emphatic *αὐτὸς* in ver. 25 is also sunk in the authorised version, but is well preserved in the revised translation. We prefer also "the water now become wine" in ver. 9, to "the water that was made wine" of our ordinary version, and also "this beginning of his miracles" in ver. 11, to "this beginning of miracles," as the clause stands in the authorised translation.

Chap. iii. ver. 8, "Knowest not" is evidently the proper translation of *οὐκ οἶδας*, instead of "canst not tell," strangely found in the common version. Ver. 10, "The teacher of Israel" is a great improvement on "a master of Israel." Almost all

the other changes proposed in this chapter, some of which will be specially noticed afterwards, seem either unnecessary, or positively inferior to the renderings of the authorised translation.

Chap. iv. ver. 21, "Jesus saith unto her, Woman, believe me, an hour cometh, when neither in this mountain, nor in Jerusalem, shall ye worship the Father," is, in every particular, an improvement on the common version, which runs thus, "Woman, believe me, the hour cometh, when ye shall neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father." Ver. 37, "For herein is (fulfilled) that true saying, One is the sower, and another the reaper," seems to give the true construction of the original, and also renders with precision the *καὶ*, which is represented by "and" in the authorised version. We also prefer "now" to "and," in ver. 4; "so" to "then," in ver. 5; "food" to "meat," in ver. 8—the latter word having changed its meaning since 1611; "Lift up your eyes, and behold the fields, that they are white to harvest already," in ver. 35, to "lift up your eyes, and look on the fields; for they are white already to harvest," only we think that the rhythm of the authorised translation might very well have been preserved in the conclusion of the verse; "have bestowed" and "have laboured," in ver. 38, to "bestowed" and "laboured;" "after the two days," in ver. 43, to "after two days;" and "this again, a second miracle, did Jesus, when he was come out of Judea into Galilee" in ver. 54, to "this is again the second miracle that Jesus did, when he was come out of Judea into Galilee."

Chap. v. ver. 4, "He therefore who first went in after the troubling of the water was made whole, with whatsoever disease he was afflicted," is unquestionably a more correct rendering of the original than the common version, "whosoever then first stepped in was made whole of whatsoever disease he had." Ver. 18, "For this cause, then, the Jews sought the more to kill him, because he not only broke the Sabbath, but also called God his own Father, making himself equal with God," is an important emendation of the A. V.,* as bringing out the force of *ἰδού*, which here contains a vast amount of meaning, and serves to explain the last clause of the verse. Ver. 35, "He was the lamp that burneth and shineth" is doubtless a more correct verbal rendering of the original than the A. V., "He was a burning and a shining light." It seems impossible to give *ὁ λύχνος* any other meaning than "the lamp;" and the articles in Greek ought not to be overlooked in the English version. There is probably, as many have supposed, an implied contrast between John as "the lamp," and Christ himself as

* We shall henceforth use these initials to denote the *authorised version*.

"the light." Campbell remarks on the passage: "Perhaps there is an allusion here to the expression in the Psalms, cxxxii. 17, ἡ τοίμασα τῷ χριστῷ μου λύχνον, and consequently an insinuation that this was *the lamp* which God had provided according to his promise." At the same time, while the translation given by the Revisers is unquestionably possessed of an advantage in point of literal correctness over that of A. V., the following observations of Mr Malan on the passage are well worthy of being considered: "As to λύχνος," he says, "it may be rendered 'lamp' if one bears in mind the kind of small portable lamp it means. But modern ideas of a lamp differ so widely from λύχνος, that 'light' of A. V., which renders the intention of the original, might remain. 'He was the lamp burning and shining,' or, 'He was the burning and shining light,' might, perhaps, be a better alteration of A. V. than the one given by the Revisers."* Ver. 44. "How can ye believe, which receive glory one of another, and seek not the glory which is from the only God." This is one of the two passages to which the Revisers refer in their preface as exemplifying absolute mistakes of the Greek in the rendering of A. V. And there can be no doubt that the only tenable translation of τοῦ μόνου Θεοῦ is that which they have given. The A. V. translates the adjective μόνου as if it were the adverb μόνον, and thus departs both from the original and the ancient revisions. Minor improvements in this chapter are, "take up" for "carry," in ver. 10; "even until now" for "hitherto," in ver 17; "in like manner" for "likewise," in ver. 19; "an hour" for "the hour," in ver. 28; "have sent" and "hath borne" for "sent" and "bare," in ver. 33, with some others.

Chap. vi. ver. 32, 33, "Jesus therefore said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Moses hath not given you *the* bread from heaven; but my Father giveth you the true bread from heaven. For the bread of God is that which cometh down from heaven, and giveth life unto the world," is, in several respects, a manifest improvement on A. V. "That bread" is an evidently improper rendering of τὸν ἄρτον, and tends to obscure, or rather pervert the meaning; and it seems greatly better to understand ὁ καταβαίνων as referring to ἄρτος just mentioned, than to regard it as pointing to the Person spoken of as "the bread." Ver. 64, "For Jesus knew from the beginning who they were

* *Malan on St John's Gospel*, Part II. p. 58. This remarkable work by the learned vicar of Broadwindsor, Dorset, contains, *first*, a translation in English of St John's Gospel from the eleven oldest versions of it (except the Latin), viz., The Syriac (2d century), Sahidic (2, 3), Ethiopic (4), Gothic (4), Armenian (4, 5), Memphitic (4, 5), Georgian (6, 7), Anglo-Saxon (8, 9), Slavonic (9), Arabic (11, 12), Persian (13, 14); and, *secondly*, remarks on every one of the alterations proposed by the Revisers on our authorised version.

that believed not, and who it was that should betray him," is better than "and who should betray him" of A. V., because the latter rendering might imply that more than *one* of the disciples should prove traitorous, whereas the *ὁ παραδόντων αὐτὸν* of the original clearly points to a single traitor. Among other preferable renderings in this chapter are, "the feast," in ver. 4, instead of "a feast;" "were going," in ver. 17, instead of "went;" "the manna," in ver. 49, instead of "manna;" "by reason of," instead of "by," as the translation of *διὰ* with the accusative in ver. 57; "the Christ," instead of "that Christ," in ver. 69, with perhaps a few others of little consequence.

Chap. vii. ver. 5, "For *even* his brethren did not believe in him," is an obvious improvement on "For neither did his brethren believe in him" of A. V. Ver. 26, "Have the rulers *come to know* indeed that this man is the Christ" is an excellent rendering of the original, and greatly preferable to A. V., "Do the rulers know indeed that this is the very Christ?" in which the force of the expressive *μήποτε* is altogether lost. Ver. 44, "And some of them were minded to take him" is a somewhat important correction, as avoiding the ambiguity in A. V., "Some of them would have taken him." Our Revisers avoid throughout the use of the English verb "will," from the danger of its being confounded with the sign of the future tense, but we think that there are several cases in which change was needless (such as chap. v. 6), and prefer the old translation. There are several little improvements in other verses of this chapter, as, "the Christ" for "Christ," in ver. 27, 31, &c., "the great day" for "that great day," in ver. 37; "multitude" for "people," in ver. 40, and some others.

Chap. viii. ver. 6. It is an obvious gain in this verse to discard the unnecessary and unwarranted supplement of A. V., "as though he heard them not." Ver. 16. The translation "because" in this verse seems preferable to "for," as bringing out more clearly the deep foundation for the truth of Christ's decisions. We may here remark that *ὅτι* varies often and much in significance throughout this gospel, and demands much delicate handling, in order to bring out its different shades of meaning. Our Revisers have in general been more successful in dealing with it than A. V. Ver. 37, "Ye seek to kill me, because my word gaineth no ground in you" brings out the meaning of *χωρεῖν* more correctly than "hath no place" of A. V. Other corrections of greater or less importance in this chapter are such as the following:—"Ye know neither me nor my Father," where the order is manifestly better than "Ye neither know me nor my Father;" "was teaching," in ver. 20, instead of "taught;" thereof for "of it," in ver. 44; "convicteth" for "convinceth," in ver. 46; "word" for "saying," in ver. 51; and

more important than any of these, "died" for "is dead," in ver. 52, 53—the *act* and not the *state* of death being that evidently intended.

Chap. ix. ver. 24, "So they called the second time the man that had been blind, and said unto him, Give glory to God ; we know that this man is a sinner." Besides the minor improvements in this verse of "so" for "then," "the second time" for "again," and "had been" for "was," there is a very important correction in the translation of the words "Δὲς δόξαν τῷ θεῷ," by "Give glory to God," instead of "Give God the praise," as in A. V. The Pharisees did not mean to acknowledge that a miracle had really been wrought on the man, and simply desire that he should give the glory of his miraculous restoration to God. They sought to induce the man to confess that deceit had been practised, and the words in question were a formula of adjuration by which he was urged to tell the truth. It seems to have been derived from the language of Joshua to Achan (Josh. vii. 19), "My son, give, I pray thee, glory to the Lord God of Israel, and make confession unto him ; and tell me now what thou hast done ; hide it not from me." In like manner, the Pharisees now solemnly enjoined the man before them to acknowledge the fraud of which they held he had been guilty, and to confess that Jesus and he had been in collusion with respect to the pretended miracle, a meaning which is brought out by the Revisers, while a totally different one is suggested by A. V. Other improvements in this chapter are the adoption of "should be" for "was" in ver. 2 ; of "seeing that" (or we prefer "since") for "that" in ver. 17 ; of "man" for "fellow" in ver. 29 ; of "it was never heard" for the awkward rendering "was it not heard" in ver. 32 ; and of "ye would not have sin" for "ye should have no sin" in ver. 41.

Chap. x. ver. 14-16, "I am the good Shepherd ; and I know mine own, and am known of mine, even as the Father knoweth me, and I know the Father ; and I lay down my life for the sheep. And other sheep I have, which are not of this fold ; them also must I bring, and they shall hear my voice ; and there shall be one *flock*, one shepherd." This passage comprises some of the most important of all the corrections made by the Revisers. They refer to it in their preface as exemplifying a decided mistake of the meaning of the original in A. V. And certainly, much is gained by the pointing adopted by the Revisers, which, instead of cutting off ver. 14 from 15, as in A. V., joins these two verses together. Campbell has substantially the same correction of A. V. ; and it is but fair to say that, while he has departed by far too much and too often from the current version, he has clearly indicated many of those

important changes for the better which our Revisers have adopted. He anticipates them in this passage with respect to the translation of *ποιμνὴ* by "flock" instead of "fold," as in A. V., (which has just rendered *ἀλλὰ* by the same word), and in leaving out the weakening connective in the close of the verse, "one flock, one shepherd." Other improvements in this chapter are—"because" for "for," in ver. 4; "layeth down" for "giveth," in ver. 11; "for this cause" instead of "therefore," in ver. 17; "because of" instead of "for," in ver. 19; "was walking" for "walked," in ver. 23; "hold our mind in suspense" for "make us to doubt," in ver. 24; "I and the Father are one" for "I and my Father are one," in ver. 30; and "made void" for "broken," in ver. 35.

Chap. xi. ver. 25, 26, "Jesus said unto her, I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me, though he die, yet shall he live; and whosoever that liveth and believeth in me shall not die for evermore." This is, to some extent, a very happy change in A. V. It is much better to render *καὶ ἀποθάνῃ* "though he die," than "though he were dead;" but the translation of *οὐ μὴ ἀποθάνῃ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα* by "shall not die for evermore," instead of "shall never die," though it tends to prevent a misconception that might spring from the common version, is, we fear, hardly tenable.* Other changes for the better are—"will recover" for "shall do well," in ver. 12; "had come" for "came," in ver. 19; "was sitting" for "sat still," in ver. 20; "also" for "even," in ver. 37; "greatly moved" for "groaning in himself," in ver. 33, 38; "do ye consider" for "consider," in ver. 50; "the nation" for "that nation," in ver. 51, 52; "are scattered" for "were scattered," in ver. 52; and "the country" for "a country," in ver. 54.

Chap. xii. No correction of any consequence occurs in this chapter. Slight changes for the better are these—ver. 13, "Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord, the king of Israel," where the order is decidedly preferable to that in A. V.; "multitude" for "people," in ver. 17, 18; "hath spoken" for "spake," in ver. 29; "what manner of death" for "what death," in ver. 33; "the Christ" for "Christ," in ver. 34; "even of the rulers" for "among the chief rulers also," in ver. 42; and "spake" for "have spoken," in ver. 48.

Chap. xiii. ver. 2, "And when supper was begun" is undoubtedly a better rendering of *καὶ δειπνοῦ γινώσκοντο*, than "and supper being ended" of A. V. We are disposed, however, to

* That is, if, as would appear, the Revisers mean the words to be taken in the sense of "shall not die eternally," as in the burial service. Otherwise, if they mean nothing more than to express the sense given in A. V., the simple negative "never," which they have adopted in the analogous passages, viii. 51, 52; x. 28, &c., is far preferable.

prefer such a translation as "And while supper was going on" to either. In ver. 3 "was going" is to be preferred to "went," in ver. 7; "afterwards" to "hereafter;" and in ver. 10, *λουόμενος* is much better translated "bathed" than "washed." Other preferable renderings are, "was betraying" in ver. 11 for "should betray;" "reclining at meat" for "leaning," in ver. 23; "leaning back" for "lying," in ver. 25; but many of the other proposed changes in this chapter seem to us the reverse of improvements.

Chap. xiv. ver. 1, "Believe in God, believe also in me," is the translation of the second clause preferred by the Revisers, though they seem to have hesitated between this and the indicative in both cases. A. V. seems clearly untenable; and for ourselves, we have no doubt as to the propriety of translating *πιστεύετε* both times as an imperative. Ver. 6. It is here a slight gain to insert the *καὶ* (unaccountably dropped in A. V.), and read, "I am the way, and the truth, and the life." The translation of *ἔγνωκα* in ver. 9 by the present "dost know," instead of the preterite, as in A. V., "hast known," is correct and preferable. In ver. 18 it seems well to retain the pathetic word "orphans" contained in the original. "While yet abiding," in ver. 25, is fully better than "being yet present;" and there is no need of inserting with A. V. a relative in the first clause in ver. 26.

Chap. xv. Scarcely any changes for the better have been made in this chapter of sufficient consequence to be mentioned. "Ye are clean already by reason of the word," in ver. 3, is preferable to A. V., "Now ye are clean through the word." In ver. 15, "no more" is better than "henceforth;" and "are," instead of "shall be," is the correct rendering in ver. 27.

Chap. xvi. ver. 2, "An hour cometh, that every one that killeth you will think that he *offereth a service* unto God," is an important correction of A. V., "will think that he doeth God service." "Convict," in ver. 8, is better than "reprove," and "tell" (or perhaps rather "announce") is preferable to "shew" in verses 14, 15. Ver. 18, "They said, therefore, What is this that he saith, this little while? we know not of what he speaketh," is an improvement on A. V., only the last clause would be better rendered, "we know not what he *meaneth*," which, though not apparently so literal as the translation of the Revisers, does more accurately express the original. "So ye also now have sorrow," in ver. 22, is better than "ye now therefore have sorrow;" and in ver. 25, "parables" is preferable to "proverbs" in both clauses.

Chap. xvii. The translation of this chapter by the Revisers seems to us a signal failure. We shall notice some of the

points connected with it afterwards, and in the mean time merely remark, that hardly one of the changes which they have here introduced appears to us an improvement.

Chap. xviii. The revisers have not found it necessary to make many alterations in this chapter. By far the most important and interesting of these occurs at ver. 37, which they propose to render thus, "Pilate therefore said unto him, Art thou a king then? Jesus answered, Thou sayest: *because* I am a king." This gives quite a different turn to the passage from what it has in the A. V. The only question is, whether the Greek will bear such an interpretation. We are disposed to think that it may, and that the passage may properly be pointed and translated thus, "Σὺ λέγεις ἐγὼ βασιλεὺς εἰμι ἐγώ;" "Thou speakest well; *for* I am a king." The *ἔγω* seems emphatic, and requires therefore to be marked in the translation, which it is not in the A. V. We prefer "*for*" as the rendering of *ἐγὼ* here, to the "*because*" of the Revisers. Other improvements in this chapter are—"that they might not," in ver. 28, instead of "lest they should;" "what manner of," instead of "what," in ver. 32; and the omission of the needless supplement "at all," in ver. 38.

Chap. xix. In this chapter also, very few alterations have been made. The most important consists of an improvement of the order of the clauses in ver. 31, "Then the Jews, that the bodies might not remain upon the cross on the Sabbath-day, since it was the preparation (for that Sabbath-day was an high day), besought Pilate," &c. In ver. 2, the translation "clothed" is plainly preferable to "put on," which has already occurred in A. V.; and at ver. 42, there is a decided improvement in the arrangement of the clauses, "There, therefore, because of the Jews' preparation day, as the sepulchre was nigh at hand, they laid Jesus."

Chap. xx. ver. 3, "they *went toward* the sepulchre," is a plain improvement on "they came to the sepulchre," since it is clear from what follows, that they are not yet regarded as having reached it. In ver. 8, "Therefore," which is dropped in A. V., ought to be inserted; and in ver. 23, "and," which is inserted, ought to be omitted. It would also be well to give *βάλε*, in ver. 27, the same rendering as *βάλε* in ver. 25, though "put," adopted by the Revisers in both cases, seems somewhat weak. The common version of this chapter is truly admirable, and perhaps approaches perfection as nearly as can be reached.

Chap. xxi. A multitude of little changes is introduced in this chapter, and generally with good effect. The most important of them is the attempt which is made to distinguish between *βίβλος* and *τοῖμα* in verses 15, 16, both words be-

ing rendered "feed" in A. V., but the first only so translated by the Revisers, while the other is rendered "keep." This effort at preserving the distinction which appears in the original is laudable, but it can scarcely be regarded as very successful. Few languages afford the means of accurately marking the difference between the two Greek words. The Peschito translates both by the same term, nor does it, any more than A. V., or the Revisers, attempt to preserve the distinction in the Greek between *ἀναγῆ*, in verses 15, 16, and *φαγε* in ver. 17. Such changes of expression may not be without significance in the original, but it seems hopeless to preserve the delicate shades of meaning which they indicate in any translation. At ver. 3, "come," in the second clause, is a more correct rendering than "go;" "*the ship*," in the same verse, is better than "a ship," and "morning," in ver. 4, is preferable to "the morning." "Fish" is more accurate in ver. 5, than "meat;" "girt about him" than "girt unto him," in ver. 7; "went on board," than "went up," in ver. 11; and "*the fish*" than "fish," in ver. 13. In ver. 18, also, "when thou *art* old," instead of "when thou shalt be old;" ver. 19, "what manner of death," instead of "what death;" ver. 25, "moreover," instead of "and also," are all slight but decided improvements.

We have thus passed lightly over the whole Gospel of St John, noticing in each chapter the principal corrections and improvements which our Revisers have suggested on the authorised version. There are, of course, many minute changes which they have adopted, that we have been unable to remark on particularly, though we might be inclined to approve and accept them, but nothing, we believe, of much consequence has been omitted. And we gratefully repeat our sense of obligation to the Revisers for the trouble which they have taken, and the sagacity and skill which they have displayed in their work. But, as before hinted, we must (though with a deep sense of the presumption which may seem to lie in the statement) confess that there are points in which they appear to us to have erred, and passages in which they have decidedly failed to improve by their alterations the authorised version. To some illustrations of what we thus humbly conceive to be their errors, we now proceed, —Secondly, to direct the attention of our readers.

And here we must begin with the general remark, that they seem to us to have been far too much influenced in their renderings by a regard to the grammatical niceties of classical Greek. We cordially accept the principle now happily acted upon by most interpreters of the New Testament, that *grammar* must lie at the basis of all true translation and exegesis. We rejoice that the arbitrary and unscholarly method of deal-

ing with the New Testament which formerly prevailed, and which represented one tense as being used for another, and particles and prepositions to be employed almost at random by the sacred writers, has now gone almost entirely out of fashion, and been replaced by a sounder and safer philology. Winer, in the preface to the last edition of his "*Grammatik*," has referred in terms of almost scornful condemnation to the system of interpretation that neglects grammatical rules, and has given several curious specimens of its strange and arbitrary procedure. His own work, more than anything else, has tended to bring such a loose and unsatisfactory mode of dealing with the New Testament to an end, and to establish on a sure and satisfactory basis the practice of grammatical interpretation.

But we confess that, as is often the case, the reaction now appears to us extreme. There seems to be no little danger lest interpreters of Scripture, after too long disregarding grammar in their translations and expositions, should now fall under a servile and injurious thraldom to its rules. We think we can detect the working of this evil tendency in several recent commentaries on portions of the New Testament, as, for instance, in the very valuable writings of Bishop Ellicott. More fully, perhaps, than any other English critic, he has carried out in his interpretations the grammatical principles of Winer, and has, we believe, in several passages, thus been led to sacrifice to some extent the real meaning of the sacred writers.

The point now referred to is one of very great importance, and one which, we trust, will attract careful consideration on the part of biblical scholars. They must beware of applying with iron rigidity those grammatical rules which hold good in the classics, to the exegesis of the sacred writings. With respect to the use of the tenses, the employment of the article, and the signification of particular phrases, there is a usage which prevails in the New Testament quite distinct from that observable among the writers of classical Greek, and which must be carefully noticed both in translation and exposition. Many passages of the New Testament have, we believe, been sorely mutilated by the application of those Procrustean principles of interpretation which distinguish the rigid grammatical school. The meaning evidently suggested by the context has been disregarded, and another adopted which the technical rules, forming the guide of the interpreter, seemed to demand. It has been forgotten that there are at least three peculiarities about New Testament Greek which forbid the application to it of those grammatical canons that are suitable to pure Greek writings. It is first of all *Hebraic* Greek, deeply tinged by the peculiarities of the ancestral language of those Jews who employed it. It is next *provincial* Greek, a dialect used by

those who lived far from the centre of Hellenic purity, and who, as a matter of course, admitted many irregularities into their ordinary style of writing and conversation. And, once more, it is for the most part the *vernacular* Greek of unpolished inhabitants of Palestine, who, though accustomed all their days to employ in substance the tongue of ancient Greece, yet necessarily both wrote and spoke it without a strict regard to those niceties of expression which are to be traced in the works of such as had a scholastic acquaintance with the language.

From a disregard of these modifying elements in the Greek of the New Testament, some very absurd interpretations have been proposed, and many needless difficulties have been started. Our blessed Lord has been spoken of as being merely "a son of God," because the sacred writers often describe him as υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ. We have been told that the meaning of Col. ii. 15 cannot be that which the great majority of interpreters has assigned it, "having *spoiled* principalities and powers," but must be, "having *stripped off from himself* the principalities and powers," because grammar forbids the former explanation of ἀπειδυσάμενος, and requires the latter.* And to give only one other example, we are assured that the exclamation of Agrippa in Acts xxvi. 28, cannot mean, as our English version renders it, "*Almost* thou persuadest me to be a Christian," because the proper Greek for such a sense would be, not *in* ὀλίγῳ, as the words stand in the Acts, but ὀλίγου or παρ' ὀλίγον. Accordingly, the most diverse and extraordinary efforts have been made by modern expositors to extort some other satisfactory or tolerable meaning from the words. Alford renders them "lightly;" Alexander, again, justly describes this as a most "unnatural" explanation, and himself gives the interpretation, "in a small degree," while others prefer "in a little time;" the explanations being as various as they are all in our opinion arbitrary and untenable.

These are a few specimens of the sort of exegesis to which the rigid application of grammatical rules, derived from the Greek classical writers, leads in their application to the New Testament. Not only the context, but common sense itself, is too often sacrificed, in order to the maintenance of these rules in all their integrity. To our mind there is not the slightest doubt that the common version of the passages just quoted from the Epistle to the Colossians and the book of Acts is perfectly correct. The meaning of both lies on the very surface, and is clearly suggested by the whole scope of the respective contexts. And it is to elevate technical rules to a

* See Alford in *loc.*, for what we cannot but think a somewhat extraordinary note.

place which they can never properly occupy, when they are allowed to over-ride common sense, and to impose a signification upon passages of Scripture which violates every probability derived, either from its general tenor, or, from its evident sense in the particular texts under consideration.

Now, we must say, with all deference, that our Revisers seem not unfrequently to have fallen into the snare just mentioned. They very truly remark in the preface to their revised version of the Epistle to the Corinthians (p. 5), "The tendency of careful Greek scholars is ever to *Grecise* in translation, and against this bias we have always endeavoured to be watchful." But they appear to us to have *Grecised* unduly in another sense; we mean in the too strict application of rules, derived from the usage of the classical writers, to the interpretation of the New Testament. Often, indeed, they have stood nobly aloof from such fetters. Thus they have retained the common version of John viii. 56, "Your father Abraham *rejoiced to see* my day, and he saw it and was glad," though it is impossible to do this and give the words *ἡγαλλιάσατο ὅτι ἰδὼν* their strict grammatical interpretation. Many expositors have made sad work of this passage. They have turned and twisted it in all directions, in the vain effort to bring some other satisfactory meaning out of it than that which is expressed in our common version, and which, we are glad to find, has been preserved by the Revisers.

But they have still yielded by far too much to the fancied requirements of grammar, especially in their translation of the *tenses*. Some hundreds of changes have been made by them in this respect, and a certain proportion of these are undoubtedly improvements; but the great majority are the reverse. Again and again is the meaning obscured or even perverted by their strict grammatical rendering of the aorist, and their refusal to give it the meaning of the English preterite. Their practice is indeed by no means consistent. They do sometimes break away from the terror of that rule which has for the most part bound them, and translate an aorist as if it were a perfect. But this is deemed so great a liberty as to require a kind of semi-apology. They observe in their preface (p. xi.), "In respect of the tenses of Greek verbs, we have not always maintained that exact accuracy of literal rendering which rigid scholarship might seem to require. Thus we have not unfrequently rendered an aorist with the sign of the English perfect, as, for instance, when it stands in immediate connection with a present, or when the act in question is so directly connected with the mention of it as to leave no room for misapprehension. Such cases are difficult to settle or to describe in the abstract; we have endeavoured to determine them, as they arose, from

the context, never forgetting the true classical meaning of the tense, but considering chiefly the facility with which the required meaning seemed to issue in the English."

Yet, while in these words they acknowledge what we believe to be the only sure guide with respect to the point in question, a careful consideration of the requirements of the context with a view to its most accurate representation in English, they have nevertheless, in almost countless passages, discarded the preterite as employed in the common version, and sought to give a strict aoristic rendering of the original. Thus, at chap. i. 18, instead of "he *hath* declared," they read, "he declared," to the manifest detriment of the meaning; and in like manner, at chap. v. 26, 27, they translate, "For like as the Father hath life in himself, even so *gave* he to the Son to have life in himself; and *gave* him authority to execute judgment also, because he is Son of man." Scores of other cases might be quoted, in which they have, in our humble judgment, clearly sacrificed the sense to the observance of that almost pedantic rule which has fettered them so much in their translation of the aorist. Most lamentable of all is the illustration of this grammatical bondage furnished in their translation of the 17th chapter. In *their* version, that solemn and beautiful supplication of our Lord for his people bristles with past tenses, which are meant to be exact representations of the aorists in the original, but which do, in our opinion, utterly fail to convey their real import. The truth is, we believe, that it is quite impossible to do justice to the New Testament, if we start with the idea that its tenses must throughout be rendered by the same tenses in English—its presents by presents, its preterites by perfects, and its aorists by that tense which in our language expresses the absolutely past. No more misleading principle could be adopted. Exegetical talent and skill will find many cases where, in order to represent the real meaning of the original as accurately as possible, a departure *must*, to some extent, be made from its literal import. Both in regard to the use of the article, the employment of particles, and the interchange of tenses, there are frequent occasions on which a rigorous adherence to those laws of interpretation which grammarians have promulgated would be the very surest means of misrepresenting the import of the original. The question is not as to the sacred writers having indulged in a wild and capricious "enallage temporum," which we do not believe, but as to the best and most effective representation which can be given of the meaning of these tenses in English. And to aim at a literal rendering of these from the Greek into our own language, is, we believe, to adopt a principle which will lead far and fatally astray. We have not space to illustrate farther the mischief

which has been done to the version of the Revisers by their rigid scrupulosity in regard to such points—a scrupulosity which, after all, sacrifices the substance to the shadow, and yields to dead mechanical laws of grammar that supreme place which ought to be occupied by exegetical tact and contextual considerations.*

We shall now notice briefly some particular passages in which the Revisers appear to us to have failed in apprehending the real meaning of the original. Several of the examples about to be quoted are to be viewed as representative of other cases of a like rendering which occur in their translation of the Gospel.

The verb *γίνεσθαι* seems to have caused them no little difficulty. They appear very anxious to discriminate it from *εἶναι*, by rendering it as often as possible “become.” Thus, they give us at chap. xii. 36, that ye may *become* sons of light instead of A. V., “that ye may *be* the children of light.” The word in the original is *γίνησθε*, and is, we believe, correctly enough rendered in this passage by the substantive verb. This sense, the Revisers, of necessity, very often attach to the word, but, from time to time, they fall back on their favourite *become*, even where it manifestly distorts the meaning of the passage. For instance, at chap. xx. 27, they render our Lord’s words to Thomas, *μὴ γίνῃ ἀπιστός, ἀλλὰ πιστός*—“*become* not faithless, but believing,” where every reader, we think, will feel that the true import of the words is greatly obscured. We are not a little surprised at such apparent want of exegetical skill on the part of our able Revisers. It requires no very lengthened experience with the Greek of the Gospels to see that the verb *γίνεσθαι* has three shades of meaning, according to the connection in which it occurs. Frequently it finds a full equivalent in the English verb *to be*, as at chap. i. 6, *ἦν ἄνθρωπος*, “there was a man.” Still more frequently it is better translated as corresponding to the English verbs, “to become” or “to be made,” as in chap. i. 3, “all things *were made* by him,” and ver. 14, “the Word *became* flesh.” But there is another modification of meaning which it assumes, as in chap. xii. 36, quoted above, which would be best rendered “that ye may be *proved* the children of light.” So again at chap. xv. 8, which the Revisers very erroneously render, “so shall ye *become* my disciples;” the meaning evidently is, “So shall ye be *proved*

* While writing thus, we heartily join with *Winer* (Gramm. p. 236) in condemning the declaration of *Bertholdt*, that “in their use of the tenses, the New Testament writers are little fettered by the rules of grammar.” They are as strict in their observance of grammatical rules as popular writers usually are, only it must not be forgotten that the rules which they followed were certainly not those of the Greek classical writers, and that we must be guided, beyond everything else, by the requirements of the passage in our translations.

my disciples," the bringing forth of abundant fruit being the great demonstration of their discipleship. In further illustration of this sense of *γινώσκειν*, we may quote Matt. v. 45, "that ye may be (be *proved* to be, *ὅπως γινώσκει*) the children of your Father in heaven," their earnest imitation of the beneficence of God being the proof both to themselves and others that they had a place in his family. This meaning of *γινώσκειν* must be attended to by translators, that they may do full justice to several passages in the Gospels, but it has been wholly overlooked by the Revisers.

Another error which we humbly think they have committed, is in the translation which they have given in several places of the verb *κρίνω*. Our readers need not be told that this verb may, according to the context, be translated either by "judge" or "condemn." There are several passages in St John's Gospel, such as v. 22, 30; vii. 24, &c., in which the former is evidently the proper translation. But there are other passages in which the latter meaning of the word ought manifestly to be adopted, such as iii. 17, 18; in which there is an evident antithesis between *κρίνω* and *σώζω*, which is only brought out with due effect by translating the former as "condemn." Yet the Revisers weaken the whole passage by rendering it thus—"For God sent not his Son into the world to *judge* the world, but that the world through him might be saved. He that believeth in him cometh not into *judgment*, but he that believeth not is *judged* already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God." Still worse is their translation of *κρίσις* as "*judgment*," instead of "*condemnation*" at v. 24, because it is apt to suggest the utterly unscriptural thought that believers will not hereafter be judged; "He that heareth my word, and believeth him that sent me, hath eternal life, and cometh not into *judgment*, but hath passed out of death into life." We may add, that at xii. 47, where both A. V. and the Revisers translate *κρίνω* by "judge," the proper rendering is evidently "condemn," as the antithetical *σώζω* is sufficient to suggest.

At chap. iii. 29, the Revisers very unnecessarily change the authorised version, "rejoiceth greatly," into "rejoiceth with joy." No doubt this is the literal rendering of the Hebraistic idiom *χαρῇ χαίρειν*, which occurs in the original, but is utterly foreign to the usage and character of the English language.

In the doubtful and much disputed passage, v. 39, the Revisers have adopted the indicative rendering, "Ye search the Scriptures," in preference to the imperative of A. V., "Search the Scriptures." They tell us, however, in their preface, that they were divided in judgment on the point. For our own part, we are strongly of opinion that the impera-

tive rendering of *ἰπνῶν* is decidedly more congruent than the indicative, to the scope and requirements of the passage.

The Revisers translate vii. 39 as follows: "But thus spake he of the Spirit which they that believe in him were about to receive; for the Holy Ghost was not yet: because neither was Jesus yet glorified." We much dislike such a bare and literal version of this important passage. Translators must ever aim at conveying the *same idea* to their readers as was at first suggested to those to whom the original words were addressed. But there is a manifest danger lest, in this case, a meaning utterly abhorrent to the intention of the sacred writer should be suggested to the mind of an English reader by the version of the Revisers. The supplement "given" ought manifestly to be inserted, as it should also be in the analogous passage in Acts xix. 2.

We shall now merely mention, without any lengthened remarks, the following passages, in which the Revisers appear to us to have signally failed. Chap. vii. 51, "Doth our law judge a man, except it first *hear from* him, and learn what he doeth?"—an awkward and needless effort at rendering literally the unusual *παρ' αὐτοῦ* of the original. Chap. viii. 25, "Therefore said they unto him, Who art thou? And Jesus said unto them, That which I also *say* (*λαλῶ*) unto you from the beginning"—another useless attempt at literalism in utter opposition to the genius of our language. Chap. ix. 25, "One thing I know, that, *though* a blind man, I now see"—a very needless and hurtful alteration of the admirable rendering of A. V., "That whereas I was blind, now I see." Chap. xii. 6, "This he said, not because he cared for the poor, but because he was a thief, and kept the bag, and *took away* what was put therein." Although *ῥαγάζω* undoubtedly has the meaning of "take away" in some of the later Greek writers, there seems no sufficient reason for giving the word such a sense in this passage, and we prefer the rendering "bare" of the Peschito, A. V., and most other versions. Chap. xiii. 19, "*From this time* I tell you before it come to pass"—Chap. xv. 2, "Every branch that beareth fruit he *cleanseth*"—(*καθαίρει* should be rendered "pruneth;" it is vain to attempt setting forth in English the connection between this word and *καθαίρει* in ver. 3); chap. xvii. 17, "Sanctify them *in thy truth*;" ver. 19, "That they may be sanctified *in truth*,"—are all efforts at a literal rendering of the original, which are unfortunate and hurtful, since, by their servility to the letter of the Greek text, they fail to convey its true meaning to the mind of an English reader.

We now lay down this able and conscientious revision of the authorised version of St John's gospel with a feeling of the deepest

respect for its authors, and a renewed expression of our gratitude for the spirit they have manifested, and the success they have achieved in their labours. If we cannot agree with them in all the changes they have proposed, we are not the less sensible of the obligations under which their earnest and painstaking efforts have laid us. We rejoice that a body of such accomplished exegetes have been training themselves by actual experience for aiding in the great and holy work of presenting the sacred Scriptures in as perfect a form as possible to English readers. Ere long, we are persuaded, the call for Bible revision will again be heard more loudly and urgently than ever. And our earnest hope is, that when this mighty enterprise is really entered on, it may be entrusted to the hands of as able scholars, as patient inquirers, and as humble believers as are the five eminent divines whose work has now engaged our consideration.

R.

ART. VII.—*Baden Powell on Miracles.*

ONE of the most prominent and palpable forms in which the Rationalism of our age manifests itself, is in its repugnance to *Miracles*, meaning by that term all supernatural interpositions or interferences within the sphere of nature, or in the events and sequences of history. Nor is any distinction allowed to be made between one miracle, or set of miracles, and another, according to the different degrees of proof that can be alleged in support of them; they are all thrown into one indiscriminate heap and rejected *en masse*. It has been usual among protestant writers to distinguish between ecclesiastical miracles and the miracles of the Scriptures, and to maintain that there is an immense difference between the two sets of signs and wonders, not only in the evidence which supports them, but in their inherent characteristics and intrinsic claims to credibility. But all such distinctions are disregarded and set at naught by the advanced rationalists of our age; and the miracles of Christ and his apostles, of Moses and Elias, are visited with the same condemnation of unreality and fiction as the lying wonders of the legends of the saints.

On the Continent, it is usual for this disbelief of the Christian miracles to be found associated with pantheistic views. Spinoza, the father of modern pantheism, held that a miracle was impossible, and as such was *a priori* incapable of proof.

Strauss, the most celebrated pantheist of our day, is of the same opinion. The fundamental principle of his *Life of Jesus* is, that whatever is miraculous must needs be unhistorical; he has even the hardihood to assert that the assumption of this principle is essential to the true conception of history. "There is no such thing," he maintains, "as the purely historical sentiment, so long as men do not comprehend the indissolubility of the chain of finite causes, and the impossibility of miracles."

In our own country pantheism has made no great progress apparently as yet, whatever may be its prospects, and the growing disbelief of miracles must be traced to a different cause; and that cause is evidently to be found in the influence of the physical sciences upon the minds of those who devote themselves too exclusively to these natural studies. For several generations back the cultivation of the science of nature has been uppermost in the national mind; natural forces and natural laws have been the grand engrossing objects of intellectual pursuit; and it is no wonder that this should have led to the formation of intellectual and moral habits of mind unfavourable to the study of theological truth. Theology has to do supremely with what is supernatural and immediately divine. Its chief objects of contemplation lie above and beyond the sphere of nature and sensible things; its methods of inquiry are, on all subjects of revealed religion, totally different from those of physical science; and equally different are its kinds of evidence and proof from those to which the mind of the physicist is habituated. Hence arises, first, an indisposedness on the part of the latter to go into theological inquiries, from a feeling that he is not at home in them, not in his own element; and next, a positive repugnance to the idea that the order and uniformity of nature should ever be, or should have ever been, disturbed by such supernatural interferences as theology puts forward; and finally, a complete and open breach with Christianity as a supernatural revelation attested and verified by miracles, as though its very claim to be such involved an insult to the system of nature and the whole body of science which expounds it—as though nature could not have all the honour paid to her which is her due unless she were acknowledged to be as immutable and eternal as her divine Author himself,—nay, as though nature claimed to be superior to her Author and Lord, by imposing upon him a necessity never to interfere with her order when it is once established—never to speak to man save by her voice—never to legislate for man save by her laws—and never to reveal himself to the world save within the limits of her undeviating uniformity. "The study of nature," said Professor Ernest Naville at Geneva, in the Conferences held there

in 1861, "has now realised the magnificent prophecies of Lord Bacon. It goes onward from conquest to conquest; and industry, the daughter of science, glorifies it in the eyes of men in our day. Its methods of attaining truth have acquired great ascendancy over the minds of men, and hence there is a very general disposition to consider physical and mathematical facts as the only truths which are solid and well proved, and to banish the wants of the heart and of the conscience, and the more elevated requirements of reason, to the land of chimeras and vain imaginations. The progress of science, a legitimate object of pride in our time, conceals therefore a dangerous rock. Minds fixed upon natural facts, as well as those shallow minds from whom the changeable surface of history hides its solid foundations, both arrive at one common result. The phenomena of time hide from them eternity. The two greatest edifices erected by hidden genius (science and industry) project the shadow of doubt over our generation. It seems as if every stone added to the building veiled from us a new portion of the eternal azure."

In the "Essays and Reviews," this antagonism of rationalism to the Christian miracles is expressed most fully and with the least disguise in the two papers contributed by the late Professor Baden Powell, and Mr Wilson, Vicar of Great Staughton. Mr Wilson pleads strongly for what is called the Ideological principle of interpretation, i. e., the principle which reduces all the miracles recorded in Scripture to the ideas which they were intended to embody, and denies the historical reality of the facts themselves. The facts go for nothing as history; they never really took place; they are a mere mythical body for the thoughts which animate them—symbols of thought, and nothing more, though allowed to be valuable, and even beautiful, as such unreal symbols. Strauss is the great master of Ideology, and his *Life of Jesus* is throughout an application of it to the gospel histories—an application so ruthless and unsparing, that it thrilled, when first published, all Christendom with a shudder.

Professor Powell proposed to himself a different task from Mr Wilson's, viz., to bring forward a new *philosophy* of miracles. His *Essay* is entitled, "On the Study of the Evidences of Christianity," and the drift of it is to make out that the Christian miracles form no real part of these evidences, although they have always been considered a highly important and indispensable part of them in every age from the days of Christ until now; and that, so far from being able to prove the truth of anything else, they do not admit, and in the nature of things cannot admit, of being proved themselves. He denies that they can be reckoned among the credentials:

of Christianity ; and though he seems willing sometimes to put them among the *credenda*, among the *objects* of faith, though not among the *grounds* of it, still it is hard to understand in what way they are to be conceived of even as objects of faith, since he will not allow us to think of them as physical facts or incidents at all, *i. e.*, as having taken place at all within the sphere or limits of material nature. For how can we conceive, *e. g.*, of the miracle of opening the eyes of the blind, if there were no actual natural blind eyes ever opened ; or how can we frame an idea of the miracle of raising Lazarus from the dead, if we are not to suppose that the body of Lazarus was a real physical body, and that the process of corruption which the miracle arrested was an actual natural process ? Truly, if, as he alleges, we can never have any rational knowledge or belief of such a miracle as wrought upon an actual natural body, it must be hugely more difficult to have any rational belief or conception of it, as wrought in any other sense—as wrought upon a body, and yet not a real natural body—as arresting a process of corruption, and yet not a natural material corruption. How plain and undeniable is it, that if such miracles as these, and all the other recorded miracles of Christ, were not wrought upon natural things, or within the sphere of nature, they were not in any sense wrought at all, and can as little be objects of faith, as credentials of faith can as little be believed as they can be grounds of believing.’

Mr Wilson is a bold man enough, but Professor Powell is vastly bolder. Mr Wilson follows in the footsteps of Strauss, but he follows him timidly, and leaves many of his footsteps untrod. He says much, a great deal too much for his own consistency as a minister of the Church of England, but he leaves a great deal more unsaid, which perhaps he would have said if he durst. But Mr Powell speaks out apparently his whole mind on the subject of miracles. He denies *physical* miracles altogether, in as complete and absolute a manner as Strauss denies them, or as Spinoza himself did.

Hume was one of the most advanced opponents of miracles that ever appeared in this country, but Powell has actually gone beyond Hume. He denies not only the possibility of proving a miracle by any amount of testimony, as Hume did, but he denies the possibility of a miracle at all. He goes farther in disbelief than even the French astronomer La Place, for the latter allowed that he would confess a miracle to have taken place if he saw it with his own eyes, and if, after scrupulously examining all the circumstances, he was assured that there was no trick or deception ; but Powell declares that he would not believe it even upon the evidence of his own senses. “The essential question of miracles,” says he, “stands quite

apart from any consideration of testimony ; the question would remain the same, if we had the evidence of our own senses to a miracle. "In short, he holds," as Dr Buchanan expresses it, "that miracles are antecedently and intrinsically incredible, and incapable of proof, whether by ocular evidence or the strongest testimony, on account simply of the antecedent presumption against them, arising from the established order of physical causes" (*Essays and Reviews Examined*, p. 87).

Here then is the extreme form of antagonism to the Christian miracles with which the theology of our country has now to deal. Such are the propositions which we have fairly to face ; such the position taken up by unbelief, from which we are challenged to drive it if we can ; and we are happy to observe, that already the challenge has been answered in more than one able quarter. Dr James Buchanan, in his *Essays and Reviews Examined* ; Dr M'Cosh, in his interesting work on *The Supernatural in Relation to the Natural* ; Dr Heurtley, Margaret Professor of Divinity in Oxford, in the *Replies to Essays and Reviews*, published under the editorship of the Bishop of Oxford ; and Mr Mansel of Oxford, in the volume of *Essays* brought out by the Bishop of Gloucester under the title of *Aids to Faith*, have all entered the lists in this fundamental controversy ; and in all these works will be found contributions more or less important and valuable to the Christian argument. And other champions of the faith will doubtless soon follow. For this controversy now fairly brought to its last issues, and put into its final form, will probably be waged for many years to come. At present it is carried on mainly upon the principles of Theism, *i. e.*, on the assumption that God is a being distinct from nature, independent of nature, and free to act supernaturally upon the order and laws of nature if he will. But we expect that it will soon come to be argued among us, as it has already been in Germany, upon pantheistic principles, *i. e.*, upon the theory that God and nature are one and the same. We observe as a first symptom of this, that Mr Mansel, after assuming the theistical view of God, and applying it to the question of miracles, thinks it necessary afterwards to vindicate that assumption in opposition to the pantheistic view. It may be noticed also, that there are some germs of pantheistic thought scattered here and there even in the *Essays* of Powell and Wilson, which will probably by and by be developed by other writers upon the same side into more distinct and definite propositions. And this phase of the controversy when it comes, will be one perfectly new to this country, or at least all but perfectly new. There is only one great work in English literature which was directed in part against the pantheistic form of unbelief—"The Intellec-

tual System of the Universe," published by Dr Cudworth in the latter half of the seventeenth century; and that work was one of the earliest productions of English learning in the controversy with infidelity. It would seem, by many sure tokens, that the last phase of unbelief will return again into the first. It was chiefly Spinoza and Hobbes who roused the deistical controversies of the seventeenth century. It will probably be the doctrines of Spinoza, as interpreted and applied ideologically by Strauss, which will engross the deistical controversies of the present and the next coming ages.

There is one very salient feature of this growing antagonism to the miraculous element of the Christian records, whether it assumes a theistic or a pantheistic form, with which it is very important that we should deal immediately, in order that it may be placed in its true light, viz., that it always puts itself forward under the sanction, and as resting clearly on the authority, of inductive science. This is done as well by pantheists like Strauss and Baur, as by theists like Parker and Francis Newman. But by no one is this claim put forward so fully and deliberately as by Professor Powell. Devoted all his life to physical and mathematical studies, and standing out prominently as a professor, expounder, and historian of inductive science, he has sought in his essay on miracles to transfer all the prestige of the inductive philosophy to his speculations upon that subject, and to leave the impression of a solidarity of credit and authority having been established between inductive science and his own antimiraculist dogmas. "In an age of physical research like the present," he remarks, "all highly cultivated minds and duly advanced intellects have imbibed more or less the lessons of the inductive philosophy, and have at least in some measure learned to appropriate the grand foundation conception of universal law, to recognise the impossibility even of any two material atoms subsisting together without a determinate relation, of any action of the one on the other, whether of equilibrium or of motion, without reference to a physical cause, of any modification whatsoever in the existing conditions of material agents, unless through the invariable operation of a series of eternally impressed consequences following in some necessary chain of orderly connection, however imperfectly known to us." "The enlarged critical and inductive study of the natural world cannot but tend powerfully to evince the inconceivableness of imagined interruptions of natural order, or supposed suspensions of the laws of matter, and of that vast series of dependent causation which constitutes the legitimate field for the investigation of science, whose constancy is the sole warrant for its generalisations, while it forms the substantial basis for the grand conclusions of natural theology."

The impression which is meant to be left by these and several other passages of the essay, is that the inductive philosophy has laid the axe to the root of the belief in miracles; that its doctrine of the uniformity and constancy of nature is the same thing as the new doctrine of nature's immutability; and that it is in the true spirit of a disciple of Bacon that the author comes forward to teach the world that all miracles are impossible and inconceivable, because the immutability of universal order is an ultimate axiom or "primary law of belief." Is this, then, a fair and just impression? Is the daring spirit of such immense assertions as these the true authentic spirit of that science which Bacon inaugurated, and which Boyle and Newton illustrated by their glorious discoveries? If this is the upshot of the Baconian philosophy, to make the order of nature not only generally uniform, but absolutely immutable, so that a supernatural revelation of God becomes impossible and all miracles fictitious, it is such an upshot, to say the least, as Bacon himself never imagined, and such as he would have repudiated with his whole soul. If this is to be thought the true spirit of the Baconian philosophy, it is certain that the spirit of Bacon himself was the exact opposite of it. It will be remembered that, in the fragment called "Valerius Terminus of the Interpretation of Nature," where he pleads so nobly for the excellence and benefit of natural knowledge, he urges, among other things, that such knowledge "is a singular help and preservative against *unbelief* and *error*;" for saith our Saviour, "Ye err, not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God," laying before us two books or volumes to study, if we will be secured from error: first, the Scriptures, revealing the will of God; and then the creatures, expressing his power; for that latter book will certify us that *nothing* which the first teacheth *shall be thought impossible*. And most sure it is, and a true conclusion of experience, that a little natural philosophy inclineth the mind to atheism, but a further proceeding bringeth the mind back to religion." Here, then, we have Bacon and our latest *soi-disant* Baconians in complete antagonism. The study of nature, says the master of modern philosophy, will certify us that nothing which the Bible teacheth us shall be thought impossible. The study of nature, say his newest disciples, certifies us that all the miracles recorded in the Bible are impossible and unreal, and that the whole conception of the Bible itself, as the book of God given by miracle, is an impossibility and a dream. How opposite the disciples to the master! How unlike Bacon to the Baconians! Are we to apply to them his own explanation of unbelief and error, and say that they have not yet drunk deep enough at the fountains of true science? So

much at least is undeniable, that it is not his spirit they have imbibed, nor the genuine spirit of his philosophy, Bacon himself being the judge. The beginning of the inductive philosophy was thoroughly Christian. If the upshot of it, in the hands of some of its present professors, has taken the form of antichristian disbelief, we cannot help suspecting that they have become unfaithful to the teaching of its founder, have corrupted the pure lessons of his philosophy, have mingled with it alien and heterogeneous elements, and are now, in fact, fighting against Christianity under false colours, and claiming a sanction and prestige from the philosophy of induction to which they are not at all entitled.

But let us look beyond the personal spirit and genius of Bacon, the father and founder of modern philosophy, and inspect from a nearer distance the character of his philosophy itself. It has always been considered to be distinguished by the characteristics of *caution*, and *modesty*, and *sobriety*, and it has been usual to trace up to these distinctive qualities of its intellectual discipline all its success. Bacon ascribed to the absence of these qualities in the old scholastic philosophy all its barrenness in discoveries and in arts. Instead of using caution in its conclusions, it was too quick and hasty. Instead of modesty, it was pretentious, boastful, and self-exalting, dictating to nature rather than submitting to her real teaching. And instead of sobriety, it was unmeasured and extravagant in hypothesis, in theory, and in dogmatism. Hence its failure and fruitlessness—fruitful only in disputes, barren of inventions and blessing to mankind. The philosophy he introduced was the opposite of the old philosophy in all these respects. That was what he claimed for it; and the claim, vindicated and verified by thousands of triumphs, has been cordially allowed by successive generations. But we ask, is there either caution, or modesty, or sobriety in such an assumption as Professor Powell puts forward as the genuine dictate of inductive science? Look at it again: nature is *immutable*, *i. e.*, has never been interfered with by the Author of nature, and never will be, and never can be—no, never in all the untold ages upon ages that are past since its beginning (if it ever had a beginning), and never in all the incalculable ages that shall pass away before its end (if it is ever to have an end). It would have been an immense assertion to say, that the order of nature had never once been interfered with in the past, considering how incalculable that past has been, and how very small a portion of it has been subject to human observation and experience; and considering too all the positive historical evidence which can be produced to prove, that at some few points at least in recorded history, and in connection with one great transaction,

at least, the bringing in of Christianity into the world, there were supernatural interferences of an exceptional kind as contrasting with the general and prevailing uniformity of things. But even this prodigious boldness is not enough for Professor Powell. He virtually dogmatizes not only upon the eternal past but upon the eternal future too. He virtually undertakes to say, that nature is immutable for ever, that a miracle is an impossibility to all eternity, because it is an impossibility in the nature of things. Is there any *caution* visible here, any *modesty*, any *sobriety*? Are not all these intellectual characteristics outraged and set at defiance by a philosophy like this? If this is to be the new style of Baconianism, will it continue to bear any degree of resemblance to its former self? will it not become the caricature of its former self? will it not in truth be the old proud and arrogant scholastic dogmatism, strutting and speaking great swelling words of vanity, under the disguise of inductive science?

But let us ask ourselves, not only what are the acknowledged qualities of the spirit of genuine inductive science as compared with the spirit of this really new philosophy, but also what is its fundamental principle as to the intellectual position and relations of man to the universe into which he finds himself introduced.

The celebrated first aphorism of the *Novum Organum* lays down the fundamental philosophical maxim, that man is the *minister* and *interpreter* of nature; that he can only know nature scientifically by observing her, and can only act upon her mechanically or industrially by having first thus learned her order and laws. He can neither know more nor do more than he has observed; and both his interpretation of nature, and his operation upon nature, are to be those of a *minister* or servant, subject and under law, not those of a *magister* or master, dictating and giving law. To know her he must interpret her; but to interpret her aright, he must interpret her ministerially, *i.e.*, with submission to the evidence which she herself lays before him, with entire deference to the facts which she herself supplies, abstaining from all prejudication of her order and laws, till he has adequate fact-evidence before him; or, at least, if he cannot help starting hypotheses and theories, holding these only provisionally till further facts emerge by which to try them, and keeping himself in readiness to surrender them without a sigh when facts and phenomena call upon him to do so. The old scholastic way of the philosophers was to carry themselves in a magisterial tone towards nature, to dictate to her by what Bacon called *anticipations* of her order and laws, or *divinations* of them, and to impose upon her the fancies and theories of their own brains, instead of

allowing her to stamp upon their minds the impress of her own actual order and laws by the evidence of facts carefully observed, and of phenomena exactly ascertained. It was the difference of these two views of man's relation to nature, the *magisterial* and the *ministerial*, which made the main difference between the spirit and method of the old and the new philosophies—of the old, which accomplished little or nothing; and of the new, which has accomplished so much and wrought such marvels, that its admirers begin now apparently to think that it is the only light of the world, the only teacher and saviour of mankind.

But is there anything of this ministerial posture and habit of mind in such views of nature as Powell has announced—anything of this entire submission of the understanding to the evidence of facts and phenomena? All the facts and phenomena of nature have reference only to the forces and laws included within her own system; and allowing that, so far as these are concerned, there is uniformity and constancy, does that amount to a proof that there is no power in the universe higher than nature, and that it is impossible for the higher power to interfere with her, to suspend her order for a time, or to bring her order to a termination? Can such an assertion be called the submission of the mind to the facts of nature? Is it not palpably a going immensely beyond the facts? This is not surely allowing nature to speak for herself, and to govern our thoughts and conclusions about her, but is an entire perversion and misinterpretation of her testimony. This is to make her say, not what she is and has long been, but to say that she cannot be otherwise than she is, and never was otherwise, and never will be. This is to make her speak not only about herself as she is, but about the purposes and plans of her Almighty Maker and Author, not only for all past time, but for all eternity too; that it never was his mind to make a change in her present order, and never will be; that he never once wrought a miracle within her sphere and system, and never will to all eternity. Is this the interpretation of nature? Is not this rather to put thoughts into nature which we have no evidence that she ever conceived, and to put words into her mouth which she never was heard to utter? Is this the ministerial position and function of man's understanding in relation to nature? Verily, this is to play the *magister nature* in a style of dictation and domineering worse than anything that Bacon ever laid to the charge of the old philosophy, ancient or modern. The truth is, this is to make nature impious in her own despite; to make her set herself above God and assert her independence of Him, against her own obvious design to laud and glorify him; to make her deify herself and her own order and laws, instead

of "the heavens declaring the glory of God, and the earth shewing his handiwork."

The ultimate fact regarding man's position in the universe, and intellectual relation to it—the fact which rules that he can only be the minister and interpreter of the universe, and nothing more—the fact therefore which lies at the lowest foundation of the Baconian philosophy and all inductive science, is this, that man comes into the world as an intelligent *spectator* and *observer* of it. He finds the system of things in existence when he opens his eyes; he finds on inquiry that it has been in existence long before he came into being; he is introduced into this wonderful theatre of things, with eyes to see it, with reason to search and understand it, and with emotions of delight and admiration to be stirred by its outer and inner glories. It follows inevitably that he must be content to take the universe as he finds it, to accept the objective evidence of things which tells him what they are, instead of prejudging and divining beforehand what they must be, or must ever have been, or must ever continue to be. A man who visits the empire of China does not go there to dogmatise as to what China must be, and must always have been, but to use his eyes and other senses—to look, and see, and find what China actually is. A man who goes into a theatre does not go to dogmatise about the play and the actors; to prejudice what the play must be, and what the actors and what the scenery, and what the successive acts and phases of the drama: he goes to take all things as he finds them, and to use his judgment upon them after he has used his eyes and his ears to ascertain what they are. And exactly similar is the position of man in the system of nature; a spectator, and nothing more; a spectator with eyes to look, and a judgment to pronounce upon what he sees, but without any power or competency to dictate to things what they shall be, or must be; without any authority or competency, *e.g.*, to assert in regard to the system of nature, that not only he has never himself seen it change or vary, but that it is absolutely unchangeable; and that this, too, is a primary law of belief, inasmuch that it shall be irrational and absurd for any man to think the contrary. Surely such language can only proceed from forgetfulness of the real position and relation of the human mind to the system of things. It is language such as could only befit the Lord of nature to use, not man, the spectator and student of it. Let the Lord of nature declare her order to be immutable, and no one can challenge his competency to declare it, for nature is subject to his will, and his own purposes regarding her are intimately known to himself. But till *he* speaks to that effect, let man be silent. And if it is alleged, as the whole Christian church alleges, that there is

good and adequate proof that he has spoken the exact opposite of that language, both by word and deed; nay, that he has supernaturally interfered with the order of nature frequently in the past, and that he designs to interfere with it again in the time to come; then let the proof of the fact which the church alleges and appeals to be fairly weighed and considered; and if the proof is good and valid when tried by the ordinary principles of evidence, let it be frankly accepted and submitted to; let no violence be done to it; let no attempt be made to gag or forestall its utterance, or to prevent it from getting a candid hearing; let no prejudication upon the subject so enormous and immense as the absolute canon that nature is immutable be set up in anticipation of the evidence which waits for an audience. For that is merely to speak wildly and unwarrantably under the guise of philosophising; that is merely to speak a language which falls below the average of common reason and good sense, while speaking in the name and with the pretensions of the loftiest wisdom and the highest philosophy.

Imagine a man going to China, or into a theatre, and refusing to believe his own eyes,—even on the supposition that his eyes are in a sound state, and that he knows them to be so. But is not this the very thing that Professor Powell does when he says that he would not believe a miracle—i.e., a real violation or suspension of the order of nature—a real interference of supernatural power if he saw it with his own senses. Yes; he is not only the last, but the greatest of all the sceptics. He out-Humes Hume himself. Hume says in his famous *Essay on Miracles*, that “though a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a system of religion, there may possibly be miracles or violations of the usual order of nature of such a kind as to admit a proof from human testimony,”—i. e., to admit of being seen and attested by eye-witnesses; and he adds in the same place that “the decay, corruption, and dissolution of nature is an event rendered palpable by so many analogies that any phenomenon which seems to have a tendency towards that catastrophe comes within the reach of human testimony, if that testimony be very extensive and uniform.” But if nature is subject to decay, corruption, and even dissolution, according to Hume, what are we to think of its immutability and invariableness according to Powell? Nor is it only Hume who admits that a violation of nature might be capable of proof. *La Place*, as before referred to, admits the same. “If we ourselves,” says he, “had been spectators of such an event, we should not believe our own eyes till we had scrupulously examined all the circumstances, and assured ourselves that there

was no trick or deception. After such an examination, we should not hesitate to admit it, notwithstanding its great improbability, and no one would have recourse to an inversion of the laws of vision in order to account for it." We do not mean, of course, to say that either Hume or La Place believed that in point of fact the order of nature has ever been violated, but we quote them to shew that it was no part of their philosophical creed that that order was absolutely inviolable and immutable, which appears to have been the creed of Powell. And he was quite sensible, be it remembered, of the advance he had made upon his unbelieving predecessors, but he regarded the advance as the progress of enlightenment and true science. He quotes the passage of La Place just given, and does so only to express his dissent from it. "In such cases," says he, (viz., as that supposed by La Place), we might imagine a misapprehension or exaggeration of some real event, or possibly some kind of ocular illusion, mental hallucination, or the like." "Of old," he continues, "the sceptic professed he would be convinced by *seeing* a miracle. At the present day a *visible* miracle would but be the very subject of his scepticism. It is not the attestation, but the *nature* of the alleged marvel which is now the point in question. It is not the fallibility of human testimony, but the infallibility of natural order, which is now the ground of argument; and modern science cannot conceive religious truth confirmed by a violation of physical truth." Modern science, forsooth! as if all other professors of modern science agreed with him in such extreme views, and as if, while broaching such an enormous paradox of his own, he were only reporting the unanimous judgment of all living philosophers; or as if, even admitting the possibility that he may not stand quite alone even in England in this pantheising mode of thought, he were entitled, as the mouthpiece of a small coterie of metaphysical physicists, half Spinozists, half Baconians, to dogmatise in the name, and upon the credit of the whole Royal Society and British Association. The fact is, that he has no right to speak in the name of British philosophers. He is rather, as Dr Buchanan remarks, a bold than a sound thinker, a speculative theorist rather than an inductive inquirer. "His fundamental principle is not an inductive conclusion; it has no resemblance to a physical generalisation, such as the law of gravitation; it is rather an abstract metaphysical opinion, such as he is pleased to rank among 'the higher physical generalisations and contemplations,' which some have thought presumptuous and profane, but which we arraign as simply unphilosophical."

But if it were really true that the physical science of our time is to any large extent in sympathy with such unbounded

generalisations and abstractions as this of the absolute immutability of nature, we should none the less be of opinion that the science of the age had ceased to that extent to be Baconian, and was beginning to return to the condition from which Bacon redeemed the philosophy of his own day. One of the greatest evils of the old philosophy was its excessive fondness for wide generalisations, which it was in the habit of forming from a very narrow and inadequate induction of facts; and one of the weightiest lessons which Bacon taught his own age and posterity, was to rise to such generalisations with caution and circumspection, step by step, and continuously, not *per saltum*; and that even when they are formed in this gradual and circumspect way, they should be held subject to modification or even supercession by the evidence of new and additional facts, if these should emerge. Generalise cautiously—generalise upon the broadest possible basis of facts and observations—generalise provisionally till the generalisation has been tested and verified beyond all possibility of doubt. Does this new generalisation of the immutability and infallibility of nature answer to these prescriptions or fulfil these Baconian conditions. Far from it; very far indeed. It is enough to shew this, that Professor Powell claims for it the axiomatic certainty of a *primary law* of belief, i. e., a law of belief which you are to take with you, even to the examination of all those alleged facts which appear to be a contradiction to itself, but which, *a priori*, you are not to imagine can really be any exception to it. Many Christian miracles are alleged to shew that in point of fact and history, nature has not been infallible and immutable, but the reverse. No matter, says Powell; they cannot be true, they must all be unreal, because the infallibility of nature is a primary law of belief, an antecedent first principle of knowledge—antecedent, he means, to all examination of these very alleged exceptions to it. But what is this but to turn the business of philosophising upside down, and to reverse all the best axioms of inductive science. What is this but to generalise before examining and justly estimating all the relevant facts? What is this but to pronounce sentence first, and then examine the witnesses only to brow-beat and abuse them? What else than an affectation of philosophical language can we call it, to give the name of a *primary law* of belief to what, even if it were a true law, could never surely be a *primary law*, inasmuch as it could only be arrived at after long study and search into the system of things.

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ART. VIII.—*Poland : Her Religious History and Prospects.*

The Polish Captivity. By SUTHERLAND EDWARDS. Two vols. London : W. H. Allen & Co. 1863.

Vicissitudes de l'Eglise Catholique des deux Rites en Pologne et en Russie. Paris, 1843. 2 tomes. Avant-propos par le COMTE DE MONTALEMBERT.

FEW countries can boast of a history fraught with more melancholy interest than Poland. It is not merely that, low as she has now fallen, she once stood high among the nations of Europe, with a king of her own choice, a proud race of nobles and heroes, and an army flushed with a thousand victories. It is not that she once owned a domain stretching from the Vistula to the Baltic, comprising Lithuania, Hungary, and Bohemia, and could boast of a series of conquests comprehending Sweden, Tartary, and Muscovy itself; for even Russia, which now tramples her in the dust, was at one time all but added as an appanage to the throne of Poland. Similar instances of fallen greatness are not rare in the history of ancient nations; but the singular fact in the case of Poland is, that, vanquished, torn in pieces, bound and bleeding at every pore, she retains to this day, as fresh and unbroken as ever, her spirit of national independence. Other nationalities have crouched, practically or nominally at least, under the yoke of their conquerors. Poland, like some haughty prince, proscribed, confiscated, imprisoned, has ever refused to own the authority of her oppressors, and stalks in sullen majesty over the soil which they would make her prison, but which she claims as her property. Every effort has been made to crush this national spirit; her kingdom has been partitioned; she has been denuded of all her ancient rights; attempts have been made to change her language, her religion, her customs; she has been forbidden to sing her native songs, or to wear her national garb. But all in vain; the Pole will neither become an Austrian, nor a Prussian, nor a Russian; he will speak in no other than his mother tongue; he will chaunt his plaintive national melodies, which sound more like litanies than lyrics, in some sequestered dell, or behind some convent wall; or, if permitted to walk in procession, he will appear personified in a populace, marching with tapers in their hands, and with one voice reciting the hymn: "Holy Lord God, God Almighty, God Immortal, have mercy upon us! Be pleased to give us back our native land. Holy Virgin Mary, Queen of Poland, pray for us!" Or, if her children should gather ominously in one of the squares of Warsaw, and some Russian official should ask, as Gortschakoff once asked, in the tones of an angry bear, "What do you want?" the only reply, uttered in a wail of anguish, will be, "We want our

country!" This is no factious spirit, kindled by designing demagogues, no passing emotion evoked by outrage. True that of late, stung to madness by insults beyond human endurance, Poland has once and again sprung to her feet; and, shaking her chains in the face of her head-gaoler, has attempted to gain her freedom by force of arms. In these attempts she has hitherto failed; and, after the sad occurrences from 1830 to 1848, it did appear that the Polish cause had been finally lost. But these were only the fitful eruptions of a volcanic fire which burns deep down in the national soul, and which the "many waters" of oppression will never quench. In Germany, we understand, she has passed into a proverb; for there, when anybody insists on attempting some hopeless enterprise, his friend will say, with a smile, "Well, Poland is not lost yet!" Her present position, viewed in its relations to the past, bids fair to turn into seriousness the saying that has been used in derision. The German proverb may now be capped by another common in Poland, that "you may strip a Pole of his cloak, and of his coat and waistcoat; but if you offer to strip him of his shirt, he will take back the whole." It is certainly the general conviction, not among enthusiasts merely, but among our oldest and wisest politicians, that Poland will live again; the visionaries now are those who believe in the continuance of the present order of things in that unhappy country.

But the interest connected with Poland does not rest merely on her political misfortunes. It becomes intensified in no ordinary degree when we consider how these have been entwined all along with her religious history. It is a common but complete mistake to suppose that Poland has been a thoroughly Catholic country, in the sense of having been a blind unquestioning disciple of the Roman Church. Romish writers have, of course, uniformly claimed her as their own, and down to the present day the Pope has called her his "dearest Polish republic, the nation so orthodox and so glorious by its faith." What is more, the Ultramontane party, with Montalembert as its literary exponent, maintains that "the security and integrity of the Catholic religion, are identified with the maintenance of the political state of Poland." We need hardly say that, had Russia not been the aggressor, had the Roman not stumbled upon a rival in the Greek Church, we should have had fewer elegiac strains from Rome over the partition of Poland, and might never likely have beheld the odd *contre-temps* of Popes pleading for national freedom. At no period, however, has Poland been remarkable for religious bigotry. The national temperament is adverse to it. The natives of Sarmatia, as ancient Poland was called, have ever borne and still retain the distinctive features of their Oriental origin.

Sombre, thoughtful, contemplative, they are less addicted to superstition than to mystic speculation ; their religion partakes more of the sentimental than either of the dogmatic or the ritualistic element ; and if attached on any side of their natures to the Roman Catholic forms, it is more through the imagination than either through faith or affection. If the Pole is an idolator, the god of his idolatry is his country ; his native land is the idol at whose shrine he pours out his devoutest homage. Religion is valued mainly as supplying a sublime allegory of national triumph, or as furnishing graceful trappings to national woe. The mass affords a fair pretext for celebrating the memory of the glorious dead, and the Virgin is venerated much less as the Mother of God than as " the Queen of Poland."

In the earlier records of Polish history, examples are not wanting of the spirit which we have indicated. The conversion of Poland to Christianity may be traced back to the ninth century. The first who carried the glad tidings to the Slavonian nations of Moravia and Bohemia, and afterwards to Poland, were two brothers, named Cyrilus and Methodius, natives of Thessalonica. These missionaries, imbued with the true spirit of their religion in its Oriental form, and superior to the worldly policy which too often actuated the emissaries of Rome, translated the Scriptures into the Slavonian, with which they were familiar ; and, besides instructing the people, conducted the whole service of the Church in the vernacular tongue, dispensed the communion in both kinds, and introduced other customs of the Greek Church, among which was the marriage of the clergy, who, according to the rules of that church, were not only permitted but enjoined to marry. This preservation of the national language, and its use in the sacred service, which continued down to the fourteenth century, together with the free institutions of the country, go far to account for the distinct nationality by which Poland has so long been distinguished. One of their queens, Hedvige of Anjou, who flourished about the close of that century, is indebted for the high place which she holds to this day in the memory of the Poles, not more for her piety and virtues than for having been the patroness of the liturgy in the national language.* As the power of Rome increased, every effort was made to supplant these early insti-

* Historical Sketch of the Reformation in Poland, by Count Valerian Krasinski, vol. i. 33. The author of this work, published in two volumes (1838-1840), was a Polish Protestant, of high family, of great learning, and most amiable character. His various works on his native country, to which we have been much indebted, being published at a time when the public interest in Poland was at a low ebb, attracted little notice. We knew the author, and a finer specimen of the Christian, the scholar, and the gentleman, we have seldom met with.

tutions. The consequence was a perpetual struggle between the supremacy of Rome and the national independence. The monarchs of Poland were jealous of a foreign authority intermeddling with their own ; the nobles eyed with suspicion the ascendancy of the clergy ; and even many of the clerical order, though acknowledging the Pope as the head of the Church, opposed his authority on many points, more especially the celibacy of the priests,—an ordinance to which they finally submitted in Poland with more reluctance than in any other country.

As in our own country, these contests rose occasionally to such a pitch as to terminate in blood. The quarrel between king Boleslav the dauntless, and Stanislaw, bishop of Cracow, was a contest between the temporal and spiritual powers very similar to that between king Henry II. and Thomas à Beckett. According to the old story, the Polish monarch slew the prelate with his own hands at the foot of the altar ; the more modern version would have it, that the bishop died by a judicial decree, but adds, that after death his head was chopped off and his body cut into pieces. When Casimir the Great was excommunicated by the Pope, in the fourteenth century, for reforming abuses among the clergy, the ecclesiastic who ventured to notify it to the sovereign was seized by the people and drowned. In the same century, one named John Pirnensis began to preach that the Pope was antichrist, and Rome the synagogue of Satan. Multitudes embraced his opinions ; whereupon the Inquisition at Cracow commissioned one of their number to extirpate the heresy. The inhabitants of Breslau who had become disciples of Pirnensis, rose as one man against the inquisitor and put him to death. His cloak, stuck through with knives and stiff with gore, was long exhibited as a relic.

These conflicts between the clerical and secular powers, which generally ended in the triumph of the latter, prove the feeble hold which the papal sway had over the Polish people. The thunder of the Vatican, which shook to their very foundations the thrones of western Europe, fell harmless in Poland, where the spirit of independence revolted against implicit submission either to temporal or spiritual authority ; where the king himself was only permitted to rule according to law ; where the Diet, as the supreme senate was termed, could issue its *rokosh*, or decree of armed resistance against the unconstitutional mandates of the sovereign, and the veto of a single member could dissolve the Diet. It thus appears that, long before the reformation, Poland was ripe for welcoming a free gospel and a reformed church. For this she was still further prepared by the extensive spread of the Hussite doctrines. At the

Council of Constance, the Polish nobility protested against the execution of John Huss. And after that execrable event, the doctrines of the Bohemian reformer, which coincided with those of Wickliffe, from whom he derived them, were propagated by his followers with such success, that the historians of Poland are at some loss to explain how they should have failed to become universally adopted.

The Reformation of Luther was rapidly communicated to Poland, which had frequent intercourse with Germany, and more particularly with Wittemberg, where many of the youths of the Polish nobility resorted for their education. Dantzic, the chief town of Prussian Poland, was the first to welcome the new doctrines; and the first protestant sermon was preached there in 1523, by one John Hegge, surnamed Winkelblack. Attempts were made by the clergy to arrest the progress of the new heresy, by proclaiming a royal edict against it, and by laying fetters on the press and on education; but these proved unsuccessful, for in 1539 the liberty of the press was established by a royal ordinance, and the Diet formally granted licence to all Polish subjects to study in foreign universities. The king, Sigismund I, noble, upright, and brave, but of an easy, luxurious temper, refused to execute with rigour the edicts which the clergy extorted from him; on being pressed to imitate the example of Henry VIII. of England, whose writings against Luther had then procured him from the Pope the title of Defender of the Faith, he replied, in a tone that savoured of the religious indifference which characterised some of the learned at that period, "Henry may write against Martin as he pleases, but I beg he will allow me to remain monarch of the goats as well as of the sheep." During the reign of Sigismund, the numbers of the reformed received an important accession by the immigration of the Bohemian brethren, amounting to a thousand souls, who had been compelled by persecution to leave their native country.

Thus there was every prospect, at the commencement of the Reformation, that Poland would speedily become a Protestant country. The prospect seemed all the brighter, from the liberal spirit which distinguished the adherents of the Church of Rome. Poland sent no representatives to the Council of Trent.

The accession of Sigismund Augustus, in 1540, was attended by one of those anomalies on the part of the Polish Protestants, to which so many of their misfortunes may be traced. The young prince, shortly before his father's death, struck with the beauty and accomplishments of Barbara Radziwill, a lady of rank, had contracted a secret marriage with her, which, on ascending the throne, he honourably acknowledged. The relatives of Barbara openly professed the reformed opinions; and her brother,

Nicolaus Radziwill, who was palatine of Vilna, and grand chancellor of Lithuania, had contributed greatly to the spread of the Reformation. He was a correspondent of Calvin, who addresses him in terms of the highest respect. Here was an opportunity which might never again offer itself, for advancing the reformed cause to a position where it might have bidden defiance to its adversaries in all time coming. And yet, strange to say, the Protestant nobles, from petty jealousy of Radziwill, leagued with the Roman Catholics in a violent outcry against the marriage, and thus not only lost the advantage which the cause of truth might have gained, but turned it into the opposite scale. In no country of Europe, with the exception perhaps of Scotland, were the higher nobility and officers of state more generally enlisted on the side of the Reformation ; and in no country was it less indebted to them. Those who are disposed to blame the Lords of the Congregation in Scotland for taking up arms in defence of their civil and religious liberties, and for proceeding, in the absence of a hostile sovereign, to give a legal establishment to the Reformation in Parliament, might discover in the opposite conduct of the Polish nobles, and in its very different result, some reason for qualifying their censure. With a Protestant queen, with a monarch favourable to the views of the reformers on the throne, with a powerful army at their command, and the commander-in-chief among their number, and with a Senate, the overwhelming majority of which were anti-Romanists, the princes of Poland failed to procure for the Protestant Church a legal establishment, or for the Protestant religion any legislative sanction. It is true that, in the Diet of 1552, the ecclesiastical jurisdiction was virtually abrogated, and the decrees of the spiritual courts, much to the mortification of the clergy, were declared void of all civil effects. True also, that, in consequence of this, though more probably from the constitutional antipathy of the Polish nation to all forcible measures for repressing heresy, the attempts at persecution made by the Romish synods met with no sympathy and no success ; and that, in Polish Prussia and in Livonia, the king legalised the existence of Lutheranism by royal privilege ; in other words, permitted the inhabitants to set up Lutheran worship in these districts ; and the same privilege was afterwards extended to Cracow, and other places in Poland Proper, as well as to the Bohemian Brethren. Still, these provisions came far short of what we understand by a legal establishment. The Church of Rome was still the established religion of the country ; she still retained the benefices and drew the tithes for the support of her clergy, while the Protestants were obliged to build their own churches and maintain their ministers by private subscription ; and the statutes pro-

hibiting their meetings under severe penalties, though for some time inoperative, still remained on the statute book of the country, weapons ready to be drawn from their scabbards as soon as the priests might deem it safe to use them. Obviously, the policy of the Protestant party, when it was in power, even as a point of self-defence, if they did not insist on having a full legal recognition of their own religion, was to demand the withdrawal of all such prerogatives from the Romanists.

At one time, indeed, everything promised well for the cause of Protestant truth and liberty in Poland. The great mass of the nobles, under which term were included all the landed gentry of Poland, and the vast majority in the larger towns, were of that persuasion. The Polish churches could boast of pious and devoted ministers, and a body of learned divines, whose writings rendered them illustrious. At a convocation held at Paris, where representatives from the Protestant churches appeared to plead for toleration in behalf of the French Protestants, the deputies from Poland, lay and clerical, put the Romish ecclesiastics to the blush by the extent of their learning and the brilliancy of their eloquence. At an early period (1563) the Bible was translated into the Polish tongue by an association of eminent scholars and divines; and when the first edition, known as the "Brest Bible," had become rare, in consequence of the Romanists having made an *auto da fe* of as many copies as they could procure, it was reprinted, with several alterations, in 1632. Numerous schools were established by the Protestants, both for general education and for the higher branches, among which the College of Leszno was long and widely celebrated. Thus the Protestant Church of Poland seemed on a fair way to success. God seemed to have "prepared room before it, and caused it to take deep root, and it filled the land."

At the death of Sigismund Augustus, in 1572, the Protestants were a powerful, and indeed a paramount, body in the state. And yet, within a very short time after this, we see matters reversed: Catholicism is in the ascendancy, and the Protestants a persecuted sect, crushed and scattered almost to annihilation. How is this to be accounted for? The inquiry, in order to be fully answered, would lead us into a large field, embracing the whole subsequent history of Poland, political and religious. We shall endeavour, however, to arrange the leading points under the following heads, which will present the chief causes of the rapid decline and almost total extinction of Protestantism in Poland.

Among these causes we would assign the first place to the unhappy disputes between the Lutherans and the Calvinists. Poland may be said to have received the reformed opinions, in

almost equal measure, from Geneva and from Germany. The Calvinists and the Lutherans, therefore, were nearly equally divided, and at first a strong desire was evinced to bring about unanimity. At the famous Synod of Sandomir, held in 1570, matters seemed to have issued in a union of the three evangelical churches, the Helvetian, the Bohemian, and the Lutheran. Seldom, indeed, has so near an approach been made to a happy alliance among the divided churches of the Reformation than on this occasion. The "*Consensus Sandomiriensis*," as it was called, while it embodied all the leading doctrines of the Reformation, sought to effect this union by the parties making mutual acknowledgments of the orthodoxy of their respective creeds regarding the principal points of religion, such as the Trinity, the incarnation, and justification by faith. On the sorely contested point of the Eucharist, it goes as far over to the Lutheran view as it was possible for the Calvinists to yield, admitting, what perhaps some may think amounted to a surrender of the whole question, "that the body and blood of our Lord are distributed and given with the symbols of the thing itself, which, according to the nature of the sacraments, are by no means bare signs." This somewhat ambiguous phraseology was left to be explained by each church according to its own confession; and each was left to follow its own rites and ceremonies, because, as they declared, "it is of little importance what rites are observed, provided the doctrine itself and the foundation of our faith and salvation remain pure and unadulterated." They resolved, therefore, to "bury in eternal oblivion all the contentions, troubles, and dissensions which had hitherto impeded the progress of the gospel," and give each other their hands, making a sacred promise faithfully to maintain the peace and the faith. The "*Consensus*," which was signed by a large number of noblemen and ministers belonging to the three churches, was afterwards confirmed and developed by the enactments of a synod held at Posnania. The government and worship of the churches were left to continue much as they had existed before; and affairs of discipline were to be settled by a mutual understanding; so that in these respects they stood more in the relation of sister churches, linked together by a common bond, though retaining independent action in their respective spheres. A general synod of all the Protestant churches was convoked at Cracow in September 1573, comprising many persons of the highest rank, and presided over by the celebrated John Firley, palatine of Cracow, grand marshal of Poland, who was the leader of the Helvetian Church, and at that time the most influential grandee of the country. This may be viewed as having been the palmiest hour of Protestantism in Poland. In a United Synod, graced with the pre-

sence of all that was noble and learned and pious in the land, resolutions were passed for promoting the reformation of the church; and animated by the true spirit of Christian charity, they took advantage of their meeting to address circular letters to the sovereigns of Germany, in which, deploring the discords which had agitated the churches, they expressed a wish that a union resembling that which now happily existed in Poland might become general, and recommended, as the fittest means of attaining such a consummation, the convoking of a General Synod of the protestant churches of Europe, to which those of Poland were prepared to send delegates.*

But the harmony thus auspiciously begun was not destined to last long. Certain Lutheran divines, actuated by party spirit, soon began to find fault with the "Consensus," and, under the pretext of zeal for the truth, rekindled the fires of contention. The Romanists took care to fan the flame, and by scattering the brands of discord, effectually broke up a combination which threatened, more than anything else had done, the extinction of the old religion. Through these contentions the Treaty of Sandomir was ultimately broken up; and, among other bitter fruits, some of the very best of the nobles, such as Zamoyiski the Great, disgusted with the endless theological squabbles between the Calvinists and the Sacramentarians, threw themselves back on the Church of Rome. To the same melancholy cause we may ascribe another thing which had a bad influence on the religious fortunes of Poland, namely, the want of any regular organisation of the church. The presbyterial being left to work alongside the episcopal government, there was no common source of jurisdiction, no head-quarters from which orders could be issued for united action, no common centre of consultation, concert, or appeal.

But, in connection with this fruitful cause of mischief, another of a still darker character was in active operation. The apostle has said, "There *must* be heresies among you." And alike in the case of Poland, which may be said to have gone to the extreme of toleration, and in the case of Geneva, where the opposite policy was at first pursued, do we see heresy dogging the steps of the Reformation. So early as 1546, the opponents of the Trinity began to broach their sentiments in a secret society at Cracow. The works of Servetus were secretly circulated, and Lelius Socinus, the brother of Faustus, visited Poland in 1551. Subsequently to this, Peter Gonesius, a zealous divine, and George Blandrata, a learned Italian, and a superintendent of the Helvetic Church, openly advocated anti-trinitarian sentiments in the synods. It is a striking feature in

* Krasinski's "Reformation in Poland," ii. p. 71.

the history of the Polish Church life, that these heretics were not only permitted to vent their blasphemous opinions in open synod, but that, in the excess of their liberality, or their love of unity, the Polish reformers took offence at the zeal of Calvin, who warned them against these insidious heretics, as well as that of Beza, who recommended the use of the sword.* Some of the more faithful and zealous ministers, headed by the famous John Laski or Lasco, who at one time officiated to the Poles in London, but was obliged to return to his native country on the accession of Queen Mary, endeavoured to stem the torrent of error; and at last, in a synod held in 1563, Socinianism was formally condemned, and a separation was effected from its supporters. The Socinian party, thus driven out, established their head quarters at Racow, from whence they issued their writings, more especially the well known Racovian Catechism, which was long held to be the manifesto of the party. Socinians from all quarters of the world flocked to Poland, and they continued to flourish there for a whole century, their final expulsion having been effected by the Roman Catholics in 1660. During this period, however, the influence which they exerted on the religious mind of Poland was sadly detrimental. Many of its Protestant nobles and learned men fell under the blighting effects of a system which seems to eat into the life of religion as doth a canker. To the undermining effects of Socinianism we may trace the fatal facility with which, in the hour of temptation, Poland left her first love, and fell back into Catholicism, sacrificing, thereby, as we shall see, at once her spiritual and her temporal freedom.

But we now come to what may be regarded as the main source of the woes of Poland, we mean the introduction of the Jesuits, who by their subtle machinations and sinister influence succeeded in gradually restoring the supremacy of Roman Catholicism. The long reign of Sigismund the Third (from 1586 to 1632) is acknowledged on all hands to have been the origin of the decline and fall of Poland. Before that period, the country had reached the acme of prosperity. Under the vigorous rule of Stephen Batory, Poland had humbled Muscovy, and inspired all her neighbours with respect. Religious liberty, which she enjoyed in a degree then unknown to any other country, produced the most favourable effect on the

* Writing to Tarnowski, one of the noblest and bravest sons of Poland, Calvin complains of the jocular and sarcastic strain in which he had replied to his warnings. "*Nulla deterior est pestis*," he remarks, "*quam humana ratio, quæ te certe nunc extra metas rapuit, ubi Deo consilium tuum opponere non dubitas*." (Calv. Epist. ad Tarnow.) Tarnowski was quite orthodox, and continued a zealous Protestant; but it is not difficult to understand how Calvin, with his stern dogmatic, should have resented the playful style in which the free-minded Polish noble declined adopting his trenchant overtures.

development of the national mind. Literature and science rose to an eminence which placed her on a par with the most enlightened nations.* The accession of Sigismund III., the grandson of Gustavas Vaza of Sweden, reversed this state of prosperity, and proved, in its ultimate results, the ruin of Poland. His mother was a bigoted Romanist, and completely under the guidance of the Jesuits. His education, conducted under the care of that astute fraternity, was such as to inspire him with a blind zeal in the cause of Romanism. He was taught to regard himself as a special instrument in the hand of Heaven for putting down heresy in Poland; and became a mere tool in the hands of these disciples of Loyola, even glorying in the name of "the King of the Jesuits," applied to him by his enemies in derision. The acceptance of such a sovereign, in preference to much better men, reflects little credit on the nobles of Poland. Certainly, the indifference they manifested with regard to the religious profession of their prince, stands out in striking contrast with the intense zeal, the sleepless vigilance, the untiring industry, which the Romanists displayed in securing, through the royal favour, the interests of their religion. It is universally admitted, however, that without the aid of the Jesuits, the grand feat of overturning Protestantism in Poland could never have been accomplished. The native clergy of the Roman Church were too enlightened, too patriotic, we may add, too honourable men, to resort to the unprincipled tricks, the low chicanery, the vindictive rancour of the sons of Loyola. Well aware of this, Archbishop Hosius, a man of splendid talents and even of some eminent virtues, but a bigoted Romanist, who held that heretics were to be converted by the sword, and that no faith was to be kept with them, and who disgraced himself by congratulating the Cardinal of Lorraine on the murder of Coligny and the massacre of St Bartholomew, declaring that the news of these events filled his soul with incredible comfort and joy,—Hosius, we say, was the person who first introduced the Jesuits into Poland; and they soon took advantage of their access to the court and their influence over the king. Their first object was to monopolise the education of the young. Their colleges at Cracow, Grodno, and Pultusk were placed under royal protection, and supplied with learned Jesuits as instructors. Within a brief period, we learn, to our astonishment, that no less than four hundred children of Polish nobles were taught at one of these colleges; and these pupils, after being thoroughly impregnated with fanatical ideas, were employed in the conversion of the lower classes of the people.†

* Krasinski's *Reformation in Poland*, vol. ii. p. 195.

† Ranke's *History of the Papacy in the 16th and 17th centuries*.

Shortly thereafter we find that the nobles themselves are converted, and go over in great numbers to the Church of Rome. Upon making inquiry into the causes of this lamentable defection, we are informed that, without employing any violent measures, the Jesuits had succeeded in prevailing on the infatuated monarch to exclude all Protestants from civil and ecclesiastical dignities; every post of honour and emolument being jealously reserved for Romanists; so that the Protestant nobility found themselves shut out from the court, the camp, the cabinet, the halls of justice, and even from the senate, unless they submitted to the Romish rites. But, trying as this ordeal was, we are compelled to ask how it came to pass that so many high-spirited nobles should have submitted to such arbitrary and arrogant intolerance? And we can find no other cause sufficient to account for such infatuation, than the withering influence of Socinian teaching. Pride, no doubt, and, we regretfully add, in some instances personal profligacy, may have had their share in smoothing the downward path; but it is too obvious that had their religious principles not been previously sapped or shaken at least by the insidious heresy which they had so long fostered, they never could have yielded so shamefully in the hour of temptation. When the Jesuits expelled the Socinians in 1660, they were merely taking down the ladders and scaffolding by which they had gained the ascendancy.

Much has been said by Romish writers in praise of the Jesuits for their zeal in the cause of education. Never were praises less merited. Montalembert, and the writer whom he introduces, lament the suppression of that order as one of the causes of the *decadence* of Poland. The very reverse is the truth. If the Polish nobles failed, as unquestionably they did fail, in imparting education to the *bourgeois*, under the foolish idea that they would thereby be led into discontent and rebellion, it is equally certain that the Jesuits pretended to patronise and educate the peasantry purely for their own sectarian purposes. "To their pupils they imparted only the shell of knowledge, retaining the kernel for themselves."* The disastrous effects of their education soon became manifest. At the close of the reign of Sigismund III., during which the Jesuits had become almost exclusively masters of the public schools, national literature had declined as rapidly as it had advanced during the preceding century. It is remarkable, indeed, that Poland, which, from the Reformation to the advent of the Jesuits, had produced many learned works, can boast of very few of any merit during their sway over the national literature.

* Pelzel, Geschichte von Böhmen, quoted by Krasinski, in his "Religious History of the Slavonic Nations," p. 195.

The Polish language itself was corrupted through their agency, by an absurd admixture of Latin, and a barbarous style called *Macaronic*. Even the classics were neglected under the regime of these conscript fathers ; not a single edition of them having been reprinted till after their expulsion from the kingdom. In point of fact, the time of their pupils was consumed, and their minds emasculated, by a wretched training in dialectical subtleties, the effects of which on the political and social interests of the country were most deplorable. The national historian, old Lelewel, viewing matters with the eye of a republican, depicts, in terms of the liveliest indignation, the weakening influence of Jesuit education on his native country ; and referring to the period from 1648 to 1717, which was that of Jesuitical ascendancy in the councils of the nation, he says : " Poland was plunged into a state of stupor ; she lost, during the reign of the Saxon dynasty, all her energy, and remained inactive, scarcely giving signs of life, save those that indicate paralysis."

On this sad picture, drawn by one of the most devoted sons of Poland, a lurid light is shed by the whole history of the period. Having, through the favouritism of the monarch, obtained possession at once of the seats of learning, the episcopal sees, and the courts of justice, the Jesuits began that system of petty, gnawing, out-wearing oppression in which they are such well-known adepts. By means of the students at their college, the lower orders, with their passions inflamed by superstition, were instigated to riotous proceedings against the Protestants. Their churches were pulled down and burnt, their ministers expelled, their people insulted and massacred. And in vain could any redress be obtained from tribunals under the influence of the party which had raised the mobs. During the reign of John Casimir, himself a Jesuit, which began in 1648, matters came to a crisis. Foreign interference in favour of the Protestants has been ever fatal to their cause in Poland. Sweden naturally came to their relief ; but the atrocities committed by the soldiers excited an irritation that found vent in a series of bloody reprisals. The heart of Protestant Europe throbbed in sympathy with the suffering Poles, and contributions were made for their relief in England and Holland ; but the unhappy Protestants never recovered from the heavy blow. In 1724, an event occurred which disgraced Poland, though nowhere did it excite more disgust and resentment. In the town of Thorn, in Polish Prussia, a riot had taken place, excited, as usual, by the pupils of the Jesuit College, who insisted on the people kneeling when the host was carried in procession, and, on their refusing, attacked the students of the Protestant College with sticks and stones. The

inhabitants, who were for the most part Protestants, incensed at the insolent behaviour of the Jesuits, burst into their college, broke their furniture in pieces, and burnt it in the street. Indignant at this outrage, the Jesuits circulated the most exaggerated reports of it, asserting that the Protestants had treated the images of our Lord and the Virgin with the most sacrilegious contumely and insult. Nothing would satiate the vengeance of these monks but the blood of some of the most distinguished of the citizens. Having obtained the sanction of the king, the accused were brought before a special commission, consisting exclusively of Romanists, and as all the witnesses presented by the city were rejected as accomplices, their condemnation was secured against every principle of law and justice. The venerable president of the town, Roesner, a man universally respected, was condemned to be beheaded, and the same sentence was passed upon seven of the burghers. Four others, accused of having added blasphemy to their other crimes, were sentenced to have their hands cut off before execution, and their bodies burnt. This act of bloodthirsty vengeance, which sent a thrill of horror throughout Europe, was followed by striking a blow at Protestantism itself. The churches were taken from the Protestants, and even their schools were ordered to be held on the outside of the city.

To form a right estimate of these proceedings, it ought to be borne in mind that the Jesuits were a thoroughly unnational and unpatriotic sect. It would be unjust to hold the nation of Poland responsible for outrages from which its heart recoiled, and for an intolerance which was alien to its nature. The truth is, that the members of the Society of Loyola, from their first intrusion down to their expulsion in the year 1775, were never regarded in any other light than as foreigners and interlopers. The native clergy as well as the Dissidents hated them with a perfect hatred, and denounced them as the authors of all the miseries and disgraces which had befallen their unhappy country.* Attempts have been lately made to paint the Romish clergy, and even the Jesuits, in the most romantic colours, as the champions of the popular freedom and national independence of Poland. Of the clergy we shall speak anon; but at present let us only look at the following picture, drawn by Mr Edwards in the deeply interesting little work which we have placed at the head of our article:—

* *Discours aux Grands de Pologne sur la nécessité de bannir les Jésuites hors du Royaume*, 1759. The author of this treatise, who was evidently a Romanist, denounces the Jesuits, as we have said above, scouts the pretence that they were necessary to the support of the Catholic religion, and concludes by maintaining that, as they could not be restrained by law, they should be driven away as wild beasts or shut up in cages.

"But the most striking prediction of the downfall of the country was uttered in the beginning of the seventeenth century, during the reign of Sigismund III., by the priest Skarga, in a sermon which breathes such lofty indignation against the tyranny of the Polish nobles, and such sublime tenderness for Poland, that in reading it one is reminded of the love of the Hebrew prophets for Jerusalem, and of their terrible denunciations against their own countrymen. Skarga is full of the most exalted patriotism, and it can be seen that he loves the men on whom he is pronouncing a kind of malediction. Even the worst of them could not have been thoroughly bad, or they would not have listened to him. He is preaching before the diet; the men he was addressing often interrupted him with murmurs. With one exception, all the senators were Protestants. They stood before the altar lifting up their heads and moving them about, so as to make the diamond clasps in their caps glisten the more. When the host was elevated the king alone went down on his knees."—"Polish Captivity," vol. i. p. 241.)

Without indulging in several reflections suggested by this and similar passages, which are much fitted to mislead, we may only remark that Skarga was a Jesuit, and, with all his eloquence as a preacher, as bigoted and fanatical as any monk in the dark ages; that in a pamphlet published on the occasion of the destruction of the Protestant Church at Cracow, he not only excused but eulogised the infamous transaction, talking of it in as inflated a style as he used on the occasion referred to by Mr Edwards, and claiming to be inspired by the Spirit of God, *ex instinctu ut puto Spiritus Dei loquor*;* and that the following facts in illustration of his character have been stated by one whose catholicity of spirit can only be equalled by his high tone of Christian morality:—

"This same Skarga went so far as to commend as an example worthy of imitation Louis the Ninth of France, who ordered the tongues of blasphemers to be cut out, and to say that all those who approved of religious liberty were blasphemers. It was not only in this pamphlet that Skarga recommended the abolition of heresy by every possible means; but all his sermons, particularly those which he preached before the king and the assembled diet, were full of the most violent and bitter invectives against the protestants; and there is no doubt that this celebrated preacher contributed greatly to the triumph of his church in Poland."†

We do not dwell on the melancholy circumstances attending the decline of Protestantism in Poland. Suffice it to say, that it admits of being demonstrated beyond all question, that the liberties of the country were sacrificed on the altar of religious

* *Adnotatio ad Evangelicos et alios A catholicos, ex parte sancti Cracoviensis eversis, &c.*

† Count Krasinski's Reformation in Poland, vol. ii. pp. 101–108.

bigotry. Nothing is more commonly asserted than that the Dissidents, as the Protestants were called, betrayed the independence of their country by calling in the aid of Russia in the year 1767. But what are the facts? Why, fifty years before that period, in 1716, it is well known that the Jesuits, with Count Sanianowski, bishop of Cracow, at their head, entered into a treaty with Russia, in which it was agreed that Poland should be virtually disarmed, by a reduction of its army from 80,000 to 18,000. This shameful piece of treachery, which was protested against by all the better portion of the Roman Catholic clergy, was perpetrated with the view of securing the power, granted in the same treaty, of putting down the Dissidents, by depriving them of all the rights and liberties they had so long enjoyed! For fifty years, as the fruit of this disgraceful compact, did the unhappy kingdom become the scene of civil war and religious strife. Gradually were the rights of the Protestant dissenters trampled in the dust. Upwards of sixty of their churches were wrested from them or levelled with the ground. The free exercise of their religion was reduced almost to nothing; no person was exempt from persecution, or could calculate on security for life or property; their clergy were dragged before Romish tribunals; their members were excluded from the magistracy, and declared incapable of bearing witness in courts of justice; their nobles were excluded from the senate, and subjected to all sorts of indignities; their sacraments and sepulture were forbidden; their marriages were pronounced invalid, if not celebrated by the Romish priests, and their children declared illegitimate. Who can wonder if, in such circumstances, the Dissidents should have appealed to Russia and to the Protestant Powers of Europe for protection of their rights and liberties, guaranteed to them by the laws and constitution of their country? Count Krasinski blames them for this, as indeed he denounces all foreign intervention as fatally injurious to his country. But who drove them into this last resource? It was the ultramontane party in the Church of Rome. But the same party had already, as we have shewn, placed Poland in a state of disgraceful dependence on the court of Russia. Under their influence the Saxon dynasty had long before concerted measures with Peter the Great for the partition of Poland. They gained their object, by nearly crushing all evangelical dissent—but gained it at the expense of the independence of their country—if, indeed, it could be called *their* country—if the Church of Rome can be said to have any regard to the political liberties and advantages of any country on earth, when these came into competition with the interests of Catholicism.*

* Krasinski's *Reformation in Poland*, ii. pp. 424-469. *Schriften die Sache der Herrn Dissidenten in Polen*. 1767.

We shrink from touching on the mournful period of Poland's decline—her heartless partition—her mortal struggles—her piteous downfall. We have not now to do with her political history; but this we may be permitted to assert, as apparent from a review of her whole history, that the fortunes of Poland have risen or fallen according to the rise or fall of the cause of religious freedom. It is truly remarkable that every public misfortune which befell Poland was sure to fall with peculiar weight on the Protestants of that country, and that the prosperity of Protestantism is linked with the most brilliant eras in her annals, the palmy days of Sigismund Augustus and Stephen Batory. In saying this, we desire it to be distinctly understood that we carefully distinguish between the men and their systems—between the people of Poland and the churches to which they respectively belong. But here also we would draw a distinction. Poland has certainly been much less indebted to her Protestants than to her Protestantism; on the other hand, while she can boast of many excellent Polish Catholics, she owes nothing to her Catholicism. That system has already proved a drag on her energies, and a snare to her liberties; and, if allowed to regain its ascendancy, may yet swamp the best hopes of her friends. Whereas evangelical truth, if permitted to recover from the partitions and convulsions by which the country has been so long enfeebled and enslaved, may yet place her as high as ever among the nations of the West.

Let the Poles know this at least—let it be proclaimed on the house-tops of Warsaw, and in the ear of Europe—that Popery betrayed their country, and that a Popish bishop struck the first deadly blow at the independence of Poland. And let them mark the principle upon which the sacrifice was made. It is the moral of the old fable of the horse and the stag. Russia agreed to help the Romish Church to hunt down Protestantism, on condition of putting the saddle and bridle upon Poland; but the stag once hunted down, Russia refuses to take off the saddle and bridle! Montalembert protests, like the horse in the fable, against the continuance of the yoke; but, true to his creed, he adheres to the principle that the Church must be preferred before the State, and Church power before civil liberty. He quotes, with high approval, the sentiment of a renegade Pole in 1768, who said, "*I love liberty more than any of this world's goods; but I love the Catholic faith still more than liberty!*" Let Poland judge how far the prevalence of such a religion as this is likely to secure her freedom or independence. Catholicism would lay the liberties of a nation at the feet of the most worthless despot, could she but thereby obtain "the security and integrity of the Catholic religion."

Christianity demands from her votaries no such unworthy sacrifices. She identifies herself, under all possible circumstances, with the cause of human liberty. She contemplates no contingencies in which it can become right or lawful for a man or a people voluntarily to surrender their freedom—no case in which the faith and liberty can be legally bartered for each other.

In fine, let the Poles of to-day prove themselves worthy of their noble-minded ancestors. Let them look back to their past history, and we feel persuaded that they will never again permit the ascendancy of an ultramontane Catholicism, which was at all times alien to the genius of the nation, and the fruitful mother of its misfortunes and disgrace. But let them learn at the same time, from the same source, the danger of religious indifferentism. They have never been either an impious or an intolerant people; let them beware of the opposite extreme, a negative creed, which has no power either to promote piety or to resist intolerance. The eyes, not of Europe only, but of the whole world, are now upon Poland; and we feel persuaded that upon her choice between Christianity and Catholicism, infinitely more than upon warlike insurrections or diplomatic negotiations, depends the issue, whether she shall succumb into insignificance, or revive, in more glorious forms than ever, the days of her Radziwills and Battorys, her Sobieskis and her Kosciuskos.

ART. IX.—*Life of Professor Robertson.*

Life of Rev. James Robertson, D.D., F.R.S.E., Professor of Divinity and Ecclesiastical History in the University of Edinburgh. By the Rev. A. H. CHARTERIS, M.A., Minister of New Abbey. Edinburgh, 1863.

THIS work will remind many how rapidly history is gathering into her domain events of which they were themselves a part. We have here the biography of one who was in his prime when the great battle which coloured his life was fought; and the biography, from the point of view inevitably occupied by the author, suggests all along the idea of another generation reviewing the proceedings of that which has gone before. A work occupying such a position has an interest of a peculiar kind, and the author could not expect, as probably he did not desire, that his representations should escape criticism. But,

besides, the work has attaching to it this additional source of interest, that it could not fail to throw some light on the temper and tendencies of the Established Church of Scotland as at present constituted, or at least on those of an important section of that Church. All men interested in Scottish ecclesiastical affairs will be glad to learn, what Dr Robertson, or, as we can hardly avoid writing it, "Robertson of Ellon," thought in his later years of the events in which he had taken part, as well as of the prospects of his church, and the policy which her friends ought to pursue. Nor is it without interest to mark how a rising man like Mr Charteris is disposed to contemplate all these topics.

Before entering on matter so debateable, however, it is a pleasant duty to acknowledge the ability with which, in general, the work has been executed. It is not too long; it is composed of materials well selected and well arranged; it is written in a fine Christian tone, and the literary execution is scholarlike and elegant. If it is, as we believe it to be, Mr Charteris's first published performance, it is undoubtedly a promising commencement. Mr Charteris was not only one of Dr Robertson's students, but apparently an intimate and trusted private friend. He evidently entertained for Dr Robertson very warm feelings of love and regard, and was led to form a peculiarly high estimate both of his character and of his abilities. We have no doubt that, in some respects, he has formed an over-estimate, and has expressed himself accordingly in terms that are exaggerated. We fear that calmer and less intimate friends will scarcely think that the motto on the title-page—

"A man with heart, head, hand,
Like some of the simple great ones gone,
For ever and ever by,"

is quite appropriate to the subject, or can quite be justified by any accessible evidence. But Mr Charteris, having formed so high an estimate of Dr Robertson, and cherishing so profound a veneration for him, has succeeded in placing before the world the judgment he has formed in a very winning way. Though, as far as the events of the story are concerned, he had little to record but ecclesiastical debates and ecclesiastical activities, in which Dr Robertson's party figured with no particular splendour or heroism, he has yet succeeded in making his narrative appeal strongly to the respect and good will of the reader on behalf of the subject of it. If he does not always justify his estimate, he at all events makes it intelligible to the reader's sympathies, as well as to his judgment, how he himself is led to form it. We think it very likely that every

one who reads the work will rise from the perusal with a higher opinion of Dr Robertson than he had before, as well as with a very cordial disposition towards his biographer.

We have said that we cannot accord to Dr Robertson the exceptional eminence which this life claims for him. But we should be sorry to content ourselves with such a merely negative rating. Dr Robertson was a very able man, possessed of much intelligence, energy, and sturdiness, independent in counsel, and powerful in debate, able to form clear views on practical exigencies, and having the courage and perseverance necessary to transmute his views into practical achievement. Throughout his life he deserved and had the respect, public and private, due to a manly and upright character, and this memoir evinces (which could previously be known only to his friends) how sincere his family affections and private friendships were. On all these points we welcome the testimony of the memoir. We differ mainly in regarding the combination of excellencies which Dr Robertson thus exhibited as not quite so exceptional and extraordinary as it appears to his biographer; while, as regards his mental endowments, we are inclined to attach somewhat more importance than he does to the decided lack of evidence of original or originating power, such as should have fitted Dr Robertson to make any important contribution to the thoughts of men about truth or duty. We retain also, after reading this biography, what we had before it came into our hands, viz., a decided impression of a somewhat commonplace and long-winded character attaching to Dr Robertson's addresses on public occasions, excepting in debate. We do not apply this remark to his lectures, of which, in common with the rest of the public, we are without the means of forming any independent opinion.

James Robertson was born in the parish of Pitsligo on the 2d January 1803. His father was the tenant of a farm not at that time very large or very productive. Throughout his life he manifested the warmest respect and love for both his parents; and to his mother in particular, he believed that he owed much. Like many distinguished Scotsmen, he combated the difficulties which lay in his way with great manliness and endurance. He toiled, and he denied himself, not merely for the purpose of pushing his own way to distinction, but for the purpose also of doing an eldest son's duty in contributing to the support and comfort of his family. The latter object he never ceased to keep in view while he lived. Indeed, all the recorded incidents of his history, from his boyhood onwards, indicate a strong sense of duty, and that sort of self-respect which secures a man against temptations to mean and unworthy conduct. So much energy of character,

under such guidance, promised well. He seems also to have had from an early period a strong and increasing sense of religious obligation. It does not appear that this was at first connected with any very clear views of gospel truth, or any strong sense of gospel motives. We should rather infer the contrary, from the materials which the biography provides. No distinct era of change in this respect is indicated. We understand Mr Charteris to look on his case as one in which the influence of distinctively evangelical views and motives became gradually more manifest and prevailing as time went on. A special influence on his views in many matters is ascribed to the visit of Dr Duff to his manse on the occasion of the first return of that distinguished missionary from India. The following extract from a letter to an afflicted friend, also, is understood to refer to his own experience, but the period when the inward trials to which he refers occurred is not known. The preceding portion of the letter recommends a method of dealing with the trial, in which his friend might be brought to know "the heart of him to whom Jehovah himself has said, in the words of the evangelical prophet, *Thy righteousness is of me.*"

"I will put what I have said into a more tangible shape, by illustrating it from the experience of another friend in whom I take a deep interest. He, too, for a long time had dark days, and found it difficult to preserve his mind from being prostrated under the deep gloom of despondency which frequently threatened to settle down upon it. From what I know of the case, I believe he must have sunk beneath the affliction, but for the comfort and strength which is found in the word of God, read and applied as I have ventured to recommend above. A particularly favourite portion of Scripture with him was the Book of Psalms, in which the royal poet, in the words, too, of the Spirit of truth, so graphically and powerfully, and to the life, describes both the hidden griefs of the wounded soul, and the equally hidden joys by which these griefs, when they are carried to the throne of grace, are so wonderfully,—my friend would almost say, miraculously allayed. In the reading of this portion of the Scriptures, he was specially struck with the constant efforts made by the Psalmist himself to realise in his soul the immediate presence of God, to see the hand of Jehovah visibly as it were in creation and providence, and especially in what came home to his own experience. My friend endeavoured to follow this precious, precious example, and, though he must have fallen far short of all the deep reality of the Psalmist's experience, he yet did attain, I am well assured, to much comfort and strength to his own soul. Often from the reading of a psalm, with prayerful application of it to his own circumstances, did he find himself, when his spirit was oppressed and ready to faint within him, rescued as by a hand from above from the deep waters, sustained under his infirmities and

ultimately invigorated with new strength. He still continues, I believe, his daily readings of the Psalms, and finds in them a never-failing source of consolation and encouragement. I have taken the liberty of referring to this case, which fell within my own observation, and for the facts of which I can fully vouch, believing that the knowledge of it may be blessed of God to sustain you, until it shall please him to withdraw from you his afflicting hand, and to enable you, as he yet will enable you, to say in the fervour of a joy with which no stranger can intermeddle, 'It is good for me that I have been afflicted.'" (P. 348.)

The following letter, written to his father, then in ailing health, not very long before Dr Robertson's own death, will shew how he was wont to express his ripened views on the most important subjects :—

"The obligation laid upon us to make our calling and election sure, grows in urgency as we advance in our course. . . . It is, indeed, the most advanced Christians who feel the most strongly the necessity of habitual watchfulness and prayer, in order that the days of their merciful visitation may be duly improved by them. Suffer me, then, affectionately to remind you, my dearest father, of your duty in this respect, and not your duty only, but your inestimably precious privilege. In reminding you, I wish also to remind myself. Every day should be consecrated to the service of God, in humble dependence on his grace to enable us to make our service acceptable. This grace will not be refused us, if we strive to seek it with humble and earnest hearts, pleading with God the exceeding great and precious promises of his word. That word, I fervently hope, will be a guiding companion. Let some of my sisters read a portion of it every morning, and make the portion read the subject of your meditations, and the groundwork of your humble supplications to the throne of grace throughout the day. Select especially such portions as set forth in the fullest and clearest terms the love unfathomable wherewith we are loved by our blessed Redeemer. His own farewell discourses to his apostles, recorded in the 14th, 15th, and 16th chapters of St John's Gospel, and Paul's Epistles to the Ephesians, Philippians, and Colossians, present this unsearchable love to us in terms that cannot but commend it to our hearts if we will only devoutly attend to them, and in terms at the same time so plain and impressive, that he who runs may read. One of the above-named chapters of John, or a chapter of any of the Epistles which I have mentioned, will provide you with a subject of meditation and prayer for the day, equally profitable and delightful. Lay open your whole heart to God in your prayers, keeping nothing back from him, but anxiously setting before him all your sins and all your needs, and beseeching him, for the sake of your own blessed Redeemer, freely to pardon the former, and fully to supply the latter. Strive to find your chief pleasures in this childlike and unrestrained pouring forth of your whole heart unto God in Christ : and you will find, that through the Holy

Spirit God himself will shed abroad in you his love in return. This daily communion with your God and Saviour will both make life sweeter while it lasts, and deprive death of all its terrors. May God's richest blessings ever rest upon you, and may your whole soul be filled with the fulness of his love."

In making these extracts, we have anticipated the due order of the history, the main events of which, however, may be very shortly told. After spending about three years in the situation of head master of the Gordon's Hospital, Aberdeen, he became minister of Ellon in 1832. He remained in Ellon during eleven eventful years. His parochial duties were performed with characteristic energy and thoroughness, sparing neither time nor labour. He himself felt, and he encouraged in his parish a lively interest in Church Extension and the Church's mission schemes. Meanwhile, he came more and more into notice as a member of church courts, and during the latter years of this period was unquestionably one of the most effective leaders in the General Assembly upon the moderate side. After the Disruption, he was appointed to succeed Dr Welsh as Professor of Church History in Edinburgh, and also as Secretary to the Bible Board, the latter appointment being attended with some circumstances which are not referred to by Mr Charteris, and which we are very willing to forget. He occupied this position till his death. Busied at first with his professorial duties, he was soon drawn to take the labouring oar in connection with the Church Extension and Endowment Scheme of the Established Church. His labours in this cause were most unsparing, and in a very remarkable degree successful. Mr Charteris looks upon them as having ultimately proved too heavy for his strength, and as having thus occasioned his death. Very unwillingly he gave up his pen, under the burden of the illness which proved to be his last. We would willingly quote the whole touching narrative which Mr Charteris gives of his last days, and we must at all events find room for a paragraph that will indicate the prevailing character of his mental exercises during the closing hours. Dr Robertson was attended by Professors Christison and Miller. The latter made his last call on a Sunday afternoon.

"Dr Robertson had expected death, but it may be that for a few moments some new expectations of life possessed him, for he said, 'If I recover from this, I shall never disobey your orders again, but work just as many hours as you tell me.' 'My dear friend,' was the faithful reply, 'God seems about to call you to himself, to do him service in another sphere. You will rest from all those labours here, and your works will follow you.' 'Instantly my meaning was comprehended,' says Professor Miller, 'and the reply came quickly, 'So be it. I would have gladly remained a little

longer and worked God's work here, not as I would, but as I could, had such been his blessed will; but if He sees best to take me now, I am ready. I am a poor sinful creature; but all my hope of salvation is in the righteousness that is of God in Christ. I place no confidence whatever in anything that I may have done; my alone rest for acceptance is on the righteousness of God by faith.' 'That is right, sir; hold fast by that now.' 'Yes, by God's help I do.' After a pause, he continued, 'And as to the Free Church and Established Church, I care not. Give me the man that has much faith. Him I respect and love. We shall be together united with God in Christ—for ever. May God bless you, my dear sir.'"

He died an hour or two after this, after again expressing with much humility his faith in the Lord Jesus, and after earnestly reverting in some moments of wandering to the schemes of which he was Convener, and to the interests of religion in Scotland as in his judgment bound up with its success. He died on the 2d December 1860, in his fifty-eighth year.

In narrating the story of Dr Robertson's life, Mr Charteris, of course, could not avoid the "Ten years' conflict." He has contrived to get over it skilfully enough, and within a reasonable space. We feel a little at a loss how to deal with this part of the biography. It is written, we are sure, with the most honest intention, and, generally speaking, in a commendable, though sometimes sufficiently *little* spirit. It is, at the same time, quite untrustworthy as a history, in consequence of the operation of the same fatal necessities which compelled the Moderate party all along to decline the proper question, and to evade the main argument. There are therefore many statements that deserve to be challenged, which, however, it would be very wearisome to enumerate, and utterly impossible to discuss. We would willingly pass from the subject altogether, and occupy ourselves exclusively with topics that can awaken no hostile feeling. But this work is not merely a Christian biography, but a contribution to history, and must be dealt with as such. It will, perhaps, be our best course to advert, first, to one or two matters of a more biographical kind, or bearing on the personal aspects of that controversy. Afterwards, if we have time and space, we shall notice one or two specimens of Mr Charteris's way of stating the controversy itself.

It was extremely natural that Mr Charteris should avail himself of the general respect in which Dr Robertson was held, to reflect a certain lustre on the party with which he acted. The testimony implied in the adhesion of a man so able, of a minister so conscientious and laborious, may be very fairly claimed in behalf of the Moderate party before the Disruption, and in behalf of the Established Church after it. But the

impression left upon the mind of the reader is, that Dr Robertson and his parish were on the whole fair enough specimens of the ministers of his party, and the parishes placed under their ministry, especially in Aberdeenshire. Mr Charteris refers with something like a sneer to the expressions used by the other party with regard to the preaching of the gospel in those districts by the deputies who went thither during the time of the controversy, in so far as these expressions imply, that light was then carried to a dark place. And he very plainly intimates, that the evangelical party, on some occasions, laid claim to peculiar zeal and spirituality, and that their claim was as false as it was arrogant and offensive. We are very far from doubting that there may have been sinful self-assertion in this way on the part of some members and organs of that party; and as it is important that all parties should be reminded of the offensiveness of this sin, we rather desire to benefit by the admonition, than to scrutinise very severely the justice of it. But the interests of truth require a little plain speaking upon this matter. We pay willing tribute to the admirable qualities of men like Dr Robertson. We gladly remember others besides him, among the leaders, and among the rank and file, who won and retained till their dying day the cordial respect of all who knew them. Farther, we desire to say not one invidious word about the spirit or the influence of the Established Church as it now exists. But we do say most deliberately, and knowing well what we assert, that on the whole the history of Moderatism in Scotland, religiously regarded, has been a dark, disgraceful, and disastrous one. And we say farther, that twenty or thirty years ago, Aberdeenshire (over which it seems M'Cheyne might have spared his "yearnings") included districts supplied with a "Moderate" ministry, so secular and so utterly reckless, that it is wonderful religion survived at all among the people. This is mere matter of fact, and the palpable notoriety of these facts justified a mode of speech with regard to those districts, which otherwise might have seemed arrogant enough. We have already admitted, that it may sometimes have been applied too sweepingly, and without due tenderness of spirit.

Mr Charteris has represented Dr Robertson as entitled to great credit for the part he acted throughout the controversy, as a candid and reasonable man. He labours to present him as one who avoided extremes, who stood clear of the responsibility of driving matters on till they were irretrievable. He, it seems, in common with Lord Aberdeen, took the line which might have extricated the church if men had been reasonable. "Most unwillingly were both the statesman and the churchman driven to extremities in the terrible strife; and it was not

the fault of either of them that the church was riven and the country distracted." We are sorry to be obliged to demur to this account of the matter. Dr Robertson had a large amount of candour, and was far from being a violent man, although he was a tenacious and persistent one. He often made admissions in debate that surprised friend and foe alike. But his course throughout was indistinguishable from that of the Moderate party generally. His vote was always sure; his speech, with whatever qualifications in its method, always for the resolution of the party. If, as Mr Charteris tells us, he disapproved of some of the things which the Strathbogie men did, in that reckless course of theirs, by which they sought to precipitate the collision between the power of the law and the conscience of the church, that disapproval never told practically. He fought for them, voted for them, stood by them; and as he was, up till the summer of 1842 at all events, a leader of the party and a sharer of the counsels which guided it, he must be held responsible along with the rest. Although far less violent in temper, and far more conscious of the delicacy of the ground than many of his comrades, he had just the same claim to credit for taking a wise and conciliatory course, which the rest of the Moderate party had,—the same and no more. All along, we are disposed to believe, his personal feelings were kindly, and his desire to see the conflict end sincere, but a public man must be judged by his public course.

Look, for instance, at the course which he took, along with Lord Aberdeen, with reference to the question of a possible adjustment. The circumstances were these. The church had deliberately resolved that it was a fundamental principle of her policy and agreeable to Scripture, that no minister be intruded on a reclaiming congregation. Repeatedly, and in the most express and formal way, the majority had made it clear, that any settlement which should make it their duty sometimes to intrude ministers on reclaiming congregations was against their conscience, and could not be accepted. The alternatives were to accept a principle which the church, by immense majorities, supported by the mass of her people, had declared to be fundamental, or else to take the consequences in a disruption. Dr Robertson and Lord Aberdeen, *in these circumstances*, presented to the Church *their own ideal* of a settlement, consisting in a power to the presbytery to entertain all kinds of objections, but with an obligation to induct whenever the presbytery were not prepared to adopt judicially these objections, or some of them, as their own. They refused to move one inch from this ideal of their own. The statesman would go no farther, the churchman would not encourage him to go further. In the Assembly of 1841, when this precise point

was raised, and Dr Candlish made his memorable appeal to the other side, at least not to oppose the Duke of Argyll's bill, which legalised the veto, the appeal was rejected, courteously but quite decidedly. It was, Dr Robertson said, a matter of principle not to accept the veto, though he admitted the Moderate party might act under it. And it was a matter of principle, *for this reason*, that when Christian men have a charge to make, they ought to be ready to bring reasons for the charge. Hence he would rather do away with patronage than have the veto. All the world knew that a proposal to settle the question by doing away with patronage would have met with determined opposition from Dr Robertson. All the world knew also, that the exercise of the veto implied no *charge* against the presentee, but simply the assertion of a right on the part of the people to decline the presentee's services. And the meaning was, therefore, that Dr Robertson and his party were prepared to obstruct the only settlement that could avert a disruption, with no plea of constraining principle in the matter, but the sheer pretext to which we have alluded. Will Mr Charteris or any human being maintain that a pretext like that will justify in the eye of posterity the claim to a character for statesmanship, or for wise guidance of affairs, in favour of those who thus did what in them lay to make inevitable the catastrophe of the Disruption? Very likely, indeed, they suffered themselves to think that pretext a weighty reason. The truth is, any pretext would have done, any that offered would have been dandled and made much of. The whole policy of the party was simply addressed to winning a victory for Moderate measures and principles as against their opponents, and to force that victory through the help of the courts of law. It was "to hold back the tide of innovation" (p. 115). There was no disposition to contemplate as anything but a calamity a measure which would really cover and secure what the evangelical party judged indispensable. And those who will vindicate the wisdom and statesmanship of a man like Dr Robertson, acting as he did, *in these circumstances*, can do so only on the ground, that he and his party did not believe there would be any considerable secession. The evangelical party were to be broken in spirit by their difficulties, to give way, and to yield the situation and its spoils to the Moderates. Some plausible bill, stopping short of what had been declared repeatedly to be matter of conscience with the majority, and yet offering a pretext to those who wanted one, should be passed, and then "the neck of the high party's conspiracy would be broken, and only the leaders who were knee-deep in pledges would go out" (p. 165). That, we repeat, is the only vindication of his statesmanship, and what a vindication! It is with a feeling of humiliation that one ranks a man like

Dr Robertson with those who built their policy on the hope that the majority would prove unfaithful to their declared views, renounce their professions, and accept a settlement which they had declared to be against their conscience. Did it never occur to him to consider what a victory like that would cost the Church, or how it would bear on the interests of religion and on the character and influence of the ministry? Was it sound statesmanship or churchmanship to build so much on the hope that men and clergymen would disregard their character and their professions? We believe that Dr Robertson would not have so acted if the question had come again in after days. That at any period of his life a man so honest as he was should have been party to a policy which relied so much on the expectation to which we have referred, is one of the strongest proofs of the lowering influence which the Moderate party as it then existed was sure to exert on every one associated with it. Mr Charteris, as was to be expected, when adverting to the Disruption, makes much of the fact, that not a majority, but a minority of the whole ministry of the church came out. It was not, therefore, he says, a separation between Church and State, as had been threatened, but a secession from the Church. He must grant, at least, that before that time, up to the middle of 1842, it was a separation of Church and State that was threatened; it was a majority, not a minority, that asserted certain principles to be fundamental; it was a declaration of the Church as such which Dr Robertson and Lord Aberdeen had to consider and deal with. But then, it is said, in the end it did not prove so. Not the church, but only a minority, went out. Very well. Will Mr Charteris consider a little how it came to pass that only a minority went out? Will he reflect on the position of those whose staying in left only a minority to go out? Does he really desire that there should have been more such? Would it not have been better for his own church if there had been fewer? There is no excuse for the policy either of the churchman or the statesman. Honest men plainly told them that certain things were essential, and they perseveringly offered something different, in the hope (whose true character, we may trust, themselves did not perceive) that the men would not prove so very honest. It is a very striking thing, that Dr Robertson, who stood out so firmly against everything beyond Lord Aberdeen's bill, should have come round within sixteen years to the resolution of working for an abolition of patronage, in the hope of thereby doing something to reunite the Scottish churches. It was highly creditable to him as regards his readiness to profit by the teaching of events. It affords at the same time a very instructive commentary on the course which he pursued up to 1843.

We have no wish to conceal, that as the Disruption drew near (in April or May 1843), Mr Robertson, according to Mr Charteris, foresaw that it was likely to be extensive, and earnestly desired that something should be done to avert it. He was not at this time, we are told, in the confidence either of government or of its advisers, and could only deplore what he foresaw. We do not find in the biography any satisfactory means of judging how far Mr Robertson would have gone. And there is no evidence that he was prepared to go any further than this, that Lord Aberdeen's bill should be brought in as a government measure *before* the Assembly. If this was all, and we feel pretty sure that it was, then this was not enough. And Mr Robertson, however anxious he may have been, and no doubt was, about the state of affairs, cannot be regarded as having, even then, departed from the vicious policy of withholding what was indispensable, and offering at the same time a pretext for staying in, which was no more than a pretext.

This leads us to one other point of a somewhat personal kind, bearing rather on men's conduct than on the discussion of principles. Mr Charteris is tolerably free in his assertions about the state of mind of those who "went out" in 1843. It was, it seems, the extreme views and the artful leadership of certain men which drove others on and led them out, carrying them far beyond their own sober judgment. *Apropos* to a conversation (in 1839) between Dr Chalmers, Mr Robertson, and Lord Aberdeen, we are told that, "had it been left to these three, without pressure from less earnest and more bigoted men, there can be little doubt that the Church of Scotland's difficulty would have been surmounted, and the calamity of 1843 been unknown." As the Disruption drew near, we are told that many a man perceived that the cause was not worth the cost, and felt that pledges given in moments of enthusiasm had been rashly given, and they would have drawn back if the Legislature had only supplied "an excuse." Nay, there can be no doubt about it, for we are informed "any one can attest it." We wonder that Mr Charteris did not perceive the extreme ludicrousness of this certificate as to the motives of a great historical movement that stirred a whole country, set forth by such an authority as Mr Charteris of New Abbey, and indorsed by the respectable attestation of "any one." Not "any one" only, but every one, knows that if the Legislature had supplied a settlement on sound principles, both "leaders" and followers would gladly have found themselves relieved from the responsibility of the movement of the 18th of May. But, as to the influence that might have been exerted by any "excuse," had the Legislature been considerate enough to provide it, we rather imagine that those who were so anxious

to be supplied with an "excuse" for "pausing in their course" contrived to dispense with the excuse, and *did* pause, *simpliciter*. "Any one can attest it." Mr Charteris's statement, we may suppose, embodies the view of the Disruption, and of the spirit which animated it, that circulates in Established Church presbyteries and coteries. The Disruption ministers, that is to say, went out, as many a man has gone to fight a duel, more than half conscious that he is an ass for his pains, but feeling he is in for it, and must go through with it. Now, really, "any one" is at liberty to form his own opinion of the value of Disruption principles, and any one in Mr Charteris's position must be excused for having not the least idea of the extraordinary gladness, and thankfulness, and enlargement, that made memorable to many sorely tried men the summer of 1843. But surely men that took such a step, after contemplating it for months and years, that carried with them the "attestation" implied in the adherence of the membership of the Free Church, that were able to make their principles tell in the work the Free Church has done since then, have justified a claim to be regarded as honest men, who acted on their own views of what is true and right, and who disregarded the temptations arising from other considerations. Men in general, however they differ from the views of the Free Church, have conceded this to the Disruption ministers, and have felt it a pleasure to applaud at least the manliness and the honesty of their course. The Established Church, it seems, as represented by Mr Charteris, cannot afford to be so magnanimous. Very well. Then, the less that they say about it, the better it will be for themselves. The Disruption and the Free Church may be right or may be wrong, but they have proved themselves to the common sense of mankind to embody a remarkable movement of the mind and heart of Scotland. There is something very funny in being assured that all that has come and gone was the work of a company of Bob Acres, who devoutly desired to be out of the scrape. It will hardly be believed, even though discerned by the penetrative eye of Mr Charteris of New Abbey; nor, indeed, upon the attestation of "any one." Of a piece with this is the attempt to deprive the evangelical party of the testimony implied in the adhesion of Dr Chalmers to the course they took. Mr Charteris hints in pensive terms, as many of his party have done before, that Dr Chalmers was driven or drawn by certain sons of Belial to courses that his own free judgment never would have approved. If it is any comfort to our friends to think this, by all means let them do so. It implies that they know Dr Chalmers's mind (doubtless in virtue of the congeniality of their own) better than he did himself. Meanwhile, it happens that Dr Chalmers needs no one to "attest" his

opinion, having uttered it pretty plentifully at the time in speeches and pamphlets not remarkable for indecision either of thought or expression. Most people will take his own word for what his mind really was, and for the reasons that governed it. There is also a prevalent opinion in the world, that Dr Chalmers was not just the man to make a tool of. It is known at least that Lord Aberdeen did not find him such.

We must, however, advert for a moment to the questions of principle which come in Mr Charteris's way in this part of his biography. We do not intend, of course, to discuss them, but only to notice how Mr Charteris states and disposes of them. An *ex parte* summary was to be expected. It would be unreasonable to call on a biographer of Dr Robertson to dwell on all the points which Dr Robertson's opponents might judge important. But *ex parte* summaries proverbially require criticism; and indeed, even on the most limited view of his responsibilities, we think that Mr Charteris comes short. He has not duly felt the obligation lying on every historian of a controversy to let the reader see, however compendiously, what the other side precisely held and meant to defend. We impute, of course, no unfair intention, but we are persuaded that there is a very unfair result. Mr Charteris refers his readers for further information to Dr Turner's "Scottish Secession of 1843." Remembering the diverse positions occupied by that gentleman, at successive epochs, Mr Charteris was perhaps led to believe that, in simply following Dr Turner, he should not fail to do justice to both sides. We are inclined to think that it is this which has misled him. However, as he writes professedly from his own investigations, we can make no farther use of that hypothesis.

At the outset, there fell to be explained the position and rights of the people with regard to the settlement of ministers, as these existed in the Church of Scotland previous to the passing of the Veto Act in 1834. According to Mr Charteris, then, the real right of the people was merely to lodge objections, which were restricted moreover to life or doctrine, excluding "suitableness." "They were indeed asked to sign the call, but the call had no legal effect in the settlement. It was a courteous invitation,—an encouragement, but no more." Thus history is written. Who would gather from this that there never was a minister settled in Scotland from the Revolution onwards, without a judicial finding of the Church Courts "sustaining the call?" But especially, who would gather that those who passed the Veto Law in 1834, denied *in toto* this account of the call and of the position of the people, and had at all events extremely plausible grounds for denying it? It was indeed the practice of the

Moderate party, as long as they had the upper hand, to treat the call, or the scantiness of signatures to it, as having "no effect," whether legal or other. They "sustained" any call to the patron's presentee. But is there anything more notorious than that, until the predominance of that party in the Assembly, the Church repeatedly refused to settle presentees, unobjectionable, and not objected to as far as "life and doctrine" were concerned, on the ground of the opposition of the people? Is there anything more notorious than that the Church did this without hindrance or interference from the civil courts, or from those having civil interests? Surely the grounds of principle and precedent on which the evangelical party acted, were strong enough to warrant and require one single sentence to explain that they, at least, thought the necessity of the consent of the people to the settlement of a minister to be no new thing in the Church of Scotland. Mr Charteris may reply that his account of the constitutional position of the people is justified by the law as ascertained in the Auchterarder case; according to which the want of a call, in the words of Lord Brougham, "was of no more effect than the recalcitration of the champion's horse at a coronation." We shall have something to say to the decisions of the Law Courts presently. Meanwhile, we remark that, at all events, the Auchterarder decision had not been come to in 1834. And what the evangelical party then maintained was not only the competency of the Church to pass the veto (which Mr Charteris frankly admits was their conscientious opinion, supported by great authorities), *but also* that, in so far as the veto required the consent of the congregation in order to a settlement, it was not the enactment of new law at all, but simply the declaring of old.

Take again the question of the Church's jurisdiction. In 1838, Dr Buchanan moved in the Assembly, the resolutions asserting the Church's exclusive jurisdiction *in spiritualibus*. Mr Charteris (p. 73), after shortly noticing the fact, laments in the following terms:—"Dr Cook in vain moved a declaration that the Church will maintain and preserve the spiritual powers derived from the Lord Jesus Christ, and yet, that it is the duty of an Established Church to yield obedience to the existing laws. The majority . . . took up a position in defiance of the law of the land as interpreted by the courts of law; they did not stand on the veto as a wise and prudent measure, but simply as a measure which the Church had adopted." There is a misstatement here as to the precise position of the Church at that time with respect to the veto, which we have not space to expose. But the main question is with respect to the Church's assertion of jurisdiction. We are quite willing to look at it, not as a matter of doctrine, but simply for the present as

to its consistency with the position of the Church as established by law. And we ask Mr Charteris whether he knows or does not know, that *as regards that aspect of the matter*, the Church in those days held that she had co-ordinate jurisdiction secured by law ; that from her spiritual domain all other courts were legally excluded ; that all intermeddling by the civil courts with things spiritual, *to the effect of decreeing spiritual sentences*, was legally as inept and null as the action of the House of Lords would be, if it should presume to vote supplies. The Courts of the Church were *courts* ; they were courts known to the law. The men who formed these courts being not merely subjects of the realm, but judges in courts ecclesiastical, were not merely entitled to assert the jurisdiction which they believed to be in them, but it was their duty, alike as subjects and as judges, to assert it. And it would have been a clear dereliction of their statutory position, as well as of their position as guardians of the interests of the people of Scotland, to take the decision of that question from the courts, whose jurisdiction they believed to be formally excluded by the law and constitution of the country. They were bound, as within a church established by law, to take no decision on that subject but the decision of the State itself. This was not the ground on which the right and duty of the Church of Christ, in all circumstances, to assert her inherent jurisdiction, was pleaded. But this was the ground on which the right and duty of asserting it *within the Established Church* of Scotland, in spite of adverse decisions in the civil court, was based. There was another and a wider ground pleadable, and pleaded to the same effect, but the one which we have referred to is enough for the present. And this being the precise state of the question as between the civil courts on the one hand, and those other courts owned by the law, and having their own line of appeal terminating within themselves, on the other, the coarseness and baseness of the treatment to which the church courts in the execution of their functions were exposed at that time from lawyers and moderates, are obvious. But we have to do at present with Mr Charteris. We ask again, whether he knew this or knew it not ? If he knew it not, he does not know the elements of this controversy. But if he knew it, why did he not make it appear ? He might have added such expressions of astonishment at the claims of the church courts as might seem good to himself. Mr Charteris must be told that now, when no farther purpose of the moment can be served by it, when no more prejudices and passions can be stimulated against honest men, and against a good cause, the old formula about " defiance of the law as interpreted by the courts of law "

is mere twaddle, unworthy to be introduced into the discussion of a great subject by a man of his intelligence.

Mr Charteris may have thought himself excused from being precise about the Church's claim to jurisdiction, on the ground, that whatever it was, it failed. The civil courts decided that they had a complete power of review, and the State, by refusing to interfere, substantially decided in favour of the civil court and against the ecclesiastical. That is quite true; it is not likely to be forgotten. But if it is adduced as a presumption, that there was anything either dishonest or outrageous in the claims of the church courts, we dispose of that presumption by a consideration which it would not be reasonable to expect Mr Charteris to advert to. It certainly *was* declared to be law by the civil courts, it was substantially affirmed as law by the State, it is now the law, that the ecclesiastical jurisdiction is to be exercised under the direct supervision of the civil court. But it was new law. It was new to the Evangelicals, new to the Moderates, new to all men. The declaration of it was founded on not a syllable of statute, was in the teeth of ALL the precedents, the uninterrupted precedents, of one hundred and fifty years. It was based on a purely speculative theory as to what a well ordered constitution for an established church ought to be, and therefore must be thought to be; which theory was that same against which the Church of Scotland always contended.

These are matters which some of our readers may regard as of less importance now. They are instances, however, of a style of quiet assumption as to the state of the question at each of its successive steps, which pervades this part of the book, and which is extremely apt to mislead an incautious reader. There remains a point of more present and permanent interest. It is a small matter how men acted with respect to the complications which a church's relation to the state might occasion. The more important question is, how far the ultimate ground adhered to by each of the contending parties can be justified from Scripture, and agrees with the historical principles of the Church of Scotland? Our readers need not fear that we are going to discuss this question; we only want to point out how it was dealt with at the time. By the one side it was continually pressed and discussed. By the other side it was for the most part avoided and evaded. That was the characteristic feature of the controversy as carried on twenty years ago. And that is, also, the characteristic and striking feature of this biography in so far as it is occupied with that controversy. This statement does not indeed, perhaps, apply with equal force to all the topics that were discussed. It applies more fully to the discussion about the church's jurisdiction than to that with

respect to the rights of the people. On the latter point, if there was no great disposition shewn to take the discussion on scriptural ground, there was an attempt to construct an argument on the constitutional one. Dr Robertson, for instance, with the help of the speeches of the judges in the Auchterarder case, put together an elaborate argument to prove that neither the Church universal, nor the Church of Scotland, had ever recognised the necessity of the people's consent in forming the pastoral relation. His argument on this subject was conclusively put to the rout in Dr Cunningham's reply. But in regard to the wider question of the Church's jurisdiction, which was that which directly issued in the Disruption, the course of the party was one of evasion from first to last. Their speeches and pamphlets ran all in this line, that the courts of law had spoken and asserted for themselves a right to dictate; that the conditions of the Establishment were thus ascertained; that the Confession of Faith attributed to the civil magistrate *some* sort of function, some right and interest in sacred matters, seeing that "he hath authority, and it is his duty," &c. (Conf. c. xxiii.), and that there was therefore nothing for it but to submit. No man was frank and manly enough to say whether the civil magistrate had proper jurisdiction in spiritual things. No man would lay down in plain propositions what he held to belong to the State, what to the Church, whether he held that there was any limit in principle to the State's jurisdiction, and if so, what, or how it should be made available. As to all this, mere vague generalities were held to be enough; and the stronghold constantly resorted to was the assertion, that since the conditions of the Establishment had been ascertained, an Established Church could do nothing but submit. This disgraceful evasion of the main question that ought to have been discussed by Christian ministers, was imposed upon them by the hard necessities of their position. It was impossible to lay down articulate positions on the subject referred to, sufficient to justify the course of the law courts and of the Moderate party, without flatly contradicting the Confession of Faith, and ascribing to the civil magistrate the power of the keys. There was no help for it therefore—and this remark applies to Dr Robertson fully as much as to the more unscrupulous members of his party—but to escape from that subject under a cloud of generalities; or, as in one memorable debate, by the help of the figure of "two poles," a civil and an ecclesiastical, each exercising an attraction, but how much, or how legitimately, no one could learn. It is willingly admitted that Dr Robertson must have acted according to the best of his judgment under the influences by which he was biassed; but it cannot be admitted that his part, in this view of it, was a high or worthy one.

The truth is, that the Moderates entered on the conflict with decided views against the rights of the people, but with the same views (most of them) as to the constitutional jurisdiction of the church, as their opponents, although probably they did not attach so much importance to it. In regard to the rights of the people, they were in a minority in the church courts. The civil courts, at the call of patrons and presentees, then came in to find the church courts "bound and astricted" to settle ministers. They came in, so far, on the Moderate side, throwing a very serious difficulty in the way of the Evangelicals, and over this the Moderates very naturally exulted. When it became apparent that the civil courts were prepared to press their views so as to subvert the Church's proper jurisdiction, this simply operated as a temptation to the Moderates to forego their earlier views on the matter, and to let their opponents feel the full weight of the civil sword. Regard being had to the infirmities of human nature, it is reasonable enough to think that this may have taken place, in many cases, without any conscious dishonesty, though not without some discomfort. But viewed with reference either to their opponents or to the future history of their church, it was a low and an ungenerous part. Meanwhile their position all along with respect to the extraordinary powers assumed by the civil courts was purely provisional. They really did not know and could not tell how the old theology of Church and State was to be adjusted to the new proceedings. They therefore never explained, and have not explained yet, their ground on this matter, as theologians that abide by the Confession of Faith.

Having a large measure of respect for Dr Robertson's character and ability, we were anxious to see whether any fresh light would be thrown by this memoir on his mode of contemplating the matter. We cannot say that we have found a great deal to assist us in this respect. It is plain enough that he helped himself out of all his difficulties by always starting from the consideration, that the settling of ministers in the face of a protesting congregation was, in his own judgment and that of his party, a perfectly admissible thing, in some circumstances incumbent. It was no way against conscience, in *their* case, to intrude. Then, when the civil court called upon the church court to perform the spiritual act of ordination, he got over the incongruity of the civil court directing a spiritual act in order to secure a civil interest, by a further consideration. The decision of the civil court might be construed as an implied finding that the Church had contracted with the State always to perform that act in certain circumstances. The Church had contracted, not merely to forego the benefice if she could not induct, but positively and always to induct. And

then he, as a churchman, was willing to be persuaded to take this view of the case ; he was willing to acquiesce in this construction of the Church's obligations. " We are men under a promise, and we must in conscience perform it." Here he found a plea for the Strathbogie ministers, and for the whole party, both as to their submission to the civil court, and their wanton insubordination to the supreme court of the Church. It was all in the line of a promise, which foreclosed all questions. But whether he held this promise to apply to everything the civil court might decree to be obligatory, or only to that in which he might see his way to agree with them ;—and again, how he vindicated, as a Presbyterian, the method which the civil courts took to apply a remedy, in the supposed case of the church failing to fulfil her contract ;—and finally, how he extricated the rights and duties of parties in a case in which the church was persuaded that she neither could in conscience do the thing, nor had ever promised to do it ;—all these are points on which we remain in the dark. As to all this it was held enough to say to the majority in the church courts, " If there is confusion, you began it." We repeat that this was an unworthy evasion of the true issue. Dr Robertson and his party were bound to face the whole question in regard to the boundaries of civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, *including and discussing the case* of diversity of judgment between the civil and the ecclesiastical judicatories. Although they, the minority, happened to agree in judgment with the civil courts in regard to some matters, they were bound to face this whole question, including the case specified. The resolution of that question was necessary, not only for the guidance of the majority, but also for the determination of the duty of the Moderate minority, as members of an organised Presbyterian church. That question was never faced. It was evaded.

We have been led to say a little more concerning this matter than we should otherwise have done, in consequence of an interesting peculiarity in Dr Robertson's position, which comes up for discussion in p. 153 of the memoir, and raises expectations in the reader which it does not fulfil. The circumstances were these : In the course of the conflict between the Church and the law courts, the Court of Session having first interdicted the deputies of the Assembly from using the churches, &c., for the purpose of intimating the suspension of the Strathbogie seven, proceeded afterwards to interdict those deputies from preaching at all in the seven parishes. This was called the extended interdict. Dr Robertson was staggered, and more than staggered, at this stretch of jurisdiction. His feelings on the subject came out in the discussion upon the Church's Claim of Right in 1842. In the course of that debate, which

necessarily travelled on a very wide field, Dr Robertson felt himself called upon to admit that he could not defend the extended interdict, and that he thought "this interdict was incompetent." It appears that this admission, the candour of which was very creditable to Dr Robertson, brought upon him considerable reproach at the hands of his Moderate friends; and Mr Charteris gives some private letters, written about that time, in which Dr Robertson explained and justified his admission. He thought, it appears, that the free preaching of the word in all her parishes, regulated (as we understand him) solely by her own sense of responsibility to her divine Head, was a right of which no faithful church can suffer herself to be denuded. The civil courts, therefore, should not have granted this interdict when applied for by the Strathbogie ministers, but should simply have withheld civil effect from the suspension, and have declared that in treating these ministers as suspended, the Church had violated the conditions of the Establishment, leaving further remedies to the legislature.

Two things are implied in this opinion. First, that the Court of Session, in this instance, were wrong in their law, and acted in excess of their legal jurisdiction. We quite believe it. But we do not see how, on the principles of Dr Robertson's party, any church court, or any member of one, could assume the incompetency of the interdict. The Court of Session, according to them, was judge of its own jurisdiction, and of the Church's too, as far as regards the Church established by law. Their law was good law until it should be altered. In finding themselves competent, they determined it to be a legal condition of the Church's establishment that she should submit to that exercise of power on their part. On Moderate principles there was nothing for it but to submit, or else to leave the Church *instante*. Dr Robertson had, it seems, a hope that effect might be given to his principles in Parliament, in connection with some approaching legislation. That legislation has never taken place: and the competency of the Court of Session to interdict the preaching of the word, at its discretion, as a suitable means of protecting the "civil interests" of ministers, remains on record as an uncontrolled precedent in law for the Established Church of Scotland.

But it seems further to be implied, that whether right or wrong in law, the power assumed by the Court of Session was inconsistent with Scripture principles. It interfered with "matters over which it is essential that the Church alone shall bear rule," with powers of which, if she suffers herself to be denuded, she "can no longer be looked upon as faithful." Now we really do not know whether Dr Robertson held it to be the duty of ministers, in such a case, simply to disregard the inter-

dict. That would seem to be the conclusion from his language. If so, then we do not know how he evaded the standing argument, *mutatis mutandis*—for example, that the Church might be held to have virtually *contracted* to exercise her powers of preaching the gospel in consistency with certain legal arrangements, which the courts of law could define. Apart from that, however, the emphasis laid on preaching, clearly implies that the exercise of discipline, *i. e.*, the forming and dissolving, ministerially, of spiritual relations in the Church of Christ, is not matter of conscience as the preaching of the word is, or is not so appropriated to the church, as her direct responsibility, which she cannot transfer. It was here that the secret lay of the constant reticence on the Moderate side. It was hopeless to think of reconciling that distinction, and the line of conduct to which it led, with the Confession of Faith.

But then, and this is the most curious part of all, it next appears that at this very time Dr Robertson was objecting to the form of conclusion in the action brought in to the Court of Session by the Strathbogie ministers, to *suspend* and *reduce* the church's sentence upon them. "If it was merely legal phraseology for disregarding the sentence, he had no objection. But if it was a civil reduction *quoad omnia* of an ecclesiastical sentence, he could not acquiesce." He was not inclined to stand much on phrases—"But whatever may be the most advisable form of recording judgment in the case, the object would be accomplished of taking a most formidable weapon out of the hands of the brethren now threatening to secede, were the civil court to *make it evident* that they look at the censure pronounced by the church only for the explication of their own jurisdiction as regards deprivation, and that they leave it, in other respects, *valere quantum valeat*." To complete the matter, it may be mentioned that he says, in a letter to his wife, "My objection lies against the *Court's* doing it, as I think it only competent to the Legislature." Recollections of old times prompt the exclamation, "This is Robertson of Ellon all over!" What was it, or is it, that is competent to the Legislature but not to the Court of Session? And why is it competent to the one and not to the other? What was the argument of the Moderate party all along but this, that the decision of the civil courts effectually and instantaneously decided the standing and rights of all parties in the Church, *as by law established*, without any necessity of recourse to the Legislature at all? But if a distinction is to be drawn as to the competency of the two, then we know of only one way of drawing it. It was that held by Dr Robertson's opponents. They held it to be competent for the Legislature to determine for itself, what church, if any, it would acknowledge. But

they denied it to be scripturally lawful for the Legislature to set up a church so ordered, that the constitution or dissolution of spiritual relationships should follow the sentence of civil courts, protecting as they do merely civil interests, and bound as they are to proceed on merely civil grounds. They denied this, while granting of course the exclusive competency of the civil courts to ascertain the legal destination (in all conceivable circumstances) of the *civilia* which the Legislature had given. They denied that any Church could ever be warranted to form such an alliance with the State. They denied that the Church of Scotland was such a Church. This is a clear distinction, and some of Dr Robertson's phrases quoted above seem to point to it. But then he had given up this ground long before. It was the civil court that effectually ascertained to the consciences of the Presbytery of Strathbogie the right of Mr Edwards to be ordained in the name of the Lord Jesus. It was the civil court that ascertained to those ministers their own competency and obligation to discharge spiritual functions of all kinds. This is *jurisdiction*—that is to say, effectual declaration of right, as by the proper authority in the matter, so as to impose obligation. And why should it be incompetent to the Court, *after this*, to ascertain and declare with authority the nullity of whatever might seem to impeach the full standing of those ministers within the Church of Scotland, as by law established? This lay clearly in the line of all that had gone before. And Dr Robertson's objection merely illustrates the constant difficulties in which he found himself, in trying to carry some shadowy theory of spiritual independence—some vestige of an idea of a proper and exclusive jurisdiction, through the successive interferences with which the Court of Session befriended himself and his party.

In connection with this, we must undeceive Mr Charteris, in so far as he thinks that later decisions place Dissenting Churches in the same position in which that decision placed the Establishment. The undoubted effect of that decision is, that a deposed minister, whose deposition is *reduced* by the Court of Session, regains his standing, and that to challenge it thereafter within the courts of the Established Church is an illegal use of those courts, which the Civil Court will restrain. That is certain. The Court of Session has not as yet unequivocally committed itself to the maintenance of such a power in the case of any non-established Church. It has admitted actions couched in wide and dangerous terms. No one, however, has found it possible, as yet, to bring to a practical bearing, on grounds which the Court will sanction, any action that concluded in those terms. But should the Court proceed all the lengths which those terms have been thought to point at, we believe

no one supposes that any Church in Scotland, but one, will have the least hesitation about the ground to be taken up.

We must really go no farther into topics of this kind. We have a strong notion that Dr Robertson himself would not greatly have enjoyed the work of giving an account of these matters such as Mr Charteris has had to present. We are led to this opinion by the whole character of Dr Robertson's life and utterances during his latter years. And we dwell on the topic now adverted to the more willingly, because it is connected with some of the finest aspects of the man. The strongest impression we have derived from the biography is this, that during his latter years, Dr Robertson turned earnestly and resolutely from the past, to look forward only. We do not mean that he deliberately altered his opinions about the various stages of the conflict, or that he would have been either ashamed or afraid to justify his conduct if he had felt himself called upon to do so. This was not likely to be the case with a mind so argumentative and so tenacious as his. But we rather think that he felt more deeply than Mr Charteris seems to do, that events were too strong for arguments, and that it was after all a very doubtful triumph in which he had assisted. We rather think that he was not without the consciousness, that to have assisted in defeating, on the ground of the Scottish Church Establishment, the principles and the men of the evangelical party, and to have thus contributed to throw such a body as the Free Church into the position which it now occupies, looked remarkably like a blunder; that the position in history of those who did so would prove somewhat difficult and awkward; and that in this part of his life's work, there was surely something not quite satisfactory. A man so thoughtful could not but have some serious reflections on what had come of the great game which he had now played out. He was not likely to feel with Dr Bryce, pure thankfulness and joy at the result. He may never have come to the conclusion that it could have been averted. He was likely, however, to have his own doubts as to whether due earnestness and diligence to merit it had been exercised. Be this as it may, the effect of the Disruption seems to have been to awaken in his mind many earnest reflections about the state of religion in the country, and about the prospects of the Established Church; henceforth he turns to the future; and there is a visible and deepening anxiety that his ecclesiastical activities, in the service of his own denomination, should be linked as closely as possible to the highest principles and the highest aims. Mr Charteris quotes a passage of a speech, which seems to us very suggestive of his inward reflections. He is speaking of the imputation cast on the Established Church, that the post-Disruption

efforts were inspired by mere party zeal. He says—"I believe that a nobler object and a greater cause than the service of mere temporal ends actuated the originators of these efforts. It may be said when the afflicted man is brought to repentance, that he cannot be saved, because his sufferings, and not the grace of God, have produced the change. But is it not thus that God works, bringing light out of darkness, by means which we cannot comprehend, softening the hardest hearts, and bringing them to Himself?" In this way he seems to have profited by the crash of 1843. There is something noble and touching in the earnestness with which he strives to assure himself, in all his after labours, that he is securing not merely the success of a party, but the spiritual benefit of the country. Those who might differ from him in opinion as to the prospect of securing that result by the measures he advocated, need not feel any difficulty in acknowledging his entire sincerity, nor in sympathising with his anxiety, to take the noblest view of his actual position, and to link the work which lay to his hand with the glory of God and the peace and welfare of Scotland.

It is in this light that we view his efforts in behalf of the Endowment Scheme of the Established Church. That scheme was, in its occasion and origin, as purely of a sectarian character as any that could be conceived. The Established Church found herself in possession of great numbers of chapels, from most of which the congregations had been ousted, and which she laid hold of in virtue of the strength of law much more than of equity. There was no possibility of getting over the scandal connected with these empty houses without some great effort, for there were not congregations to support a ministry. In these circumstances, Dr Robertson had the matter committed to him. He took it up, and planned and worked out the Endowment Scheme, under the conviction that a completely endowed parochial organisation was necessary for the religious education of the country, and for the supply of its spiritual wants. He started from the position that this would prove to be necessary, whatever might be done by the other denominations. We have been greatly interested, as every one must be, by this portion of the life. Whatever might be the character of the scheme viewed in other aspects, Dr Robertson's convictions made *his* advocacy of it to be a constant and earnest appeal in behalf of the spiritual well-being of his countrymen. He refused to look at it, think of it, or labour for it in any other light. By prosecuting his enterprise in this spirit, he conferred an inestimable benefit on the Established Church. He pushed his scheme through with a measure of success, due not merely to his indomitable energy, but to the respect inspired by the sincerity and earnestness of the

man. He thus brought his Church into the position of responding to a claim which, in his mind at least, was undoubtedly identified with the highest aims both of patriotism and religion.

But while he conferred a great benefit on his church, he visibly derived much benefit himself. He occupied his mind for years with hopes and aspirations about the spiritual good of men. He strove to turn his own thoughts and those of others to the steady contemplation of objects of faith. Under discouragements and disappointments, we find him coming back to the Bible and to prayer, that he might not despair altogether. In all this there was a discipline under which much fruit was to be expected, and it did prove fruitful. The biography shews how decidedly his character ripened during these years; and instead of scrutinising too closely the grounds of those convictions of his with respect to the worth and probable effect of the Endowment Scheme, about which we have our own opinion, we desire rather to rejoice that he found his way in connection with it to so much of Christian thought and feeling, to views of life so worthy, and to a practice of them so consistent and elevated. This part of his life is fitted to teach all men and churches the lesson, not a needless one, how much their spiritual prosperity will prove to be bound up with forgetting the things that are behind, and reaching forth unto those that are before.

Thus striving and hoping, there came more and more upon his mind the vision of a re-union of the three leading churches of Scotland. Not very long before his death he expressed his views in a letter to an eminent statesman, occasioned by a matter personal to himself. We are sorry we cannot quote it at length. He states in effect that he desired to do what in him lay, on the one hand, to rouse the missionary and evangelical activity of the Established Church, in order that she might exercise an attractive influence on good men; on the other hand, to procure the abolition of patronage. He acknowledges the difficulty connected with existing jealousies, but hopes these might be got over, especially if everything like claiming pre-eminence for the Established Church were avoided. It is extremely creditable to his good sense and his good feeling. And nothing but good can result from the multiplication of such men and such sentiments in all our Churches. We must own, at the same time, to the conviction, that the destinies of Scottish Christianity do not lie in the direction of union to the Church Established, but in a very different direction. And Dr Robertson himself had a chief hand in the proceedings which impressed upon those destinies the direction in which they are moving still.

ART. X.—*The Scepticism of Science.**

It has come to be generally conceded among discerning men, that the great battles of Christianity henceforth are to be fought with the various forms of unbelief generated by scientific inquiry. And it has come to be boldly, and even boastfully declared, that the positive claims of Christianity, so far, at least, as they are founded upon the infallibility of Scripture, must now assuredly succumb under the last great assault, slowly but steadily, as with the tread of destiny, preparing against them. We can even hear, now and then, the hurrah, the shout, the *Io triumphe!* as if the victory were already in sight. Meantime, thoughtful men are preparing for the assault, watching calmly and confidently its progress and direction, and knowing full well that under it nothing will perish which has in it the breath of divinity.

The battle of the evidences has been fought over almost every field of human thought. As the eager and progressive mind of the race opened up one area after another of investigation and study, whether in the sphere of the logical reason or the practical intellect, in history, geography, philology, ethics, or psychology, their results were brought at once to bear, as criteria, upon the claims of Scripture. It was but natural that a book claiming to embody the highest knowledge, and to promote the highest welfare possible to men, and founding its claims upon a supernatural basis conceded to no other book, should be tested by everything new in human discovery. And indeed, if its claims are well founded, it will not only endure, but rejoice in such a test. It must adjust itself, unquestionably, to every clear finding of the human mind. No two truths, or two facts, in God's universe, can be in hopeless and irreconcilable contradiction.

Thus far the test has been bravely and successfully borne. Amidst all the wondrous activity of the human mind, the shifts of human opinion, the achievements of human invention,

* We should consider ourselves wanting in duty to our readers were we to withhold from them the following article—(taken from the *Biblical Repository and Princeton Review* of January last, edited by Dr Hodge)—an article so truly seasonable and so admirably executed, that in returning our thanks to its unknown author, we feel sure that we are expressing the unanimous sentiment of his presbyterian brethren on this side of the Atlantic. If we may be permitted to call the special attention of our readers to any portion of an article well worthy of their thorough perusal, it would be to those passages towards the close, in which reference is made to the practical bearing of the subject on theological education, and on the ordinary ministrations of the pulpit. It is hardly possible to over-estimate the importance, at the present time, of counsels at once so enlightened, so judiciously tendered, and at the same time so honourable to divine revelation.—*Ed. B. & F. H. R.*

the wonders of human discovery, the rise and fall of dynasties of the intellect, and forms and institutions of society, and much else needless to mention, the religion of Christ and the divinity of Scripture have stood strong, steady, unimpaired, and so stand to-day, the civilised mind of the world being the judge. They have shrunk from no trial, and quailed before no foe. They have moved firmly on, sure and steady as the great flow of history itself, whilst much that once exalted itself against them has been left far behind amongst the *debris* which strews the high road of the world's life. The old Titanic foes of other ages are dead, without hope of resurrection. The old weapons, once wielded by sinewy arms, are rusty and dull. But now the scene changes, the conflict assumes a new phase, the battle draws to a different line, a new and powerful adjustment of the Christian evidences is required by the presence of a new and powerful test of their validity; and many are eagerly and fearfully wondering whether or not the old result of other conflicts will still be reached.

Manifestly the new factor in this great problem, the new power in the coming assault upon Christianity, is *science*, taken in its widest sense of all that is knowable, by the human intellect, of the universe of nature and of man—their properties, laws, antecedents, and results. It is not the scepticism of Celsus or Porphyry, nor of Voltaire or the French Encyclopædists, nor of Strauss and the German idealists, nor even of Gibbon and Hume—though the latter, in his *Essays on Miracles*, adumbrated one phase of the present contest—but the *scepticism of science*, that the church must prepare to meet—the scepticism (whether intentional or not) of Agassiz, and Morton, and Darwin—of the Statisticians and Mr Buckle.

It is our purpose to suggest some reflections respecting the course and conduct of the “high debate” which is impending. It is not our purpose to exhaust the controversy ourselves, nor even so much as to enter fairly upon it, as to its merits, but rather to sketch or outline it as a coming fact, and to forecast, it may be, its necessary features and conditions. We shall endeavour to point out, if possible, the origin, nature, and tendencies of the scepticism of modern science, and to suggest some earnest words of counsel to our brethren respecting the manner in which this new uprising of human opinion against the ancient bulwarks, is to be met and dealt with.

It is clear to any observer, that the great palpable fact pertaining to human inquiry in these latter days, is the progress of science. As a fact, it can scarcely be overstated. The labours, achievements, successes of the devotees of the natural sciences, within living memory, have been vast and varied beyond de-

scription, and they portend results which as yet no human mind can fully measure. They have opened to us a universe, everywhere wondrous with motion and life. Instead of a universe of gross masses and inert forms, they have gained us a universe vital and almost vocal in all its parts, and unveiled to us a complication and intricacy of laws, powers, and processes so grand and amazing, so perfectly adjusted, so nicely balanced, that we seem almost to be walking in the realms of a new existence. They have unveiled to us that wondrous alchymy of force which, in its ever-shifting and Protean shapes and metamorphoses, governs the whole course of material things, and which, itself indestructible, and incapable as a sum total of increase or diminution, raises the mind to the conception of that absolute perfection of adjustment, and exquisite pre-arranged harmony which pervade the universe,—a conception for many ages unattainable by the most exalted intellects. They have also unveiled, or are rapidly unveiling to us, the alchymy of higher spiritual, mental, and moral laws, which prevail in the human world, and which reveal to us the fact, that the laws which govern men are as nicely adjusted, as inexorable in their flow, and as sure in their results upon large groups or masses of men, as are the laws which govern matter. Thus in the grand old words of Scripture is it seen that "He turneth the hearts of men as the rivers of waters are turned."

Science has indeed made man the "priest and interpreter of nature." It has enabled him to survey and map the starry heavens, to weigh and measure the sun, to throw his line over the planets, even to prophecy the presence of the unknown before its discovery, and to determine the path of the comet, as it comes up on its blazing wheels from the depth of space. It has enabled him, by means of its parallaxes and mathematical formulas, to rise to conceptions of the vastness in space, and the stupendous grandeur of the material universe, wholly impossible without them. It has opened up to his critical gaze the earth beneath his feet, which the generations of men have trodden for six thousand years heedless of its hidden lessons, and enabled him to read in its rocky alphabet the record of a vastness in time as grand and stupendous as the vastness in space revealed by the telescope; and of successive creations and destructions far surpassing in volume the existing creation of our historical era, and of cycles of being, rude, indeed, and monstrous, compared with which our human epoch is as yet but as a watch of the night. It has put into his hands the microscope, and revealed to him a myriad-peopled world of life below him, stretching far down among the atoms, as his parallaxes stretch far up among the stars—a world of life from whose tiny organs, and delicate senses, and exquisite adaptations of sentient

being, his mind rises to still higher conceptions of the divine skill and supreme order which prevail in this universe. By the patient study and careful comparison to which it incites him, it enables him to take the stony paw of some long-buried monster, never seen by human eyes, and, rent from the huge body to which it belonged, found solitary in its rocky bed, and to construct from it the form and features of the denizen of an ancient world. It has enabled him, through the science of chemistry, to analyse and determine the elementary structure of all material things, and thus incalculably to increase human power in the control and direction of nature, and add to the uses and comforts of man, and the wealth of civilisation,—thus realising the dream of the alchemists of the Middle Ages, by changing the baser metals of the earth into gold, not by a direct, but by an indirect process. It has enabled him to detect the presence of, and put under his control, the most subtle and powerful agents, for ever invisible to human eye, and impalpable to human touch. He has harnessed the lightning which flashed over the heads of the Chaldean shepherds and around the summit of Olympus, suggestive only of dread and superstitious awe to the most cultivated people of the ancient world, and, though all unchanged in its nature since then, he has made it his swift and faithful messenger. It has enabled him, through its alliance with mechanical invention and art, in the combined uses of coal, iron, and steam, to increase a thousandfold his human power; to bind continents together in his iron bands, to whirl vast masses with arrowy speed over mountain and vale, to plough his huge leviathans through the yielding waves, and to enrich every shore with the multiplied commerce of the earth. It has enabled him even to modify and remove many of the ills that flesh is heir to, and to gradually add to the average of human life, thus realising, proximately, that other dream of the alchemist when he searched for the elixir of life.

These are not rhetorical flourishes, but actual facts. Science has realised more than the wildest dream of poet, seer, or madman. Her works do follow her. The tangible evidences of her great conquests are around us everywhere. We do not, indeed, value these things beyond their proper nature and merits. It is true they are all chiefly material in their nature and uses. It is only one side of our nature that is elevated and beautified by them. We are not forgetful of the fact that there is another side of our nature, higher and nobler still, to which these can but feebly minister in any direct way, and in the most important respects not at all. But in their proper sphere, and valued for their proper uses, we hesitate not to say that the achievements of science cannot be overstated.

Now, with this exalted estimate of the claims of science before us, we approach the statement that science is impinging on the religious beliefs of the Christian public. We have already made the statement that such is the fact. We do not propose to illustrate the fact by a citation of instances, but we may briefly designate some of the forms in which the sceptical spirit manifests itself. It is seen under one form, in the promulgation of doctrines and scientific facts (so claimed), which in themselves strike at the root of some of the great cardinal doctrines of revelation, as, for instance, the doctrine of diversity of origin in the human race. It is seen under another form in the statement of inferences from certain scientific facts, which contravene the teachings of Scripture, as, for instance, that the undeviating uniformity of nature must preclude the idea of miracle. It is seen under another form in the prompt and emphatic rejection of all appeal or reference to the authority of Scripture, as bearing upon scientific matters. It is seen again in the contemptuous thrusts, becoming in certain quarters rather common, at the antiquated notions, the absurd superstitions, and stupid traditions of religious people, which on examination are found to be the great cardinal beliefs, and grounds of belief, of the gospel. It is seen also in a wide-spread leavening of the popular mind with doubts, and misgivings, and uncertainties, derived, second hand, from scientific speculations. It is seen, finally, though somewhat rarely, in professed and laboured attacks upon the Scriptures and the Christian system, directed from a scientific standpoint. In general, the scepticism of science is quiet, unobtrusive, indifferent to results, calm in attitude, and modest in utterance. It is, indeed, in most cases, not a direct interest, but a mere side issue.

It will enable us perhaps to understand the nature and origin of this scepticism, if we examine with care the *method* which prevails in the natural sciences, and which is indeed the true secret of their wonderful advancement. It has been named the *inductive method*, and is commonly and properly referred to Lord Bacon as its great apostle. Its opposite is the *deductive method*, which has prevailed in metaphysical and philosophical inquiries in all ages. Before proceeding farther, we must endeavour to comprehend fully the distinction between these two methods, and to understand the operation of the former method in scientific studies, and its possible effects upon the findings of the latter. The inductive method is a reasoning from facts to principles; the deductive method is a reasoning from principles with a view to include facts. The inductive method gathers its data, and from them reasons to the general or original law; the deductive method assumes certain principles of axioms, and reasons from them to facts and conclusions. The inductive method

is founded, either immediately or ultimately, on individual and specific experience ; the deductive on admitted truths, intuitive perceptions, axioms, or traditional notions. In the former, experience precedes theory ; in the latter, theory precedes experience. Induction is from particulars to generals, from the smaller to the greater, from the senses to the ideas ; deduction is from generals to particulars, from the greater to the smaller, from the ideas to the senses. By induction we rise from the concrete to the abstract ; by deduction we descend from the abstract to the concrete. One is analytic, the other synthetic. The former is cautious, patient, indefatigable, wary, sceptical ; the latter is bold, speculative, sometimes rash, and oftentimes credulous. Such are the two methods of inquiry which divide the world of thought.

Now it is true that these methods are never wholly divorced. They interweave and overlap, more or less, in every extended mental process. The inductive philosopher must use his ascertained principles, in many cases, for purposes of deduction, or his processes must stop, or be greatly impeded. Indeed, some of the grandest successes of modern science have been achieved just in this way. The philosopher, from his discovered law, has prophesied facts, and his prophecy has afterwards met fulfilment. And, on the other hand, the deductive philosopher, if he be not wholly visionary, must use more or less induction in the laying down of his fundamental principles, and must correct his conclusions by the touchstone of actual experience and fact. The two are married in eternal bonds, and when our mental processes shall have become perfect and our sciences mathematically accurate, it will be seen that they are supplementary of each other. Nevertheless, in certain branches of inquiry, especially in the present imperfect state of our knowledge, the one or the other method may necessarily predominate to such an extent as to justify the designation *inductive* or *deductive*, as applied to the particular branch of science. Thus in the branches of science with which we are specially concerned in this article, the inductive method has been so manifestly predominant, that they have received, by common consent, the distinctive appellation, *the inductive sciences* ; and it is indeed their great glory, and has been the great motive power of their progress. Careful collection of facts, patient examination of details, critical comparison of instances, rigid analysis of evidence, manifold collation of experiences, strict scrutiny of appearances, boundless multiplication of particulars, vigorous sifting of qualities and accidents, ruthless rejection of hasty or insufficient generalisations,—these, and much more akin to them, are what have guided and impelled the magnificent career of the Baconian philosophy, and

unveiled to the wondering gaze of man the mysteries of the material universe. These are what have whitened the seas with his commerce, started and swelled the busy hum of his manufactures, brought together the extremities of continents, and so mightily advanced the conquests of civilisation. To these we owe the fame of Newton, and Kepler, and Cuvier, and Owen, and Black, and Boyle, and Davy, and Watt, and Brewster, and Lavoisier, and Agassiz, and Hugh Miller.

Now this method is clearly essential to the successful prosecution of the physical sciences. It is clearly impossible, as it seems to us, that they should make any progress without it. The mind has no *a priori* knowledge on these subjects. A child does not know that fire will burn until it has tried it, and a man devoid of the experience would know no better. Whatever may be claimed in behalf of original intuitions, innate ideas, axioms, perceptions, in other spheres of thought, it cannot be claimed for a moment that man has any intuitions, perceptions, or inborn ideas, respecting the elements, combinations, powers, and possibilities of the material universe. It is only when he stands over nature with hammer and crucible, with retort and pump, that he can wring her secrets from her. It is only when he watches, from the high hills of science, day after day and year after year, the recurrence of her great facts, that he can grasp and comprehend the great laws of her evolutions and developments. It is true that a powerfully intuitive mind may sometimes, from a very few data—perhaps from a single one—lead to the perception of the general law, and its statement becomes an epoch in science. And thus advances in knowledge are often made by the previous exercise of some boldness and licence in guessing. But whilst this is true, it is also true that the guesses must be verified, or otherwise, by the patient toil of the inductive philosopher. Whilst minds quick and fertile in suggesting give impulse to scientific pursuits, it is essential that minds of a different order should be careful and scrupulous in examining what is suggested; otherwise science could never be anything more than an incoherent flight of fancies. All this is admirably illustrated in the case of Kepler, in whose intellectual character were combined in a remarkable degree the swift flashing of intuition, and the slow toil of induction. His guesses, conjectures, theories, and hypotheses were legion,—some of them have made his name immortal, for they grasped the great laws of the solar system; whilst many of them, fanciful and puerile in the extreme, have perished with the other rubbish of human folly. But Kepler not only announced his guesses, he also examined them, and in many cases refuted them. With the most patient toil he gave himself to the work of these self-affirmations and self-refutations; and the

candour and copiousness with which he has narrated them are not only curious and amusing, but afford an extremely instructive exhibition of the process of discovery.

That the inductive method is essential to the successful prosecution of the physical sciences, is seen, further, from the fact that they made no progress until it came to be adopted. Man's faculties of mind have been the same from the beginning. If he is claimed to have intuitions and innate ideas, these were possessed by the ancients as well as the moderns. And yet in every age and amongst all nations, the physical sciences were wholly unknown, save where the inductive method was cultivated; and oftentimes the most crude and absurd notions were held by the learned. The thinkers of the middle ages, some of them of no mean stature, held opinions on physical subjects at which a school-boy now laughs. And it is indeed amazing for how many ages and generations of human history, mankind remained ignorant of what now seems to us the most familiar and palpable facts; facts so near to man, which lie in such direct contact with his daily life, and are so constantly brought within the scope of his examination. Especially does it seem remarkable, that for six thousand years he should have remained ignorant of the structure and history of *the earth*; that on which he treads, from which he draws his daily life, on which he builds his habitation, and with which he mingles his mortal dust; strange that the earth which has ever ravished his eye with her garments of beauty, should have so long locked up her profound and ancient lessons from his sight. But he had not found the *method* of gazing through her stony crust; she opens her ancient lore to no monarch in the realms of mere intellect, he must patiently study the key to her mystic alphabet; this only the later generations of men have successfully done, hence the younger and more promising sisters of the sciences are those which treat of things nearest to man, whilst the oldest of all is that one which deals with the most distant bodies of the universe.

From the nature of the inductive process, it will be seen at once that its manifest tendency is to originate and cultivate a *sceptical habit of mind*. The man whose business it is to gather, observe, and collate facts, for the purpose of discovering and verifying their general law and ulterior sequences, must not be a man of easy belief. He must discriminate between the true and the false, between appearances and realities, between facts and the semblance of facts. He must not be deceived by accepting mere likeness for identity. He must not be satisfied with plausibilities instead of proof. He must scrutinise, and compare, and hesitate, and doubt; and this habit is strengthened in him as he gains his experience, by the fact

that his most careful conclusions are often disturbed by subsequent and wider observations and experiments. He thus gradually and even insensibly grows into the habit of requiring an amount and degree of *evidence* not expected or required in other spheres of life or thought. He is in general sceptical of evidence, and properly so in the better sense of the term. For scepticism is not in itself a bad thing. Everything depends on the character of the thing concerning which we are sceptical. To be sceptical of spiritual rappings, quack medicines, charms and omens, huge advertisements, sensation preachers, and humbugs in general, is not a bad thing. The scepticism of evidence which we are bound to commend in the scientific man, is the habit of withholding conviction until conviction is clearly demanded and enforced by the evidence itself. It is this habit of mind which makes the pathway of science steady and sure. But it is easy to see how it may operate disastrously upon a traditional faith when carried over into the sphere of man's religious life.

Faith, in the great majority of Christians, is not a matter of induction. Only in a very small number, comparatively, is it founded upon an inductive process at all, and that process, so far as it is inductive, is but partial and supplementary. Theology, as a science, is deductive. It begins with God, and from his known or assumed attributes, reasons down to sequences and conclusions. The argumentation of the theological world is predominantly deductive. Only in certain branches, as, for instance, those pertaining to the nature of man and the genuineness and authenticity of the sacred Scriptures, is the inductive system brought into use. The great mass of religious beliefs, considered as intellections, are traditional, and so far as they are traditional they are not inductive. In the young they are always traditional, and must necessarily pass through a period of disturbance if they are subjected to the inductive process at all. Even that religious faith which springs from the inner wants of man's nature, or the work of the Holy Spirit upon it, enabling him by his proper spiritual organs to behold and realize the spiritual and eternal, is not a matter of induction. It is only when the concomitant grounds of that faith, or its external relations or affinities, so to speak, are subjected to the test of inductive analysis, that any disturbance can occur from such sources. And, as already intimated, if the cycle of our knowledge were complete, and our mental processes perfect, there could be no disturbance; but the two systems would work into one another with perfect ease and harmony. As one has well said, perfect ignorance is quiet, and perfect knowledge is quiet; it is only the intermediate transition stage from the one to the other that is restless and stormy,

anxious, uncertain, and sorrowful. It is evident at a glance, that where the rigid inductive system of the physical sciences is brought into contact with the deductive system which prevails in theology and religious thought in general, their action must be more or less, and in the present state of our knowledge for the time being, mutually disturbing, and a sceptical habit of thought will appear in the former. It is true, there is a very large part of a man's religious faiths which can scarcely be touched by the inductive philosopher, for the reason that they stand above the sphere of his system. If induction cannot prove the being and attributes of God, neither can it disprove them. So of much else pertaining to a man's religious and emotional life. There is an entire phase of our nature, with its experiences and emotions, its perceptions and certainties, which lies above and beyond the plane of the inductive reason. It is only, as we have said, certain concomitant grounds of faith which can be touched by the inductive analysis, for the reason that they lie within the plane of its action. To this class belong the sacred Scriptures, so far as their truthfulness in matter of fact is concerned, and consequently their full or plenary inspiration and infallibility in the evangelical sense. Science claims to be able to deal with certain statements of the Scriptures. It claims that the things stated, described, or taught, belonging purely to the domain of nature, and having left their own record in that domain, fall properly within its purview, and may be verified, or otherwise, by its own proper processes. And sceptical science, as we may call it for convenience, does not hesitate to pronounce that some of these statements, facts or doctrines, have been otherwise than verified.

Another important question arises at this stage of our examination into the origin and nature of the scepticism of science. It is this. What can be regarded by the scientific man as *authority* in matters of science?

Authority sways its sceptre in science as elsewhere. Indeed, science could scarcely exist, much less make progress, without it. Some things must be considered as settled. Science must have its fixed quantities as well as mathematics. In all matters of human inquiry, a given amount of evidence must be considered as establishing a certainty which is practically absolute; and any such certainty becomes an authority, a fixed basis for further discoveries. Kepler's law of the relation between the mean distances of the planets from the sun, and the times of their revolutions, is such an authority, because it has been tested and verified by every proof possible to the human mind, and fulfils all the conditions of absolute certainty. Newton's law of gravity is such an authority, for similar reasons.

The same may be said of Römer's discovery of the velocity of light, and of the laws of motion, refraction, heat, and electricity; and, indeed, of all the accepted and well established laws on the assumption of which the experiments and investigations of the various sciences are conducted. Anything may be regarded as an authority in science which the scientific world has come to accept without question, and which is found to meet all the requirements of its ever widening analysis. It is true that some things may be so accepted for a time, which do not possess the attribute of absolute certainty. A wider sweep of induction, or a happy stumbling on a new fact or phenomenon, may reveal a higher law, and modify or remove the previously accepted fact or theory. But there is a limit to proof as there is a limit to the human mind, and when that limit is reached, the results must be accepted as to all intents and purposes absolute.

Again, where the things in question are not capable of mathematical proof, of course a mathematical certainty cannot be obtained. Still, authority may vest in an accumulated—almost infinite—preponderance of probabilities. Where all the induction points in one direction, and every newly-discovered fact only serves to confirm the conclusions from the former ones, the human mind will inevitably, in due time, acknowledge authority as vested there. The whole course of human life is determined by a calculation of probabilities; human interests are daily ventured upon it, and the human mind is facile in attributing certainty to that which is likely to occur. Hence when science establishes her hypotheses by a multitude of facts, it is only to be expected that they will be believed.

Now it is held by some, and it has been put forth prominently by theologians in the high debate which science has evoked, that the statements of the Scriptures ought to be conclusive, and of the nature of authority, in matters of science. "If science does not agree with the Scriptures," says Professor Lewis, "so much the worse for science." It is held that the evidence on which the Scriptures are accepted by the Christian world, is stronger than any evidence of science can possibly be. And hence, that the clear statements of Scripture ought to be held sufficient against all opposing theories of science. And in attempting to strengthen this position, it is common to depreciate the evidences and investigations of science. Dr Dick's comparison of a geologist to an insect on the back of an elephant speculating on the internal structure of the animal, is familiar to all theological students, and is still popular with some ante-geological polemics. But with all due respect for our brethren who put forward this claim on behalf of the Scriptures, we beg leave to say, on behalf of the votaries of science,

that they cannot possibly, *as scientific men*, accept authority under any such form. We have already said that the discoveries of science rest upon a basis peculiarly their own—a basis of actual experiment and observation—and nothing can claim authority in a scientific view which does not so rest. The inquiries and pursuits of science are conducted by a method of their own, and we have already shewn that they could make no progress without that method ; hence nothing can be accepted as scientific authority which is not involved by that method. This seems to us so perfectly clear, that the mere statement of it should suffice. To suppose the opposite, would be to force upon one domain of inquiry and proof a wholly foreign and extraneous element of control—an element which could be accepted only by an entire abnegation of its own proper genius and life. Should science accept a statement of Scripture on a scientific matter as exhaustive and authoritative, prior to examination and verification in an inductive way, it would be so far forth no longer science at all. Hence, if in a congress of scientific men a member should quote a passage of Scripture as settling a mooted point of a strictly scientific nature, it would be regarded as entirely out of place. All this does not militate in the least against the Scriptures. Its force is the same, though all the statements of Scripture having a bearing on scientific matters be assumed to be correct. It is simply demanding the normal freedom of science—claiming for it that independence which it must have if it exist at all. And we are free to say, that if the Scriptures had been regarded by the Christian world as conclusive and exhaustive on subjects of science, science would have made very small progress. The influence of the Scriptures on the progress of science has not been direct, but indirect. It has been by the general expansion and stimulus it afforded the human mind, not by direct teachings on subjects of science. Had the Scriptures been so regarded, they would have held the same relation to science and scientific progress that the Koran holds, in Mahomedan history, to civil law and civil government. The gospel makes no pretensions to the character of a civil code, consequently the profession of Christianity is consistent with any sort of jurisprudence, and any sort of political constitution, and consequently opens the door for unlimited progress and improvement in the forms of man's civil and national estate. But the Koran is held to be the eternal and all-sufficient expression of the Divine will on all points ; it rules man's temporal as well as spiritual concerns ; its sacred pages must therefore be received not only as the rule of faith and the law of morals, but also as a *corpus juris civilis*, rendering nugatory or superfluous the profane labours of a Justinian or an Alfred.

To this day, the Koran, and the Koran alone, forms the groundwork of jurisprudence among all nations professing the faith of Islam. The consequence has been, that it has debarred its proselytes from all political and social progress. The human mind, in this great local sphere of its activity, has slept a sleep that has known no waking under its powerful spell. It has stereotyped the despotic forms and traditions of the East, and rendered more stationary and helpless its sluggish social life. Mahomedanism has never made one step in the direction of human freedom, and the recognition in a national way of the rights of man. So if the Scriptures had been held by the general mind of the world to be the eternal and authoritative expression of the Divine will on subjects of science, rendering superfluous or profane the labours of Galileo, Newton, La Place, and the modern geologists, we may safely say that science would scarcely have existed at all. It was so held by the inquisitors in the case of Galileo, with what possible results, had they been successful, it is now easy to see. It is no friendly deed to attempt to place the Scriptures in a false attitude to any department of human inquiry, and is sure to result, so far as successful, in disaster and regret.

"Non tali auxilio,
Nec defensoribus istis."

It is unreasonable to require science to conduct her inquiries in obedience to a *a priori* decision of scientific facts. Admitting even the correctness of the decision, and anticipating that the ultimate researches of science will verify it, still it must be held highly derogatory, both to religion and science, to enforce it, or attempt to do so. It would necessarily involve the destruction of the freedom of science, and, if carried into all the spheres in which timid religionists have taken exception to the findings of science, would involve the destruction of science itself. And the folly of any such attempt appears the more glaring, when we consider that if the judgment based upon the Scriptures be correct, as we believe it is, the ultimate finding of science cannot fail to accord with it; and thus the "hand-maid of religion" will return from her journey of search to crown with her garlands the divinity of truth. On the other hand, if the judgment in question be not correct, no bolstering of it by *ex cathedra* deliverances, on the part of the church or religious teachers, can possibly save it from refutation at the hand of science. So that in any event, the part of wisdom for us is to yield a free rein and an open course to the career of science, and not attempt to force the authority of the Scriptures upon it in a way which does violence to their whole genius and purport.

The Scriptures at one time were universally understood to

teach that the earth is a plain, that it is immoveable, and that the sun revolves around it. Had this interpretation of Scripture been made authoritative, it is obvious that all the grand discoveries, enlarging as they do immeasurably our conception of the magnitude of the universe, and the greatness of its author, had been impossible.

Besides, it is obvious on the slightest reflection, that any such attempt to impose the authority of the Scriptures upon the labours of science, must greatly augment and intensify that scepticism which we have shewn has begun to prevail extensively in the scientific world. The mind of the scientific man instinctively revolts against it. He keenly perceives and feels the incongruity and absurdity of requiring him to acknowledge authority under any such form; and in his disgust at the ill-timed zeal of the friends of religion, he may, illogically indeed, transfer his aversion to *the thing* which they would thus improperly thrust upon him. Besides, he may be led to suspect that such arbitrary procedure betrays a secret misgiving on the part of those perpetrating it—a craven fear lest their doctrines should be overthrown—a suspicion which, however erroneous it might be, would not be likely to add to the strength of his own faith. Well has the sage and pious Whately remarked, “Those who avow their dread of the pursuit of knowledge of any kind, as likely to be injurious to the cause of religion, forget that the acknowledgment of such a feeling, or even the bare suspicion of its existence, does more harm to that cause than all the assaults of its adversaries. However sincere their own belief may in fact be, the impression will inevitably be excited that it is not so; that they secretly distrust the goodness of their cause, and are desirous, from some sinister motive, of keeping up a system of delusion by suppressing the free exercise of reason.” These are words which it becomes those carefully to ponder, who are every now and then frightened out of their propriety by some new discovery of science. If all men would at all times fully and steadily realise that *truth is truth*, there would be no unseemly quarrel between Christians and the earnest students of science. But it may be said that it is not truth, but specious falsehood—science falsely so called—against which the Christian world contends. Very well; then it must be met not with the dicta of Scripture, but in another way, to which we shall revert before we conclude this article.

Another important consideration, in accounting for the scepticism of scientific men, remains to be noticed, namely, that the *evidence* of science, in the establishment of its several positions, is *cumulative*. It is an aggregation, or accumulation, which is constantly increasing, not only in bulk but in density, as its previous imperfect findings are eliminated or corrected,

and consequently is constantly increasing in *weight*—a process which may go on indefinitely in proportion as positive certainty is difficult of attainment. All this begets in men the habit of suspending judgment; in other words, of believing nothing as a finality until the preponderance of probabilities is so great that it may be regarded as equivalent to absolute certainty. So long as a process is inchoate and progressive, a trained and cautious mind is not positive and emphatic respecting it. His posture is one of scepticism; he is looking about him; he is vigilant and suspicious—a habit of mind which is just the opposite of the habit of faith, which is positive and emphatic. Hence, as scientific men are schooled, by their daily pursuits, to attain to a positive certainty and an emphatic belief only as the goal of a long and tedious process, it occurs that they are slow in attaining the positive elements of Christian faith. This, were there no other obstacles to faith, of a personal nature, to be overcome, would beget no small amount of scepticism in the scientific world.*

Moreover, the general state of mind depends largely upon the *tendency* a line of evidence is taking. If a new discovery, or series of discoveries, seems to militate against the commonly received teaching of the Scriptures, the first effect is to produce uncertainty respecting that teaching, at least respecting the commonly received sense of it—a distinction, however, which is not always readily made. Now if the progress of this series of discoveries, with its collateral inferences and consequences, be steadily and persistently in one direction; if every new fact only strengthens the previous facts; if every widening of the field of generalization only confirms the conclusions of former generalizations; if every modification, even of partial hypotheses, only carries the student to a higher platform of induction, and a more complete standpoint of theory; and if the unswerving tendency of this progress is adverse to a commonly received fact or doctrine of the Christian world, as derived from a given interpretation of the Scriptures, the only possible state of mind of a scientific man is one of increasing doubt concerning that fact or doctrine. Beyond a certain point, his scepticism must increase with the increase of evidence against the fact in question. The human mind is so constituted, that, save when blinded by passion or warped by prejudice, it must yield an involuntary consent to the force of evidence duly apprehended. And if the commonly received fact or doctrine be insisted on as an essential fact or doctrine,

* We do not deem it necessary to enlarge upon the personal obstacles to faith, referred to in the text, as we take it they are not specifically distinct in scientific men from what they are in other classes, and we know no reason why they should be more powerful in their action.

or if a prevalent interpretation of biblical statements be pressed as indispensable to the Scriptures as an inspired book, the result must be collision with the expounders and teachers of science, and aggravated scepticism on their part—scepticism directed perhaps against the *interpretation*, which, to the opposite party, is identical with scepticism directed against the Book. And doubtless, in the heat of controversy, and under the chafings of a strife embittered by the rashness of those whose zeal exceeds their knowledge, many an otherwise devoutly inclined student of science is driven into positive unbelief of revelation as a supernatural fact.

Besides the causes above enumerated, there are others on which we have not time to enlarge. According to our observation, one of the most common sources of scepticism in scientific men is one-sided culture. They are often exclusively devoted to their own pursuits; sometimes to merely one branch of natural science; more frequently to natural science as distinguished from other departments of human knowledge. In forming their opinions or framing their theories, they have therefore only one class of facts before their minds. They are consequently exposed to the danger of adopting views which a wider scope of vision would have rendered impossible. Agassiz, for example, in proposing his theory of the different zones, having each its own *fauna* and *flora* originating within its limits, had before his mind only the facts of zoology and botany. These, he thought, might be better accounted for on that theory than on any other. It is at best a hypothesis, a guess. It is only one of many possible ways for accounting for the facts in question. Had that distinguished naturalist been also a linguist; had he paid even the slightest attention to the philosophy of language, and to the relations between different tongues, he would have seen that innumerable facts stood in the way of his theory, and demonstrated it to be false. No man of general culture, no such man as either of the Humboldts, would have given Agassiz's theory a second thought.

It is only another illustration of the effects of one-sided culture, when men of science ignore or disregard the moral or religious considerations which legitimately bear on the decision of scientific questions. We have already admitted that matters of science are to be determined by the methods of science—that the facts of nature are to be ascertained by the investigation of nature. But when two theories are proposed for accounting for these facts, the one consistent with Scripture, and the other opposed to it, or to its generally accepted interpretation, then the one-sided naturalist gives the authority of Scripture no weight in the choice between those theories. The

irreligious naturalist prefers decidedly, and defends with zeal, the anti-scriptural theory, for the very reason that it is anti-scriptural. Both the indifferent and the irreligious man of science act irrationally. Viewing the matter coolly as a mere philosophical question, the moral considerations, in the case supposed, are entitled to controlling weight. The probabilities, so to speak, are infinitely (i. e., indefinitely) in favour of the hypothesis which agrees with Scripture as against the theory which is opposed to the Bible. If one scientific hypothesis precludes the idea of final causes, or of a personal God, and another admits of both, is there no rational, philosophical ground for preferring the latter? If all truth must be consistent, then truths immutably established by moral evidence cannot give way or be given up to any amount of apparently contradictory evidence. This is demanding for religion no more than reason and the constitution of our nature force us to demand. It is no more than every man of science, of broad and healthful culture, will be ready to admit. Sometimes the facts of science seem to conflict with the facts of history. In such cases is the man of science authorised to waive the historian off of the field, and tell him he must let science take its course? If history prove indisputably that three thousand years ago the sea-coast before Carthage, or at the mouth of the Nile, trended in a certain direction,—if not only the testimony of ancient authors, but extant remains and monuments confirmed this fact, it surely would not do for the savan to set all this evidence aside, and assert the independence of science. He would only render himself ridiculous were he to insist that the question was purely a scientific one, to be determined by the laws of currents and deposits. It is unreasonable, therefore, when men of science assume entire independence in the formation of their theories, of facts, which rest on the laws of language, on the facts of history, or on the authority of a well-authenticated revelation. That all truth is consistent, is an axiom which works both ways. If it proves that revelation cannot contradict science, it no less assuredly proves that science cannot contradict revelation. God cannot say one thing in his word, and another in his works. Of this we may be sure, therefore, while the believer is willing to allow the savan to take his own course, and to pursue his own methods, he may have a rational and unassailable conviction that whatever contradicts Scripture is false. His true humility is not in putting Scripture at the feet of science, but in keeping his mind open for light as to the true meaning of the word of God.

In assigning the causes above mentioned to account for the scepticism of men of science, we are not to be understood as intimating that there is more scepticism among scientific men

than among other cultivated classes of society. It is more openly avowed, perhaps, because occasions for the avowal in their case more frequently occur. Much less are we to be understood as apologizing for infidelity. Scepticism is always irreligious. "If our gospel be hid," says the Holy Spirit, "it is hid to them that are lost." This is a truth which is neither to be denied nor forgotten.

How then, turning to the other aspects of the subject is this scepticism of science to be met and dealt with? We ask the ear of our brethren and the church whilst we carefully and solemnly weigh the questions of our own duty, and the duty of the church. It is evident that the duty is critical and solemn, and the issue momentous. We feel it to be of vast importance that the church should place herself right and bear herself right, in word and action, in this great matter; and that she should not be committed to any detrimental course by the overpowering influence of narrow-minded bigotry, or ignorant zeal, or antiquated learning. We would fain see the church, in this ever-moving age, erect, eager and watchful; ever with eye and ear awake to the full import of the signal cry echoing from the mountain tops, "Watchman, what of the night?" and prepared, as she has ever been, to lead the van in every forward movement of the human mind.

It appears to us, in the first place, necessary to the proper posture of the church, that the largest liberty should be accorded to scientific men, to carry on the pursuits and investigations of their respective sciences according to their legitimate mode. The inductive method has won for itself too clear a title to legitimacy as one of the sources of human knowledge, of human power and progress, to be restrained or curbed by any mere conventional authority, or any manufactured public sentiment. The church has no alternative but to allow it to push its inquiries in the regions of fact, order, and law, to their farthest possible results. And the more readily and cheerfully this is done the better. The mind of the age will defend the freedom of science no less promptly than it will defend the freedom of conscience itself. The civilized world is too far advanced in the whole order of ideas pertaining to human freedom, and the personal, social, and religious rights of man, to tolerate any infringement of his rights in the domain of scientific inquiry. And any spirit or temper on the part of the church tending to the suppression, by the mere force of authority derived from the Scriptures, or elsewhere, of the full liberty of scientific investigation and discussion, must so far forth place the church in a false position, and be resented by the mind of the age. We all see the monstrous folly perpetrated by the ignorant monks, who compelled a venerable philosopher to abjure the

doctrine of the earth's motion, and we see with equal readiness the false posture in which the church was placed ; but perhaps we do not so readily realise that in their circumstances and with their information, they were quite as excusable as many modern divines, who not only reject evidence as clear as Galileo possessed for the Copernican system, and pledge the Scriptures to a science as false as that held by the fathers of the Inquisition, but who are fain to hold up to odium, and cover with denunciation and obloquy, those who presume, as men of science, to teach otherwise.

Besides, the freedom which we would accord to science is the surest way to secure the correction of its own errors, and the attainment of clear and satisfactory results on any subject which lies within its legitimate domain ; and beyond that domain it is not science at all, but mere speculation and conjecture. If an immature science has put forth hasty judgments, and announced wrong conclusions, and broached untenable theories, we may be sure that scientific men themselves will find it out. It will be convicted at its own tribunal. The error will be exposed by the indisputable teaching of fact ; and the clouds which may have begun to lower upon the horizon of faith will be dispersed by the same power that raised them. Unless we suppose that scientific men are specially leagued in conspiracy against the Scriptures, we must bid them God-speed, knowing that they will ultimately give us truth, and enlarge vastly, as they have already done, our conceptions of the wisdom and glory of God in the works of his hands.

But it may be said that it is not against true science, but false science, our wrath is kindled,—against ignorant pretenders, sciolists, and vain boasters. Very well ; give a fair field, and they will be foiled at their own weapons. Real attainment will put to shame pretension, and genuine discovery will silence empty boasting. The church, as the custodian of the Scriptures, if she believes in their inspiration and consequent truthfulness, has nothing to fear, but everything to expect, from the most extended researches and the most complete generalization of science.

It has been well said by Hugh Miller, that questions in arithmetic must be settled arithmetically ; questions in geography, geographically ; questions in astronomy, astronomically ; and questions in geology, geologically. None of them can be settled *biblically*, apart from an induction of facts. From this it follows, in the second place, not only that the church should concede to science the largest possible liberty in her own sphere, but that she should cultivate, through her ministry, a thorough knowledge of those branches of science which have a relation to Christian faith. She should thus master for herself a prac-

tical understanding of the elements of the problem with which she is called to deal, and a correct comprehension of the danger, if there be any, to which she is exposed. This would seem to be the obvious path of safety. An enemy who brings against us new and formidable weapons, must be met by weapons equal or superior. A contest against iron-clad ships can be sustained successfully only by iron-clad ships, or something better. If it be held important that the ministry possess a creditable acquaintance with human learning, and science generally, even if not connected directly with the matter of their work, much more ought it to be held important, now that they possess at least a good general acquaintance with those branches of science which bear directly on their own teachings, and which may be permeating with painful doubts the minds of their hearers. This would at least shield them from exposing themselves, and damaging the cause they serve, by weak and rash arguments and ignorant declamation. There are few things more detrimental to even a good cause than to have it supported by weak arguments. The mind is only too prone to attribute that to the cause itself which belongs solely to the arguments. On the other hand, there is nothing more advantageous to an opponent than the exposure of gross ignorance, in his antagonist, of the true state of the question. We have heard from the pulpit, blunders as to the true posture and progress of science, for which there could be no apology in an educated man; and we could conceive with what infinite scorn a somewhat sceptical savan would have listened from his pew, and what damage his exposure of the ignorance would have done could it have been made to the congregation. Against this the ministry should guard themselves, by a careful acquaintance with the actual state of progress of those sciences which bear more or less directly on revelation.

But the church has a right to expect more than this of her commissioned teachers. There are among them many who have special adaptations of mind to scientific pursuits. These ought to be assiduously cultivated. They ought to be held to be special gifts of God in this age. The great scientifico-religious problem now pending between revelation and science, can never reach a clear and permanent solution until it comes to be fully comprehended and mastered, on its scientific side, by the religious mind of the age; and the religious mind of the age can only thus master it through the instrumentality of those who are the appointed teachers of religious and theological truth. Hence we conceive it to be the obvious duty of those who have special gifts and inclinations in this direction, to improve their gifts, and follow their inclinations as the leadings of providence, in order that, standing above and comprehend-

ing the tendencies and requirements of both the theological and scientific interest, they may point out to the former the true path of safety and triumph. There is in the religious world a complete stairway of thought. Nowhere else is the influence of commanding minds more powerfully felt; and unless the commanding minds of it, now and henceforth, are able to seize and appropriate the scientific elements of the problem in question, and give to the world below them clear and sufficient utterances, the result must be an increasing and alarming scepticism.

To this end, may we not hope that the time is not far distant when theological education will be more carefully and systematically guarded on its scientific side? When it will be considered at least quite as important to furnish students with weapons to contend with living foes, as to arm them against antagonists who have been dead a thousand years? Surely it is quite as important to assist them to the comprehension of controversies which are shaking the living mind of the time, as to school them in the love of controversies of which only the dry bones are left to dangle in the wind. We are no advocates of hasty and sudden changes in the curriculum of theological culture, nor do we undervalue the learning and wisdom of the past; but we think the obvious phenomena and needs of the time ought not to be overlooked. It too often happens that a young man comes forth equipped for his work, richly furnished with the book-culture, the apologetics, and polemics of the past, but when called to deal with the living questions of the time, flounders sadly; when called to move in sympathy with the thinking, feeling mind of the time, finds himself in a strange and bewildering atmosphere; and when called to satisfy the wants and relieve the difficulties of inquiring minds around him, is imbecile or indifferent. We have ourselves seen painful instances of this, and could not but mournfully wonder to what this thing would grow.

The church should learn her duty from her history. In every attack which has been made upon Christianity by hostile human learning, from the days of the apostles to the days of Dr Strauss, the assailing party have been thwarted and vanquished by the church seizing and mastering the weapons of attack. The sons of the church have become learned in the learning of their adversaries, and have not only sustained the attack, but have succeeded in bringing from every newly-opened field of inquiry something to strengthen the citadel of their faith. The church has never gained anything by despising her foes, or ignoring the issues they have started; and that branch of the church, once the spiritual mistress of the world, whose policy has been of this type—who, pluming herself upon her

infallibility, turned upon her heel when any presumed to question her teachings—stands this day a petrification and a warning to all who would attempt to fetter human thought, or despise the outgoings of human inquiry. The church cannot afford to despise or ignore science. She cannot cast from her contemptuously the issues which science presents at the bar of the world's judgment. She must take up these issues, she must aim to mould and direct them in her own interests, she must learn all that science has to teach, she must become a student herself in the great school of fact, phenomena, and law: she must listen to all the various cadences of the voices of creation, in order to know whether any of them are out of harmony with what she believes to be the voice of Deity in his word, and in order to assure and shew to the world that the harmony is perfect. Let her sons be equal to their calling, and she will not belie her history. However firm and eternal the foundation on which she rests, God has ordained that the price of her safety is eternal vigilance.

A third obvious duty of the educated mind of the church is to avoid ill-natured and unbecoming abuse of science and scientific men. It would seem at first sight as if such a caveat as this were scarcely necessary, but facts too plainly shew its necessity. We do not propose to illustrate by personal instances, but we are safe in saying that a careful analysis of the controversial literature called forth in the theological world by the revelations and impugnings of science, will reveal no little acrimony and ill-nature—not a little narrow bigotry, small jealousy, coarse and even scurrilous abuse, and altogether unbecoming, behaviour in general. To call a man an ass or an ignoramus, is not the best way to answer his arguments. Especially when facts and the interpretation of facts are in the debate, is such controversial heat unbecoming? Facts are cold things and stubborn things, and cannot be set aside by high words or haughty sneers. We may be sure that science cannot be turned aside from her steady and onward course by any such bravado, and while nothing can be more distasteful to scientific men, or more foreign to their habits of mind, it will not in the least move them. Let Christian men, by all means, take up and discuss the issues which science makes, in the same calm, dignified, and self-composed spirit in which they are offered. Let them indeed contend earnestly for the faith, let them bring the heaviest batteries of argument to bear against the hostile attacks of science, let them expose unsparingly all possible errors, crudities, rash statements, and hasty generalizations of scientific men; but let them do it with the amiable calmness of men conscious of the final strength of the cause they are defending, and not with the unseemly heat

which usually betrays an uneasy misgiving of ultimate consequences. Let them avoid bandying epithets, or indulging in personal asperities, or pretending to depreciate the attainments of men who by long and patient labour have gained a name of honour among their peers. Even Hugh Miller, with all his wonderful powers, has not wholly escaped such treatment at the hands of certain journalists and others in this country. No other result can follow such a course but damage to the cause pursuing it. Let the church remember that the scepticism with which she has to contend is not a frivolous, shallow, or flippant affair—it is not the holiday tilting of novices and sciolists—it is not the preense outbreking depravity of base and wicked men—it is a grave and serious matter-of-fact affair; it has often the spirit of an anxious inquirer; and in all circumstances has a right to claim the amenities due to an honourable foe.

A fourth hint we would suggest to our brethren who are in the habit of defending the Scriptures, by tongue or pen, against the scepticism of science, is to avoid hazarding the whole doctrine of the inspiration of the Scriptures, and consequently the whole Christian religion, upon any given *interpretation* of a particular passage, or passages. We have in our mind's eye some notable examples of this, which we might adduce, did we not desire to avoid personal allusions in this article. We might cite instances of men of position and character in the church, boldly suspending (or attempting to do it) the veracity of the entire Scriptures, and the whole Christian system, upon their understanding or interpretation of a given text,—perhaps the apparent and commonly received interpretation. The process is very summary; the argument, if argument it may be called, is briefly this. "If this be not true, then the Scriptures are convicted of falsehood, the doctrine of their inspiration falls to the ground, for God cannot lie; if the Scriptures are not inspired, Jesus Christ was an impostor, his redemption is a myth, salvation a delusion, immortality a dream, and the whole system of Christian faith a mockery and sham." Now it strikes us that this is hanging too great a weight of precious things upon one hook. It is risking all the treasure in one ship. It was surely not the intention of the Author of the Scriptures thus to hang their whole authority on the apparent meaning of any one passage, or he would not have embodied in them many things dark, mysterious, emblematical, and "hard to be understood," to the gradual comprehension of which the mind of the church slowly comes in the course of ages. It is no disparagement of Scripture, and breeds no conflict with the doctrine of its inspiration and infallibility, to say, that it contains many things of which the deepest and truest meaning is not the obvious meaning; that their final meaning is difficult

of attainment, and needs the aid not only of history, but also of the development of thought and the labours of the mind in other spheres, to its full elucidation. Thus, we think it may be said with propriety, that the developments and discoveries of science are as necessary to the ultimate interpretation of certain portions of the Scriptures, as the events of history are necessary to the full understanding of prophecy.

The history of exegesis exhibits many tortuous windings in the course of ages ; the path of particular passages resembles the course of certain rivers on the map, flowing now east, now west, and then apparently returning to the point of starting. But withal the river reaches its destination ; and so do the Scriptures still stand, unbroken in their symmetry, unimpaired in their integrity, fresh as ever in their life and power. Infalibility of the Scriptures is one thing, interpretation is another. Let our brethren fully understand this.

In the fifth place, let the apologists of the Scriptures and of the Christian System carefully avoid forcing them to do violence to the laws of the human reason, or to the inevitable sequences of evidence, or to the instinct of the human mind. No more disastrous service could be rendered to Christianity by its professed friends than to attempt to array it against the human mind itself, in the legitimate exercise of its powers,—those very powers by which the evidences of the Christian system can possibly be apprehended. It is most clearly and flagrantly suicidal. Two considerable classes of men, within the last two hundred years, have been labouring, though with opposite intentions, to the same result. The one class consists of the Humes, the Voltaires, the Bayles, the Bolingbrokes of a former age, and the Holyoakes, the Martineaus, the Secularists, and Westminster Reviews of later times, who have wrought with all the fire of genius and the force of the most trained and skilful logic, to shew that the facts and doctrines of the Bible traverse those great fixed laws which regulate human belief, and that Christianity is an abnormal and transient excrescence upon the life of the world. The other class consists of those ill-starred defenders of the faith, who with perhaps the best intentions, but with a zeal that far outruns their knowledge, would set the teachings of revelation against the legitimate deductions of science, and insist that the latter shall succumb to the former ; would compel a faith which tramples upon and crushes the exercise of the reason in profane matters, and violates both the instincts of our natures and the order of our general belief. It is to be hoped this latter class is fast passing away, though some noted specimens of it still remain. A hundred years hence they will be regarded with as much wonder as the novice in geology regards the fossil saurians and

cetacea of the ancient world. Let us take an instance. As an escape from the difficulties which science has forced upon the traditional faith of the church, it has been gravely asserted that the fossil appearances in the rocks of the earth were not the remains of living creatures at all, but only *appearances*, freaks of nature, or rather the direct works of the Almighty. "For aught that appears in the bowels of the earth," said the *London Record*, some years ago, "the world might have been called into existence yesterday." "The very day when the ocean dashed its first waves on the shore," says Chateaubriand, "it bathed, let us not doubt, rocks already worn by the breakers, and beaches strewn with the wrecks of shells." We have ourselves, within the last ten years, heard a respectable minister avow his belief that the organic remains of the earth were created as we find them. We have not space nor patience to argue this point. We would simply ask—If a man does not believe that a fossil fish was once a living fish, and is logically consistent, what else can he believe? And if he does believe anything else, *how* does he believe it? Does he believe that the mounds and buried cities of the West are the remains of an ancient race which once dwelt on this continent, or the remains of any race at all, and if so, *how* does he believe it? Does he believe that the skeletons occasionally exhumed in the neighbourhood of ancient burying-grounds were once living men, and if so, *how* does he believe it? We opine such a man can only avoid being a universal sceptic by an inconsistency as glaring as his scepticism is absurd. Any such attempts to force the Scriptures to traverse the fixed laws of human belief, can only result, if successful, in unmitigated disaster. And the same order of thought, if carried into any other department of religious truth, must be equally deleterious. Christianity is indeed in a large and important sense a specialty, but it is not a specialty in such a sense as to stand in violent antagonism to the whole normal order of the moral and intellectual worlds. It has its mysteries and doctrines for faith, which transcend reason, but it does no violence to reason in its own sphere. Says the acute Bishop Berkeley, "Nothing dark, incomprehensible, mysterious, or unaccountable is the *ground* or *motive*, *principle* or *foundation*, *proof* or *reason* of our faith, though it may be the *object* of it."

The liability is great in some minds thus to set the Bible and Christianity against the laws of evidence and belief in other spheres. It is one of the misfortunes of the church, and one of the vantage-grounds of infidelity. In the practical contest at the bar of public sentiment, the advantage is immensely on the side of those who plead for the inviolability of the laws and instincts of the human mind, and the supremacy of facts. Fur-

thermore, facts and evidence are sure to assert themselves triumphantly in the lapse of time, and to control finally the course of public opinion. This they do by their own native force, as irresistibly as the channel controls the course of the stream. Take again, as an instance, the doctrine of the globular form of the earth. It is not only important as one of the first steps in astronomy, but is one of the finest examples of the triumph of evidence, being among the first of those convictions, directly opposed to the first conclusions and apparent evidence of the senses, which astronomy irresistibly proves. To make men believe that up and down are different directions in different places ; that the sea, which seems so level, is, in fact, convex ; that the earth, which seems to rest on a solid foundation, is, in fact, not supported at all ;—are great triumphs, both of the power of discovering and the power of convincing. And had this conviction failed to force itself, on the evidence, into general acceptance and recognition, it could only have so occurred through the utter and hopeless imbecility of the general mind of the race. And yet, as bearing on the present progress and claims of science, we must not forget that at a date comparatively modern, the doctrine of the antipodes, or the existence of inhabitants of the earth who stand on the opposite side of it, with their feet turned towards ours, was considered both monstrous and heretical. Let us believe that the Bible and the religion thereof, are bound to the life of the world as the bark is to the tree, which does not crack and burst with the inward expansion, but expands and spreads, and covers and protects it at every point. If this be so, no labours of science can do aught to harm them.

In the sixth and last place, let the Christian world and the Christian ministry stand firm and steady, holding by the old paths and the traditionary faiths until the irresistible force of proof demands a modification. We are no advocates for rash and hasty changes of opinion. The genius of science herself deprecates them. All changes of public sentiment, to be healthful, ought to be slow. An established belief has a claim to acceptance until the contrary is proved. The *onus probandi* now in all cases lies with science. Never before was the motto of more importance than it is now in the Christian world—“*festina lente !*” A disposition on the part of the ministry to snatch up every novelty of science, and hasten to adjust their biblical faith to its apparent demands, thus holding their faith as a mere weathercock, to be turned about by every wind of doctrine, would not only be disastrous in the extreme, but imbecile and foolish to the last degree. No matter how specious the recently announced conclusions of science may be—nay, we go farther, and say, no matter how true they may be, still,

an indecent haste to adopt them, and modify interpretation to suit them, is to be deprecated. All new truth must bide its time. And besides, time is the great test of the true and the false. Science, when she comes as a revolutionizer of old opinions, must submit to the same severity of ordeal, and the same patient trial, which prevail in her own methods. If she is to beget changes in religious opinion, they ought to proceed slowly, silently, almost imperceptibly, like the formative processes of nature, which add new shape, beauty, and completeness to the old without destroying it, not like the rush of the hurricane, which spreads ruin and desolation in its path—which casts down but builds nothing up. In this view we value highly the strong conservative elements of the Anglo-Saxon mind—the vast power of resistance which it presents to novelties in doctrine. It is the sheet-anchor of its safety, in a restless, energizing, progressive age. Especially in our own Presbyterian body do we value these conservative elements, properly modified, as we believe they are, by the propulsive forces of the age. It is a sign that the forces which direct her progress are in healthful play. The increased activity of the vital forces under excitement is pleasant for a time, but as a continuous state would be ruinous. It is true that individual cases of dogged and senseless resistance to the clearly established claims of scientific truth may be numerous, and painful to consider, and if these should preponderate too greatly, their influence would be disastrous in placing the church in that false posture which we have deprecated in a former part of this article. They would then indicate the opposite extreme of atrophy and stagnation. But we regard them rather as the necessary drag-weights in an age of progress. The chief remedy for too rapid motion is friction, and this use they serve. Thus, though it has its minor disadvantages, and occasionally presents phenomena which are not a little annoying, we ought to rejoice that, in our own communion, there is at least a sufficiently ponderous make-weight imbedded in the masses of the uneducated mind of the church, and that even the educated classes are not wholly free from it. Let us hope that our church will thereby come gradually but surely to the perception of the true harmony of science and revelation, and not sink into the listlessness of dead orthodoxy, on the one hand, or rush into the excesses of rationalism on the other. Better that the perfect harmony of the two should be deferred a hundred years, than that it should be forced upon the religious mind of the world before it had grown to the apprehension of it. Thus, while we insist upon the largest liberty being conceded to science, and would urge upon the church the pursuit of scientific studies, and would deprecate the controlling preponderance

of an order of thought which would benumb the vigorous intellectual life of the church, and pledge her to a false science, we would heartily disavow the desire to see the *vis inertia* of the church suddenly removed, and see her run with itching ears after every new teacher. Let her "*prove all things,*" and "*hold fast that which is good.*"

Finally, we avow our unhesitating conviction that the apprehended danger to the religious interests of mankind from the discoveries of science is *not real*. We cannot understand how any one who holds the essential doctrines of Christianity as realities can apprehend any such danger. To say that no permanent damage can accrue to *truth*, seems to us almost to partake of the nature of an axiom. Science and religion may each one shine with a new and peculiar beauty in each other's light; they cannot obscure or destroy one another. And whilst jarring and discord may reign for a time among those who are struggling through the twilight of that intermediate state between ignorance and perfect knowledge, they will come, in the end, to see eye to eye; and meantime the divine faith of the world will move steadily and surely on, unharmed by the feverish strife—" *saevis tranquillus in undis.*"

XI. BIBLICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE.

UNDER this head we propose from time to time to place before our readers any particulars of recent biblical or ecclesiastical intelligence which seem possessed of peculiar interest or importance. Brief extracts will be given from the leading contemporary periodicals, indicating the views taken from different stand-points of those questions bearing on the sacred Scriptures or the Church of Christ, which happen chiefly to engage attention. Of late, the Colenso controversy has greatly agitated the public mind, and drawn forth expressions of opinion from many different quarters on the vitally important questions which it embraces. Both the *Edinburgh* and *Quarterly Reviews* have, in their last issue, dealt in their own characteristic ways with this new ordeal of criticism through which the Bible has been called to pass. We give the following passages from the two articles to indicate the spirit and style in which they are respectively written, though, of course, without subscribing to all the sentiments which they express.

The "Edinburgh Review" on Inspiration.

Our first extract is from the article in the *Edinburgh*, entitled, "The Bible and the Church," and embodies the views of the

Arnold school. In reference to the question, "What then exactly are we to understand when the Scriptures are spoken of as inspired?" the following results are declared to be "inevitable" (?):—

"First of all, That it does not by any means follow, because a book is inspired by Almighty God, that it should therefore be faultless, or (to use Dr Arnold's expression) that he should have communicated to it his own divine perfections. The most highly inspired men, such as St Peter, were liable to serious error. Churches and councils, to whom we believe the divine presence to have been in a special manner vouchsafed, 'may err, and have erred, even in matters pertaining to faith.' Nay, in nature herself, where no one can deny the finger of God, imperfection, waste, self-imposed limitation as to variety of type and selection of materials, are obviously consistent with, and to some minds indicative of, the presence and agency of a divine wisdom. Why may it not be so with the Bible? Why may it not be true—and if so, why should it not be recognised—that the Book presents the same characteristics which the best and highest of God's other gifts present, viz, not the mere outward symmetry of a finite and mechanical perfection, but the inward, elastic, and reproductive power of a divine life?

"Secondly, It is obvious that the inspiration, the divine Spirit, which breathes throughout this Book is not of a scientific, critical, or historical character, but a distinctly and exclusively religious spirit; that it is in this respect that the gospel is in advance of every succeeding age; that it is to enjoy this effluence from its loved and cherished pages that the pure and good in every generation sit as learners at its feet. If we would but remember this we should escape a host of difficulties; we should thankfully accept the water of life, although presented to us in earthen vessels; and we should certainly never allow ourselves, as some good men have done, to exclaim in peevish disappointment, 'We will not be ministered to by a book which is not in all points perfect and infallible as Almighty God himself.'

"Lastly, we conclude that the epithets properly to be applied to the Bible are these, and not more than these, viz., that it is *INSPIRED*, replete itself, and pregnant without stint for him that rightly uses it, with the spirit of purity, faith, obedience, charity, which forms the essential temper and character of the church and family of God; that it is *SACRED*, set by itself a book apart, fenced from all levity, irreverence, and mere curious handling; a book worthy, if only for what it has effected in the world, of all possible respect and honour, and regarded with too great awe and love by multitudes of the tenderest, most heavenly and sensitive minds for any one possessed of the commonest sympathy or charity to approach it with the shoes of every-day profanity upon his feet; and once more, that it is *CANONICAL*, or, in other words, that collection of writings which, amid the multitude of claimants the church has 'canonised,' has deliberately, and after examination, given her sanction to, as her authorised volume of appeal and of instruction, and which so, by a natural transition of meaning, has become her canon, her rule of faith, her standard whereby to test the accordance of men and doctrines with the spirit that is in her, and with that 'mould of doctrine' into which the first apostolic churches were cast.

"And why, it may be asked, should we go farther than this? Why should we be striving and wrestling against inevitable facts, in order to extort a higher, nay, rather an infinitely lower, more unnatural, more mechanical, dead, inelastic, notion of inspiration out of data which positively refuse to lend themselves to such a purpose?"—*Edinburgh Review*, April 1863.

To this extract we append the following weighty and pertinent remarks from a rising contemporary journal, *The Weekly Review*,

published in London, which is edited by the well-known writer, Peter Bayne, Esq., and is understood to reflect the views and plead the cause of English Presbyterians.

"We do not comment upon the singular and illogical mingling up in these passages of what the Bible derives from the reverence of individuals, and what, by its intrinsic merit, or its divine credentials, it has imposed upon individuals—upon this marvellous farrago of rationalism, sentimentalism, and popery, which seems to us a positive network of vicious circles in reasoning; but we ask in all calmness, Can this kind of panegyric on the Bible have any essential bearing upon the question, whether it ought to be submitted to as a rule of faith and manners? The Bible claims something of us; it professes to give us something in return. What it demands of us is conformity to its precepts, belief in its principles. To this extent it curtails, while it crowns and develops, the freedom of our intellectual and moral existence. What it gives in return for this faith is certitude in relation to many things which infinitely concern us. Why am I to obey its precepts? On account of its authority. Why am I to believe its promises? On account of their being made by a divine Being, infinite in power, wisdom, justice, goodness, and truth. If I know that the Bible is from the Infinite One, I, a finite being, without degradation to my nature or destruction to my liberty as a man, make its words my law, and its declarations my trust. But if, on the ground of its mere excellence, I veil my intellect before it, and bow my neck to its yoke—if I permit it, in any sense, to limit my speculations or my practice—I make myself a slave. The Koran is imbued with a fanatic enthusiasm, always sincere, and rising at times into religious fervour; the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are enshrined in the admiration of mankind, have been revered for more than 2000 years, and abound, not only with the noblest imaginative beauty, but with the greatest simplicities of ethical truth; the *Divine Comedy* of Dante is an object of wonder and veneration to every man acquainted with it; the tragedies of *Hamlet*, *Macbeth*, and *Lear* produce a feeling almost of awe from the altitude of their intellectual sweep, and from the depth, in some passages, of their moral sublimity. But in relation to all these works I am perfectly free. They claim no allegiance from me, and I accord them none. It would be an absurd mixture of arrogance and folly to extract from them rules according to which it would be my duty to shape my life. It would be the wildest absurdity in me to base a church, or to erect a creed upon them—so long, that is, as I regard them as mere human productions. With reference to the Bible, it is essentially of small moment for me to know whether it is admired by men, whether it is poetical, whether it responds to instincts and cravings. Of all that I shall take the liberty to judge for myself. If the book is to regulate my life in time, and to convey to me truths affecting my weal or woe throughout eternity, I must know whether it bears the stamp of the Most High, the seal and signet of God. To claim my homage to it on any other grounds is to insult my understanding.

"Such, we submit, is the common sense of the matter, as it may be discerned both by Christians and infidels. The grand question of the day is not whether the Bible is a good book, but whether it is God's book; it is mere frivolity and impertinence in the *Edinburgh Review* to load it with compliments, while evading the point really at issue—whether it has authority from God to bid us humble ourselves before it, and accept only such freedom as that with which it informs us that God will make us free."—*Weekly Review*, June 6. 1863.

The "Quarterly" on "Colenso and Davidson."

"With regard to the great foundation of these theories (viz., of a manifold authorship of the Pentateuch), the alternation of the names *Elohim* and *Jehovah*, it is unreasonable to suppose that we can, in every case, assign a reason why one is used in preference to the other. But in many cases the reason is as simple as possible. Dr Colenso has diligently noted the number of times each occurs in the several books of the Pentateuch and the Bible. Now, in Leviticus, where *Elohim* occurs fifty-two times, and *Jehovah* 311, there is not a single passage where the latter could possibly be substituted for the former. The Hebrew language does not admit of joining *Jehovah* with a pronoun, as *my* or *our*; in all these cases *Elohim* must be used. The same is true of the passages in Numbers, with the exception of that portion of the book which relates to Balaam. We think we can discover a reason for the joint use of the two names in the fuller account of the creation of man given in the second chapter of Genesis, on the supposition that Moses wrote it. It is the account of the first covenant of God with man, and the inspired penman desired to mark from the first the identity of the covenant God of Israel and the Creator of the world. From the time of Exodus vi. the word *Jehovah* becomes the predominant term as a matter of course. When Dr Colenso endeavours to draw an argument from the circumstance that names were usually in early times compounded with *Elohim*, and not with *Jehovah*, we see nothing but a perfectly natural development of facts. The names in the desert would naturally all be compounded with the more familiar term; a few might afterwards incorporate the new and more mystical word, but family names would naturally hold possession of the minds of the people for a long period. And this is exactly what meets us in the word of God, if we take it as it is. To meet the theory of the neologists, Joshua and Judges *must* be declared spurious, nor can any portion of the historical Scriptures be deemed trustworthy! But if we take the word of God as it has descended to us, and study it with reverence, we shall see, as in this case, an answer to much that would embarrass us on any other hypothesis. There appear also traces of an intentional variation in the terms. Where the people of God came in contact with heathenism, there the name *Jehovah*, although used, as in the case of Balaam, is mixed with other names, as *Elohim* and *Elyon*, the Most High. It is remarkable that this latter name is used both by Melchisedec and by Balaam, i.e., by priests and prophets of God beyond the circle of the family of Abraham, and living amongst the heathen. In many cases, as in devotional psalms, it appears to have been permitted to make use of either or of both; and surely we cannot be justified in demanding a reason of the sacred penmen why they use one or the other in every particular case.

"Reflections such as these will rise up in the mind of the devout student of Holy Writ, and will give a clue to much for which neology in vain attempts to supply other reasons. Scripture will bring a divine light to the mind, while neology at best supplies a miserable rushlight or a waning lamp. But the profitable study of Scripture is an affair of years, and not of months. She yields her choicest treasures, not to haste and irreverence, but to humility, to love, and to faith."—*Quarterly Review*, April 1863.

Did our Lord and His Apostles speak in Hebrew or in Greek?

A very interesting and important question has recently been revived as to the language generally made use of by our Lord and his apostles. The almost universal opinion in the Church, from

Eusebius downwards, has been, that they spoke a mixed dialect, usually denominated Aramaic, and popularly termed Hebrew in the New Testament. On that hypothesis the *ipsissima verba* of Christ have perished, and we possess in the Greek of the Gospels nothing more than a translation of his words. But this opinion, notwithstanding its lengthened prevalence, is now proved to have been incorrect. This has been placed beyond all reasonable doubt, in a volume lately published by the Rev. A. Roberts, of the Presbyterian Church, St John's Wood, London. The title of this work, "Discussions on the Gospels," does not bring out very specifically its main scope and merit. In this elaborate and scholarly production, Mr Roberts aims to prove, and has succeeded in proving, that although Aramaic may have been used in ordinary converse among the Jews, yet in formal addresses, and in written discourses, the language uniformly employed in the time of our Lord was the Greek. It cannot fail to be interesting to know that in our Greek Testament we have the very words uttered by Him who "spoke as never man spake." It is still more important in a biblical and theological point of view, to feel assured that in the Greek of the Gospels we have the veritable language penned by those "holy men of God who spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." All this has been demonstrated by direct evidence, as well as by a most thorough clearing away of the grounds on which the opposite opinion was based, whether drawn from incidental allusions in Scripture, which seem to favour the notion that Hebrew was the language usually spoken, or from the conjectural reasonings and vague assertions of certain biblical critics.

We give the following extract from an elaborate review of Mr Roberts's work, understood to be from the pen of the celebrated Oxford Professor Max Müller :—

"Eusebius declares again and again that the apostles understood no language but that of the Syrians, and in one passage he represents them as replying to their Lord's command to "go and teach all nations" in the following words:—'What language shall we employ towards the Greeks, having been brought up only in the language of the Syrians?' It is curious, that on so important a point the ecclesiastical historian should have given us none of the evidence on which he based his categorical statements. But, in spite of this absence of evidence, his statement was accepted by nearly all subsequent writers, and is probably held at the present day by most who have given any thought to the subject. Even independent scholars—men like Thiersch, Ewald, and Renan, who would certainly not be swayed by an unsupported assertion of Eusebius—hold the same opinion. Ewald says, 'It is self-evident that only the generally intelligible language of the country could have served our Lord's purpose. There was no occasion why, besides it, he should have used another; nor do we find the slightest trace of His having employed another—namely, the Greek.' Renan states, 'We think that the Syro-Chaldaic was the most widely-spread language in Judea, and that Christ would not have used any other in his popular discourses.' We do not wonder that Mr Roberts should have felt awed by these positive assertions, but we are glad that he did not shrink from encountering such antagonists, and that he thought the whole question deserving of a new and minute re-examination. The result at which Mr Roberts arrives is, that '*Christ spoke for the most part in Greek, and only now and then in Ara-*

matic,' and he establishes this conclusion by an amount of evidence which can hardly leave a doubt in the minds of unprejudiced readers. If the early chapters of his work may seem to be of a special and merely professional interest, Mr Roberts has, in the second part, made the result of his previous researches the groundwork of farther investigations, which place the original composition of the gospels in an entirely new light, and will be welcome to every careful reader of the New Testament."

The following testimony (only one of many) to the importance of Mr Roberts's investigations comes from the same learned source :—

"Christianity, from an historical point of view, is the reunion of the Jew and Gentile, and, from a still higher point of view, it clearly marks the confluence of the two great streams of human life and thought—the Semitic and the Aryan. How wonderful, then, that He who came to reveal to the whole of mankind their common brotherhood and their common Father in heaven, should have had his words and thoughts moulded in the two principal languages of the two principal families of human speech—the Greek and Hebrew! To discover in the history of the world the indications of a Divine plan is no less comforting than to recognise the working of God's grace even in the smallest events of our daily life; and if we consider how a language represents the intellectual heirloom of a whole nation, to see Christ as the heir, not only of the Semitic, but even in a much higher degree of the Greek and Aryan races, is a confirmation stronger than any, of His truly historical character—a commentary clearer than any on the true meaning of "the fulness of time."—*Saturday Review*.

The Codex Sinaiticus.

The precious MS. of the holy Scriptures discovered some time ago in such a strange and romantic manner by Tischendorf, has recently been published at St Petersburg, under the title, "*Bibliorum Codex Sinaiticus Petropolitanus*." Our readers are aware of the absurd and groundless claim put forward by a Greek named Simonides, at present resident in this country, to the effect that he himself was the writer of the MS., which both its discoverer and the ablest palæographers living have agreed in judging of the highest antiquity! Nothing more will probably be heard of this wild and daring assertion. But the precise age of the *Codex Sinaiticus* is still *sub judice*. The following paragraph refers to this, and properly maintains that whatever be the ultimate decision of criticism with respect to the exact date of the MS., it must be acknowledged to hold a high place among the most ancient written monuments of our faith :—

"The '*Codex Sinaiticus*' is a great fact. It has fairly emerged from its obscurity of ages, and the appearance of a new island would scarcely have been regarded with more interest than its advent before the eyes of the critical world. A new claimant to the presidency in the republic of Biblical MSS. was, of course, a very possible occurrence, but it was not generally expected. All at once, however, a celebrated letter from Tischendorf to the Minister von Falkenstein, announced the coming of a candidate for that presidency, and of one whose rights might, perhaps, easily be determined. Codex A., which tradition ascribed to the time of the Nicene Council, and which for a long time was allowed to stand first, had been condemned to retire before at least one of its rivals, and to strike off a century or more from its assumed age. The Codex C., or the Ephraem rescript, had won a

high position. Tischendorf, for example, puts it before the middle of the fifth century,—as early, if not earlier than Codex A. The Cambridge MS., Codex D., or Bezae, has raised a good deal of discussion, but never held its ground as a candidate for the seniority. Of the rest we need not speak, excepting to name the one which had won its way to the headship—Codex B., or the Vatican MS. This last seemed to be settling down into quiet possession of its honours; and such is the exclusive veneration in which it is held, that it has for a long period been almost as difficult of access as the Grand Lama of Thibet, or his holiness the Pope. It remains to be seen whether the rival dignity of the Sinaitic Codex, which courts publicity, will have any effect in relaxing or removing the restrictions of which we speak. This is not all; it remains to be seen whether, by coming into the broad daylight, the Vatican Codex may not even yet vindicate its superior claims. It remains to be seen whether the Sinaitic Codex, Aleph or \aleph , may not be compelled to retire into the same rank as its brother Alpha of Alexandria. But whatever may be the ultimate decision of those who are able to investigate and pronounce judgment in the matter, the 'Codex Sinaiticus' is, we repeat, a *fact*, and not a myth, and it will always occupy a high and powerful position among the uncial MSS. of the Greek Scriptures."—*Journal of Sacred Literature*.

The Antiquity of Man.

On the question of the "Antiquity of Man," at present exciting so much discussion, we give the following passage:—

"No reasonable geologist will expect the public to alter the current chronology until the grounds for such a change are perfectly clear and conclusive. Till then it is not only proper but imperative to suspend the judgment. If, however, the reader should be of opinion that the advocates of antiquity have raised a fair presumption in favour of their views, it becomes necessary to inquire how far this doctrine bears upon the statements contained in the Bible. Should the theory be established by further researches, ought we to conclude that the story of Adam's creation, as chronicled by Moses, is false? Certainly not. The discovery of a whole cemetery of skulls, like those of Engis or Neanderthal, or of a collection of microscopes and other philosophical instruments, in some pre-glacial formation, would not shake our faith in the veracity of Scripture for a moment. It would, indeed, be necessary to revise our construction of the opening chapters of Genesis. But since it is nowhere expressly asserted that Adam was the first intelligent creature whom God produced on the earth, we should surely have no right to charge the book with untruthfulness because it contains no allusion to the owners of those 'ape-like' crania, or to the manufacturers of those miserable flints. Few can fail to have been struck by the fact that man is the sole acknowledged species in the genus *Homo*. Is it not permissible to suppose, if the case should ultimately require some revision of our views, that other *species* of this proud genus may have preceded us on the earth? and as we may safely assume that they would be inferior to ourselves in mental organisation, would there be any impropriety in fastening the low-class skulls to which we have so frequently referred upon their shoulders, and placing the clumsy flint implements about which so much has been said in their unskilful hands?"—*British Quarterly Review*.

The Question of Reading Sermons in the Pulpit.

We extract the following from an excellent article on the "Manner of Preaching," in the *Princeton Review*, April 1863:—

"We, of course, cannot complete this survey of this subject without some remarks upon written and unwritten sermons. In our view, if the requisites to efficient preaching already spoken of be realised, it is of less consequence how it is accomplished. Different men have their special modes of reaching the most free and buoyant intellectual activity, and of most facile and effective preparation for the pulpit. Some are hampered by any use of the pen. It is very rare, nevertheless, that any preachers, however gifted in extemporaneous oratory, may not strengthen their productions by some use of the pen in the study. Some prefer to preach from written skeletons, sometimes before them while preaching, and sometimes left behind them. Others prefer to write out more fully, but not completely. Others, and, in some sections of country, the great majority, write out their sermons in full to the last word. Of those who do this, some few memorise their sermons more or less perfectly, and leave their manuscripts behind, or pay little attention to them. The most of those who write sermons preach from their manuscripts, and are at a loss without them. There are few, however, who are so enalayed to manuscripts that they do not easily and effectively preach in the lecture-room, and on occasions less formal and exacting than the public services of the Sabbath, without written preparations. And no one can impose laws upon others in these matters, much less determine for them, that their gifts can be made more effective without than with the use of the pen, and its free and abundant use, too, to the extent of a complete manuscript sermon.

It is obvious that the absence of a manuscript is likely to have the advantage of leading the preacher to conform to the first great requisites of oratory, that he speak to his audience, and have the aspect and attitude of directly addressing them. And if he be quite self-possessed, it favours ease and freedom, and, so far forth, the force of the address. We have, however, known preachers who, after giving up the practice of writing sermons, lost the power of facing and eyeing the audience, because they became so absorbed in the process of invention, in thought and language, as to divert them effectually from looking at their hearers.

"On the other hand, it cannot be denied that written preparations have the advantage on the score of accuracy, clearness, condensation, method, fluency, self-possession, and insuring something like a due care of preparation. Still, there is a large class, and in some sections quite the largest, who have an invincible repugnance to what they call reading of sermons, which they put in contrast with preaching, or denounce as a corruption of the ordinance of preaching. Another class, who in other sections are quite as predominant, have a great aversion to unwritten discourses. They think of them as unprepared, superficial, rambling, repetitious, crude, and tedious. The true explanation of this we apprehend to be, that so small a proportion of those who write sermons prepare them on oratorical principles, in the form of a sufficiently direct address to the audience; and still fewer give them an oratorical delivery. *They have not acquired the art of speaking, instead of merely reading, from a manuscript.* They have probably never sought, with any due painstaking, to acquire it. They do not, at least many of them, even appreciate it. They do not so prepare their sermons, as to chirography and previous effort, to become familiar with them, as to be able to lift their eyes from their paper, to face the congregation, and emphasise and gesticulate, as propriety, and force, and impressiveness may require. This is the secret of the aversion and prejudice against written sermons. This is all the more so, as the few written sermons preached in regions where the people are unaccustomed to them, are usually poor specimens of their kind, at least as to delivery. Ministers who seldom use manuscripts are usually more fettered and awkward in handling them than those who are habituated to their use. They are apt to appear more like poor readers than good speakers in the delivery of written sermons. But the point on which we insist is, that the aversion to written sermons, where it prevails, is mainly owing to the want

of an oratorical delivery, sometimes aggravated, to be sure, by the want of oratorical structure and style in their composition; and that attention to each of these points, especially the former, is of the first importance in the case of all who preach written sermons. We agree with Sir H. Moncreiff in his remarks at a late meeting of the Free Church Presbytery of Edinburgh, on the motion of Dr Begg, to send an overture to the General Assembly, 'urging that body to adopt means in the theological colleges of the church for training students in the habit of delivering their sermons without reading.' On urging his motion, the rev. doctor introduced some amusing anecdotes illustrative of Scotch antipathy to the use of the manuscript.

"Sir H. Moncreiff, who considered that it was not so much the reading of sermons as their ineffective delivery to which exception was taken by the people, proposed that to the overture the words should be added, 'that means should be adopted for training students in the habit of delivering their discourses effectively, with the use of their manuscript on the desk.'

"On a division, the original motion was carried by a majority of 10 to 9.

"If he had moved that they be trained to deliver their discourses effectively, with or without manuscripts, as they might choose, we can hardly doubt that, even in Scotland, this majority of one would have been reduced to a minority. He was undeniably right. Good sermons, spoken forcibly from a manuscript to the people, instead of being read almost as if the preacher had no audience before him, seldom fail to interest and impress all classes of people, as decidedly as if the same things were delivered without a manuscript.

"On the other hand, the prejudice in many sections of the country against preaching without a manuscript, arises largely from the fact, that the poorest specimens of preaching which they hear are generally extemporaneous, not only in form, but in fact. Ministers accustomed to preach written sermons at the principal Sabbath service, seldom appear on such occasions without a manuscript, unless, for some reason, they have been cut short of time for preparation. Hence they rarely feel at ease in this sort of preaching, not only because they are unaccustomed to it, but because conscious of being unprepared. Hence, the people take the absence of a manuscript as a token of the absence of preparation. They expect a crude, undigested, rambling address. This expectation, in such cases, perfectly well understood by the preacher, reacts upon him, and still further disheartens and disables him. The meagre performance resulting, still further confirms the people in their aversion to unwritten sermons. And so, by a ceaseless action and reaction, the difficulty aggravates itself. And yet, as we have often seen, no people are more delighted and edified than these very congregations, by vigorous, instructive, and earnest preaching, without the aid of a manuscript, when they are favoured with it, which, owing to the causes already specified, rarely occurs.

"It is unwarranted, and worse than useless, to prescribe any iron rule, or to put all sorts of preachers, with every variety of gifts and training, upon any Procrustean bed, in this matter. To do so, would be to rob the church of the services of some of her noblest sons. We once heard a young man declaiming against preaching from manuscript. When he attempted to answer this argument, by saying that those were not called to preach who had not the requisite gifts, he apparently became embarrassed at the rashness of his own assertions, and was obliged to bring forth his manuscript from his pocket, in order to escape a more mortifying failure. It was once taken for granted, in this country, from the peculiarities of their printed sermons, that Chalmers preached extemporaneously, while Robert Hall carefully wrote his discourses. The reverse turned out to be true. The free, diffuse, impassioned Chalmers carefully wrote his discourses. The severely correct, elegant, classical, yet eloquent discourses of Hall were unwritten. Edwards, reading from a manuscript most closely written, caused spasmodic uprisings and shrieks in congregations, as he depicted to them the case of 'sinners in the hands of an angry God.' Those sermons of Griffin, that now overawed and now transported vast audiences of

all descriptions of people, now causing the obdurate sinner to tremble on the brink of the bottomless pit, and anon lifting the humble and contrite spirit to the third heaven, 'were written with great care, the author often rewriting, and cutting out everything superfluous.' Davies, 'a model of the most striking pulpit oratory,' probably the prince of American preachers, who almost invariably produced a profound impression on the largest audiences, whose discourses, heard by Patrick Henry, kindled that great orator to his almost matchless efforts of patriotic eloquence, usually wrote his sermons with great care, and carried them into the pulpit; but, like Dr Griffin, 'delivered them with freedom, without being confined to his manuscript.'

Millenary Commemoration.

We willingly afford space for the following intelligence communicated by a learned clergyman of the Church of England, who being himself of Bohemian extraction, interests himself specially in the well-being of that people:—

Slavonic Protestants in the Austrian Empire.

"It is not generally known, that the present year is being celebrated as the thousandth anniversary of the conversion of the Slavonians to Christianity by Methodius and Cyrillus, the sainted brothers of Thessalonica, who entered upon their work in 863 at the request of Rastislaw, duke of Moravia. The works of the English Wickliffe were carried to Bohemia by the attendants of the Bohemian wife of Richard II. of England, the study and defence of which brought John Huss to the stake at Constance in 1415. After this the Bohemians repelled no less than five crusades, supported by the whole power of Rome and the German empire, conquered special privileges from the Council of Basil, and maintained their religious liberty till 1620, when the husband of Elizabeth, daughter of the English James I., was driven from the throne of Bohemia after a reign of only one winter. The country was then converted to Romanism by the simple reduction of the population from 4,000,000 to 800,000, no less than 36,000 noble families leaving the kingdom for their faith's sake. But the Patent of Toleration issued by the Emperor Joseph II. in 1781, brought to light many thousands of concealed Protestants, and on 5th April 1861, a further ordinance proclaimed not merely toleration, but religious equality in the Austrian empire. Thus it is easy to see that the present year of jubilee is a very important one in the great struggle against the darkness of Romanism. And the Bohemian and Moravian Protestants are so poor, that none can tell the importance of British sympathy at the present crisis."

XII.—FOREIGN THEOLOGICAL JOURNALS FOR 1863

Zeitschrift für die Historische Theologie. Jahrgang, 1863.

The three numbers of this valuable historical journal which have appeared for the present year, contain the five following articles:—

1. David Joris of Delft, his Life, Doctrine, and Sect, by Friedrich Rippold of Emmerich.
2. The Weigelians and Rosicrucians of the Hessian Church in the 16th and 17th centuries, by Karl Hochhuth.
3. History of the Church of the United Brethren in Livland, by Dr Johann Laurent.

4. The Church Visitation of 1528 in the district of Wittemberg, by F. Winter.

5. The Culdean Church of the 6th, 7th, and 8th centuries, by Dr Ebrard of Erlangen. Continued from Article 11 for 1862.

The first four of these papers have an interest chiefly for continental readers, but the last, by Dr Ebrard, is the second part of a monograph which only needs to be brought under the notice of British Christians in order to attract a great deal of their attention and sympathy. The first part of the paper appeared in the last number of the *Zeitschrift* for 1862, and contained an interesting introduction to the whole subject, and a full and exhaustive treatment of the question which first brought the Culdees into open collision with the papacy of Rome, viz., their quarto-deciman observance of Easter. The second paper occupies the whole of the third number for this year, and enters into a minute and deeply interesting discussion of, 1. The religion and theology of the Culdees; 2. The constitution of their church and the organization of their monasteries; 3. The miraculous accounts which occur in the history of their missions. The subject is to be continued in future numbers, and there is every prospect, from the well-known ability of the author, and the ardent interest which the subject seems to have excited in his mind, that his monograph, when finished, will form a very valuable addition to the literature of a subject which is eminently worthy of all the labour and research that can be bestowed upon it. Indeed, we expect that Dr Ebrard's revival of the subject will have the effect of stimulating British scholars to new and remunerative researches in this important field. Such researches are still necessary, and in Dr Ebrard's opinion still practicable; and it is the chief aim of his monograph to give an impulse to their being undertaken. He expresses himself on these points in the following terms:—"That there is need for a new and thorough treatment of the history of that Iro-Scottish mission church of the 6th, 7th, and 8th centuries, to whose faithful services the greatest part of Great Britain, Burgundy, and the Rhineland, and no small part of South Germany and Switzerland, owe the first preaching of the gospel after the storms of the irruption of the barbarians, will hardly be doubted by any who are acquainted with the history of those dark and confused centuries. If any one is disposed to think that no such new investigation is called for, these papers will be sufficient to bring him to a different opinion. Not that they have any pretension themselves to solve all the great problems which still exist on this field—all they aim at is to throw some measure of light upon the darkness, to shew how much still remains to be done, and to call forth the assistance of others in an investigation which no single human life has time or strength enough to overtake. Even the materials already known to exist lie widely scattered, and are still in great need of critical sifting; but how much manuscript-material may yet be slumbering in British, French, German, and Italian libraries? It is only when the attention of learned investigators in all these countries has been directed to the subject, that it will be possible, by dint of united and persevering research, to bring many precious documents to light. For the present my design is only to awaken the interest of historical science for that church, and to correct some common errors by the help of the materials which are already within reach."

We cannot enter here upon even the briefest statement of the results which Dr Ebrard has thus far reached. We can only state, in general, that they are such as cannot fail to be highly interesting and satisfactory to the protestant and evangelical mind, and that they are supported by a full and clear array of original historical authorities. It will be our care to bring these results at some length before our readers at some future early opportunity.

Zeitschrift für die gesammte Lutherische Theologie und Kirche. 1863.
Zweites Quartalheft.

This number contains an article of great interest from the pen of Professor Delitzsch of Erlangen, one of the editors, on the Apostle John and Philo, in which the points of resemblance and difference between Philo's doctrine of the Logos and that of St John are stated with great clearness and impartiality. The affinities between them, both in substance and form, are too numerous and close, he thinks, to be accidental; and without supposing that the apostle was a student of Philo's writings, he thinks, that when resident at Ephesus, which was in constant communication with Alexandria, the apostle might readily have intercourse with Jews and Christians of the latter city, who had become imbued with Philonic ideas; and that, recognising a certain amount of high theological truth in these, as well as a beautiful appropriateness in some of the language which Philo had made use of to express that truth, the apostle saw fit, under the sanction of the Spirit of truth, to incorporate what he approved of with his own teaching, and to apply it clearly and dogmatically to Christ, in whom alone it found or could find its verification and full expression. "The preaching of the apostles," says Delitzsch, "did not despise true ideas and forms of thought, which had already come into use, but it filled them with the substance of New Testament saving truth. It not only brought forward a direct proof that Old Testament prophecy is all yea and amen in Christ, but it also proved indirectly that all the problems of religious philosophy found their solution in him; that all truth-seeking finds in him its end, and all the yearnings and dim anticipations of humanity their satisfaction and their light. As Christianity set free the spirit of the Old Testament revelation from the fetters which bound it, and separated the imperishable gold of its substance from the dross of 'the elements of the world' with which it was mingled, so was it a purifying fire for Hellenistic and Hellenic thought. It consecrated and glorified the measure of truth which was contained in these systems, and also the forms of language which they had invented for the setting forth of truth. The Alexandrian, and especially the Philonic, doctrine of the Logos, contained truth which could not be denied by Christianity, and forms of language which it filled with the true substance instead of a false one. With all this, however, Christianity still remained something new and original, which the world had never heard or known before. For its substance is not any new doctrine respecting the relation of God to the world which remains always the same, but the establishment of a new relation between God and man, by the work of redemption historically wrought out by a Divine Redeemer."

Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie, herausgegeben, von Dr LIEBKNECHT in Dresden, Dr DORNER in Berlin, &c. Achter Band, Erster Heft.

This important theological quarterly is now in its eighth volume. It is one of the chief organs of what has been called the mediative school, whose aim is to mediate between the old Lutheran orthodoxy and the scientific, critical spirit of the age. It is difficult to say by which of the two parties from which this school separates itself it is most disliked, whether by the high Lutheran party, which hates it for making too many concessions to unbelief, or by the extreme rationalist party, which hates it for still clinging too much to Christian faith. Inevitably, of course, the productions which appear from time to time in the *Jahrbücher*, and in the *Studien und Kritiken*, the other chief organ of the school, are of a very mixed character, often such as we can fully accept and greatly admire, but often also such as we cannot approve of, or regard otherwise than with deep dislike and

regret, as needlessly unsettling the old foundations, and giving too much encouragement to the dangerous and destructive criticism which has wrought such havoc in the continental churches.

We have an example of the better kind of articles which appear in these journals, in the present number of the *Jahrbücher*, in a paper of Dr Zöckler of Giessen, on the unity of the human race as descended from a single pair. The author takes the Christian side of the question, and defends it with great ability, and with full possession of all the recent science of various kinds—palaeontological, physiological, and philological—which has been brought to bear upon the subject. The paper is drawn up in the form of a lecture, which seems to have been delivered before some public assembly, but it is enriched with ample scientific notes and references. In these he draws largely from French sources, especially from a series of papers upon the same subject communicated by the Paris academician Mons. de Quatrefages, to the *Revue des deux Mondes*; but he is also quite at home in the speculations of English and American writers, to which he often refers. The paper is one which might be advantageously transferred to one of our own theological journals. It closes with the following remarks, which bring out the author's opinion as to the extent to which scientific renderings can be carried in support of the common biblical view:—"To prove the scientific possibility of the unity of the human race is all that can be effected by scientific investigations. The proof cannot be carried farther; it must always stop short at that point, content with shewing the invalidity of all the doubts and objections which appear to lie with more or less weight against this view,—the only one which duly recognises and protects the moral dignity of mankind. The unity of the human race, as founded upon the unity of their creation, as an actual fact, must always remain a matter of religious and moral faith; but of a faith which will be all the more confident and secure, the more it is provided with a substratum of able and exact scientific evidence, in proof that what it accepts as a fact of divine revelation, has a scientific possibility which cannot be shaken by any of the opposing arguments which have been set up against it." P. L.

XIII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

Small Sins. By the Rev. ALEXANDER BALLOCH GROSART, First United Presbyterian Church, Kinross. London: James Nisbet & Co. 1863.

All lovers of the Puritan divines in general, and of the heavenly-minded Richard Sibbes in particular, will welcome the appearance of his latest and best biographer, the careful and loving editor of his works, in the field of independent authorship. Knowing nothing of Mr Grosart but what we had been able to gather from his own preface and memoir of Sibbes, prefixed to the edition of his works now issuing from the press, and deeply impressed with the rare and happy combination of qualities which he had brought to the execution of his task, a zeal of antiquarian research wedded to the passion and fervour of a poetic imagination, it was with no small curiosity that we turned to the little treatise before us. Though written and preached originally in the regular course of pastoral duty, as a discourse suitable to a communion service, we cannot speak of it as a "sermon" in the ordinary sense of the term. It was natural that those who first listened to

its glowing thoughts and grave earnest counsels, should wish to possess it in some enduring form, and to them, as indeed to all its readers, its value will be enhanced by the profuse annotations, and chiefly the "golden sentences" from his favourite divines with which the author has enriched and illuminated the original manuscript. Only a mind of ripe and liberal culture, and truly catholic sympathies, keen of sight and strong upon the wing to range far and wide, could have accumulated the materials that shew such varied illustration on the subject from sources so dissimilar.

The words of the Song of Songs, "Take us the foxes, the little foxes that spoil the vines," present an image which our elder divines have loved to spiritualise, the dangerous and deadly power that lurks in even the least sin to hinder the work of grace in the soul, and blight the beauty and fruitfulness of the church, the vineyard of the Lord. Mr Grosart may be said in one sense to build upon a plan the lines of which have been already laid down. As might have been anticipated, every page bears pleasant testimony in its antique cast of diction and affluence of Scriptural allusion, to the influence which a long and close fellowship with those whom he calls his "daily, almost hourly, companions and counsellors," has had on his mind. Yet not less noticeable in his tractate is its adaptation to the special wants and evils of the time. It is a faithful exposure of the "little sins" that more easily beset the Christian profession in these latter days, and to a lamentable extent clog the action and impair the efficiency of the church, the specks of dust that by their friction hinder the smooth swift working of its wheels. With all the writer's brilliant opulence of imagery, there is no lack of plain direct speaking to the conscience. What could be more pointed and pertinent than his remarks on one of the prevailing sins of religious society:—

EVIL SPEAKING.

"How like a 'wild beast' would it glare upon us were there lying on our conscience the 'damned spot' of murder! It would not 'out.' . . . But let it take the form of 'evil-speaking,' by which a reputation is stabbed, a character murdered, and then it is only a 'little sin.' . . . Yet what a solemn, ay, awful thing, this 'little sin' that brings no sting is in his estimate! How near akin to murder it is, that murder that whitens to ashen pallor. Listen to the law of the Lord: 'Who shall abide in thy holy hill? He that backbiteth not ('biteth not back') with his tongue, nor doeth evil to his neighbour, nor TAKETH UP a reproach against his neighbour' (Ps. xv. 2, 3). Mark! 'taketh up'—not originating, not devising, nor 'framing' it; but 'taking up' the thing that should be let lie in its own nastiness, and giving it feet to run, wings to fly: 'taking it up,' and wiping it, and giving it respectability! The man who does that 'small sin' violates the law of God, and, unpardoned, never can dwell 'in the holy hill.'"—(Pp. 39-41.)

In the enforcement of the main position of his argument that little sins are as really sinful as larger, the following characteristic passage occurs:—

LITTLE SINS AS SINFUL AS LARGE.

"You recognise and act upon this in other things. For who does not see that the tiniest flaw or fracture in a diamond vitiates the whole gem, be it a very Koh-i-noor—that the smallest streak or strain sets aside the marble block of Carrara, that is like the driven snow—that the slightest spot or speck dims to rejection the whole polished *speculum*—that the most insignificant leak is perilous? In these cases it will not arrest the verdict to allege the fault is so very small. Actual transactions establish this. Once a famous ruby was offered to this country. The report of the crown jeweller was that it was the finest that he had ever seen or heard of, but that one of

its facets—one of the 'little' cuttings of the face—was slightly fractured. The result was, that almost invisible flaw reduced its value by thousands of pounds, and it was rejected from the regalia of England. Again: when Canova was about to commence his great statue of the great Napoleon, his keenly-observant eye detected a tiny red line running through the upper portion of the splendid block, that at infinite cost had been fetched from Paros, and he refused to lay a chisel on it. Once more: in the story of the early struggles of the elder Herschel, while he was working out the problem of gigantic telescope-*specula*, you will find that he made scores upon scores ere he got one to satisfy him. A scratch like the slenderest spider-cord sufficed to place among the spoiled what had cost him long weeks of toil and anxiety."—(Pp. 33-35.)

Very beautifully again is this said:—

"I know that even the big planet, while it sweeps on its pathway of light, thrills with a disturbing tremor if any foreign object swims across its orbit; and similarly I know, place anything between the heart and Christ, there will be not utter 'falling from the way,' but certain disturbance of the calm of the resting soul that hath found rest in Him."

DUTY IN REGARD TO ALL SINS.

"'Take us the foxes.' Our part in regard to sins, lesser or larger, is to 'take' them for Jesus, and to 'take' them to Jesus; telling him, morning after morning, in ejaculations through the passing day, and night after night, even every one of them we ourselves know. Let us try in our own puny strength to 'destroy' sin, even to overmaster it—try ourselves to 'mortify' so much as one 'lust' of the flesh, or of the spirit—try in the strength of the grace that is in us to overcome our heart-intruding sins—and our strength will be weakness, our wisdom folly. We must carry ALL, ALL, ALL to Jesus, and ask him to deal with them; ask him to guard the 'vineyard' of our soul; ask him to relume the silver lamp of conscience in its shrine; ask him to prevent or heal the 'spoiling' of leaf, or blossom, or tendril, or 'tender grape'; ask him to keep out, or to drive out, or destroy the 'foxes, the little foxes.' And when we make the sad discovery, as we are bowed in solitary prayer, or at the family altar, or 'searching the word,' or in the house of God, or at the prayer-meeting, or at the table of the Lord, that our vineyard wall has been overleapt—the sentinel watchtower undermined—the vines and 'tender grapes' teeth-pierced—the fruits of grace damaged—we must turn, yea, run, yea, flee to him, and ask of him that he will work our healing, and 'slay' our enmity. . . . Blessed be our Divine Gardener! (for Mary was not mistaken—He is 'THE GARDENER')—he has his loving eye upon us."—(Pp. 97-99.)

Enough has been said to shew the freshness and forcibleness of Mr Grosart's treatment of his subject, and to commend his little treatise to careful study and wide circulation. If at times we note with critical eye his super-abounding copiousness of diction and lavish exuberance of fancy, the subject is one that lends itself to pictorial handling, and a writer who so well appreciates the grand and fervid simplicities of the Puritan mould of speech, will come in due time to chasten and prune the luxuriance which sometimes hides the fruit.

The treatise is meant to be the first of a series of works, original and selected, to be issued from time to time in uniform style. We observe that the title of the book as published has been changed from "Little Sins," the form in which it was first printed for private circulation, to "Small Sins." We do not think the change by any means an improvement. It commends itself neither to eye nor ear, to understanding nor taste: It may seem a

trivial point, but Mr Grosart, of all men, will not deem us hyper-critical in pointing out a "little sin" of style, one of the merest slips or peccadilloes of authorship.

The Divine Human in the Scriptures. By TAYLER LEWIS. London: James Nisbet & Co. 1863.

The title of this treatise may startle, if not scare away, some readers, as savouring of rationalistic phraseology. In a brief prefatory note we are assured that in America, "the name of Professor Lewis, who is highly reputed as a Christian and a scholar, would be an effectual defence against any such idea of the nature of the work." And the slightest perusal of it is enough to dispel any such suspicion. Few treatises are more at variance with the spirit in which rationalism treats the holy Scriptures, and few, we think, are more fitted to counteract the vicious and wide-spreading influence of that system. By "*The Divine Human in the Scriptures*," the author does not mean that they are partly of divine and partly of human origin, but points to the fact that they are not only divinely communicated through the minds and the language of man, but also divinely adapted to the capacities, and fitted to engage the sympathies of humanity. The main object of the author is to demonstrate the *naturalness* of Scripture, and from this to infer its divine origin and authority. On this principle, and in direct opposition to the low theory of inspiration vented by Arnold, and widely prevailing in England, Mr Lewis pleads for verbal inspiration. The following is his idea of inspiration, which we give in his own words:—"It must, then, be one of the most unfaltering deductions of such a subdued spirit, thus believing in revelation as a fact as well as an idea, that not only its thought but its very language is divine. This one may hold without being driven to that extreme view of verbal inspiration which regards the sacred penmen as mere amanuenses, writing words and painting figures dictated to them by a power and intelligence acting in a manner wholly extraneous to the laws of their own spirits, except so far as those laws are merely physical or mechanical. We may believe that such divine intelligence employed in this sacred work, not merely the hands of its *media*, not merely the vocal organs played upon by an outward material affluus, not merely the mechanical impressions of the senses, or the more inward, though still outwardly reflected images of the fancy and the memory, but also the thoughts, the modes of thinking, modes of feeling, modes of conceiving, and, hence, of outward expression—in a word, the intellectual, emotional, and imaginative temperaments, all their own, each peculiar to the respective instruments, yet each directed, controlled, made holy, truthful, pure, as became the trustworthy agents, for the time being, of so holy a work. The face is human, most distinctly human, yet each lineament, besides its own outward expression, represents also some part of that photographic process that had its origin in the world of light, and came down from 'the Father of Lights, with whom there is no parallax or shadow of turning.'"—(P. 17, 18.) Or, as he expresses it elsewhere, "It is God's chosen language to us—the words and images specially selected and specially arranged with a reference to the wants of our human race in their peculiar moral history; . . . and it should be therefore, of all others, that which we should employ when we 'take with us words and return unto the Lord.' As far as possible, our prayers, our praises, our confessions, our thanksgivings, all our devotional intercourse with Deity, should be in the very language of Scripture,—in that sacred speech which he has prepared and given to us, even as he originally taught to Adam the language of the common life and common wants." The same truly rational, and yet affectionate and reverential, treatment is applied to the miracles of Scripture. Here he shews, in a manner as touching as it is convincing, the vast, the

infinite distance at which the miraculous narratives of Scripture stand from the lying legends of false religions, and how far the supernatural in Scripture differs from the *unnatural*, as it appears in the incredible and revolting monstrosities of superstition.

We have been particularly struck with the beautiful demonstration of "the wonderful adaptability of Scripture." After shewing that "every other assumed revelation has been addressed to but one phase of humanity, —adapted to one age, to one people, to one peculiar style of human thought, —that their books have never assumed a cosmical character, or been capable of any catholic expansion," and illustrated this from the cases of Zoroaster, Confucius, the Hindoo writings, and the Koran—"Each," he says, "has its peculiar phase, chronological or ethnological, out of which it cannot be transplanted. The Bible alone makes disciples of every race. It would be hard to decide where it has more strongly displayed its subduing power,—on the Asiatic, the African, or the European mind. Descending with the ages, and through every phase of humanity, it has met them all; it has warred with them all; and its uniform triumph warrants the induction, even aside from faith, that it will surely survive them all."—(P. 88).

We regret that our space will not admit of our quoting more largely from this well-timed and masterly publication, otherwise we might have adverted to his remarks on the "internal truthfulness of the Scriptures," embodying the best answers we have seen to objectors of the Colenso stamp, and to his finely discriminative estimate of the character of Paul. Altogether, without committing ourselves to all the views of the author, we know few books of the same size more fitted, from the beauty of its diction, to arrest the thoughtless, or from the force of its reasoning to satisfy the thoughtful reader.

What is Sabbath-Breaking? A Discussion occasioned by the proposal to open the Botanical Gardens of Edinburgh on Sunday Afternoons. Edinburgh. 1863.

There is a class of writers among us bent on the desecration of the Lord's Day, who seem animated by all the proselytising zeal of the ancient Scribes on whom our Lord pronounced such an emphatic "Woe." Nothing can exceed their industry in propagating their views. While our worthy fathers were at pains to instil into the minds of their children a profound regard to the holy Sabbath; while they laboured, by precept and example, by every sanction, civil and religious, to preserve inviolate the sacred enclosure, our modern anti-Sabbatarians seem determined to undo all their work, and uproot the customs they planted in the land; and, as if the carnal mind of man were not already sufficiently prone to forget the day which God has enjoined us to "remember" they supply arguments to profaneness, and teach men how they may violate God's law according to the Scripture. For this purpose, the Sunday League of London has secured the services of the writer of the brochure now before us, which is compounded of sundry letters addressed to the *Scotsman* newspaper, under the imposing signature of 'One who values the Lord's Day,' with a vast array of notes and illustrations. Whoever the writer may be, one thing is clear, that he is familiar with Biblical Criticism; and, judging from the present production, he seems fond of startling novelties in Scripture interpretation, and of talking neologically about the sacred penmen. We have no space for minutely criticising this learned Theban; but there is one point on which he lays the main stress of his argumentation in behalf of a loose observance of the Sabbath, and on which we cannot avoid saying a few words. We refer to his interpretation of verse 13th of the 58th chapter of Isaiah:—"If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy pleasure on my holy day; and call the Sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord, honourable; and shalt honour him, not doing thine own ways, nor

finding thine own pleasure, nor speaking thine own words," &c. It seems that in their petition against the opening of the Botanic Gardens on the Lord's day, the Sabbath Alliance characterised it as "a violation of the divine law, which forbids us from doing our own pleasure on God's holy day." Upon this our scribe, who "Values the Lord's Day," takes them severely to task for misinterpreting and misapplying the Scripture. "Supposing," he says, "the Jewish law of the Sabbath to bind the Gentile Christians, I say that the prohibition to the Jews by Isaiah (or whoever else wrote the 68th chapter of the book), against 'finding their own pleasure' on God's holy day, can be rationally understood only as referring to pleasure contrary to the Divine pleasure, and hence emphatically styled 'their own.' What the particular pleasure alluded to by the prophet was, we are not informed; but it may be partly inferred that the people he addressed were prone either to *work* upon the Sabbath—the sin for which the Jews are expressly reproved by their prophets—or to *mis-spend the day of leisure in vicious enjoyment*." Upon this he rings the changes throughout his letters; contending, with the Vulgate, that the word translated by us "pleasure," is *voluntas* (will), not *voluptas* (enjoyment.) What meaning the Sabbath Alliance may have attached to the term, we cannot say; it is not likely they used it in any other sense than that of *self-will* or *self-pleasing*, in opposition to "delighting" in the Sabbath. But what shall we say of the interpretation put upon it by this learned critic? According to him, the expression, "not finding their own pleasure," means mis-spending the Sabbath in "vicious enjoyments," and as the phrase is equivalent with "doing their own ways" on that holy day, it follows that as they could unquestionably do their own work on other days so they might do their own pleasure on other days also; in other words, they might spend all other days but the Sabbath in "vicious enjoyments." On the same principle of exegesis, it would follow that when the Jews were prohibited to "speak their own words" on the Sabbath, the meaning must be that they were only to abstain from *speaking bad words* on that day; leaving them at liberty to speak as many of these as they chose on other days! Every one must see at a glance that whatever may be the meaning of "our own pleasure," forbidden in this passage, whether it may be the *voluntas* or the *voluptas*,—it must refer to *lawful pleasure*, even as the *work* forbidden must refer to *lawful work*. To our mind it appears very evident that what is forbidden is just the liberty of doing whatever we please on that holy day. We are not to look upon the day as our own property, but as God's. "Six days shalt thou labour and do all *thy* work," all *thy* pleasure, in thought, word, and deed; "but the seventh is the Sabbath of the Lord *thy* God;" on that day thou art not at liberty to consult thine own pleasure, but God's pleasure. And this view of the passage covers, in our estimation, all that those contend for who think that, on the Lord's day, we are not at liberty to do whatsoever we may please to do, and may lawfully do, on other days.

We may add, that great advantage has been taken in this publication of the corporeal rest and refreshment allowed to the Jews under that dispensation of fleshly forms and figures; without adverting to the change under the gospel, indicated by their own prophets, and introduced by our Lord, when the Sabbath, like all other institutions, is to be hallowed, not by mere bodily resting or festive enjoyment, but "in spirit and in truth"—spirit superseding matter, and truth supplanting the shadow. But "strike high or strike low," there is no pleasing some people; they must have their gibe or their sneer at the Sabbath of old Scotland. Tell them they ought not to do their own pleasure on God's holy day, and they will charge you with Jewish bigotry, and hurl at you the epithets of Pharisees and Judaizers. Tell them that they are mistaken, and that the Jews enjoyed themselves on their Sabbaths; and, without perceiving the gross inconsistency of the two-charges, they will twit you in the same breath with Rabbinical joviality, and insist on reviving the Judaical Sabbath!

Academic Addresses on Various Occasions. By W. D. KILLEN, D.D. Belfast: W. M'Comb. 1863.

These admirable addresses, delivered to the students of Belfast Presbyterian College, relate to the following topics: 1. The character and position of candidates for the ministry. 2. The supply of candidates for the ministry. 3. Colleges, their history and claims. 4. The Scriptures and the preacher. They are all marked by the good sense, the manly piety, and Christian spirit of their author. We are happy to observe the hopeful spirit in which Dr Killen speaks of the prospects of candidates for the ministry. Theological students of all denominations would do well to peruse these addresses, and none of our people can do so without feeling a deeper interest in our collegiate institutions.

The Standard of the Cross among the Flags of the Nations; a Narrative of Christian Effort in the Great Exhibition. By V. M. S. London: James Nisbet & Co.

A young lady, daughter of a country clergyman, happened to read that at the former "Great Exhibition" a foreigner came to this country and returned to his own without having been asked whether he had a soul to be saved. She determined to wipe away this reproach so far as she could, and stirred up a friend to visit the Exhibition. This friend wrote letters to her, giving an account of his progress, while she aided and assisted in every way in her power. The close of the work was a meeting for tea, presided over by the Earl of Shaftesbury, within the building, and attended by 800 or more of the attendants at the various establishments within the Exhibition, addressed by Mr Capel Molyneux, Mr Baptist W. Noel, and others, and which, we doubt not, was productive of good permanent results. This volume is chiefly composed of the letters written to the clergyman's daughter referred to by the gentleman who visited the Exhibition for the purpose chiefly of doing good to the souls of the ignorant and out of the way who might be met with there. The letters are full of interest, many of the facts are curious and striking, and the volume closes with an account of the meeting to which we have referred. As a memorial of the Great Exhibition of 1862, were it on no higher grounds, the book is worth a place on the shelves of a full library.

The Book of Bible Prayer; containing all the Prayers recorded to have been offered in the Bible, with a Short Introduction to each. By JOHN B. MARSH, Manchester. London: Simpkin, Marshall, & Co. 1863.

We regard this as a very handy little volume. It is one we have long wished to see. Most thoughtful students of the Bible have formed such a volume practically for themselves. "The short introduction to each," of which the title-page speaks, is very short—agreeably so. We have only the thing wanted, namely, all the prayers recorded in the Bible as having been offered. The Book of Psalms is the exception. As there are very many of the Psalms which are substantially prayers, it would have swelled the volume to an undue size to have given all the prayers that are recorded there. We have only one remark we care to add. There are only three, or at most four prayers of any considerable length recorded in the whole word of God. The first is that of Solomon, at the dedication of the temple; the second is "the confession of the Levites on the revival of the temple service;" the third is "the prayer of Daniel for the restoration of Jerusalem;" and the fourth is our Lord's intercessory prayer, recorded in the 17th chapter of John's gospel—all public prayers therefore. The book commends itself.

Extra Work of a London Pastor. London: The Book Society, Paternoster Row. 1863.

This volume is "the extra work" of the Rev. Samuel Martin of Westmin-

ster. It consists of a series of papers on various topics. There is a wide range of subjects discussed in the several essays. Most of them have appeared before, the major part as lectures to young men, delivered at Exeter Hall, and one or two are reproductions of old matter now out of print. Mr Martin did well to gather together these stray fragments. There is nothing ephemeral either in the subjects or in his manner of handling them. Mr Martin does a thing thoroughly; he goes to the bottom of it. If some of our younger preachers would read and digest this volume, it would help them to understand at least one of the elements that go to constitute a great preacher, and that is a thorough and minute acquaintance with the topic treated. Perhaps he might learn also that a great preacher thinks nothing in the shape of information too far out of the way for him to make himself familiar with it. He that would be a great preacher cannot know too much, too well, too accurately. One of the most interesting of the lectures is that on "money," which contains a full treatment of the whole subject. Another valuable lecture is entitled, "Anglo-Saxon Christianity and Augustin of Canterbury." There is also an excellent biographical sketch of Cardinal Wolsey, and a paper of great value on the reformation of criminals, which contains much valuable statistical information. The style of the volume is quite a model of terse, nervous, clear, and forcible, as well as elegant English.

Christ on Earth, from the Supper at Bethany to his Ascension into Glory.
By the Rev. JOSEPH BAYLER, D.D., Principal of St Aidan College, Birkenhead. London: Wertheim, Macintosh, & Hunt. 1863.

The title of this volume is not happily chosen, but the matter is solid, substantial, and excellent. The topics treated are the whole events and teaching of our Lord's last week on earth. There is evidence that good attention has been paid to the exegesis of the passages discussed, and the style is sometimes hortatory, sometimes expository, sometimes meditative. Dr Bayles has produced an excellent volume, sound in doctrine, elegant in style, substantial in matter, practical, experimental, and devotional.

The Kingdom and the People; or the Parables of our Lord Jesus Christ explained. With a Preface by the Rev. EDWARD GARBETT, M.A., Incumbent of St Bartholomew's, Gray's Inn Road. London: Sealey, Jackson, & Halliday. 1863.

This little volume is the work of a lady. But the theology is masculine, and the illustrations are apt and varied. The parables are brought together into groups, and after a statement of the main truth taught in each, they are illustrated by facts, anecdotes, and missionary memorabilia. There is a thoughtful preface, elegantly expressed, by Mr Garbett, Boyle lecturer for the present year. The volume is to be commended as sound, safe, and every way trustworthy.

The Messianic Prophecies of Isaiah; the Donnellan Lecture for 1862, with Appendices and Notes, &c. By WILLIAM DE BURGH, D.D. Dublin: Hodges, Smith, & Co. 1863.

Six Lectures, with Addenda, on Messianic Prophecies from Isaiah, the Donnellan Lecture for 1862. The contents are—The Last Days—Immanuel, the Branch and Root of Jesse—The Saviour Waited for—The Foundation Stone—The Way of the Lord Prepared—The Man of Sorrows—The Redeemer to come to Zion, and the Messiah. The author is an accomplished Hebraist, sound in doctrine, and millenarian in his views of prophetic interpretation.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

OCTOBER 1863.

ART. I.—*The Scottish Philosophy.**

THE Germans have histories without number of their philosophy from Kant to Hegel, with not a few historical reviews of the later speculations. The French, too, have numerous sketches of the philosophy of their country generally, and of individual systems, such as that of Descartes. It is no way to the credit of English thought, and least of all to that of the Scotch metaphysicians, that we have not in our language a history of the Scottish school of philosophy. There are valuable notices of it, it is true, in Dugald Stewart's *Historical Dissertation*, and in his *Eloges of Reid and Adam Smith*; but Stewart is far too dignified and general in his style to be able to give an articulate account of the special doctrines of the different masters of the school, or a vivid picture of the times, with many of the marked characteristics of which he had no sympathy. The best history of the Scottish Philosophy is by a Frenchman, and has not been translated into English. We look on the volume in which M. Cousin treats of the Scottish school, as containing upon the whole the most faultless of all his historical disquisitions. In his other volumes he scarcely does justice to Locke, whom he always judges from the evil consequences which have flowed from his philosophy on the continent, and he is not able to wrestle successfully with the powerful logical intellect of Kant; but he has a thorough appreciation of the excellencies of the Scottish metaphysicians, and when he finds fault, his criticisms are always worthy of

* For a series of short articles on this important subject, of which the present is the first, we are indebted to the Rev. Professor M'Cosh, LL.D., Belfast.—Ed. B. & F. E. R.

being considered. But it could not be expected of a foreigner, that he should thoroughly comprehend the state of Scotland when its peculiar philosophy arose, nor be able to estimate its relation to the national character. Without professing to supply what is wanting, we purpose to devote a few articles, the result of original research, to the elucidation of the rise and formation of the Scottish Philosophy. In this article we sketch the characteristics of the school, and the state of the country when it arose.

The Scottish Philosophy possesses a unity, not only in the circumstance that its expounders have been Scotchmen, but also and more specially in its method, its doctrines, and its spirit. It is distinguished by very marked and decided features—which we may represent as determined by the bones rather than the flesh or muscles.

I. It proceeds on the method of observation, professedly and really. In this respect it is different from nearly all the philosophies which went before, from many of those which were contemporary, and from some of those which still linger among us. The method pursued in Eastern countries, in ancient Greece and Rome, in the scholastic ages, and in the earlier ages of modern European speculation, had not been that of induction, either avowedly or truly. No doubt speculators have been obliged in all ages and countries to make some use of facts, in the investigation both of mind and matter. But in the earlier theosophies, physiologies, and philosophies, they looked at the phenomena of nature merely as furnishing a starting-point to their systems, or a corroboration of them; and their inquiries were conducted in the dogmatic, or deductive, or analytic manner, explaining phenomena by assumed principles, or bringing facts to support theories, or resolving the complexities of the universe by refined mental distinctions. This spirit had been banished from physical science, first, by the great realistic awakening of the sixteenth century; then by the profound wisdom and far-sighted sagacity of Bacon; and, finally, by the discoveries of Newton and the establishment of the Royal Society of London. But it lingered for some ages longer in mental science, from which it has not even yet been finally expelled. Bacon had declared, that his method was applicable to all other sciences as well as to the investigation of the material universe. "Does any one doubt (rather than object)," says he, "whether we speak merely of natural philosophy or of other sciences also, such as logics, ethics, politics, as about to be perfected by our method?" "We certainly," he replies, "understand all these things which have been referred to; and like as the vulgar logic, which regulates things by the syllogism, pertains not to the natural but all sciences, so ours, which proceeds by induction, embraces them all. For thus we would

form a history and tables concerning anger, fear, modesty, and the like, as also examples of civil affairs, not omitting the mental emotions of memory, composition, division, judgment, and the rest, just as we form such of heat and cold, of light, vegetation, and such like." Sir Isaac Newton had said in his *Optics*: "And if natural philosophy in all its parts, by pursuing this method, shall at length be perfected, the bounds of moral philosophy will also be enlarged." But the employment of the method of induction in the study of the human mind was for ages slow, wavering, and uncertain. It has been asserted, that Descartes proceeded on the method of induction; but the statement has been made by metaphysicians who have never correctly apprehended the mode of procedure recommended by Bacon. Descartes does indeed appeal to profound ideas, which may be regarded as mental facts; but it is not by them to arrive at laws by a gradual generalisation, it is rather to employ them as foundation stones of his structure, which is reared high above them by the joint dogmatic and deductive method, and on the geometric and not the inductive plan. It has been averred that Hobbes proceeded on the method of his friend Bacon; but Hobbes nowhere professes to do so: his doctrine of the origin of civil government is a mere theory, his system of the human mind and of morals is obtained by a very defective analysis, and, in fact, is mainly borrowed from Aristotle, whose profounder principles he is incapable of appreciating. It cannot be denied that Locke does proceed very largely in the way of observation; but it is a curious circumstance that he nowhere professes to follow the method of induction; and his great work may be summarily represented as an attempt to establish by internal facts the preconceived theory, that all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection. To the Scottish school belongs the merit of being the first avowedly and knowingly to follow the inductive method, and to employ it systematically in psychological investigation. As the masters of the school were the first to adopt it, so they, and those who have borrowed from them, are almost the only persons who have studiously adhered to it. The school of Condillac in France, and its followers in England and Germany, do indeed profess to attend to observation, but it is after the manner of the empiricists, described by Bacon as beginning with experience, but immediately abandoning it for premature hypotheses. It will be seen as we advance, that Kant followed the critical and not the inductive method. Hutcheson and Turnbull, and especially Reid and Stewart, have the credit of announcing unambiguously, that the human mind is to be studied exclusively by the method of observation, and of consistently employing this mode of procedure in all their investigations.

II. It employs self-consciousness as the instrument of observation. It may thus be distinguished from some other schools with which it has been confounded. Bacon, we have seen, did believe in the applicability of his method to all the mental sciences. But he had no clear apprehension of the agency by which the observation is to be accomplished ; he supposed it to be by " the history and tables concerning anger, fear, modesty, the memory, composition, division, judgment, and the like." In respect of the means of observation, philosophy is greatly indebted to Descartes, who taught men, in studying the human mind, to seize on great internal ideas. The questions started by Locke, and his mode of settling them, tend towards the same issue ; he dwells fondly on reflection as the alone source of the ideas which we have of the workings of the human mind, and ever appeals to the internal sense as an arbiter in discussions as to the origin of ideas. But the Scottish philosophers took a step in advance of any of their predecessors, inasmuch as they professed to draw all the laws of mental philosophy—indeed, their whole systems—from the observations of consciousness.

By this feature they are at once distinguished from those who would construct a science of the human mind from the observation of the brain or nerves, or generally from animal physiology. Not indeed that the Scottish philosophy is required, by its manner or its principles, to reject the investigation of the functions of the animal frame, as fitted to throw light on mental action. Certain of the masters of the school, such as Reid, Brown, and Hamilton, were well acquainted with physiology in its latest discoveries in their day, and carefully employed their knowledge to illustrate the operations of the human mind. There is nothing in the method, or the spirit, or the cherished doctrines of the school tending to discountenance or disparage a painstaking experimental investigation of the parts of the bodily frame most intimately connected with mental action. Possibly the next great addition may be made to psychology, when internal observation of the thoughts and feelings, and external observation of the brain and nerves and vital forces, are in circumstances to combine their lights. But in the days of the great masters of the Scottish school, physiology was not in a state, nor is it yet in a position, to furnish much aid in explaining mental phenomena. The instrument employed by them was the internal sense ; and they always maintained that it is only by its means that we can reach an acquaintance with mind proper, and of its various operations, and that the knowledge acquired otherwise must ever be regarded as subordinate and subsidiary. They might have admitted that the occasion of the production, and the modifications of our mental states, could so far be influenced by the cerebro-spinal mass, or the

forces operating in it ; but they strenuously maintained that we can know what our perceptions, and judgments, and feelings, and wishes, and resolves, and moral appreciations are, not by the senses or the microscope, not by chemical analysis, or the estimation of the vital forces, but solely through our inward experience revealed by consciousness.

But let us properly understand what the Scottish school intend when they maintain that a science of the human mind can be constructed only by immediate consciousness. They do not mean that the study of the mind can be prosecuted in no other way than by looking in for ever on the stream of thought as it flows on without interruption. The operation of introspection is felt to be irksome in the extreme if continued for any length of time, and will certainly be abandoned when thought is rapid or feeling is intense ; and those who trust to it exclusively are apt to fix their attention on a few favourite mental states, and omit many others no less characteristic of the human mind. He who would obtain an adequate and comprehensive view of our complex mental nature must not be satisfied with occasional glances at the workings of his own soul : he must take a survey of the thoughts and feelings of others so far as he can gather them from their deeds and from their words ; from the acts of mankind generally, and of individual men, women, and children ; from universal language as the expression of human cogitation and sentiment ; and from the commerce we hold with our fellow-men by conversation, by writing, or by books. Reid in particular is ever appealing to men's actions and language, as a proof that there must be certain principles, beliefs, and affections in the mind. Still this evidence ever carries us back to consciousness, as after all both the primary witness and the final judge of appeal ; as it is only by it and by what has passed through our own minds, that we can come to discern and appreciate the feelings of our brother men.*

III. By the observations of consciousness, principles are reached which are prior to and independent of experience. This is another grand characteristic of the school, distinguishing it, on the one hand, from empiricism and sensationalism ; and on the other hand, from the dogmatism and *a priori*

* Mr Buckle, in his *History of Civilization*, vol. ii., professes a deep acquaintance with the Scottish metaphysicians of last century, who are represented by him as proceeding in the deductive, and not in the inductive, method. He adds, that in Scotland "men have always been deductive." But Mr B. was never able to understand the difference between the method of deduction on the one hand, and the method of induction with consciousness as the agent of observation, on the other : the former derives consequences by reasoning from principles, the latter reaches principles by internal observation. That his whole views on this subject were confused is evident, from the circumstance that he represents women as proceeding (like Scotchmen) by deduction!

speculation of all ages and countries. It agrees with the former in holding that we can construct a science of mind only by observation, and out of the facts of experience; but then it separates from them, inasmuch as it resolutely maintains that we can discover principles which are not the product of observation and experience, and which are in the very constitution of the mind, and have there the sanction of the Author of our nature. These are somewhat differently apprehended and described by the masters of the school, some taking a deeper and others a more superficial view of them. Hutcheson calls them senses, and finds them in the very constitution of the mind. Reid designates them principles of common sense, and represents them as being natural, original, and necessary. Stewart characterises them as fundamental laws of human thought and belief. Brown makes them intuitions simple and original. Hamilton views them under a great many aspects, but seems to contemplate them most frequently and fondly after the manner of Kant, as *a priori* forms or conditions. But whatever minor or major differences there may be in the fulness of their exposition, or in the favourite views which they individually prefer, all who are truly of the Scottish school agree in maintaining that there are laws, principles, or powers in the mind anterior to any reflex observation of them, and acting independently of the philosophers' classification or explanation of them. While the Scottish school thus far agrees with the rational and *a priori* systems, it differs from them most essentially, in refusing to admit any philosophic maxims except those laws or principles which can be shewn by self-inspection to be in the very constitution of the mind. It has always looked with doubt, if not suspicion, on all purely abstract and rational discussions, such as that by which Samuel Clarke demonstrated the existence of God; and its adherents have commonly discountenanced or opposed all ambitious *a priori* systems, such as those which were reared in such imposing forms in Germany in the end of last, and the beginning of the present, century.

These three characters are found in a more or less decided form in the works of the great masters of the school. I am not sure indeed whether they have been formally announced by all, nor whether they have always been consistently followed out. I allow that the relation of the three principles one to another, and their perfect congruity and consistency, have not always been clearly discerned or accurately expressed. In particular, I am convinced that most of the Scottish metaphysicians have not clearly seen how it is that we must ever proceed in mental science by observation, while there are at the same time in the mind laws superior to and independent of observation; how it

is that while there are *a priori* principles in the mind, it is yet true that we cannot construct a philosophy by *a priori* speculation. But with these explanations and deductions, it may be maintained that the characters specified are to be found either announced or acted on in the pages of all the writers of the school, from Hutcheson to Hamilton. Whenever they are discovered in the works of persons connected with Scotland, the writers are to be placed among the adherents of the school. Wherever there is the total absence of any one of them, we cannot allow the author a place in the fraternity.

The Scottish metaphysicians and moralists have left their impress on their own land, not only on the ministers of religion, and through them upon the body of the people, but also on the whole thinking mind of the country. The chairs of mental science in the Scottish colleges have had more influence than any others in germinating thought in the minds of the Scottish youth, and in giving a permanent bias and direction to their intellectual growth. We have the express testimony of a succession of illustrious men for more than a century, to the effect that it was Hutcheson, or Smith, or Reid, or Beattie, or Stewart, or Jardine, or Mylne, or Brown, or Chalmers, or Wilson, or Hamilton, who first made them feel that they had a mind, and stimulated them to independent thought. We owe it to the lectures and writings of the professors of mental science, acting always along with the theological training and preaching of the country, that men of ability in Scotland have commonly been more distinguished by their tendency to inward reflection than inclination to sensuous observation. Nor is it to be omitted that the Scottish metaphysicians have written the English language, if not with absolute purity, yet with propriety and taste—some of them, indeed, with elegance and eloquence—and have thus helped to advance the literary cultivation of the country. All of them have not been men of learning in the technical sense of the term, but they have all been well informed in various branches of knowledge—it is to a Scottish metaphysician we owe the “Wealth of Nations”—several of them have had very accurate scholarship; and the last great man among them was not surpassed in erudition by any scholar of his age. Nor has the influence of the Scottish philosophy been confined to its native soil. The Irish province of Ulster has felt it quite as much as Scotland, in consequence of so many youths from the north of Ireland having been educated at Glasgow University. Though Scotch metaphysics are often spoken of with contempt in the southern part of Great Britain, yet they have had their share in fashioning the thought of England, and in particular, have done much good in preserving it, for two or three ages towards the end of last century and the beginning of this, from

falling altogether into low materialistic and utilitarian views; and in this our day, Mr Mill has got some of his views through his father from Stewart and Brown, and an active philosophic school at Oxford is building on the foundation laid by Hamilton. The United States of America, especially the writers connected with the Presbyterian and Congregational Churches, have felt pleasure in acknowledging their obligations to the Scottish thinkers. It is a most interesting circumstance, that when the higher metaphysicians of France undertook, in the beginning of this century, the laborious work of throwing back the tide of materialism, scepticism, and atheism which had swept over the land, they called to their aid the sober and well-grounded philosophy of Scotland. Nor is it an unimportant fact in the history of philosophy, that the great German metaphysician, Emmanuel Kant, was roused, as he acknowledges, from his dogmatic slumbers by the scepticism of David Hume.

But the great merit of the Scottish philosophy lies in the large body of truth which it has—if not discovered at least—settled on a foundation which can never be moved. It has added very considerably to our knowledge of the human mind, bringing out to view the characteristics of mental as distinguished from material action; throwing light on perception through the senses; offering valuable observations on the intellectual powers, and on the association of ideas; furnishing, if not ultimate, yet very useful provisional classifications of the mental faculties; unfolding many of the peculiarities of man's moral and emotional nature, of his conscience, and of his taste for the beautiful; resolving many complex mental phenomena into their elements; throwing aside by its independent research a host of traditional errors which had been accumulating for ages; and, above all, establishing certain primary truths as a foundation on which to rear other truths, and as a breakwater to resist the assaults of scepticism.

In comparing it with other schools, we find that the transcendental speculators of Germany have started discussions which they cannot settle, and followed out their principles to extravagant consequences, which are a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole method on which they proceed. Again, the physiologists have failed to furnish any explanation of consciousness, of thought, of moral approbation, or of any other peculiar mental quality. Meanwhile, the philosophy of consciousness has co-ordinated many facts, ascertained many mental laws, explained many curious phenomena of our inward experience, and established a body of intuitive truths. By its method of careful observation, and by it alone, can the problems agitated in the rival *a priori* schools be solved, so far as they can be solved by the human faculties. Whatever aid physiological research as it advances may furnish to psychology, it

must always be by the study, not of the brain, and nerves, and vital forces, but of our conscious operations, that a philosophy of the human mind is to be constructed. Whether the Scottish philosophy is to proceed exclusively in its old method, and go on co-ordinating facts with ever-increasing care, and expressing them with greater and greater precision, or whether it is to borrow from other schools—say to resolve in its own way the questions started by Schelling and Hegel, or to call in physiology to account for the rise of mental states, it is at least desirable that we should now have a combined view of what has been accomplished by the philosophy of consciousness. This is what is attempted in these articles in regard to the founders of the school.

It should be freely admitted that the Scottish school has not discovered all truth, nor even all discoverable truth, in philosophy; that it does not pretend to have done so is one of its excellencies, proceeding from the propriety of its method and the modesty of its character. Among the writings of the Scottish school, it is only in those of Sir William Hamilton that we find some of the profoundest problems of philosophy, such as the conditions of human knowledge and the idea of the infinite discussed; and the majority of the genuine adherents of the school are inclined to think that on these subjects his conclusions are too bare and negative, and that he has not reached the full truth. Reid and Stewart are ever telling us that they have obtained only partial glimpses of truth, and that a complete science of the human mind is to be achieved solely by a succession of inquirers prosecuting the investigation through a series of ages. Brown and Hamilton make greater pretensions to success in erecting complete systems, but this is one of the defects of these great men, arising, as we shall see, from their departing from the genuine Scottish method, and adopting, so far, other and continental modes of philosophizing, the one betaking himself to the empirical analysis of the French sensational school, and the other adopting the critical method of Kant; and it is to be said in behalf of Brown, that he never mounts into a region of cloudy speculation; and in favour of Hamilton, that his most vigorous efforts were employed in shewing how little can be known by man. All the great masters of the school not only admit, but are at pains to shew, that there are mysteries in the mind of man, and in every department of human speculation, which they cannot clear up. This feature has tempted some to speak of the whole school with contempt, as doing little because attempting little. They have been charged with their country's sin of caution; and the national reproach of poverty has been unsparingly cast upon them. Let them not deny, let them avow that the charge is just. Let them acknowledge that they have proceeded in time

past in the patient method of induction, and avow openly, and without shame, that they mean to do so in time to come. Let it be their claim, that if they have not discovered all truth, they have discovered and settled some truth; while they have not promulgated much error, or wasted their strength in rearing showy fabrics, admired in one age and taken down the next. It is the true merit of Scotchmen that, without any natural advantages of soil or climate, they have carefully cultivated their land, and made it yield a liberal produce, and that they have been roused to activity, and stimulated to industry, by their very poverty. Let it, in like manner, be the boast of the Scottish philosophy, that it has made profitable use of the materials at its disposal, and that it has by patience and shrewdness succeeded in establishing a body of fundamental truth which can never be shaken, but which shall stand as a bulwark in philosophy, morals, and theology, as long as time endures.

During the seventeenth century, the three kingdoms had passed through a series of political and religious convulsions, and in the opening of the following century the Protestant people were seeking to enjoy and improve the seasonable—as they reckoned it the providential—rest which was brought by the Revolution Settlement. The floods had swept over the country, partly to destroy and partly to fertilise, and men are busily employed in removing the evils (as they reckon them) which had been left, and in sowing, planting, and building on the now dry and undisturbed territory. In particular, there is a strong desire on the part of the great body of the people to make the best use of the peace which they now possess, and to employ it to draw forth the material resources of the country. As a consequence of the intellectual stimulus which had mainly been called forth by the previous great contests, and of the liberty achieved, and the industry in active exercise, the riches of the nation are increasing, agriculture begins to make progress, great commercial cities are beginning to aggregate, household and social elegance and comfort are sought after, and in a great measure secured, refinement of manners is cultivated, and civilisation is advancing. In the eager pursuit of these worldly ends, the generation then springing up scarcely set sufficient value on the higher blessings which had been secured by the struggles of their forefathers. By the profound discussions of the seventeenth century, the great body of the people had been made to read their Bibles, and to inquire into the foundation and functions of political government. By the deeds done, by the sufferings endured, and the principles enunciated, the great questions of civil and religious liberty had been started, and opinions set afloat which were ultimately to settle them theoretically and practically. But the race now being

reared did not sufficiently appreciate the advantages thence accruing. They were kept from doing so by two impressions left by the terrible battles which had been fought on their soil.

Every one who has read the history of the period knows that a large amount of profligacy had prevailed among certain classes in the latter reigns of the Stuarts. This rampant vice led naturally to religious infidelity, and the two continued to act and react on each other. Self-indulgent men were little inclined to value the truths of spiritual religion, and lent their ears to plausible systems of belief or unbelief which left them undisturbed in their worldly enjoyments; while youths who had broken loose from the old religious trammels were often tempted to break through moral restraints likewise, and to rush into vice, as exhibiting spirit and courage. The great cavalier party, composed largely of the upper classes, and of those who aspired to rise to them, had been all along in the habit of ridiculing the fervour and strictness of the puritan movement, which had sprung up chiefly among the middle and better portion of the lower classes, and of describing all who made solemn pretensions to religion as being either knaves or fools. Many of those who had originally brought the charge did not believe it in their hearts, as they had been constrained to respect the great and good qualities of their opponents; but they succeeded in instilling their sentiments into the minds of their children, who were taught to regard it as a mark of a gentleman to swear and to scoff at all religion. From whatever causes it may have proceeded, it is certain that in the first half of the eighteenth century there is a frequent and loud complaint on the part of theologians, both within and beyond the Established Churches, of the rapid increase and wide prevalence of infidelity, and even of secret or avowed atheism.

The struggles of the seventeenth century had left another very deep sentiment. The sects had contended so much about minor points, that now, in the reaction, there was a strong disposition, both among the professedly religious and irreligious, to set little or no value on doctrinal differences, and to turn away with distaste from all disputes among religious bodies. The indifference thence ensuing tended, equally with the mistaken zeal of the previous age, to prevent the principles of toleration from being thoroughly carried out. Those who stood up for what were esteemed small peculiarities were reckoned pragmatical and obstinate. Their attempts to secure full liberty of worship and of propagation met with little sympathy, and were supposed to be fitted to bring back needlessly the battles and the sufferings of the previous ages.

The two sentiments combined, the desire to have a liberal or a loose creed, and the aversion to the discussion of lesser

differences, issued in a result which it is more to our present purpose to contemplate. It led the great thinkers of the age, such as Samuel Clarke, Berkeley, and Butler, to spend their strength, not so much in discussing doctrines disputed among Christians, as in defending religion in general, and in laying a deep foundation on which to rest the essential principles of morality and the eternal truths of religion, natural and revealed. The first age of the eighteenth century, as it was the period in which the first serious attacks were made on Christianity, so it was also the time in which were produced the first great modern defences of religion, natural and supernatural. Men of inferior philosophical breadth, but of eminent literary power, such as Addison, were also employing their gifts and accomplishments, and contributing to what they reckoned the same good end, by writing apologies in behalf of religion, and labouring to make it appear amiable, reasonable, and refined.

These same causes led preachers of the new school to assume a sort of apologetic air in their discourses, to cultivate a refined language, moulded on the French, and not the old English model, to avoid all extravagance of statement and appeal, to decline doctrinal controversy, and to dwell much on truths, such as the immortality of the soul, common to Christianity and to natural religion, and to enlarge on the loveliness of the Bible morality. This manner and spirit was highly pleasing to many in the upper and refined classes; was acceptable to those who disliked earnest religion, as it had nothing in it of "the offence of the cross;" and was commended by some who valued religion, as it seemed to present piety in so attractive a light to their young men, about whom they were so anxious in these times, and of whom they hoped that they would thus be led to imbibe its elements, and thereby acquire a taste for its higher truths. But all this was powerless on the great body of the people, who were perfectly prepared to believe the preacher when he told them that they were sinners, and that God had provided a Saviour, but felt little interest in refined apologies in behalf of God and Christ and duty; and they gradually slipped away from a religion and a religious worship which had nothing to interest, because they had nothing to move them. All this was offensive in the extreme to those who had been taught to value a deeper doctrine and a warmer piety. They complained that when they needed food they were presented with flowers; and discontented with the present state of things, they were praying for a better era.

To complete the picture of the times, it should be added that there was little vital piety among the clergy to counteract the tendency to religious indifference. The appointments to the livings in England and Ireland lay in the hands of the

government and the upper classes, who preferred men of refinement and prudence, inclined to political moderation or suberviency, to men of spiritual warmth and religious independence. The Nonconformists themselves felt the somnolent influence creeping upon them, after the excitement of the battle in which they had been engaged was over. Their pastors were restrained in their ministrations, and consequently in their activities, by laws which were a plain violation of the principles of toleration, but which, as they did not issue in any overt act of bitter persecution, were not resented with keenness by the higher class of Dissenters, who, to tell the truth, after what they had come through in the previous age, were not much inclined to provoke anew the enmity from which they had suffered, but were rather disposed, provided only their individual convictions were not interfered with, to take advantage of what liberty they had, to proclaim peace with others, and to embrace the opportunities thrown open to them in the growing cities and manufactories, of promoting the temporal interests of themselves and their families. In these circumstances, the younger ministers were often allured (as Butler was) to go over to the Established Church, and those who remained were infected with the spirit which prevailed around them, and sought to appear as elegant and as liberal as the clergy of the church, who were beginning to steal from them the more genteel portion of the younger members of their flocks. The design of those who favoured this movement was no doubt to make religion attractive and respected. The result did not realise the expectation. The upper classes were certainly not scandalised by a religion which was so inoffensive, but they never thought of heartily embracing what they knew had no earnestness; and paying only a distant and respectful obeisance to religion in the general, they gave themselves up to the fashionable vices, or at best, practised only the fashionable moralities of their times. The common people, little cared for by the clergy, and caring nothing for the refined emptiness presented to them instead of a living religion, went through their daily toils with diligence, but in most districts, both of town and country, viewed religion with indifference, and relieved their manual labour with low indulgences. England is rapidly growing in wealth and civilisation, and even in industry, mainly from the intellectual stimulus imparted by moral causes acting in the previous ages; but it is fast descending to the most unbelieving condition to which it has ever been reduced. From this state of religious apathy it is roused, so far as the masses of the people are concerned, in the next age, and ere the life had altogether died out, by the trumpet voices of Whitfield and Wesley. It was in a later age, and after the earthquake con-

vulsions of the French Revolution had shaken society to its foundation, that the upper classes were made to know and feel that when the salt has lost its savour, it is good for nothing but to be cast out and trodden under foot of men, and that a dead religion is of no use either to rich or poor, either for political ends or for personal comfort.

An analogous, but by no means identical, process begins and goes on, and is consummated in Scotland about half an age or an age later in point of time. All throughout the eighteenth century, Scotland, like England, had been ploughed by religious contests. But the penetrating observer notices a difference between the shape taken by the struggle in the two countries. In England, the war had been a purely internal one between opposing principles, the prelatie and puritan; whereas, in Scotland, the battle had been mainly against an external foe, that is, an English power, which sought to impose a prelatie church on the people contrary to their wishes. Again, in England the contest had been against an ecclesiastical power, which sought to crush civil liberty; whereas, in Scotland, the power of the Church of Scotland had been exerted in behalf of the people, and against a foreign domination. This difference in the struggle was followed by a difference in the state of feeling resulting when the contest was terminated by the accession of William and Mary.

The great body of the people, at least in the Lowlands, acquiesced in the Revolution Settlement, and clung round the Government and the Presbyterian Church as by law established. But there soon arose antagonisms, which, though they did not break out into open wars, as in the previous century, did yet range the country into sections and parties with widely differing sympathies and aims. In fact, Scotland was quite as much divided in opinion and sentiment in the eighteenth, as it ever was in the seventeenth century. In saying so, I do not refer to the strong prelatie feeling which existed all over the north-east coast of Scotland, or to the attachment to the house of Stuart which prevailed in the Highlands—for these, though they led to the uprisings of 1715 and 1745, were only the backward beatings of the retreating tide; but to other and stronger currents which have been flowing and coming into more or less violent collision with one another from that day till ours.

At the close of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century, the Church of Scotland was composed of a somewhat heterogeneous mixture of covenanting ministers, who had lived in the times of persecution; of prelatie clergy whose convictions in favour of Episcopacy were not sufficiently deep to induce them to abandon their livings, and to suffer the annoyances and persecutions to which the more sincere non-

jurors were exposed ; and of a race of young men zealous for the Presbyterian establishment, but "only half educated and superficially accomplished." The conforming "curates" were commonly indifferent to religion of every kind, and it was hoped that they would soon die out, and that the heritors and elders, with whom the election of pastors lay, would soon fill the churches with a learned and zealous ministry. But in 1711, the Jacobite government of Queen Anne took the power of election from the parish authorities, and vested it in the ancient patrons, being the Crown for fully one-third of the livings, and noblemen, gentlemen of landed property, and town-councils, for the other two-thirds. The effect of this new law became visible in the course of years, in the appointment of persons to the churches who, for good reasons or bad, were acceptable to the government of the day, or were able to secure the favour of the private patrons.

Forced upon the people in the first instance, there was a public feeling ready to gather round this law of patronage. From bad motives and from good—like those which we have traced in England—there was a desire among the upper, and a portion of the middle and educated classes, to have a clergy suited to the new age which had come in. As the result, there was formed a type of ministers which has continued till nearly our time in Scotland, called "new light" by the people, and designating themselves "moderates," as claiming the virtue of being moderate in all things—though, as Wotherspoon charges them, they became very immoderate for moderation, when they rose to be the dominant party. Most of them refrained in their preaching from uttering a very decided sound on disputed doctrinal points ; some of them were suspected of Arianism or Socinianism, which, however, they kept to themselves out of respect for, or fear of, the Confession of Faith, which they had sworn ; the more highly educated of them cultivated a refinement and elegance of diction, and dwelt much on the truths common to both natural and revealed religion ; and all of them were fond of depicting the high morality of the New Testament, and of recommending the example of Jesus. It is scarcely necessary to remark, that this style of preaching did not gain, as it did not warm, the hearts of the common people, who either became callous to all religion, without any zealous efforts being made to stir them up, or they longed and prayed for a better state of things. The enforcement of the law of patronage, and the settlement of ministers against the wishes of the people, led to the separation of the Erskines and the Secession Body in 1733, and of Gillespie and the Relief Body in 1753. In the Established Church there still remained a number of men of evangelical views and popular sympathies,

such as Willison and Boston, who hoped that they might stem and ultimately turn the tide which was for the time against them. The boast of the moderate party is, that they are introducing into Scotland a greater liberality of sentiment on religious topics, and a greater refinement of taste. The charge against them is, that they abandoned the peculiar doctrines of the gospel, that they could not draw towards them the affections of the people who, in rural districts, sank into a stupid ignorance of religious truth, and in the crowded lanes of the rising cities, into utter ungodliness and criminality—except, indeed, in so far as they were drawn out by the rapidly increasing dissenters, or by the evangelical minority within the Established Church.

The collisions of the century took various forms. After the Union with England, dancing assemblies, theatres, and wandering players (with Allan Ramsay to patronize them), dancing on the tight-rope, cock-fighting, gambling, and horse-racing make their appearance, and receive considerable countenance and patronage from various classes, upper and lower; while ineffectual attempts are made to put them down by civil penalties inflicted by burgher magistrates, and by public ecclesiastical censures, which the zealous clergy rigidly enforce, but which the new light clergy are anxious to relax. In the turmoil of opinions which sprung up in this new state of things, there are rumours of deism, and even of atheism, being secretly entertained or openly avowed, and of the establishment here and there, in town and country, of "hell-fire clubs," where bold men met to discuss new opinions, and even, it is said, to act mock ceremonies, intended to ridicule the sacraments, and all that is awful in religion. Worse than all, and without being much noticed, or meeting with much opposition on the part of the clergy of either party, there is the commencement of those drinking customs, which have ever since exercised so prejudicial an influence on the Scottish character.

If we look to the common people in the first quarter of the century, we find them in a state of great rudeness, at least in respect of the comforts and elegancies of life. In the Highlands, they are scarcely removed above the lowest state of barbarism; and in the borders between the Highlands and Lowlands, the Celts are lifting cattle and exacting black mail from the Lowlanders. Even in the more favoured districts in the south of Scotland, the ground is unfenced; roads are very rare; and goods are carried on the backs of horses. The clothing of the people in the same region is of undyed black and white plaiding, and neither men nor women have shoes or stockings. Their ordinary food is oatmeal, pease, or beer, with kail groats and milk, and they rarely partake of flesh meat. The houses have only the bare ground as floors, with a

fireplace in the midst, and the smoke escaping out of a hole in the roof, and with seats and the very beds of turf; even in the dwellings of the farmers there are seldom more than two apartments—not unfrequently, however, in the south-west of Scotland, there is in addition a closet, to which the head of the house would retire at set times for devotion.

Superstitious beliefs are still entertained in all ranks of life, and are only beginning to disappear among the educated classes. In the Highlands and Islands, second sight is as firmly believed by the chieftain as by the clansmen. In the Lowlands, mysterious diseases, arising from a deranged nervous system, are ascribed to demoniacal possessions; and witches, supposed to have sold themselves to the Evil One, and accomplishing his purposes in inflicting direful evils on the persons and properties of neighbours, are being punished by the magistrates, who are always incited on by the people, and often by the more zealous ministers of religion. Toleration is not understood or acknowledged by any of the great parties, political or religious.

What, it may be asked, is there in the condition of this people fitted to raise any hope that they are ever to occupy a high place among the nations of the earth? I am sure that a worldly-minded traveller, or an admirer of mere refinement and art, in visiting the country at those times, and comparing it with France or Italy, would have discovered nothing in it to lead him to think that it was to have a glorious future before it. But a deeper and more spiritually-minded observer might have discovered already the seeds of its coming intelligence and love of freedom, in the schools and colleges planted throughout the land; in the love of education instilled into the minds of the people; and, above all, in their acquaintance with the Bible, and in their determined adherence to what they believed to be the truth of God.*

Before the first age of the century has passed, there are unmistakeable signs of industrial and intellectual activity. The Union has connected the upper classes with the metropolis

* Mr Buckle is reported to have expressed, in his dying days, his regret that he could not see moral causes operating in the promotion of civilisation. Of course intellectual power must always be the immediate agent in producing civilisation; but did it never occur to Mr Buckle to ask what stirred up the intellectual power in a country so unfavourably situated as Scotland? It is all true that steam power is the main agent in producing manufactures in our country; but how contracted would be the vision of one who could see only the steam power, and not the intellectual power which called the steam into operation. Equally narrow is the view of the man who discerns the intellectual power which effected the peculiar civilisation of Scotland, but cannot discover the moral power which awoke the intelligence. It should be added, that just as the steam power, invented by intellectual skill, may be devoted to very unintellectual uses, so the intelligence aroused by moral or religious causes may be turned (as Scotland shews) to very immoral and irreligious ends.

and the Court of England, from which they are receiving a new refinement and some mental stimulus. The middle classes, and even the lower orders, are receiving instruction from a very different quarter, from their parochial schools and churches, from their burgh academies and their universities. The towns are hastening to take advantage of the new channels of trade and commerce; manufactures are springing up in various places, and already there is a considerable trading intercourse between the west of Scotland and America. The proprietors of the soil, in need of money to support their English life and to buy luxuries, are beginning to subdivide and enclose their lands, and to grant better dwellings and leases to their tenantry, who being thereby placed in circumstances fitted to encourage and reward industry, are prepared to reclaim waste lands, to manure their grounds, to improve their stock of sheep and cattle, and introduce improved agricultural implements.

This imperfect sketch may help the reader to comprehend the circumstances in which the Scottish philosophy sprang up and grew to maturity, and the part which its expounders acted in the national history. It could have appeared only in a time of peace and temporal prosperity, but there had been a preparation made for it in the prior struggles. The stream which had risen in a higher region, and long pursued its course in ruggedness—like the rivers of the country—is now flowing through more level ground, and raising up plenty on its banks. It is a collegiate, and therefore a somewhat isolated element among the agencies which were forming the national character and directing the national destiny, but it had its sphere. Through the students at the universities, it fostered a taste for literature and art; it promoted a spirit of toleration, and softened the national asperities in religious and other discussions; it is identified with the liberalism of Scotland, and through Adam Smith, D. Stewart, Horner, Brougham, Jeffrey, Sydney Smith, Lord John Russell and Palmerston, with the liberalism of the three kingdoms; and above all, it has trained the educated portion of the inhabitants of North Britain to habits of reflection and of independent thought. The Scottish metaphysicians, with the exception of Chalmers, have never identified themselves very deeply with the more earnest spiritual life of the country; but they have defended the fundamental truths of natural religion, and they ever spoke respectfully of the Bible. The Scottish philosophy, so far as it is a co-ordination of the facts of consciousness, never can be antagonistic to a true theology; I believe indeed it may help to establish some of the vital truths of religion, by means, for instance, of the moral faculty, the existence of which has been so resolutely maintained by the Scottish school. Some of the moderate

clergy did at times preach the Scottish moral philosophy instead of scriptural truth ; but they did so in opposition to the counsel of the metaphysicians, at least of Hutcheson, who recommended his students to avoid the discussion of philosophic topics in the pulpit. Some of those who have been the most influential expounders of the Scottish theology, such as Chalmers and Welsh, have also been supporters of the Scottish philosophy, and have drawn from its established doctrines arguments in favour of evangelical religion.

In order to have a full view of the circumstances in which the Scottish school arose, we must view it in its relation to the philosophy of the preceding times. But this must be reserved for another Article in a future Number.

ART. II.—*The Perfection of Christ's Humanity a Proof of his Divinity.**

WHEN the angel of the Lord appeared to Moses in the burning bush, he was commanded to put off his shoes from his feet, for the place whereon he stood was holy ground. With what reverence and awe, then, should we approach the contemplation of the great reality—God manifest in the flesh—of which the vision of Moses was but a significant type and shadow ?

The life and character of Jesus Christ is truly the holy of holies in the history of the world. Eighteen hundred years have passed away since he appeared in the fulness of time on this earth to redeem a fallen race from sin and death, and to open a never ceasing fountain of righteousness and life. The ages before him anxiously awaited his coming as the desire of all nations ; the ages after him proclaim his glory, and ever extend his dominion. The noblest and best of men under every clime hold him not only in the purest affection, and the profoundest gratitude, but in divine adoration and worship. His name is above every name that may be named in heaven or on earth, and the only one whereby the sinner can be saved. He is Immanuel, God with us ; the eternal Word become flesh, very God and very man in one undivided person, the Author of the new creation, the Way, the Truth, and the Life, the Prophet, Priest, and King of regenerate humanity, the Saviour

* The following article has been transmitted to us by the Rev. Dr Schaff, Professor of Divinity at Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, U.S., well known in this country as the author of an excellent "History of the Apostolic Church." The substance of it having been originally delivered as an address, the author occasionally speaks in the first person, but so seldom that we have not deemed it necessary to alter the phraseology. The value of such a paper at the present time, its substantial merits, and the admirable style in which the argument is handled, cannot fail to strike our readers.—ED. B. & F. E. R.

of the world. Thus he stands out to the faith of the entire Christian Church, Greek, Latin, and Evangelical, in every civilised country on the globe. His power is now greater, his kingdom larger than ever, and will continue to spread until all nations shall bow before him, and kiss his sceptre of righteousness and peace.

Blessed is he who, from the heart, can believe that Jesus is the Son of God and the fountain of salvation. True faith is, indeed, no work of nature, but an act of God wrought in the soul by the Holy Ghost, who reveals Christ to us in his true character, as Christ revealed the Father. Faith, with its justifying, sanctifying, and saving power, is independent of science and learning, and may be kindled even in the heart of a little child, or an illiterate slave. It is the peculiar glory of the Redeemer and his religion to be co-extensive with humanity itself, without distinction of sex, age, condition, nation, and race. His saving grace flows and overflows to all and for all on the simple condition of repentance and faith.

This fact, however, does not supersede the necessity of thought and argument. Revelation, although above nature and above reason, is by no means against nature and against reason. On the contrary, nature and the supernatural, as has been well said by a distinguished New England divine,* "constitute together the one system of God." Christianity satisfies the deepest intellectual as well as moral and religious wants of man, who is created in the image, and for the glory of God. It is the revelation of truth as well as of life. Faith and knowledge, *pistis* and *gnosis*, are not antagonistic, but complementary forces; not enemies, but inseparable twin-sisters. Faith, indeed, precedes knowledge, but it just as necessarily leads to knowledge; while true knowledge, on the other hand, is always rooted and grounded in faith, and tends to confirm and strengthen it. Thus we find the two combined in the famous confession of Peter, when he says in the name of all the other apostles, "We believe, and we know that thou art the Christ."† But so intimately are both connected, that we

* By Horace Bushnell, in his recent work on the subject. The same idea Dr John W. Nevin, in his able work, "The Mystical Presence"—Philad. 1846, p. 199—expresses in these words: "Nature and revelation, the world and Christianity, as springing from the same divine mind, are not two different systems joined together in a merely outward way. They form a single whole, harmonious with itself in all its parts. The sense of the one, then, is necessarily included and comprehended in the sense of the other. The mystery of the new creation must involve in the end the mystery of the old, and the key that serves to unlock the meaning of the first must serve to unlock the inmost secret of the last."

† John vi. 69: ἡμεῖς ἀπιστεύομεν καὶ ᾔνομεν, credimus et cognovimus. The reverse order we have in John x. 38: "That ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him."

may also reverse the famous maxim of Augustine, Anselm, and Schleiermacher, *Fides præcedit intellectum*, and say, *Intellectus præcedit fidem*. For how can we believe in any object without at least some general historical knowledge of its existence and character? Faith, even in its first form, as a submission to the authority of God, and an assent to the truth of his revelation, is an exercise of the mind and reason, as well as of the heart and the will. An idiot or a madman cannot believe. Our religion demands not a blind, but a rational, intelligent faith, and this, just in proportion to its strength and fervour, aims at an ever-deepening insight into its own sacred contents and object.

As living faith in Christ is the soul and centre of all sound practical Christianity and piety, so the true doctrine of Christ is the soul and centre of all sound Christian theology. St John makes the denial of the incarnation of the Son of God the criterion of antichrist, and consequently the belief in this central truth the test of Christianity. The incarnation, and the divine glory shining through the veil of Christ's humanity, is the grand theme of his gospel, which he wrote with the pen of an angel from the very heart of Christ, as his favourite disciple and bosom friend. The apostle's creed, starting as it does from the confession of Peter, makes the article on Christ most prominent, and assigns to it the central position between the preceding article of God the Father and the succeeding article on the Holy Ghost. The development of ancient catholic theology commenced and culminated with the triumphant defence of the true divinity and true humanity of Christ against the opposite heresies of Judaising Ebionism which denied the former, and paganising Gnosticism which resolved the latter into a shadowy phantom. The evangelical protestant theology is essentially Christological, or controlled throughout by the proper idea of Christ as the God-man and Saviour. This is emphatically the article of the standing or falling church. In this, the two most prominent ideas of the Reformation, the doctrine of the supremacy of the Scriptures and the doctrine of justification by grace through faith, meet and are vitally united. Christ's word, the only unerring and sufficient guide of truth; Christ's work, the only unfailing and sufficient source of peace; Christ all in all: this is the principle of genuine Protestantism.

In the construction of the true doctrine of Christ's person, we may, with St John in the prologue to his gospel, begin from above with his eternal Godhead, and proceed through the creation and the preparatory revelation of the Old Testament dispensation, till we reach the incarnation and his truly human life for the redemption of the race. Or, with the other evan-

gelists, we may begin from below, with his birth from the Virgin Mary, and rise up through the successive stages of his earthly life, his discourses and miracles, to his assumption into that divine glory which he had before the foundations of the world. The result reached in both cases is the same, that Christ unites in his person the whole fulness of the Godhead and the whole fulness of sinless manhood.

The older theologians, both catholic and evangelical, proved the divinity of the Saviour in a direct way from the miracles performed by him, and the prophecies fulfilled in him, from the divine names which he bears, from the divine attributes which are predicated of him, from the divine works which he performed, and from the divine honours which he claimed, and which were freely accorded to him by his apostles and the whole Christian church to this day.

But it may also be proved by the opposite process, the contemplation of the singular perfection of his humanity, which rises, by almost universal consent even of unbelievers, so far above every human greatness known before or since, that it can only be rationally explained on the ground of such an essential union with the Godhead, as he claimed himself, and as his inspired apostles ascribed to him. The more deeply we penetrate through the veil of his flesh, the more clearly we behold the glory of the only begotten of the Father shining through the same, full of grace and of truth.*

Modern evangelical theology owes this new homage to the Saviour. The powerful attacks of the latest phase of infidelity upon the credibility of the gospel history call for it, and have already led, by way of reaction, to new triumphs of the old faith of the church in her divine Head. Our humanitarian, philanthropic, and yet sceptical age, is more susceptible of this argument than of the old dogmatic method of demonstration. With Thomas, the representative of honest and earnest scepticism among the apostles, it refuses to believe in the divinity of the Lord unless supported by the testimony of its senses; it desires to put the finger into the print of his nails, and to

* Ullmann, *Sündlosigkeit Jesu*, 6th ed. p. 215: "So führt schon das Volle der Menschliche in Jesu, wenn wir es mit allem Uebrigen, was die Menschheit darbietet, vergleichen. Zur Anerkennung des Göttlichen in ihm." Dorn, *Entwicklungs-geschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi*, 2d ed. vol. ii. p. 1211: "Jesu Heiligkeit und Weisheit, durch die er unter den sündigen, viel-irrenden Menschen einzig dasteht, weist . . . auf einen übernatürlichen Ursprung seiner Person. Diese muss, um inmitten der Sünderwelt begreiflich zu sein, aus einer eigenthümlichen und wunderbar schöpferischen. That Gottes abgeleitet, ja es muss in Christus . . . von Gott aus betrachtet, eine Incarnation göttlicher Liebe, also göttlichen Wesens geschehen werden, was ihn als den Punkt erscheinen lässt, wo Gott und die Menschheit einzig und innigst geeinigt sind." Compare also Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, 1852, vol. ii. p. 24-31.

thrust the hand into his side, before it exclaim in humble adoration, "My Lord and my God." *

It is from this point of view that we will endeavour, in as popular and concise a manner as the difficulty of the subject permits, to analyse and exhibit the human character of Christ. We propose to take up the man Jesus of Nazareth as he appears on the simple, unsophisticated record of the plain and honest fishermen of Galilee, and as he lives in the faith of all Christendom; and we shall find him in all the stages of his life, both as a private individual and as a public character, so far elevated above the reach of successful rivalry, and so singularly perfect, that this very perfection in midst of an imperfect and sinful world constitutes an irresistible proof of his divinity.

A full discussion of the subject would require us to consider Christ in his official as well as personal character, and to describe him as a teacher, a reformer, a worker of miracles, and the founder of a spiritual kingdom, universal in extent and perpetual in time. From every point of view we would be irresistibly driven to the same result. But our present purpose confines us to the consideration of his personal character; and this alone, we think, is sufficient for the conclusion.

Christ passed through all the stages of human life, from infancy to manhood, and represented each in its ideal form, that he might redeem and sanctify them all, and be a perpetual model for imitation. He was the model infant, the model boy,

* A life of Christ, written from this stand-point, and rising from the humanity to the divinity of the Saviour, is yet a desideratum in our theological literature. But we have important contributions towards it, especially by three modern divines, a German, an English, and an American, which shows that this view of Christ forces itself upon the thinking minds of the three nations which now take the lead in Protestant theological science and literature. We refer to Dr C. Ullmann: *Die Sündlosigkeit Jesu. Eine apologetische Betrachtung* (first published in the *Studien und Kritiken*, 1828, Heft 1), 6th ed., Heidelberg, 1863 (translated into English by Lundin Brown: *The Sinlessness of Jesus: an Evidences of Christianity*. Edinburgh, 1858); to Dr John Young: *The Christ of History: an Argument grounded on the Facts of his Life on Earth* (Republished, New York, 1856); and to Horace Bushnell: *Nature and the Supernatural, as together constituting the one System of God* (New York, 1858, chapters x. and xi. p. 276-368). Compare also the beautiful essay of the late Dr James W. Alexander of New York, on *The Character of Jesus, an Argument for the Divine Origin of Christianity* (published in the "Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity delivered at the University of Virginia," New York, 1852, p. 193-211), and my *History of the Apostolic Church*, New York, 1853 (first in German at Mercersburg, 1851) p. 433 ff., and my *History of the Christian Church in the First Three Centuries*, p. 53-59. It should also be stated, that the apologetic anti-Strauss literature on the Life of Jesus, especially by Neander, Lange, Olshausen, Ebrard, Tholuck, Höffmann, Schmid, and Dörner, have brought out the ethical element and human perfection of Christ more fully than had been done before. The French works of E. Dandiran, *Essai sur la Divinité du caractère moral de Jesus Christ*, Genève 1850, and of Edm. de Pressensé, *Le Rédempteur*, Par. 1854, which seem to follow the same train of thought, we know only by name.

the model youth, and the model man.* But the weakness, decline, and decrepitude of old age would be incompatible with his character and mission. He died and rose in the full bloom of early manhood, and lives in the hearts of his people in unfading freshness and unbroken vigour for ever.

Let us first glance at the infancy and boyhood of the Saviour. The history of the race commences with the beauty of innocent youth in the garden of Eden, "when the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy," in beholding Adam and Eve created in the image of their Maker, the crowning glory of all his wonderful works. So the second Adam, the Redeemer of the fallen race, the Restorer and Perfecter of man, comes first before us in the accounts of the gospels as a child born, not in paradise, it is true, but among the dreary ruins of sin and death, from an humble virgin, in a lowly manger, yet pure and innocent, the subject of the praise of angels and the adoration of men. Heaven and earth, the shepherds of Bethlehem, in the name of Israel, longing after salvation, and the wise men from the east, as the representatives of heathenism in its dark groping after the "unknown God," unite in the worship of the new-born King and Saviour. Here we meet at the very threshold of the earthly history of Christ, that singular combination of humility and grandeur, of simplicity and sublimity, of the human and divine, which characterises it throughout, and distinguishes it from every other history. He is not represented as an unnatural prodigy, anticipating the maturity of a later age, but as a truly human child, silently lying and smiling on the bosom of his virgin mother, "growing" in body and "waxing strong in spirit,"† and therefore subject to the law of regular development; yet differing from all other children by his supernatural conception and perfect freedom from hereditary sin and guilt. He appears in the celestial beauty of unspotted innocence, a veritable flower of paradise. He was

* This idea is almost as old as the Christian Church, and was already pretty clearly taught by Irenæus who, through the single link of his teacher Polycarp, stood connected with the age of St John the apostle. He says, *Adv. Hæreses*, lib. ii. cap. 22. § 4: "Omnes enim venit (Christus) per semetipsum salvare, omnes, inquam, qui per eum renascuntur in Deum, infantes et parvulos et pueros et seniores. Ideo per omnem venit ætatem et infantibus infans factus, sanctificans infantes; in parvulis parvulus, sanctificans hanc ipsam habentes ætatem, simul et exemplum illis pietatis effectus et justitiæ et subjectionis; in juvenibus juvenis, exemplum juvenibus fœns et sanctificans Domino. Sic et senior in senioribus (?) ut sit perfectus magister in omnibus," &c. But Irenæus erred in carrying the idea too far, and assuming Christ to have lived over fifty years, on the ground of the indefinite estimate of the Jews, John viii. 57. Hippolytus, in his recently discovered *Philosophumena*, expresses the same view.

† Luke ii. 40, comp. ii. 52, Heb. ii. 10-18, and v. 8, 9, where it is said, that he *learned* obedience; and being made perfect, he *became* the author of eternal salvation.

"that holy thing," according to the announcement of the angel Gabriel,* admired and loved by all who approached him in childlike spirit, but exciting the dark suspicion of the tyrant king, who represented his future enemies and persecutors. Who can measure the ennobling, purifying, and cheering influence which proceeds from the contemplation of the Christ-child at each returning Christmas season upon the hearts of young and old in every land and nation! The loss of the first estate is richly compensated by the undying innocence of paradise regained.

Of the boyhood of Jesus we know only one fact, recorded by Luke, but it is in perfect keeping with the peculiar charm of his childhood, and foreshadows at the same time the glory of his public life, as one uninterrupted service of his heavenly Father.† When twelve years old, we find him in the temple, in the midst of the Jewish doctors, not teaching and offending them, as in the Apocryphal gospels, by any immodesty or forwardness, but hearing and asking questions, thus actually learning from them, and yet filling them with astonishment at his understanding and answers. There is nothing premature, forced, or unbecoming his age, and yet a degree of wisdom and an intensity of interest in religion which rises far above a purely human youth. "He increased," we are told, "in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and man."‡ He was subject to his parents, and practised all the virtues of an obedient son; and yet he filled them with a sacred awe as they saw him absorbed "in the things of his Father,"§ and heard him utter words which they were unable to understand at the time, but which Mary treasured up in her heart as a holy secret, convinced that

* Luke i. 35.

† Dr J. P. Lange, in his *Leben Jesu nach den Evangelien*, Heidelberg, 1844, sqq. vol. ii. p. 127, says: "Die Geschichte des zwölfjährigen Jesu repräsentirt seine ganze Entwicklung. Sie ist seine charakteristische Knabenthat, die Offenbarung seines jugendlichen Lebens; ein Wiederglanz der Herrlichkeit seiner Geburt, ein Vorzeichen seines zukünftigen Heldenlaufes. Sie stellt die Kindheit seiner Idealität dar; desswegen auch die Idealität der Kindheit überhaupt." Compare also the suggestive remarks of Olshausen to that passage, *Commentar* (8d Germ. ed.) vol. i. p. 145, ff.

‡ Luke ii. 52.

§ Luke ii. 49: *ἐν ταῖς οἰαῖς τοῦ πατρὸς μου δεῖ* (the *δεῖ* indicates a moral necessity which is identical with true freedom) *εἶναι μὲν*. The fathers, and most of the modern commentators, refer the *ταῖς* to the house of God, or the temple. This is grammatically allowable, but restricts the sense and deprives it of its deeper meaning. For he could only occasionally be in the temple of Jerusalem. Nearly all the English versions, Tyndal, Cranmer, Geneva, and James, translate more correctly "about my Father's business." But we object to the term *business* in this connection, and prefer the more literal translation "*in* (not *about*) the things (or affairs) of my Father." The *ἐν* signifies the life-element in which Christ moved during his whole life, whether in the temple or out of it.

they must have some deep meaning answering to the mystery of his supernatural conception and birth.

Such an idea of a harmless and faultless heavenly childhood, of a growing, learning, and yet surprisingly wise boyhood, as it meets us in living reality at the portal of the gospel history, never entered the imagination of biographer, poet, or philosopher before. On the contrary, as has been justly observed by an able American divine,* "in all the higher ranges of character, the excellence portrayed is never the simple unfolding of a harmonious and perfect beauty contained in the germ of childhood, but it is a character formed by a process of rectification, in which many follies are mended and distempers removed, in which confidence is checked by defeat, passion moderated by reason, smartness sobered by experience. Commonly a certain pleasure is taken in shewing how the many wayward sallies of the boy are, at length, reduced by discipline to the character of wisdom, justice, and public heroism so much admired. Besides, if any writer, of almost any age, will undertake to describe, not merely a spotless, but a superhuman or celestial childhood, not having the reality before him, he must be somewhat more than human himself, if he does not pile together a mass of clumsy exaggerations, and draw, and overdraw, till neither heaven nor earth can find any verisimilitude in the picture."

This unnatural exaggeration, into which the mythical fancy of man, in its endeavour to produce a superhuman childhood and boyhood, will inevitably fall, is strikingly exhibited in the Apocryphal gospels, which are related to the canonical gospels as the counterfeit to the genuine coin, or as a revolting caricature to the inimitable original, but which, by the very contrast tend, negatively, to corroborate the truth of the evangelical history. While the evangelists expressly reserve the performance of miracles to the age of maturity and public life, and observe a significant silence concerning the parents of Jesus, the pseudo-evangelists fill the infancy and early years of the Saviour and his mother with the strangest prodigies, and make the active intercession of Mary very prominent throughout. According to their representation, even dumb idols, irrational beasts, and senseless trees, bow in adoration before the infant Jesus on his journey to Egypt; and after his return, when yet a boy of five or seven years, he changes balls of clay into flying birds, for the amusement of his playmates, strikes terror round about him, dries up a stream of water by a mere word, transforms his companions into goats, raises the dead to

* Horace Bushnell, in his genial work already quoted, on "Nature and the Supernatural," p. 280.

life, and performs all sorts of miraculous cures through a magical influence which proceeds from the very water in which he was washed, the towels which he used, and the bed on which he slept.* Here we have the falsehood and absurdity of unnatural fiction, while the New Testament presents us the truth and beauty of a supernatural, yet most real history, which shines out only in brighter colours by the contrast of the mythical shadow.

With the exception of these few but significant hints, the youth of Jesus, and the preparation for his public ministry, are enshrined in mysterious silence. But we know the outward condition and circumstances under which he grew up; and these must be admitted to furnish no explanation for the astounding results, without the admission of the supernatural and divine element in his life.

He grew up among a people seldom and only contemptuously named by the ancient classics, and subjected at the time to the yoke of a foreign oppressor; in a remote and conquered province of the Roman empire; in the darkest district of Palestine; in a little country town of proverbial insignificance; in poverty and manual labour; in the obscurity of a carpenter's shop; far away from universities, academies, libraries, and literary or polished society; without any help, as far as we know, except the parental care, the book of nature, the Old Testament Scriptures, and the secret intercourse of his soul with the heavenly Father. Hence the question of Nathanael, "What good can come out of Nazareth?" Hence the natural surprise of the Jews, who knew all his human relations and antecedents. "How knoweth this man letters?" they asked, when they heard Jesus teach in the synagogue, "having never learned."† And on another occasion: "Whence hath this man this wisdom and these mighty works? Is not this the carpenter's son? Is not his mother called Mary? and his brethren, James and Joses, and Simon and Judas? And his sisters, are they not all with us? Whence then hath this man all these things?"‡ These questions are unavoidable and unanswerable, if Christ be regarded a mere man. For each effect presupposes a corresponding cause.

The difficulty here presented can by no means be solved by a reference to the fact that many, perhaps the majority of great

* See the particulars, with ample quotations from the sources, in Rud. Hofmann's *Leben Jesu nach den Apokryphen im Zusammenhang aus den Quellen erzählt und wissenschaftlich untersucht*. Leipzig, 1851, p. 140-268.

† John vii. 15.

‡ Matt. xiii. 54-56. Comp. also Mark vi. 8, "Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary?" &c., from which it would appear that Jesus himself engaged in the trade of Joseph.

men, especially in the church, have risen by their own industry and perseverance from the lower walks of life, and from a severe contest with poverty and obstacles of every kind. The fact itself is readily conceded; but in every one of these cases, schools, or books, or patrons and friends, or peculiar events and influences, can be pointed out as auxiliary aids in the development of intellectual or moral greatness. There is always some human or natural cause, or combination of causes, which accounts for the final result.

Luther, for instance, was indeed the son of poor peasants, and had a very hard youth, but yet he went to the schools of Mansfeld, Magdeburg, and Eisenach, to the University of Erfurt, passed through the ascetic discipline of convent life, lived in a university surrounded by professors, students, and libraries, and was innocently, as it were, made a reformer by extraordinary events, and the irresistible current of his age.

Shakspeare is generally and justly regarded as the most remarkable and almost wonderful example of a self-taught man, who, without the regular routine of school education, became the greatest dramatic poet of all times. But the absurd idea that the son of the Warwickshire yeoman, or butcher, or glover—we hardly know which—was essentially an unlearned man, and jumped with one bound from the supposed but poorly authenticated youthful folly of deer-stealing to the highest position in literature, has long since been abandoned. It is certain that he spent several years in the free grammar school of Stratford-upon-Avon, where he probably acquired the "small Latin and less Greek," which, however small in the eyes of so profound a scholar as Ben Johnson, was certainly large enough to make the fortune of any enterprising young Yankee. And whatever were the defects of his training, he must have made them up by intense private study of books, and the closest observation of man and things. For his dramas—the occasional chronological, historical, and geographical mistakes, notwithstanding, which are small matters at all events, and mostly, as in "Pericles" and "Midsummer-Nights' Dream," intentional, or mere freaks of fancy—abound in the most accurate and comprehensive knowledge of human nature under all its types and conditions, in the cold north and the sunny south, in the fifteenth century, and at the time of Cæsar, under the influence of Christianity and of Judaism, together with a great variety of historical and other information, which cannot be acquired without immense industry, and the help of oral or written instruction.* Moreover, he lived in the city of Lon-

* Comp G. G. Gervinus: *Shakspeare*, Leipzig, 1850, vol. i. p. 38-41. This masterly critic and expounder of the British poet pronounces him one of the

don, uniting the offices of actor, manager, and writer, in the classic age of Elizabeth, during the closing scenes of the greatest upheaving of the human mind which ever took place since the introduction of Christianity, in the company of genial and gifted friends, and with free access to the highest ranks of blood, wealth, and wit.

In the case of Christ, no such natural explanation can be given. All the attempts to bring him into some contact with Egyptian wisdom, or the Essenic theosophy, or other sources of learning, are without a shadow of proof, and explain nothing after all. For, unlike all other great men, even the prophets and the apostles, he was absolutely original and independent. He taught the world as one who had learned nothing from it, and was under no obligation to it. "His character and life were originated and sustained in spite of circumstances with which no earthly force could have contended, and therefore must have had their real foundation in a force which was preternatural and divine."* At the same time, it is easy to see, from the admission of Christ's divinity, that by this condescension he has raised humble origin, poverty, manual labour, and the lower orders of society, to a dignity and sacredness never known before, and has revolutionised the false standard of judging the value of men and things from their outward appearance, and of associating moral worth with social elevation, and moral degradation with low rank.

We now approach the public life of Jesus. In his thirtieth year, after the Messianic inauguration through the baptism by John, as his immediate forerunner and personal representative of the Old Testament, both in its legal and prophetic, or evangelical aspect, and after the Messianic probation by the temptation in the wilderness—the counterpart of the temptation of the first Adam in paradise—he entered upon his great work.

His public life lasted only three years, and before he had reached the age of ordinary maturity, he died in the full beauty and vigour of early manhood, without tasting the infirmities of declining years, which would inevitably mar the picture of the Regenerator of the race, and the Prince of life. And yet, unlike all other men of his years, he combined with the freshness, energy, and originating power of youth, that wisdom, moderation, and experience, which belong only to mature age. The short triennium of his public ministry contains more, even from a purely historical point of observation, than the longest life of the greatest and best of men. It is pregnant with the

best and most extensively informed men of his age. "Es ist heute kein Wagniss mehr, zu sagen, dass Shakspeare in jener Zeit an Umfang vielfachen Wissens sehr wenige seines gleichen gehabt habe."

* Dr John Young, *The Christ of History*, p. 86.

deepest meaning of the counsel of God and the destiny of the race. It is the ripe fruit of all preceding ages, the fulfilment of the hopes and desires of the Jewish and heathen mind, and the fruitful germ of succeeding generations, containing the impulse to the purest thoughts and noblest actions down to the end of time. It is "the end of a boundless past, the centre of a boundless present, and the beginning of a boundless future."*

How remarkable, how wonderful this contrast between the short duration and the immeasurable significance of Christ's ministry! The Saviour of the world a youth!

Other men require a long succession of years to mature their mind and character, and to make a lasting impression upon the world. There are rare exceptions, we admit. Alexander the Great, the last and most brilliant efflorescence of the ancient Greek nationality, died a young man of thirty-three, after having conquered the East to the borders of the Indus. But who would think of comparing an ambitious warrior, conquered by his own lust and dying a victim of his passion, with the spotless Friend of sinners; a few bloody victories of the one with the peaceful triumphs of the other; and a huge military empire of force, which crumbled to pieces as soon as it was erected, with the spiritual kingdom of truth and love which stands to this day, and will last for ever! Nor should it be forgotten, that the true significance and only value of Alexander's conquest lay beyond the horizon of his ambition and intention, and that, by carrying the language and civilisation of Greece to Asia, and bringing together the oriental and occidental world, it prepared the way for the introduction of the universal religion of Christ.

There is another striking distinction, of a general character, between Christ and the heroes of history, which we must mention here. We should naturally suppose that such an uncommon personage, setting up the most astounding claims and proposing the most extraordinary work, would surround himself with extraordinary circumstances, and maintain a position far above the vulgar and degraded multitude around him. We should expect something uncommon and striking in his look, his dress, his manner, his mode of speech, his outward life, and the train of his attendants. But the very reverse is the case. His greatness is singularly unostentatious, modest, and quiet; and far from repelling the beholder, it attracts and invites

* Heinrich Steffens, a follower of Schelling, says this of man, and bases upon this thought, his System of Anthropology. But it may be applied in its fullest and absolute sense to Christ, as the ideal man, in whom, and through whom alone, the race can become complete.

him to familiar approach. His public life never moved on the imposing arena of secular heroism, but within the humble circle of everyday life, and the simple relations of a son, a brother, a citizen, a teacher, and a friend. He had no army to command, no kingdom to rule, no prominent station to fill, no worldly favours and rewards to dispense. He was an humble individual, without friends and patrons in the Sanhedrim, or at the court of Herod. He never mingled in familiar intercourse with the religious or social leaders of the nation, whom he had startled, in his twelfth year, by his questions and answers. He selected his disciples from among the illiterate fishermen of Galilee, and promised them no reward in this world but a part in the bitter cup of his suffering. He dined with publicans and sinners, and mingled with the common people, without ever condescending to their low manners and habits. He was so poor, that he had no place on which to rest his head. He depended for the supply of his modest wants on the voluntary contributions of a few pious females, and the purse was in the hands of a thief and a traitor. Nor had he learning, art, or eloquence, in the usual sense of the term, nor any other kind of power, by which great men arrest the attention and secure the admiration of the world. The writers of Greece and Rome were ignorant even of his existence until, several years after the crucifixion, the effects of his mission in the steady growth of the sect of his followers forced from them some contemptuous notice, and then roused them to opposition.

And yet this Jesus of Nazareth, without money and arms, conquered more millions than Alexander, Cæsar, Mahomet, and Napoleon; without science and learning, he shed more light on things human and divine than all philosophers and scholars combined; without the eloquence of schools, he spoke words of life as never were spoken before or since, and produced effects which lie beyond the reach of orator or poet; without writing a single line, he has set more pens in motion, and furnished themes for more sermons, orations, discussions, learned volumes, works of art, and sweet songs of praise, than the whole army of great men of ancient and modern times. Born in a manger, and crucified as a malefactor, he now controls the destinies of the civilized world, and rules a spiritual empire which embraces one-third of the inhabitants of the globe. There never was in this world a life so unpretending, modest, and lowly in its outward form and condition, and yet producing such extraordinary effects upon all ages, nations, and classes of men. The annals of history produce no other example of such complete and astounding success in spite of the absence of those material, social, literary, and artistic powers and influences which are indispensable to success for a mere man. Christ stands also,

in this respect, solitary and alone among all the heroes of history, and presents to us an insolvable problem, unless we admit him to be the eternal Son of God.

We will now attempt to describe his personal, or moral and religious character, as it appears on the record of his public life, and then examine his own testimony of himself as giving us the only rational solution of this mighty problem.

The first impression which we receive from the life of Jesus is that of its perfect innocency and sinlessness in midst of a sinful world. He, and he alone, carried the spotless purity of childhood untarnished through his youth and manhood. Hence the lamb and the dove are his appropriate symbols.

He was, indeed, tempted as we are, but he never yielded to temptation.* His sinlessness was at first only the *relative* sinlessness of Adam before the fall, which implies the necessity of trial and temptation, and the peccability or 'the possibility of the fall. Had he been endowed with absolute impeccability from the start, he could not be a true man, nor our model for imitation. His holiness, instead of being his own self-acquired art and merit, would be a mechanical gift, and his temptation an unreal show. But here is the fundamental difference between the first and the second Adam: the first Adam lost his innocence by the abuse of his freedom, and fell by his own act of disobedience into the dire necessity of sin; while the second Adam was innocent in the midst of sinners, and maintained his innocence against all and every temptation. Christ's relative sinlessness, or the *posse non peccare*, became more and more *absolute* sinlessness, or a *non posse peccare*, by his own moral act or the right use of his freedom in the absolute, active, and passive obedience to God.

In vain we look through the entire biography of Christ for a single stain, or the slightest shadow, on his moral character. There never lived a more harmless being on earth. He injured nobody, he took advantage of nobody. He never spoke an improper word, he never committed a wrong action. He never repented, never asked God for pardon and forgiveness.† He stood in no need of regeneration and conversion, nor even of reform, but simply of the regular harmonious unfolding of his moral power. He exhibited a uniform elevation above objects, opinions, pleasures, and passions of this world, and disregard to

* Comp. with the history of the temptation in the wilderness, Matt. iv. and Luke iv., the significant passages in the Epistle to the Hebrews, iv. 15, *πειρασμένοι δε κατὰ πάντα καὶ ὑποβήθητε, χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας*; and v. 8, *καί τις ὡς υἱός. ἔμαθεν ἀπ' ὧν ἔπαθε τὴν ὑπακοήν.*

† The petition for forgiveness in the Lord's Prayer, Matt. vi. 12, is no exception, as it was no expression of his individual need in this part, but intended as a model for his disciples.

riches, display, fame, and favour of men. The apparent outbreak of passion in the expulsion of the profane traffickers from the temple, is the only instance on the record of his history which might be quoted against his freedom from the faults of humanity. But the very effect which it produced shews that, far from being the outburst of passion, the expulsion was a judicial act of a religious reformer, vindicating, in just and holy zeal, the honour of the Lord of the temple, and that with a dignity and majesty which at once silenced the offenders, though superior in number and physical strength, and made them submit to their well-deserved punishment without a murmur, and in awe of the presence of a superhuman power. The cursing of the unfruitful fig-tree can still less be urged, as it evidently was a significant symbolical act foreshadowing the fearful doom of the impenitent Jews in the destruction of Jerusalem.

The perfect innocence of Jesus, however, is based, not only negatively on the absence of any recorded word or act to the contrary, and his absolute exemption from every trace of selfishness and worldliness, but positively also on the unanimous testimony of John the Baptist and the apostles, who bowed before the majesty of his character in unbounded veneration, and declare him "just," "holy," and "without sin."* It is admitted, moreover, by his enemies, the heathen judge Pilate and his wife, representing as it were the Roman law and justice, when they shuddered with apprehension, and washed the hands to be clear of innocent blood; by the rude Roman centurion confessing under the cross, in the name of the disinterested operators, that "truly this was the Son of God;" and by Judas himself, the immediate witness of his whole public and private life, exclaiming in despair, "I have betrayed innocent blood."† Even dumb nature responded in mysterious sympathy, and the beclouded heavens above, and the shaking earth beneath, united in paying their unconscious tribute to the divine purity of their dying Lord. It is finally placed beyond all possibility of doubt by his own freedom from any sense of guilt or unworthiness, and by his open and fearless challenge to his bitter enemies,

* Acts iii. 14; 1 Pet. i. 19, ii. 22, iii. 18; 2 Cor. v. 21; 1 John ii. 29, iii. 5, 7; Heb. iv. 15, vii. 26. Considering the infinite superiority of the ethics of the apostles to the ethics of the ancient Greeks, it is simply absurd to weaken the force of this unanimous testimony (as is done by D. F. Strauss, *Die Christliche Glaubenslehre*, vol. ii. p. 192, and to some extent even by Haase, *Leben Jesu*, p. 61) by a reference to Xenophon's estimate of Socrates: Οὐδὲν πῶποτε Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ἀσεβὲς οὐδὲ ἀνόσιον οὐρε πράττοντος εἶδεν, οὐρε λίγυρος ἦκουσιν. *Memorab.* i. 11. Comp. the just remarks of Ullmann, *Sündlosigkeit Jesu*, p. 88 ff.

† Matt. xxvii. 19, 24, 54; Luke xxiii. 22, 47; Matt. xxvii. 4.

"Which of you convinceth me of sin?"* In this question he clearly exempts himself from the common fault and guilt of the race. In the mouth of any other man this question would at once betray either the height of hypocrisy, or a degree of self-deception bordering on madness itself, and would overthrow the very foundation of all human goodness; while, from the mouth of Jesus, we instinctively receive it as the triumphant self-vindication of one who stood far above the possibility of successful impeachment or founded suspicion.†

Admit once this fact of the perfect sinlessness of Christ, as is done even by divines who are by no means regarded orthodox,‡ and you admit that Christ differed from all other men, not in degree only, but in kind. For although we must repudiate the pantheistic notion of the necessity of sin, and must maintain that human nature in itself considered is capable of sinlessness; that it was sinless, in fact, before the fall; and that it will ultimately become sinless again by the redemption of Christ; yet it is equally certain that human nature in its *present* condition is not, and never was, sinless since the fall, except in the single case of Christ; and that for this very reason Christ's sinlessness can only be explained on the ground of such an extraordinary indwelling of God in him, as never took place in any other human being before or after. The entire Christian world, Greek, Latin, and Protestant, agree in the scriptural doctrine of the universal depravity of human nature since the apostasy of the first Adam. Even the modern

* John viii. 46. Comp. the Commentators, and the remarks of Ullmann, l. c. p. 92 ff.

† Compare the striking remarks of H. Bushnell, p. 325: "If Jesus was a sinner, he was conscious of sin, as all sinners are, and therefore was a hypocrite in the whole fabric of his character; realising so much of divine beauty in it, maintaining the show of such unfaltering harmony and celestial grace, and doing all this with a mind confused and fouled by the affectations acted for true virtues! Such an example of successful hypocrisy would be itself the greatest miracle ever heard of in this world."

‡ As Schleiermacher, *Der Christliche Glaube*, 8d ed. (1836) vol. ii. p. 78: "Christus war von allen andern Menschen unterschiedend durch seine wesentliche Unstündlichkeit und seine schlechthinige Vollkommenheit." Karl Hase, *Leben Jesu*, 4th ed., 1854, p. 60 f. (Clarke's English translation, Boston, 1860, p. 54) likewise admits it. D. F. Strauss denies it in his two destructive works, the *Life of Jesus* and the *Dogmatics in conflict with Modern Science*, but he does so from the *a priori* philosophical argument of the impossibility of sinlessness, or the pantheistic notion of the inseparableness of sin from all finite existence. The only exegetical proof he urges (*Dogmat.* ii. 192) is Christ's word, Matt. xix. 17, "There is none good but one, that is, God." But Christ answers here to the preceding question, and the implied misconception of goodness. He does not decline the epithet *good* as such, but only in the superficial sense of the rich youth who regarded him simply as a distinguished Rabbi and a good man, not as one with God. In no case can he be supposed to have contradicted his own testimony concerning his innocence. See the commentators *ad locum*, especially Olshausen, Meyer, and Lange.

and unscriptural Romish dogma of the freedom of the Virgin Mary from hereditary as well as actual sin, can hardly be quoted as an exception; for this exception is explained in the papal decision by the assumption of a miraculous interposition of divine favour, and the reflex influence of the merit of her Son. There is not a single mortal who must not charge himself with some defect or folly, and man's consciousness of sin and unworthiness deepens just in proportion to his self-knowledge and progress in virtue and goodness. There is not a single saint who has not experienced a new birth from above, and an actual conversion from sin to holiness, and who does not feel daily the need of repentance and divine forgiveness. The very greatest and best of them, as St Paul and St Augustine, have passed through a violent struggle and a radical revolution, and their whole theological system and religious experience rested on the felt antithesis of sin and grace.

But in Christ we have the one solitary and absolute exception to this universal rule, an individual thinking like a man, feeling like a man, speaking, acting, suffering, and dying like a man, surrounded by sinners in every direction, with the keenest sense of sin, and the deepest sympathy with sinners, commencing his public ministry with the call, "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand;"* yet never touched in the least by the contamination of the world, never putting himself in the attitude of a sinner before God, never shedding a tear of repentance, never regretting a single thought, word, or deed, never needing or asking divine pardon, and boldly facing all his present and future enemies in the absolute certainty of his spotless purity before God and man.

A sinless Saviour in midst of a sinful world is an astounding fact indeed, and a miracle in history. But this freedom from the common sin and guilt of the race is after all only the negative side of his character, which rises in magnitude as we contemplate the positive side, namely, his absolute moral and religious perfection.

It is universally admitted, even by deists and rationalists, that Christ taught the purest and sublimest system of ethics, which throws all the moral precepts and maxims of the wisest men of antiquity far into the shade. The sermon on the mount alone is worth infinitely more than all that Confucius, Socrates, and Seneca ever said or wrote on duty and virtue. But the difference is still greater if we come to the more difficult task of practice. While the wisest and best of men never live up even to their own imperfect standard of excellency, Christ fully carried out his perfect doctrine in his life and conduct. He is

* Matthew iv. 17.

the living incarnation of the ideal standard of virtue and holiness, and universally acknowledged to be the highest model for all that is pure, and good, and noble in the sight of God and man.

We find Christ moving in all the ordinary and essential relations of life,* as a son, a friend, a citizen, a teacher, at home, and in public; we find him among all classes of society: with sinners and saints, with the poor and the wealthy, with the sick and the healthy, with little children, grown men and women, with plain fishermen and learned scribes, with despised publicans and honoured members of the Sanhedrim, with friends and foes, with admiring disciples and bitter persecutors, now with an individual as Nicodemus or the woman of Samaria, now in the familiar circle of the twelve, now in the crowds of the people; we find him in all situations: in the synagogue and the temple, at home and on journeys, in villages and the city of Jerusalem, in the desert and on the mountain, along the banks of Jordan and the shores of the Galilean Sea, at the wedding feast and the grave, in Gethsemane, in the judgment-hall and on Calvary. In all these various relations, conditions, and situations, as they are crowded within the few years of his public ministry, he sustains the same consistent character throughout, without ever exposing himself to censure. He fulfils every duty to God, to man, and to himself without a single violation of duty, and exhibits an entire conformity to the law, in the spirit as well as the letter. His life is one unbroken service of God in active and passive obedience to his holy will, one grand act of absolute love to God and love to man, of personal self-conservation to the glory of his heavenly Father and the salvation of a fallen race. In the language of the people who were "beyond measure astonished at his works," we must say the more we study his life, "He did all things well."† In a solemn appeal to his heavenly Father in the parting hour, he could proclaim to the world that he had glorified him on the earth, and finished the work he gave him to do.‡

The first feature in this singular perfection of Christ's character which strikes our attention, is the perfect harmony of virtue and piety, of morality and religion, or of love to God

* The relation of husband and father must be excepted, on account of his elevation above all equal partnership, and the universality of his character and mission, which requires the entire community of the redeemed as his bride, instead of any individual daughter of Eve.

† Mark vii. 37—*Καλῶς πάντα ποιῆκε*, bene omnia fecit—is to be taken as a general judgment, inferred not only from the concrete case related before, but from all they had heard and seen of Christ.

‡ John xvii. 8, 22.

and love to man. Every moral action in him proceeded from supreme love to God, and looked to the temporal and eternal welfare of man. The groundwork of his character was the most intimate and uninterrupted union and communion with his heavenly Father, from whom he derived, to whom he referred everything. Already in his twelfth year he found his life element and delight in the things of his Father.* It was his daily food to do the will of him that sent him, and to finish his work.† To him he looked in prayer before every important act, and taught his disciples that model prayer, which for simplicity, brevity, comprehensiveness, and suitableness, can never be surpassed. He often retired to a mountain or solitary place for prayer, and spent days and nights in this blessed privilege. But so constant and uniform was his habit of communion with the great Jehovah, that he kept it up amid the multitude, and converted the crowded city into a religious retreat. His self-consciousness was at every moment conditioned, animated, and impregnated by the consciousness of God. Even when he exclaimed in indescribable anguish of body and soul, and in vicarious sympathy with the misery of the whole race, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"‡ the bond of union was not broken, or even loosened, but simply obscured for a moment as the sun by a passing cloud, and the enjoyment, not the possession of it, was withdrawn from his feelings; for immediately afterwards he commended his soul into the hands of his Father, and triumphantly exclaimed, "It is finished!" So strong and complete was this moral union of Christ with God at every moment of his life, that he fully realised for the first time the idea of religion whose object is to bring about such a union, and that he is the personal representative and living embodiment of Christianity as the true and absolute religion. But the piety of Christ was no inactive contemplation, or retiring mysticism and selfish enjoyment, but thoroughly practical, ever active in works of charity, and tending to regenerate and transform the world into the kingdom of God. "He went about doing good." His life is an unbroken series of good works and virtues in active exercise, all proceeding from the same union with God, animated by the same love, and tending to the same end, the glory of God and happiness of man.

The next feature we would notice, is the completeness or pleromatic fulness of the moral and religious character of Christ. While all other men represent at best but broken fragments

* Luke ii. 49.

† John iv. 34, comp. v. 30.

‡ Matthew xxvii. 46. It should be remembered that Jesus speaks here in the prophetic and typical words of David, Ps. xxii. 2, while, when speaking in his own language, he uniformly addresses God as his *Father*.

of the idea of goodness and holiness, he exhausts the list of virtues and graces which may be named.

History exhibits to us many examples of commanding and comprehensive geniuses, who stand at the head of their age and nation, and furnish material for the intellectual activity of generations and periods, until they are succeeded by other heroes at a new epoch of development. As rivers generally spring from high mountains, so knowledge and moral power rises, and is continually nourished, from the heights of humanity. Abraham, the father of the faithful; Moses, the lawgiver of the Jewish theocracy; Elijah among the prophets; Peter, Paul, and John among the apostles; Athanasius and Chrysostom among the Greeks; Augustine and Jerome among the Latin fathers; Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus among the schoolmen; Leo and Gregory among the popes; Luther and Calvin in the line of Protestant reformers and divines; Socrates, the patriarch of the ancient schools of philosophy; Homer, Dante, Shakspeare and Milton, Goethe and Schiller in the history of poetry among the various nations to which they belong; Raphael among painters; Charlemagne, the first and greatest in the long succession of German emperors; Napoleon, towering high above all the generals of his training; Washington, the wisest and best, as well as the first of American presidents, and the purest and noblest type of the American character, may be mentioned as examples of such representative heroes in history. But they who anticipate and concentrate the powers of whole generations never represent universal, but only sectional, humanity; they are identified with a particular people or age, and partake of its errors, superstitions, and failings, almost in the same proportion in which they exhibit their virtues. Moses, though revered by the followers of three religions, was a Jew in views, feelings, habits, and position, as well as by parentage. Socrates never rose above the Greek type of character; Luther was a German to the back-bone, and can only be properly understood as a German; Calvin, though an exile from his native land, remained a Frenchman; and Washington can be to no nation on earth what he is to the American. Their influence may, and does, extend far beyond their respective national horizons, yet they can never furnish a universal model for imitation. We regard them as extraordinary, but fallible and imperfect men, whom it would be very unsafe to follow in every view and line of conduct. Very frequently the failings and vices of great men are in proportion to their virtues and powers, as the tallest bodies cast the longest shadow. Even the three leading apostles are models of piety and virtue only as far as they reflect the image of their heavenly Master; and it is only with this qualification

that Paul exhorts his spiritual children, "Be ye followers of me, even as I also am of Christ."*

What these representative men are to particular ages or nations, or sects, or particular schools of science or art, Christ was to the human family at large in its relation to God. He, and he alone, is the universal type for universal imitation. Hence he could, without the least impropriety or suspicion of vanity, call upon all men to forsake all things, and to follow him.† He stands above the limitations of age, school, sect, nation, and race. Although a Jew according to the flesh, there is nothing Jewish about him which is not at the same time of general significance. The particular and national in him is always duly subordinated to the general and human. Still less was he ever identified with a party or sect. He was equally removed from the stiff formalism of the Pharisees, the loose liberalism of the Sadducees, and the inactive mysticism of the Essenes. He rose above all the prejudices, bigotries, and superstitions of his age and people, which exert their power even upon the strongest and otherwise most liberal minds. Witness his freedom in the observance of the Sabbath, by which he offended the scrupulous literalists, while he fulfilled, as the Lord of the Sabbath, the true spirit of the law in its universal and abiding significance;‡ his reply to the disciples when they traced the misfortune of the blind man to a particular sin of the subject or his parents;§ his liberal conduct towards the Samaritans, as contrasted with the inveterate hatred and prejudice of the Jews, including his own disciples at the time;|| and his charitable judgment of the slaughtered Galileans, whose blood Pilate had mingled with their sacrifices, and the eighteen upon whom the tower in Siloam fell and slew them.¶ "Think ye," he addressed the children of superstition, "that these men were sinners above all the Galileans, and above all men that dwelt in Jerusalem, because they suffered such things? I tell you, Nay: but, except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." All the words and all the actions of Christ, while they were fully adapted to the occasions which called them forth, retain their force and applicability undiminished to all ages and nations. He is the same unsurpassed and unsurpassable model

* 1 Cor. xi. 1, comp. 1 Thess. i. 6, "Ye became followers of us and of the Lord."

† Matt. iv. 19; viii. 22; ix. 9; Mark ii. 14; viii. 34; x. 21; Luke v. 27; ix. 23, 59; xviii. 22; John i. 43; x. 27; xii. 26.

‡ Matt. xii. 1-8; Mark ii. 23-28; Luke vi. 1-9; John v. 16-18.

§ John ix. 3, "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents, but (he was born blind) that the works of God should be made manifest in him."

|| See the dialogue with the woman of Samaria, John iv. 5, &c., and the parable of the merciful Samaritan, Luke x. 30-37.

¶ Luke xiii. 1-4.

of every virtue to the Christians of every generation, every clime, every sect, every nation, and every race.

It must not be supposed, however, that a complete catalogue of virtues would do justice to the character under consideration. It is not only the completeness, but still more the even proportion and perfect harmony of virtues and graces, apparently opposite and contradictory, which distinguishes him specifically from all other men. This feature has struck with singular force all the more eminent writers on the subject.* It gives the finish to that beauty of holiness which is the sublimest picture presented to our contemplation.

He was free from all one-sidedness, which constitutes the weakness as well as the strength of the most eminent men. He was not a man of one idea, nor of one virtue, towering above all the rest. The moral forces were so well tempered and moderated by each other, that none was unduly prominent, none carried to excess, none alloyed by the kindred failing. Each was checked and completed by the opposite grace. His character never lost its even balance and happy equilibrium, never needed modification or readjustment. It was thoroughly sound, and uniformly consistent from the beginning to the end. We cannot properly attribute to him any one temperament. He was neither sanguine, like Peter, nor choleric, like Paul, nor melancholic, like John, nor phlegmatic, as James is sometimes, though incorrectly, represented to have been, but he combined the vivacity without the levity of the sanguine, the vigour without the violence of the choleric, the seriousness without the austerity of the melancholic, the calmness without the apathy of the phlegmatic temperaments. He was equally far removed from the excesses of the legalist, the pietist, the ascetic, and the enthusiast. With the strictest obedience to the law, he moved in the element of freedom; with all the fervour of the enthusiast, he was always calm, sober, and self-possessed. Notwithstanding his complete and uniform elevation above the affairs of this world, he freely mingled with society, male and female, dined with publicans and sinners, sat at the wedding feast, shed tears at the sepulchre, delighted in

* Comp. Ullmann, *Sündlosigkeit*, p. 67; S. P. Lange, *Leben Jesu*, i. 27-34; Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, ii. 23, 24. Hase also, in his *Leben Jesu*, p. 63 (4th ed.), places the ideal beauty of Christ's character in "das schöne Ebenmaass aller Kräfte," and in "vollendete Gottesliebe dargestellt in reinster humanität" ("the beautiful symmetry of all powers, and perfect love exhibited in purest humanity"). Bishop D. Wilson, in his *Evidences of Christianity*, vol. ii. 116 (Boston ed. of 1830), remarks: "The opposite, and to us apparently contradictory, graces were found in him in equal proportion." Dr W. E. Channing, the Unitarian, in his sermon on the *Character of Christ* (Works, vol. iv. p. 23), says: "This combination of the spirit of humanity in its lowliest, tenderest form, with the consciousness of unrivalled and divine glories, is the most wonderful distinction of this wonderful character."

God's nature, admired the beauties of the lilies, and used the occupations of the husbandman for the illustration of the sublimest truths of the kingdom of heaven. His zeal never degenerated into passion or rashness, nor his constancy into obstinacy, nor his benevolence into weakness, nor his tenderness into sentimentality. His unworldliness was free from indifference and unsociability, his dignity from pride and presumption, his affability from undue familiarity, his self-denial from moroseness, his temperance from austerity. He combined childlike innocence with manly strength, all-absorbing devotion to God with untiring interest in the welfare of man, tender love to the sinner with uncompromising severity against sin, commanding dignity with winning humility, fearless courage with wise caution, unyielding firmness with sweet gentleness. He is justly compared with the lion in strength, and with the lamb in meekness. He equally possessed the wisdom of the serpent and the simplicity of the dove.

He brought both the sword against every form of wickedness, and the peace which the world cannot give. He was the most effective and yet the least noisy, the most radical and yet the most conservative, calm, and patient of all reformers. He came not to fulfil every letter of the law, yet he made all things new. The same hand which drove the profane traffickers from the temple blessed little children, healed the lepers, and rescued the sinking disciple; the same ear which heard the voice of approbation from heaven, was open to the cries of the woman in trouble; the same mouth which pronounced the terrible woe on the hypocrites, and condemned the impure desire and unkind feeling, as well as the open crime, blessed the poor in spirit, announced pardon to the adulteress, and prayed for his murderers; the same eye which beheld the mysteries of God, and penetrated the heart of man, shed tears of compassion over ungrateful Jerusalem, and tears of friendship at the grave of Lazarus. These are indeed opposite, yet not contradictory traits of character, as little as the different manifestations of God's power and goodness in the tempest and the sunshine, in the towering Alps and the lily of the valley, in the boundless ocean and dew drop of the morning. They are separated in imperfect men, indeed, but united in Christ, the universal model for all.

Finally, as all the active virtues meet in him, so he unites the active or heroic virtues with the passive and gentle. He is equally the highest standard of all true martyrdom.

No character can become complete without trial and suffering, and a noble death is the crowning act of a noble life. Edmund Burke said to Fox in the English parliament: "Obloquy is a necessary ingredient of all true glory. Calumny

and abuse are essential parts of triumph." The ancient Greeks and Romans admired a good man struggling with misfortune, as a sight worthy of the gods. Plato describes the righteous man as one who, without doing any injustice, yet has the appearance of the greatest injustice, and proves his own justice by perseverance against all calumny unto death; yea, he predicts, that if such a righteous man should ever appear, he would be "scourged, tortured, bound, deprived of his sight, and after having suffered all possible injury, nailed on a post." No wonder that the ancient fathers saw in this remarkable passage an unconscious prophecy of Christ. But how far is this ideal descriptive of the great philosopher, from the actual reality as it appeared three hundred years afterwards. The great men of this world, who rise even above themselves on inspiring occasions and boldly face a superior army, are often thrown off their equilibrium in ordinary life, and grow impatient at trifling obstacles. Only think of Napoleon at the head of his conquering legions, and at the helm of an empire, and the same Napoleon after the defeat at Waterloo, and on the island of St Helena. The highest form of passive virtue attained by ancient heathenism, or modern secular heroism, is that Stoicism which meets the trials and misfortunes of life in the spirit of haughty contempt and unfeeling indifference, which destroys the sensibilities, and is but another exhibition of selfishness and pride.

Christ has set up a far higher standard by his teaching and example, never known before or since, except in imperfect imitation of him. He has revolutionised moral philosophy, and convinced the world that forgiving, love to the enemy, lowliness and humility, gentle patience in suffering, and cheerful submission to the holy will of God, is the crowning excellency of moral greatness. "If thy brother," he says, "trespass against thee seven times in a day, and seven times in a day turn again to thee, saying, I repent; thou shalt forgive him."† "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them who despitefully use you and persecute you."‡ This is a sublime maxim truly, but still more sublime is its actual exhibition in his life.

Christ's passive virtue is not confined to the closing scenes of his ministry. As human life is beset at every step by trials, vexations, and hindrances, which should serve the educational purpose of developing its resources and proving its strength, so was Christ's. During the whole state of his humiliation, he was "a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief,"§ and had to endure "the contradiction of sinners."|| He was poor, and

* Politia, p. 74, sqq. ed Ast. (Plat. Opera, vol. iv.), p. 361 E. ed Bip.

† Luke xvii. 4.

‡ Matt. v. 44.

§ Isa. l. 3.

| Heb. xii. 3.

suffered hunger and fatigue. He was tempted by the devil. His path was obstructed with apparently insurmountable difficulties from the outset. His words and miracles called forth the bitter hatred of the world, which resulted at last in the bloody counsel of death. The Pharisees and Sadducees forgot their jealousies and quarrels in opposing him. They rejected and perverted his testimony; they laid snares for him by insidious questions; they called him a glutton and a winebibber for eating and drinking like other men, a friend of publicans and sinners for his condescending love and mercy, a Sabbath-breaker for doing good on the Sabbath day; they charged him with madness and blasphemy for asserting his unity with the Father, and derived his miracles from Beelzebub, the prince of devils. The common people, though astonished at his wisdom and mighty works, pointed sneeringly to his low origin; his own country and native town refused him the honour of a prophet. Even his brothers, we are told, did not believe in him, and in their impatient zeal for a temporal kingdom, they found fault with his unostentatious mode of proceeding.* His apostles and disciples, with all their profound reverence for his character and faith in his divine origin and mission as the Messiah of God, yet by their ignorance, their carnal Jewish notions, and their almost habitual misunderstanding of his spiritual discourses, must have constituted a severe trial of patience to a teacher of far less superiority to his pupils.

But how shall we describe his passion, more properly so called, with which no other suffering can be compared for a moment! Never did any man suffer more innocently, more unjustly, more intensely than Jesus of Nazareth. Within the narrow limits of a few hours, we have here a tragedy of universal significance, exhibiting every form of human weakness and infernal wickedness, of ingratitude, desertion, injury and insult, of bodily and mental pain and anguish, culminating in the most ignominious death then known among Jews and Gentiles. The government and the people combined against him who came to save them. His own disciples forsook him; Peter denied him; Judas, under the inspiration of the devil, betrayed him; the rulers of the nation condemned him; the furious mob cried, "Crucify him;" rude soldiers mocked him. He was seized in the night, hurried from tribunal to tribunal, arrayed in a crown of thorns, insulted, smitten, scourged, spit upon, and hung like a criminal and a slave between two robbers and murderers!

How did Christ bear all these little and great trials of life,

* John vii. 8-5. It is immaterial for our purpose whether we understand by his brothers (not "brethren," as the common version has it), younger sons of Joseph and Mary, or older sons of Joseph from a former marriage, or cousins.

and the death on the cross? Let us remember, first, that unlike the icy Stoics in their unnatural and repulsive pseudo-virtue, he had the keenest sensibilities and the deepest sympathies with all human grief, that made him even shed tears at the grave of a friend, and in the agony of the garden, and provide a refuge for his mother in the last dying hour. But with this truly human tenderness and delicacy of feeling, he ever combined an unutterable dignity and majesty, a sublime self-control and imperturbable calmness of mind. There is a grandeur in his deepest sufferings, which forbids a feeling of pity and compassion on our side, as incompatible with admiration and reverence for his character. We feel the force of his word to the women of Jerusalem when they bewailed him on the way to Calvary, "Weep not for me, but weep for yourselves and your children." We never hear him break out in angry passions and violence, although he was at war with the whole ungodly world. He never murmured, never uttered discontent, displeasure, or resentment. He was never disheartened, discouraged, ruffled, or fretted, but full of unbounded confidence, that all was well ordered in the providence of his heavenly Father. He moved serenely, like the sun, above the clouds as they sailed under him. He was ever surrounded by the element of peace, and said in his parting hour, "Peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you: not as the world giveth give I unto you. Let not your heart be troubled, neither let it be afraid."* He was never what we call unhappy, but full of inward joy, which he bequeathed to his disciples in that sublimest of all prayers, "that they might have his joy fulfilled in themselves."† With all his severe rebuke to the Pharisees, he never indulged in personality. He ever returned good for evil. He forgave Peter for his denial, and would have forgiven Judas, if in the exercise of sincere repentance he had sought his pardon. Even while hanging on the cross, he had only the language of pity for the wretches who were driving the nails into his hands and feet, and prayed in their behalf, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." He did not seek or hasten his martyrdom, like many of the early martyrs of the Ignatian type, in their morbid enthusiasm and ambitious humility, but quietly and patiently waited for the hour appointed by the will of his Father. But when it came, with what self-possession and calmness, with what strength and weakness, with what majesty and gentleness did he pass through its dark and trying scenes! Here every word and act is unutterably significant, from the agony in Gethsemane, when overwhelmed with the sympathetic sense of the entire guilt of mankind, and in full

* John xiv. 27.

† John xvii. 13, comp. xvi. 33.

view of the terrible scenes before him—the only guiltless being in the world—he prayed that the cup might pass from him, but immediately added, “Not my, but thy will be done,” to the triumphant exclamation on the cross, “It is finished!” Even his dignified silence before the tribunal of his enemies and the furious mob, when “as a lamb dumb before his shearers he opened not his mouth,” is more eloquent than any apology, and made Pilate tremble. Who will venture to bring a parallel from the annals of ancient or modern sages, when even a Rousseau confessed, “If Socrates suffered and died like a philosopher, Christ suffered and died like a god!” The passion and crucifixion of Jesus, like his whole character, stands without parallel, solitary and alone in its glory, and will ever continue to be what it has been for these eighteen hundred years, the most sacred theme of meditation, the highest exemplar of suffering virtue, the strongest weapon against sin and Satan, the deepest source of comfort to the noblest and best of men.

Such then was Jesus of Nazareth: a true man in body, soul, and spirit, yet differing from all men; a character absolutely unique and original from tender childhood to ripe manhood, moving in unbroken union with God, overflowing with the purest love to man, free from every sin and error, innocent and holy, teaching and practising all virtues in perfect harmony, devoted solely and uniformly to the noblest ends, sealing the purest life with the sublimest death, and ever acknowledged since as the one and only perfect model of goodness and holiness! All human greatness loses on closer inspection; but Christ's character grows more and more pure, sacred, and lovely, the better we know him. No biographer, novelist, or artist, can be satisfied with any attempt of his to set it forth. It is felt to be infinitely greater than any conception or representation of it by the mind, the tongue, and the pencil of man or angel. We might as well attempt to empty the waters of the boundless sea into a narrow well, or to portray the splendour of the risen sun and the starry heavens with ink. No picture of the Saviour, though drawn by the master hand of a Raphael, or Dürer, or Rubens; no epic, though conceived by the genius of a Dante, or Milton, or Klopstock, can improve on the artless narrative of the gospel, whose only but all-powerful charm is truth. In this case certainly truth is stranger and stronger than fiction, and speaks best for itself without comment, explanation, and eulogy. Here, and here alone, the highest perfection of art falls short of the historical fact, and fancy finds no room for idealising the real. For here we have the absolute ideal itself in living reality. It seems to me that this consideration alone should satisfy the reflecting mind, that

Christ's character, though truly natural and human, must be at the same time supernatural and divine.

The whole range of history and fiction furnishes no parallel to such a character. There never was any thing even approaching to it before or since, except in faint imitation of his example. It cannot be explained on purely human principles, nor derived from any intellectual and moral forces of the age in which he lived. On the contrary, it stands in marked contrast to the whole surrounding world of Judaism and heathenism, which present to us the dreary picture of internal decay, and which actually crumbled into ruin before the new moral creation of the crucified Jesus of Nazareth. He is the one absolute and unaccountable exception to the universal experience of mankind. He is the great central miracle of the whole gospel history, and all his miracles are but the natural and necessary manifestations of his miraculous person, performed with the same ease with which we perform our ordinary daily works.

There is but one rational explanation of this sublime mystery, and this is found in Christ's own testimony concerning his superhuman and divine origin.* This testimony challenges at once our highest regard and belief, from the absolute veracity which no one ever denied him, or could deny, without destroying at once the very foundation of his universally conceded moral purity and greatness.

Christ strongly asserts his humanity, and calls himself, in innumerable passages, the Son of man.† This expression, while it places him in one view on a common ground with us as flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone, already indicates, at the same time, that he is more than an ordinary individual, not merely a son of man, like all other descendants of Adam, but the Son of Man, the man in the highest sense, the ideal, the universal, the absolute man, the second Adam descended from heaven, the head of a new and superior order of the race, the King of Israel, the Messiah. The same is the case with the cognate term, "the Son of David," which is frequently given to Christ, by the two blind men, the Syro-phenician woman, and the people at large.‡ The appellation does not express, then, as many suppose, the humiliation and condescension of Christ simply, but his elevation rather above the ordinary level, and the actualisation in him and through him of the ideal standard

* For a very full exposition of this testimony, we refer to the instructive and able work of W. Fr. Gees, *Die Lehre von der Person Christi entwickelt aus dem Selbst-bewusstsein Christi und aus dem Zeugnisse der Apostel*. Basel, 1866.

† Comp. the Dictionaries, and especially Schmid's and Bagster's Greek Concordances of the New Testament (the latter republished by the Harper New York, 1865), sub *v. υἱός τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*.

‡ Matt. ix, 27; xv, 22; xii, 23; xxi, 9; xxii, 41, &c., &c.

of human nature under its moral and religious aspect, or in its relation to God. This interpretation is suggested grammatically by the use of the definitive article, and historically by the origin of the term in Daniel vii. 13, where it signifies the Messiah as the head of a universal and eternal kingdom. It commends itself, moreover, at once as the most natural and significant in such passages, as, "Ye shall see the heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man."* "He that came down from heaven, even the Son of man, which is in heaven."† "The Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins."‡ "The Son of man is Lord even of the Sabbath-day."§ "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you."|| "The Son of man shall come in the glory of his Father."¶ "The Son of man is come to save."** "The Father hath given him authority to execute judgment also, because he is the Son of man."†† Even those passages which are quoted for the opposite view, receive in our interpretation a greater force and beauty from the sublime contrast which places the voluntary condescension and humiliation of Christ in the most striking light, as when he says, "Foxes have holes, and birds of the air have nests; but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head;"‡‡ or, "Whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant: even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many."§§ Thus the manhood of Christ, rising far above all ordinary manhood, though freely coming down to its lowest ranks, with the view to their elevation and redemption, is already the portal of his godhood.

But he calls himself at the same time, as he is most frequently called by his disciples, the Son of God, in an equally emphatic sense. He is not merely a son of God among others, angels, archangels, princes, and judges, and redeemed men, but *the* Son of God, as no other being ever was, is, or can be, all others being sons or children of God only by derivation or adoption, after a new spiritual birth, and in dependence on his absolute and eternal sonship.¶¶ He is, as his favourite disciple calls him, the "only begotten" Son, or as the old catholic theology expresses it, eternally begotten of the substance of

* John i. 51 (or v. 52 in the Greek text and the German version).

† John iii. 13.

‡ Matt. ix. 6; Mark ii. 10.

§ Matt. xii. 8; Mark ii. 28.

|| John vi. 58.

¶ Matt. xvi. 17; comp. xix. 28; xxiv. 30; xxv. 31; xxvi. 64; Luke xxi. 27, 36.

** Matt. xviii. 11, comp. Luke xix. 10.

†† John v. 27.

‡‡ Luke ix. 58.

§§ Matt. xx. 27, 28.

¶¶ Mat. xi. 27; xxi. 37; xxii. 42; xxvi. 63, f.; xxvii. 48; Mark xii. 6; xiii. 32; xiv. 62; Luke x. 22; John v. 19-26; ix. 35-38; x. 36; xi. 4 xiv. 18; xvii. 1; xix. 7.

the Father. In this high sense the title is freely given to him by his disciples,* without a remonstrance on his part, and by God the Father himself at his baptism and at his transfiguration.†

Christ represents himself, moreover, as being not of this world, but sent from God, as having come from God, and as being in heaven while living on earth.‡ He not only announces and proclaims the truth as other messengers of God, but declares himself to be the Light of the world ;§ the Way, the Truth, and Life ;|| the Resurrection and the Life.¶ “All things,” he says, “are delivered unto me of my Father, and no man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him.”** He invites the weary and heavy-laden to come to him for rest and peace.†† He promises life in the highest and deepest sense, even eternal life to every one who believes in him.‡‡ He claims and admits to be the Christ or the Messiah of whom Moses and the prophets of old testify, and the King of Israel.§§ He is the Lawgiver of the new and last dispensation,||| the Founder of a spiritual kingdom co-extensive with the race, and everlasting as eternity itself,¶¶ the appointed Judge of the quick and the dead,*** the only Mediator between God and man, the Saviour of the world.††† He parts from his disciples with those sublime words which alone testify his divinity : “All power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost : teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you : and, lo, I am with you alway, even to the end of the world.”†††

Finally, he claims such a relation to the Father, as implies both the equality of substance and the distinction of person, and which, in connection with his declarations concern-

* Mat. xvi. 16; Mark iii. 11; John i. 18; xxxiv. 49; xi. 27; xx. 31; besides the many passages in the Acts and Epistles, where the term *ὁ υἱος τοῦ Θεοῦ* is as frequent as the term *ὁ υἱος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* in the Gospels.

† Mat. iii. 17; Luke iii. 22; Mat. xvii. 5; Luke ix. 35.

‡ John iii. 18. § John viii. 12 || John xiv. 6. ¶ John xi. 25.

** Mat. xi. 27. This passage is a striking parallel to the sublimest sayings in the fourth gospel, and proves the essential identity of the Synoptic and the Johannean picture of Christ.

†† Mat. xi. 28. ‡‡ John iii. 36; v. 24; vi. 40, 47, 50-58; xi. 25.

§§ John iv. 26; v. 39, 46; Mat. xiv. 33; xvi. 16, f.; xxvi. 63, f., &c.

||| Mat. v. 22-44; xxviii. 19, 20.

¶¶ Mat. xvi. 19; xxvii. 11; Luke xxii. 30; John xviii. 36. Comp. Dan. vii. 18; Luke i. 33.

*** John v. 22, 25-27; Mat. xxv. 31, ff., &c.

††† Mat. xviii. 11; Luke ix. 56; xix. 10; John iii. 17; v. 34; x. 9; xii. 47. Comp. Luke i. 47; ii. 11; John iv. 42, &c.

††† Mat. xxviii. 18-20.

ing the Holy Spirit, leads with logical necessity, as it were, to the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. For this doctrine saves the divinity of Christ and of the Holy Spirit, without affecting the fundamental truths of the unity of the Godhead, and keeps the proper medium between an abstract and lifeless monotheism, and a polytheistic tritheism.

He always distinguishes himself from God the Father, who sent him, whose work he came to fulfil, whose will he obeys, by whose power he performs his miracles, to whom he prays, and with whom he communes as a self-conscious, personal being. And so he distinguishes himself with equal clearness from the Holy Spirit, whom he received at his baptism, whom he breathed into his disciples, and whom he promised to send; and did send on them as the other Paraclete, as the Spirit of truth and holiness, with the whole fulness of the accomplished salvation. But he never makes a similar distinction between himself and the Son of God; on the contrary, he identifies himself with the Son of God, and uses this term, as already remarked, in a sense which implies much more than the Jewish conception of the Messiah, and nothing short of the equality of essence or substance. For he claims as the Son a real self-conscious, pre-existence before man, and even before the world, consequently also before time, for time was created with the world. "Before Abraham was," he says, "I am,"* significantly using the past in the one, and the present in the other case to mark the difference between man's temporal and his own eternal mode of existence; and in the sacerdotal prayer he asks to be clothed again with the glory which he had with the Father before the foundation of the world.† He assumes divine names and attributes as far as consistent with his state of humiliation, he demands and receives divine honours.‡ He freely and repeatedly exercises the prerogative of pardoning sin in his own name, which the unbelieving scribes and Pharisees, with a logic whose force is irresistible on their premises, looked upon as blasphemous presumption.§ He familiarly classes himself with the infinite majesty of Jehovah in one common plural, and boldly declares, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father;"|| "I and the Father are one."¶ He co-ordinates himself, in the baptismal formula, with the divine Father and

* John viii. 58.

† John xvii. 5. Comp. the testimony of the apostles on the pre-existence, John i. 1-14; Col. i. 16; Heb. i. 2, 3.

‡ John v. 28. § Mat. ix. 6; Luke iii. 20-24; vii. 47, 48. || John xiv. 9.

¶ John x. 30. The passage teaches certainly more than the ethical unity of will; it asserts, according to the context, the unity of power which is based on the unity of essence, or the homousia. The *ἓν* (one) excludes Arianism, the plural *ἐγὼ καὶ* (are) Sabellianism and Patripassianism.

divine Spirit,* and allows himself to be called by Thomas in the name of all the apostles, "My Lord and my God!"†

These are the most astounding and transcendent pretensions ever set up by any being. He, the humblest and lowliest of men, makes them repeatedly and uniformly to the last, in the face of the whole world, even in the darkest hour of suffering. He makes them not in swelling, pompous, ostentatious language, which almost necessarily springs from false pretensions, but in a natural, spontaneous style, with perfect ease, freedom, and composure, as a native prince would speak of the attributes and scenes of royalty at his father's court. He never falters or doubts, never apologises for them, never enters into an explanation. He sets them forth as self-evident truths, which need only be stated to challenge the belief and submission of mankind.

Now, suppose for a moment a purely human teacher, however great and good, suppose a Moses or Elijah, a John the Baptist, an apostle Paul or John, not to speak of any father, schoolman, or reformer, to say, "I am the Light of the World;" "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life;" "I and the Father are one;" and to call upon all men, "Come unto me," "Follow me," that you may find "life" and "peace," which you cannot find anywhere else; would it not create a universal feeling of pity or indignation? No human being on earth could set up the least of these pretensions without being set down at once as a madman or a blasphemer.

But from the mouth of Christ these colossal pretensions excite neither pity nor indignation, nor even the least feeling of incongruity or impropriety. We read and hear them over and over again without surprise.‡ They seem perfectly natural and well sustained by a most extraordinary life, and the most extraordinary works. There is no room here for the least suspicion of vanity, pride, or self-deception. For these eighteen hundred years these claims have been acknowledged by millions of people of all nations and tongues, of all classes and conditions, of the most learned and mighty, as well as the most ignorant and humble, with an instinctive sense of the perfect agreement of what Christ claimed to be what he really was. Is not this fact most remarkable? Is it not a triumphant vindication of Christ's character, and an irresistible proof of the truth of his pretensions?

* Mat. xxviii. 19.

† John xx. 28.

‡ "Of all the readers of the gospel," says Bushnell, p. 290, "it probably never occurs to one in a hundred thousand, to blame his conceit, or the egregious vanity of his pretensions!" Even the better class of Unitarians instinctively bow before these claims. See the remarkable passage of Dr Channing, quoted next page.

There is no other solution of the mighty problem within the reach of human learning and ingenuity. Let us briefly review, in conclusion, the various attempts of Unitarians and unbelievers to account for the character of Christ without admitting his divinity.

The semi-infidelity of Socinians and Unitarians is singularly inconsistent. Admitting the faultless perfection of Christ's character, and the truthfulness of the gospel history, and yet denying his divinity, they must either charge him with such egregious exaggeration and conceit as would overthrow at once the concession of his moral perfection, or they must so weaken and pervert his testimony concerning his relation to God, as to violate all the laws of grammar and sound interpretation. Dr W. E. Channing, the ablest and noblest representative of American Unitarianism, prefers to avoid the difficulty which he was unable to solve. In his admirable discourse on the Character of Christ, he goes as far almost as any orthodox divine in vindicating to him the highest possible purity and excellency as a man ; but he stops half way, and passes by in silence those extraordinary claims, which are inexplicable on merely human principles. He approaches, however, the very threshold of the true faith in the following remarkable passage, which we have a right to quote against his own system :—"I confess," he says, "when I can escape the deadening power of habit, and can receive the full import of such passages as the following, 'Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest ;' 'I am come to seek and to save that which was lost ;' 'He that confesseth me before men, him will I confess before my Father in heaven ;' 'Who-soever shall be ashamed of me before men, of him shall the Son of man be ashamed when he cometh in the glory of the Father, with the holy angels ;' 'In my Father's house are many mansions : I go to prepare a place for you ;' I say, when I can succeed in realising the import of such passages, I feel myself listening to a being such as never before and never since spoke in human language. I am awed by the seriousness of greatness which these simple words express ; and when I connect this greatness with the proofs of Christ's miracles, which I gave you in a former discourse, I am compelled to exclaim with the centurion, 'Truly this was the Son of God.' " But this is not all. We have seen that Christ goes much further than in the passages here quoted, that he forgives sins in his own name, that he asserts pre-existence before Abraham and before the world,—not only ideally in the mind of God, for this would not distinguish him from Abraham or any other creature, but in the real sense of self-conscious personal existence,—that he claims and receives divine honours and attributes, and calls

himself equal with the great Jehovah. How can a being so pure and holy, and withal so humble and lowly, so perfectly free from every trace of enthusiasm and conceit, as Dr Channing freely and emphatically asserts Christ to have been, lay claim to anything which he was not in fact? Why then not also go beyond the exclamation of the heathen centurion, and unite with the confession of Peter and the adoration of the sceptical Thomas, "My Lord and my God!" Unitarianism admits altogether too much for its own conclusions, and is therefore driven to the logical alternative of falling back upon an infidel, or of advancing to the orthodox, Christology. Such a man as Channing, who was certainly under the influence of the holy example of Christ, would not hesitate for the choice, as we may infer from his general spirit and from his last address, delivered at Lenox, Massachussetts, 1842, shortly before his death, where he said: "The doctrine of the Word made flesh shews us God uniting himself intimately with our nature, manifesting himself in a human form, for the very end of making us partakers of his own perfection."*

The infidelity of the enemies of Christianity is logically more consistent, though absolutely untenable in the premises. It resorts either to imposture, or enthusiasm, or poetical fiction.

The hypothesis of *imposture* is so revolting to moral as well as common sense, that its mere statement is its condemnation. It has never been seriously carried out, and no scholar of any decency and self-respect would now dare to profess it.† How, in the name of logic and experience, could an impostor, that is, a deceitful, selfish, depraved man, have invented and consistently maintained, from beginning to end, the purest and noblest character known in history, with the most perfect air of truth and reality? How could he have conceived, and successfully carried through, in the face of the strongest prejudices of his people and age, a plan of unparalleled beneficence, moral magnitude, and sublimity, and sacrificed his own life for it?

* Discourse on the "Character of Christ," in Channing's Works, vol. iv. p. 20.

† It was first suggested by the heathen assailants of Christianity, Celsus and Julian the apostate, then insinuated by French deists of the Voltairian school, but never raised to the dignity of scientific argument. The only attempt to carry it out, and that a mere fragmentary one, was made by the anonymous "Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist," since known as Hermann Samuel Reimarus, professor of oriental literature in the college at Hamburg, who died in 1786. His "Fragments" were never intended for publication, but only for a few friends. Lessing found them in the library at Wolfenbüttel, and commenced to publish them, without the author's knowledge, in 1774; not, as he said, because he agreed with them, but because he wished to arouse the spirit of investigation. This mode of procedure Semler, the father of German neo-logy, wittily compared to the act of setting a city on fire for the purpose of trying the engines.

The difficulty is not lessened by shifting the charge of fraud from Christ upon the apostles and evangelists, who were anything but designing hypocrites and deceivers, and leave upon every unsophisticated reader the impression of an artless simplicity and honesty rarely equalled and never surpassed by any writer, learned or unlearned, of ancient or modern times. What imaginable motive could have induced them to engage in such a wicked scheme, when they knew that the whole world would persecute them even to death? How could they have formed, and successfully sustained, a conspiracy for such a purpose, without ever falling out or betraying themselves by some inconsistent word or act? And who can believe that the Christian Church, now embracing nearly the whole civilised world, should, for these eighteen hundred years, have been duped and fooled by a Galilean carpenter, or a dozen illiterate fishermen? Verily this lowest form of rationalism is the grossest insult to reason and sense, and to the dignity of human nature.

The hypothesis of *enthusiasm*, or self-deception, though less disreputable, is equally unreasonable in view of the uniform clearness, calmness and self-possession, humility, dignity, and patience of Christ—qualities the very opposite to those which characterise an enthusiast. We might imagine a Jew of that age to have fancied himself the Messiah and the Son of God, but instead of opposing all the popular notions, and discouraging all the temporal hopes of his countrymen, he would, like Barcocheba of a later date, have headed a rebellion against the hated tyranny of the Romans, and endeavoured to establish a temporal kingdom. Enthusiasm, which in this case must have bordered on madness itself, instead of calmly and patiently bearing the malignant opposition of the leaders of the nation, would have broken out in violent passion and precipitate action. "The charge," says Dr Channing, "of an extravagant, self-deluding enthusiasm is the last to be fastened on Jesus. Where can we find the traces of it in his history? Do we detect them in the calm authority of his precepts; in the mild, practical, and beneficent spirit of his religion; in the unlaboured simplicity of the language with which he unfolds his high powers, and the sublime truths of religion; or in the good sense, the knowledge of human nature, which he always discovers in his estimate and treatment of the different classes of men with whom he acted? Do we discover this enthusiasm in the singular fact, that whilst he claimed power in the future world, and always turned men's minds to heaven, he never indulged his own imagination, or stimulated that of his disciples, by giving vivid pictures, or any minute description, of that unseen state? The truth is, that, remarkable as was the

character of Jesus, it was distinguished by nothing more than by calmness and self-possession. This trait pervades his other excellencies. How calm was his piety! Point me, if you can, to one vehement, passionate expression of his religious feelings. Does the Lord's prayer breathe a feverish enthusiasm? . . . His benevolence, too, though singularly earnest and deep, was composed and serene. He never lost the possession of himself in his sympathy with others, was never hurried into the impatient and rash enterprises of an enthusiastic philanthropy; but did good with the tranquillity and constancy which mark the providence of God.*

But the champions of this theory may admit all this, and yet fasten the delusion upon the disciples of Christ, who were so dazzled by his character, words, and works, that they mistook an extraordinary man for a divine being, and extraordinary cures for supernatural miracles. This is the view of the older German Rationalism (the so-called *rationalismus communis*, or *vulgaris*†), and forms a parallel to the heathen rationalism of Euhemerus, of the Cyrenaic school, who explained the gods of the Greek mythology as human sages, heroes, kings, and tyrants, whose superior knowledge, or great deeds, secured them divine honours, or the hero-worship of posterity.‡ It was fully developed, with a considerable degree of patient learning and argument, by the late Professor H. E. G. Paulus of Heidelberg.§ He takes the gospel history as actual history; but by a critical separation of what he calls *fact* from what he calls *judgment* of the actor or narrator, he explains it exclusively from natural causes, and thus brings it down to the level of everyday events. This "natural" interpretation, however, turns out to be most unnatural, and commits innumerable sins against the laws of hermeneutics, and against common sense itself. To prove this, it is only necessary to give some specimens from the exegesis of Paulus and

* Discourse on the Character of Christ, vol. iv. pp. 17, 18.

† Or the rationalism of common sense, as distinct from the rationalism of uncommon sense, or speculative reason. The sense of both systems, however, ends in non-sense. Dr Marheineke defined a rationalist, or, as Paulus called him, a *Denkgläubiger*, as a man *der zu denken glaubt und zu glauben denkt; es ist aber mit beidem gleich null*. The Hegelian school has successfully ridiculed the common rationalism, and made every scholar of philosophical pretensions ashamed of it. But the infidel wing of that school has at last relapsed into the same, or still greater, absurdities.

‡ Comp. Diodorus Siculus, "Bibl. Fragm.," l. vii.; Cicero, *De Nature Deor.* l. 42; Sextus Empir., *Adv. Math.* ix. 17.

§ Born in the kingdom of Württemberg, 1761, then successively professor in different universities; at last in Heidelberg, where he died, in 1847, after having long outlived himself. His rationalistic exegesis is laid down in his "Commentary on the Gospels," published since 1800, and his "Life of Jesus," 1828.

his school. The glory of the Lord which, in the night of his birth, shone around the shepherds of Jerusalem, was simply an *ignis fatuus*, or a meteor; the miracle at Christ's baptism may be easily reduced to thunder and lightning, and a sudden disappearance of the clouds; the tempter in the wilderness was a cunning Pharisee, and only mistaken by the evangelists for the devil, who does not exist except in the imagination of the superstitious; the supposed miraculous cures of the Saviour turn out on closer examination to be simply deeds either of philanthropy, or medical skill, or good luck; the changing of water into wine was an innocent and benevolent wedding joke, and the delusion of the company must be charged on the twilight, not upon Christ; the daughter of Jairus, the youth of Nain, Lazarus, and Jesus himself, were raised not from real death, but simply from a trance or swoon; and the ascension of the Lord is nothing more than his sudden disappearance behind a cloud, that accidentally intervened between him and his disciples! And yet these very evangelists, who must have been destitute of the most ordinary talent of observation, and even of common sense, have contrived to paint a character, and to write a story, which in sublimity, grandeur, and interest throws the productions of the proudest historians into the shade, and has exerted an irresistible charm upon Christendom for these eighteen hundred years! No wonder that those absurdities of a misguided learning and ingenuity hardly survived their authors. It is a decided merit of Strauss, that he has thoroughly refuted the work of his predecessor, and given it the death-blow. But his own theory has shared no better fate.

The last hypothesis, of a *poetical fiction*, was matured and carried out, with a high degree of ability and ingenuity, by the speculative or pantheistic rationalism of David Frederick Strauss, the author of the famous "Life of Jesus."* This writer sinks the gospel history, as to the mode of its origin and realness, substantially to a par with the ancient mythologies of Greece and Rome. Without denying altogether the historical existence of Jesus, and admitting him to have been a religious genius of the first magnitude, he yet, from pantheistic premises, and by a cold process of hypercritical dissection of the apparently contradictory accounts of the witnesses, resolves all the supernatural and miraculous elements of his person and history into myths, or imaginative represen-

* The *Leben Jesu*, by Strauss, Dr Ph., who was born in 1806, and is still living, was first published, 1835, at Tübingen, in two volumes; and for the fourth, in all probability also for the last, time in 1840. It was also translated into English by a Miss Evans.

tations of religious ideas in the form of facts, which were honestly believed by the authors to have actually occurred. The ideas symbolised in these facts are declared to be true in the abstract, or as applied to humanity as a whole, but denied as false in the concrete, or in their application to an individual. The authorship of the evangelical myths is ascribed to the primitive Christian society, pregnant with Jewish Messianic hopes, and kindled to hero-worship by the appearance of the extraordinary person of Jesus of Nazareth, whom they took to be the promised Messiah. But this theory is likewise surrounded by insurmountable difficulties. Who ever heard of a poem unconsciously produced by a mixed multitude, and honestly mistaken by them all for actual history? How could the five hundred persons, to whom the risen Saviour is said to have appeared, dream the same dreams at the same time, and then believe it as a veritable fact, at the risk of their lives? How could a man like St Paul submit his strong and clear mind, and devote all the energies of his noble life, to a poetical fiction of the very sect whom he once persecuted unto death? How could such an illusion stand the combined hostility of the Jewish and heathen world, and the searching criticism of an age of high civilisation, and even of incredulity and scepticism? How strange that unlettered and unskilled fishermen, and not the philosophers and poets of classic Greece and Rome, should have composed such a grand poem, and painted a character to whom Strauss himself is forced to assign the very first rank among all the religious geniuses and founders of religion. The poets must, in this case, have been superior to the hero; and yet the hero is admitted to be the purest and greatest man that ever lived! Where are the traces of a fervid imagination and poetic art in the gospel history? Is it not, on the contrary, remarkably free from all rhetorical and poetical ornament, from every admixture of subjective notions and feelings, even from the expression of sympathy, admiration, and praise? The writers evidently felt that the story speaks best for itself, and would not be improved by the art and skill of man. Their discrepancies, which at best do not affect the picture of Christ's character in the least, but only the subordinate details of his history, prove the absence of conspiracy, attest the honesty of their intention, and confirm the general credibility of their account. Verily the gospel history, related with such unmistakable honesty and simplicity, by immediate witnesses and their pupils, proclaimed in open daylight from Jerusalem to Rome, believed by thousands of Jews, Greeks, and Romans, sealed with the blood of apostles, evangelists, and saints of every grade of society and culture, is better attested by external and internal evidence than any other history. The

same negative criticism which Strauss applied to the gospels would with equal plausibility destroy the strongest chain of evidence before a court of justice, and resolve the life of Socrates, or Charlemagne, or Luther, or Napoleon, into a mythical dream. The secret of the mythical hypothesis is the pantheistic denial of a personal living God, and the *a priori* assumption of the impossibility of a miracle. In its details it is so complicated and artificial that it cannot be made generally intelligible; and in proportion as it is popularised it reverts to the vulgar hypothesis of intentional fraud, from which it professed at starting to shrink back in horror and contempt.

With this last and ablest effort, infidelity seems to have exhausted its scientific resources. It could only repeat itself hereafter. Its different theories have all been tried and found wanting. One has in turn transplanted and refuted the other, even during the lifetime of their champions. They explain nothing in the end; on the contrary, they only substitute an unnatural for a supernatural miracle, an inextricable enigma for a revealed mystery. They equally tend to undermine all faith in God's providence in history, and ultimately in every truth and virtue, and deprive a poor and fallen humanity, in a world of sin, temptation, and sorrow, of its only hope and comfort in life and in death.

Dr Strauss, by far the clearest and strongest of all assailants of the gospel history, seems to have had a passing feeling of the disastrous tendency of his work of destruction and the awful responsibility he assumed. "The results of our inquiry," he says in the closing chapter of his "Life of Jesus," "have apparently annihilated the greatest and most important part of that which the Christian has been wont to believe concerning his Jesus, have uprooted all the encouragements which he has derived from his faith, and deprived him of all his consolations. The boundless store of truth and life which for eighteen hundred years have been the aliment of humanity, seems irretrievably devastated; the most sublime levelled with the dust, God divested of his grace, man of his dignity, and the tie between heaven and earth broken. Piety turns away with horror from so fearful an act of desecration, and strong in the impregnable self-evidence of its faith, boldly pronounces that—let an audacious criticism attempt what it will—all which the Scriptures declare and the church believes of Christ, will still subsist as eternal truth, nor needs one iota of it to be renounced."* Strauss makes, then, an attempt, it is true, at a philosophical reconstruction of what he vainly imagines to have annihilated

* *Leben Jesu*, Schlussabhandlung, vol. ii. p. 668, (4th ed. of 1840).

as a historical fact by his sophistical criticism. He professes to admit the abstract truth of the orthodox Christology, or the union of the divine and human, but perverts it into a purely intellectual and pantheistic meaning. He refuses divine attributes and honours to the glorious Head of the race, but applies them to a decapitated humanity. He thus substitutes from pantheistic prejudice a metaphysical abstraction for a living reality, a mere notion for a historical fact, a progress in philosophy and mechanical arts for the moral victory over sin and death, a pantheistic hero-worship or self-adoration of a fallen race for the worship of the only true and living God, the gift of a stone for the bread of eternal life !*

Humanity scorns such a miserable substitute, which has yet to give the first proof of any power for good, and which will probably never convert or improve a single individual. It must have a living head, a real Lord and Saviour from sin and death. With renewed faith and confidence, it returns from the dreary desolations of a heartless infidelity and the vain conceits of a philosophy falsely so called, to the historical Christ, and exclaims with Peter : " Lord, where shall we go but to thee ? thou alone hast words of eternal life, and we believe and are sure that thou art the Son of God !"

Yes ! there He lives, the divine man and incarnate God, on the ever fresh and self-authenticating record of the gospels, in

* "In an individual," says Strauss, *Leben Jesu*, vol. ii. p. 710, "in one God-man, the properties and functions which the church doctrine ascribes to Christ contradict themselves ; in the idea of the race they agree. *Humanity* is the union of the two natures—the incarnate God, the infinite externalising itself in the finite, and the finite spirit remembering its infinitude ; it is the child of the visible mother and the invisible Father, nature and spirit ; it is the worker of miracles, in so far as in the course of human history the spirit more and more completely subjugates nature, both within and around man, until it lies before him as an inert matter of his activity ; it is the sinless existence, for the course of its development is a blameless one ; pollution cleaves to the individual only, and does not touch the race or its history. It is humanity that dies, rises, and ascends to heaven ; for from the negation of its natural life there ever proceeds a higher spiritual life : from the suppression of its limitation as a personal, national, and terrestrial spirit, arises its union with the infinite spirit of the heavens. By faith in this Christ, especially in his death and resurrection, man is justified before God : that is, by the kindling within him of the idea of humanity, especially by the negation of its natural and sensual aspects, the individual man partakes of the divinely human life of the species." But the idea of the human and divine is no more contradictory in an individual than in the race. What is true in idea or principle, must also actualise itself, or be capable of actualisation in a concrete living fact. History teaches, moreover, that every age, every great movement, and every nation, have their representative heads, who comprehend and act out the life of the respective whole. This analogy points us to a general representative head of the entire race, Adam in the natural, and Christ in the spiritual order. The humanity of Strauss is like a stream without a fountain, or like a body without a head.

the unbroken history of eighteen centuries, and in the hearts and lives of the wisest and best of our race. Jesus Christ is the most certain, the most sacred, and the most glorious of all facts, arrayed in a beauty and majesty, which throws the "starry heavens above us and the moral law within us" into obscurity, and fills us truly with ever-growing reverence and awe. He shines forth like the self-evidencing light of the noonday sun. He is too great, too pure, too perfect to have been invented by any sinful and erring man. His character and claims are confirmed by the sublimest doctrine, the purest ethics, the mightiest miracles, the grandest spiritual kingdom, and are daily and hourly exhibited in the virtues and graces of all who yield to the regenerating and sanctifying power of his Spirit and example. The historical Christ meets and satisfies our deepest intellectual and moral wants. Our souls, if left to their noblest impulses and aspirations, instinctively turn to him as the needle to the magnet, as the flower to the sun, as the panting hart to the fresh fountain. We are made for him, and "our heart is without rest until it rests in him." He commands our assent, he wins our admiration, he overwhelms us to humble adoration and worship. We cannot look upon him without spiritual benefit. We cannot think of him without being elevated above all that is low and mean, and encouraged to all that is good and noble. The very hem of his garment is healing to the touch; one hour spent in his communion outweighs all the pleasures of sin. He is the most precious and indispensable gift of a merciful God to a fallen world. In him are the treasures of true wisdom, in him the fountain of pardon and peace, in him the only substantial hope and comfort in this world and that which is to come. Without him, history is a dreary waste, an inextricable enigma; with him, it is the unfolding of a plan of infinite wisdom and love. He is the glory of the past, the life of the present, the hope of the future. Mankind could better afford to lose the whole literature of Greece and Rome, of Germany and France, of England and America, than the story of Jesus of Nazareth. Not for all the wealth and wisdom of this world would I weaken the faith of the humblest Christian in his divine Lord and Saviour; but if, by the grace of God, I could convert a single sceptic to a child-like faith in Him who lived and died for me and for all, I would feel that I had not lived in vain.

ART. III.—*Father Lacordaire.*

Le Père Lacordaire. Par Le Comte de MONTALEMBERT, l'un des quarante de l'Académie Française. Paris : Charles Douniol, Libraire-Éditeur. 1862.

WE find much to admire in the eloquent work which Count Montalembert has consecrated to the memory of his early and beloved friend, the famous Dominican preacher, Father Lacordaire ; but, at the same time, our admiration is considerably lessened by the intolerance which is displayed in every chapter, towards all those who do not agree with the author in his extreme views of the power and authority of the Romish Church. With him it is not only *Hors de l'église point de salut*, but also *Tout pour l'église et par l'église*, as if the right of free inquiry in matters of faith were entirely superseded and extinguished by the principle of authority. In his view, truth is in the church alone, and to seek it elsewhere is rebellion and blasphemy ; and he therefore naturally enough regards all such attempts with horror and detestation. Thus, in the volume before us, he speaks of "religious liberty after the fashion of Luther, which was only a revolt and a destruction," and quotes with approbation various passages from the discourses of Lacordaire, in which Luther is classed with Arius and Mahomet, and in which the noble stand made by the French clergy and parliament in the seventeenth century, in defence of the liberties of the Gallican Church against papal usurpation and Jesuitical intrigue, is spoken of as "a now scarcely breathing senility," as "the frightful spirit of Gallicanism," and as "an element destructive of the Catholic Church our eternal country." At the same time, it must be remembered that both Count Montalembert and the great preacher, for thirty years his friend and associate—even while holding these extreme views, while bending on all occasions to the authority of the church, and maintaining to its fullest extent the doctrine of the "divine power" of the pope—uniformly defended and advocated liberty of speech, liberty of teaching and of association, and liberty of the press ; though it is almost unnecessary to point out the gross inconsistency of the maintenance of such views by devout believers in the infallible church, looking to the way in which that church has uniformly resisted and condemned all such liberties. Both Count Montalembert and Lacordaire learned to respect and appreciate these liberties from their early master the celebrated Abbé Lamennais, to whom, we are sorry to say, a very scanty and imperfect measure of justice has now been dealt out by his

former pupil and associate. Here is Count Montalembert's notion of religious liberty, which he quotes and adopts from Lacordaire: "That which has not withdrawn a single inch of territory from the spiritual jurisdiction of the Roman pontiff; which is only respect for the convictions of others, which in no way affects the doctrines, the morality, the worship, the authority of Christianity; which only withdraws from it the assistance of the civil magistrate for the discovery and punishment of heresy, confiding in the innate and divine power of the faith, which cannot fail, for want of an earthly sword to raise against error." The following passage from another of Lacordaire's discourses also contains an eloquent explanation and defence of liberty: "Whoever excludes a single man from the claim of right, whoever consents to the servitude of a single man, white or black, were it even to the extent of the unjust binding of a single hair of his head, such a one is not an honest man, and is not worthy of combating for the sacred cause of humanity. The public conscience will always suspect the man who demands a liberty exclusive or even neglectful of the right of others; because exclusive liberty is nothing but a privilege, and liberty careless of the rights of others is nothing but a treason. . . . But there is in the heart of the honest man who speaks for all, and who, in speaking for all, seems sometimes to speak against himself, there is there a law of power, of logical and moral superiority, which almost infallibly produces reciprocity. Yes, catholics, ponder it well: if you wish liberty for yourselves, you must wish it for all men under every clime. If you demand it only for yourselves, they will never grant it you; give it where you are the masters, in order that it may be given you when you are the slaves." This is certainly both true and beautiful, but at the same time utterly illogical and inconsistent. For how can severely orthodox Roman Catholics profess to hold upon essential points the doctrines of advanced modern liberalism, without putting themselves in direct opposition to the teaching and the practice of their Church in all ages? The very encyclical letter of 15th August 1832, in which Pope Gregory XVI. condemned the doctrines of *l'Avenir*—a journal which had for its motto *Dieu et la liberté; le pape et le peuple*, which inculcated exaggerated catholicism in faith, and extreme radicalism in politics, and which numbered Lacordaire and Count Montalembert among its most zealous and talented supporters—made use of the strongest terms of reprobation in speaking of the liberties which these two friends then maintained and afterwards continued to defend. "From this infectious source of indifference," says the encyclical, "flows that absurd and erroneous maxim, or rather that madness, which would ensure and guarantee to all liberty of conscience.

The way is prepared for this pernicious error by the free and unlimited liberty of opinion which is spreading abroad, to the misfortune of civil and religious society, some asserting with extreme impudence that it may be productive of certain advantages to religion." And afterwards it says, "With this is connected that lamentable liberty which we cannot regard with too much horror, the liberty of the press to publish all sorts of writings, a liberty which some persons dare to demand and extol with so much noise and ardour." The letter of Cardinal Pacca to the Abbé Lamennais, the founder of *l'Avenir*, explanatory of the encyclical, is even more explicit. "The doctrines of *l'Avenir*," he says, "upon the liberty of worship and the liberty of the press, are very reprehensible, and in opposition to the teaching, the maxims, and the policy of the Church. They have exceedingly astonished and afflicted the holy father; for if, under certain circumstances, prudence compels us to tolerate them as lesser evils, such doctrines can never be held up by a Roman Catholic as good in themselves, or as things desirable."

After such a stern condemnation by the head of the infallible church, we must confess ourselves—much as we admire the sentiments expressed by the Abbé Lacordaire, and adopted by his eloquent friend and biographer—entirely at a loss to conjecture by what process of reasoning they contrived to reconcile absolute submission to the Romish Church, with the defence of that which she has again and again emphatically denounced and condemned. The conduct of their master, the Abbé Lamennais, was at least more consistent than that of his two disciples. They, proclaiming themselves the faithful and obedient followers of an infallible church—which says to its disciples, "I am the truth; it is in me, in me alone; to seek it elsewhere is heresy and rebellion"—accepted a part of her doctrines and rejected a part. He, finding that his attempt to reconcile the Church with the tendencies of the age, to unite Republicanism and Romanism, was condemned by Rome herself, and that he must choose between the two, broke at once with Rome, and proclaimed himself ready to combat and to suffer for what he deemed, however erroneously, the cause of justice and humanity. He broke with a Church which had lost the germs of life and progress, and sought elsewhere the means of regenerating mankind; while they professed implicit submission. But his schism was at least logical and consistent; their submission partial and absurd. He and the church were thenceforward in direct antagonism; while they, its submissive sons, for the rest of their lives went on endeavouring to carry out the plan which Lamennais had traced in the columns of *l'Avenir*, which Rome had emphatically condemned, and which its author had aban-

doned as impracticable. He gave up Rome because he found her claims inconsistent with those of humanity; they attempted to save her in spite of herself, to reconcile her with the wants and aspirations of the age; to put new cloth into old garments, new wine into old bottles. Yet we believe that both master and disciples were sincere and disinterested in their conduct: the former in his schism, the latter in their submission. The simplest, grandest, strongest intellect of the three was unquestionably that of the Abbé Lamennais, one of the ablest writers of the present century. Next to him comes Count Montalembert—distinguished statesman, eloquent orator, graceful writer—who endured a long and painful struggle before he could free himself from the influence of Lamennais' teaching, and submit to the dictates of the Church. Last comes Lacordaire, the popular preacher, the most showy and superficial of the three friends, the most ignorant of the character and the wants of his age, the most enthralled by high church prejudices. Of these three men, who, in 1832, set out on a pilgrimage to Rome, to submit to the Pope the questions which had been discussed in the columns of *l'Avenir*, Count Montalembert is the only survivor. The Abbé Lamennais died in 1854, tranquil and self-possessed to the end, but without the last offices of the church, and was buried, according to his written directions, among the poor, without stone or cross to mark his last resting-place. The close of 1861 witnessed the death of the celebrated preacher and second founder of the Dominican order in France, admired and lamented by numerous friends and disciples, and by none more than by him who has given us the present biography, as a last proof of undying friendship and affection.

But while fully appreciating the warmth and steadiness of that friendship which has moved Count Montalembert to give to the world a life of the Abbé Lacordaire, an attentive perusal of that life compels us to declare that it is rather an indiscriminating panegyric than a faithful and impartial narrative. The hero is placed in a far higher niche in the temple of fame than he deserves to occupy. Neither his learning, nor his eloquence, nor the charms of his literary style, entitle him to anything beyond a secondary position among the great men of his time; whereas his partial biographer attempts to place him in the very foremost rank. He exaggerates his qualities both of head and heart, terms him "the greatest of priests and the purest of democrats;" and speaks of his first attempts at literary composition in the columns of *l'Avenir*, as "having equalled, and, in truth, eclipsed the fiery eloquence of the great writer whose disciple he wrongly believed himself to be." The great writer here alluded to is the Abbé Lamennais; and it is almost needless to point out the injustice of this statement to

any who are at all acquainted with modern French literature. As a writer, Lacordaire has not the slightest pretensions to compete with Lamennais, one of the greatest masters of French prose. His loose, declamatory, theatrical style is in every respect far inferior to the simple, grand, nervous eloquence of Lamennais. And we venture to assert that no one who has read the *Essai sur l'indifférence*—40,000 copies of which were sold in a single year, and which procured for its author, from Pope Leo XII., the title of "the last father of the Church"—or that exquisite prose poem, *Les paroles d'un croyant*, could, on comparing them with the best of Lacordaire's published discourses, impute the judgment of Count Montalembert on the literary merits of these two writers, to anything but the blind partiality of a long and tender friendship.

We have said that the style of Lacordaire is diffuse, declamatory, and pretentious; and we also venture to affirm, that in too many of his discourses, instead of explaining the word of God simply and familiarly to the people, he goes out of his way to attack what he terms the prevailing doubt and scepticism of the age, and attempts to guide his hearers to a positive divine faith by the utter annihilation of the natural reason. In many of his discourses, too, he falsifies history for the purpose of making it coincide with his Romanist prejudices. He absolutely refuses to recognise any good whatever in former systems of religion and philosophy. Without the pale of the Romish Church, all is evil; within it everything is good. As to human reason, he cannot endure it. "That which at present ruins everything," he says, "that which causes the world to ride insecurely at anchor, is the reason." "Our intelligence appears to me like a ship without sails or masts on an unknown sea." "Societies are tottering when the thinkers take them in hand, and the precise moment of their downfall is that wherein they announced to them that the intellect is emancipated." And while human reason is thus summarily condemned, the infallibility of the Church is asserted and defended in the most absolute manner. "The Catholic doctrine," he says, "resolves all questions, and takes from them even the quality of questions. We have no longer to reason, which is a great blessing, for we are not here to reason, but to act, and to build up in time a work for eternity."

Of the way in which the Abbé Lacordaire distorts history in order to suit his own particular views, we shall mention two instances. The one is "*La Vie de Saint Dominique*," the founder of the Inquisition, in which he entirely ignores all those historians who have detailed and proved the atrocious cruelties perpetrated by that saint and his followers. The

other instance is, if possible, still more glaring. It occurs in a sermon preached in the church of St Roch in February 1853, Lacordaire's last appearance in Paris. The object of the preacher is to demonstrate the vanity of attempting to strive against the Church, and to exalt the influence of the Romish faith upon the spirit of a nation.

"And Spain," he says, "which had conquered the two Indies and borne so far the standard of the faith! Since Philip the Second, the Christianity of Spain, mortally stricken by the despotism of that famous monarch, had not been able to revive; it lay prostrate on the earth, like a tree which can no longer produce a young and vigorous vegetation, but which is still over-shadowed by its ancient glory and its massive foliage. It seemed good to the man to whom I first alluded to appropriate it in virtue of that which all conquerors call the right of conquest. When they said to him, 'Beware of attacking that mass of men!' he replied, 'It is a nation formed by monks, and all the nations that have been formed by monks are cowards.' And at the feet of the Pyrenees he found these Christians formed by monks; and his warriors, who, from the Pyramids to the Baltic Sea, had, to use their own language, encountered only children, these warriors confessed, in a language at once military and energetic, that here they were more than men; it was a war of giants. Spain had the signal honour of being the first cause of the ruin of that man, and of the deliverance of the world."

Upon reading this passage, any one ignorant of history would undoubtedly suppose that Spain alone had foiled and conquered the arms of France. Instead of which, she was utterly and hopelessly defeated by them, her towns and strongholds captured, her armies beaten and scattered, her resources exhausted; and all she could do to harass her conquerors was to keep up a petty guerilla warfare, like that now carried on, at Papal and Bourbon instigation, in the enfranchised kingdom of Naples. Not a word here of that consummate British general, or of that gallant and victorious British army, which alone retrieved the honour and restored the nationality of Spain, and which, in the words of Napier, "had won nineteen pitched battles, and innumerable combats; had made or sustained ten sieges and taken four great fortresses; had twice expelled the French from Portugal, once from Spain; had penetrated France, and killed, wounded, or captured 200,000 enemies, leaving of their own number 40,000 dead, whose bones whiten the plains and mountains of the peninsula." It is impossible to acquit Lacordaire of blame in thus perverting and suppressing history. For either he did it through ignorance, and was therefore no better than a blind guide to the blind, totally unfitted for the office of instructing others; or he did it wilfully and knowingly, and was therefore guilty of an action alike unworthy of

an honourable man and a Christian pastor. And yet Count Montalembert tells us, that this is the person whom we are to accept and admire as the pattern man of the first half of the nineteenth century, the model of all manly dignity and consistency, the exemplar of all Christian graces. Truly we must see better evidence than any with which he furnishes us in the course of his biography, before we can consent to admit the justice of the claims of the great preacher to so high a measure of admiration and respect.

Having thus stated our reasons for differing from some of the opinions expressed by Count Montalembert in the volume before us, we shall now proceed to examine somewhat more closely the career of the great preacher. Jean-Baptiste-Henri Lacordaire was born at Recey-sur-Ource, in May 1802. He prosecuted his studies at the College of Dijon, where he obtained the highest honours, and afterwards proceeded to Paris with the view of becoming a member of the metropolitan bar. As a young man, he was conspicuous for the extreme liberalism of his political opinions, and for his deistical tendencies in religion. But a change speedily took place in his views, which, Count Montalembert tells us, was due to no man and to no book, but solely to a sudden impulse of grace, which opened his eyes to the sin and folly of irreligion. In a single day, from a scoffer he became a Christian. He abandoned the career of the bar, entered the seminary of St Sulpice in 1824, and was ordained priest in 1827.

"It was in November 1830," says Count Montalembert, "that I saw him for the first time in the cabinet of the Abbé Lamennais, four months after a revolution which had appeared for a moment to confound in a common ruin the throne and the altar, and one month after the establishment of the journal *l'Avenir*. That journal had for its motto, *God and Liberty!* It was the intention of its founders that it should regenerate catholic opinion in France, and seal its union with liberal progress. I hurried to take part in that work with the ardour of a youth twenty years of age, from the centre of Ireland, where I had first seen O'Connell at the head of a nation, whose invincible fidelity to the Catholic faith had survived three centuries of persecution, and whose religious emancipation had just been achieved by a free press and free speech."

At this time the Abbé Lamennais was nearly fifty years of age, and in the height of his reputation, the most famous and venerated of all the priests of France. The appearance of his younger coadjutor, the Abbé Lacordaire, is thus depicted :

"He was twenty-eight years of age ; he was dressed as a layman—the state of Paris not then permitting priests to wear their clerical costume. His slender figure, his delicate and regular fea-

tures, his chiselled forehead, the already sovereign carriage of his head, his black and sparkling eye, an indescribable union of high spirit, elegance, and modesty in his whole appearance, were only the outward tokens of a soul which seemed ready to overflow, not merely in the free conflicts of public speaking, but in the effusions of intimate friendship. The brightness of his glance revealed at once treasures of indignation and of tenderness; it sought not merely enemies to combat and overthrow, but also hearts to win over and subdue. His voice, already so vigorous and vibrating, took often accents of infinite sweetness. Born to combat and to love, he already bore the stamp of the double royalty of soul and of talent. He appeared to me charming and terrible, as the type of enthusiasm for good, of virtue armed in defence of the truth. I saw in him one of the elect, predestinated to all that youth most desires and adores—genius and glory.”

We have already mentioned *l'Avenir*, the journal founded by the Abbé Lamennais, in which Count Montalembert and Lacordaire essayed their youthful strength in the futile attempt to unite Romanism and liberalism—a dead faith with a living spirit. That journal did indeed recommend radical changes in Church and State, changes which startled and appalled the head of the infallible Church. It demanded the enfranchisement of the Church, the abolition of the budget of public worship, administrative decentralisation, the extension of electoral suffrage, liberty of the press, liberty of teaching, and liberty of association. It speedily provoked the violent opposition of the episcopate, and the Abbé Lamennais was denounced at Rome as a dangerous innovator, as the modern Savonarola. The daring freedom of the new journal soon also embroiled it with the French government; and on account of an intemperate attack, written by Lacordaire against Louis Philippe, he and the Abbé Lamennais were tried before a jury in January 1831. On this occasion Lacordaire pled the cause with equal eloquence and success, and both the accused were acquitted. Encouraged by this success, the conductors of *l'Avenir* determined to concentrate all their energies on achieving complete liberty of teaching, in spite of the efforts of the university to oppose it. They announced that three of their number would open in Paris a free school, and this announcement was carried into effect in May 1831. Lacordaire delivered the inaugural discourse, and Count Montalembert became teacher of one of the classes. This bold attempt proved, however, unsuccessful. The new teachers were turned out by the police, their school was closed, and they themselves were tried before the Court of Peers, where they escaped with a fine of one hundred francs. On this, as on a former occasion,

Lacordaire distinguished himself by the eloquence and appropriateness of his defence.

At that time, there were far fewer readers than at the present day; and in spite of the novelty and boldness of its views, and the eloquence with which they were supported, *L'Avenir* had only 3000 subscribers. It had also provoked the bitterest enmity from the party then in power, so that, after a stormy existence of thirteen months, its conductors determined to announce its suspension. This they did in November 1831, at the same time stating that the three principal editors would set out for Rome in order to bring before the pope the questions in dispute between them and their opponents, "promising beforehand," says Count Montalembert, "an absolute submission to the pontiff's decision." The idea of a journey to Rome originated with Lacordaire. The pope received the three pilgrims—Lamennais, Lacordaire, and Count Montalembert—with much kindness, but carefully avoided making the slightest allusion to the matter which had brought them to Rome. They were kept waiting there in suspense for several months. But the effect of this prolonged residence was very different upon the three pilgrims in search of truth. Like Luther, Ulrich von Hutten, and many other great men, Lamennais was completely disenchanted by the sight of the corruptions of Rome. His clear and strong vision saw in her but a corpse which it was vain to attempt to resuscitate; a conglomerate religion made up of Christianity perverted by Jewish symbolism, and degraded and sensualised by oriental and classical mythology and philosophy. Yet he hesitated long before he could make up his mind to deny his whole previous life, to forsake and repudiate what he had formerly defended, to become an antagonist of the church of which he had formerly been the bulwark and the champion. And it required a year's meditation and self-examination amidst the woods of his paternal domain of La Chesnaye, before he resolved, finally and for ever, to break with the Church of Rome. In a worldly point of view, he had everything to lose, nothing to gain, by the course which he pursued; and it required no ordinary courage, no small portion of the martyr-spirit, to act as he acted. Count Montalembert remained for a long time in doubt and disquietude, and ultimately consented to a complete and unreserved submission to the condemnation pronounced by the Church of Rome upon the doctrines taught in *L'Avenir*, only after a severe and protracted internal struggle. His friend Lacordaire had no such difficulties. His imagination had been vividly impressed by the imposing ceremonies and glorious traditions of the Romish Church, and he was prepared at once to submit to it "*sicut cadaver*." "The miseries, the infirmities," says his biographer, "inseparable

from the mingling of everything human with that which is divine did not escape his notice, but they seemed to him as if lost in the mysterious splendour of tradition and authority. He the journalist, the citizen of 1830, he the democratic liberal, had comprehended at the first glance, not only the inviolable majesty of the supreme pontificate, but its difficulties, its long and patient designs, its indispensable regard for men and things here below. The faith and the duty of the Catholic priest had at once elevated that noble heart above all the mists of pride, above all the seductions, all the temptations of talent, above all the intoxication of strife. With the penetration which faith and humility confer, he passed beforehand upon our pretensions the judgment which has been ratified by time, that great auxiliary of the church and of truth. It was then, I venture to believe, that God marked him for ever with the seal of his grace, and that he gave him the assurance of the reward due to the invincible fidelity of a truly priestly soul."

With the suppression of *l'Avenir* and the journey to Rome, closes, in our opinion, by far the most interesting part of the life of Lacordaire. The man is thenceforward lost in the churchman, the active and inquiring intellect confined, if not extinguished, by the official religion. The Abbé Lamennais, the oldest and most famous of the three pilgrims to Rome, alone refused to submit to the condemnation pronounced by the pope; and in 1834, he made the breach between him and Rome irreconcilable by the publication of the famous *Paroles d'un Croyant*, which produced a burst of enthusiasm from his friends and an ebullition of rage from his enemies. It was written in a single week amid the sylvan shades of La Chesnaye, but was the result of a year's study and reflection. Its style is an imitation of that of the Bible, being written in verses, and in a kind of rythmical prose. The author exposes with great force and eloquence the gross deception of the doctrine of passive obedience, which he terms the greatest error since the seduction of the first woman by the serpent. The book was rapidly translated into most European languages, and its popularity and success roused the wrath of the Vatican, and it was denounced by the pope as a work "small in bulk but immense in perversity," while its author was accused of an unbridled love of novelty, of neglect of the holy and apostolical traditions, and of maintaining vain and foolish doctrines condemned by the Church. On the other hand, the *Paroles d'un Croyant* found many admirers and defenders in spite of the thunders of the Church, and an eminent French critic thus spoke of its author with special reference to this work: "He has believed in himself in order the better to believe in God. He has been courageous, original, great, sublime, the only

priest in Europe." The publication of this book afforded Lacordaire an opportunity of breaking a lance in defence of Rome against his former master, which he did by publishing *Considérations sur le système philosophique de M. Lamennais*, a work which proved a total failure, and which even Count Montalembert is obliged to admit was not at all successful. In this volume, Lamennais is accused of placing the authority of the human race above that of the Church, of being the author of the vastest system of Protestantism that had yet appeared, and of having abandoned the authority of tradition in order to rest on that of reason.

The journal *l'Univers*, since so well known for its ultramontane principles, was established shortly after the journey to Rome; and in 1833 and 1835, its direction was offered to Lacordaire, and refused by him. He also declined the offer of a professorship in the University of Louvain. "To speak and to write," he says in a letter written at this period, "to live a solitary and studious life, such is the wish of my whole soul. However, the future will do me justice, and still more the judgment of God. A man has always his hour; it is sufficient for him to wait, and do nothing against providence." His hour was at hand. In the spring of 1833, he preached for the first time in the Church of St Roch, in Paris. He failed in his first attempt, like Sheridan, D'Israeli, Robert Hall, and many other men who afterwards became great orators. "I was present," says Count Montalembert, "along with MM. Ampère, De Corcelles, and others, who must recollect the circumstances as well as myself. He failed completely; and every one left, saying to himself, *He is a man of talent, but he will never be a preacher*. He himself thought so." In the beginning of the following year, however, he was appointed to give lectures to the students in the College Stanislas, the humblest of the colleges of Paris, and here his former failure was recompensed by a great success, and his audience rapidly increased to 500 and 600. But his lectures were not approved of by the ecclesiastical authorities, and were ultimately stopped by the Archbishop of Paris. Shortly afterwards, however, the archbishop appointed Lacordaire to occupy the pulpit of Notre Dame, and to deliver the lectures which had been established for the benefit of the youth attending the schools of Paris. During the years 1835 and 1836, he delivered from that pulpit, to an immense and attentive audience, fifteen lectures upon the church. "It may be affirmed," says his biographer, "that if he has never fallen below, he has rarely surpassed, except in his discourses at Toulouse in 1854, the splendour and solidity of that first series of discourses. M. de Quelen, who was present at all these sermons, and who, for the first time after the violence of which he had been the vic-

tim after the Revolution of July, found himself in presence of the multitude, was transported with a success which so nobly avenged him in associating him with the popularity of that dawning glory. One day, raising himself from his archiepiscopal seat, before that immense auditory, he bestowed upon his young protégé the title of the *new prophet*."

The next phase in the career of Lacordaire is that in which he appears as the restorer of the Dominican order in France. In 1836, he resigned the office of preacher in Notre Dame, which he had filled with so much glory and applause, into the hands of his bishop, and departed a second time on a journey to Rome.

"I return to Rome," he says in one of his letters, "with the principal design of entering into the Dominican order, with the accessory design of re-establishing it in France, how and when it shall please God. I believe that this act is the event of my life, the result of all that God has previously done for me, the secret of his graces, of my trials and experiences. I am like a man who has acquired some credit, and who can apply it to something useful and generous. Without the past, I could do nothing; in continuing only the past, my life would not be proportioned to the grace which God has wrought in me. Pray for me, that he may give me the strength of which I have need, and that he may smooth down the difficulties which beset me."

More than twenty years afterwards, in a writing dictated from his deathbed, he thus assigns his reasons for attempting to resuscitate monasticism in France:—

"My long stay at Rome permitting me much leisure for reflection, I examined myself, and I also studied the general wants of the church. . . . It then appeared to me, that since the destruction of the religious orders, she had lost the half of her strength. I saw at Rome the magnificent remains of these institutions, founded by the greatest saints, and there then sat upon the pontifical throne the successor of so many others, a monk from the illustrious cloister of Gregory the Great. History, still more expressive than the spectacle of Rome, shewed me, beginning with the catacombs, that incomparable series of cells, monasteries, abbeys, houses of study and of prayer, scattered from the sands of the Thebaid to the extremities of Ireland, and from the perfumed isles of Provence to the cold plains of Poland and Russia. She named to me St Anthony, St Basil, St Augustine, St Martin, St Benedict, St Columba, St Bernard, St Francis of Assissi, St Dominic, St Ignatius, as the patriarchs of these numerous families who had peopled the deserts, the forests, the towns, the plains, and even the seat of St Peter, with their heroic virtues. Under that luminous track, which is as the milky way of the church, I discerned as the creative principle the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, key-stones of the arch of the church, and of the perfect imitation of Jesus

Christ. It is in vain that corruption had, sometimes from one side, sometimes from the other, wasted these venerable institutions. That corruption itself was only the withering of long virtues, as we see, in forests untouched by the axe, the trees that have flourished for centuries fall under the weight of a life that comes from too great a distance to resist the progress of decay. Could it be believed that the hour was come when we should no longer see these grand monuments of the faith, and these divine inspirations of the love of God and of man? Could it be believed that the blast of revolution, instead of being a passing vengeance for their errors, had been the sword and the seal of death? I could not believe it. All that God has made is immortal in its nature, and he no more suffers a virtue to perish in the world than a star in the firmament. I persuaded myself then, while walking about Rome, and praying to God in her Basilicas, that the greatest service that I could render Christianity in our days, was to do something for the resurrection of the religious orders."

We cannot help thinking that Lacordaire's selection of the Dominican order was a somewhat unhappy one, especially when we consider the views which he held with regard to liberty of conscience, and the impropriety of the interference of the civil power for the punishment of heretics. St Dominic, the founder of the order, was the very incarnation of persecution. In 1198, he was sent by the Pope into the south of France to search out and punish heretics; and when the Inquisition was established in 1233, Pope Gregory the 12th committed the task of discovering and extirpating heretics to the Dominican friars, and we have never heard that they were accused of doing their work negligently. In that bloody and exterminating war, in which Simon de Montfort and his crusaders were tempted by the Pope with offers of plenary indulgence, and promises of licence and plunder, to invade the south of France, where the opinions of the Albigenses had taken deep root, the Dominicans were especially distinguished by the atrocity of the cruelties they perpetrated or authorised. And it was chiefly owing to the blind fervour of their zeal, and the unsparing cruelty with which they carried out the papal commission against heretics, that the prosperity, the literature, the national existence of Provence, then the most enlightened and progressive county in Europe, were arrested and overthrown. We cannot view the resuscitation of an order so founded and so distinguished—an order which has more crimes and cruelties to answer for than even the infamous sect of the assassins—as any title to fame, or any proof of devotion to aught beyond or above the false and artificial Christianity of Rome.*

* Lecerf on Protestantism affirms that the religious orders have shed the blood of three millions of persons.

In 1840, after three years' noviciate, Lacordaire took the vows of the order of St Dominic, and, in 1841, preached from the pulpit of the cathedral of Notre Dame, clad in the white robe of his order, which had not been seen in France for fifty years. From 1843, until the *coup d'état* of 1851, he continued to discharge the duties of preacher at Notre Dame. In 1847, he preached, in the cathedral church of Nancy, the funeral sermon of General Drouot, which many of his admirers consider the master-piece of his eloquence; and in 1849, from the pulpit of Notre Dame, he pronounced the *éloge* of the Irish demagogue O'Connell. Count Montalembert devotes a chapter to the consideration of the characteristics of the eloquence of Lacordaire. At the commencement of that chapter, he mentions that, from the date of his brilliant success at Notre Dame, the life of his hero was divided between the cloister and the pulpit, and he then proceeds to praise, in the highest terms, the way in which he fulfilled the strict rule of his order, and the austerities by which he macerated and subdued his body, which, we are told, he carried to such an extent that they had the effect of shortening his life. It is melancholy to find a man like Count Montalembert recounting these foolish, useless, and antichristian acts of self-mortification and penance, as one of his hero's chief claims to the admiration of posterity. We have much greater pleasure in listening to his criticisms on the oratorical excellencies of the discourses of Lacordaire. He tells us that the richest treasures of his eloquence are to be found in the eight discourses delivered in 1846, which treat exclusively of our Saviour. He admits that there was an indescribable power and charm belonging to the speech of Lacordaire which is lost in his writings, and certainly we seek in vain among them for anything to justify the exaggerated praise heaped upon his discourses by his partial biographer. They are in general highly artificial in structure, and bear too evident marks of the care with which they have been studied. They are often trivial, almost puerile in thought, and deficient in solid reasoning, while the declamatory passages, the appeals to the passions and affections, in which they abound, are in many instances characterised by false taste, poverty of thought, and pomp of expression. We are too often asked to receive tinsel for gold, and the paltry mantle of the player for the velvet robe of the king. Count Montalembert, however, does not hesitate to class his hero with St Paul, St Bernard, and Bossuet, and describes the effect of his pulpit oratory in the following glowing terms:—

“ But who shall restore us the lightning of that glance, the magic of that voice, the power of that gesture, ‘which perfects speech.’ Who shall describe for us those surprises, those boldnesses and

those familiarities, those adventurous flights, in which a genius equally bold and self-assured seemed to disport itself, treading on the verge of the precipice without ever falling from it, and anon soaring to the highest heavens with a flight which Bossuet alone has surpassed in the French pulpit, which literally transported his audience, leaving them a prey to an emotion which only one word can express,—that word *ravishment*, so commonly abused, but which recalls in the Christian language the miraculous visions of St Paul : *Quoniam raptus est in paradisum* ? Yes, like St Paul and his two glorious compatriots, St Bernard and Bossuet, that little Burgundian priest of our own days and country, has truly been a master of speech : *Quoniam ipse erat dux verbi*. He has known the way to our hearts ; he has invaded them ; he has taken them captive, has enchained them, not by that ephemeral and commonplace admiration which talent excites, but by that mysterious ascendant which belongs to human speech when it drinks from heavenly sources, when it becomes that sacerdotal eloquence which Lacordaire has carried to its height, of which he has known all the secrets."

Count Montalembert affirms that even those who have never heard Lacordaire will discover, on perusing his published works, a combination of the accomplished writer and the wonderful orator, although these works give but a faint reflection of the marvellous charm that attached to his improvisation. At the same time, he admits his fondness for declamation, the feebleness of his dialectic, the deficiency of his literary taste, and the shallowness and want of accuracy of his historical knowledge. Yet, with all these defects, he asserts that his has most surely been "the most eloquent voice that has resounded in the Christian pulpit since the days of Bossuet," and that there is not a writer of our time who has left, or will leave behind him, pages superior, either in substance or in form, to some of those written by Lacordaire. We are not at all prepared to go this length ; and we do not think that the selected passages which Count Montalembert cites to prove the propriety of his encomiums, are by any means sufficient to justify them. We do not indeed agree with an eminent French critic, M. Scherer, who says of Lacordaire, that he has not left, "in the whole course of his oratorical work, a single passage which, on reading, we can pronounce eloquent, a single phrase which still occasions some emotion in our hearts." But we certainly think that M. Scherer is not so much mistaken in the severity of his censure, as Count Montalembert in the extravagance of his praise.

The political attitude of Lacordaire, and his opinions with regard to the Roman and Italian questions, furnish Count Montalembert with matter for an interesting chapter. His political career is admitted not to have been so remarkable for consistency and for sound judgment as his religious life. But his political errors never arose from any ignoble motive, any

sordid interest, any base jealousy. Lacordaire was a true but a moderate liberal, indifferent to dynastic interests and forms of government, but on the whole preferring a limited monarchy. The following passages, in which he expresses his views on modern society, will convey a tolerably adequate notion of his peculiar opinions :—

“ What do we value in this modern epoch which commenced with the American revolution of 1776? We there value the ruin of three elements destructive of the Catholic Church, our eternal native country, to wit; absolutism, gallicanism, rationalism. We love the present time, because it saps the absolute power of princes, and raises up the soul crushed for three centuries by force. Without identifying ourselves with such or such acts of revolutions, we look on them as on a great justice of God, as on a tragedy where the liberation of the church is worked out, and through her the liberation of humanity; but that tragedy is confused in its details, a mixture of good and evil, presenting Robespierre beside Washington, M. Isambert beside M. de Mérode; and conscience continually stumbles in attempting rightly to estimate a thousand diverse elements. It is chaos brooded over by the breath of the Holy Spirit; the *fiat lux* has not yet been heard. We further love the present time, because it grinds to powder the frightful spirit of gallicanism, that slow and secret schism which disunites while professing to knit together, which puts the demon at his ease, and conscience at peace. Finally, we love those terrible blows dealt to rationalism by its proved powerlessness to construct anything whatever. . . . We love the present then, in so far as it destroys the past, in so far as it appears tending towards a catholic future which shall liberate at once the church and the world; but we cannot identify ourselves with its acts. A politician can and ought to do so in the proper discharge of his duty; a priest, a man of the future, ought to keep himself like Moses on the mountain, raise up his hands for Israel, announce the truth to this nation, half free and half slaves, which sometimes elevates the golden calf, and sometimes prays at the gate of the tabernacle.”

Count Montalembert imputes the errors which disfigured the political conduct of Lacordaire, to his tendency towards that immoral and essentially revolutionary policy summed up in the maxim, that the end justifies the means. He did not indeed, like some modern reformers, maintain that the end is everything; but when it appeared to him glorious and necessary, he was too apt to overlook or justify the injustice or violence which had been made use of to attain it. He adhered to the Revolution of 1832; and he associated himself with that group of fervent Catholics who believed that the Revolution of 1848 was destined to inaugurate a new and better order of things, but he did not share in the honest and intemperate order with which, in the columns of *l'Ère nouvelle*, they maintained the

solidarity of Christianity and democracy. He was elected a member of the Constituent Assembly, in whose ranks sat three bishops and twenty priests. But his parliamentary career lasted only ten days, during which he spoke twice, neither time with much success. On the 16th May, he resigned his seat, and on the 26th, retired from the editorship of *l'Ère nouvelle*, and went to seek solitude and repose in one of the French convents of the restored order of Dominicans. We have no intention of impugning the purity of Lacordaire's motives in 1848; but we certainly think that his conduct in giving in his adherence to that most lamentable, most unjustifiable, and most useless of revolutions, which deprived France of a limited and strictly constitutional monarchy, to plunge her into anarchy terminating in despotism, did very little credit either to the clearness of his vision or the soundness of his judgment.

Lacordaire was in favour of the Italian wars of independence in 1848 and in 1859, for which a most needless apology is made by his biographer, who embraces the opportunity to make a fierce attack upon these great national movements. He denounces the covetousness of Piedmont, laments over the trials and perils of the holy see, and speaks of the unification of Italy as "that fatal utopia, invented by revolutionary despotism, to alienate for ever the Italian cause from catholic hearts." As soon as the temporal power of the papacy was menaced, Lacordaire repudiated the cause of Italian independence; and with his views of humanity as existing for the church, and not the church for humanity, we can scarcely wonder at his doing so. But the way in which he praises the conduct of Pius the Ninth, can only be accounted for by gross ignorance or wilful blindness. He is not ashamed to term the "Washington of Italy" that Pius who entered upon the path of reform, but refused to follow it out; who basely deserted the Italian cause in 1848-9, and would not permit the Roman troops to act against the Austrians; who fled from Rome, and called to his aid the foreign arms of Austria, Spain, and France; and who was finally replaced upon the throne of the country he had deluded, abandoned, and betrayed, by the aid of French bayonets, without whose support and protection his present tenure of power would not be worth a week's purchase. We should however state, that although Lacordaire was a thorough-going partisan of the temporal power of the pope, and repudiating the idea of any terms or conditions being made with the head of the church, he was, at the same time, not blind to the numerous abuses and defects of the papal government, and admitted the necessity of "important modifications in the government of the Roman States."

After he had resigned his seat in the Constituent Assembly,

Lacordaire resumed his duties as preacher in Notre Dame; and during the years 1849, 1850, and 1851, delivered, to an immense audience, a series of discourses on the communion of man with God, on the fall and the restoration of man, and on the providential economy of the restoration. His last public appearance in Paris was a charity sermon preached at St Roch in February 1853. This discourse gave offence to the imperial government; and Lacordaire, finding himself restricted in that freedom of speech of which he had been throughout life a steady and powerful defender, never again preached in Paris. But at Toulouse—the birthplace of St Dominic and the burial-place of St Thomas Aquinas—he delivered, in 1854, six discourses, which his biographer pronounces “the most eloquent, the most irreproachable of all.” Thereafter he accepted the direction of the School of Sorèze; and to it, and to the government of the Dominican province of France, he devoted the remainder of his life. He succeeded in making Sorèze the most flourishing seminary in the south of France. It was there that he commenced these “Letters on the Christian Life,” which he did not live to finish; there he received the distinguished honour of being elected a member of the French Academy; and there he died, in the winter of 1861, after a long and painful malady, endured with Christian patience and fortitude. His last words were, “*Mon Dieu! ouvrez moi, ouvrez moi!*”

We have already, at considerable length, assigned our reasons for differing from many of the views and opinions contained in this interesting volume, whose pages glow with the warmth, and tenderness, and natural partiality of a life-long friendship; and therefore—although we cannot agree in the exaggerated estimate which Count Montalembert has formed of the verdict which posterity will pronounce on the character and genius of his hero—we have the less hesitation in closing our sketch of his career in the Count's own picturesque and eloquent language:—

“And now what will remain of him upon this earth? I have said, and I believe, that his glory will soar to a very great height in a distant future. But between this and then, who knows? It will undoubtedly happen to him as has happened to all those who have more than others influenced the action of their time, and who have impressed upon it the stamp of their writings or of their speech. It will happen to him as has happened to greater than him, to Dante, to Shakespeare, to Corneille; the verdict of his age will not be entirely received by succeeding ages. Certain phases of his talent will be anew contested; certain forms of his eloquence will grow old. The ideas, the passions, the strifes which have moved him, will appear superannuated or insignificant. The immortal truths of the religion which he defended, assailed by new

enemies or compromised by new follies, will demand new proofs and new champions. Its foundations, already threatened by cupidity, will perhaps be delivered over by treachery to persecution and destruction. But what neither time, nor man's injustice, nor 'the treasons of glory' shall ever deprive him of, is the grandeur of his character, the honour of having been the most manly, the most strongly-tempered, the most heroic soul of our time; of having undertaken and practised, better than any one before him, that indispensable alliance of faith and of liberty which alone can restore modern society; of having united to so much strength and brilliancy the intimate tenderness and the soft melancholy which move and attract more than genius. He will always be, as when alive, still more loved than admired; and no one will ever contemplate that free and intrepid figure without a rising tear,—that humble, involuntary tear, which is the seal of real glory and of true love. When I look for a greater, a more eloquent than him, I can think only of Bossuet; and when I open Bossuet I find a sentence which sums up the life of our friend, I see it all glorious 'with that divine lustre which is within us, and where we discover, as in a globe of light, the immortal charm of honour and of virtue.'"

ART. IV.—*Döllinger on "The Church and the Churches."*

The Church and the Churches; or, The Papacy and the Temporal Power: An Historical and Political Review. By Dr DÖLLINGER. Translated, with the author's permission, by WILLIAM BERNARD MACCABE. London: Hurst & Blackett.

FOR considerably more than a quarter of a century the author of "The Church and the Churches" has occupied a very distinguished place among Roman Catholic theologians. Born at Bamberg in 1799, and educated at Würzburg, Döllinger soon attracted notice as a young man of superior talents; and, after serving for some years as a curate in Franconia, he was appointed a professor in connection with the Ecclesiastical Seminary at Aschaffenberg. In 1826, his earliest work, entitled "The Doctrine of the Eucharist in the First Three Centuries," made its appearance; and, in the same year, he became a member of the Faculty of Theology in the new University of Munich. Since that period his numerous publications attest at once his wonderful diligence, his zeal as an advocate of the Romish system, his eloquence, and his extensive erudition. Nor has he confined his attention to the duties of a professor's chair, and to the quiet walks of theological literature. He has been long known on the Continent as one of the leaders of the

Ultramontane party, and has signalised himself by his activity as a politician, as well as by his labours as a divine. From 1845 to 1847 he represented the University of Munich in the Bavarian Chambers; and in 1848, when elected a deputy to the national parliament, he is said to have framed the celebrated definition of "The Relations between Church and State" which was carried at Frankfort, and afterwards nominally adopted both at Vienna and Berlin. In 1847, he was deprived of his professorship, and consequently of his seat as a member of the Bavarian legislature; for the ministers raised to power by Lola Montez dreaded his ability and influence. In 1849, he was restored to his professorial chair, and he has since devoted himself with singular assiduity to literary pursuits. The progress of the recent revolution in Italy has been watched by him with intense concern; and when the throne of the sovereign pontiff began apparently to totter to its fall, he deemed it expedient to accede to a request presented to him, and to give two public lectures in Munich, with a view, as it would seem, to prepare the minds of Roman Catholics for the fall of the papal monarchy. These lectures attracted great attention at the time of their delivery; reports of them were circulated in tens of thousands through the medium of the newspapers; and the impression they produced was extensive and profound. All felt that one of the great questions of the day had been taken up by one of the master spirits of Romanism, and all were anxious to know what Dr Döllinger had to say on the subject. His lectures were, of course, variously received, and led to much favourable, as well as unfavourable, criticism. The author has appended them to the volume before us, and they may be regarded as the starting-point of his present publication.

Though Dr Döllinger has not expressly mentioned the design of this volume, the cause of its appearance is sufficiently obvious. The peculiar position of the pope may well create unpleasant doubts in thoughtful minds in reference to the Church of which he is the visible representative; and our author has written this work to reassure waverers, and to inspire fresh confidence in the divine authority of Romanism. The condition of the pontiff must ever be a matter of much interest to all his sincere adherents. He has acted as a temporal potentate for upwards of a thousand years; and when his kingly dignity is imperilled, no wonder that those who look up to him as their spiritual chief are inspired with the deepest solicitude. The pope is the head of the Roman Catholic Church, not as a picture stands at the top of the page of an illustrated magazine, or as an ornament surmounts a pillar, but as the head stands related to the man, or as the brain forms a part of the human organism. According to the ideas

of strict Romanists, the Church could not exist without the pope; for the destruction of the ecclesiastical head would inevitably and immediately prove fatal to the ecclesiastical body. But though Dr Döllinger believes that the loss of the sovereignty of Rome would be a sad calamity to the Church, and that it might interfere with the personal independence of the successor of Peter, he is careful to assure his readers that it would not affect the rights or prerogatives of the pope as the chief ruler of Christendom. In his lectures at Munich, he distinctively proclaimed that the temporal power of the bishop of Rome is of comparatively modern origin. "Unquestionably," said he, "the papacy is older than the States of the Church; the Roman bishops have been from all time chief shepherds of the Church; but in later ages only have they become temporal princes. The Roman see subsisted seven centuries without possessing in sovereignty a single village. And even after the large donations of the Frankish kings, and that the emperor had laid the foundation for a State of the Church, centuries had still to pass away before the pope came into quiet possession and actual administration of the land in its subsequent extent. In Rome itself the popes' power was long disputed; they were frequently and for a long time compelled to leave their city, and to prefer having their residence in Viterbo, Anagni, Orvieto; or they were necessitated to pass the Alps and seek elsewhere an asylum, most frequently in France. In the fourteenth century there came no pope to Italy for nearly seventy years. The court (Curia) resided in Avignon. In fact, it was not till the time of Leo X., about 350 years ago, that the popes held quiet possession of the State, with its three million of inhabitants." ("The Church and the Churches," p. 457.)

"The Church and the Churches" is the production of an earnest, vigorous, and learned polemic. If we cannot adopt his conclusions, we cannot but admire his eloquence, his acuteness, and the extent of his information. It must be interesting to British Protestants to know that there is a Roman Catholic professor at Munich who is intimately acquainted with their religious history; who can tell, as well as any of their own writers, of the Broad Churchmen, the High Churchmen, and the Evangelicals of the English Establishment; who can discourse fluently of Wesleyans, Calvinistic Methodists, Free Churchmen, Ulster Presbyterians, Quakers, and Plymouth Brethren; who can relate the doings of the Countess of Huntingdon; who has studied Mann's "Census of Religious Worship," and who has heard of Spurgeon, "the greatest favourite among the preachers of the day, who proclaims the purest Calvinism." Dr Döllinger is equally conversant with the reli-

gious condition of Holland, Switzerland, Germany, and the United States of America. We cannot, indeed, undertake to vouch for his correctness in details; we shall have occasion to shew, in the progress of this article, that his statements are sometimes ludicrously inaccurate; but he has been led astray by false guides, and we freely acquit him of any intentional misrepresentation. Though his animadversions on the ecclesiastical denominations he describes may not commend themselves to our approval, they are not altogether unworthy of consideration; for they often contain a certain amount of truth, and, as indicative of the views entertained of various forms of Protestantism by a highly-gifted Romanist, they possess a peculiar value.

Though Dr Döllinger has passed over, in suspicious silence, many points which fairly presented themselves to his notice in this "Historical and Political Review," we are bound to acknowledge that, on more than one occasion, his confessions are remarkably full and candid. He not only attests the extreme corruption of the Church at the time of the Reformation, but even goes on to affirm that Protestantism has rendered substantial service to the cause of Christianity.

"We must admit," says he, "that the anxiety of the German nation to see the *intolerable abuses and scandals* in the church removed was fully justified; and that it sprang from the better qualities of our people, and from their moral indignation at the desecration and corruption of holy things, which were degraded to selfish and hypocritical purposes. We do not refuse to admit that the great separation, and the storms and sufferings connected with it, were an awful judgment upon Catholic Christendom, which clergy and laity had but too well deserved—a judgment which has had an improving and salutary effect. The great intellectual conflict has purified the European atmosphere, has impelled the human mind on to new courses, and has promoted a rich, scientific, and literary life. Protestant theology, with its restless spirit of inquiry, has gone along by the side of the Catholic, exciting and *awakening*, warning, and *vivifying*; whilst every exalted Catholic theologian will readily admit that he owes much to the writings of Protestant scholars." (Pp. 17, 18.)

The time was when Romish writers poured unmingled abuse on Luther, and when they could discover no redeeming feature in his character. Dr Döllinger has no sympathy with this style of vituperation. He gives vent to his feelings in the following eloquent eulogy on the father of German Protestantism:—

"Within the mind of a German man, and that *man the greatest of his age*, did the Protestant doctrine spring up. Before the superiority and creative energy of that one mind did the aspiring active

portion of the nation humbly and trustingly bend the knee! In him—in that union of strength and intellect—they recognised their master; they lived in his thoughts—he appeared to them as the hero in whom the nation, with all its characteristics, was incorporated. They admired him, they gave themselves over to him, because they perceived in him their country's most potential, powerful self; because it was their feelings that he expressed more clearly, more eloquently, and with greater power than they would themselves have been able to give utterance to them. Thus has Luther's name become for Germany not merely the name of a distinguished man—he is himself the very core and kernel of a period of national life—the centre of a new circle of ideas, the most condensed expression of that religious and ethical mode of thought peculiar to the German mind, and from whose mighty influence even those who resisted it could not themselves wholly withdraw." (P. 267.)

Even in a case where the peculiar claims of his Church are immediately concerned, Dr Döllinger makes a concession which must be considered extraordinary, as emanating from a papal controversialist. Whilst he contends that the Lord "planted the institution of the infant church in the central point, at Rome," he grants that the historical evidences in support of the early claims of the papacy are almost invisible. "There" (at Rome), says he, "it silently grew—*occulto velut arbor aëvo: and in the oldest time it only shewed itself forth on peculiar occasions*" (p. 42). We presume that he here refers to the pretensions advanced by Victor in the Easter controversy at the close of the second century, and to the threat of Stephen, about sixty years afterwards, to excommunicate those churches which refused to adopt his views as to the rebaptism of heretics. If so, his allusions are singularly unfortunate, as, on both these occasions, the claims of the Italian bishop were indignantly scouted by the church catholic.

Our readers are not, however, to infer from these statements that the author of "The Church and the Churches" is some half-hearted Romanist. With all his apparent liberality, he is a staunch adherent of the so-called see of St Peter; and though he is quite prepared to admit the existence of abuses in its administration, he regards what may be designated the Catholic system as the perfection of beauty. The extinction of the pope is an idea which he cannot even entertain; for he believes that the spiritual authority of the pontiff is stable as the earth itself. "One thing," says he, "is certain, amidst all wrecks, one institution will remain erect, will constantly emerge from the flood of revolution—for it is indestructible, immortal—it is the chair of St Peter" (p. 470). Impressed with this conviction, he is firmly persuaded that the dangers which presently beset the papal see will soon pass away: but, should they be of longer

continuance than he apparently anticipates, he infers that political convulsions of portentous magnitude are approaching. According to his views, should "the pope be despoiled of his landed possessions, one of three eventualities will assuredly come to pass: either the loss of the Papal States is only temporary, and the territory will revert, after some intervening casualties, in its entirety or in part, to its rightful sovereign; or providence will bring about, by ways unknown to us, and combinations which we cannot divine, a state of things in which the object, namely, the independence and free action of the papal see, without those means which have hitherto sufficed for it; or lastly, we are approaching great catastrophes in Europe—a collapse of the whole edifice of existing social order—events of which the downfall of the Papal States is only the precursor, or, as it may be said, the Job's messenger" (p. 3).

In the work before us, Dr Döllinger, in the first place, makes some general observations on the respective merits of Popery and Protestantism, and then proceeds to describe more particularly the present condition of the religious communities unconnected with the Church of Rome. After noting down, so carefully as he has done, almost all that can be said to the prejudice of the Greek Church and her Russian daughter, of Lutherans and Calvinists, of Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Baptists, and Independents, we submit that he should have furnished as fully the other side of the account, and exhibited in the same severe style of criticism the present condition of Romanists in the British Isles and America, France and Austria, Spain and Italy. A notice of the murders recently perpetrated by Irish papists in Tipperary, and by brigands in the neighbourhood of Rome, should not, in fairness, have been withheld from his readers. After dwelling on the divisions and jealousies of Protestant sects, he was bound, in common justice, when comparing the Church and the Churches, to tell also of the divisions and jealousies of the secular and regular clergy, of Franciscans and Dominicans, Jesuits and Augustinians. But, in reference to such matters, he maintains an unbroken reticence. The temporal government of the Roman bishop is the only topic of the kind on which he appears disposed to speak freely. The mal-administration of the papal court has become so notorious, and has contributed so much to its present embarrassment, that it could not be ignored. Dr Döllinger concurs in the confession of an eminent writer, that in the last century, "with the exception of Turkey, the country beyond all others the worst governed was that of the Papal States." There is, as he admits, an increasing conviction among the people, "that they live under a pure despotism;" and he acknowledges that the papal see, "on its political side," has "presented the melancholy

spectacle of the weakest, most helpless government in all Europe; and one, too, only able to maintain itself by the double prop of foreign powers and their bayonets" (p. 459). He complains that priests continue "to discharge the functions of treasury clerks, or police directors, and to conduct the business of the lottery;" and he informs us that, by its encouragement of the lottery, the papal court has long "nurtured and incited the rage for gambling" (p. 403).

In an early chapter on "The Church and Civil Freedom," our author discusses the history of most of the Protestant states since the time of Luther, and attempts adroitly to parry the objection that Romanism is the friend of despotism. Whilst in this portion of the work he shews an intimate acquaintance with the political movements throughout Europe for the last three hundred years, his reasoning is superficial and one-sided, displaying rather the skill of a rhetorician than the serene wisdom of a Christian philosopher. The following are the conclusions which he deduces from his review:—

"On the whole, it appears, as a fitting inference from the domestic history of each country, that wherever the Reformation produced one united State Church, it acted prejudicially on civil liberty; that such States retrograded on the political path in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and that it is only where Protestantism did not attain to absolute supremacy, in the form of a State Church, but where a considerable portion of the population remained catholic, while another formed various religious communities, that there arose, from the collisions and limitations thereby occasioned, a greater measure both of civil and political freedom" (pp. 120, 121).

As the most influential Protestant States, with Great Britain at their head, belong to the class in which, as Dr Döllinger tells us, the reformed faith "has not attained to absolute supremacy," and produced one united Established Church, it follows, according to his own shewing, that, on the whole, the movement commenced by Luther has been the harbinger of "a greater measure both of civil and political freedom." And we believe he has quite failed to prove that, *in any case*, it has been really detrimental to the interests of public liberty. The examples he has adduced on the other side appear to us utterly inconclusive. It so happens that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Sweden and Denmark enjoyed little of the advantages of constitutional government; but we believe that, in the century preceding, their condition was still worse; for then they were in a state of almost perpetual anarchy. The succession to the crown was frequently disputed; the possessions of the Romish hierarchy were enormous; their arrogance was intolerable; and it was no uncommon thing to see a bishop raising an army and waging war against his sovereign. Dr

Döllinger must acknowledge that the Reformation put an end to these episcopal rebellions, and in so far contributed to promote social order and prosperity. The additional authority subsequently gained by the king was more apparent than real, as it simply enabled him to grapple effectively with the overgrown power of the nobility, and to diffuse among the body of the people a larger measure of general comfort. Nor has Dr Döllinger convinced us that the lower classes in Germany were more oppressed after, than before, the rise of Protestantism. Every one has heard of the Peasants' war in that country about the beginning of the Reformation, when the tillers of the soil, maddened by the horrid oppression under which they had long groaned, rose up in immense masses, and, after tremendous carnage, were with difficulty subdued. They have since surely made vast progress in the way of personal comfort and independence. The history of Protestantism triumphantly demonstrates that spiritual freedom is the sure forerunner of an extension of political liberty; and that, where the teachings of the Bible are most highly appreciated, the government of the country rests on the safest and best foundation. Romish States are greatly indebted to their Protestant neighbours even for the amount of social privileges they enjoy. Had popery continued to rule rampant over Europe, its inhabitants never would have known the blessings of a free press and a free parliament. The importance of the instruction conveyed to other nations by the exhibition of the advantages of these institutions in Great Britain, cannot well be estimated. Nor can Dr Döllinger hope to recommend Romanism to intelligent Englishmen by the assertion, that they may thank "*the church* for the Magna Charta of 1215." This statement, so often made by the advocates of the papacy, has been as often shewn to be fallacious. The primate of Canterbury, no doubt, assisted the barons in obtaining that palladium of British liberty: but it is well known that the pope interfered, pronounced the Charter void, and threatened the patriotic archbishop with excommunication.

If we are to believe Dr Döllinger, "historically nothing is more untrue than the assertion, that the Reformation was a movement for freedom of conscience" (p. 65). We acknowledge that the Reformers carried out of the Church of Rome too much of those principles of intolerance which they had been taught by her; but withal, when they left her communion, they practically asserted the right of thinking for themselves. And though the attention of the Protestant Churches was primarily directed to questions more directly relating to the eternal interests of man, they soon began to enunciate, in their confessions, those great truths which are the seeds of civil freedom. When the Westminster divines declared that "*God alone* is

Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men which are in anything contrary to his word, or beside it, in matters of faith or worship,"* they asserted a principle which popery has persistently refused to recognise; and, though they have themselves been charged with intolerance, they have here proclaimed the true theory of religious liberty. Dr Dollinger affirms that "the first who were in earnest about religious freedom, and who really placed the two religions on an equality, were the Catholic Englishmen who, towards the middle of the seventeenth century, founded the colony of Maryland, under the leadership of Lord Baltimore" (p. 67). This position appears scarcely to tally with another, advanced previously by our author, to the effect that "in Catholic countries compulsion was exercised to eject Protestantism, which had found its way into them, and to restore the unanimity of the Church; and Catholic princes willingly appealed to a right invented at the Reformation by the Protestants, in order thus to overcome it in their own territories, with a weapon offered to them by their adversaries, and which was declared by them to be legitimate" (p. 61); for if compulsion was unknown before the establishment of Protestantism, we do not well see why Lord Baltimore and his friends should be complimented as "*the first* who were in earnest about religious freedom." The credit due to this Roman Catholic nobleman, who in 1634 founded the colony of Maryland, has been greatly over-rated; as we believe that, under the circumstances, he could not have secured more than ecclesiastical equality for himself and his fellow-emigrants. The charter under which he acted was granted to him by Charles I., a Protestant king; and he might have endangered his whole scheme had he ventured before the eyes of a Protestant nation, strongly impregnated with Puritanism, to set up a system of Romish ascendancy. The Baptist Roger Williams, who in 1636 settled at Providence, far excelled the Roman Catholic peer in the liberality of his principles. According to the constitution of Maryland, no one within the province "*professing to believe in Jesus Christ*" was to be "in any way troubled, molested, or discountenanced, for his or her religion, or in the free exercise thereof;" but at Providence, Jews and Pagans, as well as others, were admitted to the privileges of American citizenship. We protest, however, altogether against the views propounded by Dr Dollinger as to the history of religious liberty. The principles of toleration were acknowledged and acted on in the Low Countries before the end of the sixteenth century; as, according to the terms of the compact known as the "*Union of Utrecht*,"

* Confession, chap. xx. 2.

concluded in 1579, by those who throw off the yoke of Philip II., the provinces, with the exception of Holland and Zealand, were at liberty "to countenance the Protestant religion, or the Catholic, or both, as they judged expedient;" and, even in Holland and Zealand, where the Protestant worship alone was to be publicly celebrated, pensions were to be given to the popish clergy who had lost their support in consequence of the ecclesiastical revolution.*

When Dr Döllinger speaks of "the principle of religious persecution" as "deeply seated in the very blood of the professors of the new doctrine" (p. 69), and when he describes Catholic princes who expelled nonconformists from their territories as exercising "a right invented at the Reformation by the Protestants," we cannot but think that his zeal as a controversialist has blinded his eyes as an historian. His own admissions, made elsewhere in this volume, attest the groundlessness of these representations. He tells, for example, of a gloomy sect, with Gnostic doctrines, which appeared in the eleventh century, and of which "*not one obdurate member was permitted to live!*" (p. 63). He adds, "Gradually it became THE RULE, that a falling off from the faith, and the diffusion of unecclesiastical doctrines, should be regarded as a crime *worthy of death*" (p. 63, 64). He has thus exactly depicted the legislation of the Fourth General Council of Lateran, held A.D. 1215; as that assembly promised to Catholics who undertook "to extirpate heretics by force of arms," the same indulgence granted to those who took part in the crusades to Palestine.† We can reconcile the statements of Dr Döllinger on this subject only by supposing him to mean that, whilst, before the Reformation, Romanists punished non-conformists with death, Protestants invented the plan of sending them into banishment. Whether he will accept of this explanation, it is not for us to determine; but he can never set aside the plain facts that, when Luther appeared, death was the punishment of heresy—that toleration has sprung up among the professors of the reformed faith—and that they have always been its most steadfast and distinguished advocates. In the early part of the sixteenth century, religious liberty was unknown. In the western Church, Popery, "drunken with the blood of the saints and with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus," reigned without a rival. The bishop of Rome had instigated the preaching of crusades against the Albigenses and Waldenses; cities had been reduced to heaps of desolation; and myriads of good subjects had been butchered. John Huss had been burned alive by order of the Council of Constance; and the

* Watson's Philip II., book xv.

† Dupin, li. 450, Ed. folio, 1728.

Inquisition, reconstructed and enlarged, had been carrying on a system of tyranny to which there is no parallel in the annals of the world. All this had been done under papal sanction; and, with such transactions before his eyes, we greatly marvel to find Dr Döllinger endorsing the affirmation, that "the principle of persecuting and oppressing persons of a different opinion had never been a dogma of the Church" (pp. 76, 77).

We do not mean to accompany our author in his review of the state of all the Churches unconnected with Rome; but we cannot withhold from our readers some account of his criticisms on the Protestantism of England, Scotland, and America. His blunders are occasionally rather startling; but when we consider that he produces such authorities as Mr Maurice and the *Saturday Review*, we need not wonder that he is so egregiously mistaken. The following description of the English Establishment may be given as a fair specimen of his accuracy:—

"The intellectual classes belong almost exclusively to the State Church; and it scarcely ever happens that a man of eminence professes himself a member of any dissenting body. . . . The clergy of the Episcopal Church themselves proceed from the higher classes, and are by relationship and marriage intimately connected with them; it is only very seldom that clergymen of the Church have sprung from the lower orders; and whoever does not belong by birth and connection to the privileged classes, generally finds the door of ecclesiastical preferment closed against him. . . . The son of a family of the lower order might perhaps attain to the position of a curate, but there is no Christian country where the poor and humble are so much excluded from the higher schools and educational establishments, and thereby, of course, from the Church and the service of the State, as in England."

"Before the Reformation, no closed pews were allowed in the churches; the space belonged to the whole congregation; and high and low were mingled together when they prayed. With Protestantism, however, pews, or boxes, obtained an entrance—pews furnished with all comforts, in which the rich and great can remain completely apart and separated from the common people."

"The clergy of the Established Church, evangelicals and high churchmen, are certainly the only clergy in the world who 'give every deceased person to the grave,' let him have lived how he may, let him be even a Catholic or a Dissenter, in the 'sure and certain hope of a blessed resurrection.' There can hardly be a more distinct declaration that, after all, belonging to the Church, taking part in her services, and using her means of salvation, can be a matter of no consequence."—(Pp. 144, 153, 164.)

Its best friends will acknowledge that the English Establish-

ment is at present rather too much of an aristocratic institution; but the account here given of it is unquestionably exaggerated. Though a considerable number of its clergy belong to families of distinction, it is well known to those who have turned their attention to this department of ecclesiastical statistics, that many of them are of very humble parentage; and there is certainly no law which prevents the son of a poor man from entering a university, and gaining academic honours. Neither can it be said with truth that dissenting pastors and their people belong exclusively to the unintellectual classes; for, not to speak of living preachers, it will scarcely be denied that Robert Hall, and some of his non-conforming contemporaries, had, in point of mental calibre, very few peers in England. Certain ministers of the Establishment, some of them justly suspected of Romanising tendencies, have of late frequently asserted that "preserved pews" are the fruits of Protestantism; but it can be shewn that the obnoxious arrangement had made its appearance long before the Reformation. As early as the reign of Henry VII. there were complaints made that "the parishioners were not able to have their standing-room on account of these seats."^{*} And, according to an authority which Dr Döllinger has quoted, there were no seats in some of the churches belonging to the Scottish Establishment at the close of the last century.[†] If the want of pews is a sure index of spiritual prosperity, religion must have been in a very flourishing state in some of the rural districts of North Britain about sixty years ago. The remarks on the burial service, in the concluding portion of the above extract, are well worthy of serious consideration; and we trust that they may attract the notice of Lord Ebury, and the other members of the Church of England who are seeking for Liturgic revision.

Our author represents the Dissenting interest in South Britain as at present "flourishing and vigorous." He evidently considers Richard Baxter as the most eminent of English theologians, and again and again reminds his readers, that this divine differed essentially from his brethren as to the article of a standing or a falling Church. Could the good pastor of Kidderminster have foreseen that the time would come when he would be so highly extolled by an Ultramontane professor of theology, we are inclined to think he would have felt that he placed himself in rather a false position by some of his aphorisms on justification; and he certainly never imagined that they compromised in any way the great principles of Pro-

^{*} See Sandford's Bampton Lecture for 1861, p. 323.

[†] Cunningham's History of the Church of Scotland, vol. ii. p. 586.

testantism. Dr Döllinger takes care not to state the peculiar views of this celebrated English Puritan, and quite over-estimates the extent to which they deviated from the sentiments of his co-religionists. John Wesley has the honour of being described as, "next to Baxter, the most important man whom Protestant England has produced" (p. 179); but the author of "The Church and the Churches" does not compliment our English Methodists when he says, that "they are accustomed to place the essence of religion in the strongest possible excitement of feeling, and an imaginary certainty of grace and salvation" (p. 181). He more correctly delineates the Plymouth Brethren as a sect exhibiting "a rejuvenated and modified Quakerdom," "distinguished chiefly by negations;" with "no confession formula," "no church organisation," and "no Sabbath according to the English fashion" (p. 185).

The remarks on the state of Scotch Presbyterianism, contained in "The Church and the Churches," constitute not the least extraordinary part of this remarkable volume. We can afford space for only a few quotations:

"Whilst Protestantism in the Netherlands has produced so abundantly a theological literature, Scotch Calvinism, although, by similarity of language, brought under the operation of rich English literature, has yet remained sterile; and has, in its spiritual poverty and lethargy, contented itself with very few, and very poor, productions—a fact the more surprising, when occurring amongst a people so intellectually gifted. Gross ignorance in theological matters had always been a striking feature of the Scotch preachers. Burnet, even in his time, makes the remark. Since the Reformation, Scotland has had, in fact, only two important theologians, Robert Leighton and Forbes; and both belonged to the Episcopal Church, and were themselves bishops. . . . The official catechism makes it the duty of every Scotch Christian to examine what he has heard in sermons by the Holy Scriptures. Had this duty really been performed, by only a small number, ecclesiastical divisions would naturally have become much greater than they have been. . . . The sect system did not originate in the Scotch soil, but was rather dragged in upon it from England. The great secession of the preceding century took place, not on account of doctrines, but by reason of the constitution and position of the civil power."

"There is, in fact, a solid chain of belief, with which the Calvinistic system, as it is fixed in the Westminster Confession, has encircled the minds of men. Ever since the people have been taught to measure the value of a religion according to the amount of confidence it affords, it is but natural that the Calvinist should be still more firmly convinced of the excellence of his dogma than the Lutheran, since the problem as to which affords the higher degree of tranquillising confidence is here solved."

"According to the statement of Maurice, the mechanical, fatalistic doctrine of the American Jonathan Edwards, a doctrine which relegates all human freedom and self-determination to the sole will of God as affecting all things, has gained great influence in Scotland. This influence, according to Maurice, is connected with materialism, which is very widely spread in that country. That the old Scotch Calvinistic faith is, however, lost to the Scotch Church, is, according to his testimony, the view of every intelligent man in the country. In such a state of things, a scientific theology in Scotland is not to be thought of. . . . It is only by an entire absence of theology that the three Presbyterian communities can maintain their existence.

"In the Jewish rigidity of the observance of the Sabbath, the Scotch Calvinists endeavour to surpass even their English co-religionists, so much so, that even a little walk for recreation on the Sunday is not permissible. And so, on the other hand, there is on that day a much greater consumption of spirituous liquors. In their churches there is no organ, no altar, no cross, no pictures, no light."
—(Pp. 188-193.)

Procopius, writing in the sixth century of our era, tells us that, by some in his time, the island Brittonia, lying opposite to Gaul, was regarded as the place of departed spirits; and that, beyond the wall by which it was intersected, no man could live more than half an hour. We fear that the reader who derives his knowledge of Scotland only from "The Church and the Churches," will conclude that, though not exactly in so backward a condition as in the days of the Emperor Justinian, it is still far behind other countries, as well materially as spiritually. According to Dr Döllinger, the Scottish churches are of a very peculiar style of architecture; for, as they have "no light," we must infer that they are constructed without windows; and it is not strange that they have neither crosses nor pictures, for how, without light, could such decorations be exhibited? The darkness which reigns perpetually in these Presbyterian edifices must be a true symbol of the intellectual condition of the worshippers, as it appears that, since the Reformation, they have had only two divines of any significance. There have been several Scotch bishops named Forbes, but we cannot tell to which of these now almost forgotten worthies Dr Döllinger refers; and we believe that not one in fifty thousand of the present generation of Scotchmen has read a page of any of their writings. The works of Leighton are better known, and are highly valued; and yet many of his countrymen cherish no very profound veneration for an author who exhibited such rare spiritual endowments combined with so little common sense, who permitted himself to be made the tool of a cabal of worthless politicians, and who, after having taken the Covenant, and

administered it frequently to others, became a bishop and an archbishop. As if recollecting himself, Dr Döllinger, in a note, names *Macknight* as "the only important exegist the Scotch Church has produced." We presume, therefore, that he has never heard of Dr George Campbell of Aberdeen, a man who in native vigour of intellect, as well as in exact and varied erudition, will bear comparison with any of his contemporaries, either of Great Britain or the Continent. As our author admits the abundance of the theological literature of the Netherlands, he may be astonished to hear that divines from sterile Scotland have been invited to occupy professorial chairs in the Dutch Universities; and should he ever look into the works of David Calderwood, or Robert Baillie, or Samuel Rutherford, or George Gillespie, or others we might mention, he may, perhaps, see cause to modify his views as to their "gross ignorance in theological matters." The works of the late Dr M'Crie are known all over the world; and his "History of the Progress and Suppression of the Reformation in Italy" created such alarm at Rome, that it had the honour of being specially condemned in 1844, in an encyclical letter by Pope Gregory XVI. It is rather a curious fact, that those noble contributions of the prince of British theologians, Dr Cunningham's "Theology of the Reformation," and his "Historical Theology," appeared in the very year in which "The Church and the Churches" came forth to tell the British public of the intellectual poverty of Scottish Presbyterianism.

We do not remember to have met elsewhere a more important testimony to the excellence of the Westminster Assembly's Shorter Catechism, than that here undesignedly furnished by this Munich professor. What his Church has failed to effect, by keeping the people in ignorance, and by holding out to inquirers the terrors of the Inquisition, has been, to a great extent, accomplished by the agency of this little formulary. The Shorter Catechism and the Bible have produced doctrinal unity in Scotland. Dr Döllinger assumes that the duty of comparing the teaching of the minister with the testimony of the word, is generally neglected in the land of Knox, and he thus rather awkwardly accounts for the prevalence of the Calvinistic theology; but a little better acquaintance with the country would convince him of his mistake. There is not, perhaps, a nation in the world in which the doctrine of the pulpit is more narrowly watched; and with such a symbol as the Catechism in universal circulation, it is almost impossible for an unsound expositor to escape unchallenged. Nor is it strange that other systems are unable to make way against the established creed. Calvinism is a chain of principles in which the logical faculty can discover no weak link; every part of it is composed of the

pure gold of gospel truth ; its exhibition is very awful to the sinner, for it reminds him most vividly of his danger and his misery ; and yet it is most comfortable to all who are in Christ, for it shews them how firmly they are bound to the throne of Eternal Love. We can well understand why it is so valued by a people as distinguished for their philosophical acumen, as for their biblical attainments ; and it is easy to see why popery has all but vanished from North Britain.

Dr Döllinger professes to support the statements in his text by a rather imposing array of authorities at the foot of the page ; but we must acknowledge we have not entire confidence in these references, for we have examined a number of them, and found them unsatisfactory. Thus he quotes Burnet as speaking, in the "History of his own Time" (i. 46), of the extreme ignorance of the clergy of North Britain ; whereas the Bishop of Sarum has delivered no such testimony. He says, indeed, that the Scottish ministers "had but an *ordinary proportion* of learning among them"—a statement which can scarcely be considered depreciatory, when we recollect that it proceeds from a writer who had deserted their party, and who was very adverse to their principles. This historian makes us acquainted with several facts, which shew that his Presbyterian contemporaries were pastors of no common excellence. He says, for example, of the celebrated Robert Douglas, one of the ministers of Edinburgh, that he was "as a concordance," having "*the Scriptures by heart* to the exactness of a Jew ;" and instead of making any such affirmation as that imputed to him in "The Church and the Churches," Burnet asserts distinctly that if the Presbyterian clergy "had no men of great learning among them, yet *none were very ignorant*" (i. 46). "They had," he tells us, "brought the people to such a degree of knowledge, that cottagers and servants would have prayed extempore ;" and he adds, that "every one, women as well as men, had a comprehension of matters of religion, greater than he had seen among people of that sort anywhere" (i. 217, 218). There are other allegations in the quotations we have now given, on which it must be quite unnecessary for us to comment. The readers of the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review* do not require to be assured that the "old Calvinistic faith" is still cherished ardently in Scotland ; and that nothing can be further from the truth than that "a scientific theology is not to be thought of," in a country which can point to living theological writers such as Candlish, Eadie, Fairbairn, and Alexander.

When treating of "the Church in Scotland," Dr Döllinger has made other assertions sufficiently startling. He maintains that, where genuine Calvinism prevails, the "perdition" of all Roman Catholics is "received as an article of faith." We are quite sure

that Calvin himself entertained no such sentiment, and we know no Calvinistic Confession in which it is promulgated. Neither can we join with him in the complaint, that in Scotland the "deficiency of religious compositions, suitable for popular perusal, is strikingly apparent;" for, perhaps, no part of Christendom is so well supplied with such literature. The absurdity of the affirmation that, "during the whole of the eighteenth century, *not one single church was built* by a people who regarded themselves as the most religious in Europe" (p. 187, 188), must be obvious to all who have even a very slight knowledge of Scottish ecclesiastical history, as, during the last century, the Seceders, as well as other dissenters, sprung into existence; and we are not aware that any of these denominations deemed it their duty to confine the celebration of their worship to the open air.

After this woeful account of Scotland, the reader will peruse with some satisfaction, and perhaps surprise, the following description of the "Protestant denominations in the United States of America :"—

"No State or National Church : and nevertheless a general profession of Christianity. Such is the first fact that strikes us with reference to religion in the Eastern States of North America. No one would, in that country, venture openly to proclaim himself an infidel. It belongs, among the higher and middle classes, to the tone of good society, and to the decorous conduct of life, to be a Christian. There does not, therefore—or there did not till very lately—exist such a thing as a literature of atheism, pantheism, or materialism. A religious atmosphere is diffused over the whole country, from which no one can venture to withdraw himself; and this manifests itself, especially, in the strict observance of the Sunday, in the extraordinary number of churches and meeting-houses, and in a diligent attendance at them; in the energetic, emulous activity of the various religious parties in their efforts for missions, and in the number of religious periodicals. Irreligion, or contempt of religion, is there only displayed by the Germans, and contributes much to the contemptuous manner in which the Anglo-American looks down upon Germans."—(Pp. 219, 220.)

According to Dr Döllinger, the Protestants and Romanists in the United States of America are nearly numerically equal. It is indeed stated, we presume by the editor, in a note, that the author has here been led into a mistake by a calculation in one of Dr Schaff's publications, and it is suggested that the Protestant estimate may be doubled; but every one conversant with American denominational statistics must be aware, that he would have been much nearer the truth, had he set down the Protestants to the Romanists as eight or ten to one.

As connected with the religious condition of our friends on

the other side of the Atlantic, we can afford space only for another extract :—

“A solid scientific theology is impossible for America in its present state. Every theologian, or every one who might have a vocation for the cultivation of theology, belongs to some special sect, and finds himself more or less subject to the tyranny, or at least to the influence, of his denomination. His sect . . . will afford him neither space, nor light, nor air for a theological flight. Nevin, the only living American theologian of any importance, confesses that American theology, with all its pretentious and pious-sounding phrases, is, for the most part, mere school-boy pedantry compared with the German. The only man, besides Nevin, who had in him the material and the vocation to make an eminent theologian, was William Ellery Channing, a preacher of Boston.”—(Pp. 228, 229.)

The authority of the *Mercersburg Review*, to which our author appeals, in a note, in confirmation of these sentiments, will not have much weight with Transatlantic readers ; and those of them who peruse this passage will, we are persuaded, conclude that Dr Döllinger is not endowed largely with the gift of “discerning of spirits,” as otherwise he never would have placed Channing and Nevin in the fore-front of American divines. The late Moses Stuart of Andover, the successful assailant of the Unitarian Channing, possessed a far greater amount of theological learning than his eloquent antagonist ; and though the Rome-ward predilections of Nevin of *Mercersburg* may commend him to the admiration of the Munich professor, we must take leave to think that such a man as Dr Hodge of Princeton is a theological writer of rather more “importance.” Dr Döllinger has elsewhere mentioned Jonathan Edwards ; and he ought to know that, by men at least quite as competent as either himself or Dr Nevin to pronounce an opinion, the President of the New Jersey College, and the author of the treatise on the Freedom of the Will, has long been considered the most profound divine of the eighteenth century. “Theological flights” are not very desirable ; and we certainly cannot applaud the exercises of imagination in which our author has indulged in his review of “the Churches ;” but those who delight to walk in the good old paths of Bible truth, and who have studied the works of the Alexanders, or Breckenridge, or others of our Transatlantic brethren, will certainly not be prepared to endorse the assertion that “a solid scientific theology is impossible for America” (p. 11).

Dr Döllinger has undertaken the preparation of the volume before us with the view, as he expresses it, “to make clear both the universal importance of the papacy as a world-power, and the things that it actually performs. This could not be done fully,” says he, “without exhibiting the internal condition of

the churches which have rejected it, and withdrawn from its influence" (p. 11). Our readers have now been furnished with some specimens of the manner in which his task has been executed, in as far as the Protestants of England, Scotland, and America are concerned; and they will perhaps agree with us in the conclusion, that his historical pictures scarcely deserve the name of caricatures. They are so very unlike the originals, that a discerning eye can, in some cases, detect very few features of resemblance. Let us now see how he exhibits his own denomination. There is ever present to his mind one grand idea—the idea of what he calls the holy Catholic Church. As its head, the sovereign pontiff sits in spiritual glory, reducing everything to order, consistency, and peace. His description of the papacy is a curiosity in its way.

"The Catholic Church is a most opulent, and, at the same time, a most multifarious organism. Its mission is nothing less than to be the teacher and moulder of all nations; and however much it may find itself hampered in this task, however limited may be the sphere of action allotted to it by this or that government, its task always remains the same, and the church requires and possesses an abundance of power to attain its purpose; it has a great number of various institutions, all directed to the same end, and with these it is continually creating new. All these powers, these institutions, these spiritual communities, stand in need of a supreme guidance, with a firm and strong hand, in order that they may work harmoniously together; that they may not degenerate, and may not lose sight of their destination; that they may not suicidally turn their capabilities one against the other, or against the unity and welfare of the church. It is only an ecclesiastical primacy can fulfil this mission—it is the papacy alone that is in a position to keep every member in its own sphere, and to pacify every disturbance that may arise.

"It is, moreover, a beautiful, sublime, but certainly difficult mission of the papal see—a mission only to be fulfilled by the strength of an enlightened wisdom and a comprehensive knowledge of mankind—and that is, to be just to the claims of individual nations in the church; to comprehend their necessities, and restrain their desires within the limits required by the unity of the church" (pp. 44, 45).

The following passage, which occurs towards the close of the volume, suggests, however, the rather discouraging conclusion that this bright vision of papal performance yet remains to be realised:—

"Let it be but seen that the papal government possesses a vast advantage over all other forms of sovereignty, and instantly the people will willingly again place themselves under the dominion of the papacy. What is there to prevent us from thinking that a

state of circumstances may arise in which, when elections to the papal dignity occur, the persons chosen shall no longer be decrepit, aged individuals, but men in the prime of their years and their strength—a period, too, in which the people shall be reconciled to their government by free institutions, and share in the conduct of their own concerns—whilst the upper classes are satisfied by the opening of a suitable career in public affairs? In such a condition of circumstances, the public and speedy administration of justice would win the confidence of the people; an honourable *esprit du corps*, a feeling of self-respect, and a pride in their integrity, and in the dignity of the class to which they belonged, would animate the government *employées*; the hostile separation between ecclesiastics and laity would be put an end to, by an equality in their privileges and their duties; the police would no longer prop themselves up by religious means; and religion would no longer hobble like a cripple, and rely for support upon the crutches of a policeman.”—(P. 430.)

The reader must remember that the author who describes the Roman see as preserving institutions from *degeneracy*—as pacifying “every disturbance”—as “just to the claims of individual nations”—and as thus fulfilling “a beautiful, sublime, but difficult mission”—has written an ecclesiastical history, and must therefore know something of the monstrous oppressions by which the popes have rendered themselves infamous. He ought to know that by their barefaced usurpations they have often thrown the church into disorder, and that they have tyrannised over “individual nations” with an insolence which nothing but the grossest ignorance would have tolerated. Instead of promoting peace in the spiritual commonwealth, they have kept it for centuries in turmoil; for selfish ends they have stirred up princes to make war on each other; and they have been distinguished by their contentious spirit, their political chicanery, and their insatiable ambition. Dr Döllinger asserts that the Reformation has proved a failure; but, beyond all controversy, the papacy has proved a curse. Under its management, to use our author's own language, Christianity has so degenerated that it is obliged to “hobble like a cripple, and rely for support on the crutches of a policeman.” Let any candid observer look first at Italy, and then at rich and happy England; and he may see clearly the effects of popery and protestantism. If the Roman bishop is, by divine right, the father of the church, surely the land with which he has been so long more immediately connected should present abundant tokens of his paternal care. Surely the city of his habitation should be the praise of the whole earth. But what is the actual state of matters? Has not Italy, with all its natural advantages, been the most miserable of countries, the almost constant

theatre of wars and revolutions? And is not Rome, according to the testimony of Dr Dollinger himself, one of the worst-governed cities under the sun? Verily, what this writer calls the "beautiful and sublime mission of the papacy," has turned out to be a ruinous delusion!

Dr Döllinger knows well that the world has never yet seen anything like the state of things he has depicted when delineating the blessings of papal supremacy. In the apostolic age the Church of Rome occupied a much less distinguished position than the Church of Jerusalem; and for two centuries afterwards, no other religious community beyond its own immediate neighbourhood submitted to its dictation. In the fourth century the power now claimed for the pope was, in part, exercised by the emperor, who summoned councils, presided in them, either in person or by some bishop or other deputy of his own appointment, and, in one instance, coerced even the Bishop of Rome into the profession of Arianism. In the fifth century, the General Council of Chalcedon declared that the Bishop of Constantinople was entitled to the same honours as his western brother; and, though the great Italian prelate complained mightily of this decision, he was unable to procure its repeal. Towards the close of the same century, a schism commenced which, for between thirty and forty years, interrupted the communion of oriental and occidental Christendom. No one can pretend to say that Romish claims were universally recognised when the pope became a temporal prince; for the Greek emperor, with a multitude of his clergy, was then opposed to him on the question of image worship, and the Bishop of Rome gained his kingdom by supporting idolatry. Shortly afterwards, the eastern and western churches were separated by a schism, which continues to this hour. Where, then, is the "sublime and beautiful mission" which our author has described with such enthusiasm? It has never been realised. It can be traced nowhere, except in the imagination. Of a papal rule extending over the whole church, and diffusing the blessings of a vigorous but beneficent administration, history knows nothing.

Does, then, Dr Döllinger admit that the Roman primacy has hitherto failed to fulfil its mission, and yet, believing it to be a heavenly institute, does he propose its reconstruction, and thus hold out for it the promise of a glorious future? By means of young popes and a reformed curia, does he expect it to subdue the world? Does he think that men will close their eyes to the history of the past, that they will forget the blasphemies, the perjuries, and the horrid tyranny of the papacy, and take it, a second time, on trial? We can scarcely believe that he regards them as such simpletons. And he must himself be of

a very sanguine temperament, if he anticipates that the wound inflicted on pontifical authority at the Reformation will ever be healed. He acknowledges that the antipathy to his system on the part of Protestants of all denominations is as intense as ever. They have tasted the sweets of civil and religious liberty, and they will never again be entangled with the yoke of Italian bondage. A few Oxford dreamers may be enticed back to antiquated mummeries; but, with the Bible in their hands, and amidst the light of modern civilisation, the millions, who are ranged under the standard of the Reformation, will never be induced to believe Transubstantiation, and will never consent to submit to Rome as the mistress and the mother of all churches.

Dr Döllinger proclaims, as we have intimated, that Protestantism has proved a failure; and we cannot altogether overlook an assertion which he has reiterated with such assurance, and with such evident complacency. We admit that, since the sixteenth century, the reformed faith, at least in Europe, has not greatly enlarged its visible territories; but our author must, on the other hand, acknowledge that, on the whole, it has firmly maintained its position. If, in this respect, there has been little progress, there has certainly been little failure. Its prospects in France, Spain, and Italy are at present far more hopeful than in the days of the Catholic League. Late in the sixteenth century the whole of the northern part of Scotland was almost entirely popish; now, there is no part of Christendom where the bishop of Rome has much less influence. At the beginning of the seventeenth century Protestantism had barely obtained a footing in Ireland; now, it numbers nearly one-fourth in the national census, and its adherents constitute a large preponderance of the wealth and intelligence of the population. Nor has its political power, meanwhile, diminished; for Protestant England, which, in the time of Philip II., trembled before the mighty Armada, is at present the arbiter of nations. Nor can it be said that Protestantism has failed in stimulating religious inquiry, as, in a passage which we have already quoted, Dr Döllinger himself confesses that it has thus conferred advantages even on Roman Catholic theology. Nor has it failed in elevating the standard of morality. According to the testimony of our author, the Roman Catholic Church, at the period of the Reformation, was little better than a den of all uncleanness; and it is well known that, ever since, the popish priesthood have exhibited an outward decency in their behaviour which before they did not deem it necessary to maintain. And though Dr Döllinger is so careful to inform his readers of the "crime, diseases, and deaths" in Calvinistic Scotland, he ought to know that, whilst

Rome has so long enjoyed the special supervision of the head of his church, the proportion of illegitimate children in Edinburgh, the capital of North Britain, is but a mere fraction of the amount of the same class of infants in the capital of the sovereign pontiff.

Notwithstanding the bold affirmations of this author, we emphatically deny that the Reformation has proved a failure. Had it continued to advance as rapidly as in the days of its youth, it would long since have swept popery from the face of the earth ; but though its progress has been impeded, partly by the apathy and mismanagement of its friends, and partly by the reaction created in favour of the old superstition by the Jesuits and others, it knows its strength, and it is confident of ultimate victory. With all its drawbacks, it has conferred immense benefit on society, politically, morally, intellectually, and spiritually. Let not Dr Döllinger imagine that it has renounced the creed which it professed when it won the battles of the Reformation. Channing and Nevin are no more its genuine representatives than were Socinus and Queen Elizabeth. Our author grievously miscalculates, if he believes that the doctrine of justification by faith is not still strenuously maintained by its most enlightened and trusty advocates. This doctrine has not yet disappeared from the Augsburg Confession, from the Thirty-nine Articles, from the Westminster Confession, or from the other public formularies which are the accredited standards of Protestant theology ; and so long as those who enter the ministry signify their adherence to these symbols, no one has any right to assume that they have become obsolete. And the missions supported by Protestantism at home and abroad attest at once its vitality and its energy. Eternity alone can disclose the blessings it has diffused by means of the millions of Bibles it has put into circulation.

In "The Church and the Churches" the great variety of Protestant sects is kept before the notice of the reader, and he is constantly reminded of the unity of Roman Catholicism. The argument thus suggested in favour of popery is, after all, little better than an appeal to numbers. Every party is united as far as it is organised, and Romanism simply presents the most extensive ecclesiastical organisation to be found in Christendom. This organisation is the growth of ages ; nobles and kings, from time to time, contributed to its consolidation ; and it did not acquire the influence it possesses without much plotting and many struggles. Protestants are generally agreed as to the great doctrines of the gospel, and their differences relate chiefly to matters of detail ; but we must confess that hitherto they have been too prone to split up into factions, and that they have thus greatly prejudiced the common cause.

We think we at length clearly discern indications of the approach of a better era. It is a hopeful sign of the times that Presbyterians in the various colonies of Great Britain, and in the United States of America, as well as in England, Scotland, and Ireland, are forgetting their past jealousies and divisions, and are going forward with a process of incorporation. A catholic Presbyterian Church, under the banner of the Westminster Confession, may soon become a spiritual power, before which even the pope and his cardinals will tremble. And the institution of the Evangelical Alliance is, we trust, the commencement of a still more extended movement to prepare the way for a general union of the Protestant Churches. The uneasiness which this Alliance has created among Romanists is a proof of its importance; and the volume before us shews that such men as Dr Döllinger are watching its operations with no little vigilance.

Our author frequently condemns the intermeddling of secular princes with the government of the church, and we might suppose, from the tenor of his observations, that this is a grievance peculiar to Protestantism. He must, however, be aware that such Erastian interference is as ancient as the days of Constantine the Great. In the middle ages the German sovereigns exercised it with a vengeance, claiming the appointment even of the Italian pontiff; and the struggle for superiority between the emperor and the pope kept a great part of Europe for ages in disturbance. Both secular and papal usurpations must cease before the church can enjoy her freedom, and be restored to unity. When the ministers and other office-bearers appointed by Christ are permitted to manage their own affairs, when the pope has sunk to rise no more, and when the state confines itself to its appropriate functions, many of the barriers which now stand in the way of ecclesiastical communion shall quickly disappear, a kindly intercourse between the religious societies now separated shall soon commence, and the idea of a visible church catholic shall at length be realised.

As we have turned over the pages of this volume, we have been impressed more deeply than ever with the conviction that Calvinism—the theology which the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review* has ever laboured to illustrate and expound—is the only system competent to encounter and vanquish popery. There seems to be something like a lurking apprehension in the mind of Dr Döllinger himself that this is the faith before which his church is doomed to fall. As often as he mentions the hated creed, he apparently cannot restrain his temper, and his language becomes specially acrimonious. He cannot afford to give so much as a candid statement of its principles. According to his representations, every one who

adopts it "believes, as firmly as he can believe, *that he is elect*, that by being clothed with the merits of the Saviour he may be received by God as righteous, *though inwardly he is not so*, and that he can never forfeit this state of grace;" and he describes Mr Spurgeon as telling his hearers "how infallibly certain he is of his salvation, so that, in fact there are only two things he need do, sing psalms and sleep" (pp. 174, 177, note). A controversialist who thus misrepresents his opponents, supplies evidence of his own imbecility. Did he feel confident in the goodness of his cause, he would delight to present the argument of an antagonist in all its strength, knowing how well he could take it to pieces, and demonstrate its insufficiency. Dr Döllinger sometimes, in spite of himself, pronounces a eulogy on the obnoxious doctrine. Thus, in one case, he speaks of Lutheranism as "pressed down by the *logical* and still more *consolatory* Calvinism" (p. 28). This is spoken sneeringly; and yet, from such a quarter, it is rather complimentary than otherwise. It is surely no objection to a theological system that it is theoretically perfect, that it can pass triumphantly through the ordeal of criticism, and that the most rigorous logic cannot convict it of inconsistency. The gospel is *good news*, it is designed to comfort the believer, and should not that theology be its best exponent which is fraught with the richest consolation? Dr Döllinger acknowledges that his Church has suffered most in times past from the preaching of Calvinism, he admits that the thirty-nine articles, as well as other established symbols, are "essentially Calvinistic" (p. 159), and he endeavours to console himself with the idea that this creed has become obsolete. He has the folly even to assert that it is rejected "by the majority" of the ministers of the Free Church of Scotland" (p. 192). He intimates that it is sustained only by the Cameronians and the United Presbyterians. Let him not delude himself by any such imaginations. Scotland has not abjured the faith of her confessors and her martyrs. Nor has Geneva abandoned for ever the theology of her great reformer. The recent reappearance of Calvin's Catechism in the city which still delights to do honour to his name, betokens a disposition to walk once more in the good old paths. The history of the church attests that a revival of vital godliness has always been connected with a return to principles substantially Calvinistic. In the last half century such principles have been making steady progress; and, as the glory of the latter day approaches, we feel assured that their light shall shine with a brighter and a wider radiance. K.

ART V.—*Whately's Preliminary Dissertation.*

Encyclopædia Britannica. 8th Edition. Vol. I. *Dissertation Third, Exhibiting a general view of the Rise, Progress, and Corruptions of Christianity.* By the Most Rev. RICHARD WHATELY, Archbishop of Dublin.

DR WHATELY's writings have not, in proportion to their number and importance, been much noticed by reviewers. Whether this is a misfortune or an advantage, and whether the Archbishop is disposed to complain of being neglected, or to congratulate himself on being let alone, such, to a large extent, has been his fate. We have often felt surprised that this Dissertation should have attracted so little attention. But after a careful perusal of the treatise, we can understand and sympathise with the reluctance of critics to meddle with it. We are satisfied that it does not spring from any disrespect to the author, nor from the persuasion that the work is insignificant and commonplace. Of course no production of Dr Whately's pen will ever furnish *this* plea for neglecting it. The real difficulty of dealing satisfactorily with the Dissertation must always have been felt to lie in the immense number, variety, and importance of the topics which it embraces, rendering it quite hopeless to think of discussing them as they deserve, within the limits to which periodical criticism must necessarily be restricted. We are ourselves very sensible of the difficulties which beset the task which we have undertaken; but difficult as it is, we think the attempt should be made to estimate the value of the work, and to present its leading views, whether they meet with our approval or the reverse.

It is not improbable that many readers, remembering the noble dissertations of Dugald Stewart, Playfair, and Sir James Macintosh, which enriched the former edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, and still enrich the present, may have expected to find in Dr Whately's Treatise a historical review of Christianity similar to those which are there given of science and philosophy, and may be disappointed when they meet with something so very different. But, though we confess that we shared the feeling, it may be questioned whether such an anticipation is altogether reasonable and well founded. Christianity was not developed like the physical sciences or mental philosophy. It is not the growth of striking discoveries or ingenious speculations. As a system of religious truth and duty, it came forth mature and complete from the hand of its divine author, and so, essentially, it still remains, and must remain for ever. Doubtless it has a history, and a deeply interesting one, but a history widely different in its character from that of the material

or mathematical sciences, and of metaphysical or ethical philosophy. In this point of view, we might be disposed to take exception to the *title* of this dissertation, professing as it does to treat of the "rise, progress, and corruptions" of Christianity. We can understand what the writer means by its "corruptions," but we do not see quite so clearly what is meant by its "rise and progress" in this connection. Christianity is not the church, and any expression which seems to confound the one with the other should be avoided, especially in the *title* of a discourse upon the subject.

But what a magnificent theme does "Christianity" present to one who treats it in the free and discursive fashion which Dr Whately has adopted! And the absence of progressive development in the substance and structure of his subject leaves him all the more at liberty in dealing with it. And of this liberty our author does not hesitate to avail himself to the utmost. He presents us with a dissertation, composed in a great measure of brief discussions of a vast multitude of topics connected with revealed religion; propounding sentiments and views, many of which are striking, most of them sensible, some of them highly objectionable and heterodox, but all of them suggestive—saying, in short, much that is "good," something that is "bad," very little that is "indifferent."

In treating so discursively such an extensive subject, it is obvious that even with the liberal allowance of a hundred quarto pages, much must still be left unsaid which Dr Whately would have been desirous of saying, and which he could have said to excellent purpose. The principles and distinguishing features of the Christian system; the time, mode, and circumstances of its introduction into the world; its wide and rapid diffusion amid opposition and obstructions of every kind; its conflicts, as illustrating its spiritual nature and the character and aims of its institutions; its connection with the world and the world's affairs, with civil government, with literature and science and philosophy; its corruptions, and the sources from which they sprang and the elements by which they were fostered; its wondrous career, with all its strange vicissitudes, the alternate flux and reflux, revival and decay, which it has so often exhibited, and how these have been produced and promoted and checked; its influence upon human society, how it has leavened and mitigated the virulence of existing evil, and how it has itself been leavened by it; the great men and great actions to which it has given birth; its present condition, and future prospects, and ultimate destiny,—upon all these topics, and many more, it might be proper to descant in such a treatise as this. But multifarious and extensive as the subject appears when thus cursorily glanced at, Dr Whately embraces a still

wider range, for he deals at considerable length with the Pagan religions and the Mosaic dispensation, as introductory to his proper theme of Christianity.

It is interesting to notice the *headings* under which such a writer arranges a Dissertation on "the rise, progress, and corruptions of Christianity." They are as follows:—"Introduction," "The Pagan Religions," "The Mosaic Dispensation," "Introduction of the Gospel," "Establishment of Christ's Kingdom," "Corruptions of Christianity," "Reformations in Religion," Church Allegiance and Separations." Whether these headings are exhaustive or not as respects the entire subject, it must be admitted that they afford ample scope for very interesting discussion.

Dr Whately begins the general "Introduction" by referring to the earliest history of the human race, as recorded in the book of Genesis. And the strangest thing here is, that no mention is made of the first temptation and fall. Surely this is a very singular omission, and we are at a loss how to account for it. We have, however, an ample discussion of the question of the primeval condition of man, whether it was a purely savage state from which he emerged by slow advances through the exercise of his own ingenuity and the application of his own resources, or a comparatively civilised condition from which some communities have at different times sunk into barbarism. Our author strenuously insists, that wherever barbarism exists society has degenerated from its original condition; and moreover, that recovery from a savage state *never* takes place through the operation of man's natural faculties, but is invariably owing to external influence. Give to human society a *certain degree* of civilisation to start from, and it will make indefinite advances; but if allowed in any case to sink to the lowest, or to a very low, level, from that it will never rise by its own inherent and unaided resources.

"The very existence of civilised men, therefore, proves that there must have been, at some time or other, some instruction given to man in the arts of life by some being superior to man. That man could not have *made* himself is appealed to as a proof of a divine *Creator*; and that mankind could not, in the first instance, have *civilised* themselves, is a proof exactly of the same kind, and equally strong of a superhuman *Instructor*."—(P. 452.)

As to the causes of the degeneracy and decline which issue in barbarism, Dr Whately maintains that *wars* have always been the principal.

We have in this section other observations which we can merely glance at; some of them questionable, as the suggestion that the longevity of the patriarchs may have been owing to the descending virtue of the Tree of Life, and that the sacrifices

of the earliest times may have been "merely a mode of worship which men devised of themselves, and which God thought fit to approve and accept" (p. 434); and some of them excellent, as the remarks on the close connection between moral depravity and religious corruption, and on the absurdity of seeking in Scripture instruction in astronomy, geology, and other sciences.

In proceeding to treat of "The Pagan Religions," our author deals at the outset with the notion, that all mankind have, in all ages, in reality worshipped one and the same God, under different designations.

"Father of all, in every age,
In every clime, adored;
By saint, by savage, and by sage,
Jehovah, Jove, or Lord."

Dr Whately shews that the sentiment here expressed is quite inconsistent with the true character of Paganism, and the actual belief of heathen nations regarding God, inasmuch as "few, if any, of the ancient pagans ever thought of worshipping a supreme Creator at all." An elaborate discussion of the actual state of Pagan belief concerning the *immortality of the soul*, and a *future state of rewards and punishments*, leads the Archbishop to the conclusion, that there was hardly any real belief of the kind, either among philosophers or the common people, however the popular mythology might, at first sight, seem to imply it.

We must afford room for the following shrewd remark. The Pagan religions being such,

"We wonder that the Israelites should so often have fallen into idolatry, after having had the true God revealed to them. Yet the very same thing is going on almost before our eyes in Christian countries at this very day. For in all parts of Europe the most uneducated portion of the people in remote districts are found to believe in and fear various superhuman beings, which are in reality no other than the gods of their pagan forefathers,"—trolls, nixes, fairies, brownies, kelpies, and the like. "And the persons who shew them this reverence, and who seek their help, and dread to displease them, and aim at obtaining their good will, are doing exactly the same as the Israelites of old, when they worshipped Baal, and Astaroth, and other gods of the heathen."—(P. 464.)

False religion is supposed to have been introduced gradually by designing men, the use of images, &c. The learned metropolitan opines that the confusion of Babel was rather a *dissension about religious worship* than a *confusion of language*, though how such a dissension could be directly caused by God he does not explain. The curiosity is, that he does not see any difficulty of this kind attaching to his supposition.

The discussion of the religions of Paganism is brought to a close by the following weighty observations :—

“It was not even pretended that these religions rested on any evidence worth listening to. A pagan’s reasons for holding his religion is, and always was, that it had been handed down from his ancestors. They did indeed relate many miracles said to have been wrought through their gods, but almost all of these they spoke of as having been wrought among people who were already worshippers of those gods, not as having been the means of originally bringing in the religion. And all the pagan miracles were believed merely because they were a part of the religion which they had learned from their fathers. In a word, the religion did not rest on the miracles, but the miracles on the religion.

“The Christian religion was distinguished from these by its resting on evidence,—by its offering a reason, and requiring Christians to be able to give a reason, for believing it.”—(P. 466.)

Turning from the pagan religions, Dr Whately proceeds to treat of the “Mosaic Dispensation;” and in doing so he propounds, as is his wont, many sound and sensible views, along with others which, we must be allowed to say, are of a different character. With reference to the peculiar *local* requirements of the Jewish religion, he observes :—

“It is very remarkable that that religion is almost the only one that *could* have been abolished *against the will of the people themselves*, and while they were resolved firmly to maintain it. *Their* religion, and theirs only, could be, and has been, thus abolished, in spite of their firm attachment to it, on account of its being dependent on a particular *place*. The Christian religion, or, again, any of the pagan religions, could not have been abolished by any force of enemies if the persons professing the religion were sincere and resolute in keeping to it. It was not left to be a question and a matter of *opinion* whether the sacrifices instituted by Moses were to be continued or not, but things were so ordered as to put it out of man’s power to continue them.”—(P. 468.)

The Archbishop reproduces his well-known views regarding the alleged absence of allusions to a *future state* in the Old Testament Scriptures, and propounds his singular theory as to the way in which the doctrine of a future state may have been introduced among the Jews, even by debates and discussions with their Pagan neighbours! (p. 476). Then we have the favourite but pernicious dogma, that the law of the Sabbath—the Fourth Commandment—belonged exclusively to the old economy, and, consequently, has no binding force or authority under the Christian dispensation.

Indeed, we may remark generally, that Dr Whately appears to us not only to isolate unduly the Mosaic economy from the patriarchal dispensation on the one hand, and the Christian on

the other, but also to divorce and detach it from the general scheme of God's moral government, and from the administration of Christ's mediatorial kingdom.

As to the charges of ignorance and barbarism which our author brings in such unqualified terms against the Jewish people, and the crudeness and imperfection of the laws and institutions which were given them, in harmony with their low state of civilisation, we take leave to say, that they were very far from being ignorant barbarians, and that the wisest politicians, and the most advanced social reformers of the most enlightened country of modern times, might obtain many useful suggestions from the laws and institutions prescribed to the people of Israel. And surely it is quite possible to admire the divine wisdom evinced in adapting the Mosaic code to the comparatively rude and infant state of the Jewish community, without ignoring the principles of eternal rectitude which underlie, and may still be eliminated from, that economy.

After devoting some thirty quarto pages—or about one-third of the entire treatise—to the discussion of the pagan religions and the Mosaic dispensation, the learned primate comes to his proper subject of Christianity. Here his first heading is, "Introduction of the Gospel," though we cannot say that it is altogether appropriate to the subsequent discussion. And at the outset we meet with the objectionable statement, that Christianity is a *new religion*.

"The Christian religion, though sprung out of the Mosaic, of which it was the fulfilment and completion, yet it was in itself a *new religion*. It was the fruit, of which the Mosaic dispensation was the *blossom*. And it was as distinct from it, and in many respects unlike it, as a fruit compared with the blossom which precedes it and produces it."—(P. 481.)

On reading this passage we strove to believe, that nothing more was meant by "a *new religion*" than a new *dispensation*. But we were soon constrained to admit, that in the opinion of our author the religion of the New Testament and that of the Old are radically distinct and different; that the general scope of each, and many of their principles and rules, are mutually hostile and eversive, and, consequently, that Christians have little or no concern with the Old Testament as a standard of doctrine or duty. Without formally stating this as a distinct proposition, the Archbishop says not a little that clearly implies it. Thus, when speaking of the duty of worshipping God and honouring parents, he adds:

"Of course Christians are bound to practise these and all other moral duties. But this is because they are in themselves *moral*

duties, not because they are enjoined in the law of Moses, which was designed for the one people of Israel.”—(P. 469.)

Again—

“In what relates to *moral conduct* also, the precepts given under the New covenant are much less numerous and less precise than those of the Law. Not that Christians were meant to be less scrupulously careful in leading a virtuous life than the Israelites, but that they are left to regulate their conduct by the *PRINCIPLES* of the Gospel, according to the best of their own judgment, instead of having a multitude of positive precepts laid down for their guidance.”—(P. 482.)

Again—

“When the Mosaic Code was abolished, we find no other *system of rules* substituted in its room. Our Lord and his apostles laid down Christian *principles* instead ; they sought to implant Christian dispositions.”—(P. 483.)

No hint in all this of the Christian being required to “search the Scriptures” of the Old Testament (to which alone the Lord could have directly referred when he issued the requirement), in order to ascertain the will of God ; indeed, the contrary is very strongly indicated. We cannot help seeing that Dr Whately would fix a wide gulf between the two Dispensations ; that he regards them as being in truth two distinct, if not positively antagonistic, *religions*, and that in his judgment, though the Old Testament may be usually bound up in one volume with the New, to form what is termed “the Scriptures,” a Christian is not required—nay, it would seem, is not *at liberty*—to go to its pages for an authoritative exposition of his duty as a moral and accountable being. A conclusion more perilous to sound faith and right practice, or one more at variance with the teaching of our Lord and his apostles, it is impossible to imagine. We believe that not a few prevalent and pernicious errors owe their origin to this very notion, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament are not of standing authority under the Christian dispensation ; and that while it may be studied as a curious, or even a *divine*, record of a peculiar and preliminary economy, it is not to be looked upon *now* as an essential part of the word of God, or a part with which we have practically anything to do. We cannot but regard this as one of the gravest heresies of the Dissertation. But, in truth, it is nothing more than a reproduction of the author’s pet theory, broached in his “*Essays on the Writings of St Paul*,” in which he commits the strange logical blunder of confounding the *principles* with the *rules* of Christian action. The *actuating principles* of the Christian, as every one will allow, are the evangelical motives flowing from the truths and privileges of the gospel ;

but the *regulating principle* of his life, the standard of his holiness, can be nothing else than the law of God, which, whether as promulgated at Sinai, or as expounded and enforced by the Saviour, is unalterable in its nature and everlasting in its obligations.

With the above, and some other less serious inculcations, we cheerfully acknowledge the value of many of our author's remarks upon certain leading characteristics of the Christian dispensation as distinct from the Mosaic; in particular, its *spirituality*, its *universality*, and its *unity*. By the *spirituality* of the Christian Church, he means that "the new kingdom of God was to be 'not of this world,' but spiritual;" by its *universality*, that "it was to be open to *all* mankind as its proper subjects;" and by its *unity*, that "it was to admit all of them to *equal* privileges."

The conclusion of the discussion reminds one of Paley or Butler:—

"When we look back to these distinguishing points in the gospel dispensation which have been here noticed—its spirituality, universality, and unity—as well as to several other remarkable features of it, we cannot but perceive what a strong confirmation they afford of its divine origin. It was altogether the most unlikely thing to have occurred to the mind of any man, whether dreaming enthusiast or crafty impostor. And of all men, Jews were the most unlikely to have imagined anything of the kind. But it was almost equally at variance with many of the notions of the heathen also. Both parties, Jews and Gentiles, had never conceived an idea of such a thing as a religion without any literal temple, without an altar, without sacrifices, and without any sacrificing Priest on earth."—(Pp. 489, 490.)

The next chapter of the treatise is occupied with the "Establishment of Christ's Kingdom," and contains the usual combination of gold and dross, of wheat and chaff. One of the views to which we demur is, that church organisation and modes of worship are left to be arranged according to taste and circumstances. "Doubtless," says Dr Whately, "the apostles introduced from time to time (*and designed their successors to do the same*) such alterations in the functions of the several officers (of the church), and in all regulations respecting other non-essential points, as circumstances of time and place might require" (p. 491). Bearing in mind who are, in the judgment of the Archbishop, the successors of the apostles, viz., the ordinary pastors of the church, we have put the parenthesis in the above sentence in *italics*, to call attention to the proposition which it contains. The same theory is involved in the distinction, familiar to episcopal writers and their readers, which is thus stated:—

"The *doctrines* which a Christian church teaches, and is bound to teach, are to be those of the Scriptures, neither more nor less. But on the other hand, church ordinances and regulations are only required to be not *at variance* with Scripture."—(P. 502.)

We cannot admit that this extensive discretionary power is left to the church, and are of opinion that as to government and worship, we have far more express directions given in Scripture, and are much more strictly bound by them, than the Archbishop is willing to allow.

In the discussion of the indefeasible right of the church, as of every other society, to *appoint its own officers, to frame its own rules, and to admit or exclude members*, there is much which claims our cordial concurrence. We would only make a fuller reservation of the supreme authority of Scripture *over all*, which, however, while it limits the discretion of the Church as a divine institution, does not limit, but asserts and vindicates its freedom and independence as respects all external human control or interference. And we are more disposed to admire the intrepidity with which the claim of the church to the exercise of these essential prerogatives is put forth and defended, than to consider very curiously how such views can be consistently maintained in the position which Dr Whately occupies. It is eminently satisfactory to get from such a quarter a clear and well-considered statement of the doctrine of the church's independence, and a powerful argument in support of it.

We have some excellent remarks upon creeds, confessions, forms of prayer, the succession of the ministerial order, &c., as, for example, that no creed, confession, symbol, or article of faith "can claim any authority, except from its conformity to Scripture;" that no church had any right to alter the Christian faith;" that it seemed good to God "that, after the departure of the apostles, no successors to them in the apostolic office should arise. As *members*, indeed, and as *ministers and rulers* of Christian churches, they were succeeded by others, down to the present day. But as apostles of Jesus Christ, they had no successors." We are also explicitly assured that "there is no Christian minister now existing that can trace up with complete certainty his own ordination through perfectly regular steps to the times of the apostles" (p. 503). Very true; but if *contrast* is a principle of the association of ideas, no less than *resemblance*, it is not wonderful that this last emphatic assertion should have reminded us of a counter averment, and one not less emphatic, by another luminary of the English Church. "There is not," says Mr Palmer, "a bishop, priest, or deacon amongst us, who cannot, if he pleases, trace his own spiritual descent from St Peter and St Paul" (*Origines Liturgicæ*, vol. ii. p. 249). The author of the celebrated work on "Logic"

could inform Mr Palmer that the canon, "affirmanti incumbit probatio," is a standing rule in dialectics, and consequently that it belongs to Mr Palmer, and to every "bishop, priest, and deacon amongst us," to prove that he *can* "trace his own spiritual descent from St Peter and St Paul" in the only way in which it can ever be proved, viz., *by actually tracing it*. We should like to see any "bishop, priest, or deacon amongst us" seriously attempting the feat. It would be amusing to watch him floundering helplessly in the quagmires of the middle ages, through which he must force his way to reach "St Peter and St Paul." Gravely to argue against such very "foolish talking" would, of course, be utterly useless. Dr Whately gives it its due by treating it with sovereign contempt.

It is irksome and vexatious that we cannot leave any section of this able treatise without interposing some caveat, and stating some objection. We have no love for saving clauses, and if we could honestly have dispensed with them in expressing our approval, we should have been much better pleased to commend without qualification or reserve. We should hardly have taken exception to mere questionable words and phrases, such as the neuter pronoun "it" apparently applied (twice in one sentence) to the Holy Ghost; or to the employment of the term "clergy," as the precise equivalent of "elders;" or to the statement that it is "from the church that ministers (as well as church ordinances) derive all their authority;" were it not that in the case of Archbishop Whately, inaccuracies of expression usually indicate something more serious. But we must again protest against the doctrine that the Fourth Commandment is an absolute nullity, and that the obligation to observe the Christian Sabbath rests only on the low ground of the authority of the church. It is with deep regret, though of course without surprise, that we meet with such sentiments side by side with others which claim our high commendation.

When Dr Whately comes to speak of the *corruptions of Christianity*, his remarks are extremely fresh and suggestive. Adverting to the absence of a continuous *inspiration* and *infallibility* in the church, and of an unerring interpreter and guide, he observes:—

"The two volumes—that of Nature and that of Revelation—which God has opened before us for our benefit, are in this respect analogous. Both are in themselves exempt from error, but they do not confer complete exemption from all possibility of error on the student of them. As the laws of nature are in themselves invariable, but are yet imperfectly known and sometimes mistaken by natural philosophers, so the Scriptures are intrinsically infallible, but do not impart infallibility to the student of them. Even by the most learned, they are in many parts imperfectly understood; by 'the

unlearned and unstable,' they are liable to be 'wrested to their own destruction.'"—(P. 505.)

The church, and every minister and member of it, being thus fallible, error soon crept in, and has extensively prevailed. Dr Whately does not profess to give an historical account of the corruption of Christianity, but rather "a sketch of the principal *sources* from which they arose, and of the means by which, in many instances, they were encouraged and kept up" (p. 506).

At the commencement of the discussion, he lays down two general rules, to be kept in mind :

"1st. That whatever opposed Christianity at the outset, afterwards tended to mix itself up with the religion and corrupt it.

"2dly. That as far as any corruptions depended on *local* and *temporary* circumstances, so far they would be likely soon to die away, without spreading widely; but so far as they were connected with *human nature*, we may expect to find them appearing again and again in various countries."—(P. 506.)

Under the first canon, our author shews that "the chief opposition to the gospel arose from (1.) Judaism ; (2.) Paganism ; (3.) Heathen Philosophy ; (4.) Immorality of Character ; and (5.) Worldly Policy ;" and that all these, gradually mingling with Christianity, "introduced *into* the religion the same kind of errors and wrong principles as had originally been openly arrayed against it."

The second general rule or canon above quoted, affords scope for very extensive and interesting illustration. It is remarked that religious errors "are different in their *outward form* according to the peculiar circumstances of each time and place : but that in substance and at bottom they are nearly alike, always and everywhere."

Taking the five sources of error formerly enumerated, Dr Whately observes, that the introduction of the Jewish and Pagan notions as to different grades of worshippers violated the UNITY (oneness) of Christianity as respects religious privileges, and that this notion of superior and inferior ranks of Christians has often reappeared in succeeding ages. As another illustration, our author instances the introduction into Christianity of sacerdotal priests, altars, services and temples, "so utterly repugnant to the whole character of the gospel." This error, though derived originally *in form* from Judaism and Paganism, has its real source in the tendencies of depraved human nature. And here the remarks of the Archbishop are peculiarly valuable. Every sound protestant must be gratified and refreshed by the vigorous and hearty denunciation of the dogma of a Christian priesthood which comes with such good will and effect from this high ecclesiastical dignitary ; and by his emphatic declaration,

that "the only priest in *our* religion in that sense"—the ancient and proper sense of the word as equivalent to *ἱερεύς*, a sacrificing minister, not to *πρεσβύτερος*, an elder—"is Jesus Christ himself, to whom consequently, and to whom alone, under the gospel the title is applied by the inspired writer" (p. 511). "The very institution," it is added, "which Christianity in its pure state had abrogated was engrafted into it as it became corrupted with human devices. An order of priests in the ancient sense, offering pretended sacrifices, on a pretended altar, on behalf of the people, was introduced into the Christian scheme, in such utter contradiction both to the spirit and the very letter of it, that they were driven to declare the bread and wine of the Eucharist miraculously changed into flesh and blood offered up day by day repeatedly, although the founders of our religion had not only proclaimed the perfection of the one oblation of our Lord by himself, but had even proved the imperfection of the Levitical sacrifices, from the very circumstance of their being repeated 'year by year continually'" (p. 512).

Dr Whately adds with great truth and force: "Whoever will minutely examine the errors of our unreformed church"—i.e. the church before the Reformation—"will find that a very large and important portion of them may be comprehended under this one general censure, that they destroyed the true character of the Christian priesthood, substituting for it, in great measure, what cannot be called a priesthood except in a different sense of the word. These errors, in short, go far towards changing the office of *Presbyteros* into that of *Hiereus*" (p. 513).

Here and there, as usual, among many admirable statements which claim our cordial concurrence and warm approval, there are others which we cannot but regard with different feelings. Such is the exception taken to the application of the term "evangelical" to some professing Christians, in contradistinction to others, as if etymology could of itself secure that all who receive the gospel must necessarily be equally *evangelical*,—the notion of the dangerous tendency of "looking upon the Bible as *one book*," as being fitted to foster Jewish views and prejudices, whereas, we are persuaded, as we have already remarked, that evil is far more likely to arise from regarding the Bible as *two books*, the one being of supreme authority to Christians, and the other of no authority at all,—the assertion that Baptism is an admission to a participation in the gifts of the Spirit, which constitute the church the temple of the Holy Ghost; that "we are authorised by virtue of this sacred rite to appear as it were in his (God's) presence ourselves,"—and the observation that, in the Lord's supper, by the body and blood of Christ is meant "his Spirit,"—from these and, perhaps, from

some other statements, we have the irksome but imperative duty of expressing our dissent.

As was to be expected from Archbishop Whately, we have some valuable remarks on the errors and corruptions which have often flowed from the introduction of *philosophical speculations* into Christianity. All honour to him for his strenuous advocacy of a constant deference to the teaching of Scripture, and his earnest cautions against presumptuous speculations upon topics lying beyond the range of human faculties, and where no clear light has been afforded by revelation. But it appears to us that our author unduly restricts the operations of reason in dealing with what revelation *has* unfolded, and attempts to shut it out from a wide field, over which it *will* infallibly expatiate, and within which it *may* find legitimate scope. He will not allow *any* theory or philosophical system of religion to be framed, whether true or false, or rather, he concludes that every such theory *must* be false simply because it is a theory. We have little room for quotation, but a sentence or two will give the gist of his views.

"It is not that the Arian theory of the incarnation is wrong for *this* reason, and the Nestorian for *that*, and the Eutychian for *another*, and so on; but they are all wrong alike, because they *are theories*, relative to matters on which it is vain, and absurd, and irreverent to attempt forming *any* philosophical theories whatever. We would object to the Pelagian theory, and to the Calvinistic theory, and the Arminian theory, not for reasons *peculiar* to each one, but for such as apply in common to all."—(P. 517.)

Now we confess that we should not very strenuously object to any one of these systems or theories if we had no better reason for objecting than that it *is* a system or theory. The important question with us would be, not, "Is it a theory?" but, "Is it a *true* theory?" Indeed, we cannot prevent reason from dealing with such themes and building up a system, more or less symmetrical, of what it deems theological truths. And we hold that this is quite consistent with the sound determination to appeal constantly and submissively "to the law and the testimony," and with the strongest sense of the danger of reckless and unbridled speculation when permitted without restraint to run riot among the mysteries of the divine nature, or our own spiritual being and our relation to God. We cannot but feel that, to exclude reason from the province which we have indicated, would be unnecessarily and injuriously to fret and fetter this active faculty, where it might with safety and advantage be allowed freer action and wider scope.

Nor can we admit the validity of Dr Whately's argument, that such philosophical or systematic exhibitions of Christianity would not have been a *stumbling-block* to the Jews or foolish-

ness to the Greeks, and therefore cannot be the gospel which Paul preached. It was not in the *form*, but in the *substance* and *subject* of the preaching, viz., Christ *crucified*, that the offensiveness and the foolishness of the doctrine lay. Nor do we see any force whatever in "the reason for condemning" these "metaphysical theories of Christianity," and "*all of them equally*," that "if such speculations be allowed, it is evident Christianity must be, not one, but *two* religions, that for the few profound theologians, and that for ordinary men" (p. 519). Certainly the conclusion which is so "evident" to the Archbishop is by no means so to us.

The practical character of Dr Whately's mind is well exemplified in his remarks on the errors which have been introduced and fostered by "*moral corruption*" in the members of Christian churches." How weighty is the following general observation upon this subject :—

"Every kind of depravity or moral defect predisposes man either to reject Christianity altogether, or else to introduce, or to accept, some erroneous views of it. And there is no kind of religious corruption against which men are usually less on their guard."—(P. 520.)

Among the errors which have thus been introduced or cherished, he specifies "the notion that the priest has power to forgive sins as against God,"—the doctrine of atoning virtue and meritorious efficacy of "fasting and other penances, pilgrimages, prayers and sacrifices offered up in behalf of the deceased, and rich gifts bestowed on the church,"—the idea that the receiving the Lord's Supper, or the rite of extreme unction, on his deathbed, will promote or secure the salvation of a wicked man,—and the delusions of *antinomianism* in all its phases.

Dr Whately concludes this section with some admirable observations on the effect of *worldly policy* in promoting religious errors, by the introduction of ungodly men into the ministry, the use of religion as an engine of statecraft by worldly-minded rulers, and the employment of *persecution* for their own selfish ends, and to the grievous injury of true Christianity.

The next subject is that of "Reformations in Religion," and is treated with great ability. Our author does not, indeed, notice historically the various attempts—successful or otherwise—which were made in different ages of the church to check growing abuses, and remedy those already prevailing. He deals with the two following points :—

"I. The principal hindrances to needful reformations.

"II. The faults to which reformers are chiefly liable."

Under the former he observes :—

"There are *three* mistakes frequently committed by Christians, each of which has contributed to prevent successful opposition to corruptions and correction of them :—

"(1.) Some have attached too much importance to *matters not essential*, and have contended too earnestly for them."

Of this we have examples in the old controversies regarding Easter, and with reference to the use of leavened or unleavened bread in the Lord's Supper, and in the modern disputes as to the colour of a preacher's dress.

"(2.) Others—and sometimes, indeed, the very same persons—have acquiesced in very serious corruptions through a mistaken anxiety for what they consider *Christian unity* or concord."

This is a very common error, and all the more injurious that it is often the error of good men, and one which seems to "lean to virtue's side." To avoid it there is required a clear perception, not only of what is right and true, but also of what is essential; so essential or so important as to demand that it should be maintained and contended for at all hazards and at every cost; and at the same time there is required the high principle which constrains faithful men to hold fast the true and practise the right without regard to consequences.

"(3.) A third cause, tending to the same effects, is a *mistaken dread of innovations*. Those who are upon their guard *only* against sudden corruptions, and overlook such as creep in silently and gradually, will be disposed to resist as innovations what are, in truth, *restorations*, and to maintain what are, in reality, *very great and mischievous innovations*."

The removal of this latter class of corruptions, viz., those which were introduced slowly, silently, and step by step, has often been regarded with alarm, and strenuously resisted as reckless *innovation*, whereas it is in reality *restoration* to primitive order, *the corruption*, and not *its removal*, being the true innovation. The concluding sentence of this interesting discussion is extremely valuable, as enunciating, without qualification or reserve, the supremacy and exclusive authority of the word of God,—a principle, the fearless and faithful application of which will furnish the only effectual safeguard for the prevention, and the only unfailing remedy for the cure, of corruption.

"If we would keep our religion pure, both from new and from old corruptions, we must go straight to the very fountain head itself, and observe what is or what is not agreeable to the inspired word."
—(P. 530.)

By the operation of the influences above referred to, errors and abuses were allowed to accumulate till a thorough reformation, or as Dr Whately thinks it should be called, a *restoration*, become necessary. Employing one of his homely but admirable illustrations, he observes—

"It is like the pulling down and *rebuilding* of a great part of a
VOL. XII.—NO. XLVI

house, as distinguished from the many small *repairs* which are made every year by a prudent man, and the occasional small improvements he may see need for. These repairs and improvements he makes on purpose that he may be saved from the far greater cost and inconvenience of rebuilding, which is an evil in itself, though a necessary evil when timely repairs have been neglected."—(P. 530.)

The chief dangers which beset reformers are stated by Dr Whately to be these two :—

"1. An overweening security against falling into the faults of the system they are reforming.

"2. Not being sufficiently on their guard against reactions, or the tendency to rush to the opposite extreme, and mistake 'the reverse of wrong for right.'"

We are by no means satisfied that this very short list comprises *all* the dangers to which reformers of religion are liable. We believe, for example, that they are not exempt from the risk of yielding to secular influence, and stopping short, or going astray at the instigation of civil rulers in the work of reformation. Dr Whately congratulates the church to which he belongs, that the English reformers escaped the temptation of going too far in abolishing the prevailing practices of the Church of Rome. The most reverend prelate will excuse us if we congratulate some other churches on the circumstance that *their* reformers went a good deal farther in this direction ; and the Archbishop knows that *here* the most eminent of the English reformers would have joined their congratulations with ours. He blames those who strove to be "as unlike as possible to the church from which they revolted, even in matters indifferent, altering for the sake of change. They ought to have considered that the presumption is always against a change" (p. 536). Our view is, that in such cases the presumption is always against *what is not prescribed in Scripture*, and that infinitely more evil has resulted from undue conformity to religious and ecclesiastical usages which have no authority in the word of God, than from a rigorous and unsparing rejection of them.

The last of the leading topics treated of in the Dissertation is that of "Church Allegiance and Separation." And so bold and wise are many of the remarks in this chapter, so full of plain, yet profound good sense, that we regret we cannot transfer them entire to our pages.

The author discusses the legitimate grounds of separation, viz., the refusal to correct abuses of a grave and flagrant kind ; the tyrannical enforcement of unnecessary and indifferent observances, and such like ; and points out the general duty of allegiance to church authority, and the sin of separation, except for good and scriptural reasons ; the tendency of the ideas of *distinctness* and *disagreement* to become, in some

measure, blended together in men's minds, so that "churches which are *independent* are expected to be at *variance*;" the danger of *necessary* separations leading to separations which are *not* necessary; then, on the other hand, the tendency of an abhorrence of such divisions to lead some Christians to merge Church and State into one polity, of which the supreme control is assigned to the civil magistrate; and thus instead of Christianising the State as they hoped and intended, they only succeed in secularising the Church.

As to the circumstances in which separation is, or is not, schism, when it is a sin, and when it becomes a duty, every man must be left at liberty, and is bound to judge for himself.

After making some other observations which bear the stamp of his wonted sagacity of judgment and liberality of sentiment, Dr Whately concludes the Dissertation in the following weighty and characteristic words:—

"A true Christian is most emphatically and pre-eminently public spirited. 'NONE OF US,' says the apostle Paul, 'LIVETH TO HIMSELF' (Rom. xiv. 7). And he who is the most sedulously occupied in working out, on gospel principles, his own salvation, will always be found the most devotedly active in promoting the welfare of his brethren."—(P. 545).

We have endeavoured to present as full and correct a view of this remarkable treatise as our limits will permit. We have found many things to animadvert upon, and some which we cannot but regard as grave and serious errors. We have not, we think, querulously sought for grounds of censure; and when compelled to express dissent, we trust that it has been done in no disrespectful terms, and in no peevish or captious spirit. In this, as in some of our author's other productions, we have found it impossible to be long angry with him at once, and equally impossible to be *very* long perfectly pleased with him. Ever and anon we are delighted by the dauntless and manly enunciation of some fresh and important truth; and then in the next, or perhaps in the same page, we are fretted and annoyed by some extremely doubtful or objectionable sentiment. In truth, this distinguished divine is a strange compound of incongruities. The writer of one of our best treatises on logic, he has proved himself, in several instances, one of the most illogical of reasoners. A metropolitan, a bishop of bishops, he has dealt as heavy blows, and given as great discouragement to the cause of prelaacy as the sternest of Presbyterians, not even excepting that *Episcopo-matrix*, Andrew Melville himself. And while regaling us with high professions of liberality, and unsparingly denouncing persecution in all its forms, we cannot forget—we wish that we could—the incident of the deprivation of one of his clergy, a venerable curate, whose sole offence it was that he

had joined and would not abjure the Evangelical Alliance. And to crown the list, while espousing the old Arminian hypothesis of election, and assigning a place to good works which no Pelagian would dispute, and waging on all occasions righteous and relentless war against antinomianism, he has, apparently without being aware of it, fallen upon the hyper-Calvinistic antinomian notions of the law, which were advocated by Dr Crisp in last century, discarding as a rule of Christian life the ten commandments, praying every Lord's day that his "heart may be inclined to keep this law," and yet, like Moses in his virtuous indignation, flinging away both tables and dashing them to pieces. And yet, with all these inconsistencies, there is such transparent honesty of purpose, and such unflinching courage in expressing his views, combined with so much kindness and moderation of tone, that we cannot help regarding the author with high respect and esteem, even when dissenting most emphatically from his sentiments. Looking at this treatise as a whole, though we must in conscience interpose some grave cautions concerning it, marking off certain portions as "doubtful," and others as "dangerous;" yet we do not hesitate to say that it is a singularly suggestive production, giving free and fresh expression to many noble sentiments, and imbued throughout with a profound reverence for the revealed truths of the gospel. And with all our dislike of some of the archbishop's opinions, we cherish the utmost respect for many of his high qualities as a writer: his honesty, his fearlessness, his candour; his remarkable freedom from prejudice and passion; his earnestness; his manly contempt of varnish and pretence of every kind; his love of truth and goodness wherever he finds them; his keen observation of human nature and character and life; his shrewdness and sagacity, and admirable good sense; and the ease and ability with which he wields his abundant materials, the result of the reading and reflection of a lifetime. Indeed, able as the present treatise is, we confess that we think more highly of the author than of his performance. In other words, such is our estimate of Dr Whately's powers, that we are persuaded he could have written a better Dissertation than this. We are confident that out of his ample stores he could easily sit down, even now, and compose another treatise on the same subject, giving to it a distinct and separate treatment, and that the second would perhaps be the better of the two; more consecutive it may be; more compact; more historical; perchance more interesting; by possibility more orthodox. But, taking the Dissertation as it is, we feel unfeignedly grateful to Dr Whately for the pleasure and instruction which it has afforded us.

ART. VI.—*Date of the Books of Chronicles.**

THE historical books of the Old Testament may be variously numbered and classified. It might, in fact, even be made a question, which books are properly so designated. The denomination historical, as distinguished from the legal, poetical, and prophetical books, describes them not absolutely, but as to their prevailing character. Thus Chronicles contains poetical passages, prophecies, and ceremonial enactments; yet, as these are merely incidental and occasional, and do not constitute the main body of the work, it is properly classed among the historical books. So, too, Jeremiah and Isaiah are prophetical books, notwithstanding the occurrence of historical paragraphs, and even chapters. The mixed character of a book might, however, in certain cases, be such as to create a doubt to which of its constituents the greater prominence should be accorded. Thus some have thought that the books of Jonah and of Job should be regarded as historical, since the former is rather the narrative of a prophetical mission than a proper prophecy, and the latter is substantially a history, though in poetic form. But when we consider that the mission of Jonah, turning his back on Israel to preach to Gentiles, who heard his word and were saved, was itself a prophecy of the future, and that the facts in the life of Job only form the groundwork of a sacred poem wrought in the very highest style of Hebrew art, the ordinary classification of these books is justified.

Restricting our consideration, then, to those books which are usually and properly denominated historical (and excluding the books of Moses), we have the following twelve, viz.,

Joshua,	2 Samuel,	2 Chronicles,
Judges,	1 Kings,	Ezra,
Ruth,	2 Kings,	Nehemiah,
1 Samuel,	1 Chronicles,	Esther.

In the ancient catalogues of the canon, the two books of Samuel are commonly combined into one, so the two of Kings, and the two of Chronicles; the number is thus reduced to nine. Some of these catalogues make a still further reduction to seven, by reckoning Ruth an appendix to Judges, or a part of it, and Nehemiah as forming one book with Ezra.

Adopting, however, the more familiar number twelve, we may divide these books into two equal classes in respect to the official character of their writers. They are in our English Bibles, which follow in this the order of the Septuagint and the

* From the *Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review*, edited by CHARLES HODGE, D.D., for July 1863.

Vulgate, arranged together in chronological succession. In the Hebrew Bible, on the contrary, they are parcelled between two of the leading divisions of the canon, the Prophets, and the Hagiographa. Six books are classed as Former Prophets, to denote that, though of an historical character, they were written by prophets. These are,

Joshua,	1 Samuel,	1 Kings,
Judges,	2 Samuel,	2 Kings

The remaining six are found in the Hagiographa, or that portion of the Old Testament which was written by men who, though inspired of God, were not prophets in the strict and official sense. We have, therefore, the authority of tradition, so far as that is expressed in the Hebrew arrangement of the canon, for believing this to have been the case with

Ruth,	Ezra,	1 Chronicles,
Esther,	Nehemiah,	2 Chronicles.

Dr Addison Alexander was in the habit of combining the books of Moses with the twelve historical books, and then dividing the whole after the analogy of the former into three pentateuchs. This ingenious and convenient distribution can be best exhibited in his own words, here quoted from one of his manuscript lectures :—

“Of these seventeen books, two are not so much continuations of those earlier in date, as parallel, collateral, and supplementary. These are the books of Chronicles, excluding or postponing which we come to a residuum or minimum of fifteen books, composing a continuous unbroken series. As an aid to the memory, these fifteen books may be grouped or classified in three pentateuchs, or groups of five, each containing one great division of the history. The first, that which usually bears the name of Pentateuch, comprises the whole history from the creation to the death of Moses. The second, which includes the books of Joshua, Judges, Ruth, and 1 and 2 Samuel, carries on the narrative until the close of David’s reign. The third, composed of 1 and 2 Kings, Ezra, Nehemiah, and Esther, brings it down to the close of the Old Testament canon, after which we are dependent upon uninspired but authentic writings, till we reach the threshold of the gospel history. Each of these pentateuchs contains one book, which although necessary to complete the series, is rather of an episodical character. Such a book, in the first Pentateuch, is Leviticus, containing very few events, and chiefly occupied with legislation; in the second, that of Ruth, belonging strictly to the history of David’s family; in the third, that of Esther, which relates to a remarkable deliverance of the Jews in Persia.”

Another simple and serviceable division of these books may be obtained by reducing the number from twelve to nine, in the

manner already described as current in the ancient church and synagogue. They will then consist of three groups of three, representing the three great periods of the history, the shorter periods being covered by the single books, and the second and longest, by the three double books. This yields the following scheme :—

Joshua,	Samuel,	Ezra,
Judges,	Kings,	Nehemiah,
Ruth,	Chronicles,	Esther.

The first three relate to the period of the Hebrew commonwealth, or of the pure theocracy under Joshua and the Judges; the next three contain the history of the monarchy, its institution by Samuel, with Saul as the first king; its culmination and splendour under David and Solomon, and finally its decline and overthrow. The last three belong to the period subsequent to the captivity, which was one of foreign domination. In each of these groups the first two members cover the entire period to which they relate; the third being supplementary, and recording additional facts, which did not fall strictly within the scope of the preceding. Thus, Ruth belongs to the period of the book of Judges, Chronicles passes afresh over that of Samuel and Kings, while the events recorded in Esther belong to the time included within the book of Ezra.

A characteristic common to all these books, with the exception of Nehemiah (ch. i. 1), is, that they are anonymous. This is the more remarkable from the contrast with the books of the prophets, every one of which has a title prefixed, declaring the name of the author. The same fact recurs again in the Gospels and Acts of the New Testament, as contrasted with the Epistles and Revelation. The names of the writers are prefixed to the latter, with the exception of the Epistle to the Hebrews, where it is easy to conjecture a special reason for the omission. The former are without titles, so far as their proper text is concerned, though a steadfast and well-accredited tradition has preserved to us the knowledge of their authors.

The reason of this singular difference is doubtless to be sought in the nature of the case. The personality of the prophet was of the utmost importance. He claims to be a messenger sent from God, and the only voucher of the truth and authority of his declarations and injunctions is the certainty of his divine commission. An anonymous book of prophecy would, therefore, be without the requisite necessary to establish its own validity. The credit of the historian, on the other hand, rests less upon the weight attached to his own person, than upon the general recognition of the truth of his testimony by those amongst whom he lived, and who were equally cognisant of the facts with himself, or had access to the same sources of infor-

mation. That these books were, upon their original publication, accepted as a true history, and that they have always been so regarded since that time, sufficiently entitles them to our confidence in their veracity and accuracy.

This impersonality of the sacred history is the cause of another phenomena equally pervading. The events recorded are viewed in their purely objective character; the personal relations of the writer sink completely out of sight. Accordingly, the inspired historians speak of transactions in which they took part themselves, precisely as if they were narrating the acts or the experience of others. They use the third person of themselves; they detail with the same artless simplicity things worthy of praise and of censure. Thus the author of the Pentateuch speaks of Moses just as he does of Joshua or any other of his contemporaries, and neither shrinks from saying, on the one hand, that he was meek above all men on the face of the earth, nor, on the other, from detailing how he spoke unadvisedly with his lips, and incurred the sentence of exclusion from the promised land. It is different with the prophets. In delivering their messages from God, they are not mere disinterested reporters, but are fulfilling their personal commission. It hence becomes of moment, not only that the message is correctly given, but that it is given by him who was specially entrusted with it. Accordingly, we find that Daniel, Isaiah, and other prophets, in the historical chapters or sections of their books, speak of themselves in the third person, after the manner of historians, while in the properly prophetic chapters the first person is as regularly employed. The principal exception to the above remark is found in Ezra (vii. 28, viii. 1, &c.), and Nehemiah, who betray themselves by the use of the first person, as Luke does occasionally in the Acts of the Apostles.

In the absence of any express testimony concerning the date and authorship of the several historical books of the Old Testament, we are left to such incidental evidence as we are able to gather, chiefly from internal sources. This sort of evidence, however, if sufficiently clear and unambiguous, is always held to be the most satisfactory and convincing. It has this peculiar advantage, that it is not testimony delivered of set purpose to establish a particular end, but it is involuntarily given, in allusions and expressions, by which a writer betrays, without intending it, the circumstances and the time in which he lived. It is thus lifted above all suspicion of intentional fraud or deception.

In the application of these internal criteria, it becomes necessary, first, to fix the limits and determine the constitution of each work separately. Are the twelve historical books so many distinct works, each of which is capable of being, and

must be, investigated by itself? Opinions here have been far from accordant, and yet it is manifest that an error at this point would vitiate the most carefully formed conclusions. If the opinion expressed by Bertheau* were correct, that all the books from Genesis to 2 Kings compose together one continuous and connected treatise, the theme of which was the sacred history from the beginning of the world to the Babylonish exile, of course our judgment respecting the date of the earlier portions of the canon would be materially different from that which would otherwise be entertained. Now, it is a fact that the histories of the Old Testament are consecutive for the most part, one taking up the argument where its predecessor ends. Several of the books are, besides, linked in a formal manner at the beginning with the close of the one before them, thus shewing that in the intention of their authors they are to be regarded in the light of sequels or continuations. Thus the Pentateuch ends with the death of Moses; the book of Joshua connects itself directly with this by beginning, "Now, after the death of Moses, the servant of the Lord, it came to pass," &c. This book ends with the death of Joshua, whereupon Judges begins, "Now, after the death of Joshua, it came to pass," &c.; and then, after a few preliminary statements necessary to a correct appreciation of what follows, it, as it were, begins afresh, and makes its connection with the book of Joshua still more intimate and apparent by repeating, ii. 6-9, the verses which conclude the life of Joshua (Josh. xxiv. 28-31), and attaching the following history to them. So Samuel begins where Judges leaves off, and Kings takes up the closing days of David, where Samuel drops them. It may be observed further that the historical books commonly begin with the conjunction *and*, for which our translators have substituted the word *now*. This simple connective serves to intimate that the book so beginning is not a beginning *de novo*, but a resumption of a theme which had previously been treated elsewhere—a continuation of the same inspired record with the books which go before. This is the case even with Ruth and Esther, which do not directly continue the narrative of any preceding book, but nevertheless exhibit the initial and expressive "*and*," thereby declaring themselves to be additions to the inspired history previously put on record.

A certain measure of formal and external unity is thus given to the entire Old Testament history, which is rendered yet more striking and impressive by the inner spiritual unity which likewise pervades it. The same great ideas animate the whole; the work of preparation for the coming of the Son of

* Das Buch Der Richter und Rut, Erklärt, p. 27.

God and the Son of man rolls steadily forward, one divine plan developing in majestic grandeur from first to last. And the spirit of the historians is one throughout. We everywhere meet the same lofty appreciation of the task of Israel, the same abasing of the human and exaltation of the divine, the same theocratic character estimating everything, not from a merely national or worldly point of view, but from its bearing on the kingdom of God.

All this is most interesting to note, as shewing the oneness of its divine subject and its divine author. But a further examination will soon shew that this is a unity in the midst of diversity. It is the work of one overruling and directing Spirit, but wrought by a number of human agents. These various works, though fitted thus together, are yet palpably distinct, as shewn by the completeness of each taken singly in its theme and in its execution, and by the diversity of plan prevailing in each. It would require an analysis of each of these books, and an investigation of its plan and structure, to exhibit this in detail. This cannot of course be attempted here. It is sufficient for the purpose of this article to remark that 1st and 2d Chronicles are not two separate and independent works, but form together one production. This is shewn by their unity of plan and the close connection of the parts, and from the incompleteness of either if sundered from the other. It is further certified by the express testimony of tradition. These two books, like the two of Samuel and the two of Kings, were anciently reckoned one. They were so regarded and spoken of by the Jews; they are so in Hebrew manuscripts. The division was introduced by the Septuagint translators, but was never recognised in the original text until the time of Bomberg, when it was admitted into printed editions of the Hebrew Bible; and here its modern character still appears, in the circumstance that the masoretic notes occurring at the end of every book are not found at the end of 1st, but only of 2d Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles.

It may be further remarked that Chronicles forms a complete work, and is not merely the earlier portion of an historical treatise, of which Ezra is to be regarded as the later and concluding portion. The apocryphal 1 Esdras combines them, as though they were one continuous production, and the identity of the closing verses of Chronicles with the opening verses of Ezra has been thought to indicate that they were originally one, but have been divided in the same way that the two books of Chronicles themselves were divided. But whatever may be the significance of the facts just referred to, they cannot establish the original oneness of Chronicles and Ezra. There is no ancient testimony in its favour; and they are so distinct in

plan and method, that they must have been independent works.

It has been intimated that the constitution of these various works must be inquired into, as well as their individual extent, as preliminary to a settlement of their date from internal criteria. Are they, as they now stand, the productions each of a single author, so that all its parts date from the same period? or are they to be in each case parcelled among a variety of authors belonging to different ages? A book constituted as the Psalms, for example, must not be dealt with as though it were the production of a single writer. The clearest proof that any given number of the Psalms were prepared by David would not establish his authorship of the rest, nor the collection of the whole by him. Or, if the hypothesis could be established of the successive compilation of certain books, as some have argued for it in the case of Kings, supposing that different prophets, Isaiah among the rest, wrote portions of it, bringing the narrative down, step by step, until at length it was completed; this would also preclude the possibility of arguing with any confidence from criteria found in one part to the date of any other part or section. Each distinct portion must then be settled, if it can be settled at all, by its own distinct evidence. Or again, if a work be not so much an original production as a compilation from works previously existing, there will be need of caution in distinguishing what belongs to the author of the work before us, from what belongs purely to those writers from whom his materials are drawn, or his extracts are made. Thus, for example, where it is said by the writer of the book of Joshua that the stones set upon the bed of Jordan are there *unto this day*, Josh. iv. 9, and that Rahab dwelleth in Israel *unto this day*, Josh. vi. 25, we are warranted in inferring that when that book was written those stones were still there, and that Rahab was still living; for Joshua is demonstrably one continuous production of a single writer. But it could not be similarly inferred from 2 Chron. v. 9, that Chronicles was written while the ark was still in the most holy place, and consequently the temple was still standing, for this work is professedly compiled from pre-existing writings, whose language it here simply transfers. The work from which that extract was made was written while the facts were as it describes; but things had changed before Chronicles itself was prepared. If now the question were as to the sources of Chronicles, and what could be learned respecting their character and date, everything should be carefully collated which could be shewn to belong to them in their original form, and to have been simply extracted without material alteration. As, however, our present question concerns not them, but Chronicles itself,

we must draw our inferences from what betrays the author of this production in its present form. The principal criteria which can be relied upon for this purpose are the following, viz. :—

1. The furthest limit to which the history is continued. Of course the book is subsequent to the latest event which it records ; this is the edict of Cyrus, in the first year of his reign, for the restoration of the Jews from captivity. 2 Chron. xxxvi. 22, 23.

2. The limit of the genealogies. The line of David (Chron. iii.) is, on account of the special interest attaching to it, continued to a further point than any of the others ; the probability is that the writer brings it down to his own time. In vers. 19-21 he mentions Zerubbabel, who came up (Ezra ii. 2) with the first colony of returning captives, gives the names of his children, and of the children of Hananiah, and of his sons, the grandchildren consequently of Zerubbabel. The latter part of verse 21 is obscure ; after mentioning the names of Zerubbabel's grandchildren, these words follow : " The sons of Rephaiah, the sons of Arnan, the sons of Obadiah, the sons of Shechaniah," and then the descendants of the last named Shechaniah are traced through four generations. Who this Shechaniah and the other persons named with him are, is not said. Some are disposed to give the verse up as unintelligible, and think it an interpolation, or hopelessly corrupt. Others, with the view of bringing down the composition of Chronicles to the latest possible period, make Shechaniah, without a particle of justification from the text of the passage, to be a son of Zerubbabel's grandson previously named, and then claim that we have here the descendants of Zerubbabel traced to the seventh generation, and, consequently, Chronicles cannot have been written until the seventh generation after the return from exile. This conclusion is utterly unwarranted, however. The fact of the case appears to be, that the names introduced at the close of verse 21, without explanation, are the names of other prominent and well-known families connected with the line of David's descendants, parallel to, but not descended from, the family of Zerubbabel. As we cannot identify the heads of these families, and have no means of ascertaining precisely when they lived, they can afford us no criterion of date, unless, as has been suspected, though it cannot be rigorously proved, the Hattush, verse 22, is the same with the Hattush mentioned Ezra viii. 2, as having gone up with Ezra from the captivity in the reign of Artaxerxes I. (Longimanus), seventy-eight years after the return of the first colony. In that case, the genealogy there continued to the grandsons of a brother of Hattush, brings us down to the grandsons of a

contemporary of Ezra, a record which could readily be made in the lifetime of Ezra.

3. A criterion of doubtful weight has been sought in the list of names, 1 Chron. ix. 17, 18, and the statement there made respecting them. Certain persons are mentioned as porters, of whom it is said that they “*hitherto* (הֵנָּה עַד, *until this time*), waited in the king’s gate eastward.” Some of these same names reappear, Neh. xii. 25, 26, as porters keeping ward at the threshold of the gates in the days of Nehemiah and Ezra. The only question is, whether the identity of names in two or three instances is sufficient to establish the identity of persons: if so, the time of the writer is fixed contemporary with Ezra and Nehemiah.

4. The mention made of *Darics*, 1 Chron. xxix. 7, (“*drams*,” Eng. ver.) also points in the same direction. The “*daric*,” as is well known, was a Persian coin, and the mention of it in this passage shews that it must have been well known to the Jews at this time, and current among them. They must consequently have been under the Persian government at the time this book was written. This positively refutes the idea that it was written after the Persian empire had been overthrown by Alexander, and the Greek empire had usurped its place, or later still, in the time of the Maccabees, because then Greek coins had been substituted for the Persian, as appears not only from the nature of the case, but from the Apocryphal books which belong to this period, Tobit v. 15, and 2 Macc. xii. 43, where the reckoning is in Greek *drachmas*.

The attempt has been made to convert the mention of this coin to a directly opposite use, and infer from it a date long posterior to the time of Ezra, for the following reasons, viz. :—

(1.) The word occurs in the enumeration of the sums contributed during the life of David for the building of the temple. This, it is said, betrays gross ignorance on the part of the writer, that he should have supposed this coin to have been in circulation in David’s days; such a blunder could only have been possible when the origin of the coin was no longer known. But, admitting that this was the meaning of the writer, the force of the argument is not very apparent. How is such a blunder impossible in the days of Ezra, and yet possible a few generations after? It might prove the writer an ignoramus, but surely does not prove when he lived. It is, however, perfectly gratuitous to fasten such a blunder on the writer. He mentions “ten thousand darics” not as the denomination of coin in which these sums were contributed in David’s days, but as the gross amount. It was the coin current at the time of the writer, and the amount so stated would be better apprehended by his readers. It is as if an Ameri-

can writer, in giving the amount of the national debt of Great Britain, should reckon it in dollars : it surely would be no fair inference from this, that he was not aware that the British currency was not dollars, but pounds sterling. He merely states a foreign sum in a familiar currency.

(2.) It is said that the "daric" derives its name from Darius Hystaspis, and that some time must have elapsed before it could have found circulation in Judea. Admitting this statement, however, it does not prove the purpose for which it is alleged. Darius Hystaspis ascended the throne of Persia sixty-three years before Ezra came with the band of colonists that he brought up from captivity. The coin had, undoubtedly, circulated by that time into all parts of the empire. It has been admitted that the "daric" derived its name from Darius Hystaspis, because that is the opinion of Grote, Böckh, and other able antiquaries, and it is of no material consequence to us to dispute it. It ought to be added, however, that some eminent scholars, *e.g.*, Prideaux, Keil, Hengstenberg, and others, are not disposed to make that admission, and it does seem, upon an examination of the case, as though it rested upon a very slender foundation. The only direct testimony to the point is that of Hesychius, the Alexandrian grammarian and lexicographer, who lived probably as late as the end of the fourth century after Christ. He says, "Darics were so called, *as some say*, from Darius, king of the Persians." A passage in Herodotus is also appealed to, in which he speaks of Darius Hystaspis introducing a new and pure coinage, but without saying that darics were first coined by him, or derived their name from him. On the other hand, Suidas, Harpocration, and a scholiast upon Aristophanes, unite in saying that the darics were so named, not from Darius Hystaspis, but from an older Darius. Xenophon also, in more than one passage, speaks of "darics" in the time of Cyrus, of course before the time of Hystaspis. Consequently, the scholars above referred to are of opinion that the "darics" either received their name from Darius, the uncle and predecessor of Cyrus, spoken of in Dan. ix. 1, xi. 1, as Darius the Mede, or else that *Darius*, which is the Persian word for *king*, was a general title of the Persian monarchs, and that *daric* consequently means simply the *royal coin*, and is not derived from the name of any particular monarch, so that the origin of it must be left undetermined. Whatever view be taken of this question, however, our conclusion from the occurrence of the word remains undisturbed : a book in which money is reckoned by "darics" must have been written during the time that the Jews were under the Persian rule ; and the Persian empire was overturned within a century after the time of Ezra and Nehemiah.

5. Another word occurs twice in this same chapter, which affords another probable argument of date, viz., *בִּירָה* 1 Chron. xxix. 1, 19, as applied to the temple. This is the word constantly applied in Esther, Daniel, and Nehemiah, to the castle or fortified palace of the Persian monarchs in their capital city Shusan. Nehemiah, in two instances, (ii. 8, vii. 2), uses this word of a structure in Jerusalem which he erected, but which he in the former passage expressly distinguishes from the temple proper. He means by it the fortification connected with the temple, called at a later period the tower of Antonia, and which Josephus calls *βασις*, by transferring this Hebrew word to the Greek. Now, it is a plausible opinion that the use of this word in the manner referred to in the books of Chronicles, proves them to have been written before the erection of this tower by Nehemiah. After that tower was constructed and called *הַבִּירָה*, the temple could not have been called by that name without danger of misapprehension and mistake.

6. The history of the canon shews that this book cannot belong to a later period than that of Ezra and Nehemiah, because it is the unanimous tradition of the Jews that the canon was collected by Ezra; Josephus expressly declares that no addition or alteration was made in the canon from that time onward. It is impossible that such statements could have been made, if a book so large as Chronicles had been added at a later period, and especially so late as the time of the Macca-bees, to which some critics would refer it.

7. The last verses of Chronicles are repeated as the opening verses of Ezra. This is an evident proof that Chronicles was written before the book of Ezra, and as there is every reason to believe that the latter was written by Ezra himself, Chronicles cannot have been written later than the time of Ezra. Some critics have endeavoured to get rid of this argument by alleging that these verses are taken from Ezra by the author of Chronicles, and not from Chronicles by Ezra, and that consequently Chronicles must have been written after Ezra and not before it. It is apparent, however, from a simple inspection of the passage, that this supposition is devoid of all probability, and for the following reasons:—(1.) Ezra adopts these verses at the beginning of his book for the sake of linking his narrative with the history that preceded; just as the writer of the book of Judges borrows a few verses (ii. 6–10), from the close of the history of Joshua for the same reason. (2.) The book of Ezra begins with the conjunction *ו*, *and*; this *and* is natural in the connection in which it occurs in Chronicles xxxvi. 22, but it is inexplicable at the beginning of a book, unless as implying a connection with the antecedent history.

(3.) The reference in these verses to the prophecy of Jeremiah contains an allusion to the antecedent verse (ver. 21) in Chronicles, where that prediction is spoken of.

The conclusion from the arguments now recited is, that the book of Chronicles *must have been written in the lifetime of Ezra*. To this various objections have been brought :—

1. The first is derived from the statement made 2 Chron. xxxvi. 21, that the desolation of the land and captivity in Babylon lasted seventy years. This, it is said, is a palpable error; from the destruction of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar, B.C. 588, to the edict of Cyrus restoring the Jews to their own land, B.C. 536, was only a period of fifty-two years. It could not have been reckoned to be seventy years by a person who lived just after the close of the exile. This error could only have arisen centuries afterwards, when the exact chronology of the period was forgotten or lost sight of, and it was inferred from the prophecy of Jeremiah that this must have been the duration of it. In reply to this it may be said, (1.) That Jeremiah expressly predicted (Jer. xxv. 11, xxix. 10), that the captivity at Babylon should continue seventy years; and if he was a true prophet, that must have been its duration. It has been said, indeed, that this is merely intended by Jeremiah as a round number, and that it is not the custom of the prophets to foretell the exact dates of the events which they predict. But there are numerous other instances in which exact dates are given in predictions, e.g. Isa. vii. 8, "Within threescore and five years shall Ephraim be broken, that it be not a people;" xvi. 14, "Within three years, as the years of an hireling (i.e., exactly measured, neither more nor less), and the glory of Moab shall be contemned;" xxi. 16, "Within a year, according to the years of a hireling, all the glory of Kedar shall fail." Daniel (ix. 24) predicts that there will be seventy weeks of years to the coming of the Messiah. It is also plain that Daniel (ix. 2) expected the fulfilment of Jeremiah's prediction in seventy years. (2.) His prediction is represented as fulfilled, not only by the author of Chronicles, but by Ezra (i. 1), who certainly must have been conversant with the facts. (3.) The prophet Zechariah, who lived just after the exile, expressly says, in two passages (i. 12, vii. 5), that the exile lasted seventy years. So that if the reckoning were based on an error, it was an error current in that generation which returned from exile, and not one that arose at a later period. (4.) It can be shewn that it is correct. The beginning of the exile is to be reckoned, not from the destruction of Jerusalem and the temple, but from the third or fourth year of Jehoiakim, when the city was first taken by Nebuchadnezzar, and the first deportation made, Dan. i. 1, B.C. 606. The exile began

with the carrying away of the first captives, and ended with the decree of Cyrus, and the return of the first colony from exile; and the interval was precisely that which Jeremiah had predicted. The carrying into exile was one of successive acts of deportation, just as the return was by successive colonies, at distant intervals; but if we reckon from the beginning of the one to the beginning of the other, we shall have exactly seventy years. Or, if the destruction of the temple be made the point of beginning, and we reckon from that until the temple was once more rebuilt, we shall have again seventy years.

2. The mention of Satan, 1 Chron. xxi. 1. The objection is, that the Jews received their idea of Satan from the Persian doctrine of Ahriman, an evil principle independent from the good, and warring against him.

But (1.), even were it to be admitted that the Jewish notion of an evil spirit were derived from this source, it would not answer the purpose for which it is here alleged, of proving a date later than Ezra. The people were at this very time under Persian rule, and were already open to all the influence which we can suppose to have been exerted from that quarter.

(2.) Satan is not only similarly mentioned, Zech. iii. 1, in a book belonging, as is confessed, to this same period, but in the far older book of Job i. 6, &c. And not to mention other proofs of the same thing, the doctrine of an evil spirit is implied in the very first chapters of Genesis, in the account of the temptation and fall of our first parents.

(3.) The Persian notion of an original and independent principle of evil, is, besides, so different from the scriptural doctrine of Satan, a dependent spirit, created holy, but fallen through his own fault, that their common origin is not supposable; even if the very conception of an immediate divine revelation in the Scriptures did not preclude the idea of borrowing tenets from Pagan nations.

3. The manner in which "fasting" is spoken of, 2 Chron. xx. 3. Jehoshaphat, at a time of extreme peril, sets himself to seek the Lord, and with this view proclaims a fast. Now, it is alleged, that when fasting is spoken of in earlier books, it is merely in token of grief; that the idea of the meritoriousness of fasting, and other ascetic practices belongs to a period much later than the exile. But, apart from the fact that this objection tacitly assumes that the writer has falsified the history for the sake of introducing his own ideas into it, the idea of fasting which we find here, is the same which appears universally in the Scriptures. In Judges xx. 26, the children of Israel wept and fasted, as an act of humiliation before God, and to obtain his favour. So in the public humiliation at Mizpeh in the days of Samuel, 1 Sam. vii. 6. David (2 Sam. xii. 16) fasted dur-

ing the sickness of his child ; and that this was not purely from grief, but as a means of obtaining the Lord's favour, appears from verse 20, that upon the death of the child he again ate bread. The prophets also speak of it in the same way, Joel ii. 12, "Turn ye to me with all your heart, and with fasting," &c. Jer. xiv. 12, "When they fast, I will not hear their cry." And during the distresses of the exile, and the period that followed, fasting appears to have been observed with special frequency and strictness, so that this is just the time when we would expect unusual stress to be laid upon that observance ; thus Dan. ix. 3, x. 13 ; Zech. vii. 5 ; Ezra x. 6 ; Neh. i. 4.

4. The position of Chronicles as the last book in the canon, instead of standing in the second division of it, along with Samuel and Kings, is also alleged as evidencing the lateness of its date. If this book was in existence when the canon was first collected and arranged, why, it is asked, was it not put along with Samuel and Kings ? Why does it stand in a subsequent and entirely different division of the canon, among the Hagiographa, and that, too, the very last book of the Hagiographa ? Does this not make it probable that it was not written until long after the other Scriptures were gathered and definitely arranged in a fixed order, which could not be disturbed, so that it was just only possible to add it at the end ? We answer, not at all. The distinction between the second and third division of the canon is, as has been stated in a previous part of this article, that the second division, called *Propheta*, consists of books written by those who were by profession, and technically, prophets ; those in the third division are written by men equally inspired, but who were not in the strict sense of the word prophets. This is, doubtless, the reason, though we have not the means of shewing it in this particular case, why Samuel and Kings are in the second division of the canon ; they were written by prophets. Chronicles, on the other hand, belongs to the third division, because it was written by an inspired man who was not a prophet. Its being placed among the Hagiographa has nothing to do with the time when it was written. Neither does its standing as the last book in the Hagiographa prove it later than all the other books in this division of the canon. The contrary is certain in one case at least. It was certainly written before the book of Ezra, as has been shewn already, although it stands after it. The fact is, that the Hagiographa are not arranged upon a chronological principle ; the Lamentations of Jeremiah stand before Ecclesiastes, written by Solomon ; Esther stands before Daniel, though written after it ; and Psalms stands first in the series, though some Psalms contained in the book were not written

until after the exile. And those who make use of this objection, do not themselves entertain the opinion that the books of the Hagiographa are arranged chronologically. The objection is therefore palpably devoid of all force.

5. It is alleged that the writer of the books has made mistakes in some of the names which he records, that can only be accounted for in case the books from which he drew his materials were written not in the old Jewish letter, but in the more modern square character; whence it is inferred that these books could not have been written until after the square character was introduced among the Jews. The ground of this allegation is, that certain names are written differently in Chronicles from that they are in Kings, and in earlier books of the Bible; and it is assumed that this difference has arisen from mistaking similar letters: thus 7 for 7, Gen. x. 3, Riphath is in 1 Chron. i. 6, Diphath; Gen. x. 4, Dodanim is in 1 Chron. i. 7, Rodanim; 5 for 3, Zabdi, Neh. xi. 17, is Zichri, 1 Chron. ix. 15; 7 for 7, Harodite, 2 Sam. xxiii. 25, is Harorite 1 Chron. xi. 27; and as the letters thus confounded or interchanged are nearly alike in the more modern or square Hebrew character, the inference is that this was the one in use when the interchange was made and the book written.

But (1.) This objection assumes that whenever the same name appears in two divergent forms, one of them is erroneous, whereas both forms may have been in actual use; this we know to have been the case with regard to some names of frequent occurrence, as the name of *Hiram*, king of Tyre (so called in Samuel and Kings), is in Chronicles constantly spelled *Huram*, 2 Chron. ii. 3, &c.; the regularity with which this occurs forbids the supposition of its being a mistake—so the name *Nebuchadnezzar* is also spelled *Nebuchadrezzar*, Jer. xxxix. 1, &c., and *Joshua* is also *Jeshua*, Neh. viii. 17.

(2.) It is assumed that the mistake is always in the book of Chronicles, and always made by the author of the book himself. If a textual error must be assumed, as is not improbable in a few cases, why is it necessarily the book of Chronicles that is wrong, and why may not the error in Chronicles, or in the parallel narrative, as the case may be, be with greater likelihood imputed to subsequent transcribers? Errors of transcription might very easily arise and be perpetuated in these long lists of names otherwise unknown.

(3.) This objection may be met on its own ground, by the fact that some changes of proper names are more easily accounted for if the old form of the letter was current; thus, there is an occasional interchange of 7 and 7, which bear no resemblance in the modern square letter, though it is suppos-

able they might be mistaken for one another in the old letter. *Ain*, Josh. xxi. 16, is *Ashan*, 1 Chron. vi. 44 (Eng. ver., v. 59), &c. And it should be observed that 7 and 7 are quite as much alike in the ancient as in the more modern form of the letter; so of some other letters. Also some names are altered by an interchange of letters which are not alike in either the ancient or modern form of the letters.

(4.) The objection proves too much, and consequently proves nothing. No one has ventured to assert that Chronicles is of later date than the time of the Maccabees. But the coins struck in the days of the Maccabees shew that the old letter was then in use; and it is probable that the existing form of the letter did not become current until near the time of Christ. If the objection proves anything, it proves that Chronicles was not written till near the time of Christ. But it is well known not only to have existed, but to have been translated into Greek in the LXX. long before that time.

6. The character of the language in the book is said to betray a very late date. This is urged both on the ground that it contains many Chaldæisms, whether in grammatical forms, or in the use of words of Chaldee origin, different from the Hebrew words employed ordinarily by older writers to express the same idea, and also on the ground of the larger use of the vowel letters, the *scriptio plena* being employed where older writers have the *scriptio defectiva*. What is alleged respecting the language of this book, is true to a certain extent; but this is satisfactorily accounted for by assuming that it was written shortly after the termination of the exile. The Hebrew was inclining to the Chaldee even before the exile. During their captivity the Jews were placed among people speaking the Chaldee; and the Hebrew was either then, or shortly after, supplanted by the Chaldee as the language of the people. The language of Chronicles is on a par with other writings of the same period. It is even purer than some of them, *e. g.*, Ezekiel: Ezra and Daniel, belonging to the same period, are partly written in Chaldee. As to the full and defective mode of writing the vowels, there was no fixed usage at any period of the language; it was in many cases optional to write or to omit the vowel letters, the same word being differently written in the same connection. The general fact is that, on the whole, there is a greater tendency to their employment in the later than in the earlier writers; but this is not the case in Chronicles to a greater extent than in other contemporaneous writings.

It has even been alleged that the writer of Chronicles shews that Hebrew was no longer well understood by his readers, by

substituting easier and simpler expressions for those more difficult and obscure ; and that he sometimes reveals his own ignorance of the language by himself mistaking its meaning. It is, however, a pretty bold assumption in a modern critic, that he understands the Hebrew better than the author of this book. And the composition of a work in Hebrew has no parallel at a later date than the period immediately following the exile.

7. It is said that the spirit of hostility to the kingdom of Israel revealed in this book, is such as did not exist until the split between the Jews and Samaritans became irreconcilable, and the hatred between them reached its highest point, which it did not do until the Samaritans had built their own temple on Gerizim, in opposition to that at Jerusalem.

This objection is, however, built upon such baseless assumptions, that it is difficult to understand how it could ever have been seriously urged. (1.) There is no hostility to the kingdom of Israel in this book more than in other books of the Bible. It speaks of their schism and their apostasy from God with abhorrence, but these are spoken of elsewhere in similar terms, so that it is nothing peculiar to this book. And if there were evidence of an unusual degree of hostility, as the objection assumes, it would rather be an argument of earlier than of later date ; for the longer we assume the book to have been written after the kingdom of the ten tribes had been overturned, and its members carried into exile, the more we might suppose that the bitterness and rivalry, felt so long as the kingdom existed, would have been allayed. (2.) At any rate, bitterness toward Israel has nothing to do with bitterness towards the Samaritans. This objection substitutes the Samaritans for the kingdom of the ten tribes, as though they were identical. But the Samaritans were not Israelites ; they were the descendants of heathen colonists introduced into that territory, as appears from 2 Kings xvii. 24. (3.) Even if hostility to Israel was implied in this book, and this was identical with hostility to the Samaritans, this would be no proof of later date. The rise of the Jews' hostility to the Samaritans is, by the objection, referred to a period long subsequent to the exile, when there is the most abundant evidence of this hostility immediately upon the return of the Jews from their captivity. When the Samaritans found that the Jews would not recognise them as Israelites, nor allow them to take part in rebuilding the temple, they did everything they could to hinder them, and the most bitter feud sprang up between them. (Ezra iv. 1-5, &c.)

8. The last objection to referring these books to the time of Ezra, is drawn from what has been styled their mythological character and Levitical spirit. By a mythological spirit, these

objectors mean a disposition to record the supernatural. But there are actually fewer miracles recorded in these books than in the books of Kings. So that, even on the infidel hypothesis that miracles are mere legendary fictions, the record of them creates no reason why Chronicles should be referred to a later period than the other books of the Old Testament, many of which record far more, and those of a more stupendous character, than are to be found in these books.

By a Levitical spirit, is meant a high regard for, and earnest attachment to, the ceremonial institutions of Moses. And this does certainly characterise these books in a remarkable degree. There is no subject upon which the writer dwells at greater length, or with more evident interest, than in what he details respecting the public worship of God, the regulations made by pious princes concerning it, and the measures taken for its restoration, after periods of idolatrous neglect. But the revived interest in religious worship which marked the period immediately following the exile, makes us look to it as, above all others, the time in which we would imagine such a book as this to have been written. After the long interruption of the exile, the people, sifted and purified by suffering, turned with an eagerness almost surpassing that of any previous period, to the law of Moses and their ancestral worship. The books of Ezra and Nehemiah bear abundant testimony to the zeal and earnestness with which everything relating to the ritual service was sought out and attended to. The spirit of this book is, in this respect, precisely the spirit of the returning exiles.

There is no valid objection, consequently, to the conclusion which we have before reached, that the books of Chronicles were written in the time of Ezra. Is it possible to go beyond this, and identify the author? The current tradition among the Jews, and the opinion universally entertained by Christian writers down to comparatively modern times is, that Ezra was himself the author of these books, as well as the one that bears his name. Some able students of the Scriptures have been disposed to favour the hypothesis that the books of Chronicles and that of Ezra, originally and properly constituted one book, and that the existing division is unauthorised, and ought not to be regarded.

There is much more to favour the hypothesis, that they are distinct works by the same author. (1.) This, as has just been said, has the sanction of tradition. (2.) The identity of the closing verses of Chronicles and the opening verses of Ezra, though, of course, not in itself conclusive, yet agrees very well with this view of the case. (3.) Its probability is further increased by a striking similarity, which has been observed, in

style, in the use of words in peculiar senses, and in favourite forms of expression between the books of Chronicles and the book of Ezra. While, therefore, it cannot perhaps be rigorously proved that Ezra is the author of Chronicles, this may be regarded as at least an ancient and not improbable opinion.

ART. VII.—*Slavery and the Bible.*

The Guilt of Slavery and the Crime of Slaveholding demonstrated from the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures. By the Rev. GEORGE B. CHEEVER, D.D., Pastor of the Church of the Puritans. New York. 1860.

Hebrew Servitude and American Slavery: An attempt to prove that the Mosaic Law furnishes neither a basis nor an apology for American Slavery. By the Rev. JOHN KENNEDY, M.A., F.R.G.S. London: Jackson, Walford, & Hodder, 27 Paternoster Row. 1863.

Negroes and Negro "Slavery:" the first an inferior race, the latter its normal Condition. By J. H. VAN EVRIE, M.D. "Let us reason together." New York: Van Evrie, Horton, & Co., 162 Nassau Street. 1861. Trübner & Co., 60 Paternoster Row, London.

Address to Christians throughout the world. By the Clergy of the Confederate States of America. London: Printed by Edmund Evans, Raquet Court, Fleet Street. 1863.

IN treating the question of slavery, to which we are invited, not merely by the works before us, and by a multitude of others with which the press is teeming, but by the critical and bloody struggle in America, which has revived the whole controversy, it is impossible to do full justice to the subject without viewing the various relations in which slavery has stood at the different periods of its history. We require to go back to slavery as it existed in the early days of the patriarchs; to look at the position it held among the Jews, under the old dispensation; and, finally, to contemplate the system of negro slavery as it at present exists on the American continent. Into this wide field we cannot be expected to enter at any length; still even the hurried survey we purpose making will, we trust, enable us more intelligently to review the works prefixed to this article, most of which have been selected to exhibit the extreme antagonism of thought on the slavery question in the great transatlantic republic.

We turn then, first, to slavery under the patriarchs. In entering on this part of the inquiry, the passage naturally recalled to mind is the celebrated one regarding the curse on

Canaan ; but it will be better treated of in connection with the bondage of Ham's race in America, and is therefore for the present passed by. The investigation is thus narrowed to the slavery with which Abraham and the other patriarchs had to do—that hinted at in the passage instituting the rite of circumcision, in which mention is made of those "born" in Abraham's "house," and those "bought with his money." It is unnecessary to inquire whether the first mentioned of these two classes were slaves ; it is natural to suppose those last named were so, at least technically considered. It must, however, be remembered that the word slavery is one of exceeding vagueness, and employed to designate very different social states. It may mean the mildest conceivable interference with personal liberty ; or, on the other hand, it may signify that very aggravated form of crime by which a freeman is reduced to bondage, compelled by threats of bodily torture to engage in toil beyond his strength to bear, has his wife and children torn from him and sold away into another part of the country, if not even subjected to the worst indignities. With which of these very different kinds of slavery was it that the holy patriarchs of old had to do ? Evidently with that involving the very slightest interference with liberty. That this is not too dogmatically alleged will at once appear if we consider for a little the social state of that early period. There are certain natural steps by which barbarous tribes advance to civilisation. First, the mass of the clan or horde support themselves by the chase ; the pastoral state after a time succeeds ; another interval elapses, and the pastoral is exchanged for the agricultural condition ; finally, there follows the commercial and manufacturing stage of progress, the highest of which the world has yet had experience. In laying down the foregoing generalisation, it is needful to guard it in two different ways. It in no respect involves the adoption of the unscriptural view that the first progenitors of our race were barbarians. It leaves us free to hold, as we do on divine authority, that man was created a sinless being, in a state very far indeed removed from the savage one, and that, consequently, such tribes as we now find grovelling in barbarism must have lapsed from a much higher position. Nor, again, are we hereby committed to the opinion, with which many facts seem to conflict, that a nation once fallen as a rule never rises again without foreign aid. With these two cautions no danger can arise from reasserting the statement, that tribes advancing from barbarism to civilisation exist first as hunters, then as shepherds, next as agriculturists, finally reaching the state in which commerce and manufactures are the leading sources of wealth. It is of importance to the

present inquiry to remind the reader that a tribe of hunters will starve unless they have a large part of a continent for their support; one of shepherds will require perhaps an ordinarily sized country for their maintenance; the fertile spots in a province will suffice for a colony of agriculturists; whilst a busy hive of men engaged in commerce and manufactures will thrive upon a mere speck of ground. Apply all this to the case of the patriarchs. They lived at what may be termed the pastoral epoch of the Jewish national history, but during its later portion, when the agricultural era destined to succeed was manifestly drawing on. That the latter was approaching was plainly evinced when Isaac sowed near Gerar and reaped a hundredfold; but that the former was not yet a bygone social state was evident from the answer of Jacob's sons to Pharaoh—"Thy servants are shepherds, both we and also our fathers." Taking into account the vast expanse of territory, required by people in the pastoral state of existence, it may be safely asserted that slavery of the aggravated kind could not possibly have prevailed to any extent among the patriarchs. Assume that some of "Abraham's herdsmen," or "Lot's herdsmen," were slaves, they could, had they wished it, have so easily escaped from bondage, when abroad with the cattle, that it is manifest they could not have felt the yoke to be of a very galling kind. It may be technically right to call the servitude of the patriarchal period slavery, but in reality it did not merit to be stigmatised with so odious a name.

It is not till the agricultural social state is attained that slavery worthy of the appellation becomes possible; but at the period to which the legislation at Sinai was designed specially to look forward—that after Israel should be settled in Canaan—the agricultural state was fully reached. Now, for the first time, the inquiry becomes attended with difficulty. The too well known case of the Zulu and the Bishop of Natal shews how sadly certain minds may be stumbled on finding that the law divinely promulgated in the wilderness *regulated*, in place of *abolishing*, slavery. The key to unlock the difficulties of this part of the subject is a correct understanding of the philosophy of law. The division is an old one, and familiar to the theological student, which resolves the several enactments of the Mosaic code into three distinct classes—the moral, the ceremonial, and the judicial laws. First, and pre-eminent above the rest, towered the moral law, which was not delivered to the people through Moses as mediator, but directly proclaimed by Jehovah himself from the top of Sinai, and graven "by the finger of God" on tables of stone—the mode of writing constituting a guarantee that the precepts thus honoured were

reflective of the divine character, and therefore in their nature perfect,—the enduring stone tablets on which they were engraven suggestive that the ten commandments were designed for permanent continuance. Next, there stood on an inferior but still very honourable footing, the ceremonial law ; its several enactments, types, or shadows of good things to come through the death of Christ ; those precepts therefore “ waxing old ” and vanishing away when he whose atoning sacrifice they were specially designed to commemorate had finished his mission to earth and reascended to heaven. The third class of ordinances comprised under the Mosaic code are generally described as the “ judicial law.” This designation is cognate with the word judgments, by which *דִּבְרוֹת*, the Hebrew term for the enact-

ments now referred to, is rendered by our translators. The expression is not the best that could have been employed, as not conveying to the mind any well defined idea. The nature of the precepts termed “ judicial ” will be more apparent when it is stated that they constituted the ordinary civil and criminal law of the Jewish people. Though divinely given, a certain stern necessity forbade that they should fully reach or even approach perfection. It was absolutely essential that, to acquire and retain force, they should be conformable to the moral convictions of the Hebrews ; and, if these latter were imperfect, then the law, to be in harmony with them, required to be imperfect also. If the code of any people be too far in advance of their conceptions, the result will follow that they will systematically sympathise with the violators rather than with the administrators of the law, till at length the enactments, whose only defect has been their over-enlightenment, deprived of all popular support, will fall to the ground. If, on the contrary, a code be only slightly beyond the convictions of the people, it will in large measure retain their sympathy, while, at the same time, it becomes a powerful instrument in promoting their further progress. Hence the civil and criminal codes of every country are gradually undergoing change—for the better if the country be advancing, for the worse if it be going back. As an example of a slow forward movement, take the parliamentary legislation of our own empire ; as an illustration of the opposite change, look at any nation in which liberty suddenly degenerates into licence, and you will see a quick retrogression from civil into martial law. But in a matter so much beyond the ordinary theological sphere, it may be deemed needful to support the positions now advanced by the authority of some one actually conversant with legal matters, and, if possible, who has personally taken part in framing a code of

legislation. The late Baron Macaulay, the historian, was one of the very few people possessing the last-named qualification. It is well known that, when in India, he was at the head of a legislative commission with the view of framing from the British Statute-book and other sources a digest of law, adapted to the East. Let us turn then to Macaulay's History of England, and mark what he says regarding the grotesque Act of Parliament by which, at least, an approach to the great boon of religious liberty was conceded, after the revolution of 1688 :—

“The Toleration Act approaches very near to the idea of a great English law. To a jurist, versed in the theory of legislation, but not intimately acquainted with the temper of the sects and parties into which the nation was divided at the time of the Revolution, that Act would seem to be a mere chaos of absurdities and contradictions. It will not bear to be tried by sound general principles. Nay, it will not bear to be tried by any principle, sound or unsound. The sound principle undoubtedly is, that mere theological error ought not to be punished by the civil magistrate. This principle the Toleration Act not only does not recognise, but positively disclaims. Not a single one of the cruel laws enacted by the Tudors or the Stuarts is repealed. Persecution continues to be the general rule. Toleration is the exception. Nor is this all. The freedom which is given to conscience is given in the most capricious manner. A Quaker, by making a declaration of faith in general terms, obtains the full benefit of the Act, without signing one of the Thirty-Nine Articles. An Independent minister, who is perfectly willing to make the declaration required by the Quaker, but who has doubts about six or seven of the Articles, remains still subject to the penal laws. Howe is liable to punishment if he preaches before he has solemnly declared his assent to the Anglican doctrine touching the Eucharist. Penn, who altogether rejects the Eucharist, is at perfect liberty to preach without making any declaration whatever on the subject.

“These are some of the obvious faults which must strike every person who examines the Toleration Act by that standard of just reason which is the same in all countries and in all ages. But these very faults may perhaps appear to be merits, when we take into consideration the passions and prejudices of those for whom the Toleration Act was framed. This law, abounding with contradictions which every smatterer in political philosophy can detect, did what a law framed by the utmost skill of the greatest masters of political philosophy might have failed to do. That the provisions which have been recapitulated are cumbrous, puerile, inconsistent with each other, inconsistent with the true theory of religious liberty, must be acknowledged. All that can be said in their defence is this, that they removed a vast mass of evil without shocking a vast mass of prejudice; that they put an end at once and for ever, without one division in either House of Parliament, without one riot in the streets, with scarcely an audible murmur even from the classes most deeply tainted with bigotry, to a persecution which had broken

innumerable hearts, which had made innumerable firesides desolate, which had filled the prisons with men of whom the world was not worthy, which had driven thousands of those honest, diligent, and God-fearing yeoman and artisans, who are the true strength of a nation, to seek a refuge beyond the ocean among the wigwams of Red Indians and the lairs of panthers. Such a defence, however weak it may appear to some shallow speculators, will probably be thought complete by statesmen.”—(Macaulay’s “History of England,” vol. iii. pp. 86, 87.)

Thus, in the opinion of a practical legislator, each law requires to be looked at from two points of view. First, the inquiry needs to be made, To what extent does it approach the standard of absolute rectitude? The second and really more pertinent question then follows, Whether the law is so much in harmony with the convictions of the people, while yet to some extent in advance of them, that it will succeed in enlisting and retaining their sympathies, and therefore work for good? It is needful to look at the judicial precepts of the Mosaic code from the same two points of view. And when we do so, we are enabled to see the meaning of various Scripture passages, which, though seemingly inconsistent, are on this principle thoroughly harmonised. Take for example the following:—

“Thy judgments are good.”
Psalms cxix. 39.

“Wherefore I gave them also statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live.”
Ezek. xx. 25.

In the first of these passages, what appears specially to have called forth the adoring exclamation of the psalmist, was the perfect adaptation the “judgments” had to the end they were designed to serve. In the second, on the contrary, they are compared with the abstract principles of perfect rectitude. Whatever is imperfect is also temporary; and, as a nation moves forward, its laws change, each new one more nearly approaching the standard of rectitude than the one it superseded. In this series of advances towards abstract right, a legislator tacitly assumes the existence of such a scale as the following:—

First Necessity.—That of framing measures designed to preserve life.

Second Necessity.—That of framing measures to preserve the more important social and domestic rights of man and woman, such as man’s title to liberty, and woman’s to the permanence of the marriage tie.

Third Necessity.—That of framing measures to protect property,

If, in any case, he cannot in a very backward state of society achieve at once the whole of these three legislative successes, he temporarily abandons the third for the sake of more thoroughly gaining the first and second ; and, if he fail to do even this, then for a time he sacrifices the second to make sure of preserving the first. The correctness of the scale may be easily shewn. Let us suppose that one is in bondage, and without means of making his escape, then he will undoubtedly give money for his ransom, shewing that he prefers liberty, one of the rights included under the second category, to mere property comprehended under the third. In comparing the first and second, much aid is afforded by an incident in the life of the divine Redeemer. It is thus recorded : " And the Pharisees came to him and asked him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife ? tempting him. And he answered and said unto them, What did Moses command you ? And they said, Moses suffered to write a bill of divorcement and to put her away. And Jesus answered and said unto them, For the hardness of your heart he wrote this precept. But from the beginning of the creation God made them male and female. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother and cleave to his wife ; and they twain shall be one flesh : so then they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder." (Mark x. 9.) What is the principle here involved ? That, but for one great crime, it was against the eternal law of right, that a woman should be permanently separated from her husband. But in the time of Moses, the natural hardness of the human heart having been as yet very partially softened by true religion and civilising influences, divorces had to be temporarily tolerated for the preservation of life. If a husband had been deprived of the permission he sought, to rid himself of a partner from whom he had become alienated, there was reason to fear that he would not have hesitated to take her life. The divine Legislator, in consequence, allowed the woman's rights, classed above under the second category, to be sacrificed to save her right under the first, her life. Suppose it had not been woman's title to exemption from arbitrary divorce, but that which stands side by side with it in the scale—man's title to liberty,—the principles involved are precisely the same, and the Saviour's explanation in the one case will carry us through the difficulties of the other. It seems to imply that, in very partially advanced nations, where religious, moral, and intellectual appliances have as yet had time to do but little to mitigate the natural hardness of the fallen heart, slavery may be temporarily sanctioned by law, *if this be indispensably necessary to preserve life.*

While, then, the moral law is completely opposed to slavery in all circumstances whatever, the Jewish judicial law could do nothing else but tolerate it for a certain period, while yet it remained needful for the preservation of life. But did such a necessity ever really exist? To be specific, was there ever a time in the history of the Jewish people when danger existed of a merciless slaughter of vanquished foes on the battle field? Were the lives of poor Hebrews ever in danger during famines? To take the first case inquired into, it would not be difficult to shew that, as a rule, war was carried on at that ancient period with a ferocity which rendered the legal permission to reduce vanquished enemies to slavery manifestly the lesser of two evils. In selecting an illustration of what is here alleged, it is requisite to avoid taking it from the case of the Canaanite nations doomed by a special curse to utter destruction. Let us direct our view then to a battle field in which the armies of Israel and Judah were the opposing hosts—the contest in which Peah, king of Israel, was victorious over Ahas of Judah. It was in regard to this struggle between brethren that the prophet Oded was commissioned to reprove the victorious host, which he did in the following language: “Behold, because the Lord God of your fathers was wroth with Judah, he hath delivered them into your hand, and ye have slain them in a rage that reacheth up into heaven. And now ye purpose to keep under the children of Judah and Jerusalem as bondsmen unto you,” &c. Though generally called bondsmen, the slaves spoken of, and whom Oded by divine authority compelled the victorious army to give up, were 200,000 *women, sons, and daughters*, as if no adult combatant whom the Israelites had succeeded in overcoming had been left alive. We should look for no special enactments in the Mosaic legislation designed to save the lives of the vanquished in a case of so exceptional a nature as that of a war between Judah and Israel. But we should expect to see benevolent provision made for the more ordinary contingencies of wars with those of the neighbouring nations, against whom no curse had been pronounced; and while danger of a slaughter of these when vanquished, “with a rage reaching to heaven,” still remained in full force, we should in no way be surprised to find the law save the lives of defeated combatants at the expense of their liberty. In this case, the first great legislative aim would be achieved at the expense of the second. Again, in such a state of society as that of which the battle field so significantly described by Oded affords evidence, one finds it hard to resist the conclusion, that poor Israelites must in large numbers have perished during famines, unless they were permitted temporarily to sell themselves into

a kind of mild servitude to their richer neighbours. The legal permission to do this is to this day found to save lives in the famines which so frequently occur in heathen lands. In this case, again, the first legislative aim would be successfully effected at the expense of the second.

Turning now to the Mosaic law, we find the enactments on the subject of slavery such as abstract reasoning has prepared us to expect. The somewhat permanent slavery of men belonging to the neighbouring nations, doubtless captives taken in war, is sanctioned; as is the temporary servitude of Israelites probably purchased during famines. In both cases, it was an advantage to the unfortunate bondsmen themselves. Their liberty was forfeited to save their lives. That this was indeed the benevolent intention with which slavery was tolerated among the ancient Jews, is apparent from two remarkable precepts of the Mosaic legislation. Suppose that a bondsman had escaped from his master, was the selfish interest of the master, or the welfare of the slave, to be consulted? It was the latter. There was but little danger now to the life of the fugitive, in allowing him to retain liberty; no aid therefore was to be rendered the master in repossessing himself of his escaped servant. The second is a yet more striking case. Suppose that some ruffianly man-stealer laid hands upon a freeman, and reduced him to bondage, what was the penalty of the criminal? In this case, let it be observed, the victim did not sacrifice liberty to save life, like the vanquished in battle; but, if reduced to bondage, simply sustained a grievous and wanton injury. Therefore the Mosaic law prescribed death for the man-stealer. In the backward moral state of the Jewish people, it was not inconsistent with the divine wisdom and goodness temporarily to tolerate slavery; and there cannot be a doubt that the specific enactments designed to regulate it were just that distance in advance of the moral convictions of the people, which was best fitted to lead them on. The view now taken regarding the slavery legislation of the Mosaic law is, we think, fitted to remove the difficulties in which the subject is involved. That our readers may, however, judge for themselves in the case, we subjoin, in a footnote, a classified list of the chief passages of the Mosaic law, bearing on the topic of which we have been treating.*

* Man-stealing punished with death, Exod. xxi. 16; Deut. xxiv. 7.

Permission to hold persons belonging to the neighbouring nations in perpetual servitude, Lev. xxv. 46. But did not the jubilee set them free?

Permission to hold Israelites in temporary servitude, Exod. xxi. 1-11; Deut. xv. 12-18.

Slaves in general.—The case of a female captive taken in war, Deut. xxi. 10-14. Fugitive slaves not given up to their masters, Deut. xxiii. 15, 16. Protection of slaves against the violence of their masters or others, Exod. xxi.

We repeat that the divinity of this legislation was shewn by its perfect adaptation to the circumstances of the people for whom it was originally designed. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the judicial code of the Jews indicated the very minimum of moral attainment that would be tolerated in the chosen people. A Hebrew was constantly encouraged not to stop short on surmounting this really very inferior elevation, but to make it the object of his ambition to scale the towering, the inaccessible height of the moral law. And such, in the lapse of ages, was the effect of the commandments, written on tables of stone, that it would seem as if, by the time the Saviour descended on his mission to earth, slavery of the old type described in the Mosaic legislation had almost, if not altogether, ceased within the Holy Land.

Let us now contemplate the attitude which the New Testament and the early apostolic church assumed to the slavery of the Roman empire. To do full justice to this point, we should require to look into the origin of Roman slavery, coupling with this investigation the estimate which the all-conquering people formed of the value of human life, especially in the case of enemies taken in battle. A large number of the Roman slaves consisted of such captives; and, notwithstanding the permission accorded the victors to sell those they had overcome, a certain brutal love for sanguinary spectacles, which neither their religion nor their boasted civilisation could modify or even conceal, made them greatly delight in gladiatorial combats. Admitting at once that some of those who personally engaged in these dangerous contests were volunteers who, like our own male and female Blondins, risked their lives for pay, and that others were criminals from the condemned cells, still it is universally admitted that a vast proportion of those "butchered

20, 21, 26, 27; Lev. xix. 20-22. Servants, among whom slaves were doubtless included, were entitled to the benefit of the Sabbath rest, Exod. xx. 10; xxiii. 12; Deut. v. 14. If circumcised, they partook of the passover, Exod. xii. 44; they took part in the rejoicings that attended the feast of weeks, Deut. xvi. 11; they shared also in those of the feast of tabernacles, Deut. xvi. 14.

Hebrews temporarily in servitude to their brethren.—A Hebrew might be bought, Exod. xxi. 2. To whom was the money paid? To a former master? Or, to the poor man himself? Probably to himself. When a Hebrew was convicted of theft, he was required to pay twice the value of the stolen property; and, if unable to do so, was sold for the debt, Exod. xxii. 3, 4. When he sadly required it in famine, a Hebrew might sell his daughter, Exod. xxi. 7. A Hebrew bondman was looked on as a hired servant; unless he absolutely refused the boon of liberty, he was set free in the seventh year, the year of release, Exod. xxi. 1-6; and he was not sent empty-handed away, Deut. xv. 12-18: as illustrative of this regulation, see also Jer. xxxiv. 8-end.

Hebrews temporarily in bondage to the heathen.—They were looked on as hired servants, Lev. xxv. 53; every effort was made to mitigate the severity of their bondage, ver. 47-49; and in the year of jubilee they were set free, ver. 50-55.

to make a Roman holiday," were captives taken in war. The well-known English poet, who so correctly read the heart of the "dying gladiator" (would that the powers of the noble writer had always, as in this case, been exerted on the side of moral principle!) describes the wretched combatant expiring from a mortal wound, as wandering away in thought

"To where his rude hut by the Danube lay:"

the Danube, as we know, having for a long period constituted part of the northern boundary line of the empire, where contests with the less civilised tribes continually took place. With the slavery of the Roman empire, Christianity had no sympathy. But in assuming a position of instant and uncompromising hostility to it, care required to be taken that the benevolent means employed did not simply preserve liberty at the expense of life. If the tender and compassionate Saviour could have no fellow-feeling with slave-holding, we may at the same time conceive that, had he characterised those who set on foot gladiator fights, his language would have gone even beyond that employed by the patriarch Jacob, in regard to two of his own family chargeable with wholesale shedding of blood: "O my soul, come not thou into their secret; unto their assembly, mine honour be not thou united." The Roman empire was, in fact, like a person suffering from a deeply-rooted and dangerous malady. Slavery was not the disorder itself, but merely one conspicuous symptom. Gladiatorship constituted another outward manifestation ominous of the most fatal results. The divine Physician acted as the enlightened earthly practitioner does in similar cases. He did little to remove or even mitigate the symptoms, till first he had struck at the root of the internal disease. Gradually, in virtue of this treatment, the outward symptoms vanished, and that in a determinate order. After the preaching of the gospel had continued for about 300 years, Constantine formally prohibited gladiator combats, and in the time of Honorius they were completely suppressed. It would then have been right to direct energetic efforts to remove the other symptom of the malady—slavery; but the moral force of the church had by this time sunk into such feebleness, that it was incapable of effecting this new victory for the cause of righteousness. Yet something of consequence was effected. The church protected those in bondage against various kinds of oppression; and, finally, transformed the Roman slavery, which had been as severe as that of modern America, into the considerably less bitter serfage of the middle ages. Need it be added that Christianity was the main agent in bringing this also to a close through western and central Europe, and that it is now rendering efficient aid in carrying out a great scheme of emancipation through the widely extended Russian domains?

The leading passages in the New Testament illustrative of the relation in which the church stood to the slavery of the Roman empire are the following:—1 Cor. vii. 21–24; 1 Tim. i. 9–11; vi. 1, 2; Rev. xviii. 13. The most specific of these is the passage in 1st Corinthians, of which the meaning may be thus stated: A slave led to Christ received with others that liberty with which the Saviour makes his people free. Blessed with this spiritual freedom, the nobler part of the nature had been emancipated from bondage; it was only the poor body the taskmaster could now possibly retain. Encouragement was to be derived from this reflection, if no opportunity in providence presented itself of emancipation from bondage; but if natural freedom were within the power of the slave, it was his duty to seek it as a boon not indifferent. Having been bought soul and body by Christ, he was not willingly to remain in degrading servitude to man.

Closely connected with this part of the subject, is the question of the extent to which slaveholding was tolerated within the early Christian Church. The leading passages bearing on the subject in the New Testament are Gal. iii. 28; Eph. vi. 5–9; Col. iii. 11; 1 Tim. vi. 1, 2, and the Epistle to Philemon. When a heathen is first irradiated with the light of the gospel, he does not pass in a moment from black night to the splendour of unclouded and meridian day. On the contrary, the process of enlightenment is a very gradual one. First, the truth makes way into his soul, like those faint streaks of light that herald the approach of morning; anon, the brightness increases; but still it is not till a subsequent period that there is aught like perfect day. The apostle of the Gentiles, acting under inspiration, seems to have adapted his teaching to minds but slowly advancing to a clear perception of duty on the subject of social relations. He therefore does not exhort the slaves instantly, and without regard to consequences, to escape from Christian masters; nor does he peremptorily order those masters, without the delay of an hour, to set their bondmen free. In place of this, he gradually leads both classes up to a point of attainment, sure to leave Christian masters without either the will or the power to perpetuate a system of oppression to which the moral law and the whole genius of Christianity are so completely opposed. The Epistle to Philemon affords an illustration of the way in which the apostle of the Gentiles guided the Christian feeling of a slaveholder within the church forward to a point, at which he could scarcely fail to see the sinfulness of conduct which he had not previously regarded as morally wrong. His escaped slave Onesimus is not retained after his conversion by his spiritual father, but sent back to Philemon with a letter, in which, not the tact of the apostle, but rather

the unerring guidance of the Holy Spirit pre-eminently appears. There is no peremptory mandate for the release of the returned slave ; still, this is hinted by the apostle with a delicacy so exquisite, that the only reply a polite, not to say a Christian, mind would feel appropriate, would be instantly to manumit the slave, and send him back to minister to the apostle, not now as a bondman, but as a "brother beloved," one in Christ with the earthly master he had been accustomed to serve, but now should serve no more.

The foregoing investigations have prepared the way for successfully dealing with the subject of *American Slavery*. It will be remembered that a wide distinction exists between the moral and judicial laws. The former, as we saw, was an authoritative declaration of the principles of abstract and unchanging right ; while the latter, though divinely given, was in various respects imperfect, from the necessity of its not advancing far beyond that stage of intellectual and moral development, which the chosen people had reached at the time of its promulgation. In regard to the ten commandments, it is almost unnecessary to make a lengthened statement. It will not be denied that they are opposed to slavery of every kind and degree. "Thou shalt not steal" is a precept, with a very obvious bearing on the case of any one who uses the service of a labourer without giving him his hire. Other commandments, too, are almost sure to be frequently violated by those who have slaves under their control. On these, however, it is unnecessary to enlarge ; suffice it to say, that none can retain bondsmen in his keeping, and at the same time enter into the spirit of that comprehensive precept, under which the whole six commandments of the second table find a place, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." It remains only that we inquire whether the analogy of the Jewish judicial law warrants the present legalisation of slavery in various American States ? To this question our reply is, that it does so only if the circumstances of the two nations compared be almost precisely identical, if they have reached the same stage of civilisation, and if, in both cases, *slavery be absolutely necessary to save life*. But can this be maintained ? Can it, for instance, be alleged that America, which boasts and boasts justly that it is in the very forefront of advancing civilisation, requires the same mode of treatment which the old Hebrew nation did in its earlier period of development, not long after it had been in bondage itself ? Can it be asserted, that in the Southern States of North America, the negroes are held in bondage, because, if not reduced to servitude, they would either have been massacred, or would have perished miserably through famine ? If the New York riots of this

year were a fair sample of what emancipated negroes would everywhere and at all times have to expect if granted their freedom, then an American legislator might, after scriptural precedent, legalise slavery, with the sorrowful feeling that his nation had forfeited all title to rank with the civilised. But we believe as firmly as any American, that the melancholy occurrence now adverted to was one of a completely exceptional character, and that negroes might be emancipated without the danger of their falling victims to wholesale massacre. It is then admitted on all hands that the negroes are not held in bondage to save them from being cruelly slain. In this case, the chief Scripture precedent for the continuance of slavery, derived from the legislation under the older economy, is taken away. Another question, however, still requires to be disposed of. Is slavery needful to protect the negro from death by starvation? Some transatlantic writers think that it is. They hold that the negro is naturally indolent, and that if made a freeman, he would not, when in competition with the energetic Anglo-Saxon, succeed in obtaining even necessary food; consequently, the emancipation of the negroes would be sentence of death against their race. But sufficient facts are on record to prove the inaccuracy of this opinion. There are races of men so weak in their physical organisation, or so feeble in their moral powers, that they rapidly vanish from the face of the earth, when brought into competition with the natives of northern climes. But there is a tenacity of life about the negro race, which enables it to live and even to flourish in circumstances where a less sturdy stock would perish. History has recorded, that it was because the Romish missionary Las Casas pitied the case of the poor Indians, wasting away and dying in numbers under the severe tasks imposed by their Spanish conquerors, that he first thought of having negroes brought from beyond the sea; and, when they arrived, it was found that each, without much apparent injury to himself, did on an average four times as much work as an Indian of the vanishing race. The fact too is a remarkable one, that while many of the families of mankind are slowly passing out of existence, no instance is known of any negro tribe becoming extinct, however grievously oppressed. The emancipated negroes of the West Indies have not found the battle of life a fatal one, though those honourably struggling with them have been Europeans. Nor do they feel the contest of deadly severity for them either in Canada or the Federal States. It is hard to believe, that if, when in bondage, they manage to support both themselves and their masters, they would in a state of freedom fail to maintain themselves alone. No more, then, in this than in the former case is there evidence to shew, that slavery is indispensably

necessary to save life. The Mosaic law cannot then be fairly quoted in support of American slavery. It is of importance, too, to recall to mind, that the African slave trade, now happily by the common consent of civilised nations declared illegal and piratical, would have received no quarter even from the Jewish judicial law. Its teaching on the point is quite explicit: "And he that stealeth a man and selleth him, or if he be found in his hand, he shall surely be put to death," *Exod. xxi. 16.* The principle of the American Fugitive Slave Law, a disgraceful piece of legislation—now in abeyance, and, it is to be fondly hoped, never again destined to be revived—is also pointedly condemned: "Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee. He shall dwell with thee, even among you in that place which he shall choose in one of thy gates, where it liketh him best; thou shalt not oppress him," *Deut. xxiii. 15, 16.*

But specialities are alleged in the case of the negro. It is maintained that he was divinely doomed to perpetual bondage, in the well-known denunciatory words: "And he said, Cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren. And he said, Blessed be the Lord God of Shem; and Canaan shall be his servant. God shall enlarge Japhet, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem; and Canaan shall be his servant" (*Gen. ix. 25*). It is unnecessary to enter into the question why, when we should have expected the name of Ham, that of his son Canaan appears, since the case can be argued on either of the two explanations given of the difficulty. If it be assumed that the curse was limited to Canaan, and by no means directed against the entire race of Ham, then the passage is manifestly irrelevant to the subject of American slavery, since the Canaanites proper, the Phenicians, the Carthaginians, and other nations sprung from Canaan were none of them of the negro race. If, on the contrary, it be held that the curse was levelled against the whole descendants of Ham, even in this case it can be held to justify negro slavery, only on the unwarrantable assumption that man is bound to fulfil what he finds divinely prophesied, even though he cannot do it without trampling on the plain precepts of the moral law; nay more, without doing what even human legislation must condemn. So far is this from being a Scripture principle, that it is entirely repudiated by the word of God. Take an oft-quoted passage, which by implication establishes this: "Him [that is, Jesus], being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain," *Acts ii. 23.* Though the death of the divine Redeemer had been foreknown, nay, eternally predetermined; though, moreover, it had been the constant theme of prophecy; yet the

hands that slew the Son of God were wicked hands, notwithstanding that they verified the predictions made. And though Ham's race had been cursed, and doomed to perpetual bondage, still the hands might have been in no ordinary degree wicked which executed the divine decree. A recent writer well expresses this, though, it must be admitted, in language more pithy than polite. "We need not stop here to discuss the philosophy or theology of the doctrine that, when God issues a curse against an individual or nation, that of itself constitutes a warrant for our rushing in to kick and abuse on our own private account. We need not stop to insinuate, that those who reason in this way are somewhat more zealous and pertinacious to do what they call the will of God in this particular line than they are in anything else." The passage, therefore, in regard to Ham and Canaan, as many of those who have paraded it must feel within their secret hearts, in no way justifies American slavery. An effort is sometimes made to strengthen this argument by an entirely new line of evidence. "And who is my neighbour?" asked one who felt he must stand convicted of a breach of the law, unless he could shew that a large section of the human race had been divinely placed beyond the pale of his sympathies. And who is my neighbour? it is asked again, when fair treatment of the negro race is insisted on. Science, it is alleged by some persons, proves the African to be distinct from the Adamic race, and inferior to it in position; hence the black man is not, in the scriptural sense, our "neighbour," or entitled to the love and brotherhood white people can claim. But really the view, that the so-called Caucasian and negro races are distinct, is not that taken by the most eminent naturalists now living. Agassiz is the only one, confessedly in the very first rank of scientific inquirers, who has alleged the specific difference of those races. In regard to Agassiz, it is at once cheerfully admitted that his mind is too sternly scientific and truth-loving to admit of our entertaining the belief that he divided the human race into more species than one, with any sinister desire to justify negro slavery. But it must be admitted that the power of analysis is so prominent in his mental idiosyncrasy, that he is at times in danger of unduly magnifying slight points of difference. Thus he once attempted to prove a number of recent and tertiary shells to be distinct species, which had generally been regarded as identical, the result being that, notwithstanding his marvellous ability, he entirely failed to bring the scientific world over to his views.* The leading scientific men, undis-

* "Quarterly Journal of the Geological Society of London," vol. ii. (1846). pp. 213-215.

turbed by his too refined analysis, believed as before that shell species which he made distinct were really one and the same, just as they have continued to hold that the human species, which, with the same over-refined perception of minute differences, Agassiz wished to divide into several distinct ones, was really but one, though running into well marked and permanent varieties, quite according to the analogy of the other parts of the animate creation. To shew what the ordinary scientific belief on the subject is, take the statement of Sir Charles Lyell regarding the unity of the human race, which has all the more weight that no one will accuse him of any morbid solicitude on all occasions to conform his views to orthodoxy. Speaking of "the recent opinion, that all the leading varieties of the human family have originally sprung from a single pair," he adds, that this is "a doctrine against which there appears to me to be no sound objection."* The assumption, then, so often made in America, that the negro is a distinct species from the Caucasian, is opposed to the general opinion of the scientific world, as it certainly appears to be to the word of God. And let it be observed, that it is not logically permissible that a disputant should pretend scientific evidence exists for a diversity of species in the human family, and then eke out his slavery argument with a reference to the curse on Canaan. If the authority of the word of God is to be appealed to, its verdict must be accepted in regard to the whole case. If it be quoted to shew that a curse was pronounced on Canaan, or possibly even on the whole of Ham's race, then it must also be held to decide the point of Ham's descent from Noah; in other words, the specific identity of the Caucasian and negro varieties of mankind.

But there are some who admit the common origin of the European and the African, and yet evade the force of the reply given to the question, *Who is my neighbour?* their allegation being that the negro is inferior in intellect to the white man, and therefore the enslavement of the former by the latter is right. Against this it is maintained by many opponents of slavery that the negro intellect is equal to that of the European, and the establishment of this affirmation is supposed essential to the cause of the slave. It were not, however, difficult to shew, that it has really nothing whatever to do with the case in hand; and one allows himself to be drawn away from sure ground to a battle-field on which he is not certain of victory, when he is induced to make much of the point now indicated. Facts have not yet been brought together in sufficient numbers to settle the question conclusively, but enough has been

* "Principles of Geology," 8th edit. (1850), p. 637.

collected to shew that some of the alleged proofs of the present equality, in point of intellect, between the negro and the European, are inconclusive, or founded on error. The intelligence of negro children in schools is certified to by their teachers, and we in no respect doubt its truth. But in the case of the races inhabiting the warmer regions of the world—the Hindoos, for example—the children are so precocious, that, for a certain number of years, they throw the slow-developing European completely into the shade. After a time, however, the relative positions of the two are in most cases reversed. The Hindoo boy, who at twelve, was a very intelligent and diligent student, dux in his class, and among other attractive qualities manifesting no slight love of knowledge for its own sake, at twenty may be a very ordinary man; while the European boy, his vanquished class-fellow, who at twelve shewed but slender admiration for lessons, but a heartfelt attachment to play, at twenty may be deploring the time he has wasted, and setting with all the ardour of his strong nature to recover the ground he has lost. If, in some cases, a negro boy distances his European class-fellow of the same age, it is premature to say that he is on the road to higher or even to equal attainments with the latter—judgment in the case requires to be deferred till both competitors reach middle life. Reference is occasionally made to a “black Cyprian,” and the other bishops or pastors of the early African church; but this is done in ignorance of the ethnographic fact, that the northern limit of the true negro races has from a remote period been the great desert of Sahara: Cyprian and the other North African bishops were all, so far as can be ascertained, of the “Caucasian” variety of mankind. It is remarkable, indeed, that ancient civilisation and Christianity stopped short in Africa almost precisely at the boundary line between the Caucasian and negro races. In the case of Northern Africa, this was doubtless in large measure caused by the difficulty of crossing the Sahara; but, singularly enough, however we may account for it, it was much the same where there was no such desert to cross. In advancing southward, Abyssinia was the limit both of the Caucasian race and of Christianity—all beyond was negro and heathen. Another argument for the equality in intellect between the negro and the European is the remarkable ability of an individual here and there popularly held to belong to the negro race. One of this kind we remember highly impressing us with respect for his intellectual powers; but, while recording the fact for ethnographic and higher purposes, we learned that the so-called negro was the son of a white father, and was therefore, technically speaking, of the mulatto race. The mulattoes, like the East Indians, are often subtle in intellect, but are not unfre-

quently of a very fragile constitution. Now this delicacy of organisation is an element of much importance in deciding the social and political position a nation or an individual is destined to take in the world. It is not, as is generally stated, primarily intellect that fixes the position of a people or a person: it is strength of will, coupled with restless energy, the whole powerful machinery of action being controlled by proper moral restraints. We think then that, while so little is yet scientifically known regarding the relative ability of Europeans and negroes, rash statements on the subject should be carefully avoided. Nor are they necessary. The inquiry now spoken of, though interesting physiologically and ethnographically, has really no bearing whatever on the case of slavery. Suppose that the partial inferiority of the negro intellect were ultimately established; in order to make this serve the purpose of the pro-slavery advocate, it would be necessary to combine it with another proposition, the absurdity of which will best appear when the case is put syllogistically—

Major Premiss.—Superior intellect is entitled to enslave intellect of an inferior order.

Minor Premiss.—But the intellect of the European is superior to that of the negro.

Therefore the European is justified in reducing the negro to bondage.

In the undue attention often bestowed on the minor premiss of this syllogism, the monstrous assumption of the major one escapes without rebuke. Let the advocate for slavery, who builds anything on the alleged inferiority of the negro understanding, be compelled to bring forward the evidence on which his major premiss rests. Probably he has never thought of evidence, deeming his startling proposition in political ethics a postulate, if not even an axiom! He should therefore be plied with such interrogatories as the following:—When at a public examination a boy is declared dux of the school, does he at once put up to auction his unsuccessful companions? Or does a Guthrie, or a Spurgeon, in virtue of his genius, feel free to sell off his less-gifted brethren in the ministry? Call it postulate or axiom, or whatever other term may be deemed suitable to the case, the principle that people of higher intelligence are warranted in enslaving those less liberally endowed, is one against which the common sense and general conscience of mankind utterly revolt.

None of the sciences appealed to afford any aid in proving the negro unentitled to be regarded as in the scriptural sense our neighbour, whom we are to love as ourselves. Summoned, like Balaam, from afar to curse a hated people, they open their mouths only to bless him and prophesy his good.

We have deemed it right to defer till now any formal review of the works whose names have been prefixed to this article, believing that we should be better prepared to deal with them satisfactorily when we had previously investigated the whole subject in an independent manner, and exhibited it in the form of a brief continuous treatise. Now, however, it is more than time to direct attention to the works selected for review. We have mainly limited ourselves to volumes recently published on the American Continent, and well exhibiting the extreme antagonism of views and feelings on the slavery question between the more extreme partisans of the North and South in the sanguinary civil war. The first volume that demands notice is one by Dr Cheever, entitled, "The Guilt of Slavery and the Crime of Slaveholding demonstrated from the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures." This volume, an octavo of 472 pages, published in New York about three years ago, though not yet much known in Britain, may be supposed to express Dr Cheever's mature opinion on the subject of which it treats. It is almost superfluous to say that the work, like others that have proceeded from the same pen, is marked by much ability. All the passages bearing on the subject of slavery throughout the Old and New Testament are passed in review; the force of the various Hebrew and Greek words on the subject being elaborately discussed. This feature of the book constitutes its peculiar value. In regard to the tone and temper of the treatise, it is more difficult to give unqualified approbation. It has evidently been penned under very vehement feeling in regard to negro wrongs. With this we need scarcely say we have the most heartfelt sympathy; still, an investigation, prosecuted under deep feeling, is less likely to stand searching criticism than is the keen cold inquiry of some less impassioned spirit. We fear, then, that some of the assertions Dr Cheever unhesitatingly makes are by no means likely to be accepted by calmer minds. Assuming from the outset, as he was fully entitled to do, that the Holy Bible *could not* sanction American slavery, and finding passages which, taken in their natural meaning, unquestionably seemed to countenance it, he leaped at once to the conclusion, that grievous mistranslation must have occurred. He accounts for this by supposing that the ordinary lexicographers, the translators of the English Bible, and commentators in general, deluded partly by ignorance and partly by proslavery prejudices, were all untrustworthy in regard to his special branch of inquiry. His view of those erring classes may be inferred from the sensation heading of his fifth chapter: "Cockatrices' Eggs Laid by Lexicographers, and Hatched by Commentators; Presumptions and Misrepresentations, and Consequent Prejudices and Errors; Difficulty

of the Dislodgment of Old Tenant Lies ; Necessity of their Exorcism from Theological Literature." Our author believes that there was no such thing as slavery among the Jews, much insisting on the remarkable fact that there is no specific word for slave in ancient Hebrew. He is of opinion that the Mosaic law in no way regulated, but pointedly forbade, what the Americans term the "domestic institution" among the chosen people. It will at once be obvious that he has very formidable difficulties to surmount in establishing this position. As a specimen how he meets these, we take the essential points in his interpretation of the passage which proved such a stumbling-block in the way of poor Colenso: "And if a man smite his servant or his maid with a rod, and he die under his hand, he shall be punished. Notwithstanding, if he continue a day or two he shall not be punished, for he is his money." Dr Cheever believes that the "servant" and "maid" here mentioned were Hebrews, and hence not properly slaves. Of the relation in which the man, more or less directly killed with the rod, stood to the slayer, it is said "for he [the servant] is his [the master's] money." Our author thinks the meaning may be, that the person injured fatally may have been one who had come under indenture to serve the master for a term of years, in which case his death would be a pecuniary loss to his superior, or, in other words, he might be called that individual's "money." When, then, the homicide was brought up for trial, it might be alleged in evidence that the deed was not murder, but manslaughter, that the master could not have intended to kill one who was virtually "his money." He shall be punished is next held to require the words *with death* appended, to convey the full meaning, and the same words with death are again supplied after the clause, "he shall not be punished." At first sight this view seems unnatural and far-fetched. Yet, after comparing the passage under consideration, Exod. xxi. 20, 21, with verses 26 and 27 of the same chapter, we lean to the belief that it may be the correct interpretation. To Cheever's exegesis of some other passages we find it more difficult to give full assent, but still would again emphatically record our appreciation of the ability and research displayed in his volume. It should be carefully studied by every one who wishes to have before him the entire materials for forming an opinion on the important subject of which it treats.

The work of Mr Kennedy, of which we think highly, is a short treatise of sixty pages. It to some extent follows in the track of Cheever, but is calmer, takes up positions less extreme, and will command wider sympathy. It specially devotes attention to the exegetical part of the inquiry, and carries it out with no slight care and skill. Our author shews that slavery

was not instituted, but only regulated by the divine law ; that Hebrews might be "bought," without sinking into the same category as goods and chattels ; that the law extended to them almost the same amount of protection as if they had been free-men ; and that the seventh year was to them emphatically one of release. He further cites passages to prove that only in the case of heathen bondmen was there an approximate recognition of the principle of property in man ; but that, even in this case, the slave had many rights, and would appear to have been set free in the year of jubilee. One great support of American slavery is the fancied parallel between it and Hebrew servitude ; and Cheever, Kennedy, and others have done good service to the cause of human liberty by resolutely insisting on distinguishing things that differ. They have clearly proved that, were the Mosaic law with regard to slavery put in force in America, the speedy, nay, the instant result would be to set the bondmen free.

Van Evrie's work is almost the size of Cheever's, but the two are diverse as are the poles of the world, and as sternly antagonistic as the northern and southern armies in the American struggle. Van Evrie's mind is worth studying, from the curious psychological phenomena it presents to view. The title he gives his lucubrations is characteristic : "Negroes and Negro 'Slavery : ' the first an Inferior Race, the latter its Normal Condition." Fronting the title-page is a remarkable woodcut, in which, twice over, the points of contrast between the American and negro physical aspect are markedly brought out. In one of these the representative of the "Caucasian" race figures with an amplitude of forehead, such as we see in ideal representations of Shakspeare, while the negro *vis-à-vis* is by no means an average specimen of his class. But this is scarcely worthy of notice, considering what is to follow. "Let us reason together," is the motto which the author, evidently with no feeling that he is exposing himself to the charge of irreverence, has the audacity to put on his title-page ; and undoubtedly he has a mind in some respects of a philosophical cast, and is possessed of much knowledge on the subject of which he treats. But underneath the scientific calmness, at which he evidently aims, it is not difficult to discern a furious fanaticism for slavery, as when one looks into the crater of a volcano, and some distance beneath the hardened external crust sees quite distinctly the glowing lava fires. We have no doubt that our author knows a great deal of what may be called the natural history of the negro, and can afford to look down with complacent pity on the ignorance of European writers who have not had advantages similar to his own. But as Van Evrie and we "reason together," not all the deeply tragic elements in the

case can prevent our losing our gravity on being informed that the negro is created with little love for wife and children, but much affection for his master, so that separation from the former for the pecuniary profit of the latter is not the trial that is generally supposed; or more startling still, that the nervous sensibility so wonderfully developed in the European hand, rendering it a fitting instrument for the exercise of mechanical skill, is located not so much in the hand as over the whole person of the negro, with the manifest final cause of making him feel acutely when he is whipped. After this we exclaim that there is really no use to proceed farther, and beg the "reasoner" to accept our assurance, that he has not so much fallen short in his argument as made it only too complete.

The "Address of the Ministers of the Confederate States met in Richmond to Christians throughout the World," cannot be perused without suggesting the most mournful thoughts. The fathers and brothers of these men have freely given their lives on the battle field, after exploits which have made the world stand amazed. They solicit our sympathy with them in their heroic struggles for a cause which they deem holy. They would have us to look complacently on the slavery which they believe essential to their wellbeing. But unless we are prepared to cease regard for the eternal law of righteousness, we cannot—we dare not, return the reply they wish us to give. Our answer to them must be, that we acknowledge the heroic spirit they have shewn, the sacrifices they have made, and the victories they have won. It is beyond our province to indicate any opinion on the political part of their struggle. But in regard to the slavery for which they plead, writing with the Bible before us, we implore them to cast the deep-dyed sin from them at once and for ever, as they value the blessing of the infinitely righteous God. One of the most prominent members of their confederacy has ventured to apply to negro bondage the sublime language of the 118th Psalm, to which we have the authority of the divine Redeemer himself for attaching a very different meaning. He and they seem at open variance on the point. They can never prosper till their minds become in unison with his regarding the rights of the slave. Let them, like him, proclaim "deliverance to the captives," "set at liberty them that are bruised," and preach "the acceptable year of the Lord." And let them see in him, and not in the system of negro slavery, the stone set at nought of the builders which became the headstone of the corner.

H.

ART. VIII.—Mexico.

Le Mexique Ancien et Moderne, par MICHEL CHEVALIER, Membre de l'Institut. Paris : Librairie de L. Hachette et C^e. 1863.

THE French expedition to Mexico has at length been crowned with success, and the ever-changing and disorderly republican government of that magnificent country has been supplanted by the empire of Maximilian of Austria. It is to be hoped that, under his rule, order, and peace, and prosperity, may ultimately succeed the anarchy that has afflicted Mexico during her existence as an independent State ; but, in the mean time, we fear that the strength and stability of his government, and the obedience of his subjects, are principally dependent on the presence of the French army of occupation. The Mexicans have been so demoralised by the effect of nearly half-a-century of anarchy and foreign and domestic strife, that they are incapable of understanding the advantages of peace and good order. They have become enamoured of misrule, and a long period must necessarily elapse before they can be brought to appreciate the benefits of a permanent and well-organised government, or become reconciled to a social and political state better adapted to the necessities of their country, and more in conformity with the requirements of modern civilisation, than that in which they have been living ever since their emancipation from the dominion of Spain.

The volume which we have prefixed to the present article, affords a thorough insight into the state of Mexico during the Spanish colonial system, the war of emancipation, the period of independence, and the earlier stages of the French expedition. The success of that expedition, and its consequences, are anticipated, and the Archduke Maximilian is held forth as the prince best fitted for the throne of Mexico, and the difficult and complicated task of restoring her to order and prosperity. No book, probably, could be better timed, and no man, certainly, could be better qualified for writing it than M. Chevalier. Northern and Central America are no new objects of study to him. So far back as 1832, he was sent by M. Thiers to examine and report upon the various means of communication in the United States, and especially upon their railways. He was two years absent, and the result of his mission was the publication of the admirable letters which first appeared in the *Journal des Débats*, and were subsequently reprinted, in a separate form, under the title of "*Lettres sur l'Amérique du Nord*."* He

* Baron Humboldt wrote of this work, that it might be considered "*Comme un traité de la civilisation des peuples de l'occident ;*" and another accomplished critic affirmed that it was "*le tableau le plus graphique et le plus vrai de l'état social de l'Amérique.*"

also published an elaborate work, useful alike to the engineer and the statesman, entitled, "*Histoire et la description des voies de communication aux Etats-Unis, et des travaux qui en dependent.*" During his absence from France, M. Chevalier visited Cuba, Mexico, and other parts of Spanish America, and composed "*Lettres sur l'Amerique Espagnole,*" fragments of which appeared in the columns of the *Journal des Débats*, but which have not hitherto been published in a separate form. We have no doubt, however, that they have been largely drawn upon in the composition of the present volume. It will thus be seen that M. Chevalier has the advantage of being acquainted with the position and resources of Mexico from personal observation; and his profound knowledge of political economy and the industrial sciences generally, his eminence as an engineer, his clearness of thought and felicity of expression as a writer, combine to render him admirably fitted for the task he has undertaken. His book is divided into eight parts: the first two treating of the Aztec empire, and its conquest by Cortes; the third, of Mexico under the colonial rule of Spain; the fourth, of the war of emancipation; the fifth, of Mexico as an independent State; the sixth, of the resources and future of the country; the seventh, of the motives for a European intervention, or of an intervention by France alone, in the affairs of Mexico, and of its chances of success; the eighth and last, of the attempt to regenerate Mexico viewed in connection with the present attitude of the court of Rome towards modern civilisation. The first and second of these divisions have been rendered familiar to most English readers by the delightful narrative of Prescott, from whom M. Chevalier chiefly derives his information. We shall, therefore, pass them over, and proceed to consider the condition of Mexico as a Spanish colony. The Spanish colonial system, at the period of the Mexican conquest, like that of all the other European nations who then possessed colonies, was of a narrow and despotic character, arising from the false and imperfect notions which were generally prevalent with regard to the relations which ought to subsist between parent states and their colonial possessions. Mexico was viewed, not as a great country with unrivalled natural advantages of soil, climate, and mineral wealth, which ought to be developed to the best advantage, but as a mere dependency of Spain, which afforded to the favoured inhabitants of that peninsula a rapid and easy means of acquiring wealth. The colony, in short, was sacrificed to the mother country. Her commerce was crippled by injudicious restrictions, which entirely prevented its development, except in the direction and for the benefit of Spain. The press was subjected to a strict censorship, the Inquisition was established,

the original inhabitants were purposely kept in ignorance and degradation, and the descendants even of Spaniards who came to settle in Mexico were systematically excluded from all important offices, both in church and state, which were bestowed only upon natives of Spain. And thus it happened that a numerous and powerful class gradually arose, whose interest it was to throw off the Spanish yoke, because, under that yoke, they were deprived of all share in the government of their country, and of all active and serious political life. Another evil of the Spanish colonial regime was, that the wealth and possessions of the church were allowed to become so exorbitant, that, according to the statement of M. Alaman, a distinguished Mexican writer of the present century, its property was equal in value to half the territory of the state. Some of the prelates belonging to this wealthy ecclesiastical corporation had enormous revenues. The Archbishop of Mexico, for example, had £28,000 a year, and the Bishop of Valladolid £22,000. All these high offices, however, in the Mexican hierarchy, were conferred upon natives of Spain, and the whites of Spanish descent born in Mexico were only admitted to the curacies, which were seldom worth more than from £20 to £50 a year; and it is deserving of notice, that it was one of these poorly paid and despised priests, Miguel Hidalgo, curate of the little village of Dolores, who first raised the standard of revolt in the Mexican war of independence. In fact, the chief cause of the Mexican revolution was the foolish policy, so long and obstinately persevered in by the mother country, of keeping the Creoles, or whites born in Mexico—in whose veins flowed Spanish blood without a taint—in a state of complete political nullity.

The success of the North American colonies in compelling Great Britain to acknowledge their independence, and the ideas spread abroad by the French Revolution of 1789, produced a powerful effect in Mexico very unfavourable to the stability of the Spanish government. Yet that effect might have been easily counteracted, if the Court of Spain had been wise in time, and had granted to the Mexican Creoles equal political privileges with the natives of Spain settled in the country. It refused to do so, and left, as before, two distinct and hostile classes, the privileged Spaniards, who engrossed all political power and influence, and the despised Creoles, who were permitted to acquire wealth, and were diverted with titles of nobility and commissions in the militia, but were sedulously excluded from all share in the government of their country. Some of the wisest statesmen of Spain foresaw, indeed, the folly and danger of such a course, and warned the Spanish cabinet of the inevitable result of the policy it was pursuing.

In particular, the Count of Aranda, who, as ambassador from the court of Madrid, had taken part in the treaty of Paris, which, in 1783, recognised the independence of the United States, addressed a letter to King Charles the Third, in which he predicted, with remarkable clearness and sagacity, the great future reserved for the United States, and the encroachments which they would make upon the territories of Mexico. He also adverted to the effect which the new ideas of the rights of the people would have upon the inhabitants of the Spanish colonies, and pointed out how advisable it was, if not to prevent the growth and spread of these ideas, at least to lessen their consequences. With this view, he proposed to King Charles that the Spanish crown should retain, in North America, only the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, and in South America, a dependency as conveniently situated with regard to them as possible. He further proposed that three independent kingdoms should be erected, each governed by a Spanish prince, one in Mexico, one in Peru, and the third in the Costa-firma ; that the king of Spain should assume the title of Emperor, and should bind these three kingdoms to him by all possible ties, in a strict offensive and defensive alliance, strengthened by commercial arrangements on a footing of entire reciprocity, and cemented by marriages between the royal families. In requital for the independence thus granted, Mexico was to pay to Spain an annual tribute in bars of silver, Peru in ingots of gold, and the Costa-firma in its most valuable productions, particularly in tobacco. This scheme of Count Aranda was not listened to, and probably, even if it had been carried out, it would not have been as successful as he anticipated ; but it is interesting, as shewing that at least one Spanish statesman of last century was gifted with remarkable political sagacity and foresight, and was thoroughly aware of the evils of the Spanish colonial system, and of the necessity of applying to them prompt and powerful remedies.

Yet with all the evils of the Spanish colonial system, Mexico enjoyed under it far greater prosperity than she has since done under the stormy and anarchical period of national independence. Several magnificent public works were undertaken and completed, such as the vast canal of Huehuetoca for the drainage of the lakes of the table-land around Mexico, and the protection of that city from inundations. This truly great work was begun in 1607, and only finished in 1789, and was unrivalled, even in Europe, until the days of railways. In science and in the fine arts also, considerable progress was made. "The government of Charles III.," says M. Chevalier, "shewed itself favourable to the sciences ; they began to cultivate them with success in Mexico, even in the highest branches, such as

astronomy. . . . In the secondary cities even, the spirit of progress was manifested by useful foundations. Thus, at Xalapa, for example, a good school of design, maintained by the wealthy inhabitants, spread the elements of instruction among the artisans. A school of painting and sculpture, established at Mexico, gave the most satisfactory results. The statuary Tolsa there made and cast in bronze an equestrian statue of King Charles IV. which foreign connoisseurs still admire, in the locality to which it has been consigned since the downfall of the Spanish dominion. In spite of the numerous and profound vices of the colonial government, population was increasing, its well-being had made rapid progress in a great number of places, and general enlightenment was beginning to spread. But progress was not in proportion to the impatience of the most distinguished intellects, and the permanence of institutions rebuked by reason, offended the inmost feelings of those among the inhabitants who had some acquaintance with Europe, and with the principles upon which modern civilisation loves to establish itself."

In 1808, Napoleon overthrew the Bourbon dynasty in Spain, and became for a time master of the Peninsula; but the first effect of the arrival of this news in Mexico was to produce a strong manifestation of loyalty and devotion towards the de-throned monarch. All the *Ayuntamientos*, or municipal bodies, sent addresses to the viceroy, expressive of their sympathy with Ferdinand the seventh, and their attachment to his person and cause. But the abdication of the Spanish king, from whom emanated all legal authority in Mexico, left the Mexicans for the time masters of their own destiny, and they began to think and to talk about national sovereignty and national assemblies. The municipality of Mexico took the lead in this movement, and demanded from the viceroy, Don José Iturrigaray, the convocation of a national Assembly formed of delegates from the different provinces. The Viceroy himself was not unfavourable to this demand; but before consenting to it, he laid the matter before the *Audiencia*, or Supreme Court of Mexico, in order to obtain its opinion. The *Audiencia* was composed entirely of Spaniards, was invested with great powers, and was strongly opposed to all reforms, and to everything that savoured of liberalism. Accordingly, it shrunk from the idea of a national assembly, and still more strongly from that of granting to the Creoles equal political rights with the Spaniards. The Spaniards numbered but fifty, or at most seventy thousand; while the Creoles were at least a million. The *Audiencia*, therefore, dreaded the introduction of an elective and representative system, in which the Spaniards would be swamped by the far superior number of the Creoles. They consequently determined

to reject the proposition of the municipality of Mexico ; but finding the Viceroy resolved to agree to it, they conspired against him, seized his person, and shut him up, along with two of his sons, in the prisons of the Inquisition, under a flimsy pretext of heresy which deceived no one. They then proceeded to punish the most influential members of the municipality of Mexico and their most conspicuous adherents, organised the Spaniards into committees of public safety, collected troops to repress the slightest manifestation of popular feeling, and in short, did everything to offend and insult the Mexicans, and to convince them that between them and the Spaniards there was a great gulf fixed. Some of the chief members of the *Audiencia* were accustomed to say, that while they remained a cobbler of Castille or a mule of la Mancha, to them, and not to the Creoles, would the government of Mexico belong ; and they used also to tell the municipality of Mexico, that their only duty was to keep the beggars of the capital in order. People can bear to be oppressed, but not to be insulted, and the pride and insolence of the *Audiencia* was the immediate cause of the independence of Mexico, and the final and irrevocable split between the Spaniards and the Creoles, which ended twenty years afterwards, in the banishment of the former from the Mexican territories. The two factions early assumed the names of *Gachupines* and *Guadalupes*—the Guelphs and Ghibellines of the new world—the former term being used to designate the Spaniards, and the latter the Creoles. The name of *Guadalupe* was derived from a magnificent convent in the neighbourhood of Mexico dedicated to the virgin, and Our Lady of Guadalupe was considered the special protectress of Mexico.

On the 16th September 1810, two years after the arrest of the Viceroy Iturrigaray, the standard of independence was first raised by Don Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, curate of the little village of Dolores, chiefly inhabited by Indians. He was upwards of sixty years old when he thus became the champion of his country's liberties ; and so generally had the nation been disgusted by the arrogance of the Spaniards, that he speedily found himself strong enough to capture two cities of considerable size and importance, and afterwards to besiege and take the wealthy city of Guanajuato, situated near the richest silver mines in Mexico. The successes of Hidalgo were, however, disgraced by licence and wholesale plunder, and tarnished by cruelty and bloodshed. He everywhere confiscated all property belonging to the Spaniards, and the massacres ordered or permitted by him at Guanajuato, Valladolid, and Guadalajara, have left an indelible stain on his memory. Encouraged by his first success, Hidalgo advanced upon Mexico, but found himself too weak to effect the reduction of that

magnificent and populous city. Victorious at the battle of las Cruces, he was defeated at Aculco, and at the Bridge of Calderon, by General Calleja, the most brilliant name on the Spanish side during the war of independence. He was ultimately taken prisoner on his way to the United States, and was shot soon afterwards, along with several of his companions. He met death with the utmost coolness and intrepidity; and on the very evening of his execution, in the midst of the fatal preparations, he composed two pieces in verse to thank his jailors for the attentions which they had shewn him. It is worthy of notice, that several of the most prominent figures in the war of Mexican independence arose from the ranks of the working clergy; and in reading the elaborate work of M. Lucas Alaman recording the events of that war, we meet, almost on every page, the names of regular or secular clergy among the promoters and abettors of the rising against Spain, and among the leaders of the insurgent forces. The names of three of these warlike priests are especially conspicuous: Hidalgo, whose career we have just noticed; his successor Morelos, who was for four years the centre and chief of the revolution; and Matamoros, who was lieutenant both to Hidalgo and Morelos. After the death of Hidalgo, a fresh impulse was communicated to the revolt by the energetic leadership of Morelos, who at one time was master of nearly the half of Mexico, but was defeated at Santa Maria, and still more disastrously at Puruaran, where his army was almost annihilated. In the latter battle, Matamoros, the lieutenant of Morelos, was taken prisoner by the Spaniards, and Morelos proposed to the Spanish general Calleja to give in exchange for him more than two hundred soldiers belonging to the battalion of Asturias. Calleja replied by shooting his prisoner; and Morelos retaliated by putting the 200 Spanish captives to death. Such is a specimen of the atrocities that were perpetrated on both sides during the war of independence. It is pleasant, however, to be able to record some striking instances of clemency and generosity—such, for example, as the conduct of Nicolas Bravo, a famous revolutionary general, whose father had fallen into the hands of the implacable Calleja, then Viceroy of Mexico. Morelos placed 300 Spanish prisoners at the disposal of Nicolas, in order to obtain the liberation of his father. They were offered to Calleja, but in vain; his only answer was to hasten the execution of his prisoner. On learning his father's death, Nicolas Bravo condemned the 300 Spaniards to be shot, and placed them in a chapel, with the intention of having their sentence carried out in the morning. But, during the night, the thought of the coming butchery weighed upon his soul, and would allow him no rest. He felt

that it would dishonour the cause of independence ; and at sunrise he set his prisoners free, telling them to lose no time in hastening from his camp, lest he might be prompted to sacrifice them in revenge for his unfortunate father.

It would be tedious to follow the war of independence through its various vicissitudes and fluctuations, extending over a period of upwards of ten years. The insurgents were generally beaten in the field, but their cause was steadily gaining ground in the heart of the nation. After the combat of Puruaran, 5th January 1814, the cause of independence seemed well nigh desperate in a military point of view ; and in a vaunting proclamation to his army, issued in June 1814, the Viceroy Calleja used the most contemptuous terms towards the insurgents, and spoke of the insurrection as extirpated. His real sentiments with regard to it, however, are to be found in a report which he made to the government of Ferdinand the Seventh, almost at the same period. In that report, he fully admits the extent and importance of the revolutionary movement. "The judge," he says, "disguises the crimes of the insurgents, or abstains from punishing them, when he is not a party to them. The priests in the confessional insinuate disobedience and independence into the minds of the faithful, when they do not openly recommend them from the pulpit. Authors pervert public opinion in favour of the insurrectionary movement. The women gain over the military. The government official warns the rebels of the plans of his superiors ; the youth hold themselves in readiness, and are arming ; the old assist by their councils. The corporations are on bad terms with the Europeans, refuse to admit them into their ranks, and shirk giving any assistance to government. They travesty the acts of authority in order to make them detested ; they bring them into discredit by remonstrances for which they always find a pretext. It is thus that every one is agreed to undermine the edifice of the state under the shelter of liberal institutions."

The success of the revolution of 1820 in Spain, which re-established the free constitution of 1812, gave a great impulse to the cause of independence in Mexico. But the Viceroy Apodaca was strongly opposed to it, and was encouraged in his opposition by Ferdinand the 7th, who privately wrote to him that he intended to abandon Spain and establish himself in Mexico, where he hoped to find, in the midst of more devoted and obedient subjects, a refuge from the storms of revolution. Thus encouraged, Apodaca assembled a strong force, under pretence of employing it against the revolutionary bands, who still maintained themselves in the mountains of the south, and gave the command to a Creole officer, on whose

fideliſy he believed that he might thoroughly rely. But the very means which the Viceroy uſed to ſtrengthen the government of Ferdinand the 7th, and to extinguiſh the laſt embers of rebellion, led to the irretreivable ruin of the former, and the final ſucceſs of the latter. The commander he choſe was Colonel Auguſtine Iturbide, who had been equally diſtinguiſhed for bravery and cruelty in the war againſt Hidalgo and Morelos, and had acquired great popularity among the Creole ſoldiers ſerving under the Spaniſh ſtandard. This officer received the inſtructions of Apodaca with every appearance of zeal and devotion ; but once at his poſt, he determined to employ the power which he wielded, to effect a reſult the very oppoſite of that contemplated by the Viceroy. The military force then in Mexico conſiſted of eleven regiments of Spaniards and twenty-four of Creoles, ſo that it was evident that, if Iturbide could ſucceed in gaining over the latter, he would become maſter of the ſituation, as he would be ſure of the ſupport of the ſoldiers of independence as ſoon as he raiſed the ſtandard of Mexico. Accordingly, having gone to the village of Iguala with that portion of his army of whoſe fidelity he was beſt aſſured, Iturbide, on the 24th February 1821, proclaimed the independence of Mexico, with the programme which has ſince become famous under the name of the "Plan of Iguala." This document is remarkable for its moderation, and its endeavour to conciliate the rival claims of the contending parties. It provides that Mexico ſhall be an independent monarchical ſtate, with a conſtitution ſuited to the neceſſities of the country ; that the throne ſhall be offered to Ferdinand the 7th, and on his reſuſal to the two infants of Spain ſucceſſively ; and on their failing, to the Archduke Charles of Auſtria ; and if he alſo ſhall decline to accept, that a prince of one of the reigning houſes of Europe ſhall be called to the throne. The Plan further declared that the other inhabitants of Mexico ſhould in future poſſeſs an equality of rights with the natives of Spain ; but it guaranteed to the latter the poſſeſſion of their employments, which was a great conceſſion, as all important offices were ſtill held by Spaniards. We muſt not, however, forget to mention, that the ſupport of the Mexican clergy was ſecured to the Plan of Iguala by a guarantee that the Romiſh religion ſhould be maintained with all its excluſive rights and privileges. The firſt article bears that one of the baſes of the organiſation of the country ſhall be "the Catholic, Apoſtolic, Roman religion, without toleration of any other." The liberality of the Mexican liberals does not ſeem to have extended to religion.

Success ſmiled upon the deſigns of Iturbide. He was joined by Guerrero and by Nicolas Bravo two of the moſt diſtinguiſhed inſurgent leaders. But in ſpite of this acceſſion of ſtrength,

the Spaniards, whose stronghold was the city of Mexico, determined not to agree to the plan of Iguala, and they were supported in their resistance by the *Audiencia*, that bulwark of all antiquated abuses. They deposed the Viceroy, and replaced him by General Novella, an officer of artillery; and confident in the valour of the Spanish troops, prepared to defend the city to the last. In the mean time, however, General O'Donoghue, the new Viceroy appointed by the constitutional government at Madrid, arrived in Mexico; almost immediately on his arrival he had an interview with Iturbide at Cordova, a city not far from Vera Cruz, on the road to Mexico; and there, on the 27th September 1821, was concluded the treaty, which, reproducing in all essential particulars the Plan of Iguala, recognised and secured the independence of Mexico.

No history affords a stronger proof, or a clearer illustration, that any government is preferable to a state of constant change and anarchy, than that of Mexico throughout the forty years of its independent existence. During the three centuries of the colonial administration of Spain—exclusive and despotic though it was—the vast territory of Mexico, eight times as large as France, remained entire; population and commerce increased; the finances were in a flourishing state; important public works were executed; justice was upon the whole fairly administered; and life and property were tolerably secure. During the period of independence, on the other hand—which lasted from the Treaty of Cordova, 27th September 1821, to the recent invasion and conquest by the French, and the establishment of a Mexican empire under Maximilian of Austria,—Mexico lost one-half of her territory; her commerce dwindled to a mere nothing; her debt increased; there was no security for life or property; government succeeded government as each successive military chief obtained for a time a superiority over his competitors; agriculture, mining, all the employments of peaceful industry, were neglected; and anarchy seemed destined to be the normal state of the fair land of Anahuac. First of all, the throne was offered to Ferdinand the 7th and the princes of the royal house of Spain, and refused by them. Then came the ephemeral empire of Iturbide, the bold and unscrupulous Creole officer who was the author of the Plan of Iguala and the Treaty of Cordova; and that again was succeeded by a republican form of government modelled upon the Federal constitution of the United States, in the name of which General Santa-Anna, Herrera, and other chiefs, wielded the powers of the state for their own selfish ends. During the existence of the republic, one peculiarly unfortunate act was passed by congress, in a moment of public irritation, caused by the invasion of the Mexican territory by the Spanish general Barradas in 1829.

We allude to the decree banishing the Spanish population *en masse* from Mexico. Violent and extreme measures are seldom profitable, and this one expelled from the country the most intelligent and industrious of its inhabitants, who took with them a large amount of wealth. Mexico was but little able to afford this exodus of intellect and capital. Nothing can afford a stronger proof of the misgovernment of Mexico during the period of independence, than the lamentable change that then took place in the former flourishing state of the finances. Under the colonial régime, the finances were in a prosperous state. Between 1712 and 1803, the annual revenue had increased from £640,000 to £4,387,000; and in the latter year the whole expenditure amounted to little more than half the revenue. But during the period of independence this large surplus entirely disappeared, and a permanent annual deficit became the rule; although the regular revenue of the country had been supplemented by the sum of three and a half millions sterling, received from the government of the United States, after the war of 1847, for the forced sale of New Mexico, California, and Mesilla. A national debt of twenty-five millions sterling was contracted; and in 1856, the last year for which we have statistics that may be relied on, the revenue amounted to three and a half millions sterling, of which fully three millions were absorbed by the war budget, the collection of the revenue, and the national debt, leaving a balance utterly inadequate to meet the expenses of justice, public instruction, foreign relations, and other branches of the civil administration. The following are M. Chevalier's remarks upon the state of Mexico under the reign of independence. "Under the name of republic, Mexico had only a deplorable anarchy, with all its sad accompaniments, the absence of security for property and persons, the engagements of the State violated, industry languishing or extinguished, the roads systematically infested by brigands, the nation demoralised, knowledge darkened and the few establishments for public instruction disorganised, a frightful corruption in the government and in the administration of justice. The number of men who have successively occupied the presidency and been hurled from it is almost unlimited, especially during the six last years; doubt and despair consume the souls of good citizens." If this description is correct and free from exaggeration, it is scarcely possible to avoid acknowledging that even foreign invasion and conquest, if followed by the establishment of a strong and enlightened government, must be considered a vast improvement upon such a state of affairs.

But in thus speaking of the disorders and misfortunes which marked the forty years of the independent government of Mexico, we wish carefully to guard ourselves against being

misunderstood. We are no enemies to republican institutions. Under them much national happiness has been enjoyed and much progress made in material prosperity and in civil and religious freedom ; and we have no liking for despotic governments, which, while they maintain a certain show of order and subordination in their internal administration, and display a considerable amount of vigour in war, at the same time inevitably produce a stagnation of intellect and a corruption of manners, by denying to the people all free expression of thought, and all active participation in political life. Nor do we think that the choice of a scion of the House of Hapsburg to be the ruler of the Mexican empire can be considered a happy one. That house has always been conspicuous for its enmity to civil and religious liberty. Again and again, it has crushed reforms in blood, and has joined hand in hand with the Church of Rome in putting down the free expression of religious opinion by the sword and the faggot. In its long line of princes are to be found many persecutors and only two reformers—Joseph the First and the present youthful Emperor of Austria. The choice of a prince from such a house can scarcely, therefore, be deemed a fortunate one, though we sincerely hope that the Emperor Maximilian may yet prove false to the traditions of his race, and true to the spirit and the necessities of modern civilisation. Another point to which we desire to direct attention is this, that many of the disorders that characterised the independent government of Mexico, were but a legacy from the colonial régime of Spain. Under that system, the vast majority of the people were absolutely excluded from political life, and denied all participation in the government of their country, so that when they at last got the power into their own hands, they had no knowledge and no experience to guide them in the use of it, and consequently committed all sorts of blunders. Besides, under the Spanish régime the people were kept in gross ignorance by the priests and the inquisition, and taught to believe the most childish and corrupting superstitions ; so that when a reaction took place against priestly domination as well as against political tyranny, it was but natural that it should be violent and anarchical. Then, again, when the Mexican republic, in 1856, appropriated the overgrown wealth of the clergy to the purposes of the State, the national disorders were still further increased by a great schism, on one side of which stood the priesthood supported by the See of Rome and the more superstitious part of the people who defended all abuses and would hear of no reform ; and on the other, the liberal party who were in favour of civil and religious freedom, but were inclined to carry out their reforms with too much haste and violence, and too much disregard for the rights of others.

It will thus be evident that the disorders of Mexican independence were but the natural results of the manifold errors and abuses of the colonial government of Spain ; and it should also be remembered that, in the moral as in the natural world, periods of transition are almost always marked by convulsions and strife.

There is much interesting matter in that part of M. Chevalier's volume which treats of the political and military difficulties of the French expedition ; though, as the book was written before the success of that expedition was assured, its interest is now, to some extent, diminished. The expedition, according to him, is the starting-point of the regeneration of Mexico ; but it is also intended to compel reparation for acts of spoliation and violence committed upon French citizens, for which the Mexican government has hitherto refused all atonement. He affirms, however, that in this expedition France has no thought of aggrandisement : "The French government," he says, "intervenes openly in the internal affairs of Mexico ; but it makes this declaration, of which no one has a right to doubt the sincerity, that it has no designs of conquest or aggrandisement. Instead of thinking of enfeebling or dismembering Mexico, as the United States have done in each of their wars, it has for its sole object the rescue of these beautiful countries from imminent ruin, the restoration of civilisation from an almost complete downfall, and the foundation in Mexico, with the free concurrence of the Mexicans, of a flourishing State, which shall govern itself in entire independence." And elsewhere he again declares, that "France is not drawn towards Mexico by any thought of conquest, as were the United States in 1847, and the Spanish army of Barradas in 1829. Thus the independence of the Mexicans is not compromised, and the integrity of their territory is not menaced." We sincerely trust that M. Chevalier may be correct in these statements ; but we cannot forget that something of the same nature was pompously put forth previously to the war of liberation in Italy. There also, France vehemently disclaimed all thoughts of aggrandisement, and asserted that she made war only for an idea. Yet that idea ultimately assumed the tangible and singularly convenient form of Nice and Savoy, which nicely rounded off the territory of France, and carried her frontier to the feet of the Alps. We entirely agree, however, with M. Chevalier in thinking, that one good consequence of no little importance is likely to result from the success of the French expedition, and that is, the establishment of a strong and permanent government in Mexico, which will effectually put a stop to the operation of the absurd and arrogant Monroe doctrine, so strongly insisted on by the Cabinet of Washington, which would absolutely inter-

dict European States from any interference with the affairs of North or South continental America, and which is in reality, but a flimsy disguise, behind which the United States may carry on their schemes of unscrupulous ambition in the New World.

In this part of his book, M. Chevalier presents us with an admirable and eloquent summary of the relative progress of the nations of the Latin stock—of which France is the head—who have adhered to the Romish faith, and of the principal nations of Europe and America, of other descent, who have abandoned that creed. And in drawing this contrast, he pays a marked and striking compliment to the superior advantages of Protestantism, by shewing how enormous has been the progress of Protestant nations in national liberty, in material prosperity, and in the number and extent of their possessions on the face of the globe, within the last two hundred years, as compared with that of Roman Catholic countries. The latter have lost, and are daily losing, ground; the former are as steadily increasing. France, M. Chevalier thinks, as the head of the great Latin stock, of which Mexico is the most important branch in the New World, is bound to do her utmost to raise Mexico from the degradation into which she has fallen, and thus strengthen the Latin group of nations, in whose progress and development she is naturally so deeply interested, but who have been for some time falling back in the world, owing to their adherence to Romanism, and the narrow and despotic views of civil and ecclesiastical affairs which are inseparable from that religion.

M. Chevalier is anxious that the campaigns of the French army in Mexico—like those of the Romans in ancient days—should be marked not only by the success of their arms, but also by the execution of works of public utility, such as railroads, bridges, the draining of marshes, the furnishing of copious supplies of pure water, and other improvements of a similar character, which are at present very much wanted throughout the country. He is also desirous that a scientific exploring expedition should be attached to the army, for the purpose of opening up and making known the vast Mexican territories, as yet but imperfectly explored, but which offer so much that is novel and interesting, and where nature is everywhere marked with the stamp of originality. It is acknowledged that the mission of the French army will by no means be fulfilled by the mere conquest of Mexico, and that their presence as an army of occupation will probably be required for a considerable period, to establish and maintain good order, to support the government of the Emperor Maximilian, and to check the incursions of the warlike Indian tribes, who, taking advantage

of the distracted state of the country, at present infest and desolate its northern frontiers. Twenty thousand men is fixed upon as the smallest force necessary for these purposes. M. Chevalier is doubtless perfectly correct in saying that the payment of such a force, for a period of eight or ten years, would be but little to the taste of the Legislative body in France. But there is a fund arising from the confiscation of the enormous possessions of the clergy, appropriated by the State during the period of independence, the amount of which is variously estimated at from £53,320,000 to £65,160,000; and it is evident that either of these sums would be amply sufficient, under judicious management, not only to maintain the army of occupation, but also to supply the means of communication, in which Mexico is at present deplorably deficient, to provide for the establishment and endowment of schools and colleges, for the repair of public works and buildings that have fallen into decay, and to re-establish the finances of the country on a firm and satisfactory footing.

No part of the work before us, is more interesting and instructive than that which treats of the resources and the future of Mexico. At present, that vast region is scarcely of any consequence among civilised nations. Except for the silver it produces, it is useless to the human race; but with its immense natural advantages of position and climate, a government so organised as to enable the people to profit fully by the gifts which nature has spread before them with so lavish a hand, would soon place Mexico in a high rank in the scale of nations. Her position between the two great oceans, with one coast-line stretching along the Pacific, and another skirting the Mexican gulf, is singularly favourable for commercial purposes, affording the means of developing a vast traffic with Europe on the one side, and with Asia on the other. Her territory—lying within the tropics, yet principally consisting of an extensive elevated plateau or table-land, stretching through 22 degrees of latitude, with a climate favourable to European constitutions, and to the cultivation of those grains and fruits, which are most propitious to their health and enjoyment—is another fortunate peculiarity of the land of Anahuac. This plateau, with its flanks dipping down towards the two oceans, affords the means of the most varied cultivation; on its surface and slopes almost every vegetable production of temperate and tropical climes will flourish; and were a railway constructed from Vera Cruz to Mexico, one might easily pass in a few hours from the palm and the sugar-cane, to the ash, the poplar, and the corn-field. Rivers are the great want of Mexico. It is an arid country; and most of the streams are torrents during the rainy season, and dry during the rest of the year. The Rio Bravo del Norte—

the frontier between Mexico and Texas—the Guazacoalco, and the Santiago or Tololotlan, are the only rivers of any consequence in a country three and a half times the size of France. There are, it is true, a number of lakes—the largest of which, that of Chapala, covers nearly 1200 square miles—but most of them are so impregnated with carbonate of soda, as to be useless for irrigation or domestic purposes.

The mineral wealth of Mexico is enormous, and has hitherto been very imperfectly developed. Australia and California now surpass it ; but until 1848, Mexico was the principal country in the world for the production of the precious metals, and its yield in gold and silver united exceeded that of the rest of the new world. “If Mexico,” says M. Chevalier, “has thus suffered herself to be deprived of the first rank, it is not the fault of nature, but of man. We recognise here the deplorable influence of that evil political organisation which arrests progress in every department.” At the end of the last, and beginning of the present century, before the outbreak of the war of independence, and the extinction of all steady industry, the Mexican mines usually yielded from five to five and a quarter millions annually. These mines possess this great advantage over those of Peru, and most of the other mining countries of America, that they are generally situated at a moderate height above the sea, in positions easily accessible, and enjoying an agreeable climate, whereas in Peru, the richest mines are placed at great heights above the sea, and almost on the verge of the region of eternal snow. The discovery of the mines of New-Almaden in California, and their great productiveness in mercury, so essential for the reduction of the ores of silver, is likely, as soon as the government becomes settled, to give a great impulse to mining in Mexico. At the commencement of the present century, Humboldt expressed his opinion that Europe had only begun to take advantage of the inexhaustible abundance of silver in the chain of the Andes ; and M. Dupont, an accomplished geologist who wrote forty years later, affirms that the veins hitherto worked are as nothing in comparison to those that still remain to be worked, and predicts that the time will come when the production of silver will have no other limits, than those which will be prescribed to it by its constantly decreasing value. Here, then, is a vast field opened up to the scientific skill and enterprise of the French mining engineers. But they must first pacify the country, and open it up by roads, railways, bridges, and other means of communication, before these golden, or rather silver, visions can be turned into realities.

M. Chevalier calculates that Mexico is capable of supporting three times as many inhabitants as France, or one hundred

millions of people. At present, her population amounts to only eight millions, of whom fully one-half are Indians of pure blood, descended from the ancient Aztecs ; one million two hundred thousand are Spanish Creoles ; and the remainder consists of mixed races, principally resulting from the union of whites and Indians. The negro race in Mexico numbers only ten thousand, and slavery has been abolished for nearly half a century. It is clear, therefore, that, upon the establishment of a strong and enlightened government, prepared to do its utmost to develop the resources of the country, one of the first wants felt would be a want of labour. There would not be hands enough to cultivate the soil, to dig in the mines, and to labour on works of public utility ; and to supply this want, M. Chevalier proposes to introduce Coolies and Chinese, but he expresses a decided preference for the latter. He would bind them to serve for a fixed term of years, would guarantee them the reward of their labour, and would place them, as regards their legal rights, in all respects on an equal footing with the whites. " Few countries," he says, " are so favourably situated as Mexico for becoming the aim of Chinese emigration. By their application to work, and their acuteness in commercial affairs, the Chinese would be a valuable acquisition to the Mexican nation. China has hitherto not been sufficiently considered, as it ought to have been, as an inexhaustible reservoir of population, whence we might draw, not only skilful, sober, economical, indefatigable workmen, but also mercantile men of rare ability. It has been the fashion, at a certain period, to designate the inhospitable deserts of Scandinavia by the pompous title of the laboratory of nations. That title may belong, at no distant date, to China, in this sense that we have good reason to believe that the course of events will lead numerous and unlimited swarms to issue from it, who will direct their course even to far distant countries."

The concluding part of M. Chevalier's volume, on the attempt to regenerate Mexico, considered with reference to the present attitude of the court of Rome towards modern civilisation, opens up a novel and important aspect of the Mexican question. It is a masterly summary of the past history of the papacy, and especially of its hostile attitude towards the progress and civilisation of the human race during the last thirty years. The author proves from the encyclical letters and allocutions of the popes, during that period, that so far from the Romish see being at all influenced by the spirit of the age, and anxious, if possible, to meet and reconcile itself with the liberal tendencies of the principal Christian nations, it has, on the contrary, systematically opposed that spirit and these tendencies by every means at its command. It has denounced the spirit

of free inquiry, as emanating from the devil; it has condemned freedom of the press, religious toleration, liberty of association and of teaching, as deplorable evils leading to schism and infidelity. In short, it has done everything in its power to shew that the progress of the human race in knowledge and civilisation, is utterly and necessarily irreconcilable with obedience to the teaching of the infallible church. Nations must therefore choose between the church on the one side, and liberty and progress on the other. They cannot have both. They must either submit to be kept in a perpetual minority, and petrified into unreasoning and slavish obedience to the yoke of the Romish theocracy, or they must boldly cast it aside and leave each man free to follow his own religious convictions as well as his own political opinions. "The more the liberals," says M. Chevalier, "have strengthened the ground beneath their feet throughout Europe, the more conquests they have made by the force of persuasion, the more they have succeeded in inducing states and societies to follow the paths which they prefer, and in which civilisation is assured of finding power and happiness, the more the Romish Church has affected immobility, the more she has poured out censure and insult upon the changes which sovereigns themselves, attentive to the signs of the times, have loyally introduced into their government, and consecrated in the fundamental laws of their empires. When we examine the encyclical letters and the allocutions of the holy father during the last thirty years, we are shocked to find them filled with the bitterest expressions and the most absolute condemnations against that which is the object of the love of nations and the respect of kings. The spirit of liberalism is there scoffed at as an inspiration of the genius of evil; the freedom of the press and the representative system are insulted; toleration is designated as a plague; civilization is, in every form, made the subject of insult and contempt." In confirmation of these views, M. Chevalier quotes the encyclical letter of Gregory the Sixteenth, denouncing the attempt made by the Abbé Lamennais and his coadjutors to reconcile Romanism and liberty, and the allocution pronounced by the present Pope on 18th March 1861, condemnatory of the modern tendencies towards liberty. In the last of these documents, modern civilisation is reproached with being favourable to other forms of worship besides the Roman Catholic, and with neglecting to remove dissenters—who are termed infidels—from public offices, and permitting them to take a part in the instruction of youth. But the allocution which specially relates to our present subject, is that pronounced by Pius the Ninth, in secret conclave, on the 15th December 1856, with regard to the state of religion

in Mexico and in the other independent republics of South America formerly subject to Spain. It was called forth by the republican government of Mexico having decided to establish relations between church and state similar to those which at present exist in France. It especially condemns the following acts of the Mexican government: the abolition of the ecclesiastical *fuero*, or legal privilege, in virtue of which the Mexican clergy were exempted from the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals; the refusal of the government to submit to the supreme authority of the holy see those of its acts which concerned the clergy; the confiscation by the state of the possessions of the clergy; the abolition of perpetual vows; and the granting of liberty of worship. Religious toleration is thus spoken of in the allocution: "In order more easily to corrupt the manners and the minds of nations, to propagate the abominable and disastrous plague of indifferentism, and to complete the destruction of our holy religion, they permit the free exercise of all forms of worship, and they allow every person the full and entire freedom of openly and publicly professing all kinds of thoughts and opinions." The form of the condemnation of these acts of the Mexican government is worth quoting, as its terms are absolute and sweeping enough to have issued from the mouth of Gregory the Seventh: "We raise," says the allocution, "with all apostolical freedom, our pontifical voice in the midst of your venerable assembly, and we condemn, reprove, and declare absolutely null and of no effect all the decrees above mentioned, and all the acts which the civil government of Mexico has done with such a contempt of ecclesiastical authority and of the holy see, and with so great prejudice to religion, to the popes and to ecclesiastics in particular. Besides, we warn, in the gravest manner, all those who have taken part in these acts by their proceedings, councils, or orders, to reflect seriously on the penalties and censures which the apostolical constitutions and the sacred canons of the councils have denounced against the violators and profaners of consecrated things and persons, as well as of ecclesiastical power and freedom, and against the usurpers of the rights of the holy see." We may also mention, that since the date of the allocution we have just quoted, another document has been issued by the pope relative to Spanish America. It is dated 6th March 1863, and it announces that concordats have been entered into with the republics of San Salvador and Nicaragua analogous to those formerly concluded with the other governments of Central America, in which it is stipulated that the Roman Catholic shall be "absolutely the dominant religion." It is clear, therefore, that now, as ever when it has had the power, the Church of Rome is the champion of

religious intolerance, and is thoroughly determined to permit the exercise of no form of religion except her own; and it is consequently very unlikely that she will abstain from opposing, by every means in her power, the establishment in Mexico of a strong and liberal government under French protection, which would recognise liberty of worship, freedom of the press, and the other liberties generally viewed as essential to the proper development of modern civilisation. The influence of Rome is very great in Mexico, owing to the gross ignorance and superstition in which the large majority of the people are sunk; and she may succeed in throwing great obstacles in the way of the new government, especially as she is certain to be supported by the conservative, or rather the retrograde, party, and the great mass of the clergy, who are indignant at the secularisation of their possessions, the abolition of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and other acts of the Mexican republic, which they consider as invasions of their rights and privileges. So sensible is M. Chevalier of this danger, and of the probability of France encountering another "Roman question" in Mexico, that he deems it highly advisable, nay, almost indispensable, that she should secure the concurrence, or at least the neutrality, of Rome, in her efforts for the regeneration of Mexico. Yet he almost despairs of securing it. "As long," he says, "as the policy of the court of Rome remains completely unchanged in Europe, there is great reason to fear that she will continue to favour the party of immobility in Spanish America, and especially in Mexico. As long as that party shall have such an auxiliary, we may be able to conquer it on the battle-field, or to drive it from power even when it has attained it, but we shall never be able definitely to conquer it. Irritated by the obstacles, always recurring, which it will encounter, the liberal party will continue to shew itself violent and extreme in its measures. Good order will be impossible in the country, and anarchy will perpetually be getting the better. Our attempts at regeneration will be devoted to an irremediable failure. Thus we find in Mexico the Roman question as difficult there as here." In spite, however, of these gloomy views of the probable opposition of the Romish see to the regeneration of Mexico, M. Chevalier does not abandon all hope. The problem is difficult, but not insoluble. "Whatever," he says, "may be my incompetence in questions concerning the faith, my feelings revolt against the idea that the faith forbids the court of Rome to change its system and its attitude, even in Italy. The teachings of experience are for all the world. To hope that it will turn these teachings to good account, is not to presume too much of the holy see. When the blind provocations of the court of Rome obliged the general-in-chief of the army of

Italy to make the little campaign of 1797, which terminated in the treaty of Tolentino, did not the acts of the first years of the pontificate of Pius the Seventh seem as impossible as now appears the adhesion of the holy see to a liberal policy? And would it not be to calumniate the holy see, to maintain that it will never adopt those ideas whose substance is to be found in the gospel itself, and without whose pale it has become clear to every man of sense, that there are for the pontifical authority only deceptions, for the church only perils?" We cannot share in M. Chevalier's hopes. To attempt to reconcile Rome and liberalism, is like trying to revive a corpse by uniting it to a living body. The living body will suffer from the poisonous contact, and the corpse will remain lifeless and loathsome as before. The Church of Rome may cease to be; but while she exists, she cannot cease to oppose and condemn political liberty and religious toleration, especially where—as in Mexico—she is sure of the support of a strong party both in church and state. If, however, France is destined to suffer from the hostility of Rome in her efforts for the regeneration of Mexico, she has herself alone to blame; for long ere this, but for the support of French bayonets, the papacy would have been as powerless for evil as it has long been for good.

M. Chevalier tells us that the maintenance of the vigour and prosperity of the group of nations belonging to the Latin race, of which France is the natural head, is a strong argument in favour of the expedition to Mexico. We have as little sympathy for Latinism, if we may coin a term, as for Pan Slavism. The Latin races are devoted to the Roman Catholic faith—a faith which never has been, nor ever can be, favourable to civil or religious liberty; and we sincerely hope that France, while attentive to the fancied claims of race, will also remember the far stronger and more intelligible claim of each human being to worship God after his own fashion, without let or hindrance. No worse lot could befall the fair land of Anahuac than to be subjected to the domination of the Romish see. If the religion of Rome is to be there made either the exclusive or the dominant religion, farewell to progress, farewell to liberty! M. Chevalier, indeed, is the last man to advocate such a result of the success of the French arms; and he again and again, in the course of his work, insists upon the absolute necessity of liberal institutions in the new empire. We trust that his predictions may be realised and his advice followed. But we cannot forget the wily, unscrupulous, intriguing spirit of Rome; and cannot help fearing that some arrangement may yet be entered into between France and the holy see, which shall violate, or compromise in Mexico, the invaluable and indispensable rights of liberty of conscience and freedom of religious worship.

ART. IX.—*Plato and Christ.*

Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy. By WILLIAM ARCHER BUTLER, M.A., late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Dublin. Edited from the author's MSS., with notes, by WILLIAM HEPPWORTH THOMSON, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, and Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Cambridge. In two volumes. Cambridge: M'Millan.

The Christian Element in Plato, and the Platonic Philosophy unfolded and set forth. By Dr O. ACKERMANN, Archdeacon at Jena. Translated from the German by SAMUEL RALPH ASBURY, B.A.; with an introductory note, by WILLIAM G. T. THEDD, D.D., Brown Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

The Platonic Dialogues for English Readers. By WILLIAM WHEWELL, D.D. In three volumes. Cambridge: M'MILLAN.

AT a time when so much is heard on every side of Plato and Platonism, and of their renewed influence both on the theological tendencies and general thought of the age, we shall be performing, we believe, an acceptable service at least to our less learned readers, if we attempt a brief sketch of the system or scheme of speculative thought to which those potent names belong. We shall be greatly aided in doing so, by the fresh light thrown on the subject by the important works which stand at the head of this article; the first and the last of which we would especially recommend to English readers, as forming together at least the most intelligible exposition we have anywhere seen of one of the most difficult, and at the same time noblest, chapters in the history of the human mind and of human thought.

During the period that preceded the Advent, the brightest of all heathen lands was Greece, and the brightest age, the century of which the central point was the four hundredth year before Christ. Alike in politics, in literature, in philosophy, and in art, the Hellenic race was then at the very acme of its fame. In politics, it was the age of Pericles; in literature, of Sophocles and Thucydides; in philosophy, of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle; in art, of Phidias; while before its close the forensic art, too, reached its grandest climax in the thunders of Demosthenes. An interesting coincidence is brought to light by comparing this great Gentile date with the corresponding period of the sacred history. At the very time the chosen people were hastening to their fall, and the last strains of divine inspiration were dying away on the harps of Judah, the most advanced nation of heathendom was just touching the zenith of its moral and intellectual life. Malachi, the last of the Jewish prophets, was exactly contemporary with Socrates, the best of the Grecian sages. Thus, while the voice of the holy oracle was sinking to silence, the many voices of philosophy were rising to their clearest, loftiest tones.

The schools of the prophets were dissolving at the very time that the schools of the sages were more than ever thronged with eager disciples, and instinct with fresh heart and hope. In one respect, however, the two histories thus outwardly contrasted were inwardly coincident. The lines of divine teaching and of human wisdom, hitherto so far apart, are now manifestly converging on one point. Prophecy with its latest voice proclaims the Desire of all nations; philosophy in its highest intuitions seems dimly to catch the shadow of his form. While Malachi, from the lofty watchtower of faith descries from afar the dawning of the day, Socrates gropes and feels his way in the deep gloom below, crying for the light of which he can wistfully dream, but which yet he did not see.

Those three greatest names of the Grecian wisdom which we have just mentioned together, are fitly gathered into one group, not alone on account of their chronological and personal connection, but also and still more on account of the intellectual relationship in which they stand to one another. They are mutual complements of each other, and represent respectively the three great types of mind which are ever afresh reappearing, though seldom of course on the same scale of depth and power. Socrates excelled in understanding, Plato in insight, Aristotle in logical subtlety. Socrates was the man of principles, Plato of ideas, Aristotle of syllogisms. Socrates ponders and digs deep, Plato soars aloft, Aristotle analyses and splits hairs. Socrates, in fine, is the shrewdest of philosophers, Plato the most sublime, Aristotle the most subtle. It were difficult to say which of them were the greatest, for each is greatest in his own sphere. This much, however, we may say with confidence of the great spirit who forms the subject of this paper, and who by the consent of all the ages has been crowned the prince of ancient wisdom, that if his were not absolutely the strongest mind of the three, it was undoubtedly the largest, the loftiest, and the most richly endowed. He is indeed a man of many gifts. Keen of intellect, clear of insight, bright in imagination, and in rich, radiant fancy, quick, too, in observation of men and things, he was the poet, the philosopher, the statesman, and the dramatist all together, and might thus almost be fitly called the Shakspeare of ancient philosophy. Partaking in large measure both of the shrewdness of his elder compeer, and of the subtlety of his younger, he might almost have been either a Socrates or an Aristotle, had he not been a Plato. But in his own sphere, he towers immeasurably above both, and stands indeed peerless and alone. In the serene realm of speculation and pure reason, he reigns supreme, and from his solitary throne wields a spell of mighty influence which every after age has felt, and which the most gifted minds of all time have most gladly owned. He was for

heathen times the chosen interpreter of the human soul, in its truest instincts and noblest aspirations ; for Christian times the most impressive witness of those infinite wants and sorrows, those immortal hopes and longings, which it is the prerogative of the great salvation alone to meet and satisfy.

The recorded facts of his outward life are few, and are soon told. Born in the island of *Ægina*, in the first year of the 88th Olympiad, or the 428th year before Christ, he came to Athens, then and for long afterwards the intellectual centre of the world, in his twentieth year, and at once felt the spell of that strong, brave man who then drew all the choicest spirits of the rising race around him. From that moment he became Socrates's most attached, and doubtless also most eager, and congenial pupil. Though he was present at the trial and condemnation of the martyr-sage, and was forward with generous offers of pecuniary aid to facilitate his escape, he was prevented by indisposition from being a witness of the closing scene of all. Yet, surely if he saw not the end of his revered master with eye of flesh, he saw it with the eye of spirit, or he never could have drawn that matchless picture in the *Phædo*, in which the soul alike of the master and of the pupil are for evermore enshrined, and on which the soft, tender, solemn light lingers undimmed to this hour. Athens is now no safe abode for the disciples of Socrates, or for any professed votaries of wisdom who should handle at all freely the popular prejudices or religious superstitions of the time. So he retires, with several others of the obnoxious school, to Megara, on the isthmus of Corinth ; and thence soon after sets out on a tour of philosophic inquiry, which carries him in succession to Cyrene, to Egypt, to Sicily, and Italy. At Cyrene, he studied mathematics under Theodorus ; in Egypt, he explored the mysterious learning of the priesthood, and strove, as some of his biographers tell us, to reach the equally mysterious sources of the Nile ; through Sicily he passed to Italy, where he conversed with the disciples of Pythagoras, and gathered up and assimilated the most vital germs of that old wisdom.

"Thus," in the words of one of his most recent and best expositors, "rich with the spoils of all previous philosophies, this great genius returned at length to Athens, to devote his remaining life to the establishment of that comprehensive system which was to combine, to conciliate, and to supersede them all. The gardens of Academus have left the proof of their celebrity in the structure of language, which has derived from them a term now common to all places of public instruction. It will be readily believed that Plato soon became the most frequented of the Athenian teachers of wisdom ; and not only the most distinguished men of a most distinguished time, but the literary ladies of Athens crowded the gymnasium of the philosophic analyst of beauty and of love."

The fame of Plato was now at its height, and shone with undimmed lustre and with ever widening and increasing influence until his death, which took place at the ripe age of 81, in the 348th year before Christ, and in the first of the 108th Olympiad.

If we thus know little of the external life of Plato, we fortunately possess the fullest knowledge of his inner and real life from his writings, which have descended in a state of unexampled entireness to our times. It is a remarkable proof of the embalming and preserving power of genius as distinct from mere talent and learning, that of all the voluminous and varied writings of this great master, not one so far as we know has been lost. "The collection of his writings errs by excess, not defect. Several performances are ascribed to him, which custom alone now preserves among his works ; but as far as we can discover from the remotest catalogues and allusions, no one vessel has foundered of the large squadron which Plato committed to the stream of ages."*

Most if not all Plato's writings were given to the world in the form of dialogues, or free and lively conversations between persons devoted more or less to the study of philosophical subjects. This style of composition was no doubt suggested to him by the conversational or *erotetic* method of his great master's instructions, but was at the same time peculiarly adapted to the poetic and dramatic cast of his own mind. In no other form could so fresh and fertile a genius so freely scatter the full exuberance of his mental riches over the whole field of human thought and life ; and while disporting at will in the lighter play of fancy, preserve at the same time the weight and substance of a serious discourse. It was at once more solid than the drama, and more light and airy, more animated and fascinating, than the set disquisition. It possessed, too, another advantage, which must have made it specially attractive to an author in the then immature and unsettled state of philosophical inquiry. It permitted the utmost amount of literary freedom, compatible with any measure of literary responsibility. The philosophic dramatist might give full vent to all his views and impressions on every subject of inquiry, and yet commit himself definitely and finally to none. He might discourse, yet not decide, explore and make *reconnaissance* on every side, without absolutely choosing his ground. He could raise questions without pretending to settle them ; state the elements of a problem without solving it ; throw out thoughts without following them out to the end ; broach bold theories for consideration and examination, without at least for the present lending to

* Butler's Ancient Philosophy, vol. ii.

them the final sanction of his name ; toss a subject from side to side, and ventilate it in its various aspects, without attempting to exhaust it ; confute and explode the erroneous solutions of others, without being driven to substitute any better of his own. In a formal disquisition, you are expected to settle, or at least fully expound, the subject in hand ; in a dialogue, you are only required to talk about it, and to talk well ; and anything more than this is all over and above, and to be placed as a clear item of supererogatory merit to your account. Such, as a vehicle of philosophical exposition, is the dialogue generally ; and then Plato's is no ordinary dialogue. He is the undoubted prince of this style of art, which he may be said almost to have created, and in which he has to this hour no rival, scarcely even a worthy successor. His dialogues are real living conversations between real and living men. His canvass breathes and speaks before you. His interlocutors are no mere set of iron masks or speaking machines set up to utter certain sentences, in regular series of question and answer, argument and reply, objection and explanation, according to the exigencies of the discussion, but actual veritable men of flesh and blood, standing out before you in all the distinct individuality of life—men of Athens, men of the age of Pericles, men of the agora and the schools, men who might have remembered Marathon and fought at Potidea, men every one of whom stands out in visage and expression as distinct as if photographed but yesterday. We become familiar with them as we read, and could recognise and point them out if we met them on the street. The bustling Hippias, the pompous and sounding Protagoras, the declamatory Gorgias, the blunt, downright soldier Nicias, the dashing Alcibiades—with all the rest of the eager talking group—who that knows Plato does not know them as he knows his brother ? Meanwhile, one grand figure ever holds the central place. Socrates is the hero and the ideal sage of all Plato's dialogues, into whose lips all the profoundest thoughts and noblest sentiments are put, and who in every keen encounter of wit still remains master of the field. Thus the whole series may be truly regarded as one imperishable and touching monument reared to the honour of the great master, by the affection of his still greater disciple.

In proceeding now to offer a brief sketch of the philosophy of Plato, it is manifest that we must confine our attention to a few leading heads. In a field so vast and varied as that which his speculations embrace, our only hope of intelligible exposition lies, not indeed in the selection of particulars (in any case a most profitless task), but in the grasping of principles—seizing and following out the main lines and pregnant germs of thought. Plato's philosophy, like all ancient philosophies

more or less, was a universal system. It embraced, or strove to embrace, the entire field of human inquiry and possible knowledge. It was a theory of the universe, an attempt to reduce, through the plastic power of the speculative reason, the endless multitude and variety of its facts and phenomena to the unity of a central principle, the harmony of a perfect and steadfast law. Hence there is scarcely a subject within the sphere of human inquiry, a line of investigation within the circle of its sciences, that did not come more or less within its range. Physics, metaphysics, ethics; God, nature, the world; man, the soul, morals, politics, education; life, death, immortality—all come by turns beneath the glance of his keen, penetrating reason, reflect the various colours of his rich and radiant genius. We are furnished, however, with a clue to this labyrinth, or rather this vast and many-chambered temple, in the division of his speculations into three great departments, which he is said himself to have made. These are, (1.) Dialectics, or the science of real existence; (2.) Physics, or the science of external phenomena; and (3.) Ethics, or the science of law and duty. The first strives to answer the question, *What is?* The second the question, *What seems?* (for to external nature, as we shall see, he scarcely allows more than a seeming). The third answers the question, *What is fitting or right?* We shall keep this arrangement throughout in view, as a general guide to our order and course of thought; but the three departments, as contemplated by Plato, run so much and so constantly up into each other, that we shall not attempt, in our necessarily brief review, to keep them distinct, or to assign them a separate discussion.

The central principle and pregnant germ of the whole Platonic philosophy is one which, at the first broaching, is sufficiently startling to our modern habits of thought. Of the two spheres of existence, the visible and the invisible, the material and the immaterial, the physical and the metaphysical, the world of matter and the world of mind, we are accustomed to regard the former as pre-eminently solid and real, and the latter more or less shadowy and visionary. Plato precisely reversed this order. The spirit-world was to him pre-eminently the real world, the world of material and outward things the merely apparent. On this side are the shadows, on the other side the true and everlasting realities. What we see with our fleshly eyes are only the forms and phantoms of things; what we see with the spirit's eye, the intuitive and awakened reason, is the eternal substance. It was not the sure and firm-set earth that was so sure and firm set to him, as that unseen and eternal ground that lay beneath it, and by which itself and all its goodly order was sustained;

it was not the steadfast harmony of the celestial orbs that seemed to him so steadfast, as the divine and changeless order that regulates all their changes, and whose still music is heard for ever by reason's ear amid their spheres. All knowledge, in short, was in his view resolvable into two kinds, in their nature essentially distinct and dissimilar, *i. e.*, that which comes to us through the senses, and that which is apprehended by, or reveals itself to, the reason. The one takes cognisance merely of appearances—of phenomena, the other grasps realities, principles, truths. The one sees merely the forms of things, the other their essence, their true being, their very selves. In its nature, therefore, the latter is higher, and deals with higher things. Of a sublimer essence, it dwells in a sublimer sphere, and feeds upon a knowledge sublimer and purer, even upon the very essence of truth itself. Indeed, so superior is the divine and supersensual knowledge of the illumined reason, that he refuses to every other kind of fancied information the very name of knowledge, designating it at best mere opinion, shadowy and unsubstantial as the shadowy realm of sense to which it belongs.* There can be a true and enduring knowledge, he reasons, only of true and eternal things; the visionary and changeful appearances of the outer world can only give birth to an opinion as visionary and insubstantial as itself.

But let us hear Plato's own account of this matter; and, that we may at the same time afford to our unlearned readers a characteristic specimen both of the spirit and the form of the Platonic philosophy, let it be in the words of one of the most celebrated of his allegories, that of the cave, in the seventh Book of the Republic. We give it in Dr Whewell's translation, as a sample of the manner in which he interprets the illustrious Greek to English readers:—

"Suppose a set of men in a subterranean cavern, which opens to the day by a long, direct, straight, wide passage; and that they have been kept in this cavern from childhood, fettered so that they cannot even turn their necks, but with their heads fixed so that they can only look from the light towards the lower end of the cave. Suppose further that there is a great fire, set opposite to the mouth of the cavern [so as to throw the shadows of objects on this lower end of the cave], and a road which runs past the cavern between the fire and the captives. Suppose, too, that along this road runs a low wall, like the partition over which puppet-showmen

* See especially the "Republic," book seventh, where the different kinds and degrees of knowledge are treated at large, and the distinction between opinion (*δόξα*), and knowledge or science (*ἐπιστήμη*), broadly drawn. Those familiar with the writings of Mr Maurice will remember how prominent a place a similar distinction holds in his system, though he rather proceeds upon that explains it.

exhibit their figures. And now suppose that along this wall, and so as to be shewn above it, pass men and other figures, some silent, and some speaking. You think this a strange imagination, yet these captives exactly represent the condition of us men, who see nothing but the shadows of realities. And these captives, in talking with one another, would give names to the shadows as if they were realities.

"And if, further, this prison-house had an echo opposite to it, so that when the passers-by spoke, the sound was reflected [from the same wall on which the shadows were seen], they would of course think that the shadows spoke. And, in short, in every way they would be led to think that there were no realities except these shadows. Now, consider how these captives might be freed from these illusions. If one of them were loosed from his bonds, and made to turn round and walk toward the light and look at it, at first he would be pained and dazzled by the glare, and unable to see clearly. He would be perplexed if he were told that the things he saw before were nonentities, and that now, being brought nearer the reality, and turned towards it, he saw better than before; and even if any of the passers-by were pointed out to him, and made to answer questions, and to say what he is, he would still think that what he saw before was more true than what was shewn him now. He would shun the excessive light, and turn away to that which he *could* see, and think it more visible than the objects which had been shewn him.

"But if he were dragged to the light up the steep and rough passage which opens to the cave, and fairly brought out into the light of the sun, he would be still more pained and more angry, and be at first so blinded, that he would not be able to see real objects. It would require time and use to enable him to see things in daylight. At first, he would be able to see shadows, then the reflected images of objects, and then objects themselves; and afterwards, he might be able to look at the heavens by night and see the heavenly bodies, the stars and the moon; and finally, be able to look at the sun,—not merely at a reflection of him in water, but at the sun himself in his own place. And thus he might be led to reason about the sun, and see that he regulates seasons and years, and governs everything in this visible world, and is in a certain way the cause of all the things which they in their captivity saw.

"And then, when he recollected his first abode, and the illusions of that place, and of his fellow-captives, he would naturally congratulate himself upon the change, and pity those he had left there. And if there were among them any honours and rewards given to him who was most sharp-sighted in scanning the passing shadows, and readiest in recollecting which of them habitually went before and which after, and which together, and who hence was most skilful in predicting what would happen in future, he would not be likely to covet these honours and rewards. He would rather say with the shade of Achilles, in Homer, that it is better to be a day-labourer in the region of life and day, than the greatest monarch

in the realm of shadows. He would rather suffer anything than live as he did before.

"And consider this further; if such a one should redescend into the cavern, and resume his former seat, his eyes would be purblind, coming out of sunshine into darkness. And while his eyes are still dark, and before they have recovered their power, if he had to discuss those shadows with those who had always remained there captive (a state of things which might last a considerable time), he would be utterly laughed at; and they would say that his eyesight was ruined, and that it was not worth anybody's while to go up out of the cave. And if any one tried to set them at liberty, and to lead them to the light, they would, if they could get him into their power, kill him.

"Now this image, my dear Glaucon, is to be applied to the case we were speaking of before. We must liken the visible world to the dark cavern, and the fire, which makes objects visible, to the sun. The ascent upwards, and the vision of the objects there, is the advance of the mind into the intelligible world; at least such is my faith and hope, and of these you wished me to give an account. God knows if my faith is well founded; and according to my view, the idea of the supreme good is seen last of all, and with the greatest difficulty; and when seen, is apprehended as the cause of all that is right and excellent. This idea produces in the visible world, light, and the sun the cause of light; in the intellectual world it is the cause of truth, and of the intuition of truth. And this idea, he who is to act wisely, either in private or in public matters, must get possession of."*

To this course of meditation he must have been strongly led by the aspect which the outward world necessarily presented to a thoughtful mind in that age of the infancy of science, when its passing phenomena alone were seen, and its sublime, changeless laws were unknown. All they saw in nature was shifting, transitory—a scene of continual flux and motion—in which there was nothing fixed, nothing abiding, nothing which could be said properly to be, but only to be becoming or passing away, an endless series of unmeaning vicissitudes, in which night and day, sleeping and waking, rising and setting, waxing and waning, ebbing and flowing, birth and dying, chased one another in an unprogressive progression, without interruption and without end. Meanwhile, too, the soul—the living, the immortal spirit—pined and starved amid all the world's riches; if not shadows in themselves, they were at least shadows and deceitful phantoms to her, and she felt in all the depths of her being that her home was not in them, her life was not in them. Was it wonderful, in these circumstances, that a lofty and speculative spirit like Plato's gave philosophic expression to what was already the

* Plato's Dialogues, &c., vol. ii. pp. 297-300.

instinctive cry of the heart ; and turning away from the outer world as a thing mainly visionary and unreal, should proclaim that other and higher world, the world of thought, the world of reason, the world of pure, essential, and eternal truth, as the only substance, and that we see but the shadow ? With our more advanced philosophy and maturer knowledge, indeed, we can detect in this view a certain one-sidedness. We can concede a substantive reality both to matter and to mind, both to the seen and the unseen world. A thing may truly exist, though in its present form it may afterwards cease to be. There may be permanence of essence, and of fixed and steadfast laws, amid ceaseless change of form and manifestation. Still, with all its imperfections and large alloy of error, we cannot but be thankful for this eloquent utterance, from amid the thick darkness of heathenism, of the great truth, that there is a real world beyond what we see ; that that unseen world is the more real of the two ; that therefore it is the true life of immortal man to look "not to the things which are seen, but to the things which are not seen ; for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal."*

Closely connected with this central principle—the distinction between the seen and the unseen world, the "sensible" and the "intelligible" spheres—is the peculiarly Platonic doctrine of ideas,—a speculation, indeed, by far too abstruse and obscure to be here discussed at large, but which still, in its general scope and drift, we must endeavour briefly to sketch. According to this theory, then, it was maintained that every object in this lower sphere, existing in the comparatively rude and evanescent form of material subsistence, had their pure and perfect archetypes, their absolute and everlasting realities, in the world of truth above. The things of earth, even the brightest and the best, were but copies, dim, imperfect, shadowy, and fading, of what exist in their absolute and perfect essence there. These copies, like all copies, especially those executed in a rude and intractable material, only partially realised their original, approximating more or less nearly to, striving after, but never reaching, their ideal. So there is nothing here absolutely good, absolutely true, absolutely fair, but only as it were catching and reflecting a few faint rays of the eternal goodness, the eternal truth, the eternal beauty. The copies, to use Platonic language, partake of the nature of their archetypes, but never fully possess or embody it ; imitate their originals, but never reproduce or fully represent them. But what are those ideas, those archetypal essences themselves ?

* We need scarcely point out the coincidence between Plato's views on this subject and those of some of the most profound thinkers of modern times, e.g., Malbranche and our own Berkely.

And in what sense does Plato regard them as possessing a distinct and substantive existence apart from the objects which represent them? Is the idea the perfect plan, or type, or law of each creature's existence—its true and absolute ideal, as it existed for ever in the mind of God and before his eye, after which they were made, and to which their actual life and being is more or less conformed? Is the world of ideas just God's ideal of the world and of all that it contains—the world, the universe, as it ought to be—as in the divine, eternal plan and law, itself more real than any created thing, it is? It seems to us that this must be his meaning; and if so, the theory is neither unintelligible nor, at least on the face of it, absurd. To use the words of Professor Butler, who seems substantially to adopt this view:—

“That man's soul is made to contain not merely a consistent scheme of its own notions, but a direct apprehension of *real and eternal laws beyond it*, is not too absurd to be maintained. That these real and eternal laws are things *intelligible*, and not things *sensible*, is not very extravagant either. That these laws, impressed upon creation by its Creator, and apprehended by man, are something distinct equally from the Creator and from man; and that the whole mass of them may be fairly termed the world of things purely intelligible, is surely allowable. Nay, further, that there are qualities in the supreme and ultimate Cause of all which are manifested in the creation, and not merely manifested, but, in a manner, after being brought out of his superessential nature into the stage of being below him, but next to him, are then, by the causative-act of creation, deposited in things, differencing them one from the other, so that the things participate of them (*μετέχουσιν*), communicate with them (*κοινωνοῦσιν*); this likewise seems to present no incredible account of the relation of the world to its Author. That the intelligence of man, excited to reflection by the impressions of these objects, thus (though themselves transitory) participant of a divine quality, should rise to higher conceptions of the perfections thus faintly exhibited; and inasmuch as these perceptions are unquestionably *real* existences, and known to be such in the very act of contemplation—that this should be regarded as a direct intellectual apprehension of them, a union of the reason with the ideas in that sphere of being which is common to both,—this is certainly no preposterous notion in substance, and by those who deeply study it will perhaps be judged no unwarrantable form of phrase. Finally, that the reason, in proportion as it learns to contemplate the perfect and eternal, *desires* the enjoyment of such contemplations in a more consummate degree, and cannot be fully satisfied except in the actual fruition of the perfect itself—this seems not to contradict any received principle of psychology, or any known law of human nature. Yet these suppositions, taken together, constitute the famous theory of ideas; and, thus stated, may surely be pronounced to form no very appropriate object for

the contempt of even the most accomplished of our modern physiologists of mind."—(Vol. ii. p. 118.)

We know not if this eloquent exposition will be finally accepted by the profoundest students of Plato as the true reading of this the most transcendental of his speculations; but if so, then assuredly must we join Mr Butler in pronouncing it no mere airy dream, but the embodiment of a sublime and mighty truth—a truth yet to be realised in a sense and in a way which even Plato never dreamed—when in the regeneration and restitution of all things, that which is perfect shall come, and that which is in part shall be done away; when this corruptible shall put on incorruption, and this mortal shall put on immortality; and in perfect conformity to Christ, the anti-typal pattern of all goodness, all beauty, all truth, the sons of God shall realise the perfect ideal both of their common nature and of their own individual life, in the vision and fruition of God for ever.

Another characteristic speculation of Plato—and that which is in the popular tradition most intimately connected with his name—is his celebrated doctrine of the immortality of the soul. The noble lines of Addison have made every one familiar with the fact that Plato did reason on this high and solemn theme, though it is questionable whether many modern readers would think that he reasons well or convincingly on the subject. The strongest arguments in its behalf, according to our modern habits of thought, are doubtless just such as those the poet puts in his lips, but those arguments are Addison's, not Plato's:—

"It must be so. Plato, thou reasonest well,
Else whence this pleasing hope, this fond desire,
This longing after immortality?
Or whence this secret dread and inward horror
Of falling into nought? Why shrinks the soul
Back on herself, and startles at destruction?
'Tis the divinity that stirs within us,
And intimates eternity to man."

No doubt Plato would have sympathised deeply with these words, and probably too the feeling and instinct of the heart, deeper than all reasoning, which they express, was at bottom that which mainly gave solidity and strength to his belief of a future state; still, his prevailing habits of thought led him to draw his arguments rather from the domain of pure reason than that of feeling. His fundamental principle, as we have seen, was that all knowledge is real and certain, just in proportion as it draws its materials from the intuitions of pure reason, and is most detached from the limiting conditions of a merely sensational and emotional life: hence he strives to soar to the region of eternal truth through the pure ether of reason alone, even though often in that attenuated element there is scarcely substance enough to sustain his wings. His doctrine of immortality, in fact,

was inseparably connected with his doctrine of the ideal world of essential realities already explained. To that world the soul, as it seemed to him, alike in its essence and destiny, unmistakably belonged. This was its element, its sphere, its home. There already, in the case of the truly wise, it had more than half its life, and thither, as its final and eternal seat, it aspired. The body belonged to the world of sense, and would perish with it; the soul belonged to the world of essential realities, and would live with it, and in it, for ever. Nay, not only would it have its home, but it had had its origin there. He thought he could discover in the soul itself clear traces of its having existed before the body—dreams and reminiscences of a higher and better state of existence which it had left behind, and to which it was destined to return. Those reminiscences were indeed, in the case of the many, dormant and unsuspected, but might at any time, through the quickening power and purifying discipline of philosophy, be wakened up to life, and truths first learned, and visions of beauty first seen, in another sphere, shine forth before the soul clear and bright again. The soul, in short, had not been born into the world, but had come into it, and was, through all the scenes of its earthly life, an exile and a stranger, dimly remembering its native country, and pining after it.

Many of our readers are doubtless aware that the idea of a former existence of the soul, and the present faint reminiscence of it, survives to this day, and imparts a characteristic colour to the philosophic theology and poetic musings of many gifted minds, who have drunk deeply into the Platonic spirit. "If to that future state," says Archer Butler, "there are already discernible faint longings and impulses, which to many men have seemed to involve a direct proof of their reality, hopes that will not be bounded by the grave, and desires that grasp eternity, others have found within them, it would seem, faint intimations, scarcely less impressive of the past, as if the soul vibrated the echoes of a harmony not its own." The readers of Charles Kingsley will be able to recall from his writings snatches of this kind of mystic dreaming; and the grand words of Wordsworth, familiar to almost every one, seem but the prolonged echo of some of Plato's noblest strains:

"Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting;
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar,
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come,
From God who is our home.
"Heaven lies about us in our infancy;
Shades of the prison-house begin to close
Upon the growing boy;

But he beholds the light and whence it flows,
 He sees it in his joy :
 The youth who daily further from the East
 Must travel still is nature's priest,
 And by the vision splendid,
 Is on his way attended ;
 At last the man perceives it die away,
 And fade unto the light of common day."

Whatever value may be attached to such speculations as these, whether as philosophy or as poetry,—and as poetry it is impossible to deny them a certain measure of sublimity and beauty,—we cannot doubt our readers will agree with us in preferring to rest the argument for our divine and immortal hope on other and stronger grounds. Apart even from the sure and certain hope which Christianity reveals, we have surely clearer and more tangible indications of a hereafter, than any transcendental views of an ideal world and dim reminiscences of an ante-mundane life can supply. The heart made for immortality, and hungering after it, whispers the mighty secret ; the conscience, living witness of a law and of a Judge and of a judgment yet to come, forbodes it ; reason, interpreting as she may, the hints and analogies of nature and providence, surmises it ; the contradictions and anomalies of the present life, and its interrupted beginnings, that point to endings beyond the veil, demand it ; the instinctive thoughts and feelings of universal man, in every age, in every land, proclaim it. Such are the grounds rooted deep within the heart of every human being on which, apart from revelation, the anticipation of a future life may be most securely sustained. After all, it is not so much the *proof* of immortality, as the *feeling* of immortality, that keeps the practical belief of mankind in this great cuticle alive. " 'Tis the divinity that stirs within us, and intimates eternity to man." This is the light, often, alas ! but faint and dim, that shineth in a dark place, till the dayspring of a better hope appear, and " life and immortality are brought to light in the gospel."

We should now proceed, from the ontology and theology of Plato, to speak a little of his ethics, but our space will scarcely permit us to enter this field. Its great defect lay in this, that it rested on a too exclusively intellectual ground. Adopting the doctrine of his great master, that all moral perversion and vice proceeded from ignorance,—from a mistaken apprehension of what is really good and true,—he identified the domain of knowledge with that of virtue, and included both under the general idea of philosophy, or the pursuit of wisdom. The highest excellency of man, alike moral and intellectual, lay in the aspiration after and gradual approximation to the highest truth. The supersensual vision of the good, the beautiful, the true, not

as in this world of shadows they seem, but as in reality they are. Thus the truly wise man was also the truly good man, and the love of wisdom was only another name for the love of goodness. Yet if we would do full justice to Plato in this particular, we must take into account the nature and conditions of that knowledge which he identifies with virtue as explained by him. If not itself moral, it was indissolubly connected with morals. It could be attained only as the result of a course of moral discipline and purification, by means of which the eye of the soul was purged and cleared, and its higher susceptibilities awakened up to life. With him, as with another Teacher, whose shoe's latchet he was not worthy to unloose, that we may know we must also do. Then, it included an element of moral feeling. It was not only a pursuit of truth, but a love of the truth. It was not only a divine intuition, but a divine affection, a sublime aspiration, rising at last to passionate longing, to behold and possess the highest truth and highest goodness itself. Then, finally, it implied moral assimilation. In Plato's view it was impossible to behold the ineffable loveliness of the perfectly good and fair, without being enamoured of her, and drawn into an admiring imitation of that which we behold. Thus the Platonic knowledge and vision of truth, if widely different from, may yet be regarded as the shadow, the cold, colourless, yet still authentic shadow of the holy knowledge and beatific vision of God, wherein lies eternal life. In this view, very touching, as well as sublime, are such expressions as these:—"He whose thoughts are really occupied with the high contemplation of the eternal existence, has no leisure to cast his eyes on the doings of men—to war with them, and to cherish envy and bitterness against them; his gaze for ever fixed upon objects which preserve the same mutual arrangements and relations, and which, without seeking each other's evil, are all submitted to the law of order and of reason, he makes it his object to image forth in himself their perfect harmony. For how can one be unceasingly in the company of an object which excites love and admiration, without an effort to resemble it? Thus the philosopher, by his communion with that which is divine, and subject to the law of order, becomes himself a subject of order and divine, so far as possible to humanity." And again, rising to a still higher vein, and eloquently discoursing of that supersensual love which has ever since been associated with his name: "O Socrates, the true prize of life is the sight of the eternal beauty! compared with such a sight as this, what would be the poor images of earth, which so often disturb and perplex us! What, I ask you, would be the destiny of that mortal to whom it should be given to contemplate the unmingled beauty, in all its purity and

simplicity, no longer invested with perishable human accompaniments, but face to face to see and know the beauty unchangeable and divine? Think you he would have ground for complaint, who, fixing his eyes on such an object, should give himself solely to celestial communion with it? And is it not solely in the contemplation of the eternal beauty by that organ by which alone it can be seen, that he shall be enabled to produce, not images of virtue, because it is not to images he is attaching himself, but virtue real and genuine, because it is truth alone that he loves. Now it is to him that thus produces true virtue, and preserves it, that it belongs to be the favoured of God; it is to him more than to any other that it belongs to be immortal.* “Such a contemplation as this,” says Professor Archer Butler, in quoting these words, “is a contemplation of God.” We can scarcely ourselves go the length of that statement; for Plato’s idea of the supreme goodness and beauty was far short of the Christian doctrine of the holy and living God;† still we may take those sublime words as a faint reflection at least of that mighty utterance of the truth itself,—“Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.”

If now our space will not permit us to enter in detail on the discussion of the defects of Plato, and of his immeasurable distance from that other more august Teacher, whom we have, perhaps too venturously, named along with him, we have to regret this the less, as our exposition throughout has been a comparison, either implied or expressed. It is in truth the highest encomium of the heathen sage, that it is impossible to discourse at all fitly of his philosophy without suggesting the thought of one greater than he, either in the way of comparison with his excellences or contrast with his defects. We seem to hear, as he speaks, the sound of mightier footsteps behind him, even the footsteps of him to whom his whole teaching paid unconscious homage, though Himself he did not see. These defects and contrasts, however, we may profitably sum up in a few concluding sentences:—

(1.) Plato’s teaching, in comparison with that of Christ, lacked *authority*. That this was one of the grand distinctive

* From the *Symposium*.

† On the views of Plato concerning the nature and character of God, and his relations to man and the universe, we cannot now enter. There can be no doubt, however, that while acquitting him of the charge of Pantheism in the full sense, we must yet admit the existence of certain Pantheistic elements in his teaching, which, if uncontrolled by higher and purer views, must ever be of dangerous tendency. Of the two extremes, in short, to which the unaided reason ever tends, in this the profoundest of all inquiries—those of Pantheism and of Deism—the general course of the Platonic speculation inclines towards the former rather than to the latter. It is the glory of the Christian revelation alone to hold a clear and firm position equally removed from both.

characteristics of the instructions of the great Teacher, it is scarcely necessary to remark. "He spake as one having authority, and not as the scribes." He does not reason, infer, prove, confirm by elaborate induction and process of argument, but he reveals. He does not, like other sublime spirits, pry wistfully into hidden mysteries, but he draws the veil. There is no effort or straining in his discourses, as of one struggling with problems too mighty for him, but he speaks of them with the unconstrained ease and calm assurance of one who has seen them, who is familiar with them, who has been all his life moving in the midst of them, and who is therefore now only speaking of the things which he has seen and heard. There is no irresoluteness, no wavering, no feeble guessing at truth, like those gifted spirits of old, who indeed sometimes reasoned well of life and immortality, and other high and solemn mysteries of life, but yet failed by all their reasoning thoroughly to convince themselves and fully to satisfy their own hearts. He did not question like Socrates, or dream like Plato, or laboriously balance probabilities and weigh conjectures like Cicero; but like one who tells of his native country in a land of strangers, he spoke that which he did know, and testified that which he had seen. "Such at least are my views," we have heard Plato saying, after one of his sublimest flights,—“God only knows if they be true.” Christ says, “Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away.” In short, in Platonism we have man feebly groping and feeling after God; in Christianity, we have God coming forth to speak and manifest himself to man.

(2.) Platonism lacks *moral depth*. High as it soars into the regions of pure reason, it fails to go down to the dark depths of the soul's necessities and misery—its sin, its sorrow, its bondage, its variance with the eternal law, and consequent looking for of judgment to come. Now and then indeed we meet with earnest words, which seem almost to re-echo the language in which St Paul speaks of the terrible combat between death and life, the flesh and the spirit—as when he figures the soul in its fateful career of moral progress or degradation, as a chariot, drawn by two fiery steeds of contrary natures and dispositions, the one black, the other white, the one plunging and tearing downwards, the other struggling upwards; and so itself either soaring aloft to the realms of light, or sinking down to the abyss of darkness, according as, under the guiding and controlling hand of the charioteer, the one or the other prevails. Whatever obscurity there may be in regard to some subordinate details, we can be at no difficulty to read the general import of this picture, and to trace in the two coursers, the higher and the lower propensities of our nature respectively,

the nobler impulses and passions on the one hand, and the grosser appetites on the other, which constitute together the active or motive powers of the soul, and which it is the part of the highest principle of all, the imperial reason, to regulate and control. Even here, however, it is plain that the struggle the heathen sage so impressively describes, is one rather intellectual, than in the strict sense moral and spiritual. It is a striving after truth, rather than after righteousness and true holiness. The great adversary which the aspiring soul has to contend with is error and deception, not sin—and the serene realm he seeks, the empyrean heights of pure reason and absolute knowledge, rather than the holy home of eternal purity and love. In short, light, not love, is the key-note of this whole speculation, and of all Plato's meditations on ethical questions throughout. The tree of knowledge, not the tree of life, holds the central place in the paradise which he struggles to regain for himself and for us. The same remark applies to another celebrated psychological picture, in which, with great force and beauty, he describes the elements of the human soul as threefold, corresponding to a similar tripartite division he makes of the physical frame. First, there is the reason, having its seat and throne in the highest and noblest part of the body, the head and face divine, and like it pointing upward to the skies as its true home; then there are the higher passions and emotions,* inferior to the reason, but still partaking in some measure of a noble nature, and so placed in the breast, next to the seat of reason, but still broadly separated from it by the narrow isthmus of the neck; and then, last of all, in the lowest part of the body, and separated by the diaphragm from the chamber above, the merely animal impulses and appetites.† Of the general validity and value of this analysis there can be no doubt; still the same essential taint applies to it, as worked out by Plato, as to the other parts of his philosophy. It is the highest element, the pure reason, which he regards as exclusively immortal and divine; and the other parts of our nature, even the best and purest affections, as important only so far as they help or hinder it in its aspirings and strugglings after its true home and immortal food—the absolute, perfect, everlasting truth. Truth, not righteousness, is still the central, almost exclusive, idea. The whole subject of moral law and moral responsibility is thus defective in this philosophy, and moral progress resolves itself very much into a matter of education, development, spiritual contemplation, and assimilation. The idea, alike of holiness and of a holy God, in the full Christian sense, are

* Το θυμωδές.

† Το βρωματητικόν.

unknown.† Hence there is no atonement, no cross, no foreshadowing presage even, however faint or dim, of a Lamb of God that should take away the sin of the world. Platonism has thus no balm for the soul's deepest disease, no exorcism for that dread spectre of guilt and fear which haunts the sinful and alienated spirit of man evermore, but which the wisest of heathen sages never fairly confronts, or even seems to see.

(3.) It lacks reality. It deals in ideals, but fails to furnish any actual embodiment of its own ideals. It can eloquently talk of the perfect truth, the perfect goodness, the perfect truth, but how little influence will these lofty visions produce on the soul of man, so long as it remains a mere ideal abstraction! How infinitely different when, in the person of the Word made flesh, all those transcendent excellencies are seen embodied, and we behold his glory, the glory of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. Then do we no longer stand afar off and gaze, but we draw near to his feet and cry, "To whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life?" "Then, beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, we are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord."

(4.) It lacked *power*. The glory of the Platonic teaching died with Plato himself. He left, even in his own school, no true successors. His teaching had no power of creating disciples like to and worthy of the Master. It was enlightening, but not life-giving. It awoke the reason, but regenerated not the soul. It was reserved for another to say and to fulfil through all time his words, "He that believeth in me hath everlasting life. He that believeth on me, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water."

Plato's teaching, in fine, was a philosophy—Christ's religion *is a salvation*.

† "Plato, no more than any other heathen, bore in his soul a powerful impression of the holiness of God; and hence in his, as in the whole heathen theology, little is even said of this divine attribute, which in Christian theology forms the basis of the doctrine of atonement. Because it does not bring the idea of God to penetrate into the living reality and personality, the human and finite ever remains predominant and highest in the heathen philosophy, while in Christianity, on the contrary, the eternal and infinite is predominant. In the former, the deification of man, in the latter, the incarnation of God, is the summit of pious faith."—*Ackerman*, p. 261.

ART. X.—*Life of Dr Leifchild.*

John Leifchild, D.D : His public Ministry, private Usefulness, and personal Characteristics. Founded upon an Autobiography. By J. R. LEIFCHILD, A.M. London. 1863.

THIS is not a book to be reviewed, but to be read and enjoyed. We have derived so much gratification from its perusal, that we can hardly prevail upon ourselves to say a single word regarding it in our vocation as critics. All we shall remark is, that the book seems a very exact counterpart of the man. It is not an artistically perfect biography, any more than Dr Leifchild was a man of first-rate talents, or of the highest style of pulpit eloquence. He was an eminently earnest, popular, and effective preacher, and this volume, which contains the record of his life, succeeds like himself in interesting and instructing, while like himself also, it may be justly charged with the usual faults of popularity, an excess of commonplace and diffusiveness. These defects are, of course, much more noticeable in the printed page than they may have been in the spoken sermon, but neither in the one case nor the other ought they to diminish our acknowledgment of general effectiveness and success. With all that may be said as to the mediocrity of both his learning and talents, Dr Leifchild was a pulpit-king; and with all that might be said against the style of his biography, it must be admitted to be a highly interesting, instructive, and valuable work.

Without farther remarks of this kind, we proceed to set before our readers some of those interesting passages with which this book abounds. Before doing so, it is simply necessary to note some of the most important dates and events in the life of Dr Leifchild. He was born at Barnet, in Hertfordshire, in the year 1780. His father was a cooper by trade, and was strongly attached to Wesleyan Methodism. But although young Leifchild was brought up among Methodists and Methodist influences, he saw it to be his duty to exchange an Arminian for a Calvinistic creed before entering on the ministry, and after studying at the Hoxton academy from his twenty-fourth to his twenty-eighth year, he was first settled in 1808 as pastor of the Congregational Church, Hornton Street, Kensington. After a ministry of sixteen years in this place, he removed to Bristol, where he remained from 1824 to 1830, and then returned to London as minister of Craven Chapel, where he laboured from 1831 to 1854. In the latter year he resigned the pastorate, and after officiating for a time in a new chapel at Brighton, he returned to London, where he spent some quiet and

honoured years, dying in the month of June 1862, in the eighty-third year of his age.

The active life of Dr Leifchild will thus be seen to have covered a very important period in the annals of Nonconformity, and, indeed, of the history of religion in this country. About the time of his birth, evangelism was fast rising into new life and power; the dead orthodoxy and the deadly heresy which had so long reigned with almost equally disastrous influence, were now giving way before those pure and awakening gospel-truths which Wesley and others had again proclaimed with apostolic fervency and success. Mr Leifchild senior, being the leading Methodist in Barnet, was on one occasion honoured to receive under his roof the great founder of the body to which he belonged; and the following characteristic glimpse is presented of the man who has exercised so vast a power over the religious destinies of England:—

“Upon arriving at Barnet, he drove to my father’s house, as that of the principal Methodist in the place. When the door of his carriage was opened, he came out arrayed in his canonicals. Childlike I ran to lay hold of him, but my father pulled me back; upon which, extending his hand, he exclaimed, ‘Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of heaven.’ I was struck with his accommodation of these words of our blessed Lord to the man himself, even though his limited application of them was perhaps proper enough; yet from not having been accustomed to such accommodation, the act appeared to me to border upon presumption. Even at that early age of seven years, my reverence for the Saviour greatly exceeded that for any mortal being of whom I had any conception. Soon afterwards, Mr Wesley preached at the chapel. Childlike I thought it the best sermon I had ever heard, merely for one circumstance, it was only a quarter of an hour long.

“I remember being particularly struck with the personal neatness of the preacher as he came out of his carriage. His coachman also attracted my notice, for he seemed to be his master’s *valet de chambre*, his clerk when necessary, and his deputy, to converse and even argue with people. I heard that on one occasion an individual, who was one of the class of captious questioners, addressed himself to Mr Wesley with an air of impertinent curiosity. The preacher had no time to spare, and furthermore felt it necessary to check annoyances of this kind for the future. He therefore gravely asked his questioner, ‘Can you read Greek?’ ‘No, sir, I cannot,’ was the reply.’ ‘O then,’ rejoined Mr Wesley, ‘my coachman will be able to satisfy you.’”

From the period which the best years of Dr Leifchild embraced, and from the prominent position which during these years he held in the religious world, as well as from the fact that his lot was cast for a time at Bristol, he necessarily came

in contact with such celebrities as Wilberforce, Robert Hall, Foster, Bunting, Chalmers, and others. Of all these, some personal reminiscences are contained in this volume, and add very much to its interest and value. We can never hear enough of such men, and our readers, we doubt not, will share in our own gratification on account of the additional information which is here communicated respecting them.

The young preacher had a curious encounter with Rowland Hill, which is described in a manner that does little honour to that laughter-loving divine. Without consulting Mr Leifchild, he had announced him to preach at Surrey Chapel on a Tuesday evening, when he himself had an engagement in the country. In a letter to Mr Wilson (through whom Leifchild had been placed in the academy at Hoxton), Mr Hill conveyed his desire that the young man should officiate for him; and spoke of the "formal stupid Presbyterians" of Kensington as people among whom it would be far from agreeable for him to settle. The Presbyterians probably enough deserved the epithets thus applied to them, but whether even *formality and stupidity* were not preferable to the buffoonery illustrated in the following passage, we leave the reader to judge:—

"On reaching Surrey Chapel," says Leifchild, "on the appointed evening, I found a large congregation assembled, including several of my fellow-students. Towards the close of my sermon the auditors, who had listened very attentively to it previously, displayed a disposition to risibility which confounded me. I expressed my regret if I had unintentionally said anything to excite a smile, and quoted the couplet of the poet Cowper—

'Tis pitiful to court a grin
When you should woo a soul.'

"Many were evidently ashamed, and there was a complete restoration of gravity for a short while, but the congregation was again moved to risibility. I was much perplexed to conceive its cause; but as they did not entirely recover their gravity I hastened on to a conclusion.

"The cause of this impropriety was immediately made known to me by some of my fellow-students. Rowland Hill having returned sooner than was expected, had quietly entered the organ-gallery behind the pulpit. Listening to me he performed several antics—at one time expressive of his assent, at another of his dissent from what I was saying. Many of the people observed him, for it was impossible to look at the preacher without seeing him, and hence their risibility.

"I was indignant at his unseemly conduct, and when he came into the vestry and asked me to become his curate at Wotton-under-Edge, in Gloucestershire, I told him I declined his offer, and was about to settle as minister at Kensington. 'That reminds me,' said he, 'of young men setting up in business before they have served their apprenticeship.'

"He then stated the qualities he desired in his curate, who was also to preach at Surrey Chapel during his vacation. He added that he had one already, but he was too much of a lady's preacher, and that he had no slap-dash about him; of which, said he, even you have not too much. But on perceiving my reluctance to entertain his overtures he abruptly wished me good night.

"He afterwards called upon me to request me in his absence to return an answer on his behalf to an expected vote of thanks for a donation which he had given to the British and Foreign Bible Society, at their next annual meeting. He came and sat in his carriage, and on my going out to speak to him, one of his horses began pawing the wet ground, and thereby splashed me provokingly. 'That,' said Mr Hill, 'is dirt which *will* wipe off; beware, sir, of dirt which won't.'

"He always appeared to me, when I was in his company, to be labouring to say something smart or funny, instead of joining in free conversation; and if his saying failed to excite laughter he was disappointed. Some of his observations in the pulpit were coarse and even offensive. I remember, in particular, a very coarse remark after a sermon he preached at Hayes, Middlesex (too coarse to be inserted). Yet his gentlemanly origin and education took off in some degree from the bad effect of this habit, and prevented him from descending to the low buffoonery of Matthew Wilks.

"I thank God I have lived to the day when such antics and ridiculous sayings are no longer tolerated in the pulpit. I remember when talking with Mr Jay about these things, and the odd texts which he himself sometimes took, that he remarked—'These things stick to people, while your smooth sentences run off the mind as water off marble.' I rejoined, 'But remember, sir, that dirt also will stick, and what an example you set of taking liberties with Scripture phraseology which others will not fail to plead in excuse on their own licence.' I instanced one of his perversions of a text which he thus announced before his sermon, 'Take it by the tail.' He admitted the force of my remonstrance, and promised to abstain from such oddities in future."

As a pendant to the above picture, we may give the following from the doctor's reminiscences of Scotland:—

"On one occasion he was perplexed as to the order of the service, and his own part in it, when, upon interrogating the only attendant in the vestry, he was informed that he must 'just do as their ain minister did.'

"'But how does he proceed?' was the inquiry.

"'Just as he has always done,' was the reply.

"'Explain to me,' again urged the anxious Englishman, 'what is the first thing your minister does when he enters the pulpit.'

"'He just sits down,' was the reply.

"'What next does he do?'

"'Well, he just craves a blessing to himself.'

"'What next?' inquired my father, who thought he *must* now have the desired information.

“‘Well, he just begins the service.’

“‘How? how?’ again urged the Englishman to which the only reply was—

“‘The little bell has done ringing.’ And now my father must needs enter the pulpit, uninformed as to the order of procedure.”

The mighty names of Hall and Foster now rise before us. Dr Leifchild tells us of Hall, that “hearing that Dr Chalmers was about to visit Bristol, and was coming to hear him, he sent word that unless he assured him he would not be present that morning he would not preach. He told me that he had once heard Dr Chalmers at Leicester, and was so electrified that he then determined that he would never preach before him. How afraid these great men are of one another!”

Our worthy doctor seems also to have shared somewhat in this terror of the famous Scotchman, but nevertheless had on one occasion to do his best in somewhat disadvantageous circumstances, while the great orator formed one of his hearers.

“On that particular Sunday morning,” we are told by his biographer, “my father rose very unwell, and was troubled with a severe headache. Unable to find a suitable substitute at so brief a warning, he rode down to his chapel thinking rather of a doctor of medicine than a doctor of divinity. On reaching his little vestry he began to prepare some medicine with which he had provided himself, and was sitting with aching head when in came the quaint old pew opener, and adjusting his spectacles and wig abruptly exclaimed, ‘Well, I do wonder what the people find to stare at, I see nothing wonderful in him. He’s much about such another man as yourself.’ ‘Who?’ inquired my father. ‘Why the great Dr Chalmers, to be sure,’ rejoined the official; ‘he is in Mr Hare’s pew, and all the people are staring at him.’ To beat a retreat was impossible, to ask Dr Chalmers to preach was too plainly useless, to preach himself was too plainly a necessity, and out walked the minister of the chapel from his vestry, heavy in head, and heavy at heart, along passages and round corners of pews, up the numerous stairs, and into his pulpit, to preach without manuscript or note; with nothing indeed before him by way of help, except the presence of the famous Dr Chalmers.”

In the course of the next week, Leifchild dined with his dreaded auditor, but the great Scotchman seems to have been, as he himself would have expressed it, somewhat “dowf” on the occasion. “Chalmers,” we are told, “did not then shine in conversation, or would not engross it. Others were afraid of him, and would not open their lips, except in submissive whispers. Hall and my father were there, and talked to each other, for lack of freedom with Chalmers. Altogether, it was a failure as ‘a feast of reason and a flow of wit;’ and as in so many similar instances, great men were gathered together by

a great effort, and finally separated, wondering at each other for saying so little."

Bristol was, in those days, a place of much note and many attractions. It ranked itself the second city in the empire; and in point of the talent which was gathered in and around it, it might, in several respects, have challenged comparison with even the metropolis itself. The following are some of the more striking *memorabilia* which Dr Leifchild preserved of its greatest luminary, during those favoured years:—

"The settlement of Mr Hall at Broadmead Chapel brought great *eclat* to the dissenting interest at Bristol. Strangers from all parts flocked to hear him on Sabbath mornings. I lost but one hearer, my own servant, whom I recommended to his church, as she had been benefited by his ministry. He was so pleased with this act on my part, that he said to me, 'Mr Leifchild, it shall be tit-for-tat; you have recommended your servant to attend my ministry,—I have recommended my own daughter to attend yours.' And this she did constantly, being then at a school where the young ladies frequented Bridge Street Chapel.

"I learnt from him that most of his great sermons were first worked out in thought, and inwardly elaborated in the very words in which they were delivered. Thus they were held so tenaciously in the memory, that he could repeat them *verbatim* at the distance of years. He ridiculed the delusion of those who supposed that the perorations of his sermons were delivered *impromptu*, observing that they were the most carefully studied parts of the whole discourse.

"We were present, together with several ministers, at the opening of Mr Hare's new chapel at Bedminster, on which occasion Dr Chalmers preached the morning sermon. In the course of it, he took occasion to commend ornamental building, and described most vividly the beauty of a landscape, with its village spire pointing to heaven. When we all dined together afterwards, Dr Chalmers was thanked for his 'admirable discourse,' to which Mr Hall expressed only a qualified assent. Some of us who were near him, pressed him to say what he really thought about the part on village spires, when he simply said, 'Apocryphal, Sir, Apocryphal.'

"The preacher of the evening not being a favourite with Mr Hall, he begged to be left to himself in the house. After a long service we returned, and I asked him if he did not feel weary of solitude? 'No, Sir,' he replied, 'I have been too well occupied; I have read the whole of Dr Watts' psalms and hymns—quite through, Sir—every one of them, Sir,—a thing I have never done before, nor ever thought of doing,—every one of them, Sir, I assure you.'

"He observed, respecting a sermon preached by a Baptist minister at Broadmead Chapel, on the discouraging signs, and then the encouraging ones, in the present condition of Christianity in this country, that it reminded him of a man driving two pigs to market, when one, every now and then, got behind the other, until the man,

whipping them up alternately, brought them both in together to market.

"A friend of my father's and of Mr Hall communicated the following observations to the former.

"These were his observations on three sermons which he and I heard many years ago :—

" 'Well, Mr Hall, what did you think of the first sermon, the morning one?' His reply was, 'Horrid, Sir, horrid; very much like death upon a mopstick.'

" 'But you surely don't think so of the second sermon?'

" 'Very tame, Sir, very tame indeed; very much like the chirping of a sparrow in Windsor Forest.'

" 'But what do you say of Mr Fuller's sermon, Sir?'

" 'Oh, he embowelled the text, and shewed us all that was in it.'

"During a journey to Clevedon, he observed :—'The first effort of the mind, when discerning new objects or persons, is to detect resemblances, the next, to find out differences.'

Much follows respecting Foster, the other great light of Bristol at the time, and who, in profundity of intellect, far surpassed Hall, as he probably did most of his contemporaries. We confess to finding a singular fascination in the character of this remarkable man. More than almost any biography we ever read, does his Life lay its grasp upon our attention, and rouse our curiosity. We long to know more of that powerful mind, which grapples with us in every page which he has left behind; and we eagerly welcome any scrap of additional information respecting a man who seems, to our fancy, to tower like some giant pine in its rugged grandeur, above the humbler, though more graceful, trees by its side, and who looks down from a lofty elevation even upon Hall, his great contemporary and friend. Willingly would we dilate on this subject, but have a wholesome dread of outrunning the sympathy of our readers. We may venture, however, on a few selections from the interesting details contained in these pages :—

"Next," we are told, "to his abhorrence of unnecessary publication, came his strong antipathy to public meetings held on behalf of the religious and benevolent societies of the day. He denounced the speeches as a species of public flattery, and as causing artificial excitement, all unworthy of the smallest pretensions to rationality and religion. He reprobated exciting meetings as 'a kind of dram-drinking;' and then he would add sarcastically, 'To be sure, you have taken from the people all their innocent recreations, and you must supply them with amusement of some kind.'

"His metaphors or similes, in the earlier periods of his preaching and writing, were perfect in their kind. His skill in constructing them may be traced to a habit of his mind in forming analogies from almost every object of sight or sense. At a later period, these ornaments of discourse were seldom introduced by him. He seemed

to be afraid of venturing upon one, lest it should not be perfectly correct. Mr Hall called this a retributive judgment upon Foster, for the severity with which he had criticised others in his reviews of their writings."

His notoriously morbid curiosity about the unseen world is almost *awfully* illustrated in the following passage:—

"Both of them (Hall and Foster) were believers in apparitions, and in stories founded upon them. Mr Foster's impatience of the limits of human knowledge respecting the other world, made him desirous to converse with some spiritual visitor, and of learning what such an one could disclose. When he was descending Snowdon, during a tour in North Wales, with his friend Mr Stokes of Worcester, he stopped and looked over down to a deep valley. When his friend came up with him, he was leaning forward with evident abstraction of mind. 'O sir,' exclaimed Foster, 'look down there; look down there, sir; there's a leap, sir—one leap, sir—a bold leap, and in one moment I should know the grand secret!' His friend was terrified at his wild look, and humbly entreated him to draw back from the edge of the precipice, which Foster did with reluctance."

So tempting have we found the society of those to whom this biography introduces us, that we have as yet said little about the subject of it—Dr Leifchild himself. In what remains of our space, we shall endeavour to set him as fully as possible before our readers in his own words. His one great and honourable claim to distinction is, that he was a most successful minister of the gospel. Both in his first charge at Kensington, and then successively in Bridge Street Chapel, Bristol, and in Craven Chapel, London, he attracted immense congregations, and kept them up from year to year. Thousands used to hear the word of life from his lips, Sabbath by Sabbath; and it must be interesting to all, and especially to clerical readers, to learn the means by which he contrived, during so lengthened a period, to wield so great pulpit power. He was not possessed of a powerful imagination like Chalmers, of a polished and classical style like Hall, or of striking originality of thought like Foster; yet he rivalled the most successful of these great preachers in the influence which he exerted in the pulpit. The Rev. J. Baldwin Brown, referring to the power of Dr Leifchild's preaching, thus expresses himself:—"I recall his thoughts and his words, and I try to discern the secret of the spells which, when I was young, his eloquence as a preacher cast upon me. It seemed to thrill through my nerves, and tingle in the very marrow of my bones. He kindled to a flame that desire for the work of the ministry with which my boyhood's thoughts had been haunted; and I ask myself where was the power? It was himself! It was the man, the very soul of manliness, the very soul of godliness projected into his

ministry. It was the spirit that emphasized every word, emanated in every look and gesture, and charged every sentence, when his soul was up, with its own intense vitality."

Like Whitefield and many other men celebrated in their day as popular and effective preachers, Dr Leifchild has left nothing which, apart from the man himself, and the living power which was felt in his delivery, will account for the impression which he produced. In order that the beauty of a flower may be appreciated, it must be looked at waving in the wind, or expanding in the sunshine, and not judged of by the appearance which it presents in the herbarium of the botanist. And so with the mere popular preacher. To understand and feel his power, he must be heard in the full flow and torrent of his eloquence. And however commonplace those passages from Dr Leifchild's sermons which his biographer has preserved may appear, we are assured that nothing could exceed the effect which they produced when delivered. His perorations, especially, were eminently powerful and impressive. The writer already quoted says respecting these, "I have heard him pour forth his warnings, and appeals, and denunciations, till the congregation sat as paralysed, till men held their breath, and women sobbed in the intensity of their excitement; and then, with one brief sentence which, in force and fire, surpassed them all, he would pause, and, amidst a breathless silence, with an emphatic nod, his acted Amen, sit down." With this testimony to his pulpit power, let us now present his own account of his method of preparing and delivering his sermons:—

"With regard to the manner of composing my sermons, I began, while among the Methodists, with carefully written discourses, which were committed to memory, and in which many imitations of Saun-
ders's impassioned language were employed with great effect. I continued the same plan at Hoxton; and, while there, preached with general acceptance, certainly much more frequently than any of the other students.

"When I accepted the invitation to Hornton Street Chapel, Kensington, I continued the same habits, and I found my memory, which was naturally very good, considerably improved by use. Then, however, I thought, after I had gone through my little stock, that I had exhausted all pulpit subjects, and that I should never hold out to the end of life. One sermon would then cost me two or three days to prepare and commit to memory. But subjects gradually multiplied, and composition became easier. My hearers also increased, and some were very intelligent. This had a good effect in making me attentive and studious. I had derived great advantage from Mr True's lectures on elocution at Hoxton, and am convinced that much impression in the pulpit is lost from want of proper instruction in that art.

"I have been fond of old divinity, and have made a collection,

during many years, of the best writers of the old school. Their quaintness, perhaps, infected my style; but it gave point, and, above all, many happy elucidations of Scripture, in which the old writers excelled, and which I have always found to interest and edify people. I have retained nearly the same views of divine truth as those with which I started, steering equally clear of high Calvinism and low Arminianism.

"At Bristol, and more especially at Craven Chapel, my perorations have been highly animated, and perhaps declamatory. I often found that they had been useful in awakening men's minds out of lethargy. Yet now, when nearly seventy years of age, I should be frightened, even if I could make such bold, vehement, and startling appeals.

"I never used notes of any kind, and never *read* a sermon in the pulpit but once, when the congregation were so annoyed at my lifelessness, that I gave up the practice for ever. Yet the fact of not reading deprived me of the use of the same sermons on such public occasions as anniversaries, openings of chapels, and ordinations of ministers, while I have seen other ministers easily availing themselves of their old stores.

"For many years I accustomed myself to begin my sermons in a low tone of voice, partly with a view of securing the attention of my hearers and a suppression of noise and coughing, and partly also to gather up my own thoughts, and to get the people in time into harmony with them. I reserved myself for the greatest use of my voice, and for the utmost animation, till the last. To embody this plan in a precept for remembrance, I thus quaintly expressed it :—

"Begin low,
Proceed slow;
Take fire,
Rise higher;
Be self-possessed
When most impress'd.

"I have found devotional poetry, much of which I had learnt in early life, to be very useful to me. It would often suggest itself to me in the pulpit by some remark I was then making, and would come forth spontaneously. If I failed in a word or a line, I could always make up the failure of memory from my own mind, when excited. Charles Wesley's hymns and poems were most frequently quoted by me, to which I added many pieces of blank verse from Milton, Young, and Cowper. Towards the close of my ministry I was more sparing in the use of poetry, as well as more even in my voice through the discourse.

"I have seldom had to complain of any want of attention on the part of my auditors, and I have often carried them along with me in bursts of feeling. I have invariably found that, if you preach to people in an expostulatory, persuasive, and pathetic manner, looking them in the face, and evincing no desire to be admired or wondered at, you will never fail to get a hold upon them. Ministers have only (with the help of God) to carry on the interest which a man

excites in company by an earnest discourse, to a higher style, and to a greater degree, in the most important subjects, to secure a similar or more marked attention.

"My preaching has been always textual. There is an individuality in Scripture passages which can be discerned and brought out by close attention, and by which attention I have been enabled to preserve considerable variety in an extended and regular ministry.

"I have always thought it advisable to make my introductions short, and my divisions simple. Of late years I have thought it best not to give out the divisions or heads of my sermons beforehand, as I once did, and as some ministers still do. Such announcements forestall curiosity, and sometimes make our hearers impatient when they begin to reflect how much has yet to come. I have also latterly shortened my sermons, as well as what is called 'the long prayer,' which, indeed, for many years I have made much briefer than ordinary, never allowing it to exceed ten or twelve minutes. I have also endeavoured to dispose striking thoughts in different parts of the sermon, in order to sustain the attention. I have not employed much illustration, though I have admitted pertinent anecdotes. What I strenuously laboured to avoid was *monotony*, that bane of all impression. The speaker's tone at the end of his sentences should be varied, and the pitch or key of his voice should be varied in different parts of his discourse. The less there is of gesticulation the better, in my opinion. Better than this is a direct look at the people, which secures their attention."

We have presented these gleanings from the memoir of this eminent Nonconformist minister, in the hope that they may prove both interesting and useful to not a few of our readers. Many other passages have been marked by us as worthy of being extracted, but we must refer such as desire fuller acquaintance with the man and his work to the volume itself. They will find in it much to enhance their estimate of the devotedness, prudence, energy, and usefulness of Dr Leifchild. With rare skill he steered his way through those difficulties that too often beset the ministers of such a democratic community as that to which he belonged. Without pandering to any one's prejudices, or resorting to any unworthy means of maintaining popularity, he preserved, through a long life, vast influence as a preacher, and was hardly ever vexed by any disturbances in his successive congregations. Few have been the lives of ministers which have proved such a long and eminent success. And few are the clerical biographies which are so well fitted as this one to awaken feelings of respect and admiration both towards pastor and people. In *his* faithful and fearless proclamation of the truths of the gospel, whether men were pleased with them or not, and in *their* cordial appreciation of these truths and heartfelt esteem for the man who so consistently and powerfully enforced them, there is a model presented to both ministers and congregations. In the address of one of

the deacons of the church, on the occasion of Dr Leifchild's resignation of the pastorate of Cravel Chapel, in May 1854, these words occur :—" He has been, in the strictest sense of the term, an evangelical preacher. Christ and his cross has been all his theme, and in him the prophecy of the evangelical prophet, as in a thousand other cases, blessed be God, has been fulfilled. Christ has been exalted ; Christ has been extolled ; Christ has been set high in every sermon he has preached. The deity of Christ and the sufficiency of his atonement resulting therefrom, the constant and prevalent intercession of Christ, justification by faith in his atoning blood, the new birth, the enlightening, renewing influences of God the Holy Ghost ; these cardinal points, I appeal to you, have never been omitted in any sermon he has preached within these walls down to the very last." And while testimony was thus borne—a testimony more valuable far than the *two thousand guineas* with which he was soon afterwards presented—to the fulness of that gospel which he had preached, Dr Leifchild could say for his part on that occasion :—" It has been a great satisfaction to me, on a grave and serious review of the subject of my ministry, in connection with the New Testament, as my knowledge of its contents increased, and my sphere of observation and experience enlarged, to find that I had nothing to retract, nothing but what I had to repeat again and again, with variety only in illustration and dress. The substantial and essential features, which never grow old with age, nor lose their vigour with time remain unaltered. To me it is a new gospel to this hour for its freshness and beauty ; and it brightens upon me more as I draw towards the close of my mortal journey. I have not served you, the people of my charge, as I wished to do ; but I can honestly say that I have done my best. I never once, through the whole of those three-and-twenty years, preached an unstudied sermon in that pulpit, though this has often cost me sleepless Saturday nights, and made me feel the ministry to be indeed ' the burden of the Lord.' "

This honoured servant of Christ fell placidly asleep at the close of the Sabbath, on the 29th of June 1862, and having been one of those who turn many to righteousness, he will, with that glorious company, shine as the stars for ever and ever.

XI. BIBLICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE.

There are many indications to be perceived, that the vehement attacks which have recently been made in our country on the Old Testament, will soon be transferred, with equal intensity, to the New. Bishop Colenso, though hitherto abstaining from any direct assault upon the Gospels, has warned his readers that this will come in due time. The promulgation of his sentence with respect to the authority of the New Testament is only deferred, until, as he imagines, he shall have conclusively settled that of the Old. And no intelligent mind can hesitate as to the result which he will reach in regard to the whole of the sacred Scriptures. The principles which he has adopted, and the hints which he has already thrown out, as to the degree of knowledge which he allows to our blessed Lord and his apostles, clearly indicate the conclusion which he is prepared to announce, when he comes to deal particularly with the New Testament.

Meanwhile, in this as in other matters, "coming events cast their shadows before." A Life of Christ has recently appeared at Paris, from the pen of M. Ernest Renan, which may convey to us some notion of the path about to be trod by infidels and rationalists at home. M. Renan is well known as an oriental scholar, and has acquired still greater notoriety from the extraordinary inaugural lecture which he delivered, as Professor of Hebrew, in the University of Paris. In that lecture, our divine Redeemer was referred to in terms which shocked all but the lowest type of Socinians and Humanitarians. He was represented as having been merely a man of the highest capacity and the purest character; and such is the view of Him which is presented, at greater length, in the same author's "*Vie de Jésus*," just published. This work, in point of audacity and impiety, seems quite worthy to stand side by side with Strauss's "*Leben Jesu*," which formerly excited so great a sensation. We shall probably require to notice it, and some kindred publications, at greater length afterwards, but our object, in the mean time, is to give our readers a general idea of the nature of the work. With this view, we quote the following passage from the *Athenæum*, a periodical which, we are sorry to observe, is no longer content with that negative character which it was wont to maintain in reference to divine revelation, but has of late been giving quite an active support to the rationalistic movement now in progress among us. Even it, however, as would appear from the following extract, is somewhat startled by the lengths to which M. Renan has gone in his recent work. After styling it "an *epoch-making book*," and declaring that "few men of culture, not to say theological critics, will fail to read it with admiration," it remarks:—

"Charmed, as we are, with the beauty of the language, and agreeing with many portions of the narrative, the prevailing impression on the mind is sad and sorrowful. The fine harmony of the periods conveys sentiments

that grate harshly on the soul, and leave a melancholy feeling behind. The wonderful Founder of Christianity is photographed by a critical analyst, who uses all the apparatus of modern science to bring out his inmost features, the very processes of his mind and heart, and has no scruple in substituting for the Evangelist's opinions, what he himself deems superior. He has traversed a most hazardous region without fear or hesitation. Though some parts of the way are safe and plain, we cannot accompany him generally.

"We may state the views of M. Renan on various important points.

"With regard to the four canonical gospels, he calls them *authentic*;—believes that they came from the first century, and that they belong, in a general way, to the authors whose names they bear. But he regards their historical value as very different. The discourses of Matthew merit unusual confidence, because they are the *logia*, the very notes taken under the influence of vivid remembrance. The true words of Jesus, he thinks, are easily discovered by the critic, because they reveal themselves, and vibrate to his touch, amid the chaos of unequal traditions. The narrative parts, grouped around this primitive germ in the first gospel, have not the same authority. They are interspersed with feeble legends, which originated in the piety of the second Christian generation. The gospel of Mark is much more compact and precise, less loaded with the fabulous of a later date. Of the three synoptical gospels, it has remained the most ancient and original. Mark's details have a clearness unknown to the other evangelists. He gives minute observations, coming, doubtless, from an eye-witness, who was probably Peter, as Papias thinks. The historical value of Luke's gospel is weaker, because it is a document at second hand. The narrative is more minute, the sayings of Jesus more artificial and precise. The author, writing out of Palestine, and after the destruction of Jerusalem, describes places with less accuracy, presents a false idea of the temple as an oratory, weakens the details by a sort of harmonising process, exaggerates marvels, and commits errors of chronology. He is totally unacquainted with Hebrew, and cites no words of Jesus in that language, though the latter spoke it habitually. He is, in fact, a compiler who has not seen the witnesses, but works upon texts, trying to make them agree. Probably this evangelist had before him the biographical collection of Mark and the *logia* of Matthew; but he takes many liberties with them, sometimes fusing two anecdotes or parables into one, and again, dividing one thing into two. He has not the impassiveness of Matthew and Mark. His own tendencies are apparent. A very rigid devotee, he holds that Jesus was a democrat and an Ebionite, that is, one opposed to the accumulation of property, and persuaded that the revenge of the poor will come. He is fond of narratives that bring into prominence the conversion of sinners and the exaltation of the humble, and modifies the old traditions to give them this sense. His early pages contain legends of the infancy of Jesus. In describing the last days of Jesus, he invents circumstances, and puts words into the mouth of Jesus, pervaded by the influence of legend, and borrowed from a more recent recital. Luke, in short, is less an evangelist, than a biographer of Jesus, a harmonist, a corrector, like Marcion or Tatian. Yet he belongs to the first century. The reading of his gospel has many charms, because he adds an element of skill and arrangement to the incomparable beauty of the common foundation. His admirable arrangement increases the effect of the likeness, without seriously destroying its truth. . . . M. Renan does not venture to say that the fourth gospel, as a whole, was written by a Galilean fisherman. Yet he believes that it did come, at the end of the first century, from the school of Asia Minor, which attached itself to John; and that it represents to us a version of the Master's life worthy of consideration, and often preferable to the other three."—*Athenæum*.

We simply remark at present on the above, that M. Renan clearly

bases his attack on the gospels generally, and on that of St Luke in particular, on the assumption that *Hebrew* was the language which was habitually spoken by our Lord and his disciples. This assumption, we need hardly remind our readers, has been met and overthrown by Mr Roberts in his work on the Gospels, which was noticed in our last number. We do not enter into the subject at present; but as it is manifest that the records of the life of Christ himself will soon become the battle-field on which the friends and foes of divine revelation will meet, we shall speedily have occasion to deal more particularly with the many important questions which must thus be suggested.

Stanley's "Lectures on the Jewish Church."

It is important to have an accurate conception of the position occupied at the present day, by such an influential writer as Canon Stanley. We gladly acknowledge the many eminent merits which belong to his works. His power of vivifying the past is almost unrivalled. But how little does mere scenic ability make up for the want or denial of evangelical truth! His "Sermons in the East," recently published, while abounding in beauties, shew how very negative is his theology. And his "Lectures on the Jewish Church" prove still more conclusively how far he has departed from the "old paths" of reverence for Scripture, and respect for doctrinal truth, and how close an approximation he has made to the school of Colenso and the Essayists. In the introduction to the work just named, he says :—

"Of course the main bulk of the authorities is to be found in the canonical books of the Hebrew Scriptures. It has been, at various times, supposed that the books of Moses, Joshua, and Samuel were all written, in their present form, by those whose names they bear. This notion, however, has been in former ages disputed, both by Jewish and Christian theologians, and is now rejected by almost all scholars. It has no foundation in the several books themselves, and is contradicted by the strong internal evidence of their contents. To determine accurately the authorship and the dates of these and the other sacred writings, is a question belonging to the same biblical criticism which has thus modified the opinion just mentioned; and to those who are called to enter into the details of such inquiries, I gladly leave the solution of this problem."

To this passage we append the following just remarks of a learned contemporary :—

"Whatever else the learned professor means by these sentences, he must mean that he does not receive the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch any more than he believes that Joshua and Samuel wrote the books which bear their names. We are sorry to find him mixing up together questions so different as the authorship of the books of Moses and of Samuel. We observe the same absence of minute discrimination in the manner in which he speaks of the books 'in their present form.' If this is literally what is intended, we have not much to say, because we happen to think it very probable that Moses did not write the account of his own death and burial; but, unfortunately, we suppose, we believe that Moses gave us the Pentateuch substantially as we have it. That he may have made use of existing materials we admit, as also that sundry explanatory clauses have been inserted since his

time ; but beyond this we dare not go, and do not wish to go. Right or wrong, we flatter ourselves that herein there are many scholars who agree with us. As it regards the books of Joshua and Samuel, the case is different, and the question is a much more open one. So much has of late been written in defence of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, that we wonder to hear Canon Stanley speak as he does. Equally do we wonder to hear him classing 'the other sacred writings' under the same category, and telling us it belongs to biblical criticism to determine their authorship as well as their date. To us it seems that the authorship of many of the books belongs to the domain of historical fact, and that criticism is no more in a position to decide it, or required to decide it, than to determine whether Canon Stanley wrote these *Lectures on the Jewish Church* ; or that Livy and Tacitus, Thucydides and Herodotus, wrote the books which bear their names. There is, of course, certain internal evidence which bears upon the asserted age and country of a book, and by which traditional and historical testimony is estimated. Where all these agree, no question is raised. But, after all, the evidence upon which we receive the authorship of many of the sacred books is mainly, and perhaps exclusively, historical or traditional."—*Journal of Sacred Literature*.

Colenso on the Authorship of the Pentateuch.

As most of our readers will be aware, the redoubtable Bishop of Natal has, in his second volume, fixed upon Samuel as the author of great part of the books of Moses. It is difficult to say whether the hardihood or the baselessness of this hypothesis be the more astounding. The idea which it involves offers a gratuitous insult to one of the most honoured of the Old Testament saints, and is but a monstrous birth of Dr Colenso's too fruitful brain. In the last number of the *British Quarterly Review*, the groundlessness and audacity of the hypothesis are well exposed. We quote a passage from the article entitled, "Bible Criticism—Reformers and Destructives," a title not particularly happy, since the only works referred to are those of Colenso, Davidson, Stanley, and Maurice, and it would be difficult to say to whom of these the honourable name of *Reformer* could be given :—

"It may be true that in the days of Samuel we, for the first time, find men's names formed from the divine name Jehovah ; it may be further true that the name Elohim was most used by David in his earlier, and Jehovah in his later psalms ; and yet we have not advanced a single step towards proving that we are indebted to Samuel for the latter name, or that he wrote the Elohist portions of the Pentateuch." Whatever the confidence Dr Colenso may profess, he must be aware that, even accepting all his own notions, the selection of Samuel as the Elohist is a mere conjecture, unsupported by anything which bears the most distant resemblance to proof. It may be true that he finds certain phenomena which harmonize with the hypothesis ; but no sound reasoner would attach the slightest validity to an argument of this character. We require something more than facts that can be reconciled with or explained by it ; we want some evidence that establishes its truth. He would, in fact, have been just as much warranted in ascribing the work to Abner, or Uriah of Gath, or Zadok, or any other of their contemporaries, as to Samuel.

"The theory adds another to the legion of hypotheses to which the interchange of the names Elohim and Jehovah has given rise. Considering the number who have essayed to deal with this subject, and how successful each new critic has been to overthrow the system of everybody else, and how completely he has failed in laying a better foundation for his own, we marvel

that it has not occurred to the bishop, and others of his school, that they are attaching too much importance to the phenomena, and unduly magnifying a difficulty which would easily be explained had we more perfect information. At least, after the failure of so many, a tone of greater modesty would have been more becoming a new adventurer in a field already covered with the wrecks of theories that at first appeared as promising as his own. It may or may not be true, that no explanation that has hitherto been proposed by the advocates of the unity of the Pentateuch is sufficient to account for all the facts of the case, and especially that no interpretation of the divine declaration to Moses in the burning bush affords a perfectly satisfactory mode of reconciling it with the previous appearance of the name in the sacred narrative; but assuredly there are as many difficulties in the way of those who find the solution in the existence of separate documents. If any one would learn how serious are the obstacles to the acceptance of this idea, let him carefully study the curious table which Dr Davidson has prepared, with the view of separating the Pentateuch into its component parts. Both of the names are continually occurring in the very place where, according to the notion of these critics, they ought not to be; and all sorts of devices are called into requisition to get rid of phenomena so inconvenient and perplexing, the most amusing being a '*Deus ex Machina*,' in the shape of a redactor who is prepared for every emergency, interpolating a verse here, and a clause there, and occasionally altering the divine name with no apparent purpose, unless it be to baffle the clever detectives who are now seeking to discover the truth. If, after reviewing this table, the inquirer is not yet convinced as to the illusiveness of these speculations, we advise him next to collate the different theories as to age and authorship which German theologians and their English disciples have invented; and we doubt not he will hesitate before he yields himself up to such guidance. The bishop, however, is very angry with those who make 'the difference of sincere and earnest searchers after truth' the subject of 'idle banterings,' and is especially indignant with Mr Rose, who, after alluding to the way in which 'each book of the Pentateuch, and the whole work itself, is hunted up and down the four centuries between the time of David and the captivity,' very naturally says, 'the only conclusion left for the mind is, to wonder whether it was ever written at all.' But what, we ask, are we to do? We are told that we are not Hebrew scholars; indeed, so far as we can see, our adherence to the old views would be accepted as an infallible proof of our deficient learning; we have therefore no right to judge the erudite Germans; nay, Dr Davidson informs us that we have much to do before we can appreciate the *results* of their criticism; that their *processes* we can never hope to understand. If, in this deplorable state of ignorance and intellectual feebleness, we can perceive that our teachers contradict each other, and sometimes themselves, it is not to be wondered at that we point out such discrepancies, in the hope that we may get further information. It is scarcely too much to ask that they should agree among themselves before they require implicit faith from us."—*British Quarterly Review*.

The Edinburgh Review on "The Antiquity of Man."

In an article on Sir Charles Lyell's work in the last number of the *Edinburgh*, the following remarks occur as to geology and Scripture:—

"Natural curiosity is justly excited by the attempt to determine, from the records of physical change alone, the probable chronology of man; and, although the words 'Moses,' or 'the Bible,' never once occur in Sir C. Lyell's book, no reader can fail to see that the credit of both is held by the author to be in some measure at stake in this inquiry. It is thus by implication connected with subjects now agitating the public mind, though very wide of

purely scientific debates. The consciousness of a prevailing current of thought on this subject, never exactly rising to the surface, leaves the reader with that uncomfortable amount of scepticism which loosens one set of ideas without giving a firm hold to any by which they can be replaced. We do not think that many intelligent biblical students will be much disturbed by a very liberal modification of the received chronologies of the remoter portion of Old Testament history ; but wide and infirm as may be the stepping-stones by which future historians may have to intercalate the epochs of the patriarchal times, as narrated in the book of Genesis, we must confess that we cannot detect, in the pages of Sir C. Lyell, any traces of a more stable and connected physical chronology. Most sensible men have for forty or fifty years been urging that the two records—the biblical and the geological—should not be prematurely contrasted, and we cannot but think that the time when this may safely or wisely be done seems really as far distant as ever.

“ We have just said that this under-current of thought affecting the Mosaic narrative, gives to the discussion of the antiquity of man a piquancy of interest at the present moment, not, perhaps, favourable to its impartial discussion. We can hardly doubt that the only approximate solution likely to be attained for a very long period, *if ever*, will be of the nature of a compromise ; that the biblicists will have to expand the chronology of Usher by some thousands of years, whilst the Lyellians (or Huttonians) will be compelled to restrict their demands on past time in a still greater proportion.”—*Edinburgh Review, July*.

XII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua Critically Examined. By the Right Rev. JOHN WILLIAM COLENSO, D.D., Bishop of Natal. Part III. London, 1863.

In spite of his numberless assailants—in spite of convocations and episcopal inhibitions—in spite of the shrieks of horror and dismay arising from the clergy and laity of his Church—the Bishop of Natal seems determined to keep possession of the field and of his bishopric, and to march in the same rampant style of criticism through all the books of the Bible. Like the elephant of his adopted country, hard in hide and heavy of foot, he goes on trampling down all that men hold precious in the sacred enclosure, heedless of the cries and blows that assail him on every side ; and truly, on glancing over his volume, it is pitiful to see the havoc which he is committing in his reckless career. while, in a very different sense from that of the poet, it may be said that—

“ Many a holy text around is strowed.”

The present Part, which deals with Deuteronomy, is to the full as shameless and as childish as its predecessors. It would be utterly vain to attempt anything like a review of such a work, or to follow the author in his multifarious endeavours to damage, invalidate, or pervert the inspired records. But to this Part the bishop has prefixed a lengthy preface, partly in reply to his objectors and partly in vindication of his retaining his position in the Church in opposition to his episcopal brethren. In general, it may be remarked that these rejoinders are distinguished by the same extraordinary style of cool assurance which marks his previous productions. In reply to the very natural charges of his brethren, he declares that he “ has nowhere denied the inspiration of the Bible.” He has done nothing more, it seems,

than proved it to be full of historical untruths and fabulous legends ! Again, he "denies that he wishes to prove the Pentateuch to be untrue." He merely holds that it contains a great many untruths ! Suffice it to add, that after a good deal of fencing, during which he insinuates that some of his brother bishops are no less heretical, though somewhat less honest than himself, he takes refuge ultimately in the Court of Arches, under the gown of Dr Lushington.

We deem it quite needless to enter on the controversy. Hundreds are rushing to the rescue. Our table is covered with replies, which we have hardly space or time to enumerate. Among these we might notice "Moses, or the Zulu ; a Detailed Reply to the Objections contained in Parts I. and II. of Bishop Colenso's Work," by the Rev. W. Wickes, a sensible and satisfactory performance, well worthy of perusal ; and, for such as have too little leisure for detailed answers, we recommend "The Incredibilities of the Bishop of Natal's Work," by John Collyer Knight, of the British Museum, which may shew them quite enough of the bishop to desire any further acquaintance with him.

In regard to this Third Part, it may serve to satisfy the curiosity of our readers to observe that its object is to shew that Deuteronomy could not have been written by Moses, that it must have been written after the days of Solomon, and most probably by Jeremiah the prophet. With this view he adduces a multitude of passages, shewing its diversity of style from that of the preceding books, apparent anachronisms, &c. That the latter part of this book could not have been written by Moses is of course undeniable, as it records his death ; and that there are difficulties in regard to the precise time and composition of the book is freely granted—difficulties over which hundreds of candid and clear-eyed critics have bent in reverent study, and which they have been more or less successful in solving—difficulties, however, which in a great measure cease to perplex when the *different character* of the book is kept in view, it being written, not in the style of narrative, as the other books, but in that of legislation, a record of the sayings rather than the doings of Moses, bearing a manifest reference, not to the past or the present, but to the future of Israel, when they were to be settled in their own land, speaking no longer of "Aaron and his sons," and of Moses, then living, but of "the sons of Levi and the judges which shall be in those days," and exhibiting throughout such manifold evidences of genuineness as, in a court of justice, would satisfy any impartial jury of its honesty and integrity as a book, if not immediately penned by the hand of Moses, yet so well authenticated as a record of his sayings, that it must be held now, as it was ever held by his countrymen, to be one of the books of Moses. But let it suffice to say, that among all the apparent incredibilities which Dr Colenso has conjured up as to the authorship of the book, there is none so utterly incredible as his own hypothesis. What will our readers think when we inform them that this so-called Christian bishop supposes, that this book was composed privately by Jeremiah, for the purpose of effecting a reformation in the Jewish Church ; that with the connivance of the high priest, this piece of forgery in the name of the Lord, was conveyed *furtively* into the temple in the time of Josiah ; that the priests pretended that they had "found the book of the law in the house of the Lord" (as recorded in 2 Kings xxii. 8) ; and that Huldah, the prophetess, who was in the secret, predicted that all the woes in this book, which they brought and read to the king, would come upon the nation unless they repented ! And to crown the whole, under the pretext of justifying the prophet Jeremiah for his share in this disgraceful trick, involving the three-fold crime of forgery, falsehood, and blasphemy, Dr Colenso actually pleads that Jeremiah acted under the impulse of what he deemed inspiration, and conceived that he had the divine command for acting as he did, having a good end in view ; in other words, that inspiration, according to the Jewish notion of it, authorised the fabrication of a book full of falsehoods and con-

traditions as the word of God, the imposition of this document upon the king as an ancient record, containing the laws of the Almighty, and finally, the sanctioning of the whole piece of clap-trap with a pretended prophecy in the name of the Lord God of Israel. Anything more monstrous than this never, we believe, entered the brain of the most credulous enthusiast.

Indeed, taking into view all the circumstances of the case, the impression produced on our minds is, that the Right Rev. Bishop of Natal must be labouring under some mental hallucination. In no other way can we account for the *bizarre* position into which he has thrown himself, for the incongruous spectacle of a Christian bishop writing down the authority of the book on which his Church and bishopric are professedly founded, and thus sawing away the branch on which he is seated. In no other way can we explain the stolid pertinacity with which he repeats statements for which it has been proved over and over again there is no visible foundation. But, on the theory which we have hinted at, the whole mystery is cleared up. We can even, upon this charitable supposition, account for what otherwise seems very surprising, viz., that no law of the land or canon of the church can be found applicable to such a case. Our indignation merges into pity; and we can only exclaim, as his companions used to do at Oxford, when speaking of him at that early period of his life, "Poor Colenso!"

The Gospel of the Pentateuch. A set of Parish Sermons. By the Rev. C. KINGSLEY, F.L.S., F.G.S., &c.. With a Preface. Published by request. London: Parker, Son, & Bourn. 1863.

Here, at last, surely we have a new thing under the sun. Kingsley *versus* Colenso! The author of Alton Locke, the Coryphæus of the Broad School, become a defender of the faith! True it is and of verity. We have no idea that Mr Kingsley has come over to the side of evangelism; for aught we know, he may still be clinging to his old theosophies and humanities; but, overlooking his antecedents, for the sake of the truth which he holds, and for the sake of his admirers who hold by him, we welcome him as a fellow-worker; and we must say that, in the heat of the life-battle for the ark of the covenant, we are right glad, through the dust, and din, and smoke, to discern the honest face and grasp the warm hand of Charles Kingsley.

In the preface, addressed to the Rev. Canon Stanley, the author expresses in very strong terms his obligations to the Canon for his lectures on the Jewish Church, "which inspired me (he says) with fresh energy, in preaching to my people the gospel of the Old Testament as the same with that of the New." And referring to Bishop Colenso, though not mentioning his name, he says:—"I found that book, if not always read, yet still talked and thought of on every side among persons whom I should have fancied careless of its subject, and even ignorant of its existence, but to whom I was personally bound to give some answer as to the book and its worth. It was making many unsettled and unhappy; it was (even worse) pandering to the cynicism and frivolity of many already too cynical and frivolous; and much as I shrink from descending into the arena of religious controversy, I felt bound to say a few plain words to my own parishioners."

What can be better than the following:—"There is, without doubt, something in the Old Testament as well as in the New, quite different in kind, as well as in degree, from the sacred books of any other people; an unique element, which has had a unique effect upon the human heart, life, and civilisation. This remains after all possible deductions for 'ignorance of physical science,' 'errors in numbers and chronology,' 'interpolations,' 'mistakes of transcribers,' and so forth, whereof we have read of late a great deal too much, and ought to care for them, and for their existence or non-existence, simply nothing at all; because granting them all—though the

greater part of them I do not grant, as far as I can trust my critical faculty—there remains that unique element, beside which all these accidents are but as the spots on the sun, compared to the great glory of his life-giving light. The unique element is there; and I cannot but still believe, after much thought, that it—the powerful and working element, the inspired and divine element, which has converted and still converts millions of souls—is just that which Christendom in all ages has held it to be, the account of certain ‘noble acts’ of God’s, and not of certain noble thoughts of man; in a word, not merely the moral but the historic element; and that, therefore, the value of the Bible teaching depends on the truth of the Bible story. That is my belief. Any criticism that tries to rob me of that, I shall look at fairly but very severely indeed.”

And very “fairly, very severely indeed” does Mr Kingsley deal with this sort of criticism in these Parish Sermons. He shews no quarter to that licence, “anything but rational and reverent,” with which some would treat the Scriptures. Such critics are kicked and cuffed off the ground in a slap-dash style of mingled disdain and indignation; after which the castigating, turning with a smile of triumph to his hearers, points out the grand lessons of inspired history. He may not always have pitched upon the right lessons; but so far as he goes, we cannot help admiring the manly frankness with which he delivers his message.

“Yes, my friends, the Bible is the revelation of a God who condescends to men, and therefore descends to men. And the more a man’s reason is spiritually enlightened to know the meaning of goodness, and holiness, and justice, and love, the more simple, reasonable, and credible will it seem to him that God at first taught men in the days of their early ignorance, by the only method which (as far as we can conceive) he could have taught them about himself, namely, by appearing in visible shape, or speaking with audible voice; and just as reasonable and credible, awful and unfathomable mystery though it is, will be the greater news, that that same Lord at last so condescended to man, that he was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead, and buried, and rose the third day, and ascended into heaven. Credible and reasonable, not indeed to the carnal man, who looks only at nature, which he can see and hear and handle; but credible and reasonable enough to the spiritual man, whose mind has been enlightened by the Spirit of God, to see that the things which are seen are temporal, but the things that are not seen are eternal; even justice and love, mercy and condescension, the divine order, and the kingdom of the living God.”

Ulrich Von Hutten, Imperial Poet and Orator; the great Knightly Reformer of the 16th century. Translated from Chauffour-Kestner’s *Études sur les Réformateurs du 16me Siècle.* By ARCHIBALD YOUNG, Esq., advocate. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1863.

Ulrich Von Hutten is one of those characters known only by name to the generality of readers, and yet few men did more in his day to merit a niche in the temple of fame. Whether viewed as a soldier, as a reformer, or as a man of letters, his life is worthy of being studied by all who value the cause of the Reformation, to which he so largely contributed, or the cause of learning, of which he was in his time a singular ornament, and to which he gave no inconsiderable impulse. At twenty-eight, he had written the *Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum*, the national satire of Germany, which, according to the celebrated Herder, effected for Germany incomparably more than Hudibras for England, or Gargantua for France, or the Knight of La Mancha for Spain. His works amount to about fifty separate publications in prose and verse, many of which deeply stirred the German mind. But Hutten did not confine himself to the pen; he made good use of his sword

in the cause of civil and religious liberty. He died at the early age of thirty-five; and yet scarcely any life of the sixteenth century presents so many features of dramatic interest.

"His early flight from the Abbey of Tulda," says the translator of the work before us, "his travels as a poor scholar and student through Germany and the neighbouring countries—now the guest of a peasant or burgher, now of a powerful noble or wealthy bishop, whose hospitality he repaid by his verse, and the charms of his conversation; his perils from shipwreck and robbers; . . . his combat, single-handed, with five Frenchmen, who had insulted Kaiser Maximilian and the fatherland; his coronation as imperial poet and orator, by the emperor's own hand; his brilliant services at the head of that noble army of scholars, the friends of Reuchlin, who emancipated the human mind from the bondage of the old scholastic teaching; his terrible assaults upon the vices and corruptions of Rome; his friendship with Sickingen, and their evenings in the strong castle of Wernberg, passed in reading the writings of Luther, till the strong hand of the Bayard of Germany grasped to his war-sword, and he exclaimed, It is the cause of God and of truth!—last scene of all, the defeat and death of Sickingen, the proscription of Hutten, and his early death on the little island of Uffnau; where is the romance that possesses stronger or more varied elements of dramatic interest than this true story of one of the countless champions and martyrs of freedom?"

Some curious facts are brought out in this volume in regard to Hutten's masterpiece, the *Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum*. These were letters supposed to be written chiefly by monks and theologians, in the bad Latin which at that time was the usual language of the cloister, and abounding in the uncouth phraseology and vulgarism of the later scholastics. "They unveil with a simplicity full of tact and cleverness, the secret history of the mendicant orders, their vices, their hatred of all serious instruction, their ignorance, their plots against Reuchlin and the Humanists." The satire, of course, was apparent to all men of sense, and to the German monks against whom it was mainly directed, and who, cut to the quick, begged from the pope a bull for the burning of the book and its authors, when they should be discovered. Erasmus, though he deemed it prudent to disclaim it, declaring that he hated all "personalities," yet enjoyed the joke so heartily, that he is said to have been cured of an imposthume in his face by the laughter produced on reading the book. But so delicate was the wit, so natural the caricature, that some monks actually purchased a number of copies for presentation, under the belief that it was written in praise of their order, and in England the letters were republished as a serious work! Sir W. Hamilton has noticed that even Steele, in the *Tatler*, ridicules the absurdity of men making such *fools of themselves* as to write in such an incoherent style, "without the least taste of knowledge or good sense!"

It is certainly remarkable that there is no life of such a man as Hutten in the English language. Mr Young has attempted to supply this want by translating M. Chaffour-Kestner's life, in his *Studies of the Reformers of the sixteenth century*. There can be but one opinion as to the scholarly ease and elegance of the translation; and considering Mr Young's obvious familiarity with the whole subject, the reader may perhaps regret that, instead of a translation, he did not favour the public with a sketch of his own. But in the volume thus produced, the life and character of Hutten are described with graphic power, and he is made in a great measure to speak for himself. We cordially recommend the work to all the lovers of history, and the friends of liberty, learning, and the Reformation.

Songs of the Covenant Times. By an Ayrshire Minister. London : Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.

The "Covenant Times" were singled out by Wordsworth as the most distinctive period of Scottish history, "whose echo rings in Scotland to this hour." The handsome volume on our table fully brings out the features of that unforgettable era. The blank verse poem, of which Peden is the hero, "The Hill Preacher," strikes a keynote, to which all the rest of the volume answers. The stern but earnest and deep-toned religion, the domestic affections, the hallowed and enlightened patriotism, the local colouring of scenery and names, all mark out the Ayrshire, "The Westland Whigs" of the later Stuart time. We would single out as specially worthy of praise and (did limit admit) of quotation, "The Widow's Son," and "A Conventicle in Snow Time." A historical introduction, and numerous notes, complete the usefulness and interest of the work. We hope soon again to meet the accomplished author of "Songs of the Covenant Times."

Footprints of the Holy Dead. Translations from the German. By A. M. London : W. Mackintosh.

With the exception of one brief piece from Lope de Vega, this pretty volume is entirely made up of versions from German sacred poetry. The introduction explains the nature of the selection ; but we could have desired a more carefully executed and distinctive appreciation of the characteristics of German hymnology. Having compared with the original a considerable number of these versions, we can bear testimony to their general fidelity. Altogether, we can recommend the volume before us to those desirous to make acquaintance with German sacred song. As the author, by the version above alluded to, appears acquainted with Spanish, we should recommend him, in another edition, to give a few specimens from the sacred pieces of Calderon, Quevedo, and the Spanish Mystical school.

The Principles of Christian Union laid down in the Word of God. By the Rev. WILLIAM WHITE, Haddington, Author of "Lectures on the Book of Daniel," &c. &c. Edinburgh : W. P. Kennedy. 1863.

This valuable and seasonable work has come into our hands when we are just going to press, and when we have only space to notice its appearance. The subject of which it treats will ere long occupy our serious attention ; and when we take it up, there can be no doubt that Mr White's work will be brought more fully before our readers. We have only room to say that here the basis of *all* Christian union is laid down ; and that, before judging of the expediency of the particular Union to which it points,—that, namely, between the Free and the United Presbyterian Churches,—the principles here so ably illustrated must be duly pondered and carefully kept in view.

The Editor of the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review* begs to acknowledge the receipt of the following among other works sent to him for review, which may sooner or later be noticed :—

Memoir of the Rev. James Sherman. By H. Allon.

Lectures on Theology, Science, and Revelation. By Dr Legge.

Warburton Lectures on Fulfilled Prophecy. By the Very Rev. Dr Goode.

The Life of our Lord upon the Earth. By the Rev. Samuel J. Andrews.

The Divine Mystery of Peace. By the Rev. James Baldwin Brown.

Madagascar : Its Social and Religious Progress. By Mrs Ellis.

Lectures on the Revelation of St John. By Dr Charles John Vaughan.

The Book of Psalms. By the Rev. John Noble Coleman.

Holy Women of Old. By Maryanne Parrott.

Poemata Melica. By Kennett Lea.



